Changing narratives? Shifting discursive conceptualisations of post-conflict peace-building

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CHANGING NARRATIVES?
SHIFTING DISCURSIVE CONCEPTUALISATIONS
OF POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

Elisa Randazzo
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
30th March 2015
This thesis assesses the rationale behind the shifts, ruptures and paradigm changes within the scholarship on peace-building. In particular, the thesis is concerned with examining if, and how, these shifts have significantly altered the manner in which the foundational elements of thinking about peace-building have changed beyond the ‘liberal peace-building’ paradigm. To do so, the thesis engages with the logic of critique that has led to the emergence of different theoretical approaches to peace-building that culminate with the ‘local turn’. The thesis begins by tracing an initial shift towards more invasive forms of peace-building in the late 1990s-early 2000s, before engaging with the emergence of the local turn. The research focuses on the case of Kosovo in order to understand how a lessons-learnt approach facilitated the shift towards more invasive and intrusive forms of peace-building, which can be understood less as a deep reconceptualisation of the manner of conducting peace-building operations and more as a refinement of methods of socio-political engineering from the outside. Furthermore, the case of Kosovo is also central to the local turn, as the rise of local ownership discourses is fundamentally tied to the critiques of the extensive international mission in the territory, and of its by-products, particularly resistance and marginalisation of local agency. Along with an assessment of the theoretical underpinnings of the shift towards post-liberal, relational and non-linear approaches to bottom-up peace-building, the thesis examines the implications of the framing of the ‘everyday’ in order to assess the extent to which these bottom-up approaches have been able to by-pass the problems attributed to the liberal peace approach. By looking at its normative project of change, the thesis argues that despite its critical and radical intentions the local turn retains certain foundational epistemological and ontological elements of modernist and positivist approaches that have so far characterised the very mainstream approaches these critiques claim to transcend.
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Statement of Authorship

I hereby confirm that this thesis is the product of my own work. All sources used are referenced.

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Elisa Randazzo, 30\textsuperscript{th} March 2015
Introduction
Researching the Emergence of the Local Turn:
A Genealogy of Bottom-up Peace-Building in the Age
of Non-Linearity

1. Research Agenda, Aims and Focus

‘Peace-building’ is one of the most recognisable tropes in the vocabulary of contemporary international relations. Its relevance extends to various different fields, including political theory, sociology, human geography, and philosophy. In its practice, it constitutes one of the most emblematic endeavours of our times, embodying the 20th century humanist call for halting widespread intra-state violence. In its conceptualisation it follows an analytical imperative to understand the basic mechanisms of political and social interactions that often express themselves in the form of violent confrontation. Peace-building remains a fundamentally contested subject, and not merely at the academic level, as international and policy circles continue to explain and re-frame the nature and scope of peace-building endeavours through important documents such as Agenda for Peace of 1992 and the Brahimi Report of 2000.1 Its wide reach has compelled extensive academic research into its nature and its application, which has contributed to a large body of work that includes seminal work on democratisation, consensus-building, institutionalisation, peace-making and peace-keeping. As building peace is not just a matter of theoretical explanatory importance but also a matter that deeply affects the manner in which societies are run, the plethora of material comprising the literature on peace-building and ‘peace-thinking’ has given rise to one of the most lively debates in international relations, rife with conceptual fuzziness and continuous contestation.

The research behind this thesis is motivated by the ambiguity that besieges the subject of peace-building. The history of contemporary peace-building, since the inception of the trope in the early 1990s, is characterised by

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changes, shifts and lessons-learnt, as well as juxtapositions, paradoxes and loud critiques. The loudest of these is perhaps the most recent ‘post-liberal’ strand of critique, seeking to highlight the pitfalls inherent in the way peace-building has been conceptualised and practised thus far. Yet, surprisingly, despite the constant state of contestation that surrounds this field and despite the lack of clear definitions, discourses of peace-building have been characterised by the rise and consolidation of certain narratives as the orthodoxy on the subject. The development of both the theory and the practice of peace-building since the early 1990s seems to rely prevalently on one singular narrative track, characterised by progressivist accounts of history and development. It is precisely this orthodoxy that the latest trend in peace-building’s conceptualisation has addressed critically.

In the early stages of my research into the literature on peace-building since the early 1990s, it appeared clear that a reliance on lessons-learnt lay at the heart of much of the evolution of the subject. The need to adapt, to evolve and to change the manner in which we think about, or practice, peace-building is admittedly recognised in most of the literature, with the scholarship of the mid-1990s, for instance, advocating a shift from liberalisation to institutionalisation to respond to growing concerns over the outcome of some of the most notable peace-building endeavours initiated in the early 1990s. Similarly, the later shift from institutionalisation and state-building towards local ownership of the mid-to-late 2000s seemed to reflect a concern with the outcomes and by-products of previous attempts to build (or re-build) the conditions for peace from the top-down. These shifts and ruptures with the past, largely reflected the assumption that peace-building could bear substantially different outcomes if it were conceptualised so as to adapt to the growing complexity of post-conflict circumstances in order to alter, re-think and re-formulate the means, methods and technical aspects of approaching these contexts at various different levels. This logic of conceptual evolution is the subject of my research, as I seek to

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2 For a comprehensive overview of the argument suggesting the need to move away from hasty liberalisations see Chesterman (2004) and Paris (2004).

3 See seminal works on the shift towards local ownership by Richmond (2009a), Mac Ginty (2008), and Boege et al. (2009).
investigate the conditions within which these re-conceptualisations took place and to understand their implications.

The principal aim of this research is to undertake a critical enquiry into the field of peace-building in order to interrogate the very shifts, ruptures and changes that have concurred in the emergence and alteration of the narratives of peace-building. This is primarily done by focusing on the content of the shift towards the ‘local’, as this shift directly seeks to challenge the orthodoxy and hegemonic position of what it identifies as the mainstream liberal paradigm. At this point, it is important to point out that, with this thesis, I do not seek to establish the feasibility of the liberal peace project nor necessarily to add to the existing critique that mainly associates peace-building with the liberal project. In fact, my thesis seeks to avoid the trap of dichotomous and limited pro/contra debates around ‘liberal’ peace-building. Indeed, critiquing the liberal peace is not the aim of this thesis.

Because my research ultimately shifted its focus away from a debate on the feasibility of liberal peace-building, it became necessary to alter the manner in which field work was approached and utilised in the analytical phase. In the initial stages of my research, fieldwork interviews in Kosovo were designed to assess the international community’s awareness of the difficulties encountered in the state-building mission thus far. It soon became clear that the multi-lateral nature of the mission produced widely dissonant perceptions of responsibility and accountability for the current status of the mission as a whole, as for the development of the mission throughout its existence. At that point, I began to question the international actors’ views on local ownership, expecting, to a large extent, to witness the usual paternalistic tendency to dominate that is typically identified, in the literature, as a characteristic of foreign peace-building and state-building missions (see, for instance, Richmond, 2008). Instead, I encountered wide support for the principle of local ownership, reflected in a particular vision of the mission as evolving and becoming more complex. This logic framed the rhetoric of local ownership as a necessary upgrade, to fundamentally change both the means and methods employed in the mission, but also to address the mind-set of intervening actors, international institutions and local agents,
regarding both the feasibility of the liberal project of democratic reconstruction, as well as the role that local agents should take. Interviewing local actors, belonging to NGOs, political opposition parties such as Vetevendosje, as well as governmental agencies such as the Ministry for European integration, opinions on the work of international actors vis-à-vis local ownership were also surprisingly not as widely negative or accusatory as initially expected (see chapter 5 for details of the interviews undertaken).

As my theoretical framework changed throughout the research, I was lead to re-frame the significance of the field work in Kosovo in two ways. Firstly, as it concerned the historical narrative of evolution evidently supported by most actors on the ground, figuring Kosovo as an ever evolving work in progress, and peace-building as a necessarily ever shifting conceptual and practical field. I was also struck by the manner in which the fieldwork research and the theoretical research demonstrated a kinship between the rhetoric of local ownership utilised by practitioners of peace-building and that upheld by the scholars of the local turn, in particular as these two are mostly supposed to be on the opposite sides of the conceptual spectrum. I was then pushed to probe this further, particularly because this commonality is often dismissed, in recent post-liberal scholarship, as a mere rhetorical instrument to allow further interventionism.\(^4\) In relation to this, the interviews, particularly those coming from local actors in Kosovo (e.g. Albin Kurti and Celnaja NGO Director Zulfaj) enabled me to reflect upon the paradox of the portrayal of local agency. In particular, it encouraged scrutiny of a possible selection bias on the part of the local turn scholars, evident in the way in which local actors, whether or not positively inclined towards ‘liberal’ agendas and aims, were mostly interpreted as signalling the end of top-down and the fundamental unsustainability of the liberal paradigm. The interviews, therefore, enabled me to examine how the ‘local’ is constructed (and its aims and agendas interpreted and understood), by local turn scholars, to support and sustain their project of overturning the liberal peace.

\(^4\) On this subject, see Hammond (2009), Richmond (2005) and Bliesemann de Guevara (2009b).
Furthermore, through an examination of the literature, the timeframe of the foreign endeavour in Kosovo became visibly significant to this research as many of the shifts identified in the conceptualisation of peace-building are, in fact, both visible in the way in which Kosovo is analysed as well as assessed. Yet, the case of Kosovo is not a mere test to prove the validity, applicability or even the existence of certain shifts but is crucial to the analysis of lessons learnt considerations, as well as to see how it has been used to support the emergence, modification and rise of further ruptures, shifts and changes in the manner in which peace-building is conceptualised. For instance, chapter 4 suggests that this is evident by looking at how Kosovo was referred to as a seminal case to demonstrate the limits of a minimalist, hands-off form of peace-building, thus figuring predominantly in arguments in favour of extending further and more invasive forms of peace-building. Once again, Kosovo was then used as a launching pad for the rise of the new turn – the local turn - upon the critics’ assessment of some of the paradoxes of top-down governance, and the concomitant rise of resistance to the liberal peace agenda, actors, methods and policies.

Whilst the thesis does, at least in part, discuss the liberal peace paradigm, and specifically, the way in which the paradigm has been relied on as a coherent and somewhat homogenous object of critique, it does so primarily to understand the critique of the liberal peace in its foundational claims. As such, the key research question seeks to assess the aims of the critical re-conceptualisation of peace-building operated by the local turn, by examining the conditions that led to its emergence, aided also by a reflection on the manner in which discourses of resistance in Kosovo sustained the emergence of the local turn. Furthermore, this thesis also seeks to understand the extent to which the logic that drives the critique is fundamentally dissimilar from that which is the subject of the critique itself, commonly associated with universalist, linear and causal frameworks of the liberal peace paradigm.

2. **Outline & Chapter Structure**

The thesis’ chapter structure largely reflects the evolution of the scholarship on the topic of contemporary peace-building since the early 1990s, beginning in
Chapter 1 with the emergence of critiques adhering to a neo-institutionalist and cosmopolitan focus. The chapter tracks the emergence of new, prescriptive and intrusive forms of peace-building by exploring how critiques emerging in the mid to late 1990s focused on the limited reach of previous approaches (identified as a coherent plan for the spread of the liberal system through economic liberalisation reforms). A particular exploration of the critique of liberalisation informs the analysis in order to assess the extent to which, and in what respects, the turn towards prescriptive forms of peace-building sought to cut with the past.

Chapter 2 continues the exploration of the evolution of the scholarship in order to examine the rise of the local turn itself. The aim of the chapter is to highlight the logic behind the local turn’s emergence, starting with understanding the manner in which the critique positions itself against the liberal peace paradigm. In particular, the chapter discusses how the focus on the hierarchical and exclusionary nature of the so-called liberal peace-building paradigm brought to the attention the previously hidden agency of local agents as well as the paternalistic and dominating aspects of foreign-led interventions and projects of reconstruction. The ‘local turn’, it is argued, signals the end of the belief in top-down governance and relative solutions for engendering peace based on cause and effect calculations drawing attention to, instead, an emergent form of power, consistent with what Foucault called biopower. The emergence of this form of power, it is argued, not only seeks to break with disciplinary mechanisms employed in previous forms of top-down approaches to peace-building, but ultimately seeks to open up the space for a new ontology of peace, that can reflect the agency of the local, beyond the stereotypes of the liberal

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5 Foucault’s own definition of biopower is admittedly lax as, in his work, he seemed to rely upon the term biopower and biopolitics interchangeably; nonetheless, in *Security, Territory, Population*, he provided a working definition of the concept as:

the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species (2007, p. 16).

It is this focus on the ‘naturalness’ of the social that the discussion on biopower seeks to draw out, to help in “decentering mainstream sovereign explanations of power” and authority (Coleman & Grove, 2009, p. 490). This is also particularly pertinent to framing the emergence of the critique of top-down approaches to peace-building.
peace. Accessing the ‘everyday’ whilst at the same time stressing the impossibility of controlling, determining and predicting the outcome of peace, becomes the central aim of the local turn. The practical relevance of the local turn in initiating a fundamental revolution in the manner in which peace-building is conceptualised is further supported with an analysis of the case study of Kosovo, mirrored in the second half of Chapter 3.

Chapter 3 itself focuses on Kosovo as a fertile ground for the rise of post-liberal, critical accounts of peace-building. As the chapter discusses, the ambiguous nature of the practical status of the mission in Kosovo has framed the case study as a perennial work-in-progress, thus arguably rendering it open to constant theoretical and practical experimentation. The chapter, thus, aims firstly at drawing out the significance of Kosovo for the shifting eras of peace-building conceptualisation; the first half of the chapter, in fact, examines the development of solutions advocating for the extensions of a more inclusive, comprehensive, and invasive project of peace-building through state-building. The second half of the chapter links the emergence of the local turn to the critique of state-building, suggesting that rising discontent and local resistance to externally imposed solutions and to the paradoxes of protracted interventions have been drawn upon by the critical scholarship to normatively motivate the project of theoretical re-conceptualisation of the field and practice of peace-building. Where the practical shortcomings of liberal peace-building have been identified, in the case of Kosovo, these have been used to initiate the bottom-up revolutionising of the field, with primary attention given to the need to integrate the previously unheard agency of local actors in ways which are fundamentally different from the patronising and uneven relationship of ‘partnership’ set up and largely still controlled by external agents. Where local ownership has been supported in the current practice of peace-building, the critique has pointed to its essentially rhetorical function. As this critique mostly suggests the need of accessing a more ‘authentic’ form of local agency beyond the artifice of and manipulation by western liberal peace-building, the chapter begins to outline the key tenets of this supposedly new and more authentic manner of valorising agency in order to later assess the extent to which this shift has broken away
from the linear assumptions that underline the ‘liberal’ logic it rejects and condemns.

In this regard, Chapter 4 represents the pivotal point of the thesis where, in particular, the very same non-linear logic that drove the shift towards the local, is used to turn the inquisitive gaze of critique against the local turn itself. If, according to the local turn, the shift from liberalisation to institutionalisation represented the extension of liberal control over non-liberal societies, then it is also possible to question the extent to which the re-conceptualisation operated by the critique might be free from such potential purely because of its benevolent project of emancipation. Therefore, Chapter 4 places the critical turn at the centre of the analysis in order to assess the extent to which its re-conceptualisation of the subjects, objects and practices of peace-building differ from that operated by the previous paradigm. By examining the project of emancipation of the local turn and comparing it to that of the modernist, linear approach to peace-building associated with liberalism, the chapter begins to draw attention to the epistemological and ontological similarities between the critical, post-liberal shift, and the linear logic it rejected. The chapter, in particular, focuses on the difficulties of ‘accessing’ the everyday realm of contingency without relying on causal, linear or totalising assumptions.

The final chapter examines the impact of the project of the local turn by discussing the implications of the emergence of the ‘everyday’ as the natural quality of a contingent and complex reality. Accessing the everyday, it is argued, carries significant normative assumptions that enable the local turn to lay claim to the ability to recognise and tap a more ‘authentic’ form of agency, thus exercising a form of arbitrary selection that is as problematic as that exhibited by linear approaches. This bears important consequences on the project of fundamental re-conceptualisation of governance along the lines of the appreciation of complexity, through anti-foundational assumptions. Indeed, when the everyday is ‘accessed’, this results in the identification and legitimation of certain behaviours and the exclusion of others, in a process of normalisation that is akin to more traditional teleological approaches. Finally, this also has an impact on the way in which the subject of peace-building is conceptualised, as
the agent’s actions and behaviours are controlled and regulated through an emergent biopower, according to the normative standards established through what I refer to as the local turn’s own processes of normalisation. As I argue, the paradoxes exhibited by the local turn draw attention to an interesting and problematic contradiction, which may, in itself, limit the possibility of rethinking peace-building along non-linear lines; when the social is identified as complex and contingent without altering the epistemological foundations of the way in which we think about ‘peace’, then the critique’s pluralisation of peace may instead result in a more traditional form of instrumentalisation of the multitude opened up by the acknowledgment of complexity. This questions the very assumption of the possibility to peace-‘build’, within a context that recognises the ontological limits to governing complex social dynamics.

3. Recognising Non-Linearity: Complexity & Peace-Building

The local turn in peace-building, which is the object of this thesis, is endemically tied to non-linear approaches to peace and conflict studies and, as such, it is necessary to contextualise it within the emergence of said non-linear approaches to understand both its allure and its aims and objectives.

Indeed, the urge to employ non-linear approaches to understand conflicts is echoed by many contemporary critical scholars who call for a fundamental re-conceptualisation of the methods employed to study the conflicts we try to resolve. Non-linear perspectives often refer to approaches on complexity and systems theories, both originating in studies on computational and information systems. These non-linear methodologies, whose main function is to study the relationality of systems and networks, have been well received in social sciences and have been applied to the study of conflicts since before the boom of interventionism in the 1990s. More recently, these approaches have also been employed by post-conflict peace-building scholars to make sense of the manner in which responses to conflict have been framed so far and how best to

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6 See, in particular Lederach’s extensive work on the need to acknowledge the ‘web-like’ relationships at the basis of the social context within which conflicts take place (1997, p. 78). Lederach’s later work elaborated on this by advocating for the employment of non-linear reasoning to analysis of conflicts and in the drafting of peace-building initiatives (2005).
encapsulate the reality of conflict territories without reducing said reality to the sum of its parts.

Scholars that support non-linear approaches condemn previous paradigms that follow a linear causal methodology to study conflicts and draw solutions, by pointing to some of their most notable fallacies. Some scholars have pointed to the reductionist and generalising nature of approaches to conflict that merely seek to draw causal connections between actors, agendas and actions; Danny Burns, for instance suggests that a linear, causal understanding of conflict brings forward limited solutions and options for action:

The notion that intervention A will lead to outcome B needs to be replaced by something more akin to: intervention A may open up a space for action in this location, which might have an effect on people and relationships elsewhere, which may open up spaces for further action (2011, p. 104).

Other scholars point to the inevitable tendency, when employing linear, solution-oriented methods to peace-building, to display western assumptions regarding identities, race and what would otherwise be culture-relative understandings of justice, peace and conflict (Körppen, 2013, pp. 86–93). In this regard Boege suggests that culture-specific forms of knowledge may be instrumental in proving that non-linear understandings exist and are as important as linear, western ones. The scholar suggests that “a different cultural understanding of time can have profound impacts on peace-building”, citing the instance of Bougainville’s burial and reconciliation rituals and their impact on the perception of the length of the conflict, concluding that “perhaps Melanesian time is not clock-time at all, that is: linear, measurable time” (2013, p. 39). Other perspectives focus on how linear approaches seem to often ‘miss the point’, suggesting that even research that is designed according to linear standards, when it tries to understand whether or not peace programmes are being successful, display severely limited understandings of the perspectivism that permeates the issue of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ (Woodrow & Chigas, 2013, pp. 210–211).

The allure of employing a non-linear approach rests on some of non-linearity’s most notable qualities. Firstly, it is suggested that systemic (as
opposed to linear) approaches would focus less on locating the origins of the ‘problem’ or ‘conflict’ and therefore, be less likely to generate cause-effect explanations that could engender simplistic solutions that would miss all the other elements and factors that weigh heavily on the constitution of the conflict itself (Bernshausen & Bonacker, 2013, p. 24). Indeed, it is suggested that the development of the conflict renders it impossible to trace the elements that initiated it and that this is an inherent aspect of the complex social interactions that shape conflicts themselves. “Because an intractable conflict is entrenched in a wide variety of cognitive, affective and social-structural mechanisms, it is effectively decoupled from the perceived incompatibilities that launched it” (Coleman et al., 2013, p. 42), thus, even when some incompatibilities and agonistic encounters can be identified and spatialised within complex conflicts, these should be considered as different from those that initiated the conflict in the first place, by virtue of the effect of multiple, complex interactions.

Furthermore, since it is suggested that linear approaches have tended to rely on actor-based understandings of conflict which have often perpetrated binary and misrepresented understandings of agents and their roles in conflict resolution, it has also been suggested that reflecting this contingent reality requires looking beyond the “dualistic categories that many peace-building strategies are based on, such as inside/outside or global/local” (Körppen, 2013, p. 90). The resulting analysis would take, as its object, a socio-political reality that is “constructed by self-organizing and emerging networks of action and reaction” (ibid, p.90), a space whose main qualifying characteristic is its inherent, ‘messy’ hybridity.

Non-linear approaches, espouse the localisation imperative, often underlying the importance of placing local epistemologies and actors at the centre of new understandings of peace, particularly to deflect the tendency to privilege local agency only when it is “in service of the liberal peace” (Vimalarajah & Nadarajah, 2013, p. 136). Non-linear approaches to peace-building have, in particular, challenged the orthodoxy and prevalence of the liberal peace model, particularly by outlining how this model relies on causal mechanisms to understand conflicts and issue plans and projects. This is
attributed, largely, to the modernist philosophy that underpins the liberal paradigm, with scholars tracing the roots of the liberal call for Enlightenment and change to European rationalistic philosophy (Körppen, 2013, p. 82). Non-linear critiques of liberal peace-building have also focused on another key issue typical of linear understandings of conflict, namely, the normative framework that underpins the claims to universal solutions:

For liberal peace [...] producing ‘lasting peace’ therefore entails moving the state in question further towards this ideal through a variety of transformative measures. This is also been seen as unquestioningly possible; no state or society is too far beyond the pale to be engaged and transformed into this ideal, the only question being how this is to be done (Vimalarajah & Nadarajah, 2013, pp. 136–7 emphasis in original).

These tautological assumptions, it is claimed, are blind to the evident partiality of the tools employed to understand conflict in non-liberal societies, and thus are also responsible for a vacuous engagement with the ‘other’ of peace studies. Körppen notes that “diversity in programming, meaningful local ownership, social justice and sustainable economic empowerment still do not belong to the guiding principles of many peace-building programmes” (2013, p. 83); this, the author suggests, markedly limits the potential for meaningful local engagement and results in the use of the rhetoric of local ownership only to substantiate and legitimate interventions and their liberal values (ibid, p.83).

Non-linear approaches to peace-building are informed by constructivist (see, for instance, Wolleh, 2013), as well as more deconstructive approaches closer to post-structuralism (Popolo, 2011) and to neo-materialism (see: Chandler, 2013a; Wiuff Moe, 2013). Without exception, however, these approaches are highly sceptical of the possibility of drawing implementation plans for a different form of peace-building without falling into the trap of blueprints and maps that resemble earlier linear approaches, particularly when critiques only focus on altering the tools rather than the fundamental epistemological basis (de Coning, 2011).

Nonetheless, many scholars have attempted to draw out the contours of implementation programmes for systemic conflict transformation, at different degrees, and relying on ‘process-oriented’ frameworks. Whilst these may not
immediately pose some of the more obvious issues with benchmarking, standard-setting and objectivity that linear approaches are condemned for (Ricigliano, 2013, p. 188), these approaches face a particular challenge, which I examine in Chapter 4, relative to their own normative assumptions inherent in projects that seek to reveal “hidden conflict dynamics, i.e. those which have so far gone unnoticed or have not been considered to adequate extent” (Splinter & Wüsterhube, 2013, p. 111). Indeed, it is precisely this attempt to reverse the marginalisation identified as an outcome of the liberal peace, that frames the contingent and the ‘everyday’ as a realm of agency that is more authentic than its misconstrued representations provided by the liberal peace. Furthermore, it is this project of drawing out the everyday, the complex and the contingent that the local turn essentially embodies, and it is this endeavour that my thesis seeks to understand and explore.

4. Methodology: A Genealogy of the Local Turn

The emergence of methods that reject the simple causal connections endorsed by linear perspectives is not surprising within the theoretical context of contemporary critical IR. Indeed, as mentioned above, several of the perspectives consistent with the local turn draw on anti-foundationalist premises, including insights from post-colonialism, post-structuralism and constructivism, to find appropriate frameworks for the appreciation of the complex social and political milieu.⁷

This section outlines the methods employed in this thesis by suggesting that two main principles are followed. Firstly, as this is a qualitative research endeavour, the methodology reflects a concern for the discursive conditions that led to the emergence of certain narratives, the local turn in particular. To do so,

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⁷ At this point, it is crucial to note that the scholarship engaged with in this thesis is predominantly western-based, if not western-born. Debates, particularly those pertaining to the recent local turn, are thus geographically limited and often UK-centric. This also exposes an interesting selection bias that is, however, unexplored in this thesis because of space constraints, regarding the sources of information and analysis employed by scholars of the local turn, found mostly in western literature and/or, in general, English-speaking local actors and sources. The reflection on the ‘local’ and the consequent debates on the value of the local turn are thus generally captured by this selection bias.
my thesis uses instruments consistent with those employed by the local turn itself, in particular a sensitivity for non-linear and complex approaches to the study of conflict, to turn the gaze of critique on the local turn itself. To operationalise this, a post-structuralist ‘sensitivity’ in particular is essential firstly to acknowledge the complex nature of systems of interaction, but also to reject the totalising effects of grand philosophies of the world, and to foster a desire to unfurl the discursive twists and turns that constitute and perform narrative knowledge. Ideally, such a sensitivity represents an awareness of the potential tendency of all narratives, including the most critical and benevolent, to operate discursive forms of marginalisation in order to surpass, replace or eliminate other forms of narratives. Such potential, as is discussed in Chapter 4, may also be within the realm of possibility for the critical local turn itself. Despite differences amongst post-modern theories and theorists, some fundamental methodological and epistemological considerations make post-structuralist theories the most suitable to the analysis of narratives. One of these considerations regards the epistemological standpoint of post-structuralist approaches vis-à-vis complexity is that no meta-description is capable of “capturing the essence of complexity” (Cilliers, 1998, p. 3). It is because of this rejection of meta-narratives that post-structuralist approaches exhibit a richer awareness of the contingencies that shape the issues at hand, and it is also possibly because of this that critical approaches to peace-building such as Jabri (2007, 2010) and Richmond (2010a) have also largely drawn from them.

Non-linear approaches critique scientific and positivist methodologies in the way in which these deal with the sheer quantity of information provided by complex systems by grouping, generalising and offering ‘correct’ methods to make sense of the relations between elements. Post-structuralist critiques suggest that the analyses provided within linear, modernist frameworks are social and political constructs, representations whose only use is as units to be deconstructed (Harris, 2001, p. 336). These discourses cannot, in fact, serve by themselves as explanatory or even analytical tools for the purpose of understanding the cognitive relationship between meanings, as they act – willingly or unwittingly as it may be – towards the reproduction of meanings and the construction of systems of beliefs. In other words, peace-building discourses
cannot, by themselves, claim to explain through cause and effect as the identification of the causes is neither neutral nor objective, nor are the effects identified naturally given or unproblematic.

A post-structuralist approach, on the other hand, unpacks the discursive framework of peace-building by reflecting upon the processes that shape its manifold components (Harris, 2001, p. 340) and thus reflects upon the complexity of such discourses without necessarily employing explanatory approaches to make sense of such complexity. Deconstruction of the composing elements of the discourse can be carried out for any element that concurs to the creation of the meta-narrative. This is an analytical solution to uncritical assessment exhibited by positivist, linear approaches.

Whilst modernist positivist approaches, in their analyses, conceptualise and rethink the world whilst still attempting the programming of the social towards efficiency and performance, non-linear approaches, in particular post-structuralist ones, seek to avoid this tendency by rejecting synthesis, generalisations and binaries (Lyotard, 1984, p. 12). Post-structuralist approaches are not forced to choose the ‘correct’ method, but rather, as Cilliers would suggest, they can adopt a more ‘playful’ approach, allowing for different avenues, viewpoints, and understandings (1998, p. 23). The variety of post-structuralist theories is not a disadvantage nor is it an expression of the ‘confusion’ and lack of purpose that besiege critical theorists; in this sense it is, in itself, an expression of complexity and of the sensitivity and awareness that post-structuralist epistemologies have to offer. By supposing that all practices, discourses and actors are the result of interaction, circulation and production of meanings, post-structuralism understands that universalisation, generalisation, and the reproduction of practices and beliefs are operated mainly through modernist and positivist methodologies’ support of the reproduction of established and unquestioned, often uncritical systems of beliefs. This narrows

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8 The notion of performance requires a meta-system, as performance must always be relatable, calculable and quantifiable. Contrary to much of the recent trend towards non-linear approaches, several linear approaches to conflict resolution and peace-building exist. For a contemporary example, see the empirical research undertaken in Zürcher et al. (2013) for the purpose of establishing why contemporary democracy promotion fails.
down the radical, theoretical scope and potential of research to the attainment of support for already established aims and goals (Cilliers, 1998, pp. 23–24).

This post-structuralist sensitivity is also analytically helpful in that it helps to articulate aims which do not claim to have access to universal answers, but rather abandon truth claims by essentially shifting the focus of the approach to the question and the process of knowing rather than to the answer per se. This is also why my work does not aspire to be a new theory for peace-building, nor does it seek to provide an emancipatory alternative to a hegemonic narrative.

To operationalise this post-structuralist sensitivity, I rely mostly on Michel Foucault’s analyses on the emergence and development of narratives. Foucault, profoundly linked with the post-structuralist and anti-foundationalist tradition, turned his attention to the existence and the importance of overarching, generalising, meta-narratives, but did not stop at merely declaring the death of such grand philosophies of the world. Instead, his analyses explored the iterative processes through which certain narratives emerge and become widely accepted (see Foucault, 1991). Whilst there are no specific sets of steps provided by Foucault to carry out deconstruction of certain meta-systems of belief, the scholar suggests the use of analytical tools which are now mostly associated with ‘genealogy’. Through analysing exclusion, Foucault suggests that it is possible to demonstrate the mechanisms of knowledge formation within grand narratives of the world, and particularly those that have a claim on the status of ‘science’ (Hook, 2005, pp. 5–6). The reader is invited to deconstruct the discursive fields that surround certain narratives in order to understand the conditions that led to the emergence of these narratives and to their attaining of hegemonic status. It is to this deconstructive endeavour that I now turn.

5. Michel Foucault: Deconstructing the Local Turn Narrative

My analytical approach finds its motivation, if not its methodological inspiration, in Foucault’s deconstructive analytical work. Generally, two of Foucault’s works can be associated with methodological approaches consistent with the deconstruction of meta-narratives: the Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) and Discipline and Punish (1991a). These volumes are the result of a
critical, deconstructive approach to the history, evolution and development of narratives. It is this concern for the evolution of narratives that renders Foucault’s work relevant to my examination of the peace-building narrative and, particularly, to the effects of the emergence of new trends such as the local turn itself.

Admittedly, suggesting a reliance on Foucault’s methodology and implying the existence of a pure ‘Foucauldian methodology’ is not only difficult, but would be, most importantly, a paradoxical statement. Indeed, as Dean suggests, Foucault’s approach to the need of methodology is lax in the extreme, as he appears to offer some accounts of method in some of his work, only to reject or fundamentally alter some elements, concepts and methodological principles by taking a wholly different direction (1994). Foucault’s examinations of punishment and disciplinary technologies approaches the exploration of the development of a narrative without looking for a point of origin and end as linear approaches might, but is rather interested in the webs of meaning that construct certain truths and define the way in which knowledge is formed through processes of transformation, multiple temporalities and even the reversal of historical pathways (ibid, p. 4). Foucault’s research, in other words, relies almost entirely on ruptures, discontinuities and shifts to account for why certain truths become widely accepted narratives with a generally accepted notion of history, progress and change. Foucault’s work interrogates progressivism, and seeks to displace and problematise those theoretical mechanisms that enable the cementing of certain political and ideological viewpoints on history.

Foucault’s genealogical work deals with a ‘history of the present’, thus its approach to history, to the succession of events is not so much concerned with the careful reproduction of a true sequence, or an exhaustive and holistic history

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9 Whilst arguably Foucault’s ‘archaeological’ studies present structured patterns that more closely resemble those of a methodology, his ‘genealogical’ studies, later applied to the examination of discourses of discipline and punishment, is more adept at capturing the nuances of emergent narratives, to offer a reflection on “our changing historical sense” (Dean, 1994, p. 14). Despite his concern for discourses regarding systemic aspects of governance (discipline, punishment, education, medicine), Foucault refused to cement his analysis in a fixed and unmovable method of historical inquiry precisely to reflect the sensitivity for contingent and unfixed meanings that I have previously indicated is the mark of post-structuralist and non-linear approaches.
of socio-political western thought, but rather it is concerned with history as the plurality of temporalities, with shifts and ruptures as those events which affect the manner in which the present day and its social and political expressions are created. It is a history of now, a study of the rationalities and the logic that have shaped the use of power, the organisation of societies, and the practice of politics. His work on discourses and narratives is thus not necessarily associated with a specific methodological standpoint, but with an ad hoc reflection on the specific processes (often, thus, not necessarily relying on the identification of hegemonic or structural forces) that shape a specific turn in the way a discourse produces knowledge.

As such, the relevance of employing such a post-structuralist sensitivity is manifold. In particular, however, the focus on discourses has not only a deconstructive function, but also a ‘constitutive’ one, in that discourses are fundamental to how power-relations are formed and change over time, and to how subjectivities are constituted. In this sense, whilst many non-linear approaches to peace-building have ‘deconstructed’ the liberal peace, not many have been concerned with the way in which it is ‘constructed’, or the manner in which even deconstructive work could contribute to its construction, in the way in which critiques often qualify, pinpoint and identify what the liberal peace is, before they are able to critique it. At this point, it is also important to clarify that this research project does not seek to represent the application of a post-structuralist method to the study of peace-building per se, but rather, to invite the reader to embrace a post-structuralist sensitivity in the exploration of the discourses that make up the field of peace-building, and in so doing, to reflect upon those conditions that have allowed the discourse to evolve in a certain direction. What this also means is that the local turn itself, and its non-linear assumptions, should be put to the test, as much as any other linear approach might be.

To do so, this thesis follows an approach informed and inspired by Foucault’s genealogy, by working on the basis of identifying patterns of meaning by looking at the way in which peace-building has been conceptualised. This does not mean, however, that the thesis focuses only on elements of
commonality, but rather, that it looks at how ruptures, shifts and changes, are constitutive of specific discourses themselves (how ‘change’ and ‘shifts’ are typical, for instance, of emancipatory discourses). By looking at the way in which the discourse is ripe with critiques, ruptures and shifts, the focus is on the creation of new paradigms and ideas and on the means for their dissemination. The local turn, for instance, is understood as having its roots in the critiques of the liberal peace. My thesis explores the conditions that lead a particularly situated critique of liberal peace to generate the local turn. This helps problematise the local turn as being neither a natural evolution of an outdated approach, nor a neutral response to it, but rather as being embedded within a specific web of meaning and power-knowledge relations. The value of pointing this out, however, should not be equated with an aspiration to ‘uncovering’ the uncomfortable ‘truth’ about the critique of the liberal peace paradigm, nor should it be equated with an attempt to replace the critical shift with an ‘even more critical’ one, but rather, to turn the inquisitive gaze of post-modern sensitivity back on post-modern approaches themselves, in order to warn against the very real danger of falling back into the meta-narrative trap, whether it may be an existing one (i.e., re-producing modernity) or whether it may simply mean replacing an overarching philosophy of the world with another, just as totalising.

Foucault’s own research aspirations, too, had little to do with countering one narrative with another, to replace it or even to ascertain the primacy of his own critical vision of history over the others. Neither was his primary aim that of necessarily bringing the marginalised voices and narratives into the bigger, mainstream one. As Dean suggested, Foucault’s work was not so much geared towards bringing into the discourse what has been unsaid, but rather to look at what has been said, examining the reality of affirmation, of discursive formation, in a manner which avoids the interpretative spiral of hermeneutics (1994, p. 16). Similarly, my objective is not necessarily to ‘include’ those marginalised narratives into the orthodoxy, nor to necessarily make visible what has so far been hidden, but rather, to explore those mechanisms that have made it possible for certain discourses to acquire visibility and in so doing, to understand how
any discourse, no matter how critical of the ‘orthodox’ view, may itself aspire to becoming the new ‘orthodoxy’. 10

It is precisely this issue of making the hidden visible that draws attention to what seems to be at stake in the local turn and where, once again, Foucault’s work can be useful. The emergence of the population as a contingent, complex ensemble of untraceable qualities, unplannable events and shifting identities appears more and more visible, in the literature on peace-building, as missions become larger and last longer. Rethinking peace-building, thus, involves rethinking methods of governance of the post-conflict milieu in more comprehensive ways, in less and less predictable and governable contexts. As seen in Chapter 2, where the tension between the complex milieu and the issue of governance reaches its apex, in the local turn’s affirmation of the impossibility to govern the post-modern from the top-down, then the local turn seems to imply the impossibility to grasp and manage complexity, affirming, instead, the need to embrace it.

Critical approaches to peace-building have, in fact identified previous attempts to grasp and manage the complex nature of social interaction as congruent with forms of liberal ‘governmentality’. 11 These critical approaches largely draw on Foucault’s analytics of power to understand the effects that regimes of truth, societal normalisation and control of collective and individual conduct had on those modes of being that did not subscribe to the ideal of the hegemonic discourse. It was Foucault’s discussion of the effects of the normalisation of society 12 on different expressions of agency and subjectivity

10 Existing post-structuralist informed approaches to peace-building, outlined in Chapter 2, seem, however, to be mostly interested in the object of exclusionary discursive practices. So, the analysis of how certain discourses and elements are excluded is framed within the aim of filling in the gaps by rendering visible what has been so far hidden.

11 Governmentality is defined by Foucault as “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target” (2007, p. 144). Foucauldian scholars suggest that governmentality has fundamentally to do with “management and regulation, […] ensuring and maintaining the ‘right disposition of things’ being governed and ruled” (Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005, p. 14). For comprehensive accounts that identify traces of governmentality at the global level, particularly in forms of liberal interventionism, through analyses of liberal peace-building and state-building missions see Campbell (2011), Gabay and Death (2012), Jabri (2010) and Reid (2010).

12 These are most thoroughly discussed, in relation to the problematic of the population, in Foucault’s overview of the relationship between population and sovereign power through the
that influenced heavily the post-liberal turn in peace-building, where these different expressions of agency, identified as the ‘Other’ subjected to domination and exclusion (Richmond, 2009a, p. 577 n.91), were now believed to be the key to unlocking a different way of thinking about post-conflict transformation. The identification of forms of societal control congruent with liberal governmentality has had the primary self-established attempt to bring forward the marginalised voices of alternative narratives that are excluded in the process of normalisation.

Drawing on Foucault’s work on the marginalising effects of mainstream narrative’s normalisation of regimes of truth established by the meta-narrative, post-structuralist scholarship seeks to give space to the ‘unassimilated otherness’, in other words, to promote the tolerance of differences (Hillyard and Watson in Harris, 2001, p. 345).

This is, admittedly, a powerful way to create space for the effective interplay of subjectivities in a post-conflict space, as opposed to traditional top-down approaches. However, whilst Foucault’s own analysis into hegemonic narratives around the structures of justice and punishment did not seek to necessarily include or make discursively visible the hidden narratives (Dean, 1994, p. 16), but rather, to shed light upon the processes of knowledge production that lead to the hiding of these narratives (and therefore, the including of these narratives became almost secondary if not a chance result of deconstructive analysis), the recent turn’s concern for hidden narratives demonstrates a different approach altogether in its normative project of opposing the liberal peace and its marginalising tendency through everyday agency. Therefore, by implying that the production of truth can be separated – and clearly identified – from the effects of power on the subjects, (for instance, the hierarchy of liberal peace and the exclusion of local agency), the paradigm’s main concern became the inversion of the hierarchical power structure (top-down with bottom-up) rather than a more fundamental displacement of ontological and epistemological assumptions.

establishment of a security regime (2007, p. 27), and in Foucault’s work on normalisation as process of non-formal control of societies – which will be fleshed out more in detail in Chapter 5 (1991a). At the individual level, the effects of normalisation are more specifically outlined in Foucault’s discussion on norm diffusion, individual freedom, and the shaping of subjectivities through the politics of life (biopolitics) (1982).
Finally, with the rise of the local turn in peace-building and the declaration of the end of top-down governance, it seemed that the strategies and technologies of governing employed under the liberal peace paradigm were swept away by the critique, with these techniques and the desire to govern severely limited by the celebrated, unstoppable forces of contingency and complexity. Indeed, whilst it is relatively easy to identify elements of governmentality in concepts, norms and ideas that are largely accepted as part of the orthodoxy of ‘liberal’ approaches (for instance ‘good governance’ in terms of state behaviour), it is also possible, and analytically necessary, firstly to question the value of constructing the label ‘liberal peace’ as an objectively existing reality (see Chapter 1), and also to raise another question regarding the possibility of the persistence of forms of power beyond the so called ‘liberal paradigm’.

Indeed, this brings up a crucial question regarding the types of power employed by the most recent shift, one which Foucault himself raised in regards to the shifts in discourses of punishment, healthcare and education: to what extent do forms of power consistent with governmentality disappear when norms are more contested or more ambiguous? (see Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava, & Veron, 2005, p. 16). And is such contestation operated by the local turn sufficient to relegate the dangers and marginalising tendencies to the ‘old’ liberal paradigm? It is be suggested, in fact, throughout Chapters 4 and 5, that bringing attention to the contested nature of peace-thinking as the critical local shift does, whilst laudable as a critical endeavour, should not be taken as sufficient evidence to accept the absence of forms of biopower, resulting in techniques of government that seek to control the conduct of populations. On the contrary, it is be argued – by relying on Foucault’s studies on narrative shifts and the emergence of power – that this diffused form of power – biopower – thrives in the local turn’s declaration of the end of top-down governance facilitated by the critique of the hegemony of the liberal peace. The embracing of contingency, complexity and non-linearity has enabled the local turn to exhibit a degree of denial towards its own potential to manipulate and use the power of the everyday (biopower) to direct and regulate the conduct of societies and individuals towards their own normative goals.
Whilst my research then pursues the above-mentioned issue in order to identify some of the potential limits of the local turn, an issue becomes methodological salient: how can a post-structuralist sensitivity be employed to undertake this research endeavour and what guarantees its analytical success where other post-structuralist, post-liberal approaches to rethinking peace-building seem to have fallen short? Indeed, as my analysis brings forward a particular critique of the rationale behind this latest shift, it could run the risk of making any critique – mine included - problematic insofar as such critique would be taken to be the exercise of presenting one’s own diagnosis of the present as the result of a calculation based on universal, objective conditions for the use of reason. Indeed, the post-structuralist sensitivity advocated in this chapter, cannot accept a critique that seeks to ‘shed light’, ‘uncover’ or ‘expose’ the truth about certain discourses, as this would inherently suggest the critical perspective’s perception of its aims and analytical tools as existing in a position of analytical privilege, a vantage point which would allow (Dean, 1994) a particular approach to assume to be able to expose the real or ideal conditions of existence. If this were to be taken to be the spirit of critique undertaken in this research, then it would paradoxically place the thesis in a presumed position of analytical advantage and thus expect the content of the critique to be a priori better than the object of its critique, thus biasing the research itself, and also merely representing a replacement of one meta-narrative with yet another. Moreover, if critique were to be taken as a binary position of being for or against something (being for or against liberal peace-building or even being for or against the local turn), then the logical outcome would be an imposition of a different, limited and black-and-white account.

On the contrary, the critical stance that I seek to adopt is more attuned to what Dean calls ‘criticism’ (1994, p. 54), as a form of analytical enquiry that does not seek to replace its object with another vision of a self-established perspective born out of universal grounds or pre-given conceptions on the existing social order, but rather a reflexive form of engagement which itself enters the space of contestation and constant evaluation, without standing outside the paradigm or outside the epistemological and ontological premises of modernity, necessarily. Criticism then avoids the normative need to be for or
against something, that is, for or against modernism, liberalism or even the local turn, in favour of an approach which would work with the fluid, complex ‘criss-crossing’ of the “limits of our forms of rationality” (ibid, p. 54).

What this means is that by embracing the post-modern assumption that meta-narratives are already ‘dead’, critique can only work with the limits of what modernity has defined as being a way of acting, thinking and practising politics (i.e. what is normal and what is not). This, as Dean also suggests, does not require an emancipatory drive to change the course of history to fit a vision of what society should be, and neither does it necessarily mean surrendering to the inevitability of the status quo or the orthodoxy, but is, instead a more ‘experimental’ attitude that uses knowledge and its limits to push the boundaries of what has already been entrenched as a mode of being or thinking about the world, without prescribing solutions (1994, p. 54). This form of criticism, therefore, would not reject the liberal peace or even the local turn, per se, based on a pre-given understanding of what the social order should be, but rather seeks to contest the limits of what has so far been entrenched in the ways in which we think about the world, whether this entrenchment has taken place within modernity or outside it (in the realm of the post-liberal, non-linear critiques). The result is a constant exposure to the unsettling of assumptions so that even critique itself, even the latest critique (mine included), could never be left untouched long enough for its core assumptions to congeal into a normatively totalising telos.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I have outlined the research agenda that motivates this thesis. As the research seeks to understand the rationale behind the conceptualisation of peace-building operated by the local turn, I have sought to place this shift in context by explaining the non-linear methodology that pervades these perspectives and enables them to assert claims regarding the need to step beyond positivist approaches to conflict studies. Indeed, I have also suggested that a post-structuralist sensitivity is more adept at celebrating the complex nature of the relationalities that make up the social and political interaction at the core of the issues addressed by peace-building theory and practice. Such relationality
cannot be ‘explained’, and attempts to guide it towards a pre-established normative goal has only demonstrated the rigidity of certain paradigms’ political vision and analytical reach.

The local turn is, thus, profoundly linked to non-linearity. Its emergence, I have suggested, not only points to the fragmentation of governance dictated by the increasing realisation of the limits of top-down solutions, but is also consistent with the appreciation for forms of agency ‘from below’ that seek to represent the unstoppable, unplannable, contingent forces of the ‘everyday’. The ‘problem’ of what to do with this complexity is a problem that post-conflict peace-building specialists grapple with constantly, all the more so for the ‘local turn’ scholarship that has long been declaring the end of meta-narratives and grand philosophies of the world, and the consequential end of off-the-shelf-solutions and top-down, imposed techniques for the exercise of monodirectional power. This ‘problem of the population’ is also one that Foucault employed to centre his discussion on governance and the way in which it has evolved at the domestic level in liberal states. I have sought to take this discussion further, albeit not to suggest that the local turn may operate in a similar fashion to liberal governmentality. Instead, I have sought to focus on the processes of shifting and changing that enabled the new paradigm to emerge, thus focusing more on the ruptures rather than on the continuities (which is what the critiques of liberal hegemony have tended to do). As critiques emerged from the late 1990s onwards, I have sought to understand how these dealt with the ‘problem’ of the complex post-conflict milieu, identifying, much like Foucault did, several forms of power at play (from discipline to biopower)\textsuperscript{13} in service of the attempt to govern over the complexity of the reality of the everyday.

\textsuperscript{13} Foucault’s work on the art of governing charts the genealogy of governance from the early stages of modern statehood, with emphasis on how the fragile link between the prince and the principality – the object of the art of government - is supplanted by a different understanding of government. This comes from anti-Machiavellian literature that seeks to find the answers to the question of the quality of government not so much in the forms of discontinuities between the power of the prince and any other form of power, but rather in the continuities between these different realms of power, for instance, between the government of the state, the running of the family and the government of personal behaviour. The art of government, Foucault indicates, cannot merely reduce the question of government to that of the transcendental relationship between the sovereign and the land, just as the government of a family unit, Foucault notes, is not merely the securitisation of the family property, but is the larger matter of the management of other issues like births, deaths, alliances with other families, unexpected events, wealth, etc.
I have also suggested that a post-structuralist sensitivity towards the non-linear and the complex is indeed relevant, though, not just to make visible narratives that have been dominated or exploited, but also to examine those specific conditions of materiality that enable a particular vision of the world, or philosophy of the world, to become dominant or widely accepted, whatever it may be and regardless of its benevolent intentions. The local turn has definitely done so in regards to what it perceives as the liberal grand-philosophy of the world underlying peace-building discourses, and I seek to turn the same inquisitive eye on the local turn itself, in order not to dismiss some of the local turn’s own potential for becoming a hegemonic and exclusionary paradigm.

The operating aim of the thesis is, thus, neither to ‘save’ peace-building or ‘liberal’ peace-building, nor to subvert or invert the domination of the liberal peace with the critical turn, nor to replace the local turn, but rather to map out the emergence of the new orthodoxy in peace-building from its specific context of critiquing the liberal peace paradigm. In so doing, I seek to understand what type of subjectivity is being produced (as can be seen in Chapter 5), through specific discourses and webs of meaning. Indeed, following Foucault’s footstep does not mean arguing exclusively against the liberal peace (or liberal governmentality), as mentioned above, but rather to understand how the emergence of new paradigm, even when driven by principles of non-linearity, may still be operating through technologies and strategies that function through the population to normalise the conduct of societies.

(1991b, p. 94). Social contract theory, Foucault explains, then enabled a further attempt to bring together the rigid framework of sovereignty (as government over things) with the more abstract and thin notion of the government of the family, although the result was the use of contract theory’s reflections on the relationship between the ruler and subjects as a theoretical matrix for the formulation of principles of public law. The economic wellbeing and the demographic boom of the eighteenth century raised the problem of the organisation of the population and allowed for the discussion of government to go beyond the management of the family; the family was thus no longer considered to be the model for the organisation of the population, but a tool through which information can be discerned regarding the population for the management of the same. The population is now the end of government, as opposed to the land or the exercise of the art of government itself. (ibid, p. 100). The shift from governance as ‘stateness’, (understood as the transcendental, top-down relationship between the ruler and the land) to that of government of society and space outlined here is useful to enriching our understanding of the ways in which the art of governing (at the domestic, but also international level) has developed to reflect the increasingly widening space of interface of subjects and things, in the complex social milieu.
The project is, then, an essentially explorative one, informed by Foucault’s genealogical work on narratives and power, which supports my research in identifying three aspects, related mainly to the rise of ‘new’ paradigms through shifts and ruptures, and particularly relevant to the rise of the latest critical local turn: firstly, it helps understand how a certain notion of the subject enables the formation of a telos to drive a new paradigm, supporting the truth-making exercise of the discourse upon which all other technologies and strategies draw on to normalise the conduct of society. Secondly, it supports an exploration of how a certain notion of rationality enables the paradigm to place itself outside the narrative in order to establish its own position of vantage to critique the liberal peace paradigm from. This vantage point implies the critiques’ belief in its own ability to verify that the social and political actions of the subject and of the collective subscribe and abide by the self-established principles of what is valid, legitimate, right and appropriate. Finally, it ensures that the research does not limit itself to identifying how the local turn is still ‘liberal’, but to suggest that the rationale behind the local turn does not eschew that of modernity, that is, the ability to “attach meaning to behaviour and pursue specified ends by a calculation of means” (Dean, 1994, p. 69); this, it is argued, has ultimately limited the extent to which a re-conceptualisation of peace-building’s foundations along more contingent and pluralist line might occur.
Chapter 1
From Liberalisation to Institutionalisation:
The Birth of the Critical Turn in Peace-Building

Introduction

This chapter seeks to introduce the key debates on peace-building through an initial discussion on the nature of liberal peace-building as an object of critique. The concept of ‘liberal peace’ has been central to debates on peace-building, but has been even more instrumental in the emergence of recent critical trends in peace-building theory.

In a recent article published in Security Dialogue in 2013, however, critical realist scholar Jan Selby discussed a largely ignored, albeit rather widespread tendency within the scholarship on peace-building to accept the existence of ‘liberal peace-building’ as a coherent strategy (2013). Drawing from Selby’s argument, the chapter suggests that this tendency to construct the liberal peace as a coherent paradigm was employed both to explain and critique contemporary peace-building. This construction, it is suggested, begun not only with those scholars supportive of the liberal peace paradigm and its normative project, but also, more controversially, with critical perspectives that sought to cast some doubt on the motives, methods and outcomes of international involvement with conflict and post-conflict territories.

In the first section, I outline the emergence of a consensus around the liberal nature of peace-building by looking mainly at the literature of the late 1990s. The section explores both supporters of the liberal peace who, not only cohere around common features of the liberal peace of the 21st century, but also support it as a normative project to reform war-torn countries. Secondly, it focuses on the emergence of a consensus around the liberal nature of peace-building coming from the critics of peace-building.

In the second section, I focus on critiques of liberalisation. The critiques, I suggest, draw the contours of the liberal peace by associating the perceived goals of peace-building with the practical outcomes of projects of liberalisation. This, it is suggested, shifts the attention of the debate on the mechanism for the
delivery of peace and on the sequencing of the elements of the liberal peace, setting the basis for what I argue to be a purely procedural and technical re-conceptualisation of peace-building.

In the third section I unpack the shared premises that found the largely accepted perception of the existence of a coherent liberal peace paradigm. I focus mostly on drawing out some of the paradoxes of this construction, namely the grouping of actors, aims and methods under the label ‘liberal peace’, and the ‘liberalness’ of certain missions and methods. I suggest that this coherent framework does not sufficiently pay attention to the pragmatic differences between these elements, and the interpretations of liberal theory, by attributing a homogeneity to the liberalness of missions, a congruence of aims and a coherent plan by the actors, and a whole host of methods and outcomes that are – at one time or another – all considered to be congruent with the ‘liberal peace’.

In the fourth section I focus mainly on two sets of scholarship of the early 2000s, namely cosmopolitanism and neo-institutionalism, to suggest that the alternatives resulting from the critiques of liberalisation, despite coming from notably different theoretical grounds, concur in producing similarly invasive solutions. This is due to the fact that the critiques of liberalisation do not question the tenability or need of interventionism, but rather keep that assumption untouched, and focus mostly on how to best refine peace-building’s techniques, shifting the debate from the issue of the problematisation of conflict to issues concerning how best to control it and address it. In particular, solutions are shown to be focusing on the need to employ a more comprehensive method to grasp the complex nature of the post-conflict context, in lieu of what is perceived to have been a limited approach concerned mainly with the extension of top-down macro-economic solutions. Not only is the previous approach continuously understood in singular and unitary terms as a coherent project that unifies all actors, methods and aims around a common theme, but it is also, crucially, identified as the source of limited governance, in need of further inclusiveness.

Finally, it is suggested in the last section, that the shift away from liberalisation focused on building more multi-layered, comprehensive, and
invasive, forms of governance, rather than representing a more fundamental change in the way in which we think about the ontological and epistemological premises that lead to the problematisation of certain events in need of intervention (i.e. why is political conflict problematised? How is it problematised?). Where these foundations are ignored in favour of a focus on how to peace-build more efficiently, the resulting shift is akin to a search for a technology of power that can govern populations better than the previous approach. The discarding of the latter as a limited and insufficient technology of governing produces a procedural critique that aims at amending the mechanisms and the techniques for peace-building rather than the core assumptions to lead to framing peace-building as a necessity.

1. ‘Liberal’ Peace-Building

In the literature on conflict management it is largely accepted that one aspect that characterises foreign engagement with conflict and post-conflict contexts in the post-Cold War era is the liberal tradition that drove and determined the manner in which such engagements took place. What has come to be referred to as ‘liberal peace-building’ in the literature on conflict and post-conflict management is identified as a largely coherent paradigm characterised by a fundamental ‘problem solving’ attitude apt at resolving the symptoms of war, conflict and underdevelopment through a re-engineering of the foundation of the warring society (Mac Ginty, 2008, p. 146). It is widely believed, as Roland Paris put it, that “a single paradigm – liberal internationalism – appears to guide the work of most international agencies engaged in peace-building” (1997, p. 56).

Identifying what I suggest to be a large consensual view of the coherent and somewhat homogenous nature of liberal peace-building can be facilitated by following either of two analytical routes. The first approach would involve identifying the supporters of the liberal peace paradigm who, not only believe in the overall congruent and homogenous aim of spreading the reach of the liberal peace, but also normatively support it as a viable method of conflict resolution (Carothers, 1999; Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Kang, 2006). The second approach,
on the other hand, relies on the analysis provided by critics of the liberal peace. This section will begin by initially discussing the first approach.

At the end of the Cold War, the project of the promotion of liberal democracy as a conflict resolution technique gained ground thanks to scholars such as Michael Doyle (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000; Doyle, 1986a, 1986b), Bruce Russett (Oneal & Russett, 2001; Russett, 1993) and Jack Levy (1988), who supported a connection between liberalism and democracy by examining the peaceful tendencies of democracies. Doyle, for example, drawing on Immanuel Kant’s *To Perpetual Peace* suggested that “liberal states are different. They are indeed peaceful, […]. Liberal states have created a separate peace, as Kant argued they would” (1986b, pp. 1151–1152), thereby reviving the tenets of the centuries old liberal peace thesis, with a specific focus on democracy.¹ The pacifying effect of the liberal peace, it is argued, is not only “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations” (Levy, 1988, p. 622), or a “heuristic device with which to interpret history” (Doyle, 1986b, p. 1159), but is also a fitting method to alter the domestic conditions that lead to the formation of civil wars as well as international wars. This normative function is espoused by supporters of liberal internationalism such as Fukuyama (1997), Oneal (1997) and Green (1999) who coalesced around the belief in the universal validity of liberalism, its fundamental connection to democracy, and in the value of democratisation as the tool to spread liberalism and its pacifying effects across the globe (Snyder, 2000). The existence of the liberal peace is understood as a factual reality brought about by the nature of the world system following the end of WWII and the Cold War – a ‘liberal moment’ (Green, 1999) – exemplified not only by the primacy of the liberal form of governance in theoretical terms, as Fukuyama famously proclaimed with his ‘End of History’ argument (1992), but also visible in the nature of the democratic interventions of the 1990s. These were, in fact, believed to be motivated by “bursts of liberal internationalism,

¹ Doyle, in particular, makes the specific argument to identify Kantian Liberal Peace ‘republics’ as in the form of democracy, rejecting other governance models such as Machiavelli’s autocratic republics and Schumpeter’s capitalist democracies. Doyle’s liberal democratic republics are domestically peaceful as they are governed by freely elected officials, and internationally peaceful amongst each other, whilst exercising the moral duty to expand the zone of the liberal peace, by force, if necessary (1986b, p. 1162).
renewed assertions of liberal principles such as the right to national self-
determination, widespread democratization, and expansions of political freedoms” (Green, 1999, pp. 3–4).

It is important to specify, at this stage, that this chapter is not aimed at
countering the construction of the liberal peace by suggesting what ‘it actually
is’. Rather, this chapter seeks to focus on the consequences of the emergence of
such consensus, particularly as it pertains to approaches critical of peace-
bUILDing. Where, in fact, the support for the existence of the liberal peace is not
surprising within the context of the scholarship that embraced the viability of its
normative project, the same belief in the existence of the liberal peace as a
coherent strategy is puzzling when looking at perspectives that sought to
problematisE the endeavour of peace-building. Thus, while looking at the
construction of peace-building through the prism of liberal theory itself is one
way of approaching the subject, for the purpose of this research into the
emergence of critical approaches to peace-building, a second analytical route
will now be taken to identify the elements that are considered to construct the
effort known as liberal peace, by looking at the critical scholarship on peace-
bUILDing.

This scholarship, of which Roland Paris is undoubtedly one of the most
influential representatives, has expressed a strongly suspicious attitude towards,
and critical assessment of, the results of peace-building. This has primarily been
operated through an engagement with the practical by-products, paradoxes and
problems of peace-building missions of the early-to-mid 1990s. This required
the identification of and engagement with peace-building’s driving logic, carried
out mainly by examining the foreign policy trends of western liberal democracies
towards mainly the global south. The nature of the world order was thus also
largely identified with a liberal moment; after the end of the Cold War, it was
suggested, “international power has been centred in the hands of a restricted
directoire of industrial countries under the hegemony of the ‘global sovereignty’
of the American superpower” (Zolo, 2002, p. 170). The impact of this, it is
suggested, is a protracted era characterised by the primacy of liberalism and its
agenda in re-shaping the order of international relations (ibid, p. 170). This
attempt to reshape the international order has also often been used as an analytical tool to understand the motivations behind foreign policy decisions towards certain areas of the world. This has allowed some scholars to identify and label a whole set of disparate missions under the label liberal peace as the driving principle behind peace-building endeavours. Willet, for instance, suggests:

The ending of the Cold War and the subsequent expanded reach of global institutions brought to the fore the possibility of achieving a Kantian peace. This encouraged a growing consent among donor nations, multilateral institutions, military establishments and NGOs, that conflict resolution in the South could be achieved through a number of interconnected processes involving the economic, political and social transformation of chaotic or collapsed states. *Nowhere is this more apparent than in Africa, which has become a laboratory for the liberal peace project* (2005, p. 571 my emphasis)

Overall, the critical scholarship began to trace and delineate the contours of ethos behind the liberal peace. This coherent vision of the teleological project of the liberal peace is also shared by critical approaches of the early 2000s whose work tends more towards the deconstructive, critical and anti-foundationalist side of the theoretical spectrum. For these, the liberal peace can be defined as or characterised by:

...a new or political humanitarianism that lays emphasis on such things as conflict resolution and prevention, reconstructing social networks, strengthening civil and representative institutions, promoting the rule of law, and security sector reform in the context of a functioning market economy (Duffield, 2001, p. 11).

In these critical accounts a connection between the liberal order and peace-building is then made through the pattern of foreign policy interventions of the 1990s. Dillon and Reid similarly identify elements of a common purpose in the pursuit of the liberal peace, by exploring the manner in which development has been promoted:

Much of the disorder that borders the domain of liberal peace is clearly also a function [...] of its very own normative, political, economic, and military agendas, dynamics, and practices, and of the reverberations these excite throughout the world. It seems increasingly to be a function, specifically, of the way in which development is now ideologically embraced by all of the diverse
institutions of liberal peace as *an unrelenting project of modernization* (2000, p. 118 my emphasis).

Critical, anti-foundationalist scholars, thus, also concur in the identification of the liberal peace by providing a sense of intentionality driving the project. Where they identify ‘liberal’ strategies and practices, they suggest these be pursued as a “deliberate policy of comprehensive social transformation, and of power projection” (Dillon & Reid, 2000, p. 119).

The consensus around the nature of the liberal peace also revolves around the common tracing of the relationship between liberalism and peace-building in the historical legacy of western liberal foreign policy dating back to before the Cold War (Fox, 2008). The connection made between western liberal powers and conflict territories subject to peace-building in the 1990s is, as a result, not just considered to be a consequence of the end of the Cold War *per se*, or of the rise of humanitarian advocacy, but is often tied to the project of post-WWII reconstruction through ‘embedded liberalism’ as the post-war strategy employed mainly by the United States to “create an open and non-discriminatory international economic order” (Ruggie, 1996, p. 107).

Furthermore, scholars of different theoretical provenance have agreed on the identification of a degree of consistency and coherence between the work of development agencies and international financial organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF. Paris for instance argues that “now more than ever, many international NGOs and intergovernmental organizations seem to share the desire to transform war-shattered states into stable societies that resemble the industrialized market democracies of the West as closely as possible” (1997, p. 62). This seemingly coherent effort to transform war-torn states into liberal democracies is identified both in the strategies promoting economic liberalisation (Chopra, 1997, p. 201), as well as in the promotion of democracy by agencies that had not traditionally been interested in the content of governance, such as the case of NATO, publicly demonstrating concern for the need to promote democracy, liberty and the rule of law in post-conflict contexts such as Bosnia (Paris, 1997, p. 62).
These perspectives thus conflated theoretical debates, actors, aims and policy objectives around a coherent strategy primarily identifiable through the preference for neo-liberal reform. Common ‘liberal’ methods were thus identified in the practices employed by international organisations and state actors alike. In particular, critics focusing on practices consistent with neo-liberal reforms, particularly prominent in the Cold War period and in the immediate post-Cold War period (Kaldor, 2012, p. 86), widely adopted by donor countries, foreign investors, international financial organisations and liberal democratic western countries. Amongst these practices much emphasis was given to the repeated reliance on strategies to lower deficits, manage monetary policies, liberalise foreign trade rules, reduce inflation and establish a thriving private sector (Del Castillo, 2008, p. 29).

The predominance of liberalism as the primary method of peace-building was believed to be visible in the manner in which neo-liberal macro-economic strategies were inserted into peace settlements, reform projects and reconstruction projects (Chesterman, 2004; Paris, 2004; Paris cited in Richmond, 2004a, p. 141; Shah, 2009). Despite the fact that no common manifesto was called upon by actors to inspire their developmental and peace-building plans, Paris suggests that it is still possible to see that “in practice most of them have worked towards a common goal: peace through political and economic liberalization” (1997, p. 63). As a consequence it was suggested that the mainstream approach of peace-building in the late 1980s-early 1990s held the general view that “the future internal peace in former civil-war societies hinges on how fast their economies will recover from civil war and transform it into economic development” (Kang, 2006, p. 220), suggesting a prioritisation of the development-security nexus (Duffield, 2001). This entailed that progress, as Jarat Chopra suggested in looking at the prevalent approach to development after the end of the Cold War, “relies on liberal style, capitalist democracies as a global standard of measurement” (1997, p. 186).

The perspectives that addressed peace-building in the late 1990s-early 2000s sought to re-conceptualise peace-building by examining the practical outcomes of some of the missions initiated a few years earlier on the basis of a
lessons-learnt approach. Scholars attempted to make sense of the outcomes of conflict and post-conflict missions by identifying certain ‘reverberations’ caused by the liberal peace (Dillon & Reid, 2000, p. 118). These critical assessments of peace-building, all starting with elements of empirical considerations for the outcomes of peace-building missions on the ground, thus began pointing out the problems that were besieging the missions of the early 1990s. These issues were then attributed to the previously identified coherent strategy of ‘liberal peace-building’, ascertained as driving the logic and the practice of peace-building, and, thus, also recognised as the primary culprit. It is to the emergence of this critique of liberalisation that we now turn.

2. Critiques of Liberalisation

Several of the most thorough examinations of case studies of the late 1990s and early 2000s focus on the failures of peace-building missions and on their causes. Through an array of peace-building case studies ranging from newly decolonised territories in Africa to post-Soviet Republics in Asia, the suggestion was gradually put forward that liberalisation as the primary policy strategy of the 1990s was responsible for the resurgence of fighting, the recreation of conditions that lead to the war, and the creation of new problematic and conflict-inducing conditions. In his seminal work *At War’s End*, Roland Paris points to evidence from Mozambique, Bosnia and Liberia as demonstrating the recurrence of violence and conflict in territories undergoing different levels of liberalisations (2004, p. 153).

Roland Paris’s critical assessment of the limits of the liberal approach of the 1990s is not an exception to scholarly trends. The second half of the 1990s was characterised by a large body of scholarship pointing to instances where the ‘liberal’ approach prioritised thus far was falling short of its aims. Citing as examples Haiti, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and several instances of Central American countries faced with continued social unrest, institutional deficits, and continued economic problems even after exponential economic liberalisation, these critics began to dismantle what they believed to have been an earlier misplaced if widespread support for trickle-down economics. For instance, Castañeda suggested that evidence from Sierra Leone proved that peace did not
necessarily follow economic logic (2009, pp. 236–7) Boijec-Dzelilovic suggested that hasty liberalisations had created polarised growth instead of broad-based development (2009, p. 202), and Salih pointed to the resulting failure to address developmental issues such as poverty, and to resolve the tension between economic and political liberalisation (2009, p. 134). Widespread scepticism was also evidenced towards simple aid and poverty relief strategies (Calderisi, 2006; Von Einsiedel, 2005, p. 26). Liberalisation, it was also argued had “increased the level of unemployment, resource depletion and disparities in income”, providing the basis for “an environment for growing criminalization and the creation of networks of corruption, black marketers, arms and drug traffickers” (Kaldor, 2012, p. 86).

The unforeseen consequences of liberalisation projects of the 1990s, from reversed transitions, to a heightened gap between rich and poor, to rising deficits, to unfinished reforms and incomplete peace-making settlements were critiqued as being essentially issues of implementation, by numerous scholars. Donais’ critique of the peace-building record in Bosnia, suggests that the strategy demonstrated the tendency of economic reform and privatisation to run on different tracks and therefore to follow different logics according to the discordant desires of the donors (2002, p. 4). De Soto and Del Castillo, also on this subject, concur in pointing out, through the record of peace-building as liberalisation in El Salvador, the dangers of and the strains placed on the mission by the presence of different actors and donors whose operational paths are set on a ‘collision course’ (1995, p. 70).

In other accounts liberalisation is associated with a minimalist approach to peace-building, limited to insufficient aid relief strategies, which, in the case of missions initiated in the early 2000s, is deemed as a nearly negligent approach to conflict resolution. This line of critique is particularly pertinent to approaches of the neo-institutionalist type, calling for a more structural reconstruction effort. Goodhand (2002) and Chesterman (2004), for instance, suggest that the liberal peace-building strategy of pre-2002 engagement with Afghanistan is evidence of said limited approach to conflict resolution. The focus on economic reform and liberalisation highlighted, in some cases, a preference for ‘speedy’ projects,
particularly concerning privatisation, resulting in neglect for other important aspects of peace-building such as policy planning. Evidence from the case of El Salvador, Smoljan argues, has also evidenced how such preference for liberalisation neglected to prioritise conflict reducing strategies, to the extent that despite the mission being one of the most extensive and challenging peace-building endeavours on paper, the primary tool employed consisted of the extension of macro-economic reforms without much emphasis on the particular circumstances dictated by the conflict. The international agencies involved, the author suggests, “still pursued the same macroeconomic stabilisation and structural-adjustment policies they would have followed had the country not been at war” (Smoljan, 2003, p. 245). Liberalisation is also critiqued because of the prioritisation of profit over the resolution of the conflict. For instance, examining the case of private sector reform in Africa, Gerson outlines the tendency of foreign investors to agree to work with corrupt leaders particularly when faced with competitive pressures to expand markets in unchartered areas (2001, p. 107). In other instances, strategies revolving around economic matters primarily do not seem extend sufficiently enticing ‘carrots’ vis-à-vis the behaviour to correct. In the case of Angola, for instance, Boyce suggests that the local elite’s willingness to ‘accommodate’ the donors wavered in front of the possibility of “easy oil money” (2004, pp. 12–13).

The neo-institutionalist scholarship was not, however, alone in contributing to the emerging critique of the peace-building endeavour of the early 1990s. Cosmopolitan thinkers in particular, also contributed to the critical scholarship of the early 2000s by contextualising the critique of the practice of peace-building with a critique of strictly Westphalian understandings of territorial community (Archibugi, 2008; Falk, 1995; Habermas, 1999; Jones, 1999; Kaldor, 2006; Murithi, 2009; Woodhouse & Ramsbotham, 2005). The state-centrism evidenced in previous approaches to peace-building is particularly problematised in relation to the negative outcomes of liberalisation. Kaldor has, in fact, noted that “in societies where the state controlled large parts of the economy and where self-organized market institutions do not exist, policies of ‘structural adjustment’ or ‘transition’ effectively mean the absence of any kind of regulation” (2012, p. 86). The short-sighted nature of the changes
implemented through liberalisations of the 1980s and 1990s, the author argues, are not only responsible for incomplete ‘transitions’, but are also “the main source of the new identity politics”, where shadow groups use the language of identity politics to legitimise their illegal activities, leading to the polarisation of society and often a reliance on the war economy particularly in areas that do not reap the benefits of economic globalisation (Kaldor, 2012, p. 86).

The above mentioned failures of liberalisation ascertained in the empirical analyses of case-studies began to be associated not necessarily with the logic of liberal internationalism itself (and the whole question of whether it was at all possible to intervene from the outside by engineering and imposing a peaceful solution to conflict through liberalism), nor necessarily with the internal contradictions of capitalism or of liberalism. Instead, the practical problems identified were attributed to the mechanism employed for the operationalisation of peace-building measures, and thus came to conflate a whole stock of issues that began to pile up on the record of peace-building under the liberal rubric. Much of the critique outlined above focused on the visible effects of the missions initiated in the early 1990s, sequenced primarily following a logic of economic reform and an insufficiently inclusive engagement. The problem with that approach came to be attributed primarily with the mechanisms of governance through which the recipient territory was meant to recover from extreme poverty and avoid a recurrence of war. It appeared clear, from the record of foreign interventions, that the project of conflict management through the extension of economic reforms practised in the early 1990s did not seem to reach the societies affected by conflict as easily as originally thought (Chesterman, 2004, p. 195; Cullen & Mendelson Forman, 1998, p. 6; Richmond, 2004b). It was then suggested that the type of societal change, deep and structural, required to build the type of community envisioned in the classical liberal peace project was not materialising because of a fault in the mechanism that regulated the extension of said rights and the functioning of political representation (see, for instance, Scholte, 2004), as it was increasingly unable to understand and grasp the complex nature of the post-conflict, and the global context. I now turn to examining the content of the shift away from liberalisation in order to discuss
the problematisation of the previous approach framed as unable to grasp the complex nature of the conflict milieu.

3. Constructing ‘Liberal’ Peace-Building

In his 2013 article, Jan Selby suggested the existence of a problematic tendency to identify the ‘liberal peace’ as a coherent project. Selby mostly focused on the latter work by critics of the liberal peace to suggest that the construction of the liberal peace as an object of critique is problematic as it overstates how liberal certain missions actually were. Selby’s argument suggests that this is not a fruitful method to create the foundations for a reassessment of peace-building as the critique is based on a myth. Where Selby suggests that this tendency to overplay the liberalness of peace-building has taken attention away from issues of strategy and geopolitics, I suggest that the consensus around the liberal peace has had an analytically relevant productive function. The consensus is, arguably, at the basis of a shift to more intrusive forms of peace-building, one which invited a form of re-conceptualisation through critique that focuses mostly on procedural debates on how to govern more efficiently. Before discussing how this shift towards more interventionist practices is operationalised, it is necessary to problematise the consensus around the liberal peace. This is important as, once the coherence of the ‘liberal peace paradigm’ is problematised, it can also be argued that critiques and alternatives that are built around it are revealed as engaging with less substantive issues.

Jan Selby is certainly not alone in questioning the ‘liberalness’ of peace-building in recent times. Jose Alvarez (2001), for instance, suggested that the liberal nature of state behaviour is also overplayed, disputing not only the extent to which certain foreign policy moves might be inspired by liberal internationalist goals, or expressed through liberal methods of cooperation, but also more interestingly, rejecting the notion of coherent intentionality that is often attributed by scholars supportive of the internationalisation of liberalism. Where Selby focuses on critics, Alvarez focuses on supporters of the ‘liberal peace’ to point out that such arbitrary descriptions of coherent liberal foreign policy objectives leads to problematic practical prescriptions regarding the need to espouse and promote the liberal peace. Alvarez’s arguments lead him to be
suspicious of supporters of liberal internationalism not necessarily only because of the limited analytical depth responsible for the arbitrary identification of a coherent ‘liberal’ ethos, but because the author is concerned with the tendency to then put this arbitrary coherent paradigm to work in practice through norm-making, interventionism and the fundamental attempt to re-write the world order according to it. The liberal blueprint, Alvarez suggests, is largely analytically accepted amongst both scholars and practitioners, particularly in the United States, as a vehicle for the implementation of the Washington Consensus. Because of this normative primacy of the ‘liberal peace’ and the consequential primacy of the debate on the ‘liberalness’ of missions, critiques that have emerged against it, the author continues, have “largely failed to engage its substantive assumptions concerning how liberal states purportedly behave” (Alvarez, 2001, p. 193). Admittedly, the aim of Alvarez’s work was to empirically disprove the liberalness of certain states’ foreign policy as identified by supporters of liberal internationalism. Indeed, this may be problematic in that it may still place too much emphasis on assessing foreign policy and peace operations on the basis of how liberal these are, thus also potentially assessing the successes or failures of the missions on the basis of a gap between liberal aims and actual outcomes.

This is also, arguably, a tendency found in critiques of the liberal peace, and in particular in Oliver Richmond’s work. As the scholar points to the existence of a ‘virtual peace’ as the outcome of a mismatch between the interveners’ intentions and the outcomes on the ground, he is also associating a vast variety of practical problems – accountability mechanisms, legitimacy of governance, authority – to the liberal peace itself. The issue of how forceful imposition undermines autonomous governance is understood, by Richmond, only within the framework of a liberal peace that is unaware of its unbecoming methods and means, and as such, focuses only on the ‘virtuous’ aims (2004b, p. 96), resulting in what he perceives to be a ‘virtual peace’ with no real purchase to the initial plan or the local realities on the ground. The author suggests: “the peace that is constructed through the medium of UN peace operations, such as in Bosnia or Kosovo, certainly is a virtual peace when compared to the objectives stated in their mandates” (Richmond, 2004b, p. 96). Similarly, Eriksen also
suggests, looking at the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), that “when the results are assessed in relation to the liberal peace agenda in general and the aim of state-building in particular, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the mission has failed” (2009, p. 659). The issue is then centred around the gap between the aims of the interveners and what is achieved on the ground, implying that issues to do with legitimate governance can be reduced to the simple problem of an inability to deliver what is initially intended in the initial vision.

Furthermore, the consensus on the ‘liberal’ nature of peace-building is also problematic because of the homogenising effect of a vague label – ‘liberal’ – on a variety of different theoretical and methodological approaches. This watered down label, while containing identifiably ‘liberal’ elements, tends to develop as a blanket title for a variety of different strands of thought that take a similarly large variety of practical forms. Paradoxically, the conflation of different strands of liberal theory is acknowledged far more by the supporters of liberalism than by its critics. Doyle’s modern rendering of Kant’s _Perpetual Peace_ has, recently, been problematised by several scholars who have critiqued the conflation of Kant’s ideal liberal polity solely with the democratic form of governance. Danilovic and Clare, for instance, suggest that this now consensually accepted understanding of Kantian ‘republicanism’ has largely ignored other possible forms of liberalism at the centre of Kant’s normative vision, including, mostly, constitutional liberalism (2007). The debates on the nature of the liberal peace coming from studies on liberalism show consistent disagreement over how the liberal peace is adapted in modern times, particularly in relation to the tension between Kant’s call for self-determination and modern Wilsonian understandings of collective defence (Parish & Peceny, 2002). These studies also demonstrate a more subtle understanding of the tensions behind democracy promotion between pluralism and fragmentation (Diamond, 1995), of the split between liberal internationalists and non-interventionists (Friedmann, 1968), and an acknowledgment of the inability to identify one singular expression of liberalism, and consequently, different types of possible world orders (Ikenberry, 2009).
Remarkably, however, these debates have not transpired in the critical scholarship on peace-building which has, by and large, embraced a consensus around the existence of the liberal peace, a consensus which, as will be seen in the next chapter, has been cemented and naturalised in the most recent re-conceptualisation of peace-building. Admittedly, the constructed nature of the ‘liberal peace’ is at times acknowledged in the critique, although only insofar as it can be used as a tool to critique the liberal peace’s hegemonic project. Paradoxically however, what is critiqued is how the construction informed foreign policy, rather than its existence in the first place. Critical scholars such as Duffield, Dillon and Reid, have pointed to the construction of the ‘liberal peace’, although mostly focusing on how this is operated, mainly, by its supporters. These acknowledgments, however, arguably do not cover enough ground to unsettle the consensus and discuss the way in which even critiques rely on the construction of the liberal peace. For instance, Mark Duffield’s understanding of the liberal peace, whilst acknowledging the uncritical conflation of ‘liberal’ and ‘peace’ on the one hand (2001, p. 11), still holds this paradigm (constructed by its supporters) to have driven, somewhat coherently, the interventions of the mid-1990s (ibid, p. 11).

The intentionality implied in Duffield’s critique is also shared by Dillon and Reid, whose assessment of the liberal peace conflates both the intents and agendas of different actors, as well as the level of instrumentality in pursuing the project of extending liberal power (2000). The liberal peace, the authors suggest, relies on neglecting the relevance of social, economic and political interactions at the root of complex political emergencies, for which they claim the liberal peace itself is responsible (Dillon & Reid, 2000, p. 117). Where, like Duffield, Dillon and Reid also identify a conflation, under the label liberal peace, they however suggest this conflation to have been operated by the liberal peace itself for its own instrumental purposes, and to be responsible for a great deal of confusion, both analytically and in practice.

Retaining the liberal peace as a coherent object of critique is arguably central to framing solutions in opposition to it, as well as to be able to shed light on the practices of domination that are said to cause exclusion. In fact, amongst
critics, whilst it is acknowledged that “unless one is trying to construct a new liberal theory, any attempt to identify the core themes or phenomena of this tradition is likely to appear narrow or even intellectually naïve” (Latham, 1996, p. 79), it is also acknowledged that the complexity of the myriad expressions of the liberal tradition should be cut through by designating “a broad basis of inclusion” (ibid, p. 79). This undoubtedly allows for the setting up of boundaries to guide the critique, albeit inevitably reducing the complexity of liberal thought to a handful of chosen elements which, whilst offering interesting insights, may at times lead later critiques to naturalise a particular view regarding the ‘liberalness’ of certain actors and of their ideological position as coherent, disregarding the subtle differences, paradoxes and contradictions presented both by liberal theory and by the singular actors themselves. Where, for instance, Latham suggests that “no one could say that the United Nations is intrinsically or exclusively a liberal institution”, he also goes on to say that “however, given its role in the propagation of universal human rights, democratic governance, and even markets, it would be difficult to ignore its strong imbrication with both the domestic and international dimensions of liberalism” (ibid, p. 80). Indeed in equating such association with liberalism with a coherent and intentional project of hegemonic expansion, the analytical nuance may be lost in the effort to provide a descriptive and functional inclusive basis for the label ‘liberal’. As will be seen in the next chapter, whilst these earlier critiques begin to draw the contours of the liberal peace paradigm, the liberalness of peace-building and the coherence of the plan is almost virtually undismissed in the critiques of the late 2000s and are fundamental to the whole endeavour of rethinking peace-building. Crucially, it can be argued, where this conflation is not unpacked but merely attacked as an instrument of liberal power projection, it is not possible for these critiques to make sense of the paradoxes that ‘the liberal peace’ allegedly elicits, nor to engage in a more meaningful debate on the nature of peace-thinking and peace interventions.

Several aspects are grouped under the label of the liberal peace, particularly with the purpose of attacking its hegemonic intentions. For instance, Dillon and Reid suggest that as the liberal peace has conflated distinctions between civil and military, humanitarianism and geopolitics, causing peace-
builders to become “politicized, geopolitically ambitious, and sometimes warlike in pursuit of liberal peace” (2000, p. 120). Likewise, the different expression of foreign interventions in the 1990s are grouped, by Oliver Richmond, under the label of the liberal peace as they are perceived as being commonly based a “liberal-institutionalist collusion with strategic thinking on constructing a peace which has been beneficial to liberal states post- World War I and World War II” (2004b, p. 84 my emphasis).

However, one could argue that the acknowledgment of the ‘liberality’ of peace-building cannot make sense of the diversity of expression of peace-building agents, agendas and methods, and thus merely reduces multiple expressions of peace-building as either an intentional multiplication of methods to expand liberalism more efficiently or as a crack in the veneer of the liberal peace revealing the more sinister, hegemonic intents (Dillon & Reid, 2000, p. 123) inside the ‘Trojan Horse’ of the liberal peace (Franks, 2009, p. 270). Likewise, such conflation does little to open up spaces to understand the reliance of peace-building on the use of force, which is then solely explained as the expression of denial, on the part of the liberal peace, of its own aims, goals and methods (Dillon & Reid, 2000, p. 123), again implying a level of coherent intentionality that is simply misleading considering the variety of actors, interests, events and overall factors that may arise and evolve independently of attempts by the ‘liberal peace’ to control them.

Where this acknowledgment of the existence of a ‘liberal peace’ focuses on the unfolding of its strategic and coherent plan, the analysis seems unreflective of the diversity within liberal theory, as well as of the diverse actors, intentions, agendas, aims and methods that may be employed, all elements which may not be, necessarily, liberal or primarily about liberalisation. Selby, for instance, suggests that a close look at the missions examined by critics of the liberal peace might show that these are not as ‘liberal’ in intentions and means as initially thought (2013, p. 69). Furthermore, it is also possible to suggest that the methods employed as part of peace-building might also not be necessarily ‘liberal’, and that not all issues at stake revolve around questions of political and
economic liberalisation. For instance, Selby suggests that in many cases the diplomatic settlements of peace-building missions had little to do with liberalisation and more to do with the need to establish a claim of legitimate authority (ibid, p. 76). In other cases, it is evident that certain missions demonstrated a level of doctrinal disagreement, as, for instance, Ruggie points out in the case of Somalia, where the mission statement exhibited a prevalence of American military doctrine before humanitarianism (1996, p. 96).

Furthermore, where the alterations in methods, means and expressions of peace-building are merely explained as different sides of the same grand strategy (i.e. liberalism), this may cause considerable analytical damage to the endeavour of understanding the methods and aims of peace-building. This is evident when looking at the argument proposed by Bellamy and Williams. Despite suggesting the need to realise that peace-building’s theory and practice is largely dependent on the way in which the problem of conflict is constructed, the authors still identify a determining zone of ‘liberalness’ within which actors are driven to act– as well as initiate change. As the authors suggest “the dominance of liberal ideas also contributes to the material context in which peacekeepers operate and the intellectual tools they use to understand and address the problems they confront” (Bellamy & Williams, 2004, p. 8). The problem of the construction of peace-building is therefore hinted at, but this is still framed within the perceived overall coherent dominance of the liberal narrative.

As a whole, then, the perceived fallacies of the liberal peace (i.e. the sinister intents, the inability to own up to its own goals, its hegemonic intents, its dominating tendencies) are then naturalised as inherently part of the liberal peace paradigm, enabling the critique to trace patterns of intentionality to justify the failure of ‘liberal’ peace building, rather than enabling a more substantial

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2 Jarat Chopra in an 1996 article hints at the importance of debates that touch upon issues of political legitimacy that may not necessarily have to do with liberalism or liberalisation, for instance questions regarding the disproportionate response of the US to Iraq’s aggression in Kuwait, or debates around the issue of military, diplomatic and civilian capability lacunae related to Security Council mechanisms (1996, p. 350). These elements that produce marked differences between missions, within missions, and actors, are, unfortunately, largely dismissed when accounts of the ‘liberal’ peace conflate different missions together (see, for instance Paris, 2004; Richmond, 2004), and are also largely missing in Chopra’s own later work which focuses mostly on identifying negative patterns, trends and outcomes of liberal peace-building missions in the 1990s, such as its hegemonic traits, and its quasi-imperialist qualities (see: 2000, 2007).
engagement with the multiple expressions, strategies and outcomes of peace-building, some of which might not be predetermined as part of a master plan, but might be caused by unforeseen consequences and developments on the ground.

It is then possible to argue that the critique of liberal peace constructs an object of critique whose contours are vague, blurred and ever changing, and under which label many practical outcomes, tendencies and empirical ‘reverberations’, and consequences of peace-building are included. The identification of liberal peace-building as a coherent paradigm provided the critique with a starting point to identify its key mechanism (liberalisation), which will be at the basis of the critique and the solutions offered. This, as will be seen below, has primarily led the re-conceptualisation of peace-building in the early 2000s to follow a merely technical and superficial engagement with peace-building (and with liberalism) based on the catch-all category of the ‘liberal peace’.

4. The Emergence of the Shift

The following section outlines the emergence of a critical shift towards the end of the 1990s-early 2000s. This chapter does not deal with other, more anti-foundationalist critiques of the liberal peace paradigm, as that is investigated in more detail in Chapter 2. Instead, the emergence of a critical trend in the conceptualisation of peace-building is analysed by looking at two approaches of the early 2000s, one coming from the advocates of institution-building, and the other coming from cosmopolitanism³. It is suggested that the identification of liberalisation as a coherent strategy employed in the 1990s is instrumental in the creation of critiques that problematise the lack of inclusiveness and the need for further engagement with the complex nature of the post-conflict. The

³ The literature engaged with in this chapter, predominantly cosmopolitan perspectives and neo-institutionalist ones, are identified as part of a ‘critical’ shift as a functional analytical tool to draw out those elements of the scholarship’s critique that congruently and commonly find a fault with the previous liberalisation approach. Thus, the chapter does not seek to either discount or reject the differences between these perspectives, nor to indicate that the shift is a factual and empirical ‘truth’ but rather that several points of common interest in the critique of liberalisation are instrumental in introducing a call to re-think the parameters of peace-building.
identification of the limits of the previous approach, it will later be argued, is also central to the emergence of solutions that do not question interventionism but rather mostly focus on improving the practical mechanism to grasp and manage such complexity thus eliciting more invasive forms of social engineering.

As the legacy of peace-building in the 1990s did not seem to have heralded the expected fruits of stability and peace (and certainly not in the timeframe desired), solutions were framed to address what began to be perceived as a structural issue regarding the correct mechanism to ensure the transmission of rights and the transformation of conflict and instability. Where the prioritisation of neo-liberal economic reform was framed as an issue, the sequencing of peace-building became the problem – and the source of the solution- for neo-institutionalists such as Roland Paris. As the focus of the debate moved towards building functioning infrastructures to withstand a long-term, durable peace, institution-building became the catchphrase of the time.

Perceived structural weakness was deemed to be the leading cause of the inability to sustain the population’s rights, security and development (Carment, 2004; see also Kasfir, 2004; Rotberg, 2004), especially in cases where peace-building had so far privileged a focus on macro-economic reforms. In Afghanistan, for instance, a call for a “strong legitimate state with the monopoly of violence” is called for as “the basic precondition for lasting peace” (Goodhand, 2002, p. 854). Weak statehood, when left unaddressed, is often considered to be a cause for further grievances and worsening conditions, as Donais suggests in the case of Bosnia. Furthermore, Donais also adds that the weak Bosnian state is a direct consequence of the Dayton Agreements and of the inability to ground the liberalisation and privatisation projects on “solid institutional foundations” (2002, p. 4). This assessment is also supported by Cox’s suggestion that building constitutional order was initially not the highest priority in Bosnia (2001). Lack of attention to institution-building, Donais finally suggests, is responsible for the further fractionalisation of the body politic along ethnic lines in Bosnia (2002, p. 3). This was not, however, treated as a question of whether peace-building required institutionalism, but rather a question of
‘when’ (i.e. at what point of the sequencing) was it required. In fact, the focus on the state reflected a concern, not so much with the contents and the shape of individual and collective rights, nor necessarily of the manner in which the state can guarantee those rights domestically, but rather with institutions as the most suitable vehicle and regulatory mechanism, that could guarantee political and economic rights of the subjects and address the complex causes of instability (see: Chesterman, 2004; Cox, 2001; Evans, 1992; Fearon & Laitin, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004; Ghani, Lockhart, & Carnahan, 2005; Krasner, 2004; Sandbrook, 1993). In institutionalisation accounts, however, the nature of these political and economic rights is largely unexplored and vaguely associated with a mix of human rights, civil rights and economic rights.⁴

The focus of neo-institutionalism on state-building pointed to the need to address the root causes of war, instability and failure, beyond the strictly institutional set-up. Such approaches, in fact, recognising a plethora of evolving and changing issues in the post-Cold War era, suggested the need to complement infrastructural reform with the integration of emerging actors such as global civil society and to take into account the role of other informal and non-state actors (Chesterman, 2004; Paris, 2004, 2009, p. 102; Reno, 2007). It is argued, in fact, that the complex nature of emergency situations such as war-zones and failed states, requires a multi-pronged approach which aims at targeting the political and social roots of the grievances, through the rebuilding of the apparatuses, institutions and agencies responsible for guaranteeing political and social change (Adelman, 2004, p. 303). A strict focus on the state alone, however, it was largely admitted, would be insufficient to grasp the complexity of these contexts, thus requiring engagement with issues such as relationship-building in ethnically divided contexts in the formal decision-making arena as well as at the informal (civil society and grassroots) level (Maynard, 1999). The purpose of neo-institutional critiques was thus to employ a multi-pronged approach that could

⁴ Poulingy, Chesterman and Schnabel’s volume *After Mass Crime* provides a good example of this. The contributions to the volume are largely concerned with conceptualising the institutional mechanisms that can better enforce a set of rights usually associated with physical, mental and economic security. Where they discuss a conceptual shift, it is mostly focused on the visibility that these rights can gain (or have gained) through addressing domestic and international institutional capabilities (2007, p. 46).
deepen the understanding and reach of the post-conflict endeavour, without relying on linear or causal assumptions (Pouligny, Chesterman, & Schnabel, 2007, p. 15). The rejection of linearity is necessary to avoid “facile binary thinking” (ibid, p. 21). Thus, it is suggested “it is essential to reintroduce complexity when observing and intervening in such situations” (ibid, p. 21), although it is also specified that complexity should not mean indifference to violence as a natural expression of humanity, but rather as “something one should simply deal with in the best way possible” (ibid, p. 22).

Similarly, critiques of peace-building coming from cosmopolitanism are also concerned with altering the practices and mechanisms to promote more effectively the extension of solutions to conflicts. For the cosmopolitans, these mechanisms should reflect a larger concern for those societal elements that go beyond territory and which could muster truly comprehensive and multifaceted political solutions (Kaldor, 2006). Thus, the cosmopolitan camp also associates with the previous approach a limited understanding of the constitutive elements of the conflicts that have so far been responsible for the narrow focus of peace-building and the notable emergence of lateral issues such as global networks of terrorism and organised crime. In this line of critique, Archibugi, for instance, suggests the interventionism of the 1990s was erroneously framed within a framework with a preference for individual state solutions, neglecting the need to widen the basis for understanding issues of consensus and legitimacy that lie at the root of the problems affecting these territories. Archibugi’s solutions are still framed within the existing legal framework insofar as they accept the UN as being the most useful vehicle for implementing a cosmopolitan project of intervention, although he advocates a shift in the deepening of the mechanisms through which foreign engagements are rendered more publicly accountable (2008, p. 196).

The drive towards a post-territorial understanding of representation leads the cosmopolitan critique of the early 2000s towards an assessment of the complex nature of the relationship between local and international actors, as well as amongst individuals in the vastly different and ever evolving contexts of the conflict zones of the 21st century. Complex problems, it is agreed, require holistic
and comprehensive solutions (Howells, 1999, p. 85; Kitson & Michie, 1999, p. 178; Kluth & Andersen, 1999, p. 122; Pavitt & Patel, 1999, p. 114), which operate on different levels to tackle all aspects of the warring society with the purpose of initiating, supporting, and often directly driving the transition from peace to war, from command economy to liberal economy, from autocracy to democracy. Such solutions are then no longer satisfactorily attained through what is agreed to have been a limited focus on, and preference for, economic liberalisation, but are framed to require a comprehensive, systematic and inclusive approach. The polity itself is no longer the only element in need of tackling, but the political subject himself, within and without his territorial confines, individually as a citizen as well as collectively across boundaries, necessitates a radical transformation acquired only through a process of internationalisation and transnationalisation. The global subject is connected, affected by and affecting change everywhere at the same time; it is the agent for change and the recipient of change. It is for this reason that the traditional top-down, vertical structures of representation (Rosenau, 2003) allegedly fail to grasp the complexity of the subject’s need to articulate its needs individually and operate in an ethically bound collective (Murithi, 2009).

Thus, both approaches display an interesting affinity; where they critique a somewhat naïve understanding of conflicts displayed by previous approaches, both advocate the need to more deeply explore the complex and multi-faceted roots of the conflicts themselves, discounting one-track, linear explanations that seek a direct cause of a conflict in favour of a more locally attuned understanding of cultural, historical and political contexts. Relatedly, despite the seemingly fundamental disagreement over the reliance on the traditional structures of the sovereign state, both approaches suggest the solution lies in the deepening of social and political engineering, in order to integrate institutional reform with

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5 Policy agencies including international governmental and non-governmental organisations also refer to the language of complexity, defining emergencies as a “complex combination of natural and man-made causes”; these include events such as natural disasters, biological hazards such as epidemics, as well as political issues of governance largely defined as breakdown of authority due to conflict and mass movements of population. For a more detailed exploration of the policy framing of complex emergencies see the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (n.d.) as well as the WHO’s guide to emergency response conducted in difficult political and security environments (2002).
international and transnational elements of concern that are believed to work towards resolving the conflict on informal but significant levels (Armstrong & Gilson, 2011; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995). Cosmopolitanism, too, in fact, whilst on the one hand often condemning a strict reading of the role of the sovereign state as the sole guarantor of rights, also frequently recognises the importance both of working on strong internal structures (McGrew, 1997; Scholte, 2004) and of the establishment of stable domestic apparatuses (Risse-Kappen, 1995). It can thus be suggested, that both Cosmopolitans and neo-institutionalist scholars, despite notable theoretical differences, identify the fallacies of the previous approach to peace-building as having to do mainly with a simplistic approach that did not sufficiently target the complex nature of the conflicts. Both schools have, in fact, converged on the need to extend, stratify and deepen the engagement with conflict territories in order to manage and control the conditions that lead to conflict more efficiently.

The common logic that can explain the affinity between these two perspectives lies, arguably, in the call to engage with complexity and non-linearity. The acknowledgment of the need to manage the complexity of conflict and the post-conflict milieu is reiterated often in the critical literature on peace-building, particularly to highlight on the one hand the limits (and inability) of the previous approach in that respect,

The complex nature of the conflict “involves multiple parties, multiple roles, and multiple issues, its management concerns not just one of these multiplicities but the entire party-issue space” (2003, p. 179). Zartman goes on to suggest the need to “simplify, structure and orient these elements into a process that produces an outcome” (ibid, p.179). Complexity is then taken to represent the natural interconnectedness of the social and political realities of conflicts, which not

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Simon Chesterman, for instance, points to the tendency in the post-Cold War era to rely on “false assumptions of simplicity at the local level. In East Timor, for example, it was taken for granted by the expatriate expert community that the territory in late 1999 was a political and economic vacuum” (2004, p. 58). Chesterman thus also points to the limited understanding of the realities on the ground exhibited by the previous liberalisation approach (ibid, p. 58).
only reduces the possibility to accept linear approaches to conflict management, but also presents complexity itself as a natural limit to top-down governance. Such complexity is said to have evolved partly because of globalisation (Habermas, 1999, p. 267; Held, 1993), and to be expressly visible in the changing nature of conflicts (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999; Kaldor, 2006).

In this respect, analysing the conflict milieu, Goodhand and Hulme point to a shift from ‘classic wars’ to ‘complex political emergencies’. The significance of the shift towards complex political emergencies lies partly in the acknowledgments of the practical differences between old and new conflicts, as it is in the analytical acknowledgment that “every conflict is unique, with its own configuration of power, structures, actors and beliefs or grievances” (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999, p. 17). This widespread acknowledgment, the authors suggest, has also led to a more fundamental shift away from analyses focusing on military capacities and international political economy towards “social and cultural analyses that recognise complexity and contingency and that question the feasibility of prediction” (ibid, p. 14). Complex emergencies, Goodhand and Hulme suggest, are thus taken to be:

...not specific problems with identifiable causes that can be fully understood and for which ‘solutions’ can be generated. At best, understanding will always be partial, contingencies will play havoc with linear notions of cause and effect and predictability will be at low levels (ibid, p. 24).

The re-conceptualisation of peace-building, according to this acknowledgment of complexity was thus, at least rhetorically, framed to be a mainly analytical engagement with peace-building whose primary aim was that of avoiding quick causal connections, linear understandings and predicted ‘solutions’. Roland Paris, for instance, also suggested that the broadening of the study of peace operations should be kept separately from the world of policy recommendations: “the academic’s mandate is not primarily, or necessarily, to contribute to policy discussions; it is to analyse and explain complex phenomena, even if doing so yields no specific policy recommendations” (2000, p. 33).7

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7 Roland Paris’s warning, however, can also extended to his own later work, which, not only rendered itself well to policy interpretations, but explicitly made policy recommendations regarding what strategies to avoid and what path to peace-building is more conducive to success.
The acknowledgment of complexity does not, however, result in jettisoning interventionism, but rather in designing more inclusive, comprehensive, and often invasive forms of controlling, managing and normalising what are perceived to be substantially ‘defective’ societies. Where complexity is evidenced, this is mostly in support of a framework of action that invests in extensive engineering rather than substantial reconsideration of the basis for intervention. Willett, for instance, has suggested that so far:

…strategic actors pursuing the liberal peace find themselves ill-equipped to respond to the so-called crises […]. Simplistic explanations that reduce wars to breakdown, fail to capture or respond to the complex emerging structures which represent an alternative and antagonistic system to that proposed by the liberal peace (2005, p. 575).

Willett’s assessment of the limits of the previous approach focuses mostly on complexity as an alternative to the liberal peace paradigm, and sees the attempt to grasp such complexity as antagonistic to it. Arguably, however, the scholar mainly sees capturing complexity as a response to improving management, without looking at how it may in itself be a discursive condition within which further interventionism can be framed (arguably, in this case, were the liberal peace to be taken as an actually existing reality, it would not necessarily be antagonistic to the notion of capturing complexity). The result of Willett’s arguments, in fact, is not to jettison the foundations of peace-building or the logic of development, but rather to understand this inability to grasp complexity as a limitation of the previous approach, exemplified once again, in the mismatch between the aims and the goals of the liberal peace. “International or regional attempts at building sustainable peace will only be viable if constructed upon a subtler analysis of war economies and failing states and when the inequities of the global economic and political system are redressed” (ibid, p. 587), the author suggests, thus also implying the need for further inclusiveness rather than retreat.

Paris’s own *At War’s End*, a seminal book on peace-building operations, proposes several recommendations, including the nature and sequencing of the pillars of the ‘Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation’ approach, and an assessment of why partition solutions to ethnic conflicts are fundamentally untenable and should be discarded (2004, p. 181-185). In recent times, Roland Paris’ own engagement with peace-building directly blurred the previously separated fields of scholarship and practice, as he was appointed by the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to an international panel of experts to advise on the future of NATO.
Furthermore, where critiques point to the need of targeting the issue of excessive authority, for instance in the form of the quasi-despotism of peace-builders, solutions tend to focus mostly on planning better to avoid the potential for such impositions in the pre-deployment phase of the mission (Beauvais, 2001, p. 1170; Stromseth, Wippman, & Brooks, 2006). Here, the comprehensive knowledge of the case helps in the planning phase, with the advice given dealing with the problem of despotism or of its perception as a potentiality to foresee and plan for, thus focusing on including pre-deployment in policy-planning to prevent the problem of despotism from arising. The re-conceptualisation of peace-building then tackles the complex milieu by expanding horizontally (e.g. through addressing the pre-deployment phase) to cover as much ground as possible in the operationalisation of peace-building. The vertical nature of interventionism is only identified briefly (e.g. despotism), and only insofar as it is a problem of strategy that can be prevented by further including local stakeholders in designing the structure of the mission (Carment, 2004, p. 145; Chesterman, 2004, p. 9; Keating & Knight, 2004, p. 247; Leenders & Alexander, 2005, p. 87) (without, however, entering into deeper discussion regarding whether the mission should exist at all). Likewise, we can see that critiques which point to the complexity of state failure, whilst stressing the importance of avoiding big bureaucracies, autocratic systems or anachronistic understanding of international legal sovereignty, still result in approaches to peace-building which reduce the complexity of the post-conflict to a problem that requires casting the net further, and thus, further invasive methods of social engineering, rather than a more radical form of power diffusion to manage the opposing and at times contrasting forces within the milieu. For instance, Langford suggests:

state failure is a highly complex and an essentially political problem both domestically and internationally. Therefore solutions to the problem cannot be confined atomistically to settling war, building governing institutions, revitalizing the economy, or instituting social welfare programs. Nor can theories that promote the disconnection between domestic and international factors serve to help us understand the catalysts of state failure. Solutions and theories must encompass all of these factors and more (1999, p. 65 my emphasis).

The shift towards complexity is not only acknowledged as being prevalently one that no longer accepts linear narratives of security and development, but is also
one that is encouraged by the authors as a path towards understanding conflicts
and increasing the chances of peace in that “must capture the micro-level
dynamics of conflict and peace” (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999, p. 23) for it to be
effective. This acknowledgment of complexity does indeed imply a shift towards
the abandonment of linear and causal narratives that offered off-the-shelf macro-
economic solutions adopted by the liberal peace. Yet, if one were to also extend
an analysis that does not depend on the identification of the ‘liberal’ nature of
peace-building, it could be possible to see the acknowledgment of complexity as
a sign of a deeper shift towards a different way to manage societies. This would
reject linear understandings and rigid top-down universal models (e.g. macro-
economic reform), in favour of a more diffuse, albeit more effective form of
power that acknowledges the complex and often messy, unpredictable nature of
the milieu upon which one is to govern. This approach does not rely on simply
handing down solutions, edicts and rules, but rather employs methods of control
that are less coercive although no less invasive.

Since the acknowledgment of complexity operated by some of the
critiques of the early 2000s does not entirely question interventionism and the
need to peace-build, the resulting re-conceptualisation of peace-building does
not represent an analytical approach that seeks to disperse power radically and
completely in the face of such inability to employ linear and causal thinking.
Rather, as the fundamental assumption regarding the need to peace-build is left
untouched, the critiques focus mostly on amending the technology through
which problem areas are addressed, instead of the knowledge structure through
which they are identified as problems in the first place. The result, as can be seen
in the next section, is a purely mechanical shift that affects the manner in which
problematic societies are managed.

5. Disciplinary Peace-Building

The acknowledgment of the complexity of post-conflict contexts has important
consequences for the evolution of peace-building’s conceptualisation. This
section suggests that the nod to the complex nature of the post-conflict frames
the body politic as something that cannot be grasped singularly by the structures
of one particular apparatus (i.e. the ‘economy’ of the state, or the security
apparatus) but rather something that requires a form of governance that takes multiform shapes and is understood in terms of movement, instrumentation, ‘strategy’ (Foucault, 1991a, p. 26). In short, understanding the social and the political as complex enables a shift towards methods of governance that are also fluid, driven by a form of power that is also constantly in movement. This form of power is not ‘owned’ by someone over someone else as a material thing but is framed within a view of the body politic itself as a set of complex networks. Within this framing the exercise of power requires apparatuses, techniques and material elements that serve as means of communication of power and knowledge, features “that invest human bodies and subjugate them by turning them into objects of knowledge” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 28).

Thus, a further element of significance can be identified in the shift operated by critics of liberalisation from what appeared to be a minimalist approach to peace-building towards a more involved, intrusive approach. More significantly, in fact, what is at stake in the shift is an even more fundamental change in the strategy of governance, one which necessitates, indeed relies on identifying the previous approach to governance as limited, for the establishment of a technique to govern. Where Foucault suggested, for instance, that modern states moved from top-down sovereign power to a more diffuse form of power to govern populations, a parallel can also be drawn with 21st century peace-building as the governance of the complex milieu of the post-conflict. Foucault’s analysis suggested that governing more efficiently required acknowledging the limitedness of the previous approach’s understanding of the complex milieu of the population (2007, p. 65).

Despite the fact that Foucault did not discuss peace-building or state-building, his studies identified an important process that is relevant to contemporary discourses of peace-building, too. In particular, where peace-building is a process that seeks to alter the conditions that lead to war and to fashion a settlement for the establishment and rooting of long lasting peace, this project contains several aspects of governance and social engineering that have relied on the same modern instruments and techniques of governance that Foucault focused on in his research into the evolution of discourses on criminal,
education and healthcare systems. Foucault’s work is mostly interested in the ways in which the acknowledgment of certain limitations to orthodox ways of governing gave birth to new ways of governing more efficiently and can thus be employed to examine how identifying the limits of orthodox forms of peace-building may give rise to different technologies of power.

For instance, Foucault discusses the emergence of ‘discipline’ as a move to replace the monotonous, monodirectional exercise of power typical of absolutist sovereign power. The ‘old’ type of power, Foucault suggests, was characterised by a reliance on executive, inflexible orders that regulated and facilitated the rule of territories by outlawing behaviour not consistent with the edicts of the sovereign (2007, p. 83). In applying his insights on the subject of peace-building, a similar shift can be observed. The intransigence of top-down attempts to govern is often identified with the stubborn imposition of neo-liberal reform onto non-liberal and conflict territories, what Mac Ginty calls a “peace from IKEA; a flat-pack peace made from standardized components. […] there is a danger that peace support interventions become non-reflexive and uniform” (2008, p. 145). What are identified as essentially inflexible orders (see, for instance: Muggah, 2008, p. 1; Pronk, 2004, p. 15; Richmond, 2009a, p. 568) – be it regarding macro-economic reforms, SAPs, or political liberalisation – become essential to the identification of the inability of the previous approach to accept, and accommodate the complexity of the post-conflict.

The results are then framed in terms of fragmenting the power employed to govern, horizontally, such as it is implied in the focus on civil society typical of cosmopolitan perspectives. Such focus is, in fact, welcomed as a fragmentation of power operationalised by the “proliferation of mosaics of

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8 In Foucauldian approaches, discipline is the key to understanding the relation between subjects and space and across subjects in society. Discipline, however, is not a form of power that works upon subjects but through subjects (Allen, 2003), and as such, it is relevant to non-linear approaches in that it operates through constitutive relations, discourses, techniques and practices, as opposed to being an externalised tool that can be manipulated by actors, isolated by the conditions of formation of the network itself and with causal impact on the outcome of the network. Discipline, as a form of power is fluid and operates in the intersections of localities, whether they are micro, as the case of the prison in Foucault’s research (1991a) or macro, as in the case of the exploration of the wider structures of governance inside liberal nation-states in Rose and Miller (1992), and Dean (1999); as such discipline rejects monodirectional accounts of power in that it flows horizontally and depends on multiple instruments and technologies beyond the mere imposition of a sovereign, vertical power source.
differently sized public spheres” (Keane, 1998, p. 188), which, it is argued, should be welcomed as a means to “ensure that nobody ‘owns’ power and increase the likelihood that its exercise everywhere is rendered more accountable to those whom it directly or indirectly affects” (ibid, p. 188). This argument proposed by Keane is the exemplification of the attempt to blend the distinction between public and private, state and non-state, into a system of overlapping networks “defined by the lack of differentiation among spheres” (ibid, p. 187).

Peace-building is then reconceptualised on the basis of the need to put a stop to such monotonous exercise of power by breaking down what needs to be governed into its constituent parts. This is consistent with the attempt to grasp ‘complex’ emergencies through more inclusive methods. In Foucault’s studies a similar diffusion of power is identified with the emergence of what he calls disciplinary power, the extension of more inclusive techniques through which a whole host of mechanisms and apparatuses are employed to make sense of, contain and prevent certain types of complex issues (including unwanted, criminal behaviour, the spread of diseases, etc.)

These complex issues are, however, always framed within an unfazed will to govern, which is, in itself, driven by a process that Foucault calls ‘normalisation’ (2007, p. 85), according to which the legitimate expression of

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9 Both neo-institutionalists and cosmopolitans, for instance, reject the intransigence of top-down economic reforms, as well as the rigidity of traditional forms of sovereign authority, accepting, in both cases, the need to create multiple networks and layers of governance to include NGOs, supra-national organisations, international institutions as well as state apparatuses. David Held’s vision of democracy, for instance, does not advocate the outright abandonment of domestic institutional structures but a functional overlapping of “local, regional and global processes and structures” (1993, p. 39). Held’s vision recasts the territorial aspect of statehood in a manner which does not reject statehood itself but is rather a reflection of the sensitivity to the limits of governance understood as the exercise of a ‘unilateral right’ to policy-make, in favour of a form of governance that embeds the process of governing into “boundary transcending organisations” (ibid, p. 228). Whilst the rejection of boundaries seems to be the antithesis of the work undertaken by neo-institutionalist, one could argue that the latter school would find itself in agreement with cosmopolitan perspectives on the need not to rely only on strong state structures understood as unilaterally exercising sovereign power. Neo-institutionalist perspectives that focus on state-building indeed warn against relying on an outdated understanding of the all-powerful vertical sovereign state model, in favour of re-building institutions as inherently deeply entrenched in transnational and international webs to tackle issues such as international terrorism and crime (Reilly & Wainwright, 2005, p. 139). These perspectives also promote a move away from seeing the state as a ‘singular entity’, focusing on the multiple layers of governance structures therein (Skendaj, 2014, p. 3). The acknowledgment of the limits to top-down governance has been instrumental in framing the beginning of the debates on the importance of the local, already present in the work of both cosmopolitan debates on grassroots and NGOs, as well as neo-institutionalist calls to devolve power to local stakeholders.
governance is identified. This is the process through which the ‘normal’ standard is established, and through which behaviour is judged as normal or abnormal, and hence in need of modification and treatment. Setting up the ‘normal’ and problematising the abnormal is a prescriptive endeavour through which an analysis of the atomic level of the milieu “breaks down individuals, places, time, movements, actions and operations […] into components such that they can be seen, on the one hand, and modified on the other” (ibid, p. 84). Peace-building in itself contains such element of normalisation, mostly visible in the discourses around failed states, but also more largely acknowledged in the general assessment of problematic areas that require some sort of intervention.

Because normalisation indicates the need to address the abnormal by breaking down the complex into its atomic components, a similar process can be seen at play in the critiques and alternatives explored in this chapter. It is, in fact, through their attempt to ‘complexify’ the milieu by making the components more visible that these are also exposed more directly to the prescriptive nature of normalisation and thus made more modifiable. It is thus no surprise that such breakdown of the whole into components did not result in a lesser form of engagement, but rather evolved into a multi-layered, invasive form of social engineering, whilst at the same time relying on power being diffused and exercised at all levels of governance, including the local, the international, the grassroots, and the state. Power being fragmented should not, in fact, be taken necessarily as a sign of the end of the will to regulate the conduct of society as much as evidence of the acknowledgment of the need to regulate it better. This is arguably also Foucault’s conclusion on the shift towards disciplinary forms of punishment and disciplinary power used to contain and respond to public problems such as food scarcity or pandemics (2007). It is also my conclusion with regards the nature of the emergence of the critiques and the shift away from liberalisation. Since the fragmentation of peace-building along horizontal, non-linear lines was not met with a deeper examination of why conflicts are problematised and how solutions are consequently produced, but rather focused around a mainly technical discussion regarding the techniques and methods of externally led peace-building, this re-conceptualisation of peace-building resulted in a mere technical refinement of techniques and apparatuses. These
disciplinary techniques are visible in the promotion of more ‘monitoring’ instruments that can facilitate setting up “specific limits on the arbitrary exercise of power by leaders and political institutions” (Rotberg, 2004, p. 37), as in calls to wait until conditions are ripe for elections and to control hate speech (Paris, 2004), to monitor elections (Zartman, 2005, p. 283) and to establish “at the very least, a monitoring mechanism to track aid flows” to more efficiently regulate the budget for post-conflict reconstruction (Chesterman, 2005, p. 347)

The construction of the liberal peace paradigm as a problematic ensemble of actions, tendencies, negative outcomes and problematic elements, did facilitate a significant shift, albeit one based on questioning the methodology of peace-building, rather than the fundamental plausibility of ‘building’ peace. This shift, it can be argued, is consistent with the emergence of a disciplinary form of peace-building in that, firstly, the identification of failure, the problematisation of conflict and the general affirmation of the need to peace-build is reflective of such forms of normalisation that seek, as Foucault suggested, to establish the normal as well as the abnormal to correct. Secondly, the actions taken on the basis of such normalisation, that is the correcting, ‘fixing’ and ‘managing’ of conflicts, requires accessing the social milieu “at the level of the group and at the level of each individual” (Foucault, 2007, p. 89), using rational calculations that not only identify the abnormal after it emerges, but also seek to address the potential for its emergence.

Foucault discusses the treatment of smallpox in modern European states as being an example of disciplinary power used to understand the cases at individual and group level, for the purpose of identifying the risk of catching the disease. Likewise, the potential for failure is framed as a central part of peace-building in the form of insecurity (whether it is economic insecurity, political instability, and a general ‘fear’ of failure), which frames the need to ‘understand’ the problem as a simultaneous and implicit desire to ‘fix’ it and ‘prevent it’. Here, Foucault marks an interesting difference between sovereign power and disciplinary power that can be helpful in understanding the shift towards what I call more invasive forms of disciplinary peace-building. Whereas, Foucault suggests, sovereign power operated through imagining the negative –
formulating edicts on the basis of what must not be done – discipline works in “a sphere complementary to reality” (2007, p. 69), and as such is dependent on acknowledging the constraints and limits imposed by the fact that “the nature of reality is tenacious and difficult to overcome” (2007, p. 69). Discipline relies, fundamentally, on an acknowledgment of the limits of imagining direct power; it is the beginning of the end of non-reflexive, inflexible, top-down governance.

Similarly, the multi-layered and multi-level forms of governance implied by the emergent critics from the neo-institutionalist and cosmopolitan perspectives, present a whole host of solutions which diffuse power by pluralising governance through multilateral efforts (Reilly & Wainwright, 2005, p. 139), promoting communication internationally and across boundaries at the grassroots level, and contributing to signalling the end of inflexible governance, whether it was attributed to economic reforms (Barbara, 2008, p. 110) or rigid territorial interpretations of governance (Scholte, 2004, p. 230). At the same time, however, the projecting of the ‘normal’ standard through all these multiple levels, actors and tools does not cease to operate, providing direction to the techniques of discipline. The result is a form of power that does not rule over its subjects but disciplines more subtly through them at the individual and collective level, at the institutional as well as at the informal level.

The fundamental inability to recalculate the nature of the normalisation that decides what is normal or not, what is an appropriate expression of conflict or not, continues to perpetrate a core prescriptiveness that does not result in the total fragmentation of power, but in the instrumental acknowledgment of the contingent and of the multiple only insofar as it makes governing easier and more efficient. Thus when peace-building scholars discuss the need for more inclusive methods, for a deeper understanding of the problem, for a more nuanced form of intervention, or for an appreciation of the inability to impose macro reforms, this is done, arguably, not with a view to understand and disprove the link between the liberal peace and peace-building (as I have discussed in the previous section, this is largely accepted as a natural connection), nor to question ‘what is to govern the post-conflict’. Just as the function of critiquing sovereign power was not necessarily to fundamentally question the legitimacy of governance, so the
function of the critique of liberal peace-building is not, thus, to question whether or not to peace-build, nor was it to jettison peace-building in lieu of its notable mistakes, nor to question the nature of peace and the problematisation of conflict, to understand the emergence and construction of collectives or the relational aspects of governance.

Instead, the function of the critique was rather to ‘peace-build’ better, to build the social body itself, to more directly access the complexities of the body politic in order not to necessarily celebrate its plurality, but to manage it and its irregularities and their expressions such as conflict, instability and underdevelopment. The shift, one can argue, represents not necessarily the outcome of a deep discussion over the justification for the right to ‘govern’ over the complexities of the post-conflict (i.e. the right to ‘peace-build’ in the first place) but was rather an exercise in the establishment of a new way to govern, to peace-build more, and to do it better.

**Conclusion**

The concept of the ‘liberal peace’ is fundamental to the debates on peace-building, particularly, as will be seen in the next chapter, to the most recent re-conceptualisation efforts which have, by and large, sought to construct a different paradigm directly against what they perceived to be a coherent liberal peace strategy. This chapter, however, has suggested that the foundations for the identification of the liberal peace as a coherent strategy have been laid by the critics of peace-building of the late 1990s-early 2000s, who collected the bulk of western foreign policy, the post-Cold War international order, a disparate set of liberal theories, along with a whole host of actors and methods, under the label ‘liberal peace’. Furthermore, it has been suggested, this association led to the perception that peace-building was being driven by a coherent plan, and by a largely consistent and harmonious group of actors, commonly joined in the pursuit of ‘liberal’ aims, through largely common liberal ‘methods’. Where this logic was identified, the contours of the liberal paradigm were drawn – although these would later be much more solidly cemented by the local turn, as I will discuss below. This project was then associated with what was perceived to be the primary mechanisms of the liberal peace in the 1990s (liberalisation), and the
outcomes of conflict management missions across the globe, most of which presented various implementation issues.

The consensus around the existence of the liberal peace, however, is problematic for two main reasons. Firstly because, as seen in section 3, this does not allow for a nuanced account of the differences within liberal theory itself, or between the actors, their aims, and the practical details of the missions themselves. These are largely reduced and selectively chosen to be added to the ‘liberal label’ discounting the significant fact that many practical issues with peace-building may not necessarily revolve primarily around the ‘liberalness’ of the missions, the aims or the actors. Therefore, it has been suggested, the focus on the liberal peace on the side of the critics has not enabled what could have been a more fruitful engagement with substantial issues concerning autonomy, legitimacy and authority, which are reduced mostly to an assessment of the gap between the intentions of the liberal and the ‘virtual peace’ created on the ground. Finally, the focus on the ‘liberal’ nature of peace-building has also had the consequence, which will be examined in more detail in the next chapter, to naturalise the liberal peace as an objectively existing object of critique. Contradictions and paradoxes visible with the liberal peace, where they are acknowledged, are consistently still attributed to intentionally ‘sinister’ intents of the liberal peace. Thus, the construction of the ‘liberal peace’ is acknowledged only insofar as it can be used to critique it, rather than to question its existence in the first place.

Because of the focus on the mechanisms for the implementation of peace-building (i.e. the critique of liberalisation) and because of an essentially unchanged and undisturbed assumption regarding the need of interventionism and conflict management, the solutions that have emerged in the early 2000s – and in particular those coming from neo-institutionalist and cosmopolitan perspectives – do not consider the possibility of jettisoning peace-building, nor do they question the very foundations of the so called ‘liberal peace’. Instead, the critiques, whilst on the one hand acknowledging the complex nature of the post-conflict milieu, do so only insofar as this acknowledgment can be used to flag up the limited nature of the previous approach. This purely procedural
critique, it has been argued, treats complexity as the natural limitation of inflexible top-down solutions, a multiplicity which, however, can and indeed needs to be grasped if peace-building is to succeed.

Solutions that promote more inclusionary approaches – the fragmentation of governance and the diffusion of power, such as neo-institutionalist approaches that focus on state-building, or cosmopolitan approaches on transnationalism – are responsible not only for the superficial shift from liberalisation to institutionalisation, or from peace-building to state-building. They are, crucially, responsible for a more fundamental – and purely mechanical and procedural – shift in the techniques of governance of the post-conflict milieu; one which, by necessity, recognises complexity, decomposes the milieu into its ‘atomic’ levels, calls for the end of absolute top-down power, but does not proclaim the end of governance or the end of peace-building. Rather, by eschewing substantial debates over the nature of reconstruction, intervention, authority, autonomy, liberalism, democracy, they do not question whether or not to peace-build, but rather prescribe the need to peace-build more, and to do it better. The next chapter will engage with the emergence of a strand of critique that evaluates the impact and implication of the shift towards more extensive, and more involved, forms of peace-building outlined above. As will be seen in the next chapter, whilst this critique fundamentally challenges the feasibility and desirability of long-drawn missions, they agree with the identification of the common ethos and driving logic behind this extended engagement, namely the liberal peace paradigm. This becomes central to the framing of new ways of thinking about peace-building and takes centre stage in the emergence of bottom-up approaches.
Chapter 2
The Local Turn:
The Problematisation of the ‘Liberal Peace’ and the End of Top-Down Peace-Building

Introduction

This chapter continues the discussion on the re-conceptualisation of peace-building by focusing on the emergence of the local turn. The chapter outlines the fundamental claims of the scholarship advocating for a substantial shift in the way in which peace-building is theoretically framed. This shift, starting from existing critiques of the liberal peace (outlined in Chapter 1, section 2) and complementing these with lessons-learnt considerations from the missions initiated in the late-1990s-early 2000s, consolidates the image of liberal peace-building as the object of critique, by adding to the pool of problematic tendencies and outcomes. The tendency of liberal peace-building to rely on top-down solutions in the form of institution-building to obtain its aims, is added to the host of characteristics that exist under the label ‘liberal peace-building’. This is explained as being a function of the universalising and totalising tendencies of the liberal paradigm. The solution, bottom-up, is then framed in opposition to these totalising and universalising tendencies. The chapter seeks, therefore, to outline the nature of this shift from top-down to bottom-up and to argue that this shift reflects the emergence of a form of biopower grounded in the acknowledgment of the inability to govern through imposing coercive solutions such as state-building. The emergence of this form of power is a consequence of the call to diffuse power and the opening up of contingencies and pluralities.

The first section furthers the discussion on the liberal peace by outlining the critiques coming from the local turn. This is central in that these critiques cement the consensus around the nature of the liberal peace, by adding to its description a number of negative outcomes and tendencies ascertained in the peace-building missions of the late 1990s- early 2000s. In particular this section focuses on the main point of critique against the liberal peace, namely its hegemonic nature and its consequential tendency to marginalise alternative
narratives. The second section, then, examines the emergence of solutions known as the ‘local turn’.

The critiques of the liberal peace, after ascertaining the hegemonic and exclusionary tendency of the liberal peace, call for an alternative to the liberal peace, by advocating the need of a shift in focus towards the local recipients of peace-building. This change in focus, it is advocated by the critics, is necessary to combat the ill effects of an increasingly out-of-touch liberal peace. What is called for is an appreciation for the multiplicity and plurality of the complex post-conflict milieu beyond what is identified as a still primarily rhetorical commitment of the liberal peace whose main aim is to perpetuate and expand the liberal project. The previous approach, the liberal peace, is now fundamentally rejected as unable to come to terms with the complex post-conflict milieu beyond the imposition of top-down solutions that perpetuate its hegemonic plans. These, it is suggested, are consistent with forms of governance that can no longer deal with the emergent agency of the local and the realities of the everyday without eliciting resistance and essentially non-organic forms of peace. The end of top-down governance, as is examined in the third section, is consistent with a shift in focus away from disciplinary forms of power towards a more fragmented understanding of power akin to what Foucault – in his own context of study – called biopower, emerging through the framing of the social milieu as essentially complex and contingent, and not governable, manageable and predictable from the top.

In the fourth section, the significance of this shift is explored. Particularly, it is suggested that the fragmentation of governance to allow for the emergence of a more ‘authentic’ plane of everyday agency beyond the rigidity of the liberal peace form of governance, is symptomatic not of a total retreat of governance and the subsequent jettisoning or calling into question of interventionism, but with a further refinement of the techniques employed for the exercise of power. This, far from being an outcome exclusive to the technologies of governing employed in the liberal peace’s project of expansion, is also evident in the local turn’s construction of the ‘everyday’ as a contingent
and complex plane of action which, whilst representing the end of top-down governance, is still framed as a reality to grasp, include and, ultimately, govern.

Ultimately, it is argued, the fragmentation of governance does not epitomise the ending of the aspiration to govern, as much as it represents the refinement of the mechanisms of governance to target the individual and the collective as a complex whole whose mechanisms may not really be identified and explained but whose potential failure is always present and in need of being addressed.

1. **Introducing the ‘Local Turn’: The Critiques of Liberal Peace-Building**

The controversial decisions to initiate military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq were pitted against the backdrop of over a decade of less than fruitful foreign engagements with failing, failed, post-war and conflict territories. If, as the previous chapter suggested, the call for ‘better’ engagement translated into ‘more’ engagement, this is particularly visible in the muscular engagement, first with Kosovo, and later Afghanistan and Iraq. By the mid-2000s, however, it was quickly becoming clear that these muscular interventions presented many problematic features, most of which manifested in the form of resistance. The difficulties in successfully ‘securing’ the north of Kosovo (Bieber, 2011), the limited post-Taliban peace obtained in Afghanistan (Mac Ginty, 2010), and the persistent local hostility encountered in Iraq (Edelstein, 2009, p. 93), are only some of the issues haunting the record of foreign engagement in the mid-2000s. It is not surprising, once again, that calls for rethinking the parameters of peace-building should start from a practical assessment of the record on the ground.

The critical scholarship emerging towards the end of the first decade of the 2000s soon began to express urgent concern over the impact of what were increasingly perceived as heavy-handed interventions. Calls for the emergence of a new “critical agenda for peace” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 766) came to be grounded in the imperative of taking stock of what the record of peace-building seemed to be indicating as a crisis of what had been identified as the project of liberal peace-building (Richmond, 2009a). Critical approaches to liberal peace-building vary, to an extent, in focus and range of methodologies
employed, as well as in theoretical provenance. Yet, it is possible to identify a common effort to draw out evidence to prove top-down approaches employed by liberal peace-builders as problematic and limited (amongst many, see: Campbell, 2011; Felix da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012; Hameiri, 2010; Lemay-Hébert & Mathieu, 2014; Tschirgi, 2010; Wolff, 2011).

The problems identified in the critique range from unstable political settlements such as that achieved in Bosnia (Donais, 2012, p. 95), local resistance such as that witnessed in Cambodia and Afghanistan (Richmond, 2010b), local elite co-option of the liberal peace-building agenda as in Kosovo (Visoka, 2012b), increasing legitimacy issues besieging international administrations (Lemay-Hébert, 2011) and the recurrence of violence or increasing volatility of the ‘negative peace’ obtained in places like Kosovo and Iraq, accompanied by the polarisation of certain factions of society excluded from politics by external actors (Newman, 2011, p. 1745). Furthermore, worsening security and economic conditions are also evidenced, particularly in cases where the apparatuses had to be rebuilt from scratch as in the cases of Kosovo and East Timor. Some notable critiques, in fact, focus on outlining the inability of the liberal peace-building project to come to terms with unsustainable economic growth, economic polarisation (Smoljan, 2003, p. 245), the breakdown of the welfare state (Pugh, 2010), further retreat into anti-western feeling (Van der Linden, 2001) and continued marginalisation of non-liberal polities (Jahn, 2007). These accounts often suggest that the project of expanding the reach of liberalism has operated at the expenses of a more nuanced understanding of conflicts.

Other scholars identify substantial issues of accountability and legitimacy, mostly evident in the nature of transitional administrations of post-conflict territories, by pointing particularly to the need to review the process to include substantial ‘local input’ (Caplan, 2005; Chopra, 2000, p. 29). These critiques draw on case study analyses of a wide array of missions, from state-building in Kosovo, to peace-maintenance in Sierra Leone, to democracy promotion in Iraq. Despite the notable social, historical and political differences between these cases, the critical accounts provide a common critique pointing to
the lack of norm incorporation, attributing this to the nature of projects and reforms as not attuned to local realities. This gap, then, is linked to low legitimacy (Roberts, 2013, p. 83) and to blurring lines of responsibility (Bliesemmann de Guevara, 2010, p. 121). The local/international gap is also attributed to the inability of external liberal agents to acknowledge the local counterparts as anything other than a “homogenous and disorderly Other” (Richmond, 2009b, p. 325), and attributed to the tendency of liberal peace-building, to rely on technical exercises in state-building (Brown & Gusmao, 2012; Richmond, 2010b) based on one-size-fits-all blueprints and “off-the-shelf packages” (Boege, 2012, p. 104), and finally also attributed to the hypocrisy of a liberal project which is considered to be “self-interested and ineffective” (Sabaratnam, 2011a, p. 799).

Other scholars suggest that the gap between liberal plans and local realities is particularly manifested in the form of resistance; “a wave of popular opposition to the international administration” is noted by Lemay-Hébert in his research into UNTAET and UNMIK in East Timor and Kosovo respectively (2012, p. 467). In particular, Lemay- Hébert suggests, this is evidence that the legitimacy of international peace-building authorities are questioned and that nowhere is a legitimacy gap more visible than in the case of the transitional administration in Kosovo. Here, the emergence of Vetevendosje and general local discontent with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) may reflect a concern not necessarily with the internationals per se, but rather with the “idea of absolute control” (2013, p. 98). The gap, however, extends beyond local despondency to externally imposed policy packages or to the international presence. Indeed, critics suggest that the gap is visible in the outcome of the projects of institution-building in themselves, which are claimed to have had “little impact, other than in basic security and rhetorical, rights-oriented terms, on the everyday life of populations” (Richmond, 2009b, p. 325). The impact on the recipient societies is often limited to formal structures, and is suggested to be at best insubstantial, particularly on the security apparatuses of post-conflict territories (Bliesemmann de Guevara, 2010, p. 114).
In the identification of trends and patterns, outcomes and tendencies, of the missions of the 1990s and 2000s, perspectives critical of peace-building arguably also concur in cementing a coherent picture of the liberal peace project. The project of promoting the liberal peace is said to be characterised by restrictive, blueprint-like projects, not attuned to local conditions, imposed from the above, and displaying little concern for pre-existing forms of governance, traditional and customary institutions, cultural sensitivities, and/or a complex combination of all of these factors (Caplan, 2007; Chandler, 2006; Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013; Wilde, 2007). Here it is worth noting that in the emergence of the new critical paradigm, the maintenance of the liberal/non liberal semantic categories is instrumental to portraying the solutions as radical, reflexive and pluralist, opposed to the ‘dogmatic’ nature of the liberal framework (Lidén, 2009, p. 630; Richmond, 2011a, p. 2). The following section focuses particularly on one element of the critiques of the liberal peace, one which is commonly identified by critical perspectives regardless of their theoretical provenance, namely the hegemonic nature of the liberal peace. This is important in that the negative outcomes of the liberal peace are given meaning by framing them within a coherent plan of hegemonic intent, which is said to drive the linear logic behind the liberal peace-building paradigm. Against this perceived hegemony the local turn offers an opposite and radical project of empowerment that starts by displacing top-down governance through locally sourced forms of agency.

2. The Problem of Liberal Hegemony

The hegemonic nature of the liberal peace is the character that is most frequently and most vehemently attacked by the recent critiques of peace-building. The perceived hegemony of the liberal peace, it will be seen, is the starting points of these critiques to address the issue of peace-building and attempt an ontological reconfiguration of the subjects of peace-thinking and peace-building.

The problem of hegemony is handled, in the critiques, not just as a discursive reality born out of the absence of any other competing ‘project’ to that of the liberal peace (Hopgood, 2000, p. 2), but it is also framed as an inherent aspect of the liberal theoretical underpinnings of the paradigm itself. Beate Jahn,
for instance, suggests that liberalism in itself is bound to produce inequality, and attributes this to the promotion of private property, and in particular with the role of government as guarantor and protector. Internationally, Jahn notes, from the time of John Locke onwards, territories and societies not seen as protecting the right to private property were then considered to be legitimately open to the denial of political sovereignty and the removal of property rights (land) (2007). Whilst having nominally rejected such unequal assessment of the appropriateness of property and political rights, it is suggested that a similar logic continues to be applied by liberal state-builders towards non-liberal territories; where local government and society is not seen as able to understand or support the role of government as guarantor and protector of liberal rights, the territories are stripped of political sovereignty temporarily (e.g. Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq) and to a different extent (e.g. through the monitoring of elections such as the UN mission in Congo). Hegemony, is also visible in the inability of the liberal episteme to recognise its potential for producing “not just affluence but also poverty, not just progress but also moral regression” (Jahn, 2012a, p. 154). Hegemony, then, resulting from external imposition and local subordination, is identified as the outcome of practices of international governance such as development, peace-building and state-building, but it is also indicated as a precondition of liberal internationalism (Jahn, 2005, 2007, 2012b; Joseph, 2006, 2012).

Liberal peace-building’s project of spreading the liberal system is not, however, only attained through coercion and imposition, but is also dependent on processes of consent. Several contributions employ what Chandler identifies as ‘power based critiques’ (Chandler, 2011) to identify how such hegemonic tendencies are exercised with both methods of consent and coercion. Many of these contributions are influenced by critical theories, by post-colonial and post-structuralist perspectives, and some draw particularly on the work of Michel Foucault.¹ Foucault’s analysis of power and of the physical manifestations of

¹ Comprehensive analysis of peace-building through Foucauldian lenses include Lipschultz’s critique of liberal governmentality (2005), Richmond’s analysis of peace as everyday versus peace as top-down governance (2010a), and Debrix’s analysis of the techniques of surveillance and social control exercised by the United Nations through peacekeeping and peace-building missions (1999). These perspectives share a concern for the global and international dimensions
relations of power has been used, in fact, in relation to the post-conflict territory as a site where disciplinary power can be evidenced, as in relation to interventionism as an expression of international forms of governmentality that rely on panoptic-like forms of surveillance. Foucauldian accounts do not focus solely on surveillance to control societies, but also on non-coercive, subtler techniques that are deeply entrenched in the life of the subjects to operate, giving rise to accounts that are concerned with the regulation of the body politic through its biological qualities. These accounts identify, in particular, western apparatuses that produce and spread a particular set of normative assumptions regarding the conduct of society which are then imposed, through a variety of means and at various levels, on the basis of an assumption of universal validity of the liberal system and its norms (Duffield, 2010; Jabri, 2006; Reid, 2010). These techniques are consistent with what is called governmentality, as an ensemble of techniques for the control of the conduct of societies according to pre-given liberal standards. These techniques operated at different levels, and involve different aspects of governance from security apparatuses, to healthcare, education and development (see for instance: Campbell, 1998; McConnachie & Morison, 2008; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2005; Richmond, 2010a).

Indeed, the mechanisms employed to regulate the conduct of society do not necessarily need to be coercive. On the contrary, they can be more efficient if they are framed as adaptable and reflective. Governmentality is usually attributed such an adaptable quality, as a diverse range of institutional manipulations and ideological representations are employed to make up the

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2 The type of global governance exemplified by the emergence of UN supported missions in the mid-1990s is, for instance, indicated to be the embodiment of what Debrìx calls Panopticism, taking inspiration from Foucauldian analyses of discipline through surveillance: "panopticism in contemporary international affairs is the dream, formulated by sovereign states, of having international organizations peacefully control and dominate the entire spectrum of international activities, at any time and in any place, by multiplying global surveillance mechanisms" (1999, p. 84).

3 For comprehensive accounts of liberal governmentality as it pertains to international governance structures involved in discourses of development and capacity-building see Joseph (2006) and Larner & Walters (2004). These perspectives are particularly concerned with how the domestic technologies of power involved to control societies and spread liberal governmentality are also visible at the international and global level in the liberal system’s attempt to govern over global spaces.
practices through which power relations are continuously reasserted as they are modified (Porter, 1993, p. 152), thus removing the need for forceful imposition. For this reason, critical approaches are not blind to the efforts coming from the policy world to reflect upon the need to include the local in the re-conceptualisation of peace-building. Critical approaches then explore how the local has been included/listened to, suggesting that efforts to localise coming from international organisations, donor countries and/or transnational agents can be understood primarily as rhetorical instruments of discipline (amongst many others, see Richmond, 2009b) for the deepening of governmentality and of western/northern modes of existence (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, pp. 774–5). The different methods employed to manage societies, including for instance the shift from a more direct form of ruling to a partnership based engagement, ripe with rhetoric of ‘local ownership’, is explained as the ability of liberal governmentality to change and adapt in order to become more efficient in its grasp of the subject’s conduct (Rose & Miller, 1992). Indeed, it is argued that such projects of consent rely on rhetorical framings of ‘partnership’ and support that seem to hide more sinister plans (Barbara, 2008, p. 316) and that do not represent ‘genuine’ partnership (Baskin, 2006, p. 88; Boege, Brown, Clements, & Nolan, 2009, p. 612) but that continue to be used in order to foster the cooperation (or lack of resistance) of the local population for the continued exercise of liberal power and influence. Jabri refers to this as a ‘post-colonial’ rationality, through which the local is not entirely negated or openly opposed, but rather, where the local is incorporated through a rationality that requires listening to the subjects of governing for efficiency’s sake (2013). Because of the scepticism towards the intentions of the liberal peace and its agents, attempts to localise peace are seen as problematic as, at their worst, these frameworks can use labels such as ‘peace-making’, ‘securitisation’, and the “benign language of humanitarian intervention” to “airbrush-out the casualties in opposing armies and civilian populations” occurring as a consequence of aggressively militarised missions (Francis, 2010, p. 77).

Just as the policy world’s employment of the local rhetoric is considered insufficient at best as well as potentially manipulated by the liberal peace for the
advancement of its hegemonic plan, theoretical approaches to reconceptualising peace-building also do not escape the criticism exercised by the local turn. Some attempts to conceive of peace-building in a more inclusive manner, are framed as being an extension of the regulatory and managerial governmentality of liberal modernity. In other words, the critique suggests that previous approaches, including for instance the critical perspectives advanced in the early 2000s (see Chapter 1) represent attempts to include the local in a manner which remains insufficient, merely rhetorical in nature. It is suggested, for instance, that these perspectives, despite conceding to the existence of problems with previous liberal approaches, continue to represent “more of the same” (Roberts, 2013, p. 67), given their unshed reliance on Weberian understandings of statehood (Lemay-Hébert, 2014). Furthermore, the rhetorical engagement with the local is also problematised by scholars of the local turn who focus on the relationship between state and society. Robins, for instance, critiques neo-institutionalist approaches – such as those coming from Call and Cousens (2008), Clapham (2003) and Milliken & Krause (2002) – suggesting that these perspectives’ consideration of the local rely on employing standards (to gauge whether governance is sufficiently including the local) that originate in metropolitan, international and cosmopolitan ideas, rather than originating from the very priorities of the populations affected. Thus, Robins suggests that the resulting “liberal peace that perceives legitimacy as constructed in metropolitan institutions rather than in the communities where people live can be irrelevant to such local priorities and thus struggle to be perceived as legitimate” (2013, p. 47). It is also suggested that certain institutionalist approaches continue to prefer solutions that seem to be more impactful in the short term because they are more muscular, and thus they tend to diminish the impact of local needs, and at times consider them a hindrance to the goals of the liberal peace that can bog down the processes of consultation essential to the liberal peace-builders. These views are critiqued by Oliver Richmond as essentially tied a liberal governmentality, that does not engage with local realities (2009a, p. 575).

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4 The author is referring, in particular to the work of Chesterman (2004b) and Call (C. Call, 2008) on institution-building as a peace-building tool.
Despite the differences between the missions and the actors involved (much as it was argued in the previous chapter), the consensus on the liberal nature of peace-building and on its foundational qualities (hegemony, universalism, exclusion) have never been as strong as with the critiques of the mid-2000s. Indeed, these come to cement the idea of the liberal peace paradigm not only by concurring in the identification of what are perceived to be primarily liberal reforms, actors and aims (see Chapter 1, sections 1 and 2), but also, by reinforcing a link between the outcomes of peace-building and the inherent qualities of the liberal paradigm. The ethos of promoting liberalism abroad is then tied to the inherently negative exclusionary and hegemonic tendencies of liberal actors and liberal theory alike, and these are then not only critiqued as having caused problems with the peace-building missions, but potentially also indicate the a priori fallibility of the liberal peace project itself, grounded in the liberal paradigm’s innate tendency to exclude and marginalise in order to attain its vision. As such, the identification of a clear ‘liberal’ paradigm is instrumental in the emergence of the most contemporary approach to peace-building as different and radically opposed to the principles (and also the outcomes) of what is painted as an insufficient and flawed paradigm.

Such fundamental critical agreement on what not to do (i.e. the critique of the liberal peace), has in fact placed the roots for calls to re-envision a ‘post-liberal’ way of conceptualising and practising peace-building. “Does this mean the end of liberal institutional governance?” Oliver Richmond asked perceptively in 2009. He replies by suggesting that scholarship should be enabled to develop theoretical approaches,

…without these being tainted by Western, liberal, and developed world orthodoxies and interests. In other words, to gain an understanding of the ‘indigenous’ and everyday factors for the overall project of building peace, liberal or otherwise, a via media needs to be developed between emergent local knowledge and the orthodoxy of international prescriptions and assumptions about peace (Richmond, 2009a, p. 571 my emphasis).

The notion of ‘everyday’ then emerges as an analytical category, representing both an alternative to the liberal peace, as well as an acknowledgment of the already existing hybrid nature of post-conflict settings. Critical approaches have
then formulated solutions that are firstly pitted against the liberal peace, its perceived ethos and the whole host of its adduced by-products, as discussed above, and are also projected into what are framed as yet unexplored and unattained objectives of pluralism, celebration of everyday agency, dialectical articulation of subjectivities, complexity and non-linearity. Having discussed the point of departure for the emergence of the local turn, namely the critique of the liberal peace’s ‘unbecoming’ project of hegemony, the chapter now turns to exploring the solutions offered in order to discuss the effect of the critique on the newly emergent conceptualisation of peace-building beyond the perceived liberal orthodoxy.

3. The Solutions: The Everyday and the End of Top-Down Governance

In the previous chapter, I acknowledged that in the early 2000s, some perspectives consistent with neo-institutionalist as well as cosmopolitan perspectives, embraced the need to create a more inclusionary form of peace-building by acknowledging the complexity of the post-conflict (see Chapter 1, section 4). This, I suggested, generated more intrusive forms of peace-building; it also represented a shift in the form of power employed to address dysfunctional and problematic conflict situations, akin to a shift towards disciplinary forms of peace-building. These perspectives also suggested that peace-building could no longer promulgate solutions without acknowledging the realities on the ground (for instance, through remotely extended macro-economic reforms typical of liberalisation techniques). I suggested that the solutions provided still called for the need of some form of top-down governance (i.e. the reliance on strong state institutions for the delivery of services for the supporters of neo-institutionalism, and supra-national and trans-national mechanisms of governance for the cosmopolitans), resulting in a shift that handled the complexity of the post-conflict as a problem to be understood, catered for and managed. Where others have suggested this is part of liberal governmentality, I have suggested that the

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5 Indeed critics have also concurred in the identification of disciplinary elements of interventions in the 2000s. Peace-building itself is, Jabri argues, “a project of governmentality, or the government of populations. It is designed in bio-political terms as a project of institution-building, or more specifically of ‘state- building’, and its agents are at once both local and international, military and civilian.” (2013, p. 14) Elements of governmentality are noted in post-
type of power employed is indeed of a disciplinary nature, although I have refrained from concurring in the identification of a coherent ‘liberal’ strategy of hegemonic expansion.

What happens with the local turn, however, is crucial in that the shift away from top-down implies the emergence of an even more radical trend in governance, one which acknowledges the impossibility of ‘controlling’ the complexity of the social, accepting the ‘naturalness’ of the contingencies of the post-conflict milieu, condemning any top-down attempt as inherently hegemonic and fundamentally bound to fail. The local turn, Mac Ginty and Richmond suggest, has in fact indicated that “in the context of peace making power circulates rather than is unidirectional and top-down (meaning structural power and governmentality effectively fragment when applied to the subaltern or local)” (2013, p. 775), whilst also simultaneously offering a possible solution. “It may not be far-fetched to assume that liberal peace building’s oversight of the local may in some senses be designed to avoid this postcolonial realisation of subaltern agency” (ibid, p.775). The desire to rethink peace-building from the bottom up is in fact premised on an acknowledgment of the end of top-down governance through its framing and rejection of liberal peace-building’s teleological assumptions regarding the possibility to know the causes of conflict and artificially alter them towards a desired end.6 This is identified and then condemned as an outdated and inflexible linear paradigm by critiques that offer solutions which advocate a fundamental re-assessment and re-working of the very endeavour of peace-building beyond the liberal peace (Sörensen, 2006, p. 318).

conflict reconstruction efforts such as Cambodia and Yugoslavia; Hughes and Pupavac, for instance, note the “policing of collective action and perceptions of the need to discipline damaged and culturally mal-programmed citizens into appropriate behavioural norms” which has generated a “a disciplined politics, regulated by international norms” (2005, p. 883).

6 Hopgood suggests that these typically linear, teleological assumptions form the backbone of Euro-centric arguments regarding what the vision of the ‘good life’ looks like, which are then used to classify certain forms of social interactions, conflicts, behaviours as ‘backward’ (Hopgood, 2000, p. 20).
As critiques of the liberal peace focus primarily on the hegemony of the liberal peace, solutions are framed beyond the universal and linear logic\textsuperscript{7} that are said to pose undeniable limits to traditional peace-building theory and practice (Richmond, 2008b, p. 444; Robins, 2013b, p. 51). In practice, a shift is advocated, to unsettle the dominating tendencies of the liberal paradigm and its alienating effect on the local recipients of peace. Since the problems identified in the previous paragraph are essentially tied to the top-down nature of peace-building, a bottom-up solution is often mentioned as a required response. What is suggested is a multi-layered effort to place the local firmly at the centre of the practice of peace-building. Several scholars, such as Felix da Costa and Karlsrud, point to the need of bottom-up approaches to counter previous top-down strategies responsible for mere replications of macro level decisions (2012). In this direction, Roger Mac Ginty too, has pointed to the need to add ‘trickle-up’ to the ‘trickle-down’ development (2012b, pp. 210–211). More attention to local agency is proposed as necessary in order to successfully enhance the local ownership of and input in the peace-building agendas (Autesserre, 2010). Such input may reveal the possibility to open up to multiple and different understandings of peace. Van Leeuwen and Verkoren, for instance, suggest that external actors need to be ready to accept that the social contract of these territories might possibly take different forms from the accepted western liberal one (2012a, p. 91).

The focus on the local subjects of peace is understood as emerging “as a result of the fact that their presence exemplifies the impact of conflict and plays an important role in perceptions of legitimacy and in community attitudes to the post-conflict dispensation” (Robins, 2013, p. 47). In this case, then, bottom-up is understood as affecting the legitimacy gap identified in the previous sections. The solution offered to unsettle the primacy of western forms of knowledge rests in identifying those forms of agency, knowledge and expertise that are said to have been alienated and marginalised (Richmond, 2009a, p. 575). In particular,\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{7} For a comprehensive overview of the debate between linear and non-linear knowledge production informing research in peace-building, see Verkoren (2008). In particular, Verkoren’s analysis explores literature on the link between research and policy, examining a shift towards “a more complex view that emphasises a two-way process between research and policy” (2008, p. 92).
the everyday needs of these marginalised agents are the focus of bottom-up approaches that replace the rigid, institutional top-down logic, focusing on the local to rethink the parameters of peace-building (Mitchell, 2011). The ‘local’ is spatialised and identified with both the geographical location of the recipient population of peace-building (that which is opposed to the ‘international’), as well as being embedded in forms of agency that are identified according to their resistant qualities, and to their non-mainstream, informal (see, for instance, Kraushaar & Lambach, 2009, p. 1) and often non-liberal nature.

Critiques suggest that moving away from liberal hegemony is not merely a question of a practical change of strategy, but requires a far deeper and more fundamental de-centring of the foundational ontology of orthodox peace, along with the unsettling of the epistemological primacy of certain overarching meta-narratives. What is called for is a fundamental rethinking beyond the ‘structural’ liberal framework (Shinko, 2008, p. 474), a conceptual and theoretical reassessment of the key assumptions behind the project (Lemke, 2002; Richmond, 2010a). This requires a different ontological framing of actors, which can be more reflective of the variety of agency as well as facilitate mutual accommodation and the rise of political communities (Bliesemann de Guevara, 2010, p. 121; Boege, 2012), and a basic re-conceptualisation of the relationship between the international and the local, not on the basis of a “dichotomous binary” (Sabaratnam, 2011b, p. 260), but on a dialectical understanding of the relationship between formal and informal (Richmond, 2011a).

Here, the bottom-up, localised solution is offered as a stark opposition against the ‘fictional’ representation of the local provided by liberal peace-building. Oliver Richmond’s work is essential to the local turn’s claims regarding the possibility to frame peace-building beyond the fictional representations of the liberal peace. Richmond, in fact, suggests in particular the need to reconceptualise peace-building in theory, beyond positivist approaches that are claimed to have done little to interrogate the subject of peace-building and state-building (2008b, p. 450). Richmond’s concern for the epistemological faults of liberal understandings of peace-building is evident in his denouncement of the liberal belief that all knowledge is replicable, confirmable and
implementable, which he suggests is no longer adequate to the provision of a broad and comprehensive understanding of peace (ibid, p. 450).

He also indicates problems with the ontological assumptions of the liberal meta-narrative, essentially tied to an endless replication of narrow truth or ‘mimetic’ representations of an imagined reality, without paying sufficient attention to breadth and depth of subjectivities (ibid, p. 450). These epistemological and ontological orthodox assumptions are claimed to be responsible for the creation of a fictional peace, based on western myths regarding the local recipients of peace, as on liberal ‘idealised’ understandings of democratisation, statehood (Shah, 2009, p. 31) and the rule of law (Peterson, 2010, p. s34). The everyday, thus, is presented as a realm that not only exposes but also opposes the fictional and arbitrary constructions operated by the liberal peace. The everyday is qualified as a more authentic field of agency, vis-à-vis forms of knowledge that have been biased towards the west, and that do not necessarily prioritise the needs of the locals beyond what are perceived to be western liberal understandings (Robins, 2013). The liberal peace, it has been suggested, has been driven by a global discourse of rights wherein the only understanding of ‘local’ is dictated by elites and other groups speaking on behalf of victims of conflict. What this suggests, Robins claims, is that the rights that post-conflict peace-building tries to establish, even when they are geared towards the local, are modelled on a perception of what the victims of conflict need, rather than coming from the victims themselves (Robins, 2013, p. 48). Furthermore, speaking in regard to liberal peace-building in Sierra Leone, East Timor and the Ivory Coast, Newman notes that an “apolitical model of peace building can miss the reality on the ground and fail to create conditions conducive to durable stability” (2011, p. 1741). These accounts thus imply that the liberal project is responsible for establishing a virtual image of peace based on misleading and western-centric views, and crucially, that there are non-hierarchical, locally sourced behaviours and actions that do represent the ‘reality’ of the local, in its most authentic and least imaginary form. This reality on the ground, it is then suggested, is accessible through the focus on the local, allowing, as Tadjbakhsh suggests, “a new conception of peace-building that is more locally authentic, resonant, and agential, to emerge” (2011, p. 7). Moving
beyond the framework that dominates orthodox approaches to the study of peace is necessary, according to Richmond, in order to open up radical avenues of research and offering “multiple ontologies of peace” (2008b, p. 454).

The need to access the everyday in order to counter and replace top-down with bottom-up represents the belief that an ‘organic’ peace requires the emergence of a perception of ‘real’ as opposed to ‘virtual’ politics (Hughes, 2009, p. 240), closer to the populations affected by the interventions. This is not simply a matter of consultation, but a much more fundamental re-scripting of the roles of the actors involved, a diverse ontology of peace. Here, the notion of ‘organic’ peace takes centre stage; since the critiques of the liberal peace associate the previous approach with fictional and ‘virtual’ outcomes, this implies the existence of a truer, more ‘organic’8 realm from which a better form of peace can be attained, and one which can be accessed through bottom-up processes with the purpose of unsettling the dominating predispositions of the liberal paradigm, which has so far failed to help “alleviate local grievances and supporting organic, indigenous structures” (Oksamytna, 2011, p. 106).

The realm of the everyday is attributed several qualities, as will be seen below, although it is usually coherently identified primarily by its stance vis-à-vis the liberal peace. Despite the different terms employed to qualify the everyday (e.g. the ‘mundane’, the ‘hidden’, the ‘marginalised’, the ‘local-local’, the ‘authentic’), what local turn perspectives have in common is the portrayal of a social plane of agency and meaning that can be accessed, and indeed should be accessed, to engage with local realities and concerns beyond the mere realm of ‘high’ politics and institutional set-ups (Pouligny, 2006; Pugh, 2009; Richmond, 2009b, 2010b; Scott, 1985) and beyond the intransigence demonstrated by the liberal peace (Shinko, 2008, pp. 487–9). The everyday realities on the ground, Richmond claims, have one crucial critical function in that they expose the,

…liberal peace project [and] its general tendency to harvest power and resources for politicians, officials, experts, and institutions. This forms a liberal discourse that removes individual and societal agency

8 For specific references to the use of ‘organic’ in relation to indigenous and local processes of peace and state formation, see for instance Krause & Jütersonke (2005, p. 451) and Mac Ginty (2008, p. 145).
at the expense of empathy and care, and therefore of a sustainable peace. [...] The net effect is the displacing of community, culture, identity, and welfare in favour of external discourses of expert knowledge. These are tinged by their own ideology, culture, and interests. The everyday, empathy, and care therefore unsettle liberal institutions rather than merely confirming them, but add additional dimensions and sensitivities and the ontological dimension that they imply (2009a, p. 575).

Accessing this more ‘authentic’ realm of everyday agency is thus espoused as the best method to obtain the non-linear approach necessary to appreciate the contingency and complexity of different forms of agency. This is opposed to the inflexible ‘fictional’ understandings of the liberal peace that have so far handled the difference of the conflict milieu by relying on practices of inclusion/exclusion, dealing with the local mostly, as Richmond notes, in binary terms of assimilation or resistance. Richmond in fact suggests that liberal peace-building as a dominant order then attempts to deal with everyday needs and actions by strategically ‘domesticating’ these (2009a, p. 572) in order to make them fit into the binaries provided. A different, non-linear appreciation of everyday actions and behaviours would, however, understand ‘the everyday’ as a realm of malleable and ‘tactical’ forms of agency that would normally be encumbered by ‘hegemonic institutions’ representing the order, but whose material reality remains plural in nature, full of potential and an effective and undeniable reality. Indeed, this reality may be quite open to engagement (even by the liberal order and its agents) precisely because of its malleability and accessibility, although this would not really be a problem, as it would be the expression of a more genuine form of hybrid interaction that would be, in any case, closer to ‘locally imagined’ realities (Richmond, 2009a, pp. 572–3), free from the forcefulness of the teleological drive of a purely liberal-driven peace.

The notion of the everyday then enables a shift away from linearity and universality in that it is presented as a starting point to overturn the hegemonic tendencies of orthodox understandings of peace. Oliver Richmond’s use of the ‘everyday’ stems from an adaptation of Michel De Certeau’s notion of the everyday, ⁹ used specifically to move peace-building away from a focus on the

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⁹ Richmond uses De Certeau’s distinction between strategy and tactics to discuss everyday agency. In De Certeau’s writings ‘strategy’ is the type of manipulation exercised by agents of
institutional trappings of power, to a more fluid understanding of micro-level behaviours and actions through which populations take ownership of and affect the processes of governance to which they are subjected. “This re-appropriation through the everyday then becomes a site of politics and represents a move from subjects to active citizens, from de-politicisation to self-government and self-determination” (Richmond, 2009a, p. 571). Meera Sabaratnam underlines the importance of everyday practices by suggesting the need to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the subjects of the peace-building; Sabaratnam, whilst outlining how orthodox IR approaches have been unable to go beyond the strict and often stereotypical roles of the actors involved, pushes for a deeper analysis of what has otherwise been called “the realm of the ‘mundane’”. This, she explains in the context of a study of Mozambique, could shed light on the impact and outcome of international practices on the local realities (Sabaratnam, 2011a, p. 799). Similarly, Alison Watson invites her readers to look beyond traditional political expressions and to explore the agency of the ‘everyday activist’ even in its smallest act of resistance that may, otherwise, go unnoticed; she points to examples such as fibre arts and mothering as important social elements of expression, resistance and agency that have important roles in the transformation of certain divided societies (2012, p. 50) on an everyday life basis. In these accounts the everyday is ‘accessed’ by looking beyond the formal and institutionalised into the fluid exercise of power through ordinary actions.

Ultimately, meaningful engagement with the ‘everyday’ is said to require a fundamental ‘paradigm shift’ (Pugh, 2009, p. 79) that would also open debates on a post-hegemonic world order (Cox cited by Pugh, 2009, p. 79). The everyday, in these accounts, is valued as a realm of complex interconnectedness beyond the rigidity of the categories applied by linear perspectives such as the liberal peace, and their binary identification of actors and their agendas. The complexity of the everyday is usually identified in already existing hybrid relations (Jarstad & Belloni, 2012, p. 4), forming everyday political and social

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modernity in order to identify and isolate the subject of power and to exercise scientific and strategic rationalisation to create clearly identifiable identities, fields, and knowledges to exercise power over subjects. Tactics, on the other hand, are juxtaposed as actions that counter the rigid borders and boundaries imposed through an external rationality and thus results in fluid and malleable expressions of agency (De Certeau, Jameson, & Lovitt, 1980, pp. 5–6).
local realities. Indeed, it is suggested that the everyday is, in itself, a terrain of shifting loyalties and identities (Scott, 1985, p. 22), a space of interplay between hybrid identities that allows for the agency of local actors to take shape and operate; nowhere, it is argued, is the political life of the subject more evident and lively than in ‘everyday’ struggles and modes of life of the local actors. In peace-building the everyday becomes a point of contact to engage local actors (from disenfranchised groups to elites, from subaltern to what Richmond calls the ‘local-local’ or the local agents beyond the stereotypes generated around the civil society) (Richmond, 2009b, p. 331). The hybrid everyday would shed light on the, ‘unscripted conversations’ (Duffield, 2007, p. 234), unexplored needs, ‘infrapolitics’ (Richmond, 2011a, p. 18), intentions and strategies of a wider variety of local actors beyond the elites typically engaged by the liberal peace (Belloni, 2012, p. 31).

Overturning the hegemony of the liberal peace requires also identifying forms of agency that express themselves primarily against said hegemony. As such resistance is often referred to as a crucial expression of the everyday, both in its function of countering hegemony and in its dynamic function of producing agency. The point of contact between the everyday and resistance is most notably identified as the transformative value resistance that seeks to replace misconceptions and avoid romanticisation and stereotypisation. Resistance speaks to the malleability of the everyday in that it is said not to require public organisation to be effective. “Efforts do not have to be public, organized, formal, or unambivalently intentional to qualify as resistance” (Riessman, 2000, p. 122). Often, said expressions of resistance “can be seen in even the smallest activities” (ibid, p. 122). Furthermore, resistance may also not necessarily be wilfully organised, and forms of unconscious resistance have been identified, which are of great relevance to scholars in order to acquire a different understanding of the ways in which problems are conceived by international and local stakeholders. Where, for instance, resistance has been identified in the case of Northern Ireland’s riots, graffiti and damage to the pockets of peace created by the internationals, this has not been primarily an attempt to raise a conscious issue against the liberal peace and its agents, but can be read as a form of discontent against the existing attempts to resolve the conflict, by accepting local discontent
as a form of raising awareness regarding a different perception of the stakes of the conflict, of what matters and what the problem at hand is (Mitchell & Kelly, 2011, p. 321). Resistance thus represents the everyday on its atomic level, and in particular it concerns the transformative quality of the everyday that translates recalcitrance, dissent or even de-politicisation into a useful and tactical expression of agency.

The atomic, informal and fragmented quality of the everyday gives it its unique non-linear analytical function. In the local turn, the appreciation for the complexity of the local and the everyday marks the end of linear and universalist understandings of conflict. Critiques oppose this form of top-down governance by suggesting that the ‘everyday’ is a realm of messy contingency that is almost natural and as such not subjected to the imposition of linear cause-effect relations. This sets it in a position to oppose the linearity and universality of liberal paradigms (Robins, 2013, p. 51). Indeed, critics have suggested that because of the complex nature of social relations, peace itself cannot be a linear process (Bush, 2004, p. 41; Castañeda, 2009, p. 237; Darby & Mac Ginty, 2003, p. 256; Lederach, 2003, pp. 30–31). Indeed, scholars have specified that the post-conflict milieu itself does not follow a linear logic, nor do conflicts (Jabri, 2007, p. 21). Mac Ginty, in fact, specifically suggests that since indigenous or local realities do not share western “sequential notions of time it is unsurprising that traditional societies found, and still find, Western versions of peace alien” (2008, p. 149). At best, without paying attention to the realities of the local context, it is suggested, peace-builders would be unable to fulfil the requirements of the society they are meant to represent (Chatterjee, 2004; Migdal, 1994). More crucially still, an acknowledgment of the relevance of local everyday practices places significant limitations on the linear understanding and management of post-conflict contexts: “At best, understanding will always be partial, contingencies will play havoc with linear notions of cause and effect and predictability will be at low levels.” (Goodhand & Hulme, 1999, p. 24). Furthermore, contingency and movement are fundamental aspects of the complex milieu, where identities are not fixed (Heathershaw & Lambach, 2008) and multiple communities and networks exist, interact and overlay “without necessarily resulting in the domination of one core identity or idea” (Richmond,
As a result, accessing the local necessarily requires an approach that does not limit itself to reproducing universalised ideals, to applying cause and effect calculations or to rely on blueprint and lessons learnt, but rather requires an appreciation of said complex webs of relations that may be dependent on actions, circulations and events that are nearly untraceable, as “non-linear interactions [...] spontaneously result in self-regulating behaviour through complex feedback systems” (de Coning, 2013, p. 4). Thus, overall, the end of linearity and the emergence of the contingent and the everyday has one important implication for governance and for peace-building in that it signals the end of assumptions regarding the possibility to predict and prescribe policy interventions to ‘fix’ conflicts.

This is then an evolution from the fuzzy understanding and instrumental appreciation of the complex conditions of the post-conflict operated by previous critiques (as outlined in Chapter 1), in that it signals a definite break with the previous paradigm (liberal peace) and acknowledges the impossibility of exercising governance from the top (or through cosmopolitan and global solutions that do not originate in the immanent and complex realities of the local ‘everyday’), or to understand building peace as a linear, causal effort to building governance. The complex reality acknowledged by critical perspectives on peace-building can no longer be ‘grasped’, as it is perceived as a social plane where ideas and identities interact and overlap in ways which defy formal control, within the realm of the everyday. This, Richmond suggests, is a matter of operating at the level of the everyday as the ontological space within which the quality of freedom exists. In this context, the emergence of the everyday is also the emergence of self-government, and the end of top-down regulation. This, in turn, is taken by Richmond to signal the end of liberalism’s claims to universality and instrumental mastery of society: “self-government, rather than top-down regulation may be taken as a critique of political liberalism’s grand interventionary strategies on behalf of others” (2010a, p. 201).

The everyday is, therefore, an ‘alternative space’ (Richmond, 2010b), a locus of contestation, the ground upon which the roots of agency sprout, a place of hybrid encounter and, in Foucauldian terms, it is the ‘naturalness’ of the
complex milieu within which power is exercised fluidly and takes different expressions. It is a realm of contingent materiality, visible in physical forms of resistance and in the hybrid encounters between international and local, but it is also, arguably, an abstracted realm which has not fully been accessed by peace-builders, and lies beyond the instrumentation, manipulation and fictional understandings of the liberal peace. It is ‘truer’ and more ‘authentic’ by implication, particularly when it is opposed to the fiction of the liberal peace.

The everyday, however, has yet another important role; as argued below, the emergence of the everyday not only signals the end of top-down governance and an important shift towards fluid, pluralising and fragmenting forms of power, but that through it, the local turn has been embraced as the next step in the conceptualisation of peace-building. Bottom-up approaches to peace-building frame local agency as existing within this ‘authentic’ and ‘organic’ realm which, arguably, hints at the presence of an undeniably ‘natural’ quality of the population subject to peace-building. The question of what to do with this agency is a central issue of concern to the local turn as it enables yet another shift, I argue, towards a form of power akin to biopower in its rejection of absolutist and totalising power and in its reliance on the real and ‘natural’ attributes of the ‘everyday’.

4. Biopower & the Local Turn

The following section draws out the significance of the emergence of the notion of ‘everyday’ for the re-conceptualisation of peace-building. The critique of the liberal peace operated by the local turn is one that seeks to change not just the way in which peace-building is carried out, but the very epistemological and ontological premises that form the corpus of knowledge employed in thinking about peace. Moving towards the everyday has been proposed as a practical as well as a theoretical move away from frameworks that either reproduce liberal governmentality, or are tainted by western ‘virtual’ and fictional understandings of the local, its needs and its expression. When earlier accounts coming from the neo-institutionalist camp acknowledged the problems with the liberal paradigm, the solutions were, however, framed by the critique as still liberal and ‘more of
the same’. The difficulty of governing complex post-conflict realities is acknowledged only insofar as governance needs to be diffused and fragmented to operate more efficiently. This critique I advanced earlier is also shared by some post-structuralist scholars of the local turn, with the sole but important difference that these post-liberal perspectives attribute such refinement in the techniques of power to govern directly and mainly to the coherent liberal peace-project.

Because of this sense of intentionality, sparked by the identification of the hegemony of the liberal project, critiques suggested an ontological and epistemological move away from the liberal peace, a declaration of the need to end absolute control and lack of legitimacy (Lemay-Hébert, 2013). This requires a form of pluralisation that is said to differ consistently from that operated by the liberal peace paradigm. “Liberal peace-building is an interrupter device that slews political momentum towards pluralism and representation with the objective of legitimating itself as a cosmopolitan process and the institutions it emphasizes as a means of achieving peaceful politics” (Roberts, 2013, p. 83). The shift to the everyday is then aimed at countering absolute control and lack of legitimacy by renouncing these cosmopolitan processes as not grounded in everyday realities, and calling for an ontological restructuring.

This ontological restructuring, I have suggested earlier, is consistent with a preference for non-linear approaches that call for the fragmentation of governance to avoid the rigidity of linearity. If the critique of liberal peace-building is aimed at declaring the end of a type of top-down governance that has so far only created a wide gap between the local and the international and perpetuated the hegemonic objectives of the liberal peace, and if the critique has then called for the emergence of a paradigm that can embrace the contingent, blurry, and indefinite nature of the social and the political, then a question emerges regarding the persistence of the framework of intervention within which peace-building continues to be enclosed. Where I have suggested in Chapter 1 that disciplinary approaches to peace-building did not jettison interventionism, this is arguably understandable given the fact that many of the solutions offered engendered calls for ‘more’ engagement rather than less. Yet, while the local
turn’s explicit attempt is to question the very project that leads liberal peace-builders to engage in social engineering (as well as the outcomes), it is possible to question why such fundamental ontological ‘revolution’ did not eschew the question of the need to intervene per se.

Examining the emergent power at play in the local turn may bring forward some issues of governance that the local turn itself is subject to, which may also, in turn, shed light upon what the local turn’s project of ‘accessing’ the everyday means for peace-building in general. Here, I argue that a link can be made between biopower and the local turn. Since peace-building does not escape the issue of governance and as such is fundamentally tied to the problem of managing populations, what is at stake in the identification of the ‘everyday’ is arguably consistent what Foucault suggested in relation to the emergence of the ‘milieu’ as a problem of governance in the 17th century. By milieu Foucault identified the complex realm within which actions occur and circulate. The milieu is a pragmatic realm of naturally occurring social as well as biological and physical phenomena (births, deaths, famine, disease, conflict) that are complex and interconnected to the extent that they defeat the linear and causal knowledge employed to govern them (Foucault, 2007, p. 36).

The relevance of this to peace-building and to the local turn can thus be explained; if what is at stake is circulation, as Foucault suggested, then the notion of everyday posited by advocates of the local turn is also one that has to do, fundamentally, with circulation and relationality, particularly as it focuses on pointing out the limits to governing on the basis of cause and effect, and of linear understandings of social interactions (2007, pp. 36, 93). In Foucault’s study of governance, the relevance of the complex nature of societies was instrumental in the emergence of a new form of power to govern populations, particularly in contexts where a particular problem, such as disease or famine, brought forward the limits of existing methods. Where individuals could no longer be seen as legal subjects that would simply absorb and react to top-down edicts, but had to be acknowledged to be complex entities bound to the materiality within which they exist in complex and often untraceable ways, a different type of power developed to govern over populations that could no longer be assumed to be
controlled from the top-down. Foucault suggested that such acknowledgment of the complexity of the social generated a shift first from the sovereign power to rule, to the power to discipline populations at the individual as well as collective levels, and later to a form of power, biopower, which addressed the body of the individual to govern populations as living organisms. Biopower was a response to the innate natural quality of human beings which, when combined, made it impossible to predict not specific events or crises but the inevitable ‘natural’ potentiality of the same (e.g. death, natural disasters, disease, etc.) (Foucault, 2007).

It is important to note that elements of biopower are not ignored by critical approaches to peace-building in particular. In fact, some scholars - particularly those informed by Foucauldian analyses - have also suggested that elements of biopower are still present in the way in which peace-building and development support is carried out and conceptualised, even after shifts towards partnership and local ownership. For many, this is mostly evident in the way in which liberal understandings of conflict as abnormal led to peace-building following a therapeutic logic in the Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular (Campbell, 1998; Chandler, 1999; Duffield, 2010; Pupavac, 2001). Others have suggested that the fragmentation of power has enabled liberal governmentality to employ biopower in order to access the lives of the subjects it seeks to regulate, and that this is particularly evident in the ways in which both development as well as security have targeted the biological and natural elements of the populations. For instance, Shapiro suggests this is evident in the rise of biometrical approaches to intelligence and surveillance of the war on terror (2004, p. 165). Audra Mitchell’s exploration of the ‘everyday’, too, specifically targets issues of biopower, suggesting that the immanence of the everyday may make societies more open to bio-political manipulation: “the penetration of the basic elements of daily life – survival, hygiene, social structure, and behaviour, for instance – is one of the bases of bio-political control” (2011, p. 1631).

What many of these perspectives have in common, however, is the suggestion that these elements of biopower originate in the liberal project of hegemony itself. It is then often reiterated that biopower enables liberal
governmentality. Mark Duffield, for instance, discussed the development agenda of the 1990s as one that sought to “transform the dysfunctional and war-affected societies that it encounters on its borders into cooperative, representative and, especially, stable entities” (2001, p. 11). The transformative aspect of development and peace-building are framed, thus, within the larger plan of providing a distinctively normative direction to the new global order of the post-war era. This view is also espoused by other Foucauldian approaches to development and peace-building, focusing, in particular, on drawing out the methods, techniques and apparatuses employed to expand the liberal system.

Disparate forms of methods are then attributed to the liberal actors’ project of controlling zones of conflict. These methods range from techniques designed to establish partnerships to promote the infiltration of liberal governmental power in recipient societies (Joseph, 2012), to techniques of individual “empowerment and citizenship” (Dean, 1999), bio-political forms of control that are focused on the regulation of the life, reproductive ability, and death of subjects (Rose, 2001). At the international level, they also include the establishment of a global network of surveillance through liberal institutions such as the UN (Debrix, 1999), or the establishment of human-centred discourses such as ‘human rights’ that frame interventions as ‘saving others’; these ultimately create a further sphere of intervention, global and transnational in essence, but one that still employs juridical and political instrument to order the life of the subjects (Jabri, 2007, p. 187). These accounts share, in common, a focus on the liberal interests that lurk behind all these methods and ultimately provide a telos that binds the most disparate techniques and apparatuses in the pursuit of it.

These approaches do not, as Chandler suggests, critique the liberal basis for interventionism per se, but rather focus on critiquing the liberal endgame that drives interventions and peace-building (2011, p. 177), namely the attempt to perpetuate the enlargement of liberal and neo-liberal systems and maintain the hegemony of the liberal way of life. Furthermore, the analysis of biopower in terms of biopolitics remains quite limited to an identification of the point of origin and exercise of said power, and its instrumental role in enabling liberal actors’ vision of social transformation through instrumental intervention in societies. Seldom is biopower examined in itself as a constitutive force, as a pre-
existing quality of the ‘everyday’ and thus as a form of power that can be manipulated and used by multiple actors in multiple ways,\textsuperscript{10} thus rendering its association solely to the liberal system cumbersome and limited. Indeed, these approaches seldom question whether elements of biopower could be found in alternatives provided by perspectives that consider themselves post-liberal. When they do, these are still grouped within the label of liberal governmentality.\textsuperscript{11}

Many scholars have conflated the governmentalisation of biopower at the domestic level with the workings of biopower at the international level (Debrix, 1999; Finkelstein, 1995). For example, Vivienne Jabri argues that the processes at play internationally represent a form of domestication of governmentality at the global level; the author takes the example of post-conflict reconstruction to suggest that “what we witness in practices of intervention associated with state-building is the culmination of the governmentalisation of the state rendered \textit{transnationally}” (2007, p. 126 my emphasis). What this indicates is that a simple translation of the discourse of domestic biopower and governmentality may also work, in parallel, at the international level. Indeed, the lure of associating biopower with the ‘liberal peace’ might be understandable. Foucault did, after all, refer to biopower as a particular strategy employed by western modern states.\textsuperscript{12} Nonetheless, it can be suggested that insofar as biopower is a technique

\textsuperscript{10} For an examination of this, it is necessary to go beyond the peace-building debates where the subject has been dealt with in a more insular manner. Accounts of biopower coming from political theory, such as Lemke (2001, 2002), and Coleman and Grove (2009) offer greater insight into the preconditions for biopower, its expressions and possibly its employment by different approaches and paradigms.

\textsuperscript{11} Julian Reid’s recent contribution to a volume on state-building can be considered a notable exception to this trend. Reid’s work, in fact, warned against ignoring the potentiality of any narrative to become hegemonic, whatever its provenance (2014), suggesting, much like Foucault’s own work did, that because of the heterogeneous nature of power and biopower in particular, most narratives in their attempt to subvert the hegemony of a meta-narrative are also expressing their own desire to become hegemonic by replacing the orthodoxy. In this sense, all narratives, when they struggle, aspire to replace the other in a struggle for power, “in effect, between a relationship of power and a strategy of struggle there is a reciprocal appeal, a perpetual linking and a perpetual reversal” (Foucault, 1982, p. 794).

\textsuperscript{12} He does this particularly in \textit{The Birth of Biopolitics} (2008), where he expands on the notion of biopower elaborated in \textit{Security, Territory and Population} (2007) to focus mostly on liberalism (Foucault, 2008, p. 21). In \textit{Security, Territory and Population}, he rather vaguely defines biopower in theoretical terms and within the modern context of its emergence, which is connected to the salience of the problem of population. This was engaged with by western liberal countries in the 18th Century, tied to both the emergence of the Enlightenment movement, the progress of science and the particular history and development of European monarchies and the manner in which these ruled over the land (2007). Biopower in itself is loosely described as a
of governing that has as its object populations, it is also possible to suggest that identifying the emergence of biopower does not necessarily rely on pointing to liberal intentionality, nor does it require centring the discourse of governance only around the liberal paradigm and its perceived goals. Insofar as it has been argued in Chapter 1, section 3, that ‘western’, ‘liberal’ and ‘peace-building’ may not necessarily be so easily identified as a coherent paradigm, it is also possible to suggest that the emergence of biopower is primarily a problem of governance, rather than an issue to do principally with liberalism, and thus is a question that does not escape critical approaches to peace-building.

However, focus on a coherent international liberal governance plan may be questioned particularly because Foucault’s own work, whilst undoubtedly revolving around liberalism, was however centred around the internal working of domestic governance apparatuses of western liberal states rather than an exploration of the much more complex webs of social and political elements that make up post-conflict international peace-building. Indeed, in the case of peace-building, the apparatuses of governance cannot be reduced to the state unit, requiring an appreciation of the mechanisms of governance that cannot rely on the simple identification of a singular, coherent point of origin of power. In addition to this, the mechanisms responsible for the foreign policy decisions that make up the missions construed as part of the liberal peace are substantially varied (see Chapter 1, section 3) and may represent variations on the liberal theme, which may make the attempt to identify a singular ‘liberal’ hegemonic drive inconsequential at best.

Furthermore, even if one were to accept the existence of a coherent liberal peace paradigm, it would be problematic to identify it as the origin and only point of extension of certain types of hegemonic power. Foucault himself warned against identifying power as coming from a singular, particular source technology of power that has its origins in liberal states, but retains epistemological and ontological rationales that are more widely associated with positivism and modernism (and therefore, arguably, not only limited to political liberalism but potentially to other ideologies and political systems that employ modernist methodologies to understand the world and govern over it). The exploration of biopower and its potential in itself is later foregone in favour of a focus on biopolitics (a concept which is, for instance, much more referenced in I.R. approaches to peace-building than biopower).
(2007, p. 16). Despite the focus on modern western societies, he also warned against seeing biopower as a theory of power *per se*. Foucault, in fact, pointed out that,

…if we accept that power is not a substance, fluid, or something that derives from a particular source, then this analysis could and would only be at most a beginning of a theory, not of a theory of what power is, but simply of power in terms of the set of mechanisms and procedures that have the role or function and theme, even when they are unsuccessful, of securing power (2007, pp. 16–17)

Indeed, insofar as the issue of governance is a modern issue, it may still be possible to suggest that it may not necessarily be an exclusively liberal issue and may, thus, apply to other paradigms that work on a modernist logic, beyond the ‘liberal’ one.

I will, for the time being, set the critiques of liberal governmentality aside, to focus on biopower as it concerns the local turn’s own contentions. The emergence of the naturalness of the everyday framed as opposed to the rigid interpretation of the social provided by the liberal peace seems to bring forward agency as the innate natural quality of human beings, existing beyond the direct control of those who want to govern it. *Prima facie*, the declaration of the existence of the ‘everyday’ and ‘authentic’ would seem to signal a final departure from the previous paradigm and the end of top-down, linear and universalist paradigms of peace-building. However, acknowledging the existence of an authentic ‘everyday’ realm may inadvertently place the emergence of biopower in the position not to abandon the will to govern, or to question universal framework of governance in themselves, or even to question the relationship between legitimacy, authority and governance. Since these approaches are not, arguably, free from dealing with the issue of governing, that is with the establishment mechanisms and procedures whose main aim is to secure some form of power, then it is possible to suggest that the manipulation of biopower might not be an exclusively ‘liberal’ tendency, as scholars of governmentality have dedicated themselves to study.

Indeed, just as the turn to discipline did not question the need for peace-building interventions, so the focus on the everyday did not fundamentally lead to a re-conceptualisation of interventionism, since the very need for peace-
building interventions is not questioned. The fragmentation of governance and the emergence of biopower, then, does not represent the cessation of an aspiration to govern, as much as it embodies an attempt to refine the mechanisms of governance to target the individual, not as a rational entity, but as a living organism, and the collective, not as the sum of its parts, but as a complex organism whose functioning may not really be traced but whose potentiality for failure was always present.

The end of top-down governance suggested the need to focus on operating at the very molecular level of individuals and societies, by addressing those ‘natural’ and untraceable qualities that held so much potential for failure. Thus, just as Foucault’s analysis turned to the emergence of bio-political solutions aimed at addressing issues such as mortality and reproduction to manage demographics in booming modern societies, one could suggest that a similar shift is evident in the emergence of paradigms that focus on ‘everyday’ forms of agency, concerned in particular with harvesting and embracing the natural qualities of the subjects of peace-building. These qualities are not only a conscious reaction to the hegemony of the liberal peace (such as resistance), but they are also innate characteristics that may be expressing themselves unwittingly and without previous organisation (such as resilience to conflict, or forms of urban resistance found in the graffiti-making of Northern Ireland (see Mitchell & Kelly, 2011)); these forms of agency need to be accessed, valorised, listened to and used to build up not the predictability potential, but the ability of

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13 Some critics problematise the very possibility or need to initiate peace-building interventions. Cunliffe brings forth the paradoxical relationship between external state-building and the sources of domestic legitimacy (2007), Jeffrey Herbst, on the other hand, argues against interventions to save some weak states as these should have never been granted the status of state, suggesting state failure to be a natural process of the modern cycle of state construction and destruction (2004). These perspective are not included in this analysis as they do not advocate the re-conceptualisation of peace-building from the bottom-up and, as such, do not encounter the paradox of having to pluralise the knowledge on peace-building whilst at the same time not rejecting peace-building interventions. Without exception, recent attempts to rethink peace-building towards the local imply the need to address conflict, as they frame their research within the larger aim of conceptualising more efficient, and ‘better’ approaches to peace-building. Scholars such as De Coning, Aoi and Thakur (2007), and Popolo (2011), who have recently employed pragmatic and radical post-modern approaches such as complexity theory, also avoid more substantial engagement with the need of peace interventions or indeed the uncomfortable fit between the will to avoid asymmetric and hierarchical relations and the very asymmetrical and hierarchical nature of foreign interventions.
the subject to bounce back in the face of potential threats that cannot be controlled or predicted, such as conflict or natural disasters.

Where I argued that the previous shift identified in Chapter 1 attempted to grasp the complexity of the milieu through extending disciplinary power mechanisms to enhance and multiply exposure to such complexity in an attempt to grasp the bigger picture, it is possible to suggest that the local turn seeks to further embrace the naturalness of the milieu by declaring the need to accept the existence of the ‘authentic’, the ‘local local’ and the ‘everyday’ as a limit to forms of governance with a telos. The difference is, however, that where discipline operated in a realm that is near reality, biopower claims to operate within reality itself, or what is called the ‘everyday’, just as Richmond notably suggested that accessing the everyday requires operating at the level of society (2010a, p. 201). The ‘natural’, undefinable and ungovernable nets of connection and circulation that tie individuals to each other and to the materiality that surrounds them comprise the social and the political everyday realities of the post-conflict and these, it is implied, can no more be governed by cause and effect calculations, than could the modern cityscapes found in Foucault’s analysis.

The emergence of biopower does not, therefore, mark the end of peace-building itself, but rather emerges as a form of power that enables the local turn to target specifically this issue of the complexity and ‘ungovernability’ of the naturalness of the population. To deal with the fragmentation of governance, Foucault suggested, this new form of power emerged as a, …set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern western societies took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species (2007, p. 16).

Importantly, Foucault suggested that the emergence of biopower did not put an end to the existence and exercise of older types of power, including disciplinary and sovereign (top-down) rule (ibid, p. 22). The impact of this claim on the shift towards the local is central. One could, in fact, argue that the turn towards the local did not signify a complete abandonment of disciplinary methods nor of the
rationale that lead to the identification of the post-conflict as a site of illegalities that need to be prevented, addressed and cured, but that the claim to access the potentiality of populations, the naturalness, the realities, the needs and the everyday concerns of the populations, made the power to govern more effective, if less visible.

Arguably, it is precisely the qualification of the everyday as a more authentic, truer reality beyond the artifice that allows biopower to be used as a means to ‘access’ such realms of complexity. Access, here, is the operative word. Despite the fact that, as will be seen in Chapter 4, it is somewhat unclear how these critical perspectives suggest to valorise and embrace the complex nature of the social and the political, it is still possible to identify certain elements of normalisation that puts biopower to work in a way which, whilst renouncing absolute power, top-down governance and teleological solutions, is still not giving up on the will to peace-build and thus, to intervene. When questions of autonomy, agency and asymmetrical relations of power are critiqued without changing a core assumption – intervention – that has fundamentally to do with such questions, then the critical value of the local turn is overshadowed by a paradox. The adaptation of the seemingly contingent and non-linear concept of ‘everyday’ then becomes quite open to exercises of governance, particularly when ‘accessing’ the everyday is framed as a project of reaction to the liberal peace paradigm, and is accepted as a normative necessity. In such cases, as will be seen in Chapter 4, ‘everyday’ practices are constructed as being more ‘authentic’ than the perceived liberal fiction – the contours of which are identified by the critique itself – as such, the ‘everyday’ is not a contingent reality, but is embraced as a normative, idealised goal-oriented policy aspiration.

Therefore, it is possible to question the extent to which the local turn may be free from its own potential to generate or influence the emergence of forms of governance that contain their own processes of norm formation, normalisation of societies, subjectivation and the consequential outcomes of marginalisation and exclusion of certain narratives. As of yet, no current critiques of the liberal peace, including those that draw on Foucauldian governmentality critiques, have extended such questioning to the foundation of the local turn itself. Notably, I
do not wish to suggest that the local turn may be extending a form of power that is consistent with liberal hegemony, and that the local turn is symptomatic of yet another shift in liberal governmentality, but rather, that this type of power, with its associated effects on the subjects and on societies, is not the exclusive remit of any ‘liberal paradigm’ per se, and that to limit the critique to an eventual ‘liberal peace’, may result in an uncritical belief in the benevolent nature of the new paradigm that could potentially obscure the mechanisms of power inherent within the local paradigm itself. These mechanisms will be explored, with particular emphasis on the processes of normalisation and subjectivation, in Chapter 5. For now, it is sufficient to raise awareness of the presence of an important shift whereby, despite the call for the end of top-down governance, the local turn has, however, identified a solution that has not signalled the end of peace-building or indeed even problematised the need for interventions. Indeed, the fact that the problematisation that gives rise to the need of intervention is left out of these re-conceptualisations of peace-building, may be sufficient ground on which to raise questions regarding the nature of the shift towards the local.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has introduced the contemporary shift in the conceptualisation of peace-building by focusing on critiques comprising the local turn. Following attempts to break with the intransigence of linear perspectives and informed by post-positivist and critical theories, critiques emerged in the mid-2000s with the intention of identifying and displacing what was perceived to be the foundations of a hegemonic project of liberal peace promotion. The critique’s concern for the hegemonic power of the liberal peace, in particular, has produced a coherent vision of a project whose understanding and approach to peace-building are construed as limited and damaging to the heterogeneous expression of agency in recipient societies. Given the unfavourable record of liberal peace-building, the solutions offered raised the need to acknowledge the limits of top-down, universalist and imposed solutions, declaring the impossibility to impose any form of governance without doing damage to the complex nature of the post-
conflict context and the consequential impossibility to rule by cause-and-effect and according to linear understandings of conflict and peace.

Previous theoretical as well as policy attempts to expand existing frameworks of peace to include the local in the form of partnership or local ownership have also been addressed by the critique as being at best rhetorical and inconsequential, and at worst, as attempts by the liberal paradigm to expand its hegemony by employing methods that rely less on coercion and more on consensus. These critiques in particular have identified forms of liberal governmentality in projects of partnership, and have also claimed that theoretical frameworks coming from the scholarship of the early 2000s are insufficiently stepping out of the liberal paradigm. What has been offered to counter such hegemonic projects of the liberal peace has been a fundamental re-conceptualisation of the ontology and epistemology of peace to avoid reproducing the fallacies of the liberal peace paradigm. These efforts have focused particularly on replacing top-down with bottom-up in order to fragment governance and diffuse power. Critical approaches to bottom-up peace-building have been particularly adamant regarding the end of universal solutions and causal reasoning, and have offered the need to access the realm of the ‘everyday’ practices that have meaning beyond the fictional and mythical representations of it provided by the liberal peace.

This shift to the local, it has been argued, is consistent with a deeper shift that has allowed the emergence of biopower, a set of mechanisms that have the population as its object and centre, and that seeks to reject ready-made solutions and teleological approaches to governing populations, by harvesting the innate ‘naturalness’ of the social in all of its complex, interconnected qualities. Yet, it has also been suggested that the shift to biopower should not merely be seen as an extension of liberal governmentality itself, but rather, that this form of power (along with others, discipline included) may also be advanced within the critical and post-liberal paradigm, and that to confine the critique to the liberal paradigm may centre the discussion too much on liberalism and not sufficiently on governance itself. Furthermore, the chapter has suggested the need to enquire about the significance of this shift, questioning the extent to which the
emergence of biopower has not signified a more fundamental questioning of interventionism but has rather still been framed within the necessity of peace-building interventions.

In the next two chapters, I will continue questioning the extent to which this shift has sufficiently been able to influence the formation of multiple and different ontologies of peace. The next chapter will discuss how, despite calls for avoiding the ‘romanticisation of the local’, the re-conceptualisation of peace-building in Kosovo has only been framed as a solution entirely dependent on liberal peace-building as an object of critique. This solution has thus been created and advanced against the liberal peace instead of in spite of it, and, as a result, attempts to access the ‘everyday’ retain a particularly arbitrary form of selection which is not too dissimilar from the very rationale the local turn initially raised objections to.
Chapter 3
Reflections on Kosovo:
Shifting Discourses and Paradigms of Peace-Building

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the case of Kosovo to illustrate the shifts outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. This chapter does not focus on the conflict in Kosovo itself, but rather mostly reflects on the way in which Kosovo has been used to frame different approaches to peace-building. It is argued that Kosovo has been central to the framing of the need to re-conceptualise peace-building, thus also largely reflecting the two abovementioned stages of the creation of the critique of the liberal peace. Where, for instance, the establishment of the peace-building mission in itself is symbolic of the shift from minimalist to intrusive, disciplinary forms of peace-building, particularly in light of both neo-institutionalist and cosmopolitan support for the deepening and extension of a multifaceted mission, it is also argued that the latter stages of the mission have also been instrumental for the setting up of the local turn’s critique of the liberal peace as a shift towards the end of top-down governance of post-conflict territories. The fifteen year-long intervention in Kosovo and its by-products, outcomes and paradoxes, are identified by the scholars of the local turn as signs of the limitations of universalist and top-down liberal peace-building. Through a lessons-learnt debate on Kosovo, in particular, a few more elements are added to the host of problems under the label ‘liberal peace-building’. These include the lack of accountability to local stakeholders, the rising frustration caused by the lack of an exit strategy, and the marginalisation and alienation caused by a merely rhetorical engagement with the local which is said to hide behind ‘partnership’ a more fundamental inability and unwillingness to hand over authority and autonomy to local actors. As a whole, the case of Kosovo is a relevant example of the construction of the ‘liberal peace-building’ paradigm as an object of critique, and of the consequential identification and selection of legitimate agency at the basis of the new critical paradigm.
The chapter discusses the relevance of Kosovo for the shifts in the re-conceptualisation of peace-building beginning with the first section on the emergence of disciplinary peace-building. The first section suggests that the widening and deepening of the post-conflict mission in Kosovo is consistent with the shift towards a more comprehensive form of peace-building born out of the need to understand and tackle as many aspects of the conflictual milieu as possible. This shift generated justifications and legitimisation for the more invasive form of peace-building witnessed in Kosovo since 1999. The second section discusses the critiques to said muscular forms of intervention, by reflecting on the relevance of Kosovo for the emergence of the later shift, the local turn. The section argues that critical approaches assessed the record of peace-building in Kosovo with the liberal peace’s perceived hegemony, strengthening the critique of the liberal peace paradigm, and offering the problems witnessed on the ground as evidence of the need to move beyond linear, liberal and top-down approaches to peace-building and towards locally produced solutions. The final section then suggests that the realm of the everyday, in Kosovo, is associated largely with resistance to the liberal peace, both as a project of raising awareness of alternative narratives of peace, as well as an acknowledgment of the contingent realities of the local that defeat the stereotyping operated by the liberal peace paradigm.

The identification of the everyday with resisting agency, I suggest, begins to outline traces of selective engagement with agency that may, as a result, be problematic for the critical turn’s own objectives of a radical, non-linear, re-conceptualisation of peace-building. Indeed, the chapter ultimately argues that ‘localisation’ could paradoxically become the very problem that the bottom-up approaches sought to resolve. Just as previous disciplinary forms of power enabled the observation and understanding of the polity’s behaviour aimed at regulating its productive functions, peace-building ‘from below’, may inherently facilitate the manipulation of the contingent qualities of the ‘everyday’ in order to enable the observation of collectives and individuals. In this case, the local turn runs the risk of being a merely symbolic reversal of the roles within an unchanged modernist framework of assumptions regarding societies and their functioning.
1. **Kosovo: Towards Disciplinary Peace-Building**

The shift to intrusive peace-building in Kosovo was perceived to be a necessary step to respond to what were identified as limited and minimal approaches to resolving complex conflicts. The solutions, framed on a lessons learnt basis, quickly involved external actors, in a mission that was deemed to be substantially different from anything experienced before, involving a plethora of actors, methods and strategies aimed at tackling the construction of peace on a number of different, non-linear levels. The establishment of a state-building mission, and the embedding of Kosovo within larger international and transnational networks represented a form of deeper and more extensive attempt to control problem-affected polities, in a manner which unites both supporters of institution-building as well as cosmopolitans around a comprehensive and multi-layered approach. To understand the logic of the shift towards more invasive forms of peace-building it is important to briefly examine the manner in which the early critiques of peace-building framed the need to create a more inclusive approach.

The shift from minimalist to intrusive peace-building is firstly evident in the very establishment and nature of the peace-building mission in Kosovo. Following a bombing campaign that began in March and ended in early June 1999, the allied forces negotiated an agreement for the retreat of Yugoslav military and para-military groups from the territory of Kosovo. On the 10th of June 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, mandating the deployment of a UN-led force to support the repatriation of the refugees whilst “performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required” (United Nations Security Council, 1999). Through the establishment of a mission whose primary function was not to firmly and resolutely express itself on the singular issue of the sovereign status of the territory, but rather to set up a multilateral and multi-layered external presence to support the attainment of substantially autonomous self-rule, Kosovo became an institution-building mission that focussed on the development of a corpus of norms and values attuned to international principles of human rights and multiculturalism. Furthermore, the resolution itself deeply entrenched the future of the polity in extensive global networks, highlighting elements of a transnational nature such
as the regulation of refugee returns, the establishment of human rights provisions and unimpeded access to humanitarian and aid organisations. The rapid development and branch-like extension of the mission in Kosovo demonstrated just how fast the shift towards deepening and widening interventions took place in policy circles, just as surely as it also brought together the concerns of both cosmopolitans and neo-institutionalist scholars. Scholarship engaging with the chronology of Kosovo’s ever expanding mission identify phases or generations in order to explain the methods employed and the aims sought. King and Mason, for instance, identify ‘four distinct phases’ that, according to them, best exemplify the “changing relationship between the mission and its local counterparts” (King and Mason, 2006, p. x). Other scholars, including Douzinas, also identify two distinct phases to suggest a shift in US foreign policy ideology from Clinton’s cosmopolitanism to Bush’s imperialism evident in Kosovo’s embodiment of the security/freedom interventionist nexus (Douzinas, 2007, p.147).

Kosovo has been considered to be the embodiment of “a progressive shift” in the international community towards strategies of peace-building and state-building (Lemay-Hébert, 2012, p. 468). The generational approach to categorise the chronology of the Kosovo mission has been employed in order to explain the emergence of new actors as well as the employment of diverse methods. In Kosovo, Ernst compares the period between 1999-2005 in Kosovo suggesting that whereas the first period was marked by negotiations, shifting patterns of consensus, and generally what the scholar considers to be a state-building endeavour as a 'deeply political process', the second period is rather marked by the initiation of the status process in 2005, seem to represent, for the scholar, the disappearance of politics from the negotiations, with a distinct preference for diplomacy as carried out between the countries of the 'Quint' (a contact group made up of the foreign ministers of Italy, UK, USA, Germany, and France) (Ernst, 2011, p. 133).

Generational accounts of Kosovo frame the chronology both as a factual account of different actors and methods, as Bieber does in relation to outlining the strategies employed by the EU as a state-building actor (2011). A
generational categorisation of the mission, furthermore, is also more crucially relevant as a tool that enables a fundamental shift in the conceptualisation of peace-building, born out of a reflection of what are construed as increasingly insufficient approaches. For instance, Florian Bieber notes a general shift in the practice of state-building away “from direct intervention to conditionality” (2011, p. 1791) born out of considerations to do with the impossibility to reconcile impositions with democratic governance, as well as with the rise of local dissent through unfavourable political groups such as Vetevendosje, a decisively anti-external intervention political party. Malte Brosig also notes a shift from ceasefire peace-keeping types of engagement with post-conflict territories towards more complex state-building missions, in particular due to heightened importance of institutional cooperation in peacekeeping missions, thus noting that the manner in which international institutions operate within a mission in a post-conflict territory now presents more awareness of the need for a more comprehensive and wholesome approach to integrate all the efforts of different actors (2011, p. 185).

In general, these approaches do not limit themselves to outlining existing shifts in Kosovo; it can be argued that in the theoretical re-conceptualisation of peace-building, reflections on the case of Kosovo has also been instrumental in making the shift possible. The categorisation of the mission in Kosovo along clearly delineated generations is also responsible for the creation of new approaches by presenting the limits of previous perspectives and calling for the need to deepen the engagement, as is the case with perspectives that call for the need to engage with NGOs on the ground to meet the demands formerly ignored by previous, strictly institutionalist approaches (see also Knudsen, 2006, p. 159).

Whilst this chapter discusses shifts and changes in the manner in which Kosovo has been conceptualised, it does not seek to suggest that its chronology can, or indeed should, be so easily categorised and rigidly understood. Instead, the chapter suggests that these generational approaches carry out a discursively productive role, in that they construct an evolving narrative concerning Kosovo that presents the solutions purported as natural outcomes of a progress of development in peace-building conceptualisation and practice. Instead, where
shifts are identified in this chapter, they are understood as a reflection of the scholarship’s engagement with Kosovo, rather than as ‘factual’ categorisation of methods and means. This exploration of shifts and ruptures then becomes an analytical engagement that can enrich our understanding of how Kosovo has become instrumental to framing new ways of thinking about peace-building.

Kosovo has, in fact, often been referred to for the purpose of identifying fallacies, lacunae and notable insufficiencies in previous approaches to peace-building, from the inability to tackle the conflict by leaving the question of Kosovo out of the Dayton peace accords (O’Neill, 2002, p. 22), to the failure to address the regime responsible for the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia and elsewhere in the region (Booth, 2001, p. 3). Kosovo has also been used by the critical perspectives of the mid-1990s, to point to other notable insufficiencies, including the inconsistency of the framework of humanitarianism and its reliance on state-centrism. Perspectives advocating for the rise of transnational governance, for instance, suggested that whilst Kosovo evidenced a consistent pattern of state erosion, the solutions thus far had only met this issue with a type of humanitarian advocacy framed only as a ‘corset’ around what remains an essentially realist understanding of foreign policy interactions (Habermas, 1999, p. 268).

From perspectives displaying a preference for institution-building, Kosovo was also symptomatic of an insufficiently comprehensive approach to the management of conflicts. Earlier approaches to peace-building are said to display limited understanding of the structural problems that lead to conflict. This is claimed to be evident in the way in which local stakeholders are beginning to reject the “(violently) homogenised imaginings of political space” that gave birth to claims regarding the origins of ‘ancient’ ethnic hatreds (Devic, 2006, p. 270). A deeper understanding of the conflict itself is said to be conducive to a more comprehensive and successful mission. These perspectives advocate a wider, more inclusive approach to display a more comprehensive knowledge and thus more inclusive solutions to the issues presented by these warring societies. As La Cava et al. note with regards to ensuring the extension
of the reach of peace-building to all groups of the recipient society, “successful results and best practices should be mainstreamed and scaled up to cover the entire spectrum of needs” (2000, p. 78 my emphasis). This is partly a matter of consultation as, in fact, many neo-institutionalist perspectives suggest recognising the value of understanding the logic behind the agendas of the warring parties, before being able offer solutions that can encourage leaders to recognise the benefits of peaceful resolution of grievances (Covey, 2005). This requires employing strategies that require the peace-builders to accommodate their agendas through compromise both amongst international actors with the purpose of avoiding duplication of tasks (Brosig, 2011, p. 200) and, more importantly, with local actors. This was done within a framework that provided for the local as a result of the need to limit the resistance of local actors and encourage their cooperation (Narten, 2009, p. 270).

The need to deepen the understanding of the post-conflict milieu had the notable outcome of not necessarily focusing the discussion on the tensions created by the presence of competing claims to authority (i.e. Serbia, the Kosovo-Albanian political elites, the international transitional authorities). Instead, the discussion was firmly centred on the need to set the post-conflict effort on as wide a basis as possible. The primary concern in Kosovo was, in fact, not necessarily the establishment of a strong state, but a strong and multiple, horizontal governance framework that could act as a panacea for a variety of issues, including the protection of individual rights, the provision of infrastructures, and the extension of toleration and cooperation across different groups in the polity (see: Chesterman, 2004; Cocozzelli, 2006; European Agency for Reconstruction, 2002; Krasner, 2004). The framework provided to engage with post-conflict Kosovo was then multi-layered and multilateral, aimed at building capacity to govern, without necessarily qualifying the nature of governance itself. This capacity is grounded in wide and multiple apparatuses of governance, one which is indeed historically tied to a territorial notion of state, albeit consistently less strict on how authority is exercised, what mechanisms
generate and cement legitimacy, or what other networks of governance exist in lieu of the state.\footnote{The absence of the state, in the case of Kosovo, was the constitutional precondition for autonomous rule. As such, Kosovo was never truly a \textit{state-building} mission to begin with, and the institution-building measures taken were more geared towards building a diffused form of governance rather than being strong, centralised structures of government. Unlike Bosnia, then, the mission in Kosovo was uniquely framed in a way which represented the most temperate expressions of neo-institutionalist and cosmopolitan perspectives, namely an internal governance structure (self-governing authorities) embedded in larger international and transnational networks (UN and EU, as well as the wide variety of transnational non-governmental organisations employed in extensive governance provision projects all over Kosovo since 1999).} 

In Chapter 1, the overlap between the two seemingly different schools of thought was explained as being a function of the need to grasp the complex nature of the post-conflict context, as of the need to respond with an equally complex and multi-dimensional approach. The concern over the procedural aspects of making this happen is what brought the two schools closer together, in particular coalescing around the extension, in width and depth of engagement, casting the net as far as possible to deal with as many issues as possible (and in the process, diminish the need to rely on a strictly Westphalian notion of sovereignty as unbound autonomy). The literature on Kosovo also reflects this concern, suggesting that the ability to control, manage and rule over the potential dangers coming from warring polities, was framed as being dependent upon a much more complex engagement than the minimalist approaches employed in previous missions could offer (Blair, 2002, p. 7; Fearon & Laitin, 2004; Stroschein, 2008, p. 656). The post-conflict peace-building mission in Kosovo was set up not merely as an option, an alternative, but as a necessity, to make sense of the conflict, and increase the opportunity to normalise relations in problematic societies in a more efficient manner. This implied that other previously employed methods could no longer be considered viable, beginning with the imposition of a ‘victor’s peace’ (see Richmond, 2005, p. 25), and continuing with the extension of privatisation packages (Knudsen, 2013). 

Within this move away from minimalist to more intrusive approaches to peace-building one could also identify another important element. The need to engage with more nuanced and comprehensive understandings of the conflicts gave way to the horizontal expansion of the governance framework, framed in
terms of finding “the proper mode of governance” (Fukuyama, 1992, p. 213) and establishing a more “inclusive, participatory and holistic security transformation” (see Dudouet et al., 2012), operated to grasp a fuller image of the conflicts that peace-building was addressing. This is arguably consistent with a more fundamental move away from employing coercive power to fix conflict. This shift then represented a move away from the ‘spectacle’ of peace interventions, and towards a more efficient form of involvement, that starts with an appreciation of lessons learnt (for instance, in Bosnia) and ends with a seemingly more reflective, conscious and inclusive form of engagement based on a productive form of power, disciplinary power.

The move towards more subtle and comprehensive forms of peace-building has been theoretically fleshed out in Chapter 1; nonetheless one could look at the manner in which this took place with relevance to the case of Kosovo, particularly as it concerns the transformation of the methods employed in peace-building to reflect the emergence of mechanisms that relied less on coercion and forcefulness, such as the very violent spectacle of militarised peace operations. The transformation of these practices enabled the emergence of apparatuses that relied more on a softer form of power, more consistent with discipline than with coercion. Indeed, this shift is visible in the depictions of Kosovo as a more ‘reflective’ form of engagement, wary of flexing the muscle whilst being continuously sure of both the moral grounding of its argument and the need for multi-layered international intervention. Here, a useful comparison between

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2 I draw on Foucault’s work on punishment (1991a) to indicate ‘spectacle’ as an ensemble of apparatuses, methods and actors aimed at identifying and punishing ‘abnormal’ behaviour through modes and practices that largely appeal to sensationalisation, grandeur and visual impact. These methods are designed to imprint a strong image of the crime-punishment nexus, through an almost artistic and spectacular enactment of the ritual of punishment. Muscular military interventions, such as the bombing campaign in Kosovo and the Gulf War, are such forms of punishment against the abnormal conduct of politics that leads to conflict and widespread violence.

3 This can also be seen in the shift advocated by cosmopolitans from the self-justified muscle-flexing of the West in Kosovo, to a more nuanced and reflective form of cosmopolitan rights regime, grounded in the global civil society, as outlined in Habermas' perspective, earlier. It is also evidenced in both scholarly and policy concerns of avoiding the hydra-headed structure of the Bosnian mandate (Fukuyama, 2011).

4 Several accounts of the months before the intervention refer to policy-makers’ acknowledgment of the potential political crisis that military intervention might cause, particularly due to the Vietnam Syndrome, to memories of Somalia and to public concerns over deploying military force yet again (Tatum, 2010). Signs of this form of self-reflectivity can be found in scholarly cosmopolitan accounts of humanitarianism, such Habermas’ condemnation of NATO’s methods
Kosovo and Bosnia can be made. Despite the seemingly common moral dilemma guiding the core of humanitarian advocacy in Bosnia and in Kosovo, the depiction of the intervention in Kosovo as a worrying, problematic decision, paraded particularly by policy-makers’ tendencies to articulate the moral conundrums, inner turmoil and doubts prior to the decision to intervene,\(^5\) seems to indicate a different rationalisation of peace intervention. Douzinas, for instance, suggests that the missions initiated in the mid-1990s were indicative of the power of spectacle, that is, a mixture of “warlike fantasies, police action and law” that provided the missions with a normative backbone to back up the interventions both at home and internationally (2007, p. 249). Sörensen, too, agrees that the bombing of Yugoslavia represented a display of western power, an element that superseded the need of “disciplining evil dictators” (2002, p. 2).

The reflectivity witnessed in the rhetorical endorsement of engagement in Kosovo, seems to indicate a reliance on less muscular, less coercive forms of peace-building, and a concern for the long-term implications of the plan, also mirrored in the scholarly debates on Kosovo. Chesterman, for instance, embodies this trend by asserting the need to establish an extensive, albeit clear, post-conflict mission unlike the hydra-headed mission of Bosnia (2004, p. 132). Zisk Marten (2004) and Paris (2010) reiterate the importance of avoiding policies that may draw comparisons with imperialism and colonialism, whilst others point to the need to streamline the mission by avoiding the mistakes made in Bosnia (International Crisis Group, 1999). Likewise, from the beginning of the mission in Kosovo the concern for including local stakeholders was deeply

\[^5\] This is quite evident in the rhetoric of both Clinton and Blair’s addresses to the public and the parliament respectively, shortly before the intervention, e.g.: “Now, I want to be clear with you, there are risks in this military action, risks to our pilots and the people on the ground […]” (Clinton, 1999); “Do our interests in Kosovo justify the dangers to our Armed Forces? I’ve thought long and hard about that question […]” (ibid); “I say this to the British people. There is a heavy responsibility on a government when putting our forces into battle, to justify such action” (The Guardian, 1999).
entrenched both in the policy discussions,\(^6\) and in the scholarly accounts outlining the need to work with the pre-existing and fairly extensive local structures (La Cava et al., 2000) and to “capitalize on the popularity of the moderates among the Kosovar Albanian community and involve them more directly in the peace process” (Chesterman, 2004, p. 208) (for an account discussing the importance of acknowledging the breadth of the pre-existing structures in Kosovo, see Clark, 2000).

Arguably these accounts suggest that there are significant limits to what peace-builders can do, and how far they can govern over the conditions on the ground. Zisk Marten suggests that Kosovo has so far demonstrated that “no matter how noble our intentions, we face limitations in our capabilities and in the effects that our actions can have”, adding also that “instead of trying to change societies, we should change our expectations” (2004, p. 165). This seems to imply the beginning of the acknowledgment of the limits of top-down governance, which has substantive implications for the claims that the local turn will make later. In particular, it suggests that impositions and coercions are no longer viable options. However, it is also possible to note that the publicly-aired parading of doubt, along with the scholarly discussions regarding the limits of homogenous and monotonous forms of top-down power, and the need to employ a more complex approach to peace-building did not suggest that the shift away from coercion was to represent also the end of peace-building, or of the unaltering belief in the ability to know and govern what cannot ultimately be linearly foreseen. Instead, as suggested in Chapter 1, this shift facilitated the framing of new intrusive approaches as a need born out of the very acknowledgment of the limits of the previous approaches. Thus, one could possibly see this display of concern and reflectivity as more indicative of the need to cast the net of control further by economising the strategy of

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\(^6\) Discussions on the relevance of local needs in divided societies were very much present in the early stages of policy-making in Kosovo. Consultation on the value of decentralisation as a conflict assuaging policy was centred in fact around the need to give space to local agendas, to give locals “a government they can understand and control” (Ebel & Péteri, 2007, p. 13). Scholarly accounts on decentralisation in Kosovo, too, have long discussed the need to learn from Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland in particular, to apply a comprehensive and holistic approach to devolving power to the local level; in this respect, see Brancati’s assessment of decentralisation vis-à-vis conflicts of an ethnic nature (2006).
involvement. By projecting a reflective, thoughtful acknowledgment of contingency and complexity, it is possible to re-frame the parameters of intervention without, however, removing the drive and normative imperative to know, control and govern the unforeseen.

Despite the multipronged approach, struggles such as those evidenced in Kosovo, are still understood as needing to be managed and prevented. For instance, where Narten suggested that early approaches in Kosovo exemplified a preference for short-term projects that caused “externally prolonged dependency” (2009, p. 267), the scholar then recommended the extension of “longer-term cycles of local capacity building” (ibid, p. 278 my emphasis), associating the length of the commitment with the quality of the governance promoted and thus, with the lessened likelihood of engendering weak basis and continued dependency. The prevalence of short-term goals of maintaining order has, Ernst concurs, generated “fuzzy governance” rather than long-term goals of democratisation or the establishment of human rights regimes (2011, p. 127).

Conflict understood as the expression of an ‘illegality’, an abnormality, a straining from the common understanding of expression, representation and interaction within polities and amongst subjects, leads to the unsurprising framing of governance as a need to control and rein in the illegality. This is proposed both as an inevitable deduction as well as a social imperative. The need to prevent the potentiality of conflict, i.e. the recurrence of violence, is in fact constantly declared in accounts related to Kosovo. For instance, in relation to the tenuous partition resulting from the geographical decentralisation, Newman argues that,

…Kosovo provides a lesson that will appeal to sectarian extremists. […] It clearly has negative, and potentially destabilising, implications for minorities within ‘new majorities’ and the danger of ever more ‘ethnic security dilemmas’, for example the remaining Serbs in Kosovo after the latter’s declaration of independence (2009, p. 35 my emphasis).

The potentiality here is given as almost pre-existing, and then further exacerbated by the previous approach employed. The discussion, however, does not preclude that the potentiality for conflict is there, associating the possibly homogenised status of ‘remaining Serbs in Kosovo’ with the violent potential
attributed to them by what appears to be an essentialised and ethnicised understanding of the conflict. Calls to employ differing and pluralist methods are then framed as a need to address the potentiality of conflict, thus, arguably reinforcing the view of intervention as a given.

A reluctance to rethink the problematisation of the need to peace-build is evident in the lack of deeper discussion of the content of self-determination and, particularly in the case of Kosovo, of the tension caused by establishing local autonomy within a vague framework of authority. While many accounts in fact mention the difficulties spurred by the paradoxical endeavour of promoting self-governance through temporary external authority (see, for instance: Barnett & Zurcher, 2009; Lidén, 2011; Papadimitriou & Petrov, 2012), many accounts mostly discuss said paradox within a framework that sees said temporary suspension of authority as a ‘necessary evil’ (see, for instance: Brinkerhoff, 2005; Chesterman, 2004, p. 47; Fukuyama, 2005), thus focusing the discussion mostly on the desirable length of external rule and the extent of control, rather than on the very possibility of establishing and promoting ‘self-rule’ through ‘external’ mechanisms.

When the paradoxes of establishing autonomous self-rule externally are faced with the potentiality of conflict, the threat of the latter prevails. Questions of whether interventions are suitable methods to attain peace, or questions regarding the very nature of both conflict and peace, become secondary at best. Arguably, this implies that rather than a deeper attempt to rethink the issues of concern at the very basis of the governance of post-conflict territories, the multi-layered mission in Kosovo is more symptomatic of a technical refinement of the tools of social engineering: one which disciplines and normalises, just as it individualises, fragments power and dilutes governance across horizontal networks of actors and agents.

Thus, an analysis of the content of the re-conceptualisation of peace-building from minimalist to intrusive indicates not so much a tendency towards a deep re-conceptualisation of the deductive logic that leads to the core assumptions of peace-building, but rather a focus on the procedures and mechanisms, responsible for the correct attainment of the ideal norms regime,
the effective and efficient obtainment of the end game: the ‘normalised’ polity. What this indicates is, thus, that the final element of commonality amongst these scholarly accounts and between them and the policy world, is a procedural concern for the need to economise peace-building in Kosovo to avoid the mistakes of the past (O’Neill, 2002; Van Meurs, 2004), which results in solutions that do not reject or question the need of social engineering, but rather seek to create more efficient mechanisms to peace-build better.

The intervention in Kosovo is not necessarily a shift that demonstrates the end of certainty itself, but the beginning of a more contingent, reflexive, ad hoc certainty, one which permits, indeed relies on the extension of a disciplinary form of power that seeks to administer to the impossible, to control the uncontrollable by extending its normative gaze to the ‘prevention’ of multiple forms of behaviour, to cater for all possible consequences. This form of power concerns itself with the ‘unintended consequences’ that have not yet happened in this case, but have seemed to cause a lot of problems in the past (i.e. Bosnia). The lessons-learnt approach employed in Kosovo provided the opportunity to focus on those ‘unintended consequences’, making it possible to extend the control of the conduct of society into the potential future.

As the mission in Kosovo developed and expanded, and as scholars attempted to make sense of the situation on the ground, several critiques, such as those I outlined in Chapter 2, began to assess the progress in Kosovo by comparing the ethos of the mission to its methods and apparatuses, as well as to the extent, breadth and length of the peace-building interventions. These critiques soon began to target the structural hegemonic disposition of liberal peace-building outlined in Chapter 2 as the principal reason for the multiplication of actors and projects involved in Kosovo and for the emergence of substantial forms of local resistance. I now turn to the emergence of the critique of the liberal peace by examining the localisation discourses in Kosovo. Where I have, so far, outlined a shift towards disciplinary modes of governing that enabled peace-building to acquire a distinctively invasive and prescriptive nature, I suggest below that Kosovo was crucial to the emergence of bottom-up approaches to
peace-building primarily because of the ways in which critical approaches gave
the meaning of resistance to the forms of agency identified on the ground.

2. The Limits of Top-Down Peace-Building in Kosovo & the Rise of the Local

The re-conceptualisation of peace-building is operationalised through the rise of
the local, as discussed in Chapter 2, in a manner which aims to beyond the
stereotypical and limited approaches to local ownership attributed to the liberal
paradigm. Kosovo best demonstrates an understanding of the rise of local agency
that is framed both as a reaction to the practical consequences of liberal peace-
building, as well as an instrument of critique to enable the rethinking of the
foundations of societies beyond hegemony.

The authority structure in Kosovo has, in the past 15 years – and more so
since Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008 – been the subject of
extensive critique in the scholarship of peace-building. One of the points most
frequently made by critics of the externally imposed mission in Kosovo, is the
inability to fully hand over authority. UNMIK’s continued presence is often
taken as proof of the inability or unwillingness of liberal peace-builders to face
the impasse they have been responsible for. From the inability to work out an
exit strategy (Knoll, 2005), to the reluctance to let go of the reins (Richmond,
2009a, p. 575), the legal presence of a structure higher than local authorities is
symptomatic of a number of issues that demonstrate the fundamental
inappropriateness of the imposed protectorate mission in Kosovo, and more
generally, the paradox of promoting autonomy through the establishment of
externally controlled systems of governance. In more general terms, it is
suggested, the peace-building effort so far has privileged vertical relations over
horizontal ones, across and amongst local actors (Fawn & Richmond, 2009).
Authority in this sense is said to be built through methods of state-building that
do not sufficiently eschew the Weberian understanding of state formation as
occurring through securing the monopoly on violence, mobilising revenue, and
providing goods; this understanding of authority, it is suggested, reveals a
blindness towards the conditions for the emergence of legitimacy to be found,
Sörensen argues, in already existing local structures and power relations, through
which actors choose to compete, ally or contest (2013, p. 269). Kosovo, it is then suggested, is evidence of how such a model of peace-building has generated “fraught state-building experiences”, questioning the validity of such view of authority vis-à-vis outcomes such as predatory political settlements and weak statehood (Salmon & Anderson, 2013, p. 42). The authority structures existent in Kosovo – for instance the EU Special Representative – are claimed to represent only a simulated, arbitrary form of power that has little connection both to the politics internal to the institution that issued the mandate (the EU in this case) or to the Balkan society subject to it (Chandler, 2014b).

The dilution of accountability and legitimacy in Kosovo has been considered one of the main problems with the extension and diversification of modes of intervention. In the critique, it is suggested that the extension of multi-layered and multi-dimensional missions, has been able to minimise the lines of accountability in a manner which has eluded all traceable responsibility (Bickerton, 2007; Visoka, 2012a). Generally, it has been suggested, externally imposed state-building in Kosovo demonstrates a fundamental fallacy of the liberal peace, namely the establishment of authority without the basis of legitimacy (Kostovicova, 2008; Lemay-Hébert, 2009; Mulaj, 2011). The question of legitimacy, it is suggested in critical accounts, goes far beyond the issue of representation and participation as enacted by liberal peace-building. Lemay-Hébert, for instance, draws attention to the dangers of privileging a procedural understanding of legitimacy-building by focusing all attentions to the establishment of democratic political structures; individuals may flood to the polling stations, the author suggests, but that would not necessarily say much regarding the sources or local understandings of the relationship between authority, power and legitimacy, which may be consistently different from those held by external actors (2012, p. 475).

7 Visoka calls this ‘Kafkaesque Accountability’. In his research into human rights abuses allegations against UNMIK, the scholar suggests the existence of complex, multiple layers of regulatory mechanisms and review practices set up to deal with allegations, which the author suggests are responsible for the weakening of the right to seek justice through an over-complication of the procedures for dealing with cases. This, the author suggests, is evidence of a systematic attempt to avoid public accountability and transparency (Visoka, 2012a, p. 208 n.1).
Critics have also suggested that top-down approaches are responsible for engendering alienation and marginalisation of those identities in Kosovo that have not been formally socialised within the international normative framework. Thus, for instance, it is suggested that the Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Turk, Gorani, Vlach, Bosniak and Croat minority communities have often been marginalised by international provisions (Sigona, 2012, p. 1215; Visoka, 2012a, p. 202), if not inaccurately or stereotypically represented (Blumi, 2003, p. 222) both in peace-building practice and theory. Furthermore, much attention has been given to the sensationalisation of multiculturalism and inter-ethnic relationships in the problematic northern areas, whilst insufficient attention has been given to the readjustment and development of inter-ethnic dialogue in other areas of southern Kosovo (Devic, 2006, p. 261). Women and children are also reported as being largely left out of the reconstruction efforts or mainstream peace-building conceptualisations, despite both their positive input and their potential role in producing civil unrest (Watson, 2010, p. 371). In more general terms, the problem of marginalisation is attributed to the liberal understanding of the origin of the conflict (the inability to manage difference and to turn irrational disagreement into rational peaceful competition, outlined in the first section of this chapter), which is claimed to exhibit, as Žižek and Hamza note, an inability to understand the context of conflict in Kosovo beyond stereotyped and at times racist understandings of ethnicity and difference (2013).

When looking at the record of peace-building in Kosovo, critical scholars have indeed acknowledged the existence of a practical shift in the methods employed by the peace-builders. For instance, Florian Bieber notes a general shift in the practice of state-building away “from direct intervention to conditionality” born out of considerations to do partly with the rise of local dissent through political groups such as Vetevendosje, a decisively anti-external

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8 Indeed, veiled stereotypical views of the Balkans continue to accompany discourses on Kosovo coming from the policy world. Ample example of this is the rhetoric utilised in UK Member of Parliament and diplomat Denis MacShane’s account of the negotiations in Belgrade after March 2004:

I have to say I don’t trust any of them. I don’t believe what they say. Perhaps they mean it when they say it but I just don’t think they have any real capacity to deliver. I tell them all to work with the Kosovans to find a solution but they hate them with a deep, passionate and enduring hatred (2011, p. 80).
intervention political party (2011, p. 1791). Hehir also notes how, by March 2004, UNMIK was forced to “significantly rethink the resolution of the province’s status” (2007, p. 128). The events of March 2004⁹ are depicted as the watershed moment at which UNMIK realises the bleak state of the mission and a blindness to the state of the affairs thus far:

UNMIK found itself in a captured peace-building situation with respect to the Kosovo-Albanian elite and majority population in the aftermath of the riots […] some of the latter being members of the parliamentary assembly who openly agitated against UNMIK apparently regarded the external peace-building agenda as illegitimate (Narten, 2008, p. 382).

Yet, for the most part, the practical shift is indicated to be little more than a response to the need to make do with the realities on the ground. It is thus suggested that the turn towards local ownership in the policy world remains little more than a justification, consistently tied to a logic of furthering interventionist approaches. In fact, as Hehir crucially points out, the phased pull-out strategy undertaken as a result of the March 2004 events and embodied by the precepts of the Eide Report¹⁰ did not signify a call for total international disengagement, as enabled more ongoing, direct, international control, by framing a move away from Standard before Status not as the last stage of the international presence, but as the next (2009, p. 133). He rightly points out how such a strategy of

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⁹ On March 15th 2004, a Kosovo Serb was wounded by allegedly Albanian assailants. The following day, Serbs blocked the road to Gjilan and the KLA staged a protest against UNMIK’s arrest of KLA commanders on charges of war crimes. On the same day, the media reported that three Albanian children had been drowned in the river Ibar whilst escaping from Serbs. The tensions of the events of the previous two days exploded drastically on March 17th, with widespread clashes across Kosovo, in particular in Caglavica and Mitrovica, resulting in 19 people dead and thousands of Serbs fleeing to neighbouring countries.

¹⁰ In May 2005, Kofi Annan appointed Kai Eide as Special Envoy to the Secretary General, tasking him with the compiling of a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo, with a view to “look at the actual political realities, as well as the formal preconditions for launching the future status process on the basis of continuing and effective progress towards implementation of the Standards for Kosovo” (United Nations Secretary General, 2005b). In his report, Eide suggests that the time is ripe to enter discussions on the status issues, whilst acknowledging that although “there will not be any good moment for addressing Kosovo’s future status […] the time has come to commence this process”. Despite this, Eide does not suggest a radical departure from the standards implementation approach, as he reiterates that “further progress in standards implementation is urgently required” (United Nations Secretary General, 2005a), thus maintaining the legitimacy of the contents of such an approach unchallenged, reasserting the need for continued international presence, as well as reinstating the importance of emphasising the very same areas of development previously highlighted in other documents, approaches and strategies from 1999 to 2005 (i.e. human rights, rule of law, returns, heritage protection, inclusiveness, accountability, economic liberalisation, etc.).
continued involvement signified firstly an inability to return power to local actors, and secondly the growing dissatisfaction of local groups with such ambiguous and reluctant plans. As a result, Narten suggested, the period after the March 2004 riots demonstrated how the external actors on the ground had so far been unable to generate momentum, thus limiting themselves to merely reacting to local demands (2008, p. 386); local ownership, it is finally suggested, remains an ‘empty signifier’ when employed by the policy world (ibid, p. 381). The shift towards intrusive peace-building, visible throughout the establishment of the multi-layered mission in Kosovo, has been thus critiqued both as a form of perpetuation of a liberal plan to establish a distinctively liberal form of state at the expenses of a more hybrid ‘shared’ form of sovereignty (Fawn & Richmond, 2009) as well as a fundamentally unsuitable framework for the understanding of conflict that privileges universal, cosmopolitan and essentially non-local ideas and principles and thus is not suitable for accessing the everyday needs and realities of the population (Debrix, 1999, p. 115).

Other forms of ‘local ownership’ such as policy attempts to further involve local actors in the decision-making process are also addressed as being insufficient. In the case of the establishment of the Interim Administrative Council (a body established in 2000 and appointed by the SRSG with the purpose of engaging local elites in political negotiations), Lemay-Hébert suggests that elites reportedly often complained of decisions being made largely behind their backs before consultation (2012, p. 427). What is suggested in critical accounts is, therefore, that previous liberal understanding of and responses to local realities in Kosovo have fallen short of having a real impact on the everyday life of populations partly because they have been imposed, partly because they have continued to follow a vertical logic by including elites and excluding other possibly disenfranchised or different forms of agency, and generally because they represent forms of virtualised, abstracted and stereotyped views of local everyday realities (Richmond, 2010b).

These limited understandings are also present in the literature, as Lemay-Hébert suggests. The author in fact notes that “the Kosovo experiment stands as a useful reminder that the institutional focus, so pervasive in the contemporary
literature on state-building, leaves crucial elements out of the equation, such as the structural conditions under which legitimacy emerges in state-building processes” (2013b, p. 100). The fundamental limitation of linear, universalist paradigms – including those that draw on transnational horizontal, cosmopolitan approaches – is evident in the crossover with the practice of peace-building. Nowhere is this clearer, it is often suggested, than in the gap between local needs and international ideals. Critics have suggested that where peace-builders have attempted to bring the process of peace-building closer to the people these projects have been unable to significantly impact high level decision-making and the policies of the UN protectorate (Devic, 2006, p. 257), and have mostly been subservient to the goal of building a liberal state and a neo-liberal economy (Richmond, 2009a, p. 560). Even attempts to increase the role of civil society and NGOs are pointed to as being far from ‘local everyday practices’. In the case of Kosovo, for instance, it is noted that the civil society faces extensive pressure from western donors and from their ethnocentric views of inter-ethnic relations in the region, which bear limited affinity to the reality of everyday interactions (Devic, 2006, p. 258). In other cases, it has been suggested, NGOs in Kosovo have had limited impact in bringing attention to local issues of concern, particularly when these were related to local/international interactions, as in the case of NGOs advocating for equal treatment for different ethnic groups from international police forces (Chip Carey, 2010, p. 255).

Thus, local ownership as practised through previous approaches is associated with the perceived cultural and political hegemony of liberal peace-building. This top-down understanding of peace-building is claimed to enable the marginalisation and exclusion of sections of the local population from the initial governance framework, in order to control the progress of the mission. For instance, the inclusion of former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) combatants into new political parties and civil society has been said to represent a useful method to extend custodial relationships with local elites with the purpose of disciplining spoilers (Visoka, 2012b, p. 28). What this has caused, it is suggested, is a manipulation of the ambiguous nature of the post-conflict transition, both on the side of the international actors and by local elites, to push for their respective agendas, leading to a form of path-dependency that has only
brought forward closed off politics and fragile structures of representation (ibid, p. 28). The continuous gap and friction between the top-down and the everyday forces of the bottom-up have also directly contributed to the creation of new paradoxes, amongst which is the wave of popular oppositions against international administrations (Lemay-Hébert, 2012, p. 467). Some of this resistance originates, it has been argued, in plans to foster local ownership of governance such as the decentralisation project. These plans, Baskin has suggested, “were not the product of a genuine partnership between international and domestic (Kosovar) officials and have encountered a good deal of local resistance” (2006, p. 88 my emphasis).

Resistance here is key, in the case of Kosovo, as it is framed both as a material reality of the contingent and complex everyday, as well as a normatively sound starting point to reject and counter the unwanted liberal paradigm. Below, the next section investigates the framing of resistance as the key to unlocking everyday forms of agency in Kosovo. The section suggests that resistance is framed both as a response to the liberal peace, but also as a natural quality of the everyday subject of peace. Thanks to this framing, the end of top-down approaches is met with the instrumental use of resistance as a method to ‘access’ the everyday to conceive alternative and non-linear ontologies of peace. The practical exercise of ‘accessing’ the everyday through the identification and legitimation of certain forms of agency may however present some notable limitations to the conceptual objective of non-linearity established by critiques of the liberal peace as outlined in Chapter 2.

3. ‘Resisting’ Everyday Agency in Kosovo

In Chapter 2, I outlined one of the local turn’s primary aims, that of presenting alternatives to the liberal peace as counterweights to the fiction produced by the liberal peace, placing emphasis on non-traditional and informal forms of political agency in order to upset the traditionally elitist, hierarchical and still dominating understanding of ‘partnership’ promoted by the liberal peace (Chandler, 2006; Devic, 2006, p. 261). Here, the realm of the ‘everyday’ can, once again, shed light on the significance of the shift and the relevance of the emergence of discourses of localisation, in Kosovo.
Given the temporal and physical extent of the peace-building mission in Kosovo, the local turn seeks to draw out the material conditions of exploitation, marginalisation and ‘othering’ that the liberal peace is predisposed to cause (see Chapter 2, section 2).\textsuperscript{11} The ‘everyday’ is then presented as a hybrid reality that is more nuanced than the fiction of the liberal peace in that it embodies both the ‘authentic’ local that Oliver Richmond described, as well as hybrid and co-opted realities that the liberal peace seems to be unwilling to own up to (Visoka, 2012b). This fundamental de-centring and unsettling of what is perceived to be the orthodoxy in peace-building begs the question of whether the previous unwanted disciplinary tendencies of the liberal peace have indeed been abandoned or even displaced. To assess in what way the local turn is different from its own object of critique, the following section starts by looking at the way in which the local is identified and valorised in Kosovo. It is then suggested that a shift has indeed taken place with the local turn, away from the more rigid disciplinary forms of peace-building outlined in the previous section. This section focuses particularly on resistance as the predominant discursive element that enabled the local turn’s call for the fragmentation of governance along non-linear, complex lines.

Resistance plays a crucial role in critical scholarly accounts. These often begin by pointing to local discontent as the first expression of resistance. Local discontent is, in fact, often cited as one of the most common and visible outcomes of the continued mission in Kosovo. By 2005, in fact, it is suggested that the top-down approach employed by external actors, spearheaded by UNMIK, began to backfire, giving rise to pockets of resistance. This is evident, Narten notes, particularly in the Kosovo-Serb voting and assembly boycotts, in forms of resistance against Steiner’s Standards before Status policy\textsuperscript{12} on the side

\textsuperscript{11} Critiques of liberal approaches to international development focus particularly on how a western-centric notion of evolution engender grossly misconceived representation of the Third World and of non-western societies in general (see, for instance, Spivak, 1988; Kapoor, 2008). Critiques of liberal peace-building also draw on this trend, by suggesting that western notions of peace are embedded in colonial articulations of other cultures that support supremacy, subjugation and domination (Jabri, 2007, p.65).

\textsuperscript{12} In August 2003 Harri Holkeri was appointed as the new Special Representative to the Secretary General. Under Holkeri’s direction, the Provisional Institution for Self Governance and UNMIK drafted a report titled “Standards for Kosovo” in December 2003, with the purpose of outlining the standards to be reached in the field of governance before opening up the discussion on the status of Kosovo (UNMIK/PISG, 2003).
of the Kosovo-Albanian communities, who demanded a parallel ‘Status and Standards’ policy, and finally in the rise of armed militant groups such as the Albanian National Army (2008, p. 381). Furthermore, rising support for anti-interventionist movements such as Vetevendosje (Lemay-Hébert, 2013, pp. 91–95) are also taken to be examples of the opposition amongst the locals to continued external authority. Discourses on Kosovo are pregnant with meaningful moments of resistance, in which local everyday realities find representation beyond the traditional channels of authority and representation created by top-down, externally imposed vertical structures of power. In Kosovo, resistance in its multiple forms has often qualified the very agency of the local subject, from the peaceful resistance of the student movement in defiance of Serbian oppression (see, for instance Kostovicova, 2005), to KLA resistance against the violence of Yugoslavian paramilitaries and parallel education as resistance against marginalisation (Clark, 2000), and to current boycotts and defiance methods of Kosovo Serbian resistance against the policies of UNMIK and the Pristina local government after 1999 (Gow, 2009).

In recent times, attention has been given to the role of resistance, whether directed at the liberal peace, or in itself, directed at any other form of imposing and hegemonic power. In the first case, resistance is identified as an outcome of the “unfulfilled promises of liberal peace-building” (Visoka, 2011, p. 124). Resistance is also framed as the expression of a material gap between the imposing policies of the external actors involved in the liberal peace project and local needs and agendas (Lemay-Hébert, 2013b). The hegemonic tendencies of the liberal peace are again invoked, where resistance is framed as a form of ‘political alterity’ that counters the de-politicisation of the reconstruction effort of the liberal peace in Kosovo (Pugh, 2011, p. 154). Disappointment with the work of the liberal peace-builders is not, however, the only perceived origin of resistance. Another one is, in fact, the establishment of additional elements to the existing missions, such as the EULEX mission, considered to have been met with extensive resistance from Serbian and Albanian communities in Kosovo

13 Sörensen’s piece on intervention and state-building in Kosovo further identifies different forms of resistance in Kosovo: the pacifist, the activist and the militant positions. These also imply various expressions of dissent including demonstration, occupations or more militant strategies (2002, p. 272).
alike because of matters of legitimacy (Sahin, 2013, p. 29). Resistance to the liberal peace in Kosovo is seen as taking a different form. Non-participation is noted as a common form of resistance, one which has the potential to unlock meaning behind a seemingly unproductive disengagement with mainstream politics. In the case of the Serb boycott of the elections in Kosovo, for example, Mac Ginty has suggested that this is actually a prime example of a political act that “can be interpreted as a form of communication at the out-group and in-group levels. It is worth stressing that the agency involved in principled non-participation is reactionary and is a response to an agenda largely set by others” (2012a, p. 174). Resistance is thus a form of local and ‘authentic’ expression, a mode of political participation that is pitted directly against the liberal peace, through bringing forth customary or hybrid forms of politics (Richmond, 2009a).

Beyond the way in which the policy world includes the local in its agendas, local forms of resistance are given attention by critical scholars that employ them as the starting point of a re-conceptualisation of peace-building not just in Kosovo but in more general terms; resistance is taken to signal a meeting point between politics, armed resistance and everyday society, united in the common effort to change the intolerable status quo (Bekaj, 2010, p. 14; Weller, 2009, p. 187). What the critique suggests in relation, for instance, to the violent events of March 2004, is that these events are indicative of the limits of liberal peace-building itself, reflected in the inability to bring the process of peace-building closer to the people that are affected by it. Lemay-Hébert also notes that 2004 represented in the statistics on satisfaction with the work of UNMIK the lowest ever point, suggesting the March riots to be tied to a fundamental moment of local discontent (2012, p. 472, 2013, p. 95). The resistance witnessed in Kosovo five years into the mission, was thus associated with a depletion of legitimacy born out of the inability to “to actually accommodate local political interests” (Narten, 2008, p. 386 my emphasis). This problem bears consequences not merely for the resolution of the impasse in Kosovo, but for the wider notion of foreign interventions to bring peace. Recurring violence, as understood within critical perspectives, is not evidence of the inability of local actors to resolve their grievances peacefully or to manage their differences, but rather it is associated with the rigid, top-down approach of liberal peace-building. Newman,
for instance, suggests that the top-down structure of ‘soft partition’ imposed from above is responsible for the potential recurrence of violence in Kosovo (2009, p. 35).

The solutions proposed through localisation, in the literature, are not just proposed as material responses to the need to bring the process of peace-building closer to the people for efficiency’s sake. Whilst this is, willingly and directly, one of the policy world’s driving motivations for employing a policy of localisation, the critical scholarship places on top of its agenda the need to bridge the gap between peace-building and the people, for the people’s sake. In other words, by placing the subject at the centre of this re-conceptualisation of peace-building, localisation does not want to offer a mere empirical alternative to ‘get to Denmark’ but becomes, in itself, a much more profound method of critique through which to bring forward the illiberal, intransigent and unbecoming aspects of peace-building so far, to question the suitability of the liberal project. Co-option and resistance are then framed as real, often hybrid, fragile outcomes of non-attuned processes of liberal peace-building (Narten, 2008, p. 386) and localisation, as a method of critique, becomes an explanatory paradigm that acts as an alarm bell to warn against the oppressing, forceful and ineffective methods of liberal peace-building.

Resistance in Kosovo is thus framed as a useful, productive form of agency. Michael Pugh, for instance, exemplifies this discourse by suggesting that examples of locally organised collective resistance such as the Democratic

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14 The policy agenda also often seemed to indicate the need to change the approach employed towards local ownership in Kosovo. This concern is largely reflected in the interviews I have carried out with representatives of key international actors in Kosovo. A key EULEX official mentioned ‘local ownership’ to be “the very modus operandi of the [EULEX] mission” (Face-To-Face Interview, 2011). The concern for localising peace-building was also strongly supported in earlier policy agendas, as can be seen in the Independent International Commission on Kosovo’s Report of 2000:

…in the end, the people of Kosovo have to solve their own problems, together with their neighbours. The international community can provide the framework for a Kosovo at peace but it is for the citizens of Kosovo to make it a reality (2000, p. 286).

This commitment to localisation can also be seen in Ambassador Eide’s report reinforced by the UNMIK SRSG’s calls for a concrete diplomatic engagement with all parties to move the process of status along (United Nations Secretary General, 2005).

15 The phrase was coined by Francis Fukuyama in Origins of Political Order to indicate the process of achieving liberal democracy (2011).
Alliance movement headed by Ibrahim Rugova can make space for “intersubjective forms of politics” in peace-building (2010, p. 275). In this context, accounts have focused on the cohesive and constructive value of certain forms of non-violent resistance in withstanding “opponent repression while promoting internal unity around a set of realistic goals and methods” (Stephan, 2006, p. 76). As such, resistance is central to the local turn’s fragmentation of power (see Chapter 2, section 4), in that it is directed at the monotonous and monodirectional use of hegemonic power, whomever it is exercised by.

Undoubtedly, one of the strengths of the recent conceptual shift towards localisation, visible particularly in the case of Kosovo, is precisely its ability to initiate a material change in the peace-building by bringing attention to the voices of the marginalised other. The value of bringing to the surface the marginalised forms of agency that take expression in more or less vocal forms of resistance lies, most importantly, in the idea that such forms of agency can access the everyday in a way which is fundamentally different from the liberal peace’s preference for expressions of agency that are usually only limited to axiomatic associations of liberalism, work and productivity. Thus, Mac Ginty includes non-compliance and resistance to open up space to consider “multiple, complex and often unanticipated ways in which local and international actors engage with the liberal peace” (2012a, p. 183 my emphasis).

This plays well within the aim to re-conceptualise peace-building along non-linear lines, which is, as suggested in the introduction to this thesis and in Chapter 1, a fundamental aim of the local turn. The emergence of the everyday, however, as will be seen below, is not entirely unproblematic. The process of ‘accessing’ such a level in a way which is fundamentally dissimilar from that of the liberal peace, presents certain operational issues that will be explored below, which may significantly hinder the possibility of the local turn to open up to multiple, complex and contingent realities, without resulting in generalised, abstracted and linear assumptions. The remainder of this chapter explores how accessing the everyday requires exercising a somewhat arbitrary form of instrumentalisation of biopower.
4. **The Biopower of Kosovo’s ‘Everyday’**

The framing of resistance in the case of Kosovo is crucial for the shift I have outlined in Chapter 2, from disciplinary power to biopower. The emergence of the forces of everyday realities, particularly when understood as agency resisting the hegemony of unsuitable, imposed and top-down solutions, indicates that Kosovo has been instrumental in the latest phase of the re-conceptualisation of peace-building. The framing of the need to access the everyday needs of the population in Kosovo, it is argued below, not only enables a shift towards biopower, but it crucially reveals something of the aspiration of this critical set of scholarship that bears important consequences for the project of rethinking peace-building beyond linear understandings. When the everyday is ‘accessed’ for the purpose of reversing the hegemony of the liberal peace, this project requires the identification of the forms of agency to accept, legitimise and valorise which has a profound normative impact on the manner in which agency and subjectivity is understood. The case of Kosovo begins to shed light upon the qualities that are attributed to the emergent contingency of the everyday. The actions and behaviour associated with the everyday are not only qualified as more ‘authentic’ than the stereotypes of the liberal peace, but these are then identified and spatialised particularly in forms of resistance, as seen above.

The focus on the complex nature of the everyday life of populations in Kosovo has brought forward a decentring of peace-building, shifting attention to the framing of the ‘problem’ of the management of populations. What this complexity seems to tell us is that acting upon conflicts on the basis of linear, reductionist understandings of events and temporalities as determining a particular outcome (Popolo, 2011, pp. 201–204) is not possible and can only produce problematic ‘virtual’ outcomes that do not sit well with the ‘organic’ complexity of the everyday. Resistance then, becomes not just the ‘inevitable’ outcome of this virtual imposition (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 775), but also a positive starting point to upset the primacy of the liberal peace-building agenda in Kosovo, and to shed light upon the complex web of interaction that comprise the post-conflict milieu. Yet, one could argue that it is in its attempt to go beyond the liberal peace, as will be seen in deeper detail in the next chapter,
that the local turn exhibits some paradoxes that limit its appreciation of the contingent nature of the everyday. Indeed, the inherently normative value of the local turn (particularly when it is opposed to the liberal peace as in resistance), born out of assumptions relating it to a somewhat closer and more organic understanding of the ‘authentic’ ‘everyday’ confers to the local turn yet a further, and extremely crucial, quality that carries important consequences. In its identification of the ‘local’ voices in need of empowerment, as the case of Kosovo's resistance suggests, this displays potentially dangerous elements of selectivity, just as the paradigm continues to showcase similar elements of selectivity in its identification of the liberal peace and its expressions.

The case of Kosovo is in fact useful in taking stock of the logic behind the identification of the ‘local’ and the ‘everyday’. Despite openly recognising the difficulty and potentially limiting effects of identifying a coherent local, the critical scholarship has, willingly or unwittingly, exhibited a paradoxically deterministic view of everyday agency. In accounts on Kosovo, this is particularly evident. In her account of local civil society in Kosovo, Devic, for instance, launches a critique against liberal, western-style multiculturalism as a limit to the potential of local civil society and local everyday forms of multiculturalism. At the same time Devic, however, also warns against the dangers of “‘less civil’ sectors of civil society, such as the KLA veteran’s associations” which she considers responsible for the March 2004 violence (2006, p. 262). Fawn and Richmond, also point to the agency of local actors, whilst at the same time warning against traditional pre-conflict forms of elites, who may use their agency to manipulate the process of peace-building towards a particularist and ethnocentric view of the exercise of sovereignty; the two scholars point to Kosovo and Republika Srpska as evidence of two such polities (2009). Richmond himself specifies his focus on ‘civil’ forms of everyday agency as opposed to ‘uncivil’ ones (2009a, p. 572)

If the notion of everyday is what provides the struggling voices with the legitimacy to be heard and brought forward as an expression of authentic agency,

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16 The rise of the local is accompanied, in the scholarship, by a warning call to avoid romanticisation or indeed homogenisation of the ‘local’ agent (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 272; Pouligny, Chesterman, et al., 2007; Pouligny, 2006; Richmond, 2011b).
then it is worth questioning how everyday struggles are identified and given meaning and, most importantly, what other forms of agency are not given meaning or are not included as expressions of ‘authentic’ or meaningful everyday agency. These debates demonstrate a potentially arbitrary identification of which ‘local’ forms of knowledge are to be privileged. Narten’s critique of liberal peace-building’s inability to “actually accommodate local political interests” (2008, p. 386 my emphasis) also does not shed light upon what actually accommodating local demands means or how this fits into an existing mission which is, by default, invasive and top-down; neither does it illuminate the question of how these political interests take expression and what form they should take when they are ‘accommodated’. Furthermore, despite concerns over the potential ‘romanticisation’ of the local (this is a central feature addressed by several scholars of the local turn in peace-building; for instance, see: Lidén, Mac Ginty, & Richmond, 2009; Mitchell & Richmond, 2011; Richmond, 2011b; Roberts, 2013, p. 68), these accounts, whilst acknowledging the fluid and contingent nature of the identities involved in the ‘local’, continue to operate on a discursive binary by defining the outer limits of the local against what is perceived to be the ‘external’, their counterpart, or their ‘other’. For instance, in the discourses on Kosovo, Kostovicova welcomes a nuanced view of the local by warning against romanticisation and wholesale accounts of what the local is. Later in her project, however, she also dedicates a section to outlining the issue of local discontent by focusing on ‘the Serbs’ (2008, p. 640). This is problematic particularly because, despite attempts to acknowledge the unfixd reality that shapes the polity in Kosovo, it reinforces a unitary vision of a portion of society, advancing an implied understanding of a sense of common belonging, or even of common concerns amongst the individuals of Serbian provenance, ignoring, amongst many other factors, differences in income, geographical location, personal historical experience of the war, etc. The same could be argued in relation to views on resistance, which run the risk of becoming wholesale accounts of what individuals may be fighting for (or against) regardless of the differences that make up the collective expression of the resistance movement. It is not difference itself but the way in which difference is valued according to biased preferences that becomes problematic.
For instance in Richmond’s account of the local turn, ‘enclavisation’ and the ‘Kosova dominated’ declaration of independence of 2008 are critiqued as undesirable forms of statehood achieved through ethnonationalist projects (2011a, pp. 79–80), without taking into consideration that these ethnonationalist projects may, in themselves, be the very expression of some forms of the ‘everyday’ agency that the author himself has endeavoured to draw out. Similarly, the “post-communist culture of distrust of central government, which also bred a tradition of non-communication and non-cooperation with central government structures” is critiqued as a negative feature of Kosovo-Serb communities (Richmond, 2011a, p. 81), where, elsewhere, non-cooperation is otherwise hailed as a form of valuable agency (2010b).

Furthermore, the discussion on hybridity is also particularly exemplary of the paradox generated by the local turn in its attempt to celebrate the diversity of the social in its interconnectedness. Given that critical approaches place particular weight on hybridity as a notion that can best exemplify the untraceable and complex nature of contingent relations, many accounts focusing on hybridity present contradictory conceptualisations of hybridity, particularly where they attempt to trace the boundaries of the hybrid identities, their origin, their ethos, and their agendas. For instance, Visoka suggests that examining the different levels of hybridity can bring clarity to what forms hybridity takes in Kosovo (2012b, p. 23), although it can be argued that the endeavour of identifying the physical point of contact that generates local/international hybridity still relies on an exclusionary principle that forcefully imposes definitional limits upon what is local and what is international. Particularly, when hybridity is used as an instrument to identify patterns of subordination (Visoka, 2012b, p. 24) or to combat what is perceived as being ‘structural’ power such as the hegemony of the West (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 765), the concept then necessarily serves the explanatory purpose of recognising the identities of the actors before qualifying the interactions. This is also true for those assessments that acknowledge an even more complex concept of ‘prior hybridity’ but focus on

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17 I am not arguing that the notion of ‘prior hybridity’ is either unappealing or useless. However, when it is used solely as an instrument to demonstrate the inability of the liberal peace to access local realities its potential remains limited to a mere instrument of critique, for instance, when it is advocated as a lens to examine how the non-elite level has been marginalised, forcing a rather
the vertical interaction between top-down and bottom-up (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012, p. 4), thus relying on the identification of certain qualities and characteristics that identify which actors fit the top-down and which fit the bottom-up at the moment of interaction.

These paradoxes demonstrate the difficulty of attempting to reflect the plurality and non-linearity of social processes vis-à-vis the practical endeavour of ‘building’ peace by starting from identifiable actors to work with. What this suggests is precisely the ‘problem’ of managing populations that biopower becomes the answer to, in that biopower is not necessarily the constituent power of the everyday, but the process of ‘making sense’ of the everyday, that which makes it possible to ‘access’ it in order to ‘build’ peace. Biopower, then, operates at the intersection of the multiplicity of the social, amongst the ‘naturalness’ of the everyday:

To say that this is the sudden emergence of the ‘naturalness’ of the human species in the field of techniques of power would be excessive. But what [before] then appeared above all in the form of need, insufficiency, or weakness, illness, now appears as the intersection between a multiplicity of living individuals working and coexisting with each other in a set of material elements that act on them and on which they act in turn (Foucault, 2007, p. 37 footnote *).

It is the ‘naturalness’ of life, therefore, that renders biopower appealing as a technology of governing and disciplining individuals and populations (Nadesan, 2010, pp. 3–5). Yet, one could suggest that the naturalness of life as the innate contingent quality that biopower seeks to harness in principle is not just subjected to techniques of power coming from liberal governmentality. Biopower, then, is a typology of power that emerges in certain conditions but is not limited to them, as Foucault suggested it could not in itself be pinned down to a singular origin (2007, p. 16). In this sense, biopower could be anything and anywhere, and may be inherently resisting (of rigid linear frameworks), without

blunt division of individuals across the elite/non-elite line (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012, p. 4). A possible analytical alternative to engage with hybridity might investigate how processes of constant contact and interaction (of different kinds) are replicated numerous times in society and how this interconnectedness represents the fundamental logic behind how publics are formed and interactions amongst individuals maintained.
needing to be actively framed as resistance against something or towards any objective.\textsuperscript{18}

When, however, the quality of the contingent is identified in resistance, and when resistance is given a particular object (i.e. the liberal peace and its symptoms) and a particular ethos (that of identifying and overturning relations of subordination), then it is also given a particular origin point, and power is localised, spatialised and identified with those sources who identify themselves with, or are identified as opposing, the liberal peace. This bears yet another important implication for the framing of the everyday as a tool of critique of the liberal peace. Whilst the local can be taken as the centre of the shift from a subject victimised by hegemonic forces to a resisting-subject, an expression of agency associated mostly with resistance, the notion of ‘the local’ could potentially attribute a productive value to the subject which is not dissimilar from other modern forms of disciplinary and even governmental powers. Where, for instance, Foucault suggested that the barracks, the schools, the prisons, as symbols of disciplinary power, sought not just to punish abnormal behaviour but to place the subject in a positive, productive position, this was indicated as evidence of the economisation of punishment towards managerial forms that could be useful to the system itself (1991a, p. 210). This could also, potentially, \textsuperscript{18}

\begin{quote}
I do not seek to venture into the risky field of theories of power, nor do I wish to attempt to sketch a framework within which biopower could be positively used to represent this innate ‘naturalness of life’. Such an attempt can be seen in Lipschultz and Rowe’s critique of governmentality, where they suggest that the power of the everyday can be harnessed to counter global governmentality:

…what is necessary is not the global wielding of the power to influence […] but, rather, to produce power ‘locally’. To make this possible, a restoration of the political to everyday life, and the ‘acting’ on which it depends […] is essential (2005, p. 4).
\end{quote}

However, I can suggest, in contrast, that it is precisely the attempt to access the naturalness of life that generated what Foucault identified in biopower as a set of mechanisms to further control societies and individuals. Foucault’s own work on biopower does not, in fact, address the other possible uses of biopower, nor does it suggest that biopower could perhaps represent the contingent and non-linear nature of complex social interactions and the different mechanisms that make these interactions possible, but rather specifically frames it as an issue of governance, as a set of methods and actors employed for the sole purpose of governing over populations and individuals, as a method to ‘secure power’ (2007, p. 16). Likewise, most approaches to biopower also share this negative understanding of biopower as an extension of neo-liberal instrumentalisation of power for the purpose of the regulation of the body politic (Dean, 1999; Nadesan, 2010; Reid, 2010; Rose, 2001).
be the case for the identification of legitimate struggles, and for the normative drive to utilise the resisting subject as an empowerment tool. The selectivity demonstrated in the process of giving meaning and identifying the ‘local’ and its struggle, has the reverse result of that which it sought to accomplish, as it demonstrates a nearly hubristic assumption regarding ‘what the locals really want’, by suggesting the existence of an ‘authentic’ everyday beyond the artifice created by the liberal peace.

Localisation could then become the very ill it sought to extinguish, by manipulating the contingent naturalness of the everyday, to observe and enable the collective to exist and be useful, just as previous disciplinary forms of power enabled the observation and understanding of the polity’s behaviour aimed at regulating its productive functions. Peace-building ‘from below’, ultimately, could represent a mere symbolic overturning of the roles, a switching of top-down with bottom-up, particularly if certain modern assumptions are not changed, as will be seen in Chapters 4 and 5.

Finally, one could also suggest that the shifts from minimalist to intrusive and from intrusive to locally-focused peace-building, are not as separate and compartmentalised as they seem and that, as such, the overlap of methods pertaining to all these different forms of power is visible and constant. Indeed, Sörensen suggests that if ever reforming the way we think about intervention through employing cosmopolitan approaches failed, then the ‘humanitarian bombs’ are never really far away (2002, p. 18). Similarly, one could suggest that elements of ‘spectacle’ (i.e. flexing muscle, bombing, etc.), as well as elements of disciplinary power consistent with less coercive forms of capacity building through state-building (Merlingen, 2011), as well as elements of biopower, could concomitantly be present, as these methods would themselves be part of a further ‘economisation’ of peace-building, through which power is instrumentalised and directed when it is identified, pinpointed and given an origin (resistance) and aim (empowerment of a particular group, identity, or actor).

Pointing out the limits and marginalising tendencies of top-down approaches and fragmenting the governance structure and logic behind peace-building has been the core objective of the critical turn towards the local. Yet, as
I have outlined some problematic issues inherent in the conceptualisation of the local in the latest critical shift, as evidenced in Kosovo, it is possible to question the extent to which the outcomes and tendencies of peace-building outlined by the critique as typical of liberal frameworks, have actually been abandoned with the latest critical shift. In the next chapter, I will continue this exploration of the implications of the local turn, hypothesising that just as the reflectivity demonstrated in the shift towards intrusive forms peace-building played an important role in the justification of further invasive modes of normalisation, so can the sensitisation to the local of the latest critical shift also carry similar dangers. Legitimising certain forms of struggle as expressions of the ‘authentic’ agency can unwittingly reproduce the dualisms and arbitrariness that the critique associates with liberal peace-building.

Conclusion

Amongst the many instances of post-conflict foreign engagement, Kosovo has undoubtedly offered the scholarship several insightful elements to draw from. This chapter has in fact suggested that in the discourses on intervention and peace-building, Kosovo is an emblematic case, taken to represent the limits of minimalist approaches to peace-building first and of invasive and hegemonic forms of liberal control later. Kosovo arguably pushed the boundaries, exposed the limits, supported paradigm shifts and continues to represent, to this date, a world of endless possibility. Not yet as problematic and divided as the stalemate in Bosnia (Lemay-Hébert, 2013, p. 99; Mitchell, 2001, pp. 251–259), nor quite as independent from Security Council politics as East Timor (Lemay-Hébert, 2012, p. 465), and never quite finished (Gow, 2009), the case of Kosovo is constantly meaningful. Kosovo exists in a complex and unfixed reality which eludes understanding and is, because of this, always bound to be conceptually in need of making sense, and practically in a “permanent state of exception” (Žižek & Hamza, 2013, p. 101).

This chapter has sought to discuss the significance of Kosovo for the shifts in the conceptualisation of peace-building. Kosovo’s relevance lies particularly in its unfinished and transitory status that has attracted attempts,
coming from across the ideological spectrum, to manage and regulate the
conduct of the conflict and its resolution. The muscular intervention in Kosovo
demonstrated a deep and subtle shift towards disciplinary forms of power that
have enabled it to be framed as an ongoing test site and which have framed
intervention as necessary whilst refining it in its methods to make it more
efficient. This shift has also enabled a ‘complexification’ of forms of
intervention that has generated multi-layered and multi-levelled invasive
approaches. The extension of said forms of intervention has brought together
both the neo-institutional and cosmopolitan schools of thought on the issue of
peace-building, whilst it has also seen a practical implementation through the
extension of a top-down transitional administration in Kosovo.

The protracted external presence in Kosovo, as well as the wave of
scholarship in support of a lengthier (and more invasive) form of intervention,
has then generated extensive critiques focusing on the negative outcomes of
externally imposed institution-building. Local dissent, the recurrence of
violence, corruption and other forms of resistance have been identified as by-
products of the liberal-peace, increasingly non-attuned to local realities and
genengering marginalisation of authentic forms of agency beyond liberal
fictional understandings of civil society and elites. The emergence of the
everyday, it has been suggested, is associated largely with the issue of resistance
in Kosovo, which is identified as both a material reality, a quality of local
agency, and as an outcome of inorganic liberal peace-building policies.
Resistance has then been qualified as representing a more authentic expression
of the everyday needs of the population and has taken centre stage in the re-
conceptualisation of peace-building from the bottom up, away from universalist
and linear understandings of the complex contingencies of post-conflict
territories.

Whilst acknowledging the immense value of recent critical approaches
to the liberal peace, particularly in shedding light on some of the most notable
problems with the establishment of authority structures and their relationship
with legitimacy and accountability, this chapter has also highlighted some of the
issues with localisation in Kosovo, which will be examined in more detail in the
next chapter, with reference to the rationale behind this critical shift in general. These mostly focus on the way in which local agency is given meaning and legitimised. Given the fact that the local turn itself, as will be seen in the next chapter, is not free from its own normative assumptions, then the process of identifying a truer and more authentic form of everyday agency may present similar issues of selectivity that earlier approaches – now mostly discarded by the critique – also exhibited.

Two questions, then, become pressing. Just as critical approaches suggest the shift from minimalist to intrusive peace-building to be insufficiently critical and a refining of liberal and linear methods to impose power, is it possible that the shift towards localisation, hailed as conceptually fundamentally different and non-linear, is also only a technical project? What can account for the manner in which the everyday is accessed, and biopower is potentially employed to ‘harvest’ the everyday? These questions will be investigated in the next chapter with references to the logic that drives the project of change supported by the local turn, in order to understand the impact of the local turn’s emancipatory drive on the project of rethinking peace along multiple and non-linear directions.
Chapter 4
The ‘Emancipatory’ Local Turn?
The Limits and Paradoxes of the Local Turn’s Normative Project of Re-Conceptualisation

Introduction

So far, my research has addressed the shifts in the conceptualisation of peace-building, pointing to the turn from minimalist to intrusive approaches and from intrusive to localisation. Bearing in mind that this shifts do not need to be considered as absolute chiasms in what would be an otherwise linear narrative of peacebuilding, it has been suggested in Chapter 2 that a critique of the hegemony of the liberal peace paradigm has given birth to a shift in the manner in which peace-building has been conceptualised, towards the local, the aim of which was to fundamentally overturn the logic that engendered the marginalisation of alternative, often locally produced, modes of thinking about peace. The local turn has now obtained a level of consensus visible in the fact that recent conceptualisations of peace-building are now almost always accompanied by references to local ownership or to local agency. Yet, some of the more practical paradoxes identified with the local turn’s handling of agency, explored in Chapter 3 in relation to Kosovo, have also raised a significant question, which are further addressed in this chapter and the next: to what extent are the rationalities that distinguish the local turn from the previous approaches different to what has been identified as problematic in the liberal peace paradigm?

The focus on the local, it was suggested in Chapter 2, is not only the solution that seeks to practically reverse the position of subordination of the local subject of peace, but it has also been argued to be the foundation of a radical shift to open up multiple ontologies of peace. There is no question regarding the unsuitability of the identified liberal model amongst the critical scholarship, which then attributes to the critique itself an emancipatory aim. This draws out the agency of the subject to be empowered from the resistance to the old paradigm that needs to be overcome in order to break with the continuum of
marginalisation and alienation extended through invasive methods of interventions across different eras. This is, arguably, a radical project of empowerment and emancipation, where the subject of peace becomes the subject of empowerment and where emancipation is the transitory process that can break with the dominance of the liberal peace by presenting it as the point to emancipate from. Accessing and valorising the ideal, contingent, multi-layered, complex realm of the ‘everyday’ is implied as the point to emancipate to.

This chapter reflects on the significance of the local turn’s own project of emancipation, by comparing its logic to that which formed the subject of the critique of the liberal peace. If the liberal peace is, in fact, responsible for engendering causal understandings of emancipation as linear developments which in turn have operated on the basis of a process of inclusion/exclusion, the chapter also suggests that the local turn’s own project of emancipatory peace bears linear elements. To articulate this argument, in the first section, the chapter looks at the critiques of linearity operated by the local turn in relation to previous, mainstream forms of emancipatory engagements with peace-building. The second section contrasts these approaches with the local turn’s own non-linear logic of emancipation. In the third section, I begin unpacking this project by examining the subject of this project of change. By understanding the logic that drives the identification of the typology of agency to valorise and legitimise, I begin to draw attention to the unexplored normative dimensions of the local turn itself that can account for the way in which the ‘everyday’ is ‘accessed’. In the final section, I suggest that the underlying normativity of the local turn’s project of emancipation outlines a tension in the way in which the local turn has been presented, which has to do with the friction between the linearity of certain normative assumptions and the opposing, fragmentary power of the contingent, the complex and the ‘everyday’ understood as an immanent plane of fluidity. As is suggested in this chapter and the next, this has important implications for the effects of the local turn on the individual, and on the relationship between the emergence of the local turn and the issue of the governance of the conduct of societies.
1. Beyond the Linear Modern Narratives of Change

As seen in Chapter 2, the critical scholarship of the mid-2000s claimed to be able to re-conceptualise peace-building in a manner which is closer to the needs and interests of local populations by providing a fundamentally different understanding of political change to that commonly associated with the liberal, linear forms of emancipation that have traditionally been at the core of theories of economic development. It is to this understanding of political change that the chapter turns.

With the critical turn in IR and the emergence of critical and anti-foundationalist perspectives, several scholars sought to displace some of the underlying assumptions of modernity that had been perceived as forming the orthodoxy in International Relations theory as well as practice. In particular, what was critiqued was the manner in which the Enlightenment movement had established a grand philosophy of the world that acted as a meta-narrative through which causal relations could be employed to understand and operate in the world.1 Since the meta-narrative is understood fundamentally as a legitimation of a specific manner of ‘knowing’ and being in the world, it has specific implications for the manner in which human development, emancipation and change are understood.

Claims to change underlying modernist projects revolve around assumptions regarding the ability of the rationalist subjects to be transformative. The framing of the transformative subject is associated with liberalism and thus, several critiques of modernity define the meta-narrative they critique as ‘liberal’, in that its origin is traced to the discourse of European Enlightenment and the consequential specific axiomatic assumptions regarding human mastery of nature which underpinned most liberal notions of development, productivity and welfare (Walker, 1993; Zein-Elabdin, 2001).

The linear quality of the narrative is attributed to certain unchanged attitudes to development and progress across different eras, which originate in western-centric understandings of liberal modernity and continue not only to

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1 For a comprehensive overview of critical and post-positivist approaches to mainstream I.R., see the edited collection by Smith et al. (1996).
marginalise other non-European types of development, but also exhibit a fundamentally flat and evolutionary understanding of linear historical development (see Mitchell, 2000). Anti-foundationalist approaches critique modernity as a form of meta-narrative which employs scientific knowledge to find the ‘truth’, to draw out patterns and cycles of behaviour, but also crucially to affirmatively create the rules of its own game, producing a discourse of legitimation for itself called philosophy (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiii). This requires creating a consensual basic value of a truth claim between all the interlocutors that need to assess that claim; in the case of the grand-narrative of the Enlightenment, this context is given by the consensus and unanimity between rational minds, dictating that knowledge works towards a normative idea of, for instance, universal peace (Lyotard, 1984, p. xxiv).

Meta-narratives operate a binary form of exclusion/inclusion which determines what is proper and what is not, what is good and what is bad, what is true and what is false. As such, the meta-narrative produces discourses which carry out a pathologisation to identify abnormal and unideal behaviour, not compliant with the parameters set by the meta-narrative. This is said to have been the logic behind modernisation theory, which has been notably critiqued for marginalising, racist, policies towards non-European others (Kiely, 2005, p. 121; Zisk Marten, 2004, p. 73). The meta-narrative asserts a claim over ‘what is real’, based on the need to know, understand and modify social, political and material realities. It is this concern for ‘what is real’ that drives the agents within the meta-narrative to try and organise the world and to continue to represent it (Mitchell, 2000, pp. 17–18).

In modernity’s linear project of change, human emancipation became a matter of instrumentally projecting “human values and desires on the world through scientific instrumental rationality, enabling the active intervention into and exploitation of nature” (Bielskis, 2005, p. 8). The modern human subject is framed as amenable to change and transformable insofar as it is accepted that the environment within which he lives is also subject to instrumental exploitation and engineering, by virtue of being knowable and its limits being quantifiable and identifiable. This has several implications for the political projects of change.
and development initiated within the linear meta-narrative of a liberal nature. In fact, the process of providing meaning and interpretation, of understanding the world in a specific manner seeks to supersede and overcome older methods in a transformative manner, thus revolutionising, reflectively and rationally, the life of the subjects. This, it is suggested, is a distinctive characteristic of European Enlightenment, of the self-reflective concern with the ‘darkness’ of the pre-modern times (Gray, 1986, p. 82), which framed the self-proclaimed project of emancipation as a matter of rupture with the past. It was western philosophical tradition that suggested that modern subjects could aspire to transcendental universal rationalism to represent themselves and transcend their traditional constraints of history, faith or geography and transform themselves in a manner that is only possible through the establishment of a claim to a privileged position of “disembodied observer of the world” (Mitchell, 2000, pp. 20–21). The modern subject was thus placed in a unique position to know and understand the previous limitation to its potential, and placed in an empowered position, projected into a life of learning and improving.

From anti-foundationalist perspectives the notion of emancipation is evidently linear, as the liberal project of change implies the possibility of identifying a starting point to emancipate from (the ‘Dark Ages’). Emancipation itself revolves around the idea that change is geared towards a potential future where progress will help improve human existence by wiping out the conditions for the subject’s unhappiness. This is operationalised, in the liberal episteme, through technological advancements which allow the subject to engineer, manage and interact with his environment to alter, quicken and potentiate the course of his interactions (within and with the system) by gearing it towards his perceived desires and wants. Within the liberal meta-narrative, the subject is ‘the people’, who are legitimately in the position of having the right to decide for society; legitimacy comes from consensus and deliberation is the manner in which the subject expresses himself. The notion of progress, Lyotard suggests, is thus an outcome of the assumption that knowledge moves by accumulation, and that such movement is extended to the socio-political subject much in the same way that scientific knowledge is accumulated by scientists (1984, p. 30).
The linearity of this approach is problematised through raising a number of different objections. Some critics have suggested that the relationship between the human subject and its own emancipation presents a crucial paradox: it is suggested, in fact, that the call for emancipation emerged as a result of the creation of mechanisms from which humanity needed to be emancipated (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002, p. 200). What this means is that the subject of modernity found himself in the paradoxical position of feeling sufficiently uncomfortably unassimilated by the system to want to resist and be emancipated, but content and comfortable enough within the existing order to perpetuate and work within the logic of the order itself (ibid, p.200). The individuality championed by Enlightenment, in fact, crystallised a blindness to the repressive power that individualised the subject in the first place. In short, the modern subject, when it recognises the need to emancipate itself from the system, is already playing the game of the system that created his capacity to recognise his own individualised right to be emancipated.

Other critics have focused on the inherent tendency of the Enlightenment project of emancipation to end up in domination, fascism and exploitation (Horkheimer & Adorno, 2002; Jahn, 2005). Liberalism, it is suggested, exhibits strikingly paradoxical positions regarding emancipation, that made the task of translating the utopian project into a practical system of societal organisation cumbersome. In particular, and central to the local turn’s discussion regarding the possibility of a post-hegemonic emancipatory paradigm, a question arises regarding who is supposed to possess the claim to superior reason and to the exercise of said reason, and over whom (i.e. who can emancipate whom?). More problematically still, the issue of the selectivity and subjectivity of what could be considered as ‘emancipatory’ to some and not to others was also largely not explained beyond the veil of utopian universality (Harvey, 1989, p. 14).

The post-liberal critiques of the liberal peace have largely also embraced the above mentioned lines of critique of modernity. This is not least because of their own theoretical affinity with anti-foundationalist perspectives, coupled with what I described in Chapter 1 as being a tracing of an intentional and coherent project of liberal discursive and practical hegemony. As such, linear
evolutionary claims typical of liberal modernism – such as those that informed modernisation theory and developmental practices after WWII – became the subject of extensive critique, particularly because of their association with a universalist understanding of progress that diminishes the importance of alternative modes of being beyond the liberal understanding of normalcy (Chandler, 2010; Duffield, 2010; Jabri, 2010; Pugh, 2009; Reid, 2010; Roberts, 2011). This point of critique was frequently raised in regards to the exercise of informal (for instance, cultural) and formal structures (for instance through transitional justice structures) of hegemony in post-colonial relations (Maddison & Shepherd, 2014; Shapiro, 2004; Vieille, 2012) and has been increasingly central to critical, bottom-up approaches to foreign interventions and peace-building.

The modernist logic of emancipation, it has been suggested in much of the critical scholarship on peace-building, has dictated the practice and conceptualisation of peace-building in all of its forms and adaptations so far, from minimalist approaches based on neo-liberal economic reforms (Barbara, 2008; Pugh, 2010; Tadjbakhsh, 2009), to more hands-on humanitarian interventions (Bachmann, 2012; Gabay & Death, 2012; Haahr & Walters, 2005; Larner & Walters, 2004; Williams & Young, 2012). Traditional approaches to interventions such as those that characterised both developmental projects of the 1990s and interventions such as in Bosnia, are then said to imply an emancipatory claim that stems from the desire to fulfil individual and collective universal desires (e.g. ‘human rights’). This emancipatory claim is associated with a particularly specific linear, normative vision: “international interventions based on social and economic development also entailed a strong emancipatory element based on the powerful normative image of modernisation and ‘prosperity’” (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1637).

This normative vision is said to rely on inclusion and exclusion at the discursive level in order to articulate a material image of what is considered to be a desired, good, form of governance, this results in the exclusion of all other alternative narratives that then become pathologised as abnormal and unideal, marginalised in favour of practises that are considered more acceptable
(Chandler, 2000, p. 148; Pugh, 2005). It was then suggested that this meta-narrative acquired hegemonic status and was thus concerned with the production of a specific type of emancipation, one that was based on northern/western forms of knowledge employed to strengthen hegemony (Franks, 2009; Kapoor, 2008; Richmond, 2010b).

Within this framework it is suggested that subjects are empowered to act as part of a larger plan for the active intervention into, and exploitation of, the nature of the societies subject to peace building. It is thus suggested that this form of peace-building does not create a form of peace that is conducive to emancipation: “as part of the regulative post-Cold War peace […] local consent and the liberal peace are juxtaposed”, suggests Richmond (2009c, p. 58), indicating also that the liberal peace does not serve the interests of local agents, as it rests on “‘cold institutions’ lacking empathy, care and the capacity for emancipation” (ibid, p.58). As such, the type of change generated by the liberal peace’s project of emancipation constructs the idea of the autonomous and responsible subject only insofar as it is instrumentally pertinent to the implementation of its own agenda (Dillon & Reid, 2009). For instance, taking the example of the promotion of NGOs as autonomous agents free from governmental control (close to both neo-institutionalist and cosmopolitan approaches to peace-building), Hynek suggests that far from empowering the subjects, this strategy only oils the totalising machinery of new humanitarianism and speeds up the attainment of the liberal human security agendas (2011).

The central question raised by critics discussing liberal peace-building then revolves around how best to ‘access’ other narratives so far silenced by the predominance of linear understandings of peace and human development. As explained in Chapter 2, critical approaches sought to bring forward those marginalised voices and alternative narratives. As will be seen below, the turn towards the local exemplifies an effort to understand change in a fundamentally different way to that of linear perspectives, precisely to avoid the logic of narrative inclusion/exclusion typical of linear understandings of change. This is indeed an ‘emancipatory’ approach, although, as I suggest below, there are several reasons why one might be sceptical or wary of the way in which this
‘emancipatory’ understanding of change is promoted as substantially different from previous linear ones. This begs the question, which will be investigated below, as well as in Chapter 5, to what extent, and in what way, is the project of change championed by the local turn different in its logic from that of linear approaches?

2. **Emancipatory Peace-Building**

Despite the scepticism towards linear emancipatory paradigms, particularly given their association with the ‘unbecoming’ elements of liberal modernisation and development, it is important to note that most critiques of the linear notion of emancipation do not, however, advocate the absolute abandonment of the notion of emancipation in itself, but merely the need to reclaim it from the modernist framework (Roberts, 2011a) and rethink it along non-linear lines. These critical approaches are driven by the desire to overturn the conditions of exploitation generated by or supported by previous approaches and understanding of peace-building as outlined in Chapters 2 and 3. Since these are associated with the inherent flaws of the liberal approach (see Chapters 1 & 2), then the type of political change advocated is designed to resist and counter this narrative by building the new paradigm on the basis of a fundamentally different logic. The shift towards the local is, therefore, framed as an enabler of the emergence of “greater emancipation from structural violence, some degree of indigenous autonomy in determining peace-building priorities” (Roberts, 2013, p. 67 my emphasis). This project of emancipation has featured prominently in “the idea of the ‘everyday’ as a focal point for ‘post-liberal’ or fourth generation peace-building” (ibid, p. 67).

Even those accounts that do not explicitly make reference to what Richmond specifically calls the ‘emancipatory’ model (2008a) support the need to embrace a critical position in order to positively affect the discursive and empirical dynamics that have so far shaped the orthodox approach to peace-building and that have been responsible for the negative outcomes most often mentioned (particularly with regards to the loss of autonomy, the inability to alter policy-making that is imposed from outside, and the general tendency of
the local subject to be subordinated by the exporters of the liberal peace). The type of change championed by this critical scholarship promotes a shift in focus toward the “hidden scripts of peace” (Mac Ginty, 2013), with a particular preference for those expressions of agency that can be empowered and emancipated as they resist or counter the liberal hegemony (Demmers et al., 2004; Kapoor, 2008; Lemay-Hébert, 2011; Mac Ginty, 2008).

The focus on the everyday as a method to alter and replace the orthodoxy of the liberal peace and its modernist foundations in its fixed hierarchical vision of post-conflict contexts, I argue, inherently presents an emancipatory conceptual model for rethinking peace-building that starts with the fundamental acknowledgment of the limits to top-down, linear governance. Pugh, for instance, rejects forms of governance such as the “economic diktat of Kosovo’s constitution”, regarding its unsustainability as the “death of the neo-liberal consensus” (2005, p. 26 emphasis in original). Duffield too, shifts attention to the power of the ‘below’, as suggested in Chapter 2 in relation to the emergence of the forces of the ‘everyday’, suggesting that space can be found in a form of emancipatory governance that is centred around “the solidarity of the governed” (2007, p. 234).

Recent critical perspectives on emancipation offer diverse paths to understanding empowerment beyond the liberal peace. Despite differences in focus, most critical accounts agree on the need to move beyond traditional liberal-driven understandings of empowerment as human security (see, for instance: Chandler, 2012; Duffield, 2001; Owens, 2012). Some of these perspectives suggest that the emancipatory potential of liberal human-centred approaches is fundamentally flawed because of the permanence and resistance of forms of biopolitics that co-opt and capture even the most benevolent forms of ethical approaches to development and human rights (Tadjbakhsh, 2009, p. 648), thus advocating a much more radical overcoming of the discursive structure that has determined orthodox understandings of empowerment and emancipation as human security so far. This, it is argued has only seemingly reproduced asymmetrical power relations and bio-political forms of societal and individual regulation through sovereign power (Turner, Cooper, & Pugh, 2011)
and through other more subtle forms of technologies of domination (Doucet & De Larrinaga, 2011). Others suggest that the everyday can emancipate human security itself by bringing back the political in the social, that is, by shifting attention on the ‘real’ everyday concerns of local communities, rejecting universalised abstractions and grounding heterogeneity in discourses of pragmatic and alternative everyday concerns such as welfare and the environment (Alt, 2011).

As suggested in Chapter 2, critical approaches to peace-building indicate that bringing forward such a new manner of thinking about the foundations of peace requires an appreciation for the heterogeneous and complex nature of the social (see Lemay-Hébert, 2013, p. 87). It is suggested that this is not possible within a modernist logic, since this orthodox understanding of emancipation, however, would only engender hierarchical relations and exploitation through the imposition of black and white, cause-effect explanations regarding the nature of the world, and the best way to conduct society; within this framework, it is suggested, emancipation is not ‘for everyone’ (Roberts, 2011). Therefore, the focus on the local and the everyday becomes a unique methodological tool to reopen “the debate on power, peace, social justice, the evolving framework and terms of emancipation” (de Coning, 2013, p. 3 my emphasis). In these accounts, the notion of the everyday can only be empowering if it is not understood in a strictly organisational sense, but rather, it if is taken to mean an approach that is attentive to the pluralities of power (Pugh, 2004, p. 54), and to focus on the ‘inbetweenness’ the ephemeral space within which mixtures and relations of power can be valorised through the deconstruction of discourses and binaries (Mitchell, 2011).

The local turn, it is suggested, is emancipatory because it opens up the field in favour of “a more expansive epistemology that is able to overcome the artificial conceptual boundaries imposed by the notion of state sovereignty” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 768); it helps “thinking more creatively” about new political spaces (ibid, p. 779), and it contributes to the exploration and understanding of how change takes place, without considering traditional methods such as reforms as ends but rather as potential strategies that may have
little impact without the participation of local stakeholders (Cubitt, 2013, p. 111). Thus, the notion of emancipation and change supported by critical, bottom-up approaches to peace hinges upon a radical transformation of the foundations of peace-thinking operated through ‘the local’, the focal point of agency as resistance.

So far, I have suggested that the subject of the ‘emancipatory’ local turn is framed as materialising its needs and participating to the political life of the community through everyday practices that do not necessarily privilege western/northern knowledge on peace. The everyday is then framed as an ideal end point, as well as a potential field of action; as an ensemble of effects that, if unlocked and sufficiently paid attention to, could more fruitfully capture and involve every aspect/actor within the highly complex context of post-conflict peace-building. The re-conceptualisation of peace-building is thus, arguably a political project driven by a normative drive projected into the future towards emancipation of individuals and societies away from the hegemonic practices of the orthodox approaches. But how radical is this re-conceptualisation and how far beyond the linear logic has it been able to go? The next section begins to chart some of the elements of the local turn’s conceptual bearings to assess whether they significantly differ from the modernist logic from which they seek to depart.

3. Critiquing the Critique: Who is being Emancipated?

So far it has been suggested that the critical turn towards the local has sought to re-conceptualise peace-building in a radically different manner by addressing the modernist assumptions that have so far captured the notions of emancipation and empowerment. Whilst it is possible to agree with some of these critiques in the identification of how certain dominant practices and technologies have been extended to further facilitate the control of the conduct of societies (as I have done in Chapter 1 in relation to the shift towards more invasive forms of peace-building), it is also important not to assume that this pattern has now ceased with the advent of a new turn towards the local and the post-liberal. Secondly, whilst agreeing with the identification of certain disciplinary forms of power visible in
intrusive approaches to peace-building (see section 4, Chapter 1), my research seeks to avoid taking part in the construction of the ‘liberal peace’, in order to de-emphasise both the consensus around its nature, and the sense of coherent intentionality that is inherent in critiques of it. To that end, this section investigates the local turn’s project of change in its own terms, to discuss how far ‘the radical apple has fallen from the tree’ by examining how different the rationale of the radical critique of the liberal peace is from the rationale of the meta-narrative it rejects in the way in which it ‘accesses’ the everyday. Indeed, several scholars have pointed to the dangers of accepting the inherent benevolence of post-liberal ‘emancipatory’ arguments, or have called for a clarification of nebulous and unclear understandings of the ‘emancipatory’ peace. In these cases it seems that the problem is one of clarity. For Visoka, for instance, the fallacy of post-liberal approaches lies in the association of emancipatory agency only with certain forms of behaviour. In relation to Oliver Richmond, Visoka suggests:

…while in theory Richmond seems to favour local agency and self-government, as well as locally initiated political developments, in the context of Kosovo he seems to find problematic Kosovo’s claim for statehood, considering it as a monopolisation of the entire state-building and peace-building process by the Kosovo Albanians (2011, p. 106).

Sabaratnam, too, places emphasis on what could be a problem of a missing emancipatory drive, one which can be more substantially found in post-colonial scholarship (2011a, 2011b). Whilst this is definitely a valid position of critique, it still does not explain what would happen, within this post-colonial perspective, to competing claims that may wish to be ‘co-opted’ by or adopt liberal agendas.2

2 Critiques of the local turn have been assessed, recently, by two of the local turn’s most vocal supporters, Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond. In a 2014 article the scholars defend the emancipatory push of the local turn whilst acknowledging the limits that a liberal heritage poses on the local turn’s radical reconceptualisation project. Indicating the need to adopt a more honest and clear positionality, to examine the epistemological foundations of analyses and critiques, and to move the discussion towards the examination of hybrid political orders (2014, p. 184), the scholars, however, do not indicate how the epistemological assumptions behind the local turn would fare vis-à-vis the unchanged framework that continues to indicate the necessity of interventions to ‘fix’ conflictual relations as an a priori given. Furthermore, whilst resting on the emancipatory drive as a strong point of the local turn (2014, p. 173), the scholars reject the need to qualify or specify the nature of emancipation as a possible contradiction in relation to their theoretical framework (2014, p.184). Emancipation, thus, remains a nominally strong but
It is also problematic to assume that a post-colonial perspective might not operate its own forms of subordinations, alienation and marginalisation of narratives just as much as the liberal master-narrative does. Finally, it seems that Roland Paris’ attempt to ‘save’ liberal peace-building introduces a slightly more nuanced understanding of the problems that the local turn faces, as he raises a plethora of questions regarding the content of the emancipatory vision of the local turn; the scholar suggests that these questions are largely unanswered by the local turn, due to a deliberate and unnecessary focus on equating the difficulties of peace-building with a crisis of liberalism. Where critiques have pointed to the difficulties of implementing top-down imposed solutions, this, Paris argues, “is a criticism of institutional isomorphism, not liberalism” (2011, p. 169). Paris argues that the emancipatory drive of the liberal peace can be ‘saved’ and is not, in fact, in crisis. Although one could disagree with this by also suggesting that Paris’ own understanding of the liberal peace is based on an extremely wide and perhaps arbitrary selection of elements, actors and missions under the label ‘liberal’, it is perhaps possible to concur with his conclusion that much more might be made of the discussion on emancipatory politics if the local turn were to question the very meaning and direction of its own emancipatory politics (including the risks and the potential for marginalisation that normativity engenders). Although Paris does this by ‘salvaging’ the potential of the liberal peace, I suggest that this is still a limited discussion that risks centring the debate around liberal and post-liberal peace-building, rather than questioning whether non-linear peace-building can be emancipatory and non-teleological at the same time.

practically empty trope that enables the rhetorical shift towards the local but significantly hinders the political impact of the notion. In this respect, perspectives pertaining to Marxist and post-colonial studies may arguably present stronger, clearer and more politised understandings of emancipatory politics by virtue of not having to reconcile the normative nature of emancipation with the non-linear and non-teleological nature of post-modern theoretical framings.

3 Notably, some scholars have recently begun to put the non-linear, relational ontology behind some of the local turn’s claims to the test. David Chandler, for instance, is particularly notable for questioning the possibility of advancing any form of emancipatory project within a framework of continued interventionism (see see: 2013a, 2013b), whereas Morgan Brigg’s conclusion has been more ambiguous, problematising the persistence of a flat ontology behind the local turn’s emancipatory project as a limitation for what he considers to be a legitimate democratising ethos of the local turn (2013).
To go further, one can look at studies of peace-building that mobilise complexity theory in order to understand how the everyday is accessed in the context of unfixed, untraceable complexity and contingency. For instance, Damian Popolo examines conflict resolution as framed within the modernist episteme’s ‘analytics of finitude’. This concept of finitude, Popolo suggests, has determined the manner in which conflicts, particularly the case of Kosovo, have been problematised and consequently handled through interventions. Modern knowledge, the scholar explains, produced specific understandings of the meanings of certain concepts (such as autonomy and agency) which then determined the manner in which the conflict was handled (Popolo, 2011).

Complexity theory has been suggested by Popolo as an approach that could truly reverse the epistemological premises of the modern episteme by destabilising both the notion of the linearity of history and the analytics of finitude by producing ‘uncertain knowledge’ as an intrinsic quality of the world rather than the outcome of imperfect knowledge (2011, p. 209). Immanence is the key to this approach, and reason becomes not a way of making sense of complexity in a way which makes immanence understandable and certain, but rather a way to enable subjects to cope with uncertainty and randomness. The everyday, as outlined by many non-linear approaches to peace-building, can be considered the immanent field within which the uncertainty is played out, and the emancipatory drive of the new paradigm consists in rejecting modern reason, although not reason in itself, replacing it with the pragmatic, immanent and grounded reason necessary to generate frameworks that can valorise and cope with uncertainty.

The analytic of finitude it taken to describe the assumption that the limits of human existence form the basis of true knowledge in the human sciences (Dean, 1994, p. 50). The episteme establishes man’s position “as an object of knowledge and as a subject that knows” (Foucault, 1970, p. 340). Finitude is important to understand the ethos that drives the paradigm’s call for emancipation. As a project of political change, I have argued above, emancipation implies positivity and futurity. Finitude, Foucault suggests, is what makes this possible; the struggle of man takes the form of the endless, the hopeful and the positive precisely because its finitude allows for the possible acquisition of knowledge (ibid, p.342). Damian Popolo suggests that the modern episteme’s analytics of finitude is supported by a concept of linear history which then reveals the limits of the knowable world and places contingency upon the finitude. The manner in which the conflict in Kosovo has been problematised prior to the intervention is indicative of these two elements of the logic of modernity: “continuous historical time and historical linearity are also epistemic formations that allow the idea, according to which persistent ethnic hatreds characterise conflict, to be actually thought” (Popolo, 2011, p. 65).
Therefore, progressivism is not necessarily rejected, as much as it is placed in service of the subjects of peace; in conversation with David Chandler, Oliver Richmond argues that post-liberalism:

…is not a rejection of rationalism or the state, material factors or, indeed, the international architecture of peacebuilding. But it does position them all as subjects to a range of sites of authority and forms of legitimacy beyond their own bureaucratic structures (2015, p. 7).

This may, arguably, represent a much less radical claim than the previous positioning of an emancipatory, “interdisciplinary, pluralist agenda” that sought to break with “notions of a territorially bounded international space and concurring with sovereign liberal or neoliberal governance” (Richmond, 2008b, p. 463). Admittedly, the relationship between the liberal and post-liberal is unclear, particularly in Richmond’s work. The emancipatory drive of post-liberal approaches to the local, Richmond claims, “is not being lost in the crisis of liberal and neoliberal power; instead, it is being reconstituted in a more pluralistic manner” (Chandler and Richmond, 2015, p. 11).

If it were conceded, as it is by Richmond, that “a clearer approximation of the possibilities of emancipation may be found in a world with liberal and neoliberal sets of infrastructures” (ibid, p. 6) by finding a common ground with significant ranges of local agency, it remains, however, difficult to see how this may work in practice. This project, if indeed carried out in the name of contingency and complexity, and thus on the basis of a logic of interconnectedness that puts a premium on non-causality and blurred boundaries of identity, would imply a pluralisation of governance structures in a manner which may, necessarily, fragment even ‘liberal’ forms of governance to the point of making them unrecognisable in their ‘new’, pluralised, hybrid and interconnected forms. Furthermore, where it is implied that the emancipatory value of the local turn may result in a fundamental reconceptualisation of traditional notions, such as the Rule of Law, in a way which may “at least counter some of the issues pertaining to legitimacy and sustainability” (Peterson, 2010, p. s34), the reverse might also be true. Local agents may, in fact, have a radically different understanding of legitimacy and sustainability to the point that the hybrid order generated might no longer be to the liking of either the local turn
proponents or the liberal peace-builders themselves. It is assumed that the local agents will work towards the same understanding of closing the legitimacy gap, although one could ask, what happens when local agents veer off into a completely opposite, and possibly uncharted, direction, establishing a fundamentally different notion of legitimacy? Would that not be an expression of ‘everyday’, ‘true’ agency? Where a supposedly linear, liberal normative framework would have an answer to normalise what it perceives as ‘abnormal’ and undesirable forms of behaviour (i.e. spoilers), the same cannot be said, at least in theory, for the local turn.

Indeed, it is possible to suggest that a form of normalisation does occur, when certain forms of agency are chosen over others. It is precisely in this issue of the identification of agency to be empowered that unchanged modernist assumptions regarding the possibility to know and control the world are most evident. As discussed above, the goal of emancipation that drives the critical scholarship is meant to be obtained through the valorisation of everyday forms of agency rather than through a strict focus on traditional methods of expressing agency such as representation, consensus and participation. Both as an acknowledgment of the untraceable links that produce ‘already existing’ hybrid identities (Mac Ginty & Sanghera, 2012), and as an acknowledgment of the inevitable processes that connect and change individuals inside networks (Canclini, 1995), hybridity is taken to be the starting point for focusing on unscripted and hidden practices of the everyday and their outcomes, in particular, as hybridity does not fit clear-cut models and does not reflect fictional identities often provided in orthodox, linear peace studies. Yet, the manner in which these identities are recognised, given meaning and valorised, raises an important question: if the local is the subject to be emancipated, how could hybridity do that conceptually – let alone ‘practically’ – without delimiting and constraining in a binary way the identities of local and international actors? The manner in which the actors to be empowered and emancipated are identified remains
particularly problematic, despite the critique’s reluctance to delineate clear-cut identities.\footnote{Non-linear, critical perspectives display a reluctance to define the limits of the local, and push for a focus less on the identities that comprise the actors subject to hybridity and more on the process of hybridisation itself (Popolo, 2011, p. 209). This is because previous approaches to peace-building referring to ‘local’ communities necessarily presented a delimited and defined understanding of the ‘local’, whilst new approaches recognise that discussing communities according to their identities is a notable problem, and one which partly derives from the problem of reaching an agreement on the criteria defining a particular kind of community. This issue is particularly visible in the fact that even scholars of the local turn find themselves bound to identity descriptors such as ‘Albanians’ and ‘Serbs’ (as the major stakeholders) to discuss complex interactions, regardless of how much they seek to valorise their hybrid nature, their existing hybridity, and the constitutive agent-producing quality of their material interactions. For instance, where Ropers replaces ‘dilemmas’ with the pluralist notion of ‘tetralemmas’ (2011, p. 160), and where this is specifically done with the problem of ‘polarising’ positions in mind, it is not clear whether the interactive process itself may profoundly alter the identity of actors to the point that it is not helpful to identify who they are any longer. This becomes even more problematic if one is to take into consideration the possible ‘tetralemmas within tetralemmas’, i.e. the existing hybridity within these positions or the simultaneous presence of different desires, needs and cross cutting identity markers that may blur the identification of these positions even further. The question remains, at what point do complex interactions change the identities of the actors to the point that traditional descriptors are rendered redundant?}

Everyday forms of resisting agency are identified and rendered legitimate in a manner which is not immediately evident to the reader and without much exploration of the normative content of this legitimisation. Mitchell and Kelly’s work on Northern Ireland and Bosnia explores, for instance, how populations have reclaimed spaces previously appropriated by liberal peace-builders (for instance, areas that had been designated for certain development projects) by exercising everyday forms of occupation and resistance as graffiti (2011). This exploration of the methods with which populations express their discontent with the policies imposed by outside agents is useful in drawing attention to the arbitrary nature of foreign interventions, but at the same time it does little to explain why resistance is expressed in that particular way rather than in other ways (why drawing graffiti and not launching rockets?); nor does it say much about what other types of agency these subjects could be expressing and where this could be visible beyond the territorialised and spatially specified areas of friction and contestation.

Finally, it is possible to question the extent to which the critical scholarships’ conceptualisation of the everyday and of hybridity have been able to reflect on agency without resorting to tools of exclusion, categorisation and
delimitation identified as responsible for the marginalisation and alienation of narratives typically operated by the liberal peace-building paradigm. When discussing hybridity even as a process and not an outcome, the point of encounter discussed by Richmond, Mac Ginty and others seems to draw a line between the local and the international (or between other elements that are, at one point prior to the hybrid moment identified as self-standing identities). This is reflected, for instance, in the research questions that examine the compatibility of the liberal model with international engagement with the local (Albrecht & Moe, 2014; Canclini, 1995). Despite calls to avoid one-sided views of both internationals and locals, very often these research questions, whilst valid in themselves, do not seem to be able to conceptualise interaction without qualifying the agents that are taking part to that interaction according to their orthodox positions (i.e. ‘internationals’ vs ‘locals’), ignoring issues regarding the manner in which these actors may already be assemblages outcome of numerous untraceable previous interactions. Often these accounts may call for the relativisation of identities, but continue to provide a coherent external variable to explain the logic of interaction, such as using political economy as a determinant in the interaction between agents in complex networks (Felix da Costa & Karlsrud, 2012, p. 54).

In other accounts, whilst valorising the prior hybridity that has co-constructed these identities, the calls for acknowledging the previously silenced ability for self-organisation of certain networks, these potentially sharp conceptual critiques continue to frame this process on the basis of a binary understanding external and internal agendas in need of ‘balancing’ (de Coning, 2013, p. 5). Even the notion of ‘friction’, recently used to further emphasise the relational element of hybridity as a process, does not seem to go beyond the identification of the identities which are subject to the frictional encounter (Björkdahl & Gusic, 2013; Jarstad, 2013; Öjendal & Ou, 2013), focusing on how the liberal peace has imagined identities, whilst failing to recognise how even critical approaches have similarly ‘imagined’ spaces for hybrid agency to flourish. Other power-based appraisals of everyday, focusing in particular on the how control and governmentality may even be promoted through everyday, local or hybrid trajectories, continue to demonstrate reluctance in abandoning a traditional local/international dichotomy, using it instead one of the conceptual building
blocks to ascertain where and how liberal disciplinary power is exercised (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1645).

Other dichotomies are also present, even in localisation accounts which are highly sensitive to the negative potential of hybridity discourses and to the importance of relativism, such as with Albrecht and Moe’s work. The scholars in fact suggest the need to focus on the simultaneity of discourses of authority to by-pass the binary between the liberal and the non-liberal other, by focusing on how certain agents may enact different roles at the same time embodying different sets of interests. They take the example of traditional tribal Chiefs who may be able to reinforce their influence by drawing on different sources of authority and interacting fruitfully, at the same time, with both international agencies and traditional structures (Albrecht & Moe, 2014, p. 15). From this perspective, however, whilst the truly non-linear and complex moment of hybridity seems to take shape in the figure of the traditional Chief, in its dialectical encounter with either side (internationals, locals) it still relies on an assumption of dissonant interests and agendas that makes it possible to identify the moment of hybridity itself (i.e. when the traditional Chief is successfully being ‘hybrid’). Furthermore these moments of hybridity are not only identifiable in time (i.e. the moment of enactment) but also driven by a similarly linear understanding of opportunities and challenges that determines the incentives for participation of the actors involved. Lastly, the understanding of the meanings of concepts such as participation and representation are not dialectically altered in the moment of hybridity, so whilst the actors may be fluidly co-constructed, the manner in which they then exercise their agency (participation, representation, co-option) is not understood in a different manner from the traditional forms that critique has so far identified with liberal peace-building practice and theory. Thus, for instance, whilst acknowledging the need to discard the preference for western/northern forms of knowledge, critical appraisals still rely on the language of ‘rights’, statehood, representation and social contract typical of the frameworks they critique.6

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6 For instance, the language of hybridity, resilience and ownership remains fundamentally anchored to the rhetoric typical of previous approaches associated with liberal orthodoxy. Whilst condemning the unbecoming aspects of liberalism linking it to its colonial legacy (Richmond,
The identification of the legitimate forms of agency to valorise and emancipate, or alternative narratives that necessitate giving a voice has, therefore, an important two-fold consequence: firstly, it arguably produces reductionist understandings of the alternative narratives which are categorised, delineated and become almost as fictional as those ‘imagined’ by the liberal peace-builders; secondly, these are then given meaning according to a new normative order the driving principle of which is to resist the liberal peace.

Yet, the manner in which agency is identified and legitimised is also problematic for another reason: despite the fact that the critical turn undoubtedly offers an element of emancipation from hegemony and exclusionary practices, the manner in which it does so, arguably, is not entirely dissimilar from more traditional, orthodox claims to emancipation, consistent with modernist and linear frameworks. In its emphasis on resistance, the critical local turn has focused primarily on power in its coercive dimension in order to locate the original site of violence and coercion to fuel and drive its critique (de Coning, 2013, p. 3), and thus associating power as power upon, and freedom as its diametrical opposite. Yet, one could suggest that this identification of the unitary source of power is, arguably, what reproduces the familiar story of linear modern emancipation even in a paradigm that seeks to escape it, where the rational subject can take consciousness of those conditions that engender its exploitation (be it from the dark ages or from the tyranny of imposed liberalism) and sets up normative regimes that can constitute the social, enable agency and positively work towards a ‘normalised’ understanding of subjectivity. This is partly what Foucault warned against, in his analysis of power, suggesting that to focus on the effects of power was not to suggest that power is the antithesis of freedom, and therefore to discursively frame an opposing force from which to counter the forces of marginalisation (1982). Indeed this has been the tendency of many critical studies on liberal governmentality, which have opposed modernist framings of emancipation that understand progress as the advancement of technocratic consciousness exercised by the autonomous and rational subject

2009b), some critical scholars still retain the framework of ‘social contract’ (Richmond, 2010b; Van Leeuwen & Verkoren, 2012) which retains significant ties to state-centric, Westphalian and typically modern understandings of consensus, peace and political representation.
(Scott, 2005, p. 32) by integrating alternative, and marginalised narratives into the mainstream discourse. It is then difficult not to turn the tables on the critique of the liberal peace itself, in that the project of emancipating (away) from the liberal peace may not inherently be taken as free from the potentiality of its own normative aspirations.

If, then, the aspiration of these critical struggles is to identify the conditions that limit the subject’s freedom and to emancipate the subject towards better futures, how different is this logic from that of what is identified (and condemned) as the liberal way of development? Arguably, not sufficiently. “The liberal way of development privileges adaptive self-reliance” says Duffield (2010, p. 67), although this, in a way, is not dissimilar from the self-reliance expected of the empowered local subject whose resisting voice can potentially be its ticket to success in a world of ever changing meanings and unfixed realities.

This manner of valorising local agency as the expression of a pragmatic ‘everyday’ understands local agency as the enabling element that can develop ‘new ways’ of thinking about peace by presenting alternative narratives as delineated forms of interest-based agency. If previous transformations in paradigms, such as that from liberalism to neo-liberalism, were taken to be the emergence of new and more invasive ways of governing through the instrumentalisation of individual agency (Hindess, 2000, pp. 71–2), then one could also question whether the conceptual framing of the ‘everyday’ as instrumental to the empowerment and emancipation of the local subject can also part-take in framing individual agency as interest and as an abstracted, future-projected ‘possibility frontier’. This, as will be seen in the next chapter, lends

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7 The fixing of agency within a neatly identifiable set of interests with a telos and an ethos, (in particular when it is tied to the terminology of the ‘local’ or when it is framed as ‘resistance’) could also explain why hybridity can hardly be considered a post-modern solution to a modern problem. Instead, it is much more likely to be a modern solution to a modern problem, much in the same way that emancipation of the subject is a solution given by modernity to a problem that modernity itself created. Pieterse suggests that “hybridity is a sensibility of our time in that boundary and border-crossing mark our times” (2001, p. 20), in that the inclusion of hybridity for the improvement of the human condition would not be necessary if we did not accept, a priori, the existence of difference, boundaries, demarcations. This could partly explain why, as I have mentioned above, regardless of the level of conceptual nuance towards prior hybridisation, complexity and contingency, the discourses on hybridity inevitably result in some degree of binary-making.
itself quite appropriately to the further extension of regulatory methods to control the conduct of society, to planning, benchmarking and calculating. This does not mean, necessarily, that the local turn is ‘liberal’, or that it perpetuates liberal governmentality willingly or even unknowingly. Indeed it is valuable to move away from assuming that certain epistemological methodologies are only ‘liberal’ or that the liberal peace is a coherent and cohesive discursive category (see Chapter 1). Instead, it may be worth understanding how the rationality of governance which is at play in the vision of the local turn’s project of political change may also responsible for the manipulation of biopower for the purpose of societal control.

4. ‘Accessing’ the Everyday? Normativity in the Age of Fragmented Governance

I have suggested that a normative ethos provides direction to the emancipatory project of the local turn. In this section, I suggest that the arbitrary selection of which agency to valorise as the ‘truer’ form of the ‘everyday’ beyond the fiction of the liberal peace is at odds with the theoretical foundations of the local turn’s non-linear logic. What this produces is a tension between the normative imperative that drives the selection of worthy agency, and the desire to fragment governance to give space to the interconnected, flowing power of the everyday.

What is at stake here is primarily an issue of analytical coherence; admittedly, the theorisation of the normative basis of many of these critical perspectives is limited, if not secondary or entirely omitted in light of the non-linear attempt to not close the horizon of possibilities. Yet, one could suggest that there is a point to identifying the existence of a baseline of normativity. The relevance, in particular, has to do with the link between normativity, linearity and universal claims, through which it is increasingly difficult to conceive of a multiple, fragmented and contingent reality. The normativity of the local turn itself (along with what this normativity implies ontologically and epistemologically), despite not being openly engaged with in critical accounts, is evident in the way in which local agency is valorised. As a practical example, in studies on post-conflict pacification, narrative therapy is taken to be a legitimate manifestation of everyday responses to trauma that subjects can use
to re-shape the course of their lives (Pia, 2013); yet, other forms of responses to traumas – existing in an ethical grey area, but existing, contingently and empirically, no less – are largely under-researched in their contribution to the discourse of the everyday. To what extent could, for instance, the armed ‘bridge-watchers’ of Mitrovica (Kosovo) be responding to trauma in their own ‘everyday’ way? And what would it mean to acknowledge the impact (normatively neutral at least in theory) of such behaviour?

Other forms of agency are also more clearly assessed on the basis of their violent/non-violent expression (Mitchell & Richmond, 2011, p. 24). It is particularly difficult to distinguish violent from non-violent resistances (particularly as some struggles have changed their approaches throughout time, and as there exists a thin line between violence and lack thereof, filled with different, blurry and nebulous psychological quasi-violent methods). If the acceptability of these local forms of resistance as worthy of the discussion on the everyday were to hinge on their positionality regarding conflict/non-conflict, this would rely on a binary distinction not just of local/international (which is what critics such as Sabaratnam (2011b), Heathershaw (2013) and Hameiri (2011) have already cautioned against) but also, importantly, between violence/non-violence, which is not unproblematic and is, in fact, predicated on generalisations and arbitrary definitions of what ‘violence’ or ‘conflict’ would consist of and what forms these struggles may take. Their allocation to either camp for the identification and promotion of “non-violent ways of conflicting” (Mitchell & Richmond, 2011, p. 24) would similarly be as arbitrary as more traditional, linear attempts to identify acceptable non-violent forms of confrontation or, indeed, to identify a clear status of ‘peace’. The unclear logic that drives the manner in which the alternative voices in need of emancipation are legitimated finally raises a core question to deal with the conceptual logic of the critique, namely, the normative framework which dictates the terms and characteristics of what/who needs to be empowered, how, and in what direction.

The case of Kosovo demonstrates that it may, in fact, be the case that in their interaction within fluid networks, individuals, agencies, institutions (that which critics call ‘hybridity’) may evidence the appropriation, alteration,
assimilation and hybridisation of the actors’ defining characteristics, agendas and ideas, although in ways which are not always necessarily identifiable. The transformation of certain political parties’ agendas is arguably a fitting example. This goes for parties such as LDK and PDK that have traditionally been tied, through elite politics and diaspora connections, to foreign donors, international organisations and agencies, where the influence of external ideas is more obviously evident (see Sörensen, 2006). But it is also the case for the transformation of political parties that have gone through a radical transformation, such as Vetevendosje, from underground resistance movement upon its inception, to the fringes of political life in the early phases of the mission in Kosovo, to established and institutionalised participants in parliamentary democracy. Vetevendosje’s agenda has also altered with time, as has its stance on the presence and role of international actors, from an openly hostile stance (mostly visible in the famous graffiti slogans painted all over Pristina), to a tolerant and even supportive one. In general terms, concepts such as democracy, liberalism, or ‘European’, have been adopted by local groups and adapted to suit local understandings of the same in ways which may, at times, counter traditional western/northern understandings, but which may equally demonstrate a fundamental agreement with the European understanding of the concept. When asked about having any objection towards the imposition of external European principles and ideas, Vetevendosje’s leader Kurti asserted: “I’m okay with European integration. [...] us making steps towards EU is good.” (Face-To-Face Interview, 2012a). Director of political NGO Jeton Zulfaj, when asked the same question responded that the real problem was the unrealistic nature of the extension of these principles, through in particular the unfulfilled promises of joining the EU; he stated “only the lucky ones can go over to western Europe and touch this European democracy. We want euro, we want NATO, we want to be like them but we’ve never really enjoyed them, we haven’t seen how it ends” (Face-To-Face Interview, 2012b). Despite questioning the techniques, methods and paths, often, it seems, concepts and ideas coming from outside are accepted in principle, albeit becoming largely altered (or hybridised) when they are adopted for policy or agenda-making. Less identifiable forms of hybridity at that point could be represented by the unique brand of capitalism adhered to in the
country, which is in itself a conflation of – but not limited to – elements of Islamic communitarianism, Christian secularism, and neo-liberal developmental approaches.

What this latter example suggests is that the agency required to enact, appropriate, exchange and relate inherent in a truly fluid network can actually be negated when it is framed mainly as resistance to a set of ideas that are associated with previously negative outcomes (i.e. the liberal peace), which is what happens when scholars of the local turn ask the question “what if local agencies do not concur with their liberal agendas?” (Richmond, 2010b). Whilst not suggesting that this question is in itself irrelevant, it is also possible to conceive of the possibility that agency, when framed within the idea of the social as endemically complex and contingent, may express itself in the form of co-option or even in a way that subscribes to a liberal model, for a variety of reasons, interests and circumstances. This, arguably, would accentuate the tension between the desire to open up to multiple ontologies of peace, and the acknowledgement that some of these may aspire to be ‘liberal’ or something possibly more unpredictable that has not even figured in the local turn’s understanding of agency yet. To be clear, this is not an apologia for any or all forms of interventionism, all agendas or policy proposals, but it merely employed to suggest that by picturing the local as always resisting the ‘liberal’, or always ‘resisting’ something, and associating that fight with a logic of “resonant emancipation” (Richmond, 2010b), the view concurs not only in the very same romanticisation of the local vehemently discouraged initially, and in a romanticisation of what the liberal is. More crucially and problematically, it works against the local turn’s own objective of embracing contingency, by proposing a form of instrumental ‘accessing’ of the everyday and its expressions for the main purpose of resisting the perceived origin of hegemonic power, thus implying a positionality and a normative direction which is evident, albeit ignored or denied. Furthermore, agency is limited to retroactive resistance, and it is thus increasingly difficult to square the emancipatory circle, without being able to acknowledge any form of agency that produces and affirms.
This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, vis-à-vis the theoretical preference for non-linearity, contingency and complexity, this effort to identify and make visible hidden everyday realities implies the separation of identities that supposedly make up the untraceable networks of complex, hybrid relations. If complexity is, on the one hand, valorised as a material reality within which the exercise of separating then international from the local is discouraged by critical approaches, on the other hand, the expectation of identifying and separating the authentic from fictional and stereotypical representations of the everyday requires carrying out precisely that same form of boundary-making that separates identities and thus, negates hybridity or complexity. Thus, the realm of the everyday is abstracted and imagined as a plane beyond instrumentalisation and manipulation, ‘de-politicised’, as Sabaratnam suggests (2011a, p. 797), and beyond top-down governance and universalised projects.

At the same time, however, the everyday, is practically accessed by critical perspectives in a manner which legitimises the alternative normative project proposed by the critical perspectives. This, whilst continuing to declare the end of absolute solutions, universal truths and cause-effect calculations, and thus whilst being careful not to provide teleological foundations for its critique, implies a normative direction opposed to the liberal peace in its identification of resistance, in particular. Thus, arguably, the critique promotes a project which is firstly in denial of its normative aims and methods, and secondly, promotes disengagement and a virtual ‘authentic’ form of agency, which is, according to Sabaratnam, also inherently trivialised as a less political form of engagement in virtue of its association with more ‘mundane’ behaviours (2011a, p. 797).  

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8 This may, indeed, be the case for accounts that widely identify everyday agency mainly with a large pool of informal actions and behaviours ranging from knitting, to mothering, to graffiti-making, to the use of the black market. David Roberts’ definition of the everyday includes the most disparate forms of human behaviours associated with the everyday:

…”selling out-of-date aspirin and sweets outside refugee camps, roadside vendors selling petrol in Corona bottles, policewomen bribing motorists, street children taking food from people in outdoor restaurants, hawkers at ferry ports selling pigs’ trotters for the journey, old men peddling rickshaws loaded with car bodies to scrap yards and smelters, or parents openly bribing teachers to provide the desired grade for their children’s school exams (2011a, pp. 89–90). The common thread that ties these elements together is agency understood as “socially sanctioned ways in which people outsmart their surrounding limitations and manage the gaps
A paradox begins to form, in the shape of a tension between the linearity of normativity and the non-linear objectives of re-conceptualising peace-building to valorise contingency and complexity. The reluctance to acknowledge the linear tendency of the normative project of reversing the liberal peace project has put forward an understanding of ‘accessing’ the everyday which renders the critique potentially vulnerable to a reliance, once again, on goal-driven processes of peace-building that privilege a focus on amending procedures rather than questioning foundational assumptions and concepts regarding governance of post-conflict territories. In the critical turn, the acknowledgement of the ‘complexity’ of the social milieu, the need to by-pass ‘off the shelf’ universal solutions, is met with a call for context-specificity. But the trademark incredulity for foundationalism typical of critical approaches is foregone in favour of an understanding of change that requires a multi-layered approach to ‘the way we plan’, and thus one which does not abandon the ideas of ‘planning’ and ‘management’ which are typically associated with modern approaches.

Applying complexity theory to the study of peace-building, Cedric De Coning suggests: “in a non-linear social system the ‘one-problem-one-solution’ construct does no longer make sense because the linear cause-and-effect logic no longer applies” (2013, p. 4). Despite this the author also suggests the need for “a new planning model that can recognise the need for continuous iterative processes and that enable interventions to evolve along with the surrounding system” (ibid, p. 4); this new planning model requires a new way of thinking about knowledge production and transfer (potentially the basis for rethinking modernist epistemological foundations) that can replace ‘lessons-learnt approaches’ with a “new focus on learning from the context, from the tactical to the operational” (ibid, p. 4). Nonetheless, it remains substantially unclear how altering the focus of knowledge transmission to make it flow from the bottom to the top (or from the periphery to the centre, as De Coning would put it) would
contribute to a radical project to alter the fundamental manner in which we approach the problems of societies, problematise behaviour and understand the logic behind the plethora of possibilities and alternative narratives open to us. Learning from the context, in this sense, might be akin to expanding the knowledge basis to ‘grasp’ and manage complexity, much like I suggested disciplinary and bio-political forms of peace-building do.

Finally, in putting resisting agency to work in the sense of employing it as a tool for the emergence of an alternative normative framework against the liberal peace paradigm, the critical scholarship then translates the call to appreciate complexity and contingency into a plan to chart and guide the subject towards resilient subject-building, much like the modernist and linear approaches do through the imposition of reform plans, or through less coercive and yet still goal-driven projects of capacity-building. The ontological assumption here is one profoundly linked to the management of local agency, or rather, to the need to initiate an upward move towards empowerment. Just as the concept of ‘good governance’ represented a technique in the normalisation of behaviour and elimination of illegalities (i.e. abnormal behaviours, elements and narratives that were not desirable within a finite understanding of society), so can the unproblematic legitimisation of alternative struggles in a way which does not shed light upon its normative basis also come to be a technique of normalisation of the conduct of societies. As will be seen in the next chapter, this shift towards the local could, then, contribute to the internalisation, further refinement and further economisation, of methods for the control of societies through its call for emancipation legitimated in terms of the ability to turn on the transformative potential of the empowered subject. This does not necessarily mean that the radical drive behind the critical shift is condemned as irretrievably unrealistic and utopian as assessed against some universal understanding of feasibility, but rather, that it is far closer to the rationale of modernity that informed previous forms of peace-building conceptualisations than its promoters care to admit.
Conclusion

This chapter has suggested that despite advocating a relativisation of the identities involved in the conceptualisation of hybridity (Visoka, 2012b, p. 26), and of the preference for non-linear approaches exemplified by the emergence of the realm of the everyday, the local turn’s framing of the ‘everyday’ has presented certain problematic features that could arguably undermine its potential for a radical re-conceptualisation of peace-building.

Through the legitimisation of the ‘local’ as the subject to be emancipated and empowered, in fact, the local turn provides a judgement value that gives local agency a clearly delineated identity and shape. The critical turn towards the local is driven by the rejection of the liberal peace, which provides its search for alternatives a point to emancipate the subject from and a logic that somewhat provides also a linear direction to emancipate to. The alternative narratives championed by the critical approaches on the ‘everyday’ and the ‘hybrid’ are then legitimised mainly according to their stance vis-a-vis the liberal peace and a number of strategies that are considered to be ‘unbecoming’ and undesirable (e.g. lengthy, unaccountable, extensive transitional authorities like the ones in Bosnia and Kosovo are now considered to be problematic). It is then implied that the more the alternatives are the expression of resistance or non-compliance to the hegemony of the liberal peace, the better the chance that they represent something more ‘authentic’ and closer to local societies’ real needs (Mac Ginty, 2012a; Mitchell & Kelly, 2011; Richmond, 2010b; Riessman, 2000).

This, I have suggested, implies two fundamental assumptions: firstly, an epistemological assumption regarding the ability to know and access the ‘real’ conditions that determine the social context of the subject, to identify the elements that oppress him (i.e. the liberal peace and its actors), which is not fundamentally dissimilar from the linear logic that underpinned modernist frameworks of development. Secondly, and relatedly, it permits the formulation of strategies of emancipation from and to. This, in turn, presupposes that the local turn is conceptualised as occupying a position that can identify the practices that are holding back the subject and to initiate a ‘revolution’ from a position of privilege. In other words, the local turn begins to demonstrate certain normative
assumptions on the nature and direction of development itself not unlike the modernist tradition that spurred linear understandings of development.

It may be, arguably, that the drive to operationalise this plan of political change, without acknowledging or ditching a normative drive and sense of progress, provides a narrow path to these emancipatory perspectives that is dictated by goal-oriented imperatives that are, in themselves, the fruit of epistemic orders that have normalised and crystallised a certain concept ideal path to emancipation itself. In other words, if the problem with modernist understandings was mainly the linearity that closed off all other alternative avenues that could truly valorise the complexity of network and agency, and if this needs to be rethought, it is increasingly difficult to ascertain how a turn towards the local could do that whilst promoting an idea of emancipation that is still irrevocably goal-oriented and linear. The new paradigm is, thus, doused in futurity and embedded in an epistemology of planning for tomorrow, of managing the conditions that halt the full potential of the agent and hinder his progress along the axis of personal development. If the ‘real’ conditions of the everyday are necessary for the unlocking of a more nuanced version of peace, this is only because there is an inherent belief that the ‘everyday’ is somewhat ‘closer’ to a normatively ideal sense of a ‘better’ peace. The focus on the ‘everyday’, as will be seen in the next chapter in more detail, thus becomes a technique of control that categorises social experiences as cumulative and thus contributes also to a sense of time as ‘evolutive’ and progressive (Foucault, 1991a, p. 160). The next chapter will focus on outlining how the normative drive of the local turn outlined above runs the risk of turning these potentially radical critical approaches to peace-building into mere technical improvements on existing methods of social control.
Chapter 5
The ‘Uncritical’ Turn: Between Modernity and Non-Linearity

Introduction

The last three chapters have focused on the trend in the re-conceptualisation of peace-building which represents the culmination of generations of critical engagement with peace-building theory and practice. The local turn, as I have identified it, has been concerned with pointing out the negative outcomes of top-down liberal approaches to peace-building (imposition, coercion, othering, marginalisation, oppression, exploitation). The thesis has indicated, in Chapters 2 and 4, that this shift is underpinned by a critique that conflates the hegemonic tendencies with linear approaches under the rubric of western, liberal modes of thinking and practising peace-building. Moreover, the previous chapter has suggested that the local turn itself, when engaging in its project of overturning the liberal peace, presents certain analytical tendencies of selectivity that may prevent it from achieving its critical, non-linear potential.

This final chapter draws attention to an important consequence of the critique operated by the local turn. The chapter, in fact, suggests that a tension between the need to pluralise peace-building along non-linear lines and the linearity provided to the local turn by its claims regarding how the possibility of identifying and accessing a more ‘authentic’ form of everyday agency has tested the limits of how the local turn’s non-linear emancipatory project.

To outline the difficulties of the local turn’s project of rethinking peace-building the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section focuses on ‘spatialisation’ as the process of embedding actors and identities in time and space through the selection and legitimation of certain forms of agency over other. This, it is suggested, stems from the exercise of a form of normalising judgement that derives from the previously identified normative project of resistance to the liberal peace (see Chapter 4). The process of translating the ‘abstract’ everyday into practical expressions of everyday agency presents several problems, the most notable of which is the clash between aspirations of
non-linearity and complexity, and the linear process of physically identifying authentic forms of local agency from the allegedly ‘fictional’ and ‘virtual’ ones.

The second section, on normalisation, draws out the linear elements of the processes of normalisation present in the local turn’s project of change. The section suggests that the normative core of the latest critical shift, previously unpacked in Chapter 4, makes it suitable to the extension of a normalising gaze and techniques to normalise societal control in a manner which is not dissimilar from techniques associated to liberal governmentality. An ethos of normalisation, different from liberal governmentality albeit based on linear principles, results in the local turn handling complexity through managing individual and collective behaviours according to pre-established sets of regimes of practice (for instance, through the claim to accessing the ‘authentic’ nature of the local, through the arbitrary selection of and preference for certain types of local agency over others). The normalisation operated by the local turn, whilst largely underexplored, remains visible in the bias towards certain forms of agency, and arguably further stresses the contradiction between the non-linear goals of the local turn and the linear pull of normativity.

Finally, as the third and final section explores, the contradiction between the fragmented, bottom-up understanding of governance and the normalisation of society operated by the local turn’s identification of agency in the everyday has an important consequence for the individual at the centre of peace-thinking in the local turn. The individual is in the paradoxical position of having to govern without being able to be governed. As this question of governance is framed within peace-building that still retains its aspirations to productively build peace, the local turn’s project then attempts to reconcile a loose understanding of a-political, abstracted everyday agency with a militant, normative understanding of what societies should look like (one, for instance, that puts a premium on resistance). As such, whilst on the one hand framing the authentic as a realm that cannot be managed and governed through traditional top-down forms of governance, on the other hand, it also frames the need for emancipation by framing peace-building directly against the liberal peace. As a result the resisting
subject, the post-liberal subject, is understood as a rational, transformative subject through which the project of social change can be practically enacted.

The thesis’s final contention is proposed in this chapter, suggesting that the opening up to multiple ontologies of peace sought by the local turn cannot be fully unpacked through the focus on the contingent and the everyday in the way in which it has been so far formulated. As it stands in the literature, the everyday actually reduces the agency of the subject to spatialised resistance, and enables further social intervention in the form of resilience-building, whilst negating these effects of power on account of its benevolent aims of emancipation through the attainment of the virtual ‘authentic’ plane.

1. **Situating the ‘Everyday’: Spatialising Identities**

The problem of the everyday brings to the fore a tension between the local turn’s attempt to pluralise and fragment governance in order to reflect the contingent, heterogeneous materiality of the everyday, and the framework of peace-building which assigns particular identities and positions to the agents within the interventionist paradigm. This section suggests that this tension embodies a contradiction, visible in the manner in which agency is identified and legitimised as being the expression of the authentic everyday, in the local turn; this is the production of a form of ‘spatialisation’ which may run against the principle of non-linearity that animates the local turn’s attempt to open up space for the conceptualisation of multiple and plural ontologies of peace.

The issue of spatialisation is important to the local turn in that in their attempt to go beyond the binaries and identities created by the liberal peace, they seek to embrace the hybrid, complex and fluid quality of everyday agency. As suggested in the introduction and in Chapter 4, critical, non-linear perspectives condemn the tendency of modernist and linear accounts of International Relations to identify a spatial division between identities and agents; in traditional development paradigms, for instance, Praeg (2010) suggests that this is mostly visible in the identification of the *locus* of poverty. Within this context, the site of social intervention is always outside, externalised, in relation to the action and actors that initiate the intervention (i.e. ‘us’ and ‘them’). This also
makes it possible to identify a dividing line between interveners and subjects of intervention. These lines and identities are often located through:

...an ideologically over-determined spatialisation and temporalisation of a difference on the basis of which intervention becomes a voluntary, charitable act of intervention in the lives of the poor. Assistance is conceived of in terms of volition and exteriority, its ethics, one of conscience and not responsibility (Praeg, 2010, p. 260).

These binaries are then solidified in the processes of domination of the hegemonic meta-narrative. Jabri, for instance, suggests that modernist understandings of conflict included cultural differences only to “determine the legitimate, the acceptable, the righteous and the barbarian” (2007, p. 153); cultural identity was then used to produce subjects that are “categorised and spatialised, shaped in accordance with the rationalisations of discursive and ultimately institutionalised modes of identification. In a context defined in terms of a global ‘war against terrorism’, such rationalisations are often interlaced with friend/enemy identifications” (ibid, p. 153). The binary categories created are problematic in that they create a universe of ‘spatialised units of analysis’, which support the provision of “a temporal logic” to processes such as development or failure; these binary assumptions are said to forego other relational perspectives that can open up to multiple understandings of social change (Shah, 2009, p. 19). In conflict contexts, spatialisation is said to be contributed to by the formal structures of government (i.e. the formal constitutional make up of Bosnia); however, this can also be contributed to, unwittingly, by citizens in their ‘everyday’ actions, as Galvanek suggests in the case of the ‘ethnic spaces’ created in Bosnia by citizens’ display of flags and symbols.

Yet, Galvanek also suggests that the everyday can also be the main source of resistance to formal spatialisation, visible in the ways in which citizens refuse to be identified with a particular ethnicity, such as the case of people refusing to specify their ethnic provenance in Bosnia or across the Green Line in Cyprus (2013). Luke, too, has suggested that resistance comes from below, from the multitude, and represents a direct attack to the ‘modernising biopower’ of the Empire’s project of hegemony. The struggle over control is fought in certain ‘spatial registers’, with Empire aspiring to extend its reach through fluid,
transnational projects of democracy promotion and coalition-building, and with the multitude focusing instead on achieving narrower, localised aims of autonomy and self-rule, as Al Qaeda in Iraq shows (Luke, 2007). Here it is noted that spatialisation is an outcome of institutionalised governance (for instance imposed peace-building provisions), and that the everyday is the site where resistance to it originates, thus placing the two fields in opposition to each other.

Indeed, contrary to linear perspectives, relational views of peace-building would understand ‘the everyday’ as a realm of contingent relationality, an assemblage of hybrid networks, where the identification of clear cut identities and agendas is discouraged. So within this understanding, accessing the everyday is called upon as a way to avoid doing violence to the heterogeneity of existence. Mac Ginty and Richmond, exemplify this belief:

These localised epistemologies and discourses are distinct from Western modes of thinking in one important respect: their variance. The sheer heterogeneity of the sources of localised thinking and expression means that there is no neat framework of ideas and that any genealogy of a universal norm or institution will tend to uncover hidden injustices that need to be rectified. The local turn is characterised by a cacophony of thinking (2013, p. 780).

These perspectives then suggest that because of this plurality, attempts to govern over the complex and contingent, over the hybrid and fluid, have so far created warped and virtual forms of peace (Lidén, 2009; Richmond & Franks, 2007; Richmond, 2004b), implying, as I have outlined in Chapter 2, the existence of a more ‘authentic’ form of everyday agency, an ‘authentic local’ (Richmond, 2009b, p. 328), ‘actual local’ or ‘real everyday’ (ibid, p. 326). Since the reality of the milieu can now only be accessed through acknowledging the contingency of the everyday, intervention then, was seemingly no longer able to re-create the social through an outdated understanding of governance as a mere link between ruler and land, shifted towards forms of facilitation, partnership and support (Chandler, 2014a, pp. 78–9). Indeed, the acknowledgment of the contingent and complex milieu frames the problem of the social as one that cannot square the circle of non-linearity with top-down interventions and theoretically reduces the salience of spatialisation. The abandonment of strictly spatialised understandings of governance is an issue that is very close to post-modernists in
general. In theory, the end of top-down governance represents the ultimate fragmentation of power and the acknowledgment that the very issue of governing populations goes beyond establishing vertical structures that tie the authorities to the land, through the population, but that governance itself depended on the acknowledgment of the undisputable underground forces of the contingent ‘everyday’ and their fluid, non-linear, relational nature.

Since the complex milieu and its occurrences can no longer be accessed through instrumental engineering from the top by fashioning causal connections, imposing sovereign authority, or implementing blueprints (Belman Inbal & Lerner, 2007, p. 47; Lidén et al., 2009; Pouligny, 2009, p. 15), it was then implied that the everyday reality of post-conflict societies can only be made accessible through non-linear, pluralised and effused understandings of the relations of co-constitution and transformation that constituted the social.

Linear understandings are problematised because insofar as they acknowledge that the world is complex, these perspectives continue to understand the occurrences constitutive of the complex milieu, like conflict, as ‘complex emergencies’, in need of further control. Along these lines, it was

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1 For a comprehensive overview of the relationship between anti-foundationalist, non-linear perspectives and the issue of space and agency, see Murdoch (2006). Post-colonial scholarship is also interested in the ways in which subjects have been constructed and their identities cemented in specific physical and social positions of subordination; for post-colonial perspectives on spatialisation see Kapoor (2008) and Bhabha (1994). As it pertains to the problem of the structure of governance, post-structuralist, in particular Foucauldian scholars of governmentality have also been interested in the way in which spatialisation of identities permitted particular instruments of governmental control and discipline to persist as tools of governmentality; see for instance Kingfisher (2011).

2 Indeed both Oliver Richmond and Michel De Certeau are concerned with the issue of the relationship between non-linearity and the spatial expressions of relationality. The linearity of rigid institutional approaches to governance is contrasted by the non-linear, relational and fluid ‘opportunities’ that arise in the everyday. These ‘opportunities’ in everyday life, as De Certeau suggests, lie in “the play of alteration, the metonymic practice of singularities, and, as a kind of general effect, an unsettling and wily mobility” (1980, p. 41). Where these two accounts differ, however, is in relation to the issue of the spatialisation of the everyday. De Certeau reiterates the need to de-spatialise and unhinge the everyday from its spatially embedded identity: “I call tactics the calculated action which is determined by the absence of a proper place. Thus no delimitation of exteriority furnishes it a condition of autonomy” (ibid, p. 6). On the other hand, Richmond more firmly relies on such spatialisation in his interpretation of localisation. Localisation for Richmond is not merely a reactionary form of displacement resulting from centralised and western-centric, liberal orthodoxy, but it is an actual positive process of producing of the loci of agency in the post-conflict context (see: Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013, p. 775; Richmond, 2009a, p. 572). De Certeau, arguably, proposed a non-linear appreciation for the everyday that is somewhat lost in Richmond’s normative grounding of the everyday into ‘civil’ expressions of agency (Richmond, 2009a, p. 572).
suggested that “the concept of a complex political emergency carries with it the ideological means of justifying, mobilising and coordinating the state and non-state actors of liberal peace” (Duffield, 2001, p. 163). Duffield then suggests:

…it would make more sense, however, to rephrase the encounter so that liberal peace is seen to confront not complex political emergencies but emerging political complexes on its borders. Rather than remaining a pure projection, the object of governance is endowed with the possibility of a will and volition of its own. This implies elites able to choose between a range of options rather than just following blueprints (ibid, p. 163).

Duffield’s political complexes represent micro-locales, or networks wherein interactions, power relations and co-constitutive actions concur in the creation of certain individual and societal choices, identities, actions and actors. Duffield’s perspective, like that of many scholars of the local turn that focus on interactions, understand what happens within these spaces (‘everyday’) by looking at the relationality of the societal problems (like conflict, for instance), not necessarily their origin (Coleman et al., 2013, p. 42), understanding these problems not at the ideological or structural level, but at the pragmatic and unfixed “level of practices” (Chandler, 2013b, p. 22).

Given the framing of the local turn within the context of fragmented governance, non-linear understandings of peace-building frame the nature of the social as being one of relational networks, as opposed to distinctively identifiable actors. These perspectives discourage, at least in theory, the identification of clear identities to avoid reductionism (see, for instance, Sabaratnam, 2011a), preferring a relational view that would, at least in theory, leave the boundaries of the hybrid open and undefined (Peterson, 2012) in order to focus on the ‘inbetweenness’. Naturally, solutions coming from the local turn, by rejecting simple dualisms and binaries, would seem to operate to dislodge the inclusion and exclusion mechanisms critiqued as qualities of the liberal peace (see Chapter 2) by reversing top-down with bottom-up, and by giving particular attention to resisting and non-mainstream forms of agency (see Chapter 3, in relation to Kosovo and resistance). But how can this be done, without resulting to the vertical governance structures that the liberal peace has so far employed? The
practice of accessing these complex societies is, arguably, one that strikes at the
core of this question of governance.

When the ‘abstracted’ idea of the everyday is enacted, a form of
spatialisation takes place that facilitates the emergence of the everyday. The
emergence of the problem of the everyday can then be associated to what
Foucault (1991b) identified as a move from a focus on ‘land’ to a focus on
population, through which different forms of power were at play to try and
govern over the complexities of the social and the natural; this shift is, in fact,identified by Foucault as the origin of the emergence of forms of power that
could better deal with an ever changing object of governance. The emergence of
the population as the object of governance (as opposed to the land), came to shift
the attention towards the conditions of the life of the subject; everyday issues
and concerns (such as famine, scarcity, death and births) were identified as the
determinant factor in explaining societal and individual behaviour.

Likewise, the shift to bottom-up approaches, whilst being framed within
an increasing acknowledgment of the limits of governance from above, does not
exist outside considerations of power and relies on its own form of emergent

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3 Foucault’s genealogy of governance from the early stages of modern statehood suggests a shift
away from the notion of governance based on a transcendental link between the territory and the
ruler. The fragile link between the prince and the principality as the object of the art of
government is then supplanted by a different understanding of government starting from
identifying continuities between different realms of power, for instance, between the government
of the state, the running of the family and the government of personal behaviour. The art of
government, Foucault indicates, thus begins to include the governance of the family, economy,
as a new level of intervention (1991b, p. 92), which cannot merely reduce the question of
government to that of the transcendental relationship between the sovereign and the land, just as
the government of a family, Foucault notes, is not merely the securitisation of the family
property, but is the larger matter of the management of other issues like births, deaths, alliances
with other families, unexpected events, wealth, etc. (ibid, p. 94). The population is now the end
of government, as opposed to the land or the exercise of the art of government itself (ibid, p.
100). As such governing becomes a search for the conditions and techniques of government
rather than the mere exercise of power over the land, and it also becomes a political science in
that the search for these techniques relies on the use of statistics which are no longer aimed at
administering the land but are rather used to collect information about the interlinking of
phenomena such as deaths, birth, disease, wealth, poverty, customs, religion, etc., to map out the
population’s regularities and patterns (ibid, p. 99). In a similar manner, it is possible to identify
such shift in the way in which peace-building has been practised and conceptualised across its
shift, whereby, through the turn towards pro-active and invasive state-building, the multi-
layered, complex missions as well as the multi-level, comprehensive analyses that followed are
grounded not so much towards the establishment of control over the land, but towards the
securitisation of community, everyday life. Peace-building was then also deployed as a scientific
method not just to impose governance from above, but rather non-coercively to gather
information to draw patterns regarding the population’s behaviour to govern more efficiently.
power, much like the shift towards intrusive peace-building relied on disciplinary power. In fact, the power in question, biopower, can be seen at play in the way in which the local turn seeks to engage with the everyday, not in its abstracted, theoretical role, but in its practical, spatialised use to get closer to the populations affected by peace-building. When the essence of the theoretically abstract concept of the ‘everyday’ is fleshed out in practical terms, analyses often rely on representations of individual agency (for instance, the resisting graffiti city-scape of Belfast, or the knitting circles of Bosnia), which tend to identify agency itself in its positionality (i.e. where it is physically located) or functionality (i.e. the physical evidence of the acts it performs). As such, it is important to understand the implications of such ‘spatialisation’ of agency, that is, the process of translating the virtual notion of the ‘everyday’ into practical reality.

‘Tapping’ everyday forms of agency or sources of knowledge, and drawing these out from their ‘hidden’ or ‘silenced’ status (Mac Ginty, 2013; Verkoren, 2008), as demonstrated in the previous chapter, is problematic not only because it exhibits a level of selectivity that was initially critiqued as biased, but also because it arguably requires a logic of spatial organisation that associates identities with time and space, and qualifies their actions and behaviours to then gauge how they fare (i.e. how liberal is a policy, or an actor, or how dissent is the expression of resistance). Indeed, some scholars have shown awareness of the potential problem of bias in conceptualising the everyday. Critical scholars such as Mitchell have, in fact, warned of the need to extend the understanding of ‘everyday’ beyond discourses that outline either the positive qualities of life (i.e. Richmond’s resistant agent) or the framings of everyday as methods of societal control (as Dean’s, Duffield’s and Rose’s approaches to biopolitics), in favour of an approach that grasps all the nuances and ambiguities of the everyday beyond this binary, acknowledging also the potential of the ‘everyday’ itself to be co-opted and bio-politicised (Mitchell, 2011).

Instead, to by-pass such problem, Mitchell has suggested looking beyond the typically positive understandings of the ‘everyday’, towards ‘threatworks’,
to establish a more inclusive method to understand not just the quality of everyday life that allows to identify what agency is, but also the provenance of it and thus, where it comes from. The scholar in fact lamented the focus on the quality of the everyday life produced by accounts such as that of Richmond. Instead, “‘threatworks’ are the sets of practices, institutions or customs through which people exchange, acknowledge, evade, manoeuvre, contest and otherwise resist threats to their collective existence” (Mitchell, 2011, p. 1641). The response to these threats, everyday agency, is thus fluid and unfixed, extending to violent and aggressive behaviour, as opposed to being limited to Richmond’s or Mac Ginty’s preference for non-violent action. Threatworks such as the display of paramilitary or sectarian flags, aggressive behaviour at parades, and the erection of social and physical barriers are, Mitchell argues, ways of diffusing and engaging with conflict in different ways and, although aggressive, they:

…are crucial to the inclusion, well-being and social, cultural or economic integrity of the polity and the groups within it, even if they involve unevenness or exclusion, which may be an affront to the norms of peace-building actors. As such, they are not simply local versions of ‘negative peace’, but may instead constitute competing – or even conflicting – visions of positive peace developed by each group or community in accordance to its orientation to or place in the conflict (2011, p. 1644 my emphasis).

Yet, despite evidencing a more open and pluralist understanding of the different way in which agency is expressed, this perspective still implies the need to include silenced or hidden groups, as to affect the progression from war to peace. The issue to highlight here is not so much the spatial identification of identities per se but the failure to acknowledge that such identification is a form of embedding the subject within social structures that are not neutral, and relying on this subject to operate a new form of peace-building, which is not conceptualised in a vacuum but in a highly normative context. Indeed the attitude towards identities is symptomatic of a tension in the local turn between the need to celebrate ‘alterity’, agonism and difference (Paffenholz, 2011, p. 148; Richmond, 2011c, p. 231; Shinko, 2008), whilst on the other hand blurring the dividing lines between positions and identities in the complex and interconnected everyday (Mac Ginty, 2011, p. 210; Richmond, 2011c, p. 232).
The identification of identities becomes salient mostly when it says something about the vertical imposition of peace-building from above, for instance when it enables the identification of resistance or of a form of coercion. Where, for instance, Kappler points out that communities in Bosnia “often perceive their identities as mutually exclusive”, the author refers to this gap as significant to point out how “the language the EU uses is not connected to people’s everyday lives, with terms such as ‘peace-building’ or ‘democratisation’ remaining meaningless beyond their institutional context” (2013, pp. 357–358). Lines of friction, separation and difference, thus seem to be mainly associated with the artificiality of the peace-building’s forceful creation of islands of identity, although it is not really clear how the local turn deals with its own boundaries-making, and or whether it accepts that communities themselves might create boundaries or spatialised understandings of the everyday even as they seemingly engage in more productive forms of peace-building such as community projects, ‘everyday’ activism, and organised or non-organised resistance.

Moreover, accounts pertaining to the local turn, even as they perceive the potential for the manipulation of the everyday, or the ‘dark side’ of the everyday itself, still seek to harvest the knowledge coming from the ‘everyday’, to instrumentalise it to bring about change to the quality of life of everyday subjects of war. In this sense, it is not clear how the project of change of the local turn may differ from similarly normatively motivated projects coming from the liberal peace itself or by local elites. Furthermore, this brings forward another contradictory tension, between the de-politicised project of pluralising and fragmenting the everyday – regardless of the quality and outlook of the agency that composes it – and the rather linear process of distinguishing desirable forms of agency from undesirable ones. This is the case both for attempts to identify agency for normative purposes as well as for descriptive, explanatory ones, as in Mitchell’s (2011) and Visoka’s (2011) conceptual unpacking of everyday agency beyond positive, non-violent expressions.

Indeed, these perspectives are captured by their own attempts to distinguish agency and make sense of where it comes from and what forms it
takes, rather than discussing how and why certain forms of political statements are co-opted, rejected or glorified, by either the ‘liberal peace’ or by the local turn itself. Examining why the local turn may react to agency in certain ways may, in fact, shed light on the presence and the role of the normative aspirations of the local turn itself that should not be disregarded, as they may contrast the epistemological and ontological intent to produce an apolitical, relational understanding of peace.

Furthermore, the manner in which agency is identified, particularly within a relationship of power/resistance, and the manner in which actors are identified in the process of separating the virtual peace from the ‘authentic’ everyday demonstrates that the manner in which the relational view is conceptualised is not problem-free as it implies projecting a particular understanding of space as an entity within which the relationships amongst subjects and between subjects and objects take place. This means that despite acknowledging the heterogeneous and at times murky and undistinguishable nature of the assemblages that shape these networks as social spaces, the local turn operates an embedding of individuals in modes of spatial organisation (Murdoch, 2006, p. 56), which is operated through the rational identification of the identities, agendas and goals of certain actors (see Chapter 4), for instance, by pitting locals vs internationals or by qualifying a certain relationship as one of resistance (i.e. who are the graffiti artists in Northern Ireland resisting? Can one subject resist more than one relation of power? What happens when a subject stops resisting and decides to be co-opted?). The normative project that delineates the direction of the critique, as outlined in Chapter 4, which is what makes it possible to tell the ‘authentic’ everyday from the ‘fiction’ of the liberal peace, also makes it possible for social space to be ‘distinguished’, and for the network itself to be circumscribed and addressed as if it were an identifiable, albeit complex, whole. The subjects within these networks possess agency and said agency is again pinpointed and clearly identified (for instance, resistance) in regards to its effects on the outlook of the network (for instance, qualifying how graffiti resistance can change the post-conflict space). Relatedly, therefore, the identification of the ‘everyday’ in its physical expression, is also put in service of a normative plan to avoid those forms that the critique identifies as
being ‘too liberal’ or ‘too co-opted’ or not organic enough. This is, arguably, the analytical process that enables the critical perspectives to identify the ‘authentic’ from the ‘fiction’.

The normative underpinnings of the local turn, unknowingly or not, may contribute to strengthening the assumptions, narratives and foundations that have so far embedded and cemented certain characteristics and identities of the entities and actors in the network (for instance, the implied and often under-theorised meaning of representation, agreement and consensus, which are often mentioned in literature on peace-building as being the core of peace itself). This may, in itself, be evidenced by the apparent inability, despite numerous attempts, to by-pass the analytical binary ‘local/international’. Indeed, these categories can be considered crucial in the identification of a source of power (hegemonic power) which the everyday can resist in order to be given meaning ‘beyond the artifice’ of previous representations. If the local/international dichotomy were to be abandoned and the limits of these two micro-locales interrogated, the foundations of the local turn’s own project of overturning the liberal peace might be put into question insofar as these foundations themselves would cease to be identifiable and the liberal peace too, would cease to have clear borders. This tension between the fragmenting pull of non-linearity and the spatialising effects of identifying and qualifying agency suggests that important questions are being overlooked, within the local turn itself, regarding the feasibility of conceiving of a non-linear approach of peace-building whilst working with a framework of interventionism that necessarily makes a distinction between interveners and subjects of interventions.

Finally, another question can be put to the local turn regarding the effects that the turn itself has on the subject of peace-building: as normativity persists in the local turn’s project of critique, spatialisation is thus put to work to substantiate and legitimise the new paradigm’s grand philosophy of the world. Within a context that, however, denounces governance as top-down imposition, the local turn then relies on a type of power – biopower – that fragments and pluralises, but is also employed to make sense of, categorise, spatialise and normalise agents and actors in its attempt to distinguish the ‘authentic’ from the
‘fiction’. The next paragraph will suggest that the spatialised identities resulting from the identification of specific forms of agency enables the instrumentalisation of biopower, producing specific effects of normalisation on societies and actors.

2. ‘Normalising’ the Everyday

The issue of normalisation is one that fundamentally has to do with the ways in which societies are regulated and individual and collective behaviour normalised according to standards that define what is acceptable and what is not desirable. Since some scholars of the local turn associated attempts to relate to the local coming from orthodox perspectives as an extension of liberal governmentality (Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2006; Scholte, 2004), one could also suggest that it is not necessary to rely on the identification of a unitary source of hegemonic power, or a coherent ‘liberal’ plan, to unpack this issue. Indeed, such a narrow focus might be counterproductive as an emphasis placed exclusively on constructing and then critiquing the ‘liberal’ plan may not be conducive to the emergence of critical perspectives that can question the significance of this commonality, beyond attributing it to the liberal peace’s manipulation.

I would like, therefore, to distance myself from approaches employing Foucault’s studies on liberal governmentality and power solely to critique the liberal way of war (or peace), and expose the critique of the liberal peace itself to an appraisal of its assumptions. How does the local’s attempt to treat complexity compare to linear attempts to grasp complexity? In the previous paragraph it has been suggested that the ‘everyday’, when identified and pointed out by supporters of the local turn, is also similarly spatialised in delineated locales (although perhaps less dependent on structure).

It will now be suggested that the normative drive of the local turn outlined in Chapter 4, combined with the above discussed notion of spatially embedded identities provide the new paradigm with the parameters of the correct path through which to attain the vision of political change advocated. It will also be suggested that the identification of local, ‘authentic’ or organic forms of
agency (resisting agency for instance) contributes to the casting of a normalising judgement that permits the regulation of societies according to a form of power – biopower – that does not rely on coercion but thrives on being perceived as fragmented and originating from below. The instrumentalisation of biopower to ‘access’ the everyday does not, arguably, need to be used to suggest that the local turn is still liberal, but rather, to outline how biopower can be employed also in post-liberal frameworks that rely on a linear, para-modern rationale to conceptualise their project of political change through the everyday.

In this sense, it might be useful to start by looking at the effects of the employment of biopower by the local turn in its exploration of the everyday. Since the everyday is qualified as a realm existing beyond the institutional and the formal, the typology of power employed to access it, which I referred to as biopower, operates at the level of the informal, in what Foucault would call ‘normalisation’. Normalisation is a process through which power that “constitutes the other side of juridical and political structures of political representation” (Foucault, 2003, p. 49) is utilised to shape conduct within society by affirming what is normal and what is not.

As normalisation functions to ‘make normal’ behaviour (Taylor, 2009, p. 52), it thus defines normal behaviour by identifying abnormal behaviour that needs to be harmonised or removed. For instance, the establishment of the notion of resistance to the liberal peace provides a view of what normal agency looks like (for instance, peaceful resistance, everyday activism as acceptable forms of agency), by providing an image of what abnormal, irregular or unacceptable behaviour is (violent behaviour is unacceptable, so is neo-colonialism, paternalism, and increasingly ‘partnerships’ and ‘support’ are also seen with scepticism).

Many of these ‘abnormalities’, such as paternalism, domination and imposition do, indeed, resonate with most as distinctly negative and instinctively deplorable traits to condemn and reject, just as the idea of crime. Less openly rejected issues, such as the acceptability of elite politics, co-option and the establishment of lengthy ‘partnerships’, all of which are beginning to be problematised as part of the critique of the hegemonic liberal peace, reveal a
much more subtle process, that which enables certain actions and behaviours to be cast as undesirable. Yet, when certain actions, behaviours, actors and patterns are naturalised as ‘abnormal behaviour’, without much explanation of how a specific act is framed as problematic or inappropriate (and how, by consequence, other behaviour is accepted and justified), the process of normalisation that even the local paradigm might be exercising is then obscured. To apply this to our field, one could suggest that local turn’s critique of the liberal peace and the consequent wholehearted call to empower the local obscures how certain behaviour and acts are singularly identified as forms of domination, and how certain others are not. In other words, it is now, for instance, nearly universally accepted in critical circles that the liberal peace disempowers local voices, no matter how hard it tries to devolve power, or how much it says it loves all things local. Furthermore, whilst rejection to the ‘liberal’ peace is widely registered, it is also possible to see that accounts of local support for the liberal peace and its initiatives tend to be easily explained away by the critics as co-option or imposition, ultimately placing most of the negative connotations of co-option onto the ‘liberal’ peace; Richmond, for instance suggests that “liberalism tolerates or co-opts while contextualism resists, modifies and adopts” (2010b, p. 687). What this may also cause is an almost instinctive association of issues such as marginalisation and alienation with an immediate culprit, at the expense of questioning and examining whether other systems, orders, actors, narratives, may also advocate practices that can result in marginalising people and narratives.⁴

The local turn, may, in spite of its critical, denouncing role, also be seen to exercise a form of normalisation that derives from its own normative ethos. This reinforces a particular view of societal organisation that has come to be associated with an idealised form of resistance against a similarly idealised liberal peace object of critique, and thus also projecting an image of what the ‘normal’ functioning and processes within the network are (although this normal appears to be an inversion of top-down into bottom-up).

⁴ One could argue that this also contradicts Richmond’s assertions regarding the fact that liberalism often creates hybridity where it meets the local (2009b, 2010b). The effects of liberalism versus those of contextualism may, thus, not be as easily established.
Insofar as normalisation determines the direction of social and individual behaviour, and establishes what ‘illegalities’ (Foucault, 2006, p. 110) (that is, unwanted behaviour) to avoid, it fundamentally concerns the question of government, as the exercise of power that derives from normalisation is aimed at guiding the conduct of society in one direction or another, and not merely to facilitate the confrontation and communication between individuals (for an account of normalisation in modern societies, see: Bielskis, 2005; Rose & Miller, 1992). It follows that even the local turn, despite its denouncement of hegemonic power, exercises a form of power of its own which cannot implicitly exclude the range of methods and outcomes that may have been used prior to it (for instance, discipline) just on principle or because of the benevolent intentions of the paradigm. The local turn’s re-conceptualisation of peace-building seeks to reverse and denounce existing liberal norms and normalisation regimes the liberal project is allegedly responsible for, by promoting a new “critical agenda for peace” (Mac Ginty & Richmond, 2013) and a different form of emancipatory framework facilitated by engaging with complexity and non-linearity. Nonetheless, these critical accounts remain blind to their own potential for normalisation and to their own forms of problematisation of abnormal behaviour that follow the processes of normalisation.

To better explain this, one can identify other forms of normalisation and consequential problematisation of the conduct of societies. For instance, Foucault suggested that punishment was a reaction of the formation of the idea of what was criminal (1991a, p. 104); likewise, in Chapter 1, I suggested that extensive social reconstruction and engineering was a reaction to the idea of the failed state. In the case of the local turn, one could advance the hypothesis that the need to empower and emancipate the subject is also a reaction to the idea of what is now identified as abnormal behaviours such as paternalism, domination and imposition. None of these norms and their respective regimes, however, as Foucault suggests, are natural or God-given. For instance, paternalism is not, naturally, linked to liberal ideology but is ascertained through critique. Since these elements are in themselves the outcome of a discursive knowledge production that instinctively allows to link the behaviour or act with an image of appropriateness (Foucault suggests this happens to how we constitute crime).
These patterns of knowledge production may be more or less obvious but they all have an effect, wittingly or not, on both individuals and populations by attempting to bring behaviour in conformity with the new social norm (Taylor, 2009, p. 52).

The normalisation operated by the local is mostly visible in its naturalisation of certain qualities of the everyday, those that are privileged because of their position within the normative vision of the local approach. For instance, several authors have more than once assumed that local forms of justice making, like the Gacaca courts in Rwanda (Clark, 2007) and the Loya Jirga in Afghanistan (Mac Ginty, 2008) are valuable ways of getting to a peace that is naturally closer to the society it is meant to affect; nonetheless it is not clear why these forms of ‘local’ customs and justice are chosen over others that are just as ‘local’ although less likely to be understood within a western-centric understanding of the local. Clan-based solutions are celebrated in some cases (in Africa or Afghanistan) but supposed to be problematic in other contexts, like in Kosovo or Zimbabwe, where solutions driven by one ethnicity or based on ethnicity are merely condemned as repeating the mistakes of ethnicised peace-building that the liberal approach is responsible for. Oliver Richmond has, for instance, supported the need to place the local at the centre of the peace-building endeavour in Kosovo on the one hand, although, on the other, he has also condemned the monopolisation of the process of peace-building by the Kosovo Albanians (Richmond, 2011a, p. 81). Roger Mac Ginty and Andrew Williams’s conceptualisation of local agency has also exhibited a similar bias, particularly in its treatment of guerrilla groups that have “transformed very quickly into political parties”; where their methods may often rely on the use of “the language of liberation”, the authors warn against these elites’ “too narrowly based agendas” that may “merely continue the civil wars by peaceful means” (2009, p. 80).

Even where the local turn attempts to go beyond local vs international dichotomies, by focusing on the relationality, i.e. the connections and interactions between actors, such as in Wiuff Moe’s account of relationality in Somaliland (2013), it is implied that the interactions are still examined within
the context of positive ‘reconstructive’ and ‘order-making’ efforts, understanding peace-building largely within productive forms of relationality in service of reconstruction, “acceptance and support” (Saul, 2011, p. 166). This means that very little attention is given to destructive interactions, what Oliver Ramsbotham calls radical disagreement (2013), or even to multiple, shifting and simultaneous registers of interactions, where agents may be increasingly difficult to pin down according to agenda, wants and needs. It also means that the problematisation of violence remains unexplored, without much understanding for why a paradigm may refuse to engage with or understand violent behaviour, and prefer to engage with forms of everyday agency which may, paradoxically, still only represent only a portion of the ‘everyday’ and only the one that is more easily interrogated, approached, co-opted or ‘made visible’.

Finally, the very line between formal and informal is highly subjective; since the local turn requires accessing the everyday beyond the trappings of institutional set-ups, it is also responsible for identifying those struggles that it seeks to ‘make visible’, by separating them from the formal and institutional. This is, however, part and parcel of normalisation, since this exercise requires identifying which actors exist “beyond the artifice of civil society” (Kappler, 2012, p. 264; Paffenholz, 2011; Richmond, 2009b, p. 331). The assumption here is the underlying belief in the ability to reveal or shed light upon what lies beyond the artifice, which may be difficult because it would entail speaking for the ‘local’. In Kosovo, for instance, this may entail examining the relationship between NGOs, the state and wider populations, which is an increasingly complex and ever evolving one, particularly in a context like Kosovo, where NGOs are very small, often staffed by only two members, and often motivated by the need to earn a wage through sponsorship. In this case, the NGO itself

5 This was confirmed to me in an interview with ‘Celnaja’ NGO director Zulfaj:

As I told you from the beginning I knew what I wanted to do, but I was also concerned that I couldn’t do it if I didn’t have a job and I couldn’t look after myself. So this was the first concern with everyone one else who started an NGO. They were running around to get funding from donors. Now it’s coming to a balance, because loads of NGOs failed because of no more donations. And all the ones who could really reach something are now stable and can really do good work (Face-To-Face Interview, 2012b).
might want to be co-opted by the institutions, might want to exist and operate in the formal, work with the ‘liberal’, but as a way to respond to peoples’ own ‘everyday needs’. In other words, these account may be in denial not only of their own normative baggage, as I have so far suggested, but also of assuming that the everyday is a-political and has no normative aim of its own, which may contrast the project of the local turn as well as the projects coming from other communities, individuals and actors. Visoka in this sense, rightly points to the issue of Bosnia suggesting the need to acknowledge that the ethno-cultural disagreement in Bosnia “might represent the will, needs, interests and local context of each ethnic community” (2011, p. 106), struggling for their own vision of the everyday. This is however jettisoned when the everyday is abstracted as a field where meaning can be harvested and identified anew, such as in Körpen’s idea of hybrid encounters as a third space, as opposed to where meanings may have already formed on their own. Furthermore, where alternative, local narratives are celebrated as contributing to a more “dynamic” peace process by exposing peace-building to different value systems (2013, p. 89) it is also ideal not to entirely exclude the possibility that several of the others narratives of peace brought forward by the local turn, may rely on linear epistemologies themselves.

The issue at stake is, therefore, normativity and the effects it has on the creation of subjectivities. As the local turn raised this problem with the ‘liberal peace’, it is also possible to question the effects of the local turn’s own normalisation processes. Whether the local turn nudges, implies or directly promotes any particular social norms, the process becomes problematic not because these elements may or may not be ‘legitimate’ or ‘good’, but, as I argue, when these are legitimised and naturalised as necessary, concealing the processes of normalisation and their effects on subjects behind a veil of benevolence. The vast acceptance of and reliance on the ‘local’ as new reference points in peace-building could indeed be sufficient to raise questions regarding

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Given many of the NGOs in Kosovo were motivated by the ‘everyday’ need to earn a wage, this might make it difficult to separate the local agency and NGO participation from the ‘artifice of civil society’ provided by the fictional representation by the liberal peace and its agents (Paffenholz, 2011).
how these came to be so widely accepted and what forms of normalisations may be at play behind this ‘silver bullet’.

Admittedly, this should not be taken as an ethics-based critique of the emancipatory approaches to peace-building, but rather, as a way to bringing to attention the manner in which the local turn may run the risk of exercising a form of normalisation not dissimilar to that encountered in linear frameworks in that it promotes the uncritical acceptance of something that is presented as natural. When a particular phenomenon is identified as ‘natural’ (everyday, the local, the hybrid, resistance), it is, as Taylor suggests, causally tied to the freedom of the individual (2009). The critical potential of the local turn then, whilst seemingly increasing the individual’s power to attain freedom through a valorisation of its agency, may indeed at the same time (though not necessarily in a zero-sum manner) also achieve the limitation of other possible modes of being and thinking which are equally identified as problematic either directly or inherently through the exclusion practised by the processes of normalisation. This is not entirely dissimilar from the exclusionary logic that drove linear, liberal approaches to modernisation.

Furthermore, precisely because the local turn emerged with the outspoken aim of avoiding certain patterns, behaviours and outcomes typical of the liberal peace paradigm, the new approach is inherently projected into the future, hence relying on a linear notion of progress and futurity that might exclude, *a priori*, the simultaneity of multiple narratives, just as it tends to exclude those narratives it deems as too hegemonic, not appropriate, and not conforming to its normative vision. When it accesses the everyday the new paradigm produces knowledge regarding what it observes (and it is thus, in turn used to observe the spatialised everyday), and this knowledge exists in function of not repeating those mistakes of the past. The paradigm is then not necessarily accessing the non-linear present, existing amongst the chaotic and messy relational assemblages whose existence it acknowledges and explores, but it directly steers the subject away from certain directions, concerning itself not with opening up spaces for the marginalised narratives, but with avoiding the “potentiality of danger that lies hidden in an individual” (Foucault, 1991a, p.
as well as in societies to marginalise. It seeks to modify behaviour before it happens, and this, necessarily, further induces goal-oriented, linear and deterministic, problem-solving approaches that promote further and more invasive forms of individual and societal intervention.

Nonetheless, type of normalisation operated by the local turn seems to differ from the disciplinary power of liberal governmentality in one crucial way. To the extent that it no longer seeks to necessarily eliminate uncertainty in calculation but to actually include it by addressing each complex space and its units (Foucault, 1991a, pp. 147–8), it thrives on complexity and uncertainty, it indeed would seem to work on a different logic, dissimilar from that driven by the “liberal tautology” (Körppen, 2013, p. 83). Whilst I am not suggesting that ultimately the local turn is a mere extension of liberal biopolitics and liberal governmentality, it is possible to suggest that the logic that drives the local turn is rather consistent with the epistemological basis of modernity and with the employment of forms of power that have previously been associated solely with liberal governmentality (like biopower) by critical scholars. The identification of agency, the valorisation of the everyday characterises movement, complexity and contingency itself are reduced to a holistic entirety, i.e. the abstracted and virtual ‘authentic’ or ‘local-local’.

Earlier on in this paragraph I have outlined how the critique dismisses the policy world’s acceptance of the local as a mere instrumentalisation of the same for the purpose of accessing and controlling societies by extending liberal governmentality. But, as suggested in this chapter, the local turn too, handles plurality and complexity in a not totally problem-free manner, by arbitrarily distributing its elements, ordering the multiplicity according to its normative principle as it for instance does when it expresses preference for certain types of local agency over other types (non-violent over violent, or ‘civil’ versus ‘uncivil’ as Richmond qualified them). In this way it treats everyday agency as holistic, the constitutive sum of which is still identifiable by its contours that divide it from what it is not (i.e. the authentic from the façade, the civil from the uncivil). Indeed this is problematic because the normative regime behind the local turn itself is rhetorically denied in favour of an ontologically plural framework,
although the selection of what forms of agency to valorise and how to do so require, indeed rely on, expressing a preference, and expressing value judgements regarding the desirability of some forms over others.

Finally, if linear, “modern or normative praxes” (Richmond, 2010b, p. 686) facilitated interventions geared at reproducing the ideal of western-style liberal democratic model (the normative goal) through top-down policy prescriptions (Tadjbakhsh, 2009), the critical local shift also pointed to the need to understand the functioning of government as a process through people as opposed to ‘on’ people to achieve their normative end goal within a framework that recognises the end of top-down governance. A goal and policy-oriented approach is not excluded within even the most critical perspective on complexity, and this is problematic because qualitative concerns regarding the nature and the expression of agency, whilst acknowledged as complex and materially contingent, are channelled into quantitative concerns regarding how to govern more effectively. An example of this is De Coening’s use of complexity theory to “a new approach to planning that goes beyond the old problem-solving ‘assessment-design-apply’ approach” (2013, p. 4 my emphasis), one whose primary purpose is not to question necessarily what, if any, can be accessed through an acknowledgment of the complex and unquantifiable nature of iterative processes of relation, but rather how to establish “a new planning model that can recognise the need for continuous iterative processes and that enable interventions to evolve along with the surrounding system.” (ibid, p. 4 my emphasis). Other non-linear approaches extend this policy-oriented attitude by calling for “enhancing monitoring” to generate “constant feedback” on the status of the programmes and projects initiated (Woodrow & Chigas, 2013, p. 226), providing guidelines for navigating conflicts – including strategies for identifying leverage points and plans to create positive, sustainable and adaptive attractors for engagement – that continue to be based on a lessons-learnt approach and a deterministic understanding of what peace means, even though they rhetorically embrace a the non-linear logic of ontological complexity (see, for instance, Coleman et al., 2013, p. 47)
Even with a focus on the everyday as a site of resistance (which was necessary to draw a new narrative for the new paradigm), one of the tell-tale signs of modernity may be reproducing itself in the local turn’s discourse: the focus on the population as the source of the problem did not signify a substantial change in the manner of problematising, nor a complete pluralisation of peace. As such, the need for and implication of societal intervention was often not discussed – as was already suggested in the case of an earlier shift in Chapter 1 – as the issue is once again one of peace-building better rather than, questioning whether social engineering of that kind is at all possible.

In so doing, the shift towards the local runs the risk of becoming a merely technical refinement of those modernist rationalities that require, and indeed expect, the control of the conduct of the individual and of societies in general, and that uses the ‘naturalised’ aspects of the ‘everyday’ as a tool of biopower to access, control, and conduct societies. In order to explore how this technical refinement might be even further evidenced, it is important to examine what effects this critical shift has had, through spatialisation and normalisation, in the production of specific subject positions that enable the life of the individual to be instrumentally accessed to carry out the social project of the change advocated.

3. Subjectivation: Building the Resistant Subject

So far it has been suggested that the normative contours of the latest shift reveal the limits of the local turn’s ability to deliver a non-linear, pluralisation of peace-thinking without resorting to traditional dichotomies and binaries, and with no small amount of ambiguity and lack of clarity. However, it is also possible to suggest that the spatialisation and consequent normalisation operated through the shift towards the local outlined above has important consequences for the subjects of peace-building themselves; bringing individuals and societies towards emancipation produces subjects capable of being addressed, and thus responsible, responsive and transformative. The manner in which the individual is subjectivised relies on a form of power – biopower – that is diffused by way of being framed within the limits of governance, but which gains strength in the face of such diffusion in that it infiltrates societies and individuals in an even
more effective manner than previous forms of powers such as discipline, permitting normalisation at an even more atomised, hidden and uneven level.

I have suggested that the struggle to bring to the fore alienated and marginalised narratives is consistent with a form of normalisation that defines the contours of what behaviour is desirable at the individual and societal level; this is then given direction by the normative aims of reversing the liberal peace that underpins the local turn paradigm. The type of power that is exercised through normalisation, biopower, as mentioned in section 2 of this chapter, is exercised through individuals and on individuals, at the level of everyday practices. The subject is both individualised and collectivised and his agency is made comprehensible by the definition of his struggle and his purpose (to resist the liberal peace, or to engender results that are different from those of the liberal peace). This has the potential to turn critical attempts to pluralise into a normative paradigm that seeks to manage individual and collective behaviour.

The spatialisation and normalisation of agency through the identification of the expressions of said agency positions the identity of the individual both in regards to himself and in regards to society as a whole in relational terms. This form of subjectivation, or subject-building, requires a form of responsibilisation that, like liberal biopolitics, through capacity building, relies on the assumption of capable, transformative ‘autonomous’ individuals (Lemke, 2007, p. 44). The local turn’s project of political emancipation requires the subject achieving awareness firstly of the position of subordination occupied and secondly of the impossibility of relying on imposed blueprint solutions to resolve it problems; thus, this outlines the contours of a modernist disposition towards the subject as a transformative, rational and self-aware individual. Subject-building is then, in itself, part of the process through which biopower is employed for the purpose of drawing out the ideal attributes of the agent in question and transfers them at the community level, using relational elements such as hybridity as vehicles to enhance connectivity and exposure to the desired qualities of the ‘authentic’ subject.

Here, it is worth looking at the notion of resilience as the epitome of recent non-linear ontological reflections, and to draw a parallel between the
subject of resilience and the agent of the local turn. Literature on resilience suggests a form of subject-building that does not start from linear assumptions about the subject’s ability to own and control its own environment but rather precisely because of the unknowable conditions that may generate shocks and dangers, it seeks to build the subject’s capacity to bounce back, to resist and to adapt to the potentiality of the world he inhabits (Folke et al., 2010; Kaufmann, 2013). The social aspects of resilience-building attempt to combine notions of non-linearity, complexity and heterogeneity, to describe complex systems and their abilities to withstand external shocks such as environmental crises, political emergencies and natural disasters (Chandler, 2012; Stockholm Resilience Centre, n.d.). In a similar way, the subject of peace-building in recent re-conceptualisations is constructed as unable to fully predict and plan for himself or society, which excludes any form of top-down imposition of management blueprints (Chandler, 2014a; Zebrowski, 2013) As the subject is no longer able to determine her own future, contingency and complexity are dealt with as potential dangers, and peace-building, through the everyday, the hybrid and the relational, becomes a form of subject responsibilisation which seeks to build empowered, aware and adaptable subjects.

Similarly, the subject is responsibilised through the ‘everyday’ at the individual, practical, daily level, since the possibility of top-down governance is discarded as an ontological fact determined by complexity. Since the subject’s life cannot be guided through deterministic, linear and teleological framings of governance, he is, as Reid suggests, conceptualised as an already failed subject. Yet, whilst he can no longer be directly governed, his potential for failure still needs to be managed and planned for. In fact, to the extent that the subject is no longer able to engineer and alter his environment, it is reduced to responding to shocks and dangers by using its agency only as a technique to adapt rather than to resist or alter those it identifies as conditions of its suffering (Reid, 2014, p. 177). Since these elements are ‘natural’ parts of the ‘everyday’, they do not, arguably, hold any explicatory value for the analysis of the shock in itself (i.e. ‘what are the roots of war’ or ‘what role does this factor play in the recurrence of war’). Because these natural factors cannot be altered, and hold no causal
relation that can be immediately grasped through knowledge, then the capacity of the subject to adapt to these conditions and their potentiality has been framed as a ‘window of opportunity’ (ibid, p. 176) that enables the positive exercise of agency itself and only insofar as the potentiality of danger is acknowledged as a ‘natural’ attribute of life (like death, famine and conflict). The structuring of the ‘everyday’, even if in a non-linear manner, thus continues to imply a form of planning and control of conduct the ultimate aim of which is to cater to complexity, to know it by governing over it through its subjects at the molecular level, as at the societal level, “outlining the possible field of actions of others” (Foucault, 1982, p. 790) by identifying and legitimising certain physical expressions of everyday agency over others. The local subject of the critical remains framed as a rational, transformative, autonomous subject whose path to empowerment can be charted, quantified, economised, and rendered more efficient.

Advocates of the local turn would undoubtedly reject this parallel with subject-building on account of its similarity to liberal governmental power. Indeed several critics have engaged the notion of the everyday with a nod to post-structuralist theories and Foucauldian perspectives in particular (Debrix, 1999; Jabri, 2006; Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005; Mitchell & Richmond, 2011; Richmond, 2010a). This is why agency was mostly identified with resistance to the liberal peace and its hegemonic power. Yet, it is worth referring to one crucial point raised by Foucault in relation to resisting agency; resistance and insubordination are ‘natural’ to power, in that power can only be exercised over free subjects, implying the existence of mechanisms of escape (resistance) that signal the limits of said power (1982). But crucially, the strategies of confrontation set up to transform or overturn the power relations are also seeking to become relations of power in themselves and crucially, even these, when they become relations of power, will have their own resistance to face (ibid).

The local turn has so far not identified its own limits, its own resistance, captured in a dream of itself and its possibility in the future just as the liberal peace ‘benevolently’ dreamed of being able to save humanity. At the point in which the critical turn becomes a coherent strategy to overturn power relations,
that is, at the point in which the abstract authentic is identified, spatialised and legitimised, it itself takes the shape of a technical mechanism to alter and direct the conduct of societies towards its own goals. It does this through subjects, and without the need for domination or coercion precisely as this could hinder the performativity of the emancipatory project itself. In the way in which the local turn translates the abstract qualities of the everyday into practice, biopower becomes even more successful in accessing individuals and shaping subjects. This is because the arbitrary selection of agency does certainly bring into focus some hidden narratives, but it also conceals others in the processes; this abstraction, therefore, exercises a type of power that “decides what aspects of a limitless reality are brought into sharp focus and what aspects are, literally left out of the picture” (Krishna, 2001, p. 403), just as much as disciplinary power brought into focus, somewhat more forcefully, a decisive view of what to include in its vision and what to exclude (i.e. spoilers).

Indeed, Foucault notably suggested that some of the most effective forms of power remain hidden by not necessarily being exercised directly (and forcibly) on others (1982). If one were to accept that this is a quality of hegemonic discourses like the so-called liberal peace, would it also be fair to suggest that no other discourse holds the same potential or may rely on similar mechanisms to render itself more efficient? Undoubtedly the hidden quality of the everyday is the highly celebrated characteristic that enables resistance to operate, passively, to disrupt the violent power of the liberal hegemonic paradigm, but it cannot and should not be taken to be in itself, free from other forms of power (including those that engender difference, alienation and marginalisation) just because of its ‘benevolent’, revolutionary or empowering ethos. The very hidden, passive quality that makes resistance so successful as a form of power can also make it just as problematical tyrannical as more obviously visible forms of liberal governmentality. The discourse on peace-building produced by the local, critical turn then also runs the risk of being just as ‘tyrannical’ as any other imperative narrative (including, if it were accepted to exist, the liberal peace) regardless of how life affirming it may be (Reid, 2014, p. 165).
What this also suggests is that the limited range exhibited by the local turn (mostly captured by its role of critique) insufficiently understands those relations, processes, acts and transformations that affect individuals, structures and networks as well as discourses, epistemes and narratives. For instance, if a non-linear appreciation of what peace is requires a deconstruction of those events, actors and expressions of agency that come together to produce the knowledge through which we form and understand the concept of ‘peace’, then a much deeper understanding of these elements is required beyond the discourse of liberal/post-liberal. This may, for one, resolve the tension between the need to pluralise and blur borders of identities and the continued reliance on insider/outsider logic to explain the behaviour of actors. It may also prevent the discussion of the local to be narrowly understood in terms of its romanticisation and its ‘dark side’ (see: Galvanek, 2013; Mitchell, 2011), or at least articulate this discussion within an acknowledgment of the normative parameters that define the perspectives involved.

Finally, assessing the local turn against its own aims and goals may require looking at how the notion of peace is semantically constructed (Chandler, 2014b; Lemay-Hébert, 2014), given the fact that the local turn continues to refer to ‘peace’ building. It also requires looking at what types of power imbalances this construction may perpetuate (Onuf, 2014), although with an eye towards what potential for marginalisation even the most critical project of empowerment may hold. If indeed a non-linear reconceptualisation of the way in which we think about peace is the aim of such critical endeavours, then a much more radical project that could revolutionise the field may require a more radical ‘incredulity’ towards any of the foundations of paradigms that become orthodoxy. This should not be taken as a denouncement of any form of emancipatory drive, but as a caution that every emancipatory paradigm, when it aspires to overturn the mainstream, is doing so with a consistent baggage of norms, normalising judgements, goals and future-projected policies whose effects on subjects and societies should not be discounted only on account of their benevolent, non-mainstream nature.
Conclusion

The chapter has begun by comparing the local turn’s attempt at moving towards a plural and horizontal, relational understanding of the social vis-à-vis the practical effects of spatialising identities and agendas to better identify the sites of resistance, and the needs of individuals. Where spatially embedded accounts of conflicts were critiqued as being reductive and often responsible for the creation of cemented and rigid identities, it is also possible to ascertain that the local turn itself has operated a similar spatialisation of identities in service of its project of accessing the everyday. This has evidenced, aside from issues of arbitrariness and selectivity, other ambiguities relating to the difficulty of reconciling complexity with the analytical tool of identifying identities to explain interactions and relations of power, particularly between international and local actors.

It has also been suggested that the translation of the ‘abstracted’ realm of the everyday into practice has followed a normative logic that has so far been unexplored. Normativity plays a big role in the critiques of the liberal peace, because of its role in the establishment of regimes that regulate the conduct of domestic and international societies (i.e. in the discourses of state failure or development and security), but the normative elements of the local turn itself have so far been left outside the conceptualisations of the local turn. This has made it possible for the local turn to present a seemingly a-political project of valorising the ‘everyday’ in all of its forms, whilst not engaging with its own normative bias. The latter is responsible, in fact, for the selection of certain forms of agency over others which, in turn, may present a considerable analytical blockage to the non-linear logic of critique of the local turn.

Finally, it has also been suggested that within a theoretical context that highlights the limits of governing, the local turn’s project of accessing the everyday has encountered a paradox of governance that has produced ambiguous attitudes to the whole endeavour of building peace; if the post-conflict milieu can no longer be controlled or governed, how can the local turn still talk about peace-‘building’? This grey area has, however, enabled the local turn to advance a project that continues to be fundamentally tied to a logic of governance, but
which relies on a much more diffused form of power to operate its vision of political change. Where it seeks to reverse the liberal peace and pursue its normative vision, and where this cannot be done by coercion or top-down policy-making, the local turn has resorted to building the subject from the bottom-up, enabling the instrumentalisation of a form of power that has ultimately generated even more effective ways of controlling societies and subjects – rather than bringing about the pluralisation of peace.

The paradigm’s project of political change, by not fully rejecting the need for peace-building, lends itself to the creation of goal-oriented policy advice that translates and reduces the contingent and complex, to a reality in need of being understood and included in the policy framework. Thus, the idea of the everyday not only allows the paradigm to identify forms of agency that are legitimate expressions of the ‘authentic’ from those that are still deemed to be tied to the ‘artifice’, but to actively create techniques for the management of these complex phenomena that seek to normalise behaviour according to the (ever changing) characteristics of the everyday itself, providing governance a responsiveness and flexibility that was consistently lacking in previous (disciplinary) approaches, but that aims to control and regulate societies nonetheless.

Not only is this not fundamentally dissimilar from the arbitrariness of the binaries and dichotomies that the critical turn has attributed to the liberal peace paradigm, but is also potentially more problematic in that the alleged inability to govern from the top-down facilitates a view of the debate that accepts, indeed even warrants for the continued framing of complex problems as forever out of reach of management, whilst paradoxically still attempting to grasp such ephemeral complexity by leaving the question of the very possibility to do intervention and peace-building from the ‘bottom-up’ virtually untouched. Thus, the de-politicisation of the discourse of intervention and peace-building, left untouched by the abstract focus on the ‘everyday’ and the ‘authentic’ has not lent the analysis the possibility of opening up space for contingency and complexity, but rather has reduced the appreciation of complexity to the attempt to capture and reduce such complexity to an easily manageable reality that can
then be ‘scripted’ or brought into the discourse by ‘tapping’ into the ‘authentic’ reality beyond the artifice.
Conclusion
Life after Critique?

1. From Minimalist to Intrusive Peace-Building

The field of peace-building has witnessed continued conceptual expansion since the early 1990s in a manner which has rendered it substantially more contested. The spread of the discourses on peace-building have made it increasingly difficult to identify each singular strand, narrative and constitutive element. This has, however, enriched the corpus of knowledge on the subject and played with the defining borders of orthodox interpretations and definitions of peace-building theory and practice.

One of the core aims of this research has been to further contribute to the wide scholarly field of peace-building’s conceptualisation by unpacking the historical unity of discourse granted by a generational view of peace-building. The thesis has also sought to take stock and examine the status of the academic debates on the subject of peace-building in order to rekindle a sense of contestation on the matter of the history and development of the narratives of peace-building. To do this, the thesis has addressed the manner in which peace-building has developed since the early 1990s by examining shifts, ruptures and grand-critiques. The introduction outlined this analytical aim as well as suggesting that this can be accomplished by adopting methods that are consistent with post-structuralist examinations of the conditions that make possible the emergence of certain narratives. As suggested in the introductory chapter, this thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by systematically tracing the influential elements that contributed to the emergence of the critical agendas of peace-building, by identifying the logic behind the patterns of critique that have characterised the conceptualisation of peace-building in theory. The thesis has done so in order to challenge the establishment of uncontested assumptions regarding the unproblematic nature of the local turn. Nonetheless, the thesis has done this not with the purpose of normatively discouraging the local turn, nor to establish an objective critique of the feasibility of the local turn and its bottom-up approaches, but rather, to disturb some of the more ‘uncritical’ assumptions
within the local turn which have remained crystallised and untouched behind the local turn’s more visible critical, emancipatory, and benevolent façade.

The thesis began with an outline of the emergent logic of this critique of the limits of peace-building, by focusing on earlier critical accounts of the mid-to-late 1990s. These perspectives have focused particularly on identifying the limited and insufficiently comprehensive approach to the complex issues of peace-building that had been prevalent up to the mid-1990s in regards to peace-building. In so doing, the emergent critique of the liberal peace coalesced actors, policies and institutions around a common ethos, that of transforming conflict-afflicted societies into liberal territories through a common, narrow, focus on extending liberalisation reforms. The framing of the previous approach as limited and unable to grasp the nuances of the post-conflict context represented a call to create a more comprehensive basis to engage with the social and political particulars of post-conflict societies.

This has had important implications for the development of the conceptualisation of peace-building itself. The problem of the complex nature of the post-conflict milieu framed social reality as comprised of complex events, elements and phenomena in need of inclusion. These elements were thus approached with the purpose of being understood and managed, fundamentally based on the linear assumption that reality can indeed be accessed, understood and handled. The practical assessment of the inability to fulfil the liberal vision through peace-building came to be associated with a lack of the acquisition of the ‘full picture’. This need to grasp the complex led peace-building approaches of the early 1990s to be conceptualised as hands-off and limited. Analyses such as those carried forwards by cosmopolitans and by neo-institutionalists, despite notable theoretical differences in their approaches (see Chapter 1), agreed on the need to expand the reach of the engagement. Planning for unintended consequences (for instance planning for possible spoilers), is one such attempt to meet the demands imposed on the system, an imperative to cope with them, and as a result, prevent and predict. Thus, the shift towards a more intrusive form of peace-building, equally supported by cosmopolitans and the neo-
institutionalist scholarship, whilst conscious of the dangers of coercion, moved towards more invasive, if less forced, forms of social and political engineering.

The idea of the ‘fresh’ outlook on peace-building is what drove the rise of new paradigms as a rupture with the past. What the rise of this critical wave did, however, was to cement a historically linear understanding of progress, where the historical narrative presented as an epic was then used as an explanatory paradigm. Thus, for instance the liberal peace came to be cemented as a coherent paradigm, regardless of its multiple theoretical and empirical expression, giving birth to a solid consensus regarding the way in which peace-building had been practised so far. Indeed this has been described as problematic not simply because the coherent intentionality attributed to the liberal peace ‘monster’ may be misleading and may obscure other issues that may not have to do primarily with liberalism (see Chapter 1), but also because this critical exercise represents the establishment of a regime of normative recollections of the past, a narrative which draws on continuous representation of the past, not necessarily on the contingent singular historical events themselves. Forms of “acceleration, rupture, evolution in time” (Latour, 1993, p. 10) are established to enable the creation of the rules of the new regime of truth, which are important, because narratives rely on the construction of historical notions of ‘pre’ and ‘post’ also to legitimate a quasi-scientific unquestioned position of the ‘now’ in the present from which to achieve a legitimate perspective on the evolution and succession (Lyotard, 1991, p. 24). In other words, this cementification of historical linearity, grounded by the emergent critique of the liberal peace, provided a vantage point from which the advocates of the new shift could claim to be able to ascertain the path to a better future.

It is from the establishment of this narrative that consigned the old paradigm to the dustbin of time, that the new paradigm found purchase in its attempt to rethink peace-building in a more inclusive manner. By establishing the need to know more and peace-build better, solutions provided by paradigms of the late 1990s suggested the establishment of a variety of multi-levelled, multi-layered and multi-directional techniques to govern these territories. It was, however, assumed that post-conflict peace-builders could no longer expect to
rule over territories without incurring severe problems of legitimacy, accountability and, ultimately, without facing the problem of the inevitable gap between the plan of the interveners and the conditions on the ground.

On the basis of this gap, the literature expanded on the need to govern in more diffused ways, without relying on coercive methods that could be associated with outdated methods or inspire comparisons with colonialism and imperialism. As governance fragmented horizontally, however, the desire to peace-build and the necessity of intervention to establish peace, along with the outlook of peace itself, were never questioned. Peace-building was then framed so as to adopt a more intrusive approach, giving rise to arguments in favour of extending the presence lengthwise and content-wise through, in particular, institution-building and extensive transnational and international projects to integrate the society in question within larger transnational and global structures. The shift to intrusive peace-building, it was suggested, relied on a form of power that, by acknowledging the constituent complex nature of the social milieu, relied on less visibly assertive forms of governing in post-conflict territories, by establishing the narrative of necessary peace-building through partnership, capacity-building and good-governance. The methods and techniques employed were then consistent with more subtle forms of monitoring and disciplining that controlled societies and governed through them instead of ruling over them. This was a seminal moment in peace-building, where the problem of the population became central to the issue of governance, and where peace-building came to be conceptualised to reflect a modernist epistemological imperative to know more and rule better.

2. Critiquing the Liberal Peace Paradigm: The Rise of the Local Turn

In Chapter 2, I suggested that the linear, totalising logic behind the shift towards intrusive peace-building did not escape the literature of the late 2000s. It is this particular set of literature that brought to my attention the need to understand the context that led to the rise of the local turn. These critiques mostly focused on identifying the more visible forms of continuities between the most recent paradigm (intrusive peace-building) and the old (peace-building through liberalisation), arguably being less interested in the manner in which certain
ruptures and shifts contributed to the evolution of the narrative. Towards the latter half of the 2000s, aided by the acknowledgment of the severely limited impact of liberal peace-building, by the continuous and multiple issues that beset the practical missions of peace and state building abroad, and by critiques of the exclusionary tendencies of the liberal paradigm, a strand of the scholarship, informed by the critical turn in International Relations, tried to make sense of these outcomes, turning, in particular, to what it perceived as being a problem with the ontological and epistemological framing of peace-building, now argued to be in need of fundamental rethinking.

This scholarship argued that the linear, positivist analytical framework of liberal peace-building was unreflective of the complexity of post-conflict contexts. Theoretical critiques of modern epistemologies upon which this critical peace-building literature drew, focused mainly on elements of exploitation and domination engendered by the birth of political liberalism and the pursuit of its agenda (see for instance: Jahn, 2005; Macdonald, 2014) others still launched a staunch critique over the greater plans of domination of liberal polities over non-liberal others (Beauvais, 2001; Chopra, 2000; Jabri, 2013; Turner, 2012; Wilde, 2007) which engendered social alienation, subjectivation, exploitation and chronic economic and political dependence. Generally, such issues, coupled with an observation of the practical status of the missions initiated under the so called ‘liberal peace agenda’, came to be attributed to the original modernist telos of humankind’s mastery over nature, which is believed to have brought about the subject of nature in the interest of self-preservation, the extension of domination expressed in the division of labour, and the suppression of the desires and pleasures of the self through the normalisation of behaviour to reflect the reliance on instrumental rationality (Duffield, 2010; Harrison, 2010; Lemay-Hébert & Mathieu, 2014; Macdonald, 2014; Merlingen & Ostrauskaite, 2005, 2006; Reid, 2010).

As argued in Chapter 2, the critical re-conceptualisation of peace-building of the mid to late 2000s, aimed for a much deeper and fundamental rethinking of peace-building, in its ontological and epistemological assumptions. These critiques sought to address those structural elements of narrative exclusion
and violence operated by those orthodox understandings of peace-building that had so far only managed to further exclude non-mainstream issues such as gender, imperialism and domination issues. Given the non-linear aspirations of this latter set of literature, there was reason to believe that the historical linearity, totalisation and universalist tendencies typical of earlier approaches was to be confined to the past. Indeed, the deeper edge of the critical turn seemed, at a first glance, to be able to breathe life into what seemed to be a paralysed orthodoxy of peace-building, and to offer endless opportunities of a life beyond the discourses of the liberal peace. This was certainly accomplished in some levels, with the discourse focusing on the paradoxes of imposing top-down solutions to potentiate autonomy, on the marginalisation of local narratives and on the conceptual incompatibilities between liberal peace-building and local ownership. However, the discussion continued to be based on the unchanged assumption that peace-building had, indeed, so far been ‘liberal’ in nature. As a result, the solutions offered took the liberal peace as its object of critique, renegotiating the issues of peace-building on the basis of the ‘liberal’ claims, their feasibility, and their inherent faults.

Furthermore, in examining critiques of liberal peace-building consistent with the ‘local turn’, a number of issues and assumptions begun to appear problematic. Firstly, most critical literature appeared to be concerned with the inherent impossibility of implementing a liberal blueprint on non-liberal states, thus gauging interventions, interactions and programmes on the basis of how liberal their agenda was and how and why these missions were failing. Secondly, the response provided by much of the critique revolved around an inverted logic of reversing top-down with bottom-up in order to enhance the voice and agency of previously ignored, less powerful agents. Thirdly, the rise of the new paradigm had been met with a level of acceptance that made it not too dissimilar from the wide support enjoyed by earlier approaches that had been said to make up the ‘orthodoxy’, thus paradoxically placing the local turn itself in a position of representing the new orthodoxy.

These three elements began to point to the presence of a lessons-learnt approach also underlying the critical turn towards the local. Two questions, then,
became central: how was the new paradigm’s rise different from previous attempts to rethink peace-building? And how did the new paradigm manage to achieve widespread acceptance? Despite the undoubtedly gripping critical emancipatory drive of much of the post-liberal critique, it became necessary to question the extent to which this much more visible rupture in the history of peace-building’s narrative, represented a sign of a fundamental break with the rationality that was attributed to (and critiqued in) the previous shifts. Was the critical local turn, thus, the revolutionising break necessary to split from the discursive hegemony of the modernist rationale? Was the notion of emancipation inherent in the project of change of the latest critical shift, fundamentally different from that which was presented by scholarship’s re-conceptualisations before it?

Here, I reflected on the lessons-learnt approach employed by the critique of the liberal peace, by looking, specifically at Kosovo. I suggested that where Kosovo had been central to the operationalising of hands-on, intrusive and prescriptive peace-building in the late 1990s, it had also become salient as a lesson to be learnt and a test site for the development of new approaches, in particular the local turn. Indeed, as the latter part of Chapter 3 suggests, the protracted external presence in Kosovo contributed to the emergence of critiques focusing on the negative outcomes of externally imposed top-down solutions to peace-building. Local dissent, the recurrence of violence, corruption and other forms of resistance have been identified as by-products of the liberal-peace, increasingly non-attuned to local realities and engendering marginalisation of authentic forms of agency beyond liberal fictional understandings of civil society and elites. Whilst acknowledging the value of recent critiques of the liberal-peace endeavour in Kosovo, the framing of agency as resistance in Kosovo allowed me to examine the conditions that led to the emergence of the latest shift. Starting with identifying the core dissatisfaction lying at the basis of the latest turn, I questioned whether the local turn had been successful in its self-established goal to avoid being yet another technical refinement of the strategies employed by liberal peace-building regimes. By firstly looking at how Kosovo was framed as a site for resistance, as a state of exception, as an unfinished peace, and as a general opportunity to apply ‘new’ and improved peace-building
techniques, bottom-up as they may be, it also appeared possible to identify, in the local turn an shift away from earlier disciplinary forms of peace-building. This was primarily operated through the reversal of top-down with bottom-up, to counter and resist the totalising logic of the liberal peace and its negative effects of marginalisation. These effects, it was suggested, could be seen in the everyday itself, with the rise of resistance. Resistance, however, was not just acknowledged, descriptively, as an element of the everyday, but was actively supported as evidence of the need to bypass the previous approach (the liberal peace). The shift away from disciplinary forms of power was thus accompanied by the important emergence of an even more subtle technology of power – biopower – that stemmed from, indeed warranted, the identification of the limits of governance, and the framing of the milieu (in this case, Kosovo) as a complex site. At this point, the thesis begin to question the implications of said shift and of the emergence of this new technology of power for the project of re-conceptualising peace-building along non-linear lines.

3. The Local Turn: Re-Conceptualising Peace-Building?

With the local turn, the critique sought to place local populations in charge of the process of peace-building. This unsettling of the hierarchy of peace-building aimed at avoiding the dominating tendencies of previous approaches to peace-building that had, despite technical refinement, continued to exhibit paternalism, hubris and a general tendency towards domination and exploitation.

Yet, despite the attempt to unsettle the orthodox narrative of the liberal peace by drawing attention to the ‘local’ as the new centre of a structural and epistemological revolution in peace-thinking, I suggested that the local turn continued to rationalise the foundations of peace-building in a way which dealt with the issue of linearity only tangentially. Whilst replacing top-down with bottom-up, the local turn continued to focus on local populations as objects of enquiry, thus only altering the structure of peace-building insofar by reversing it on its head (replacing top-down with bottom-up). Furthermore, where the ‘local’ moved to the centre of the project of political change, the notion of political change itself did not exhibit any fundamental structural, ontological or epistemological unsettling from that witnessed by linear, modernist perspectives.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the project of change that was supposed to empower the local recipients of peace-building seemed, in fact, to continue to present striking similarities with the modernist understanding of development, with the ‘local’ now taking centre stage, but within the same logic of instrumental mastery of nature that enabled liberal claims regarding progress. Furthermore, as this project hinged upon the self-established aim of critiquing the liberal peace paradigm, it begun to present an understanding of the actors at the centre of the ‘new’ approach which seemed to bear consistent similarities with the very type of wholesale and generalised identities produced by the liberal peace paradigm (i.e. ‘the local’ vs. ‘the international’; the ‘liberal’ vs. ‘the everyday’). Therefore, Chapter 4 also suggested that a monolithic understanding of the local, grounded in the rationalist attempt to identify and delimit identity and agency according to interests and agendas (i.e. resistance as a vector) demonstrates a particularly modernist, linear tendency to assume the possibility to access the ‘real’ conditions of existence, or ‘authentic’, ‘local-local’ agency. This is particularly problematic as, in light of the critical turn’s own goal of by-passing the totalising and universalising claims that it attributes to liberal peace-building, the new paradigm seems to also put forward a claim regarding its own position of privilege to identify and access a ‘truer’ and more ‘authentic’ expression of agency. A question then became central: could the local turn be contributing to the formation of its own illegalities, those it then seeks to identify, combat and regulate, just as surely as the liberal peace did when it marginalised and victimised the local?

To answer this question I began examining the rise of the paradigm itself by looking at what drove its critical project of political change. Where the local turn’s critique of liberal peace-building identified the old paradigm with a now largely discounted method that ‘enslaved’ man by marginalising alternatives through top-down impositions, the local turn itself proposed a normative solution of accessing ‘everyday’, authentic forms of being in the world that acknowledged the limits to governance from top. Shedding the rationale that underpinned liberal peace-building was the precondition of the rise of the new paradigm, considered to be a necessary step in the achievement of emancipation and empowerment, with the post-liberal literature placing itself in the position
to be able to identify this fault, and destroy the source of man’s exploitation in favour of a different social order projected into a promise of better conditions in the future. Therefore, it seemed that the emergence of the new paradigm posited a belief in its own ability to overturn those conditions, which in turn came to be responsible for the reinforcement of a historically linear notion of the evolution of peace-building by establishing a linear narrative based on progress, benchmarks, lessons learnt (or not learnt) and objectives.

When the local turn identified domination as the ordering principle of the liberal peace approach, I argued that this critique did not necessarily seek to only undermine certain types of truth claims and to open up the field for a more profound enquiry, but rather, it also aimed at strategically exposing the limits of the discourse of the liberal peace with the aim of altering and engineering the social order (thus not touching the assumption that the social order should or indeed could be objectively altered to fit an ideal endpoint), to thus replace the (old) hegemonic discourse strategically with another vision, or grand-philosophy of the world (the post-liberal peace). The possibility for change along with the contingency and complexity of the social thus became not merely material facts and ontological conditions within which peace-building needed to be rethought, but became the source of a quasi-ethical responsibility driven by the establishment of a normative truth claim regarding the need to uncover hidden narratives. Analytically, the modernist epistemological concern with the speculative unity of all knowledge that allowed earlier paradigms to place themselves in the position of addressing the problem through a scientific analysis of what it believes to be objective attributes of the system, was then not necessarily lost in the new critical paradigm. The inherent tendency to associate political action with the implementation of practical steps towards implementing the political vision of emancipation congruent with the now inverted understanding of how subjects should be treated, by whom and in relation to what. Agency thus came to be identified, delineated and then judged on the basis of pre-established normative ideas regarding the social order. Where the liberal episteme had done this through ‘good’ governance, the local turn begun to associate the new normative order starting with ‘resisting agency’ as its norm.
Chapter 4 then finally suggested that certain elements of these critiques can be considered to be in line with, and not totally dissimilar from, the modernist rationale that is at the core of the very liberal peace-building paradigm that the critique sought to go beyond. Where the philosophy of history advanced by modernism was critiqued as being governed by the principle of reason as liberation,¹ it is then possible to question whether the critique advanced by the local turn may be advancing another liberatory principle, the ‘everyday’ without altering the epistemological reasoning behind the possibility to know and alter the world. The philosophy of the world advanced by the local turn is one that conflates multiple, abstract, concrete, discursive, material, individual and collective elements into one historical explanation, a model for what could be a new dominant narrative. In this, critique runs the risk of operating a totalisation of reason and its telos. The problem with this form of emancipatory is, to paraphrase Dean, that its own radical critical potential is undermined by the imposition of a “unidirectional story of progressive instrumental mastery” (1994, p. 106).

This has had important implications, which were examined in Chapter 5. Finally, the reasoning behind the persistence of normative arguments regarding the necessity of socially and politically altering the conditions of certain interactions (whether violent or not) is largely unscathed in favour of a meta-critique that prefers a focus on a general and abstract structural critique of liberalism. The rationality of this critique is dependent on the existence of the liberal peace for the viability of its project of re-conceptualisation; it became clear, thus, that the critique’s radical potential was not only captured by the orthodoxy and language of liberal peace-building, but that any chances of future radical research was now held hostage by it. This was evident in how the critique had, inadvertently, reduced the complex elements of the object of critique (liberal peace-building) to a unitary discourse in a way that may cast relevance onto certain elements only purely on the basis of how they fare compared to the original telos (that identified by the critique). Critique was then reduced to a form

¹ The concept of Enlightenment exhibited elements of a self-contained philosophy of history, by proposing a condition prior to the moment of Enlightenment (i.e. the dark ages), an act in which modern history originates (Enlightenment) and a teleology to drive history, namely human mastery over nature (Dean, 1994, p. 100).
of self-serving exercise not necessarily to understand the conditions for the existence of a certain form of knowledge, but rather, as an instrument to interpret certain practices according to a normative compass guide, and to invert those practices accordingly. This leads to a second implication of this critique. By seeking to replace the dominant rationality with another model driven by an emancipatory, progressivist and futurist telos, such a critique would also result in the creation of an instrumental rationality not unlike that which was born out of the modernist episteme. By identifying a particular position of the agent embodying the ‘everyday’.

This form of ‘spatialisation’, that is the embedding of the subject in particular spatial and temporal identities (for instance through identifying ‘resisting’ forms of agency), I have argued, pointed to an important paradox regarding the possibility of acknowledging hybridity and complexity whilst still discussing conflict and peace within an interventionist paradigm that still relies on positions of ‘interveners’ and ‘locals’. Indeed the fact that the local turn largely ignored its own reliance on this binary-laden language to pursue its emancipatory, normative project of change signifies that the contradiction between non-linearity and the linear pull of the project are even more pronounced. Given this ambiguity and the persistence of normative claims that are, however, not recognised, the ‘everyday’ becomes a malleable, instrumentally accessible realm that, whilst abstracted and seemingly a-political (to make space for all forms and plural expressions of agency) when it is ‘accessed’ in practice, relies on a form of power that can be easily put to use to define the ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ characteristics of society. This form of power, biopower, can arguably be even more successful in normalising societies than disciplinary power, in that it relies on the fundamental premise that the social milieu is complex, and that governance has limits, whilst not renouncing to the telos and futurity that the normativity basis provides to the paradigm.

The emergence of this form of power in the local turn does not, however, need to be taken as an assault on all the principles of the local turn’s attempt to pluralise the field of ‘peace-building’, but can actually be useful in shedding light on what the local turn has so far obfuscated, namely, the need to rethink
what we are doing when we are ‘building’ peace, and what this ‘peace’ is supposed to be like. Furthermore, the need to include in the conceptualisation the normative aspect of the local turn itself, may bring a more nuanced approach to the field, in that it may bring to the fore the potential, of all paradigms, to exercise exclusionary practices, regardless (and possible precisely because) of their transformative intent.


Despite the seemingly grim outlook provided by some of the critique advanced in my thesis, it is, however, possible to finish this analysis on a hopeful note. The twists, turns and shifts witnessed in the conceptualisation of peace-building, whether interpreted as rhetorical only, accepted as revolutionary moments of change, or interrogated as constitutive moments in the rise and fall of hegemonic paradigms, are no doubt a sign of conceptual depth and analytical reflection on some of the key tenets of the field of International Relations. Without the shift from liberalisation to institutionalisation, for instance, regardless of its methods, aims and outcomes, peace-building would, arguably, not have recognised the paradoxes of the uncritical assumptions regarding the pacifying effects of fast liberalisations, so popular in the late 80s and early 90s. Similarly, without the further shift towards the local, peace-building might have remained conservatively anchored to discourses privileging top-down solutions and engendering further alienation and marginalisation of the subjects of peace-building missions.

Similarly, it is important to note that the approach employed here does not seek to generalise or synthesise largely complex factors in the conceptualisation of peace, and that, by consequence, it seeks to avoid explanatory claims issued via the application of a method (more or less positivist as it may be), but rather, to avoid normative bias that can prejudice the direction of the research a priori (Cilliers, 1998, p. 23). It has not been my intention to claim that the latest shift is not critical enough only to prove that my view is more consistent with what ‘true’ critique is, but rather, to draw out the generation of ideas and approaches of the most various and interconnected conceptual nature, without fully shutting the door on any, and to focus on the contingent,
practical implications of discourses, to avoid generalised meta-narratives that would only limit the ideation of conceptual options only to the pursuit of a specific normative aim. Thus, this thesis has neither sought to completely dismantle the shifts, to suggest that these did not take place conceptually, nor to dismiss, indiscriminately, the validity of these ruptures and changes. Rather, the aim of this thesis has been to investigate some of the accepted and taken for granted assumptions regarding the nature of these changes, albeit not necessarily with the function of revealing a sinister, ‘authentic’ reason for the shifts. Indeed, the very method employed throughout this thesis, a critical genealogical overview, has sought to avoid replacing meta-narratives with other blanket assumptions and claims, and rather, to understand what were the conditions that led to certain shifts and changes in the manner in which peace-building has been conceptualised till today.

It would be foolhardy to suggest that this thesis could fully and comprehensively provide a final key to read the history of peace-building’s conceptualisation to date, or even to attempt to predict its future. Indeed, such an attempt would be fundamentally contradictory to the post-structuralist sensitivities that have informed the thesis from its inception. However, insofar as one of the principal aims of the thesis was that of examining the conditions that led to the emergence of shifts and ruptures in the manner in which peace-building has been conceptualised, the thesis has identified some areas of analytical interest, providing some explanatory depth to the analysis, as well as a radical push to look inwardly at the manner in which critique has sought to reconceptualise peace-building and at how it has so far fared vis-à-vis this objective. By holding a mirror to these shifts and changes in peace-building, the thesis has, in fact, identified some of the paradoxes and limits. This is not, however, to suggest that the content of the paradigms are normatively ‘incorrect’ or ‘untrue’, but rather, that where these approaches expressly seek to surpass and distance themselves from the linear rationale, methods and means of previous approaches, the resulting emerging perspectives, despite being critical in their outlook and intent, may not necessarily have lived up to their own initial, critical expectations.
This has had important implications for the wider project of rethinking peace-building. Firstly, it seems that discourses of peace-building are still fundamentally tied to a logic of critique and regeneration, where the paradigm continues to frame the solutions against the old paradigm rather than rethinking the very foundations of the subject. Autonomy, agency and subjectivity, for instance, are critiqued by the local turn only in the manner in which they have been implemented by the liberal paradigm, rather than being opened up to inquiry. Complexity, too, is understood within an unchanged framework of interventionist, where it is then ‘handled’, in a rather assertive way, to be put in service of establishing unchanged understandings of ‘peace’. Any reconceptualisation that only pays lip service to the complexity of the social, without also fragmenting the epistemological building blocks employed to interface with said complexity, may only continue to serve a linear logic of critique that enhances the performative efficacy of the method, thus only resulting in a technical refinement of the techniques for the control and determination of behaviour and governance.

Secondly, the very foundations of peace-building have remained untouched. Even in critiques, power asymmetries are understood within micro locales; top-down is simply replaced by a reversal of bottom-up; private/public dichotomy is repeated in the local/international binary; liberal transformative subject remains transformative in terms of its attitude towards the world he inhabits and the epistemological assumptions regarding the possibility to identify its conditions and alter the world. Thirdly, despite the incommensurable value of Foucauldian approaches to governmentality strategies, to power asymmetries and to the effects of normalisation on collective and individual levels, there might be a limit to the reach of liberal governmental critiques to rethink the core elements of peace-building beyond resulting in ‘black-hole’ critique. Particularly, where these approaches are used to draw out the hidden agency by fulfilling its role in a larger normative project of emancipation against the liberal hegemonic plan, what arises is not the contingent or the everyday, but very specific, arbitrarily selected forms of subjectivities and agency, which may even concur in further marginalisation, as the new paradigm will aspire to replace the old one and will rely on tools of exclusion to do so, ultimately
potentially exhibiting further tyrannical tendencies. In fact, once this limit is recognised, so is the fact that a purely benevolent intention behind the critique does not make the critique exempt from the dangers of becoming the new orthodoxy and doing some narrative marginalising of its own.

Once this is acknowledged, it becomes possible to see that the re-conceptualisation of peace-building does not necessarily need to be kept hostage by this new orthodoxy, neither does it need to respond to taking a position on the pro/contra modernity dichotomy, which only gives rise to self-serving cycles of critique and meta-narrative. It is possible, rather, to destabilise the very ontological and epistemological core of ‘peace-thinking’. In so doing, it may be finally possible to open analytical space to allow for an examination both of the interactions between individuals and collectives, and our understanding of how these occur. This may finally allow us to focus discussions on ‘peace-building’ around the ultimate analytical objective of peace-building conceptualisation and practice itself: the manner in which we frame those interactions that we have come to call ‘peace’ (or ‘conflict’).
Bibliography


