The role of the state in re/constructing the 1973 war discourse in Egypt

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THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN RE/CONSTRUCTING THE 1973 War DISCOURSE IN EGYPT

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Abstract

In Egypt, questioning the country’s victory in the 1973 War and its implications can lead to media blackout, public outrage, imprisonment and even exile. Public representations of this alleged victory continue to be thus regulated in spite of 40 years of socio-political change, and in the face of a mass corpus of external and even internal literature which tells a different story. This thesis explores and problematises this persistent war discourse, by tracing the shifting process through which it was constructed and reconstructed by the state throughout the periods of President Anwar Sadat and his successor Hosni Mubarak. It uses Critical Discourse Analysis to combine analysis of texts commemorating the war with a study of the socio-political milieu related to personal authoritarianism and the state’s intricate relations with the army, the press and Islamists. In doing so, it makes an original contribution to theoretical knowledge about the relationship between war and discourse with reference to the Arab world specifically: it unpacks a particular discursive form of legitimacy existing, equitably and significantly, alongside physical forms centred on the ‘use of force’ to rule and endure in power. The thesis, furthermore, is empirically innovative in its use of largely untapped sources of Egyptian war discourse such as newspaper archives, textbooks along with war memorials, stamps and even song scripts. The study finds that the interplay of language and politics left the war represented through three coherent and logically structured patterns over 40 years: (1) Egypt had a ‘massive and consistent’ victory; (2) war was always personalised and personified; and (3) war was always miracilised or/and ‘religionised’.

1 ‘The word ‘miraclisation’, or its derivatives such as ‘miracilised’ or ‘de-miraclised’, sound awkward. However, I found them to be the most appropriate words to analyse the 1973 War, which was not only treated as a miracle in state-dominated discourse, but also the notion of a ‘miracle’ links broader events in the post-war period and the president himself with its inventories of myths, legends and memories mostly expressed in a charged nationalistic language. While dealing with the word and its associations from such a technical perspective, it is always italicised and explained at both levels of analysing text and context.
Although these patterns were reordered over time (with both change and continuity evident between the era of Sadat and Mubarak), the official discourse retained an appearance of coherence since it was always so closely attuned to its broader political context. Rather than inferring from this legitimacy that the discourse was as historically ‘truthful’ as any other, however, the thesis provides hard evidence that it relied on intentional falsehoods.
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Declaration

I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work.
A Note on Transliteration

The study follows a simplified form adopted by the International Journal of the Middle East Studies (IJMES). The letter of *ayn* is transliterated in that shape: [‘]. However, the *hamza*, the Arabic alphabet letter representing the glottal stop, is excluded from the transliteration by turning it into [a] all for the sake of convenience to non-specialists. *Al-Rais al-Mu’min* (the faithful president) is an exception since it is widely used as such in scholarly literature. *Ahram* is used in the thesis to refer to *Al-Ahram al-Yawmi* daily newspaper. Since the paper is sometimes referred to *Ahram* by the paper itself such as in the *Ahram* Online and by its readers, I opted to use the colloquial version which is styled without this prefixed article (*Al-*). On all other words that had the same prefix, the study adopts a style that turns it into [*al*] for non-humans and [*el*] for humans.
Chapter One: Introduction

Introduction:

Before his resignation on February 11, 2011, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak gave three significant speeches appealing for an end to an unprecedented wave of protests against his rule. In the speeches, Mubarak repeatedly focused on an event which occurred almost 40 years ago: the October 1973 War (also known as the Yom Kippur War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1973 War). “Here I have lived and fought for its sake and I defended its land.”2; “The people know … what I offered this country in war and peace, just as I am a man from the armed forces and it is not in my nature to betray the trust or give up my responsibilities and duties”3; “I also lived the days of the (Suez) crossing, victory and liberation. It was the happiest day of my life when I raised the flag of Egypt over Sinai. I faced death many times as a pilot,”4; and “I trust that the overwhelming majority of the people know who Hosni Mubarak is. It pains me to see how some of my countrymen are treating me today.”5

Accordingly, this study is about the resilience of this regime through employing a very powerful strategy of discourse for its maintenance. The two aims of the study are: (a) to examine the official and semi-official discourse on the 1973 War in Egypt, and (b) to understand how this discourse was deployed to justify, normalise and legitimise under both Mubarak and his predecessor Anwar Sadat as the second and third military men to consecutively held power from 1970. While political, economic and social factors and the monopoly of the ‘use of force’ are mostly considered in discussions on the survival of the

2 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/02/president-hosni-mubarak-egypt-speech [accessed on August 1, 2015]. Mubarak was the commander of Egypt’s Air Forces during the 1973 War.
3 Ibid
Egyptian regime, this study starts from ‘texts’ as diverse as newspapers, textbooks and even song wording, and hypothesises that the latter was a significant factor in legitimising the regimes of both Sadat and Mubarak.

In achieving these two aims within a time frame which extends 38 years, the time-span of the rule of both Sadat and Mubarak, I found that the political and cultural meanings of this pivotal war were dominated by three ‘patterns’, or what can be called ‘macro themes’, the most significant of which being the 1973 War as a ‘massive and consistent victory’. The two other macro themes, as systematically carried in texts under analysis, are associated with this victory; victory ‘personified/personalised’, and victory ‘religionised/miraclised’. These themes are based not only on patterning or repetitive mentions in text, but are also based on a context including a supportive national narrative and a dictating civil-military relationship, a context which is broadly called in the thesis ‘socio-political practices’ to include as many of these practices as possible. Given these themes, this study offers the first in-depth analysis of the construction, and reconstruction, of the 1973 War discourse in Egypt. Until now, questioning this alleged Egyptian military victory, regardless of how contested and polarising it has been, may lead to media boycott, public anger, imprisonment, or exile from Egypt. These rules are strictly applied even to the army’s Chief of Staff at the time of the war, Sa’edddin El-Shazly. El-Shazly was charged with ‘divulging military secrets’ after publishing his critical memoirs which not only questioned the war ‘victory’ but also destabilised Sadat’s role and status as the ‘hero’ behind this perceived miracle achievement.

The significance of this project multiplies as Critical Discourse Analysis (hereafter CDA) is adopted as an approach combining both theory and practice. This approach has an “explicit
socio-political agenda” as it has a concern to “discover and bear witness to unequal relations of power” which underlie such texts under analysis, and also to “reveal the role of discourse in reproducing or challenging socio-political dominance”. Accordingly, in an effort to dissect the language of the war ‘in use’ by certain actors for certain purposes, this study also relates this discourse to power relationships and ideological workings both in text and beyond. The study takes the Ahram newspaper as the ‘major’ case study where language and practice on the war are analysed. This newspaper is specifically selected because it is considered the ‘mouthpiece’ of the two regimes, and therefore it is a sample best suited to help understand the interplay between language and politics. Access was secured to all of the text and context of the newspaper in order to conduct a thorough and careful analysis of the discourse, and to trace the latter’s reconfigurations to reinforce the right to rule, justify policies, or combat opponents all during the 40 years under analysis. In order to keep the exploration as thorough and all-inclusive, especially while dealing with elusive concepts such as memory, war and discourse, I conduct an ethnographic analysis of the extra linguistic socio-political atmospherics which explain the manifestly pivotal role of this institution as a state discourse-bearing institution. For example, this thesis addresses how war reports are ‘produced’ and by whom, and how limitations imposed by the state and motivations released by reporters reflect on this material. I interviewed journalists and war reporters who wrote the content under analysis, and editors who decided what was to be published or not. Having access to those producers of texts going back four decades has been significant and revealing, especially as the process of discourse remains self-reflexive. Generally, this ethnographic part of the research is meant for a closer observation of the whole institution of Ahram as a ‘natural habitant’ in which information was collected accurately and discreetly. Accuracy and discretion are essential in a topic as significant and sensitive as the 1973 War, especially as

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the army’s influence is expanding beyond reach since one of its commanders, Abdel-Fatah El-Sissi has been in power. The findings in the case of Ahram are compared and contrasted with other findings drawn on analysing elements formulating this ‘national narrative on the war’ at a more tangible object-based level such as memorial sites and at a more formalised text-based level such as text books and stamps which are official productions. Significantly, I found major themes in these text books that are strikingly similar to those found in the Ahram. Further corroborating my findings, this study also includes a general analysis of other sources of narrativisation of the war, such as the two main state-run museums commemorating the war which I visited several times through the course of this research.

As the country is ruled by a member of the armed forces, whose reputation and efficacy are synonyms associated with the meanings of the 1973 War among unsuspecting ordinary Egyptians, the topic of this study relevant to Egypt’s modern day politics. As it is more about drawing patterns rather than reaching conclusions or updated topicalisation of the event, the study ‘fixates’ the time frame from the beginning of the war until the end of Sadat’s rule and from the beginning of his successor Mubarak’s rule till its end. This fixation over time and space is designated to help this study further investigate change and continuities between Sadat and Mubarak. To sum up, this study establishes a general precedent by systematically exposing gaps in written literature dominated by certain state-dictated interpretations on a strictly tabooised war, and also establishes an academic precedent by examining the relationship between language as a real phenomenon and workings of power.

1. Purpose of the Study/Research Questions
The main purpose of this study is to explicate the official and semi-official narrative on the 1973 War in Egypt at two levels: language and politics. Therefore, the goal of this study can be summarised by one primary research question:

How has the state under President Anwar Sadat and his successor Hosni Mubarak re/constructed the 1973 War as a discourse designed to achieve certain political goals?

Still, there are a number of secondary questions based on this relationship between language and practice. It is a relationship which endows texts with a political purpose, directing language to work for something and for someone through a mechanism depending on an exercise of power and an enactment of ideology. These secondary questions are as follows:

1. How do linguistic structures relate to the socio-political forces which had enabled the 1973 War to continue to be perceived as a massive, unprecedented and unquestioned victory in Egypt, despite its enormous human and material costs?

2. What are the ‘regularities’ in the texts under analysis? For instance, is it an attempt to probe patterned use of lexis, structures, sematic/rhetorical features, denotative or connotative meanings and colligational potentials, etc. and establish how closely these features relate to others in the same text or other texts;

3. What are the links between these regularities in text, forms and structures of various kinds, conceived as the ‘micro’ level of analysis, with extra-linguistic social and political phenomenon conceived as ‘macro’ level of analysis? At this broader level, claims are made on the mechanisms of ideology in the organisation of society and processes of what
have been labelled “manufacturing consent” by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky and “symbolic control” by Basil Bernstein⁷;

4. Who are the actors who join forces to enact or reinforce this specifically-biased discourse? The answer is meant to reveal power relations which allow these “socio-linguistic mechanisms … to play a part in the control of members of subordinate groups by members of dominant groups”.⁸

Addressing these secondary questions is crucial in that they can pinpoint the interplay of language and practice regarding the 1973 War and the shifting ‘meanings potential’ always formulated and reformulated amidst this interplay. What is also crucial is to build conclusions on any possible patterning in text and context on a broader and more solid basis that is sufficiently examined.

2. Significance of the Study

The idea of conducting this study originated in my mind in October 2009, when former Foreign Secretary David Owen declared, on the occasion of a Cairo seminar, that Egypt had been defeated in the 1973 War, or at least had not won it.⁹ Owen’s comment triggered a massive furore and brought him scathing criticisms almost across the spectrum of Egyptian
media; a columnist in a self-claimed liberal newspaper asked for “Allah’s wrath” to be
heaped on Owen\textsuperscript{10}, and an Egyptian talk show dedicated an entire episode to refuting these
claims and to validating ‘the Egyptian victory’.\textsuperscript{11} This reaction arguably calls for a simple yet
vital question to be asked; how did this discourse of ‘victory’ in Egypt became so engrained
in official and public perception? This discourse, as the study exposes in coming chapters, is
not even questioned by intellectuals across the spectrum who also speak the language of the
‘October victory’, accepts its assumptions and takes for granted its forms of knowledge and
policy prescriptions. These perceptions have triggered further questions in my mind: how is
this dominant narrative of ‘victory’ strong enough to marginalise any dissent and be shielded
from criticism even by those who took part in the war itself? What are the mechanisms
through which the states, or even society, sustained certain structures and social relations
over time in order to guarantee the sustenance of this dominant, yet erratic, narrative on the
war? I contend that exploring these tools that will guarantee this discourse its survival and
maintenance is the main task which I undertake in this project. The task comes drawn on a
claim of mine: the 1973 War represents a war victory ‘in discourse’ not in action and, in
proving this, the study is the first attempt of its kind.

This study, however, does purport to seek originality of contribution to knowledge by first,
identifying certain discursive formulations or macro themes over 30 years of rule under Sadat
and Mubarak. This adds to this attempt to understand how both regimes legitimised, and were
legitimised by the October 1973 War discourse. Since none of the official war documents
have been released so far, and since scholars mainly depend on the limited and arguably
biased archives of Israel - as explained in the literature review below - this study seeks to

\textsuperscript{10} \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XSyKugqmlIo} [accessed on July 7, 2015].
prove itself invaluable for researchers by systematically getting hold of official and semi-official narrative on the war. Second, this study takes a newspaper organisation as the main case study in a pronouncedly political research project because of my deep conviction that “there is potentially much to be learned about the culture, values and living ideology of a society from the totality of mass communication content”. Studying media content serves as an indication of other essential forces in this communication process, assisting researchers to learn about the people and organisations and, in the case of this study, state powers that produce media content. In the case of the Ahram newspaper, taken as the ‘mouthpiece of the state’, it is worth noting that the staff work towards officialising the newspaper’s content in line with state discourse. In Althusserian terms, media is an Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) with a potential and actual role in establishing and maintaining ideology. It can do this because it is made of language. Language is not only an agent in the construction of reality but also a creator of ideology, considered by some scholars such as Annabelle Lukin as a “legitimacy” which “authorizes, sustains and reproduces social relations and organisations”.

However, this ‘legitimizing’ political role of language is not necessarily direct or consciously manifest. In Benjamin Whorf’s terms, and as the argument runs in Chapter Two, ideology can be hidden within a harmony of covert patterns of linguistic structures which unconsciously work and form a “configurative rapport” which “become a deep persuasion of a principle behind phenomenon”. The significance of this thesis is therefore the tracing of this unconscious working of this “configurative rapport” by explaining consistencies, or the lack of them, in the discourse of the 1973 War at deeper levels of text and context.

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Language here is understood by CDA, the main theoretical and analytical framework adopted in this study, as a socio-political action in the construction of reality in a profound way. Over the course of the research, I witnessed the construction of reality on the 1973 War through language, particularly during my six-year stint with Ahram itself. This work experience allowed for a better understanding of how language in texts under analysis can enact patterns of “society as a culture” where meanings are semiotically formulated but also can create a physical “social system” based on roles and relations. I suggest that this approach grasps the complexity of such an event as the 1973 War which moves within “systems of different orders”, such as physical order (the destruction of equipment, buildings and structures on the ground during the war), social order (the killing of human beings and the impact on social networks), and semiotic order (the personalised meaning potentials of experiences, memories and engagements). Linking these orders of systems within the thesis, as a target to be realised in the study, requires an ethnographic access to the paper, its journalists and editors since the time of the 1973 War itself. As the topic is still taboo, my contacts in the paper made this ethnographic mission easier as enquiries about this controversial event had to be conducted in a discreet yet accurate manner.

This thesis is increasingly significant because of one final consideration: namely the consequences of the 1973 War which are still manifest in Egypt today. During a patterned process of discursive constructions over the past 40 years, as illustrated in this study, an ‘image of credibility and exaltation’ of the army was cultivated. This image is partially

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19 The description was made by Lina Khatib in her portrayal of another case, Hezbollah’s messages and strategies. Khatib demonstrated that these messages and strategies were a success “in cultivating an image of credibility among its supporters” as the group had achieved its promises of measurable aims such as the 2006 ‘defeat’ of Israel and the release of Lebanese political prisoners from Israeli jails in 2008,
based on solid achievements of the army during and after the 1973 War. During the war, arguments among many ordinary people and in intellectual circles in Egypt, the army won an unprecedented victory and greatly contributed in development and peace-keeping after the war. During these discourses, the army, unlike any other apparatuses within the state, was always positively beyond any accusations of wrongdoing or failure. Accordingly, the war and the army were invoked by Mubarak in his speeches before his downfall, as referred to above, within the understanding of the loftiness, credibility and popularity of this apparatus. Since the overthrow of Mubarak, the role of the army has increased at political, social and economic levels. Strikingly, as I personally witnessed the emergence of this discourse, many Egyptians, including Tahrir protestors, repeatedly urged the army to take over as it was the ‘only state body that can deliver’. Linking words and deeds, many of those people cited the 1973 War as an example of the army’s legacy. This legacy is mentioned in the discourse on the war during these four decades not only aggrandised the army but also making it infallible as well as untouchable. Sissi, the former Minister of Defence and the president of the country since 2013, has repeatedly attributed his recent military interventions to the army’s ‘victory’ in the 1973 War, despite Sissi himself not taking part in the war. Sissi, already facing numerous waves of opposition contesting the legitimacy of this role, on one occasion reminded the Egyptians that “the people stood beside the army” during the 1973 War. This can be regarded as an attempt to reify a national unity and shield the regime from criticism by invoking the war as a constructed discourse embedded in the wider political culture. The remarks by Mubarak raise questions about the salience of the war as a crucial subject of enquiry on the one hand, and the way(s) in which this study might contribute to a fuller understanding of Egyptian politics where the 1973 War is embedded on the other. This PhD research is an attempt to trace this long history and architecture of discourse which has made

both of which had earlier been promised by [Hezbollah leader Hassan] Nasrallah”; Lina Khatib, Dina Matar and Atef Alshaer, The Hezbollah Phenomenon: Politics and Communication (London: C. Hurst & co., 2014), p. 27.

the *Nasr October* (the October Victory) a master narrative which is powerful, enduring and self-evident enough to be vividly recalled, even now.

3. Literature Review

This section addresses two main questions. First: what are the gaps in literature the thesis seeks to fill? And how does this task of filling in these gaps accord with similar tasks with different case studies not related to Egypt or the 1973 War themselves? Answering the two questions combined, my contention is that this project is aimed at exposing, rather than overcoming these gaps in literature on the 1973 War in Egypt, and that there is a scholarly path dependence in which this approach is adopted and the realisation of its aims is recognised.

In Egypt, there exists a mass corpus of literature on the 1973 War. Nevertheless, this literature has frequently failed to answer essential questions on this critical juncture of the region’s history, such as ‘what happened in this war?’ for two main reasons. Firstly, the 1973 history telling has long been held hostage to one single genre: memoirs. Secondly, and relatedly, the available memoirs have failed to give clear, factual account of the war since they are directed by the state itself. Most of these memoirs were written by war commanders or military reporters approved by the state, if not working with it. Funded and censored by the state, these publications are arguably *standardised* and *officialised* to produce similar narratives as they draw on similar sources, use the same rhetoric and even sometimes share the same authors of their introductions. Since the bias of writing and publishing this literature is part of discourse under study, Chapters Five and Six will discuss in detail the content of
these books as well as all macro-economics and macro-politics related to the processes of writing and publishing them.

Answering basic questions on the war to fill in the gaps mentioned above, such as ‘what happened in the war?’ per se, is outside the scope of this PhD thesis for two main reasons. Firstly, it is important to note that this is a study on the war as a ‘meaning’ rather than a historical investigation of war as a ‘fact’. It is an attempt to understand how this ‘meaning’ was shaped doggedly enough to create untrue war representations at the textual level, as detailed in Chapters Three and Four, and macro-political realities used by the regimes of Sadat and Mubarak as linchpins for legitimisation, as detailed in Chapters Five and Six. Secondly, the task of only understanding the happenings of the war is an extensive and daunting task that requires a separate project, and one which may even require a comparative approach at both archival and analytical levels as Mohamed Hassanein Heikal has done in other studies. Such would be the task of a historian who, amongst many other issues, would have to sift through not only Egyptian writings but also Israeli ones, a task made difficult as the Israeli literature itself is also claimed to be biased, partial and lacking. Furthermore, the historian needs to exercise similar caution when she or he is up for the task of addressing Western literature on the war as this area is also in need of similar caution in analysis. This is primarily because Western literature depends mainly Israeli literature which, unlike the Arab habit of keeping all records on the matter classified, Israel has adopted the practice of

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releasing documents to the public after 30 years of classification and that such declassification. Still, Egyptian, Israeli and Western accounts of the war are to be cited for the sake of understanding how far they were accurately, or inaccurately, represented in the discourse under analysis. This comparison of literature proved very beneficial and revealing at the level of discursive construction. For example, I examined the original testimonies of the Prime Minister at the time of the war, Golda Meir, to find out her words were twisted in the Ahram in order to validate the Egyptian version of ‘the truth’. It is hypothesised in this thesis that these ‘other’ discourses were used to enhance the semiotic environment of the dominant state-controlled discourse in Egypt. Additionally, within this semiotic milieu of innumerable Israeli and international discourses, agents can ‘pick and choose’ from literature, embody both consensus and conflict, and move into ‘inter-textual paths’ which can be included or excluded in an elastic process of national commemoration as Chapter Two explains. Additionally, since discourse is about what is not ‘there’ or unspoken, the absence of any counter-narratives which could de-hegemonise the officially uniformed narrative is similarly revealing for the findings of this study.

Away from this task of understanding or comparing happenings of the war, this project engages with the war at a discursive and narrative production level, that is to say, through perceptions. Indeed, there are a number of writings which have adopted the same path, such as those of Yoram Meital. Meital addressed these perceptions of the 1973 War commemorative discourse, but the focus of his work was on the ‘object-led’ discourses represented by memorials such as the Unknown Soldier, the burial place of Sadat and the panorama. When he handled the textual part of this discoursing, in a separate journal article,

23 Avi Shalim said: “Israel has been considerably more successful than its Arab opponents in putting across its rendition of events”; Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall, p. xv. This has led many historians such as Martin Gilbert, a leading historian of the modern Middle East, to massively depend on Israeli sources in his account of the war whom he concluded that “Israel won an impressive victory”; Martin Gilbert, Israel: A History (New York: Harper Perennial 2008), p. 460.
the focus was on less formalised commemorations, such as stamps. Navigation through these symbols was brief and non-systematic at times, as was the case with his examination of the novels written on the war.\textsuperscript{25} Laurie Brand attempted to fill in this gap in literature by carefully analysing various texts: history and religion textbooks, constitutions, national charters and presidential speeches. In the book aptly titled \textit{Official Stories}, Brand took these texts to demonstrate how leaderships of both Sadat and Mubarak had attempted to reconfigure narratives ‘to reinforce the right to rule, justify policies, or combat opponents’.\textsuperscript{26}

She also linked miscalculation in these legitimating processes to setting in motion opposition forces beyond the control of their regimes. Although Brand gave a careful exploration of the full range of tools available for legitimating purposes, she did not discuss how these tools coordinated over time and space to construct their own patterns at both textual and contextual level to guarantee continuity and endurance as a force that enabled the two regimes to guarantee a leadership’s hold on power for decades. Keeping this focus on the war discourse as a ‘national narrative’ and an ‘identity marker’, this study seeks to fill in these gaps by engaging with language and politics in an equally systematic and thorough manner over same time and space before making judgements on how this interplay constructed an ‘untrue’ yet legitimising history of the war. Doing so also complements another genre of literature, the one which focuses on the political repercussions of the war rather than discussing the war representations themselves. Part of this literature is dedicated to probing Egypt’s civil military relations in a state which was and still called the ‘Officers’ Republic’ in reference to the self-perpetuating military networks that run through civil administration and public life.\textsuperscript{27}

This study indirectly seeks to challenge, by validating or not, this deeply analytical literature.


\textsuperscript{26} Laurie A. Brand, \textit{Official Stories: Politics and National Narratives in Egypt and Algeria} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014). See for example Brand’s mention of Sadat’s speech, ibid, pp. 82-83.

Engagement with discourse requires a methodological approach, identified with CDA, which will be further examined in Chapter Two. At this point however, it is necessary to note to what extent and with what degree of success the same approach has been used by other academics to analyse war or other political events. I contend that CDA has been efficient enough to trace of the state’s attempts to construct and reconstruct the war discourse. The most obvious example is the similarly with the contentious war in Vietnam. John Story and Paul Grainage traced the transformation in discourse on the Vietnam War in the US from a sentiment of defeat associated with guilt and loss up to mid-1980s, to a sentiment of victory associated with pride in the second half of the 1980s and 1990s. The metamorphosis was mainly linked to the state and power relations ‘dictating’ these perceptions in the form of symbols. While former-President Richard Nixon said in the 1970s that the fear of another Vietnam made America “ashamed of ... [its] power, guilty about being strong”, former-President Ronald Reagan said in the 1980s that “it is time we recognized that ours was, in truth, a noble cause”. This transformation in discoursing is traced through analysis of signification in variable semiotic field sites related to media such Hollywood movies. Such an attempt at a discursive level proved productive in similar studies on other wars. Kathleen Gleeson sought to identify similar discursive patterning of perceptions in the ‘war on terror’ in Australia. Remarkably, these patterns identify not only continuities but also change within a certain time frame. Again, Gleeson was not interested in what has happened, but rather sought to answer almost identical questions to those raised in my thesis; how has Australia’s war on terror discourse been shaped? Other scholars also adopted CDA in their analysis of the US ‘war on terrorism’, as they found in the approach an identification of the dominant notions related to

30 Kathleen Gleeson, Australia’s 'war on terror' discourse (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), p. 5.
war and its representations such as power, hegemony and ideology.\textsuperscript{31} Richard Jackson, for one, adopted CDA in his analysis of the ‘war on terrorism’, in which he proved that war is simultaneously a set of practices as well as an “accompained series of assumptions, beliefs, justifications and narratives”.\textsuperscript{32} David Butt, Annabelle Lukin and M.I.M Mathiessen were more theoretically sophisticated and empirically insightful in their analysis of 9/11 by seeking patterns specifically in the “grammar as a covert operation”. By showing a grammatical patterning in the speeches of former US President George W. Bush and British Lieutenant Colonel Tim Collins, the trio proved that the 9/11 was a “semiotic event” that shaped not only material action but also social processes and acts of meanings.\textsuperscript{33}

The focus on media also fills a gap in political science which has long led to undermining or ignoring the media as a crucial part of national politics. Recently, for example, Robert Erikson, Michael MacKuen, and James Stimson neglect the media in their ambitious model of the political system in \textit{The Macro Polity}.\textsuperscript{34} Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady failed to mention the media in their impressive examination of citizen participation in \textit{Voice and Equality}.\textsuperscript{35} Steven Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen remarkably ignored the media in their well-received study of electoral mobilization, \textit{Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America}.\textsuperscript{36} This situation even applied to the most sophisticated cases of well-connected media-state relations such as the United States.\textsuperscript{37} Egypt is no different where this ignorance or undermining in political action and processes is concerned.\textsuperscript{38} Indeed, other

\textsuperscript{33} Butt, Lukin and Matthiessen, pp.267–290, p. 270.
\textsuperscript{36} Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, \textit{Mobilization, participation, and democracy in America} (New York: Macmillan, 1993).
\textsuperscript{38} This is evident in analysing the so-called Arab spring. A group of scholars analysed their phenomena through the prism of three levels: the individual (i.e. protest groups); the state (i.e. policies adopted by regimes); and the international (i.e. regional or non-regional players).
scholars have sought to fill this gap in literature by analysing the media as handmaidens of the state.  

Marie Gillespie and Jason Toynbee analysed media texts to “help us understand the power of texts: the ways in which power relations are encoded in texts and how texts exert power over us and in society.”

Ofra Bengio in his book, *Saddam’s Word: Political Discourse in Iraq* depended on a wide range of sources, including late president and Ba’athist leader Saddam Hussein’s speeches and writings, Iraqi newspapers, Ba’athist publications, and Iraqi government documents, all for the sake of understanding how “language, the expressions and verbal statements that reflected events and sometimes shaped and nurtured them.”

Egypt is no exception to this analysis of both media and politics. Indeed, some scholars seek to understand the state discourse via the media in Egypt, as if they are mutually representative. Talaat Pasha, for example, analysed the state representations of the Muslim Brotherhood through the issues of the Egyptian newspaper *Ahram*. Pasha adopted CDA’s multi-layered analysis to address both the text and the socio-political system surrounding it.

Bahaa-eddin Mazid took the same path, analysing the speech of former president Anwar Sadat along with *Ahram* text to explore the functionality of discourse as well as tools of control and ideology in its production. This study seeks to add to this trend of relating what is ‘political’ to ‘what is communicated’.

Upon this media-free conceptualisation comes even though the book is divided illustrates the non-linear, multifaceted and ongoing nature of these changes in the Middle East states including Egypt, see *The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy*, ed. by John Davis (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013). In another book, the myriad revolts and revolutions of the so-called Arab Spring were addressed from a distinctive three-tier perspective: comprehension, localisation and positiveness. In the ground-breaking approach that does not limit their modes of engagement and analysis to the countries and spectacles of regime change, media was still absent; see *Dispatches from the Arabian Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, ed by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis MN: University of Minnesota Press).

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4. Thesis Layout

This thesis is divided into six chapters, following Fairclough’s ‘Dialectic-Relational’ CDA approach. The division is based on the tenets of this approach which include text analysis on one hand, and discourse and social practices on the other. In other words, the thesis is a progression from text to discourse to practice, or from description to logical interpretation. Still, this comes with the reservation to freely move across description and interpretation as the limits between both are not strictly defined as I explain in the next chapter.

In Chapter Two, CDA is explained as a theoretical and analytical framework. I ‘ground’ CDA and establish its loose theoretical bases by addressing it as an approach with a number of ‘assumptions’ at the levels of language, society and power. These assumptions are also explained critically; by setting them against evidence drawn either from different schools that in/validate the assumptions. I also explain in detail the three levels of analysis in CDA. A critique of CDA, including claims of theoretical flaws and methodological shortcomings, is also given. These claims are either admitted or contested, with the conclusion that, despite these shortcomings, CDA still stands as a solid theoretical foundation of this thesis. The chapter also answers some methodological questions: why media is chosen as a field of analysis? Why is Ahram chosen as a main case study against minor case studies such as school text books? Why is data collection based on a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods?

Chapters Three and Four are about text analysis. In Chapter Three, text analysis is tightly time-framed from October 6, 1973, when the war began, until the end of the rule of Sadat with his assassination on October 6, 1981. The analysis seeks to identify ‘patterns’ not only on the war itself but also on constructions re/shaped in the aftermath of it. The analysis found
three ‘macro themes’ in the text: (a) Egypt achieved a consistent and massive victory; (b) war victory is personified/personalised; and (c) war victory is religionised/miraclised. These marked thematic structures are judged and grouped by their frequency, repetitiveness and domination in the text. They also draw from certain assumptions that underline and reflect on other elements of analysing the text; e.g. modality, words meaning, metaphor, grammar, cohesion, interactive control, transitivity, cohesion and ethos. These features are also used to examine the language that officials in the Sadat regime used, as cited by Ahram during and after the war.

Chapter Four searches for the same macro themes in the Ahram text during the whole era of Mubarak’s rule. Remarkably, these similar macro themes are mainly found during the rule of Sadat, albeit with their own rounds of discontinuities, such as the de-religionisation of language and politics and the re-prioritisation of the macro themes themselves. The analysis also involves identifying patterns in discourse practices at the micro textual level, such as intertextuality, interdiscursivity and coherence. Analysis is made against regularities and irregularities endured from the Sadat era to that of his successor. The overall argument in these two consequent chapters is fairly clear: the language of the war “is not an objective or neutral reflection of reality; nor is it merely accidental or incidental... Rather, it is a deliberately and meticulously composed set of words, assumptions, metaphors and grammatical forms”.44

The scale and possible implications of language in the texts analysed in the two chapters are reason enough to consider the context which made these texts possible. Chapters Five and Chapter Six aim to explain how this textual patterning identified in the preceding two

44 Jackson, Writing the War on terrorism, p. 2.
chapters is drawn on a carefully constructed discourse designed to achieve a number of key political goals, which include normalising the ‘victory’ in the war and legitimising the rule of both Sadat and Mubarak on the basis of their personified roles in realising this ‘victory’. Chapter Five is dedicated to socio-political practices under Sadat. These practices includes the nature of rule, which is to be defined as ‘authoritarian’, the similarly ‘authoritarian’ media system, the ‘Islamist Revival’ and broader aspects of national narrativisation of the war such as text books, general books, stamps and the less formalised yet tightly state-controlled song writing and production. Chapter Six adopts the same pointers for analysis, albeit with a different order, intended to reflect the re-prioritisation of these socio-political practices as well as identify patterns of change and continuity between two regimes which co-legitimated each other. These socio-political practices in the two chapters permeate essential elements in the discourse production and dissemination processes such as civil-military relations, myth-making and history writing, and even including economic orientations. Both Chapters Five and Six are an attempt to explore wider practices, including history, politics and the army, in order to serve our broader understanding of the text. Furthermore, ‘object-based’ discourse and broader ‘national narrative’ items related to the war are also added, such as memorial sites and museums, general books, text books, songs and stamps. It is all part of the commitment to maintain this study as thorough and all-inclusive in elucidating this top-down war discourse.

This progression from description to interpretation as adopted in such division of chapters indicates it is meant to be logical and constructive in this research which takes language as the main unit of analysis. This text-based analysis seeks to avoid any judgmental separation of socio-politics, which left several scholars heaping judgemental and speculative accusations on the two regimes of Sadat and Mubarak for falsifying the war without enough evidence of
patterns or regular behaviour. This move from or across description and interpretation is suitable since both levels are not strictly defined and as the CDA theorists admittedly argue that works are interpretive, explanatory and critical, as will be explained in Chapter Two. Notably, this movability, as advantageous as it is, may still run the risk of randomness, subjectivity and lack of rigidness. Indeed, CDA scholars admit that there is a constant alternation of focus from the particularity of the discourse sample, to the type(s) of discourse which it draws upon, and the configurations of discourse types to which it is oriented. However this alternation can be disciplined by directing analysis at “showing features, patterns and structures which are typical of certain types of discourse, restructuring tendencies in orders of discourse and ways of using these conventional resources which are specific to this sample.” Therefore, these features and patterns will link Chapters Three and Four at the level of text analysis and Chapters Five and Six at the level of socio-political analysis. Finally, this division is based on an understanding that runs through the whole project; that language and practice reinforce each other within the confines of rhetorically constructed reality in the name of discourse.

**Conclusion**

This chapter introduces this thesis as motivated by a desire to unpack the discursive patterns of narrative formation, particularly in reference to how certain framings of victory and success are instrumental in supporting hegemony and power asymmetries. In relation to this motivation, this research engages with the political context of Egypt, and with the discursive framings of the 1973 War. In this chapter, a number of primary and secondary questions are

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45 Asaad Abu Khalil, a scholar specialised in Middle East affairs, wrote that the “October victory could be more hurtful and painful than the [1967] June defeat, since the former gave energising doses for the political legitimacy of both Egyptian and Syrian regimes”; Asaad Abu Khalil, ‘Ukzubat October’, Al-Akhbar, 12 October 2013.
47 Ibid.
drawn, with their answers meant to fill in gaps in literature. This chapter also proves how results of the research are meant to be efficacious since other scholars adopted not only the same approach of CDA, but also focused on media and politics to understand major wars as far back as the Vietnam War and as recent as the ‘war on terrorism’. It addresses the layout of this thesis and how this division of labour into six chapters consecutively relates to text and context, and is meant to prove the main hypotheses on the 1973 War and its socio-political workings.
Chapter Two
Critical Discourse Analysis:
Theory and Methodology

Introduction:

This study deals with both language and practice, therefore it employs CDA as a perspective most fitting to move across those two platforms. In the first section of this chapter, I ‘ground’ CDA and establish its loose theoretical base by addressing it as an approach with a number of ‘assumptions’. I outline eight assumptions typifying CDA as designated by Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak, who are pioneering theorists of the approach. I also discuss these assumptions critically by setting them against evidence drawn either from a broader theoretical literature on the approach to validate or invalidate the assumptions, or against empirical evidence from this study itself. In section two I relate CDA to its methodological application. Three levels of analysis are identified and adopted as drawn on Fairclough’s classification: text analysis, discourse practice, and social practice. Section three moves on to further methodological considerations related to major and minor case studies. The section explains why media is selected as a field site and why *Ahram* is used as a major case study against other minor case studies of school text books and Egypt’s main war museum. *Ahram* is taken as the most significant, accurate, recorded representative of the state discourse and its media system. Once the case study argument calms down, the chapter gets into investigating
deeper methodological questions in section four. The two final sections are related to limitations. Section five explains the critique of CDA and how the approach stands up to it. Section six deals with caveats including elements which I deliberately exclude from this study. I conclude that CDA is a theoretically sophisticated and practically insightful approach, appropriate to grasp the whole picture of the subject under analysis, and that its variant manifestations are capable of containing the multi-disciplinary nature of research that touches on politics, sociology, media studies, and even psychology.

1. CDA: Assumptions

CDA is not just a theory; it is an approach. An approach is a certain set of “defined theoretical assumptions which are specifically linked with empirical data, permits specific ways of interpretation and thus reconnect the empirical with the theoretical field”. These characteristics appear to make ‘method’ and ‘approach’ almost interchangeable, but there is a difference. Approach is general and axiomatic, or as Edward Anthony puts it, a “point of view, a philosophy, and an article of faith” based on a number of correlative assumptions”, while method is specific and procedural. Also, an approach includes many methods, each of which represents a level at which theory “is put into practice.” As a compromise, the first part of this chapter addresses CDA as an approach, and the second as a method. This compromise is valid enough as it makes an all-inclusive journey from assumptions to methods along a pathway that permits observation and facilitates the collection of experiences.

49 Ibid.
52 Ibid, p.14-15
In relation to CDA, there are various scholars theorising on different perspectives within this approach. Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigi focus on ‘discourse-historical’, Teun van Dijk on ‘Sociocognitive’, Theo van Leeuwen on ‘Social Actors Approach’, Siegfried Jäger and Florentine Maier on ‘Dispositive Analysis’, Norman Fairclough on ‘Dialectical–Relational’, Gerlinde Mautner on ‘Corpus-Linguistics’. Although these perspectives claim subscription to specific philosophical frameworks, they are also driven by commonality, i.e. they are united by a common attention to the “significance and structuring effects of language”, and associated with “interpretive and reflexive styles of analysis”. Ruth Wodak and Norman Fairclough sought to enlist this language-centred and interpretation-based commonality into eight assumptions, which can apply to all CDA research in general. Since these ‘assumptions’ are the most widely and convincingly cited, what follows is a summary of them.

1.1. CDA Addresses Social Problems

CDA sees discourse as an element of “social practice rather than a purely individual activity or a reflex of situational variables”. By ‘social practice’, Fairclough in another publication elaborated that he meant “a relatively stabilised form of social activity”, mentioning examples such as classroom teaching, television news or even family meals. Each practice includes elements such as activities, subjects, and their social relations, objects, time, and

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54 See the introduction of Discourse Analytic Research: Repertoires and Readings of Texts in Action, ed. by Erica Burman and Ian Parker (London; New York: Routledge 1993), pp. 1-13 (p. 3).
56 Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, p. 63.
Describing discourse as an element of ‘social practice’, or on other occasions as an ‘event’, implies a ‘dialectical’ relationship between discourse and other elements of this practice. Discourse is therefore both ‘social constitutive as well as socially shaped’. In other words, discourse constitutes and enables social relations, structures, and identities, simultaneously being enabled by them.

Discourse is thus treated not as language per se, as a language ‘in use’. CDA acknowledges that these concepts spring from Systematic Functional Linguistics (SFL) pioneered by M.A.K. Halliday. The theory takes a functional view of language, in the sense that “we are interested in what language can do, or rather in what the speaker… can do with it, and that we try to explain the nature of language, its internal organisation and patterning, in terms of the functions it has evolved to serve.” Going beyond the formalist analysis of language, SFL and accordingly CDA observe language while functioning primarily as a societal phenomenon dictating even linguistic formations such as grammar. Grammar, as an example, is directed at “encoding the meanings of these various functions into an articulated structure”. To sum up this assumption, John Richardson said: ‘Language is social’, and Blommaert negated it towards the same meaning: “there is no such thing as ‘non-social language’.” Dorothy Smith built on these conceptualisations to argue that texts are always ‘active’ due to interactive positionality in a social milieu.
This study problematizes the war as a ‘social problem’, i.e. how texts in the Ahram constitute a discourse and, at the same time, how these texts are ‘constituted’ by or interact with other discourses through processes ultimately controlled by the state. This dialectical relationship takes research towards elucidating textual elements such as grammar and modality and contextual levels as far afield as Egypt’s media systems and civil-military relationships.

1.2. Power Relations Are Discursive

That ‘language is social’ indicates that questions of power are areas “of central interest” to CDA.\(^{64}\) This power is neither behavioural, i.e. one that can be judged by outcomes of individual decisions as Dahl argued\(^{65}\), nor is biased by focusing on the outcomes of ‘non-decisions’, as Bacharach and Baratz contended.\(^{66}\) Because of the role of ideology, as will be seen later in the third assumption, power in discourse is dispersed into three dimensions.\(^{67}\) This multi-dimensionality means power of discourse, power over discourse, and power at discourse. The first dimension addresses powers exercised by discourse over the surrounding social events; the second attends to powers exercised by agents on discourse; and the third refers to intra-discursive powers that link one part of the text to another, either in the same text, or even in other texts of the same genre. All these powers emanate from the functionary nature of language ‘in use’. Pierre Bourdieu calls such power ‘symbolic power’ endowed with a ‘certain linguistic capital’ and ‘material profit’ in *Language and Symbolic Power*.\(^{68}\)


As linguists and anthropologists have discovered, language also has the power of ‘binary’ opposition; almost every noun, adjective and verb has its direct opposite. This opposition usually implies a ‘devaluation of one term and a favouring of the other’, i.e. the natural inequality where one term is lacking something that the opposite embodies, which is rarely questioned or challenged. Some of the examples of binary opposition in this study, as Chapter Three explains, mainly include defeat, Israel, and humiliation, against victory, Egypt, and pride.

As symbolic/real, and as social/cognitive, power revolves around texts, the main unit of analysis in CDA. Fairclough considered these ‘texts’ part of ‘social events’, and that these ‘events’ have ‘causes’ that are dictated by social structures, practices, and agents. This conceptualisation is Marxist in origin as it relates to the main concept of ‘hegemony’ as conceptualised by Antonio Gramsci. The ‘power over discourse’ refers to social and political conditions producing or reproducing this discourse. These conditions are controlled by agents exercising ‘hegemony’ at both social and accordingly discursive levels.

Fairclough proceeded from an essential connection between discourse and hegemony, and contended that the control over discursive practices is the result of a struggle for predominance over what he called ‘orders of discourse’. Furthermore, hegemony as a concept shows how the domination can be realised via ‘discursive intermediaries’ in the form of intellectuals, e.g. journalists in the case of Ahram, authors in the case of history textbooks, and guides in the case of the army-run 1973 War Museum. Nevertheless, CDA is

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70 Ibid.


72 ‘Orders of discourse’ is defined later on in the text with reference to Foucault who regarded these orders as representing a ‘totality of discourse types’ and relations between them in one domain. The mostly cited example of these domains is the ‘school’ whose orders include the discourse types of the classroom, the school playground and the staffroom. See Titcher, pp. 144-171 &

not only about power as a dominating factor, but also as a resistance factor, or ‘counter-power’. Van Dijk aptly summarizes this assumption by identifying CDA as a “type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context”.74

### 1.3. Discourse Does Ideological Work

CDA focuses on the practices of the dominant class, which exercises hegemony not only via violence (social power) but also via reconciliation, consent, and convincing (cognitive power).75 That said, ideology comes to be an indispensable part of any CDA project.76 This presumption is simply explained by Caroline Coffin: CDA is “an approach to language analysis which concerns itself with issues of language, power and ideology.”77 Terry Eagleton in his seminar publication found how ideology stands between language and power by defining it as “sets of discursive strategies for displacing, recasting or spuriously accounting for realities which prove embarrassing to a ruling power; and in doing so, they contribute to that power’s self-legitimation”.78 Furthermore, Louis Althusser, again with much relevance to this Marxist-based conceptualisation of CDA scholars, argued that ideology is also necessary for sustaining these relations of power, that it enables every social formation to reproduce the conditions of its production.79 Althusser gave ‘the state’ more prominence in running ideology. He argued that the state is not only a class state, as Marx

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76 See also, for example, James Paul Gee, Social Linguistics and Literacies: Ideology in Discourses (London ; New York : Routledge, 2008); Robert Wuthnow, Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the Enlightenment and European socialism (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1989); Lawrence Venuti, Rethinking Translation: Discourse, Subjectivity, Ideology (London : Routledge, 1992)
79 Louis Althusser, Essays on Ideology, (London: Verso, 1984, 1976), p. 2. Althusser gave the example of capitalists who are always in need to maintain all conditions leading to the production of materials in their factory. In order to secure these materialistic needs, a woolen yarn factory owner would not only needs the continued supply of yarn from farmers and machine parts from engineers, but also means to sustain this relationship of ‘submission’.

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contended, but also regarding it as a ‘machine of repression’ that enables the ruling classes to ensure their domination over the working class. Named as ‘Ideological State Apparatuses’ (ISAs), they include the media, schools and the museums. For example, the media, or the communications apparatus as he calls it, fills every ‘citizen’ with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism, and moralism. However, Althusser found school as the greatest ISA with a determinant dominant role in the reproduction of the relations of production. Going to school, children not only learn the ‘know-how’, but also ‘the rules of the established order’ as well as respect for these rules. Learning from history text books on the October 1973 War, as far as this study is concerned, also ventures down that road of ‘subjection to the ruling ideology’ of the mastery of its ‘practice’. In this thesis, I deal with two of these ISAs, namely media and schools, and also weave into the analysis a broader ‘national narrative’ that includes other ISAs, such as museums and religious institutions.

In CDA, language in itself is taken as an ideology. According to Robert Hodge and Gunther R. Kress, language is both an instrument of control as well as communication. This ideological manipulation is inevitable because communicable perceptions in society have to be necessarily coded and even language format in order for the latter to create what Berger and Luckman called ‘social construction of reality’ or what Whorf called ‘science’. The Whorfian account, based on the a priori assumptions embodied in and learnt through language, even found the power of language ‘scientific’, and more significant than official sciences, since it acts unconsciously. This provides language with the ideological power of

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80 Althusser, p. 17.
81 Ibid, p. 28.
82 Ibid, p. 6.
83 Ibid.
84 Robert Hodge and Gunther R. Kress explained in their book that linguistic forms allow significance to be conveyed and to be distorted: “Hearers can be both manipulated and informed, preferably manipulated while they suppose they are being informed”, Robert Hodge and Gunther R. Kress, Language as Ideology (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 6.
indirectness and deceit. Although ideology has for some considerable time been used as a negative term, CDA employs it objectively as a medium. Roger Fowler explained elements of this power in his analysis of the role of the press in the “(re)production of ideology”. For example, the ideological power of newspapers, such as Ahram in this study, stems from “their ability to say the same thing to millions of people simultaneously”, and from “mediating ideas from particular perspectives” related to the economic and political circumstances of the newspaper industry. However, the imposition of ideologies is not always an easy ride as they could be faced with ‘anti-ideologies’, as was the case in post-war Europe.

In this study, I investigate the role of ideology in association with power relationships. For example, Chapters Three and Four explain how language is ideologised through certain tropes such as repetition and legitimisation by linking it to myths, religion, and national identity. Furthermore, Chapters Five and Six explain how ‘relations of production’ at Ahram had guaranteed the continuation of the dominant discursive formulations and the marginalisation of others on the 1973 War.

1.4. Discourse Constitutes Society and Culture

According to Fairclough and Wodak, we can only make sense of the salience of discourse in contemporary social processes and power relations “by recognizing that discourse constitutes
society and culture, as well as being constituted by them.”

This requires that every instance of language use “makes its own contribution to reproducing and transforming society and culture, including power relations.” Fairclough and Wodak identified three domains of social life that are discursively constituted:

- ‘Representations’ of the world
- ‘Relations’ between people
- ‘Identities’, both socially and personally.

Remarkably, these three levels harmonize with the multifunctional theory of language and Halliday’s text, which identifies three functions of language: ‘ideational’, ‘interpersonal’ and ‘textual’. In other words, even the individual clauses of a text “simultaneously function ‘ideationally’ in representing reality, ‘interpersonally’ in constructing social relations and identities, as well as ‘textually’ in making the parts of a text into a coherent whole”. Therefore, any part of any text can fruitfully be examined in terms of the co-presence, interaction of these functions, and relevant constitutive processes.

In the study, the role of discourse in constituting society and culture is delineated via its dissecting of the representation of a new reality of the war itself. This reality portrays the event as a massive victory (ideational). The construction of reality as such, despite being ‘unreal’ when contrasted with facts on the ground, is dictated within relationships that link

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90 Fairclough and Wodak, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, pp. 258-284 (p. 273.)
91 Ibid.
92 According to Halliday, the system is intricate and complex. For example, the ‘ideational’ function of language has two components: the ‘experiential’ and the ‘logical’. The ‘experiential’ is “the ‘content’ function of language as the expression of the processes and other phenomena of the external world, including the world of the speaker’s own consciousness, the world of thoughts, feelings and so on”, M.A.K. Halliday, Language as a Social Semiotic (London: Edward Arnold, 1987), p. 48. The ‘logical’ component is expressed “through non recursive structures and is represented in the linguistic system in the form of parataxis and hypotaxis, including such relations as coordination, apposition, condition and reported speech”, ibid, p. 49.
93 Fairclough and Wodak, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, pp. 258-284 (p. 275.)
the state, *Ahram* editors and reporters, and the reader on the other end (interpersonal). Still, these ideational and interpersonal functions of language reflect on a text which makes this reality workable (textual).

1.5. Discourse is Historical

Simply put, discourse is historical because language itself is historical. Language, semiotically understood so far in these assumptions, at any given time involves not only an established system but also an evolution. In this context, CDA analysts adopt a Saussurian understanding of language. As Ferdinand de Saussure put it: “At any given time, [language] is an institution in the present and a product of the past.”94 Consequently, discourses are always connected to other discourses that are produced earlier, as well as those which are produced synchronically and subsequently.95 CDA adopts an holistic approach towards language and discourse in general. Drawing upon structuralism96, CDA scholars believe that language has to be understood within context. For example, a speech of Sadat or Mubarak on the anniversary of the war makes sense if we understand the situation in which it was made, the underlying culture, and conventions affecting the delivery of this speech, either in the present or the past. All these attachments within which the speech is embedded are in fact different discourses acting either to validate or invalidate the main discourse related to this speech.

96 Jacques Lacan claims that the human conscious is ‘structured like a language’, and the Claude Levi-Strauss argues that social relations in ‘primitive’ societies can be treated as if they were linguistic structures. That means that “the individual elements of a system only have significance when considered in relation to the structure as a whole, and that structures are to be understood as self-contained, self-regulated and self-transforming identities,” David R. Howarth, *Discourse* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), pp. 17-18.
Other than externally linked to other discourses, the historicity also relates to the intrinsic power of discourse itself to multiply, i.e. a discourse can create another discourse or discourses. For Foucault, a mega discourse can produce another discourse before being countered by a third discourse within a circular mode of production and circulation. Therefore, Foucault is interested in understanding the multitudinous ways in which these discourses relate to one another.97 Nevertheless, discourses don’t always produce other discourses that also do not exist in and of themselves. Relations between discourses can become less cooperative and more contested, something van Dijk, a leading theorist of CDA, calls ‘discrimination of discourse’98. For example, and unlike Foucault, Kathryn Lovering explains how contesting discursive strategies make ‘sexual harassment’ ‘invisible or non-existent’.99 Even if the discourses mentioned above are moving specifically in the present, there is always a connection with the past. This is because various temporalities are not “objective chronometrical phenomenon, they also refer to perceptions and experiences of time by humans”.100

If ‘discourse is historical’ as argued above, the question remains: how does this affect the viability of CDA as an approach? First, as history is being treated as a social phenomenon, this means that both language and history are equally social, and engage even more in broader dialectical social practices. As Fernand Braudel put it: “History is a dialectic of the time span; through it, and thanks to it, history is a study of society, of the whole of society,

97 For example, in studying the proliferation of discourses related to sex since the seventeenth century, this is Foucault’s explanation: “[There was a] multiplication of discourses concerning sex in the field of the exercise of power itself: an institutional incitement to speak about it, and to do so more and more; a determination on the part of the agencies of power to hear it spoken about, and to cause it to speak through explicit articulation and endless accumulated detail”; Michel Foucault, ‘The Incitement To Discourse’, in The Discourse Reader, ed. by Nikolas Coupland and Adam Jaworski (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 513-522 (p. 515). See Michel Foucault, The History of Textually: An Introduction, trans.by Robert Huxley (London: Penguin, 1978).
100 Blommaert, ‘The Debate is On’, pp. 1-33 (p. 4).
and thus of the past, and thus equally of the present, past and present being inseparable”101 History, based on a sociological understanding, means that discourse can never be studied as new and unique; i.e. “the novel is never entirely new. It goes hand in hand with the recurrent and the regular”102 Nevertheless, studying history from such a perspective allows us not only to discover similarities and patterns, but also differences and transformations of human societies. Furthermore, history is related to two assumptions of CDA mentioned above: power and ideology. History is about power, since there are always forces attempting to distort history for their own purposes. This is Eric Hobsbawm’s explanation of why all regimes make young people study history at school: “Not to understand society and how it changes, but to approve of it, to be proud of it,…”103 History is also an ideology, since it has a “built-in tendency to become self-justifying myth. Nothing is a more dangerous blindfold than this, as history of modern nations and nationalisms demonstrates”.104 Linking all these concepts together, Hayden White refers to ‘narrativisation’ of history, i.e. the desire to control how history is being narrated. This narrative agency, based on language, is therefore up for grabs by competing opponents seeking to control how the story is being presented and elements included in or excluded from it.105

This study examines these workings of history by juxtaposing a history of what happened in the 1973 War with a history of what is narrated by Ahram, text books, and the country’s national museums. For example, in Chapter Three, the ‘factual’ happenings of the Israeli

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104 Ibid.
counter-attack are contrasted with the way Ahram discoursed that event in a completely twisted manner to enhance the paper’s macro-thematic lines on the whole war.

1.6. The Link Between Text and Society is Mediated

Generally speaking, CDA is not interested in reducing the social events studied to their underlying causes, but they are interested in ‘relations’ that can demystify processes in these events that seem inexplicable. In the case of this thesis, CDA would be interested in how the meaning of ‘Egyptian victory’ in the 1973 War would be ‘processed’ rather than finding reasons behind these configurations of victory. Using CDA, one adopts a mode of thinking drawn from structuralism. Simply explained on a structuralism-adopted basis, a social phenomenon is like a game of chess. In the game, different pieces (such as the king or queen) have first to be identified, then possible interactions have to be explained (such as moving and checking), before finally observing a real interaction between two players. Since the conception of meaning is therefore more relational than referential, there is a need for ‘mediation’. This mediation gains further significance as language is being treated in CDA as a social semiotic; i.e. primacy is given to relationships of language as a set of signs rather than the meaning of these signs.106 In this sense, language has an individual aspect and a social aspect, where one is inconceivable without the other.107 Moving across these relations (personal/social and structure/smaller units) depends on ‘mediation’.

Accordingly, CDA is also predominantly about making broader connections between “social and cultural structures and processes on the one hand, and properties of text” on the other.”108

106 Again, this conceptualisation is based on a structuralism-based reading. Ferdinand de Saussure proposed that ‘language is a system of signs expressing ideas’. These signs result from the association of a sound-image (signifier) with a concept (signified). See Saussure, Course In General Linguistics.
107 Ibid, p. 9. Saussure argued that the job of the linguist is to take “the study of linguistic structure as his primary concern, and relate all other manifestations of language to it.” (ibid.) Italics are from the source).
108 Fairclough and Wodak, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, pp. 258-284 (p. 277.)
But these connections “are rather complex, and are best seen as indirect and also need ‘mediation’ \(^{109}\). The link can come in the form of ‘orders of discourse’. The elements of discourse are not like nouns, sentences, or any other elements of linguistic structure, but discourses, genres, and styles. \(^{110}\) In other words, these orders control linguistic variability for particular areas of social life. \(^{111}\) Again, this is a Foucauldian concept. Foucault sees these ‘orders’ as moving externally in the form of “procedures for controlling and delimiting discourse”, as well as “systems of exclusion”, or internally in the form of “internal procedures” which function rather as principles of classification, of ordering, of distribution”. \(^{112}\) For example, there are particular orders of discourse associated with the media system in this study, such as fixing roles for war reporters, a distribution and an appropriation of discourse according to power and knowledge, and a ritualization of content. Furthermore, the mediating role of discourse links ‘orders of discourse’ to rules of inclusion and exclusion both in text and context.

1.7. Discourse Analysis Is Interpretive and Explanatory

Given the nature of the mediated relationship between discourse and society, it is important to note that the role of discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory. This is due to a number of issues. First, there is no single definition of discourse itself. \(^{113}\) This lack of definition leads to multiple understandings of the meaning of discourse. \(^{114}\) Therefore,
discourses differ because “the audience” and the “amount of context information” around them differ as well. For example, Lutz and Wodak illustrate typical but different interpretations of the same text in a study of the comprehension and comprehensibility of news broadcasts. These different interpretations “depend on emotional, formal and cognitive schemata of the reader/listener.” Understanding the texts does not take place “through a tabula rasa, but against the background of emotions, attitudes and knowledge.” Under this assumption and for our, CDA justifies the academic delimitation of discourse units under investigation, and relativizes the amount of contextual knowledge needed for interpretation either by the researcher, the reader, or the speaker himself. For example, Mubarak referred to ‘the Egyptians’ in his speeches and interviews on the 1973 War anniversary, but the mention is very obscure. Who is meant by ‘the Egyptians’: all Egyptian subjects and is the government included or excluded? Human beings per se, people in the sense of citizens? Egyptians at home or abroad? Soldiers or civilians? The group is not clearly defined, which allows readers to exclude and include themselves according to their own ideologies and beliefs. Consequently CDA can deconstruct any contradictions out of these different interpretations. In doing so, CDA shows the different implications of different readings for social action. Knowledge of Mubarak’s argumentation structures and politics (using a discourse-historical methodology, for example) would make it much easier to understand his political rhetoric in his interviews on the war, while focusing on the space of religion in Egyptian personal and ideational identifications would make it easier to understand the prevalence of Qur’anic verses colouring presidential speeches.

1.8. Discourse Is A Form of Social Action


115 Fairclough and Wodak, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, pp. 258-284 (p. 278.)
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
The notion of ‘critique’ is understood differently among scholars, drawing from different interpretations such as the Frankfurt school, literary criticism, and Marxism. Wodak identified a number of common features of the notion; to be ‘critical’ means “having distance to the data, embedding the data in the social, taking a political stance explicitly, and a focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research”. This conceptualisation is drawn from the 1973 essay by Max Horkheimer comparing ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ theories, with the latter addressing a broader social and historical context in order to expose the system’s lack of legitimacy and justice, with the former merely describing this system. Within this process the researcher has a role to play, as one of the first tasks of critical theory is to “challenge the privileged “non-position” of social scientific knowledge by analysing the modes of its production, the roles it played in society, the interests it served and the historical processes through which it came to power”. According to the Marxist tradition which CDA draws on, the theory asks the researcher to play an ‘emancipatory’ role. Nonetheless, this position may open the door to bias and subjectivity in research. However critical theorists argue that researchers can link critical with practical activity, and theory with praxis without ‘absolutism’ of traditional theory. The whole point, they would argue, is to give researchers space to view the big picture, and employ an “outsiders” perspective to get beyond shared meanings and their hermeneutic retrieval. While scholars such as Foucault keep this research at the systematic institutionalized level, CDA went one step further as Michael Mayer put it: endeavouring “to make explicit power relationships which are frequently hidden and thereby to derive results which are of practical relevance.”

view, perspective, principles, and aims, both within their discipline, and within society at large. Accordingly, as I explained in the sections of purposes and significance in Chapter One, this thesis is an attempt to challenge the dominant war discourse of the 1973 War, in the hope of opening doors for other researchers to examine other ‘hidden’ or ‘suppressed’ discourses of the same war, and exposing power networks that are strong and well-knitted enough to guarantee one single reading of the war for their own political, social, and even economic interests. Nevertheless, this position I find myself in runs the risk of bias and partiality, a point which I address in detail below in section five on the critiques of CDA, and section six on the caveats of CDA in this chapter.

2. CDA: Levels of Analysis

In this section, I begin by explaining why Fairclough’s ‘Dialectical Relational’ is the perspective of CDA approach most appropriate for this study. Based on this preference, a detailed analysis of the approach’s three levels of analysis follows. Once these levels of analysis are explained, a critique of this classification is carried out.

I select a ‘Dialectical Relational’ perspective because of its relevant points of strength. In other perspectives such as media discourse, the ‘linguistic and sociolinguistic’ analysis “does not attempt to show systematic linkages between language and sociocultural context”. The CDA ‘semiotic analysis’ perspective does not “systematically attend to detailed properties of

123 Tuen A. van Dijk, ‘Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis’, Discourse & Society, 4-2 (1993), 249-283 (252). Wodak and De Cillia, for example, published the first official school materials dealing with post-war anti-Semitism in Austria. These materials are now used in schools and by teachers who want to discuss the different ranges and variations of anti-Semitic discourse in their classrooms. Van Dijk also analysed the Dutch schoolbooks in terms of their potential racist implications. This led to the production of new school materials; in Lilie Chouliaraki and Norman Fairclough, Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical Discourse Analysis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1999), p. 1.

the texture of texts”125, while the focus on the CDA ‘conversation analysis’ pays relatively little attention to elements of representation and associated linguistic features.126 Avoiding these pitfalls, Fairclough’s ‘Dialectical Relational’ approach is inclusive of other perspectives that Fairclough sought to develop as ‘desiderata for a critical analysis of media discourse’.127 Nevertheless, this all-inclusiveness has not complicated analysis of the discursive process. This process is still “relatively straightforward” to grasp theoretically according to John Richardson, who already adopted Fairclough’s approach, and concludes that “I feel most satisfied” with it.128 Scholars such as Ruth Wodak, Michael Meyer, Bryan Jenner, and Stefan Titscher trace this ‘straightforwardness’ to the dialectical ‘focus on language’ use and the ‘wider social cultural structures’, and to the three-dimensional attributes of discourse as detailed below: text, discursive practice, and social practice.129 Others find that Fairclough’s theoretical delineations and assumptions are more difficult to apply due to the ‘circular and reinforcing’ nature of discourse under CDA.130 It appears like a “spinning roundabout, difficult to jump onto; how do we distinguish cause and effect when effects become causes?”131 Admitting the validity of these criticisms, I make the case throughout the thesis that my purpose is to disentangle this process of re/constructing discourse, rather than reaching conclusions about cause and effect. The second emphasis of mine, which also helps to avoid this circularity of discourse analysis, is to invert the point of departure of my analysis. This thesis focuses on the role of ‘the state’ in shaping the 1973 War discourse; therefore, moving from the state to society means that the analysis is less circular and more relational. Such analysis accords even more with the assumption that discourse does

127 Coincidently or not as it corresponds with eight assumptions of CDA, Fairclough identified eight points in his ‘desiderata’ in which he stressed that analysis of texts should be conceived ‘multifunctionally’. See Fairclough, Media Discourse, pp. 33-34.
128 Richardson, p. 37.
129 Titscher and others, pp. 149-150.
130 Richardson, p. 37.
131 Ibid.
ideological work, as mentioned above.\textsuperscript{132} Still, section five of this chapter is dedicated in general to these criticisms of CDA as an overall approach. Below is a summary of the three dimensions identified by Fairclough as levels of analysis: Texts (a micro level), discourse practices (a macro level), socio-political practices (a ‘macro’ macro level). The three levels indicated by Fairclough include textual analysis, discourse analysis, and social practice.

The first level is concerned with the manner in which dominant themes are established in text. These concerns include interactional control (who controls or even polices the interaction in such examples as a newspaper interview on the 1973 War), grammar (which dimensions of grammar are used and how they are ‘patterned’ in a certain process and favoured in a certain way), theme (what is the dominant theme/s in the text and what is the reasoning behind the choice of these thematic structures), word meaning (which ‘key words’ are emphasised in the text, and what is the ‘meaning potential’ of these words), and metaphors (which metaphors are used in the discourse sample, and what factors determine their choice).

The second level, discourse analysis, is relevant to questions of interdiscursivity (which genre/s of discourse can be identified in the whole text) and intertextuality (how far the text borrows from other texts, are these discourse representations direct or indirect, and is the represented discourse clearly demarcated), coherence (how the text is heterogeneous, ambivalent, or well connected, and how the text stands up to ‘resistant readings’), and conditions of discourse practice (which conditions affect the production of the text under study, and who are the agents in control).

\textsuperscript{132} The assumption is based on a Marxist development of ideology as an ‘upside-down’ version of reality imposed by the elites and those in power (the ruling classes) during social interaction. See James Paul Gee, \textit{Social Linguistics and Literacies: Ideology in Discourses}, 3rd ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2008).
Finally, the last level - that of social practice - is interested in why and how the discourse practice is as it is, and of the effects of discourse practice upon social practice. This level includes orders of discourse (what are the orders of discourse that dictate the relationship between social and discursive practices), social matrix of discourse (what are the ‘hegemonic’ relations and structures which constitute the matrix of discourse), and ideological and political effects of discourse (what are systems of knowledge and beliefs affecting the case study). Since the study focuses on the role of the state in shaping and reshaping the dominant discourse, the third level is called ‘socio-political practices’, much to allow the research to add what is ‘political’ in this discoursing process, such as the ‘authoritarianism’ of rule of both Mubarak and Sadat, and the continuity and discontinuity of the rule workings, either between both leaders, or in relation with previous regimes, as explained in Chapters Five and Six.

By making this classification, Fairclough attempted to “bring together three analytical traditions, each of which is dispensable for discourse analysis”. These traditions are close textual linguistic analysis within linguistics, macro sociological tradition of analytical social relations and structures, and micro sociological interpretivist tradition of seeking social practice as something which people produce. However, these dimensions still overlap considerably and even confusingly. For example, a clear line can be drawn between text analysis and discourse practices, since elements in each one of them can overlap, such as ‘intertextual chains’ and ‘manifest intertextuality’. Furthermore, space dedicated to each

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133 These three levels are drawn from Fairclough. Since I adopt CDA’s approach from Fairclough’s perspective, some terms were taken verbatim at the discretion that they are his. See Discourse and Social Change, pp. 234-238
134 Ibid, p. 72.
135 Ibid.
136 Widdowson contended that “we are also in the dark as to how these modes or systems relate to the ‘elements; or ‘parts’ of ‘orders of discourse’ which Fairclough has earlier distinguished as being of the following types: genres, styles, activity types, discourses… ”; Henry G. Widdowson, “Norman Fairclough: “Discourse and Social Change (Book Review)”, Applied Linguistics, 4, 16 (1995), 510-516 (p. 512).
element is circumstantial, i.e. it is related to circumstances that can benefit from an emphasis on one element against the other for certain purposes.

Due to these criticisms, I do not demarcate these three levels equally in the thesis, since analysis of the text will involve some discursive and social analysis, and vice-versa. For example, Chapters Five and Six include some elements of textual analysis as part of the ‘national narrative’, such as texts in books published by the state, along with media texts produced at the time. Furthermore, at the level of text, not every element of this framework will be mentioned for the sake of space. As Fairclough himself admitted, these elements represent a “large-scale map of the terrain” after which a “selective analytical focuses which seem especially fruitful”. Furthermore, due to this overlapping, the divide would be between text analysis and socio-political practices’ analysis, where each is dedicated one chapter for each of the two eras under analysis. This division is meant to enhance the journey of the researcher into examining patterns without redundancies in analysis or examples, a path adopted by most other discourse researchers.

3. Case Study: Media and Ahram

My research focuses on the impact of the media for four main reasons. Firstly, the media is critical for the success of any political discourse, because in modern societies it is the main transmission belt or conduit between politics and society. Political elites need media since the latter play a key role in the ‘social construction of reality’\(^{139}\). As mentioned above, any social

\(^{137}\) Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, p. 74.

\(^{138}\) See Yoram Meital, ‘Who is Egypt’s “Hero of War and Peace”? The Context Over Representation, History & Memory’, 1, 15 (Spring/summer 2003), pp. 150-183.

\(^{139}\) The term was coined by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966)
action is not simply “a direct duality of human agency and social structures, but has a triadic structure in which “social structures are enacted through human agency with continuous reference to a medium, resulting in the ‘social construction of reality’”. However, the media helps reality to become social in different terms. In terms of culture, the media acts as a “primary source of definitions and images” of the social reality, and as “the most ubiquitous expression of shared identity”. In terms of politics, the mass media is a means of exercising power by virtue of the relatively privileged access that politicians and agents of government can generally claim form the media as a legitimate right. Thanks to the gentleness and indirectness of media as a tool of power, ruling or dominant groups find media indispensable in order to rule through this Gramscian process of ‘negation, mediation and compromise’.

Secondly, in today’s mass societies, people are almost entirely dependent on the media for information about public affairs and they rely heavily on media sources for cues on how to understand and interpret that information. In a developing country like Egypt, where literacy rates are low, this influence of media for adolescents can be greater. Focusing on audience and receptiveness leads to traditional theories that analyse the process in terms of a circulation circuit, i.e. concentrating at the level of message exchange (sender/message/receiver). Nevertheless, and away from this linearity, the mass media should be conceptualised on the same postmodernist theoretical framework adopted in the whole of this study, i.e. as a web of interconnected and complex relations and interests.

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142 Ibid, p.4
143 Eoin Devereux, Understanding the Media (London: SAGE, 2003), p.54
144 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, p. 165. For example, Doris Graber found that American high school students say they rely on the mass media more than on families, friends, or teachers in developing attitudes about current events, in Doris A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, in David Croteau and William Hoyney, Media/society: Industries, Images, and Audiences (London : Pine Forge Press, c1997), pp.211-212
Thirdly, media is all about frames. Frames in the news are defined as “patterns … of representation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion”. Furthermore, “media frames, largely unspoken and unacknowledged, organize the world both for journalists who report it and, to some important degree, for us who rely on their reports.” Gaye Tuchman was the first to apply the framing process to newsgathering. Tuchman concluded that news offers an ideological frame through which perception of public events is filtered and contained in place of projecting an objective picture of reality. Robert Entman explicates that the concept of framing by associating it inclusion and exclusion. The “analysis of frames,” Entman thus explains, “illuminates the precise war in which influence over a human consciousness is exerted by the transfer (or communication) of information”. Furthermore, these frames can “bundle key concepts, stock phrases, and iconic images to reinforce certain common ways of interpreting developments.”

As far as the media is concerned, this framing also gives the media an agenda-setting role (determining the most important issues), a priming role (signalling and preparing the public to receive messages about these issues), and evaluative role (offering or implying solutions).

Fourthly, the role of the media is never more important than during times of national crisis. There are two main reasons for this. First, the media looks primarily to political leaders for cues on how to interpret and explain national events, and it offers officials almost unlimited access to communicate with the public. The frames employed by the media to transmit messages from the politicians are therefore critical. Second, in times of crisis such as the 1973 War, the public relies heavily on the media for information and explanation, and the

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151 Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism*, p. 165.
152 Ibid.
way in which the media frames such events will therefore have a powerful effect on the public’s subsequent understanding, perception, and knowledge.\textsuperscript{153} It is because the media plays such a crucial role that it is always in danger of being manipulated by political actors who will use it to try to ‘manufacture consent’ for particular policies.\textsuperscript{154} This role of the media in shaping discourse in a national crisis becomes obvious in war, as the power to shape the public’s outlook rests almost solely with governments because it is to government officials that reporters tend to defer to explain events. As Livingston put it “Those who have routine access to the mass media, those to whom reporters turn when the dust settles and the shooting stops, have the ability to shape coverage and perceptions.”\textsuperscript{155} In this sense, senior politicians are ‘opinion leaders’ in times of crisis; they shape the terms of the debate, and set the parameters of discussion.\textsuperscript{156} The 1973 War is not an exception to this understanding.

As a necessary note of methodological clarity, it is important also to explain the logic behind the choice of \textit{Ahram} as the main case study. According to Mohamed El-Bendary’s book on the Egyptian press “since national publications are government-owned, they reflect a major extent the view of Government and tend to support its policies …”\textsuperscript{157} Indeed, \textit{Ahram} is taken an example of this state rhetoric rather than as a newspaper of its own, as “national newspapers are similar in the manner they select, cover and frame stories”.\textsuperscript{158} Furthermore, this state discourse is usually unmediated and uncriticised, since journalists at these national newspapers “have less influence on what makes the news”.\textsuperscript{159} Indeed, every speech of the president under the era of Sadat or Mubarak was transmitted verbatim in both the front pages and a special page dedicated to the whole text of the speech. In the \textit{Ahram} this ‘unmediated’ discourse, also including army communiqués or

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\setcounter{enumi}{153}
\item Ibid.
\item See Herman and Chomsky, \textit{Manufacturing Consent}.
\item Jackson, \textit{Writing The War on Terrorism}, p. 166.
\item Ibid.
\item Ibid, p. 11.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
official statements, exists side by side with ‘mediated’ discourses. The latter are mostly interpreted, absorbed, reconstituted, and reproduced in a new form to other listeners.\textsuperscript{160} Along the way, meanings are often altered or lost, and the discourse assumes new forms and takes on novel ways.\textsuperscript{161} As I explain in the following chapters, this mediation is standardised and patterned as the state controls newspapers, and regulates their content. As a final remark, \textit{Ahram} is also notably the oldest newspaper in the Arab world. It began publishing in 1876 as a weekly newspaper produced by brothers Beshara and Saleem Takla, who migrated to Egypt from the Lebanon/Syria in 1875. It became a daily newspaper in 1881, publishing throughout the week except on Saturdays. It is published today by the giant \textit{Al-Ahram} Group, is the largest newspaper in Egypt, and is printed seven days a week. To sum up, \textit{Ahram} is the mouthpiece of government.\textsuperscript{162} As a result, scholars depend on the newspaper to understand the official discourse such as El-Bendary did for his thesis. Furthermore, I worked for \textit{Ahram} for six years (2000-2006). This advantage, as I mention in next section, has facilitated my access to elements of the text, discourse practice, and social practice as well.

\section*{4. Data collection}

The research method in this thesis is qualitative since it is meant to identify an action of language, as well as social and political phenomena. As explained above, the main purpose is not to reach conclusions but to understand a process of re/constructing a ‘discourse of victory’. The project is concerned less with collecting quantifiable data and reaching verifiable truths and more with how this data and these truths are moving ‘in action’. I focus on all \textit{Ahram} issues published in the month of October, 1973 - when the war raged for almost two weeks, followed by negotiations and

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\textsuperscript{160} Jackson, \textit{Writing The War on Terrorism}, p. 164.  
\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{162} Mohamed El-Bendary, \textit{The Egyptian Press}, p. 32.
\end{flushright}
an intermittent ceasefire - as well as on the paper’s annual issues marking the anniversary of the war on October 6, for 38 years until the overthrow of Mubarak in February 2011. In the 63 issues of *Ahram* under study, as well as the history books of pre-university education in Egypt, I look for primary and secondary ‘frames’ of victory in the 1973 War. This means that I do not exclude quantitative methods in certain parts of the research, since I am interested in the patterns that can be seen based on repetitions of certain words, arguments, or advertisements, by companies and columnists.

I take the position of moving between both methods, especially as history does not declare the death of one against the other but rather keeps them in a mutually valid contestation. The question in the thesis is not ‘how many’, but ‘what’ the process of employing these texts is, and what social and discursive practices are employed in trying to reach the goals envisaged by the state elites. Indeed, the research is descriptive in most parts, making qualitative methods predominant in the whole project, but quantitative methods are needed as these examples indicate: How many times is the Chief of Staff in the 1973 War, Sa’adeddin El-Shazly, one of the main opponents of ‘victory’ claims, mentioned in the 70 issues of *Ahram*, and in the school curricula under investigation? The fact that El-Shazly was literally ignored and obliterated from these texts is very significant for the results of this study. In school curricula, another example is how many times the *thagra* (the point in the 1973 War when the Egyptian forces were about to be crushed as they were infiltrated by Israeli forces) was mentioned. Comparing this ‘little’ mention of such an event with the ‘massive’ mention of others, such as the role of Mubarak’s ‘air strike’, also adds to

163 Historically, from at least the time of Isaac Newton in the enlightenment period of the eighteenth century, the connection to the natural sciences has been dominated by a belief in objective observation and quantifiable data, Pamela Maykut and Richard Morehouse, *Beginning Qualitative Research: A Philosophic and Practical Guide* (Washington: The Falmer Press, 1994), p. 7. Positivists have ever since sought to establish this approach as a rule. From 1970s, there was a change, and quantitative methods have no longer been called the only valid methods of inquiry. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge, MA: MIT), Evelyn Keller, *Reflections on Gender and Science* (New Haven: Yale University, 1985). These alternate voices have contributed to making qualitative research an acceptable way of doing science.
the whole picture that is drawn out in the analysis. In the 1973 Museum, how many times were the war casualties on the Egyptian side mentioned? How many tanks and planes did Egypt lose in the war? Answering these questions will show how the state elites are selective in their discursive constructions.

However, the use of quantitative methods comes with its own restrictions. They should depend on careful instrument construction to ensure that the instrument measures what it is supposed to measure. The instrument must then be administered in an appropriate standardised manner according to prescribed procedures. Interview findings will then be recorded on a form. Here, the focus is on the measuring instrument of the test items, which are the text. The fact that each period under study is historically marked and time framed from one year to another adds an element of consistency in the systematic findings. This measurability allows me to compare and contrast not only between one president and another, but within the same term of each president. Accordingly, in interviews I ask both fixed-choice (closed) questions and open-ended questions. This is another example of how qualitative measurement and quantitative inquiry are often combined. In interviews with reporters of the war, I ask these fixed questions: Do you believe that the 1973 War was a ‘victory’? Do you regret any of your reporting on the war that happened thirty years ago?

The qualitative part of this study remains the core of the inquiry. The research deals in part with values such as nationalist sentiment, mythmaking, and religious inclinations, along with claims of victory and defeat. Here I acknowledge that the credibility of qualitative methods hinges to a great extent on the skill, competence, and rigor of the researcher doing fieldwork as well as events in a

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164 Some argued that elites under Sadat and Mubarak sought to undermine the role of Nasser in preparations for the 1973 war despite under Nasser plans for the war were drawn out; see Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, Al-Tareeq ella Ramadan (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar leil Nashr, 1975).
165 Michael Quinn Patton, Qualitative Research & Evaluation Methods (California, Sage Publications: 2002), p. 4
person’s life that might prove a distraction. Therefore, I guarantee that the quantitative research follows a method that seeks to avoid distractions in order to ensure the credibility of my findings.

Indeed, given the nature of the area of study, this thesis is unavoidably political and possibly selective. The ‘political’ refers to exposing and targeting those power elites who enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore inequality and injustice regarding the construction and reconstruction of the 1973 War. Indeed, selectivity may stem from my aim, which is consistent with that of several other CDA analyses: to gain further insight into the crucial role of discourse in the reproduction of dominance and inequality. Van Djik once made a similar case in the opening of one of his papers: “This paper is biased… we pay more attention to ‘top-down’ relations of dominance than to ‘bottom-up’ relations of resistance.

However this research does not seek to discuss the views of those elites to confirm or falsify these claims of manipulation, or to counterbalance what the victims say with what the elites say, or to historically trace forms of this manipulation. The purpose is rather to focus on the process of ‘understanding’ this manipulation in discourse, i.e. newspaper articles, school textbooks, and so on. Therefore, I took such ‘assumptions’ seriously to justify my politicized hypothesis, focusing on the state as an agent controlling the discourse on the 1973 War, all meant, in the words of Van Djik, to “understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality.” Furthermore, this explicit bias in aims is balanced with a more rigorous form of research.

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166 Ibid, p.14
167 Van Djik, ‘Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis’, p. 250
A further methodological caveat related to data collection is also excluded from the study. The focus of the thesis is on the role of the ‘dominant’ elites, not the receptiveness of the ‘dominated’ groups, not only for lack of time and space but also for emphasising power relations from the vertical upper end of the ‘state’ and its ISAs. Additionally, analysing the audience-based discourse requires opening up to broader methods such as surveys and questionnaires, and to other fields such as social psychology, which deals with how social groups can determine the experience and conduct of the individual member. Furthermore, theories of media effects, related to measuring the reaction of audiences, are complex and sufficiently strikingly contradictory to be dedicated a whole new thesis on their own. For example, direct effects theories claim that an audience receives media messages in a uniform way. On the other hand, ‘limited effects’ theory argues that audiences are not passive or isolated entities of mass society, but are individuals in an interactive relationship with the media which they are exposed to. Other theories were developed with more focus on division of power in society. ‘Cultural affects theories’ argue that the impact of the media is not immediate but the product of a ‘cumulative build-up of beliefs and values over a long period of time.’ Because of this complexity and intricacy, let alone the lack of resources to trace these changes over a longer period of time, the study avoids the receptiveness of an audience within its remit.

5. Critique of CDA

CDA has come under a myriad of criticisms for theoretical flaws and methodological shortcomings that undermine its strengths. In order to understand CDA’s relevance and value in the analysis of the discursive formation of the narratives around the war in Egypt, it is necessary to face these

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criticisms, and to understand how it might offer relevant and balanced insight into narrative analysis.

One of the approach’s limitations can be the one seen by its pioneers as a salient advantage; i.e. being critical. Henry Widdowson found that while the approach acknowledges “the essential instability of language” it seeks at the same time to stabilise its selection of language interpretations.\textsuperscript{172} That said, CDA develops a “socially transformative agenda”.\textsuperscript{173} Fairclough himself defended this agenda setting as a “mode of action”, one form in which people may “act upon the world and especially upon each other”.\textsuperscript{174} Hammersley, among other scholars, found this overambitious and “superior” to other positions precisely because it is conducted in a spirit of self-reflexive critique.\textsuperscript{175} However, I believe that those critics of CDA on this specific point ignore one main argument; the approach’s bias and politicisation are in the goals and the aims, not in the tools. Indeed this bias led CDA to avoid the gap left by Halliday’s systematic functional linguistics, and critical linguistics as drawn in Fowler’s works in the 1970s, by rejecting these two schools, which adopt “the treatment of language systems as autonomous and independent of the ‘use’ language, and the separation of ‘meaning’ from ‘style’”.\textsuperscript{176}

Given the striking heterogeneity, CDA came under further attack, especially as the approach expands in its borrowings from other schools of thoughts such as feminism and post-modernism. This comes with what Slembrouck called a lack of clarity “about the exact preferences for a

\textsuperscript{174} Fairclough, \textit{Discourse and Social Change}, p. 63.
particular social theory”.177 Nevertheless, CDA takes this multiplicity as a point of strength since these theories and constructs gleaned from different philosophical or sociological thinkers are simply tools meant to solve the problem under ‘critical’ study. In the words of Weiss and Wodak, “one can speak of a theoretical synthesis of conceptual tools (...). Tools of this kind are, for example, Foucault’s discursive formations, Bourdieu’s habitus, or register and code as defined by Halliday and Bernstein”.178

CDA also suffers from a similar lack of scholarly rigour. For example, in a review of 40 articles using CDA in the field of education, published up to 2003, Rogers and other scholars noted that one quarter of the articles included no discussion of language theory, while the others made reference to CDA, SFL and discourse theory, though many in rather general terms, and few included detailed discussion of the linguistic evidence.179 This lack of rigour leaves CDA with what Jef Verschueren calls a tendency to leave out important aspects of the text that do not fit with the interpretive framework. Nevertheless, to avoid this weakness, researchers can focus on ‘sampling’; i.e. qualitative analysis of a small sample of text might be the only way of analysing certain types of discourse, for example, the discourse of a particular politician or party.180

Finally, a debate persists regarding the variability in dedication to text and context, i.e. if is it too much or too little for language or its context. Some scholars, such as Widdowson and Jef Verschueren, argue that CDA does not look closely at the linguistic features of interactions, but

rather jumps towards the macro context.\textsuperscript{181} On the other hand, CDA is also accused of the exact opposite, i.e. failing to take the macro context into account out of its centrality accorded to text. It can be suggested that the type of balance exhibited by the CDA approach is a virtue because the approach is mainly designated to identify patterns equally in texts (as per Chapters Three and Four) and in socio-political contexts (as per Chapters Five and Six). Indeed, the four chapters act in tandem as they complement each other, all for the sake of understanding how the state constructs and reconstructs the war discourse into these patterns.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter has outlined CDA as the most appropriate approach as a framework for this study. The CDA’s eight assumptions as drawn by its pioneers are aptly explained, with literature critically drawn from other sources. Examples from the case study are also detailed at the end of each of these assumptions to give relevance and salience to this theoretical outline. Based on these assumptions, CDA adopts three levels of analysis, which are detailed and critiqued as well in the second section of this chapter. The chapter has also delved into the media in general and \textit{Ahram} newspaper in particular as a case study. Since the project is about language and politics, the selection of media and the newspaper is fleshed out and justified in the third section of this study. The debate on qualitative and quantitative data collection schemes, still prevalent in social science for many decades, is settled with adopting a mixture of both schemes in the study. Despite the criticisms outlined in the latter part of this chapter, CDA as an approach remains relevant and useful in that it obliges the researcher to choose certain pathways for analysis, without jeopardising the clarity and accuracy of the empirical findings.

Chapter Three
Text Analysis:
1973 War Discourse under Sadat

Introduction:

The main goal of this chapter is two-fold: how the language and its deliberately and meticulously composed set of themes, assumptions, grammatical forms and myths constructed a new reality on the 1973 War, and how this reality developed sustainable patterns that normalised the event and legitimised the regime and its policies throughout the years following it. The chapter forensically analyses the texts of *Ahram* on the 1973 War during the reign of Sadat. The analysis is time-framed from October 6, 1973, the day the war began, until the end of the rule of Sadat, with his assassination on October 6, 1981. Quantitatively, the analysis includes every single issue of *Ahram* since the war began until its ‘end’ with a ceasefire on October 22, 1973. Since the ceasefire was interrupted by skirmishes and serious Israeli counter-attacks on the frontline as well as diplomatic wrangling, I extend the analysis to the whole of the month of October 1973. As the main objective is identifying ‘patterns’ not only on the war itself but also on representations re/ shaped in its aftermath, the text analysis includes every annual issue marking the anniversary of the war on October 6 until the end of Sadat’s era; i.e. from October 6, 1974 until October 6, 1981.

Seeking to realise these two goals, the war as reported is conceptualised as a series of three related macro themes: (1) Egypt made a massive and consistent victory; (2) the war as
These marked thematic structures are judged and grouped by their frequency, repetitiveness and domination in the text. They also draw from certain assumptions that underline and reflect on other elements of analysing the text, namely modality, word meaning, metaphor, grammar and transitivity. Each element is also analysed, either separately or in conjunction within each thematic structure.

The chapter is thus divided into two sections: the first section is dedicated to explaining in detail the dominant trio of themes; section two explains specialised linguistic features such as grammar (composition of words, clauses and phrases), semantics (meanings either referential or relational) and pragmatics (contextual meanings). Admittedly, I do not deal with these textual patterns as a linguistics specialist interested in their technical modes of action per se, but as a discourse analyst interested in patterns which substantiate the macro-themes identified in the first section. Judging of the patterning of these macro themes is based on frequency and repetition of the same words, phrases or sentences that carry them. Therefore, the chapter is descriptively detailed on certain occasions, all for the sake of highlighting patterning through this functioning repetition within the text. Some examples are taken from the texts and placed at the end of the study as appendices to keep analysis sharp and clear. My conclusion is that the language used in the Ahram was not objective or a neutral reflection of reality, nor was it accidental or incidental, but rather, it was deliberately composed and meticulously designated to achieve a number of key political goals, all based on regarding the war as an unquestionable ‘Egyptian victory’ and as a personified/personalised performance led by the ‘faithful’ President.

1. Textual Patterns: Macro Themes

1.1. Egypt Had a Massive and Consistent Victory
Defining the concept of ‘victory’ is still theoretically challenging and elusive, as many existing theories pay little attention to what victory is and why one wins, going instead to the more difficult issue of how one wins. Indeed here is a shortage of scholars who addressed winning, albeit on a scattered and partial level. Colin Gray, for one, focused on the concept of decisiveness in war and on the necessity to operationally and militarily defeat the ‘enemies’ of the US. William Martel was more inclusive and comprehensive in analysis, yet he stayed away from calling his literature a complete theory of victory. Von Clausewitz remains an exception as his masterpiece On War remains the most comprehensively seminal work by focusing on the meaning of victory at both ontological and epistemological levels. According to Clausewitz, victory is tripartite. “If in conclusion we consider the total concept of a victory, we find it consists of three elements: 1. “The enemy’s greater loss of material strength [,,] 2. His loss of morale [,,] 3. ‘Enemy’s giving up his intentions’”. Based on this understanding, ‘victory’ is constructed by Clausewitz as a concept rather than an actuality. For example, casualty reports, one of the main deciders of who wins the war, are mostly a far cry from truth; “casualty reports on either side are never accurate, seldom truthful and in most cases deliberately falsified”. Here victory acquires a psychological and sociological meaning; it is all about claiming victory rather than just achieving military progress. “What matters most is the ultimate perception of the situation, not the facts”. Here I employ Clausewitz’s definition as not only the most convincing and the broadest among other definitions in literature, but also as he treats ‘war’ itself as a discourse or, in his own words, as a ‘mere continuation of politics

183 Colin S. Gray, Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory (Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002). Gray wrote that his main contention is that “(a) wars can be won or lost (admittedly on a sliding scale of completeness, perhaps “decisiveness”); and that (b) that wars’ “outcomes typically have a significant power of decision, if not always the decisions intended, even by the victor,” ibid. p. 9.
by other means’. Consequently, victory becomes a discourse since it is subservient to ‘a political condition’ and ‘interests’. This brings in the role of agency; those who work hard to create a ‘tactical’ victory even if it does not cohere with operational or strategic achievements on the ground. Such an agency-related and discourse-based understanding as detailed in this section links the theme of ‘victory’ with the two other themes as explained below.

In this section, I address how Ahram constructed the 1973 War, or its victory, on the basis of Clausewitz’s three ‘benchmarks’ cited above. Since these benchmarks are still drawn on ‘realities’ on the ground and claims on the happenings at the war; the section includes a critique contrasting claims against realities. My conclusion is that the paper twisted, omitted and restructured the war as a military action to exhibit what a macro theme which I call massive and consistent victory in order to reflect how the war representations made this victory overwhelming and consistently indisputable either during or after the war.

‘Enemy’s Greater Loss of Material Strength’

In order to prove this element in the theme of victory, Ahram’s strategy depended on two following steps which demonstrated the “enemy’s greater loss of material strength”, an indicator of victory in any single war according to Clausewitz’s classification. First, the paper aggrandised Egypt’s ‘crossing’ of the Suez Canal into the Israel-occupied bank and belittled Israel’s serious crossing of the same canal into the Egyptian-controlled west bank. Second, the paper maximised Israeli losses in weapons and armoury while minimising Egyptian losses in weapons and armoury. Below is a detailed analysis of these two steps.

Ibid.
In the first step, *Ahram* concluded that Israel lost the war because it lost ‘territory’; i.e. the strategic Suez Canal whose eastern bank had been occupied by Israel since Egypt’s humiliating defeat at 1967. In other words, and in terms of political geography which brings together the ideas of power and space, Egypt claims back its occupied ‘territory’. ‘Territoriality’ as an activity means that Egypt succeeded in establishing control over this clearly demarcated piece of land and defending it against the ‘enemy’ attempting to contest the same space.\textsuperscript{189} In political geographical terms, the state is an expression of this territorial power, as it has an area over which it claims jurisdiction and through which it demarcates its borders. Therefore, military advancement in this territory is taken as a victory for the whole state.\textsuperscript{190}

On basis of this conceptualisation, *Ahram* symbolised the six-hour ‘crossing’ of the canal as clear unquestioned evidence of victory, overshadowing any disappointing or shaky performance by the Egyptian army during the whole two-week war. The paper had built this frame, symbolically put as ‘we won the war because we crossed the canal’ through using a linguistic feature: metonymy. Metonymy is defined as a ‘figure of speech that consists in using the name of one thing for the name of something else with which it is associated’.\textsuperscript{191} Generally, employing metonymy as a form of language formation is ‘highly creative’.\textsuperscript{192} It is a process based on deriving a one-word meaning that acts as the ‘master frame’, much to achieve economy and pithiness of expression.\textsuperscript{193} I found a clever overuse of this metonymy in text analysis of the whole era of Sadat by reducing the claims of victory to the ‘crossing’ of the canal in the first six hours of the war and thus marginalising all other details which were less

\textsuperscript{192} Ibid, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid.
supportive of these claims. In other words, Israel is ultimately shaped as the defeated state in the whole war within these six hours of crossing the canal by Egyptian forces, although the war continued for three more weeks before the October 22, 1973 ceasefire.

The paper is full of systematic patterns that validate this hypothetical generalisation on the usage of metonymy. Take, for example, the statement made by Minister of War and Supreme Commander of Ahmed Forces, Ahmed Ismail, just three days after the beginning of the war. As published verbatim by the paper the next day, Ismail said in a statement to his soldiers: You “made victory” by the act of “crossing the biggest military barrier in the history of wars” (p. 5, October 9, 1973)\textsuperscript{194}. On the front page of the same issue, Tawfiq El-Hakeem, one of the most revered literary figures in Egypt at the time, made a similar metonymical statement in his column: “Crossing Sinai means we crossed defeat. Regardless of the results of the battles, what does matter is the leap whose meaning is that Egypt is Egypt…” (ibid, p. 1). In the same issue, military reporter Mohamed Basha said that victory was not only made by the crossing but it was also celebrated by the soldiers. Basha wrote: “I spent the whole of yesterday in the heart of Sinai. I saw happiness, longing and smiling in the eyes of the fighters who finally have the long-awaited opportunity.” (ibid, p.4). Furthermore, using the first-person account in this report and in media discourse generally make pretensions to factuality on this alleged victory.\textsuperscript{195}

The metonymical meaning to the effect that victory and the crossing are treated as having the same meanings that can guarantee that the Egyptian army’s victory is consistently fixed and guaranteed all along the two weeks of the war and despite losses by this army. For example, on

\textsuperscript{194} Please note that, as has been the case in other chapters, all textual citations from the \textit{Ahram} is separately mentioned in the text of the study rather than in footnotes. It is an attempt to identify intertextuality and patterning as well as situate the order in both chronological and spatial sequences.

October 16, 1973, world press reports were full of news that Israeli forces crossed the canal and even took pivotal positions on the west bank which earlier had been fully dominated by Egyptian forces.\textsuperscript{196} Golda Meir, the then Israeli Prime Minister, made a Knesset statement in which she said that Israeli forces ‘fight courageously to the east and west of the canal’.\textsuperscript{197} However, the \textit{Ahram} issue the next day completely ignored these developments, which were credible and authoritative enough, and kept the reader attached to the crossing as a sign of victory either by denotation (direct meanings) or connotation (indirect meanings). The crossing, one article in the issue reads, is “a miracle” of “intelligence, secrecy and gallantry” (p. 5, October 17, 1973). The same issue also included the full text of a speech by Sadat in Parliament in which he made no mention of Israeli crossing into the west bank of the canal and in which he focused on the moment of crossing. On the front page, this is one of the lines quoted from Sadat’s speech: “History has to stop for a long time in order to take note and understand how this crossing had happened” (p. 1, October 17, 1973). In the same issue, Lutfi El-Kholi, a prominent columnist and a significant literary figure, wrote that “Egyptian man got rid of [his] subjective and objective conflicts” by “crossing both the canal and defeat…” (p. 5, October 17, 1973). On the next day, October 18, Israeli forces sent reinforcements to the west bank of the canal, and even attacked the highly fortified anti-aircraft missile defence wall.

According to Egyptian army correspondence released by veteran writer and Sadat’s confidante, Heikal, and memoirs of Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Dayan, Israel’s army and political leaders regained confidence while the Egyptian army officials and political leadership had suffered from shock, confusion or division.\textsuperscript{198} Nevertheless, the next day’s issue of \textit{Ahram} did not report these disappointing results, and instead retained a celebratory mood of relishing victory based on the ‘crossing’. On the front page, one expert said assertively that the Egyptian


\textsuperscript{197} Ibid, p. 466.

\textsuperscript{198} See classified army correspondence published by Heikal, \textit{October 73}, pp. 486-489 & p. 583. Dayan wrote in his memoirs that Israeli forces changed the balance of the war completely. As of October 11 till the end of the war, he named this stage ‘victory’ for his country. See Moshe Dayan: \textit{Story of My Life} (New York: William Morrow and Inc., 1976, p. 520). Dayan said that the \textit{thagra} made Sadat realise “he had suffered a full defeat, (ibid, p. 613).
‘crossing’ is an act “that has rendered many military theories obsolete” (p. 1, October 19, 1973). The quotes were made in an assertive tone with the use of declarative clauses rather than modal clauses as I explain in the second section of this chapter on other linguistic features. The metonymical patterning of the canal crossing as a sign of massive, consistent and consequently unquestioned victory was not accidental or arbitrary, but rather deliberate and well-organised by the paper and the state itself. My conclusion here is based on tracing ‘patterns’ in two areas of war reporting in the Ahram: state-sponsored advertisements and the editorials which reflect the position of this state-run newspaper.199

Most advertisements from the early days of the war equated the crossing with victory (p. 5, October 10, 1973), hailed “the decision maker of the crossing” (p. 3, October 6, 1973) or greeted “the hero of crossing” (p. 6, October 6, 1975 & p. p. 6, October 6, 1979). The significance of these statements is that they act as indicators of the patterns in the state behaviour on framing or reframing the 1973 War. According to the table below, the state is the predominant sponsor of the war advertisements. The texts of these advertisements are always scripted and relatedly approved by the sponsors before publication in the Ahram. Below is a table 1 which shows the dominance of the state bodies as sponsors of the war-related advertisements published in the paper.

199 An ‘advertisement’ is used to refer to these announcements which were published in the Ahram and which are not dissimilar to promotional advertisements on products. Because it was paid by a state body who consciously mention its name as the sponsor, an announcement is described as ‘state-sponsored advertisement’ across the whole study.
Table 1 _The number of state-sponsored advertisements from year 1974 until 1981

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Total number of advertisements</th>
<th>State-sponsored advertisements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 1974</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 1975</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 1976</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 1977</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 1978</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 1979</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 1980</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 1981</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: All the issues of *Ahram* from 1974 until 1981

The use of the ‘crossing’ as an abbreviation for whole war victory Egypt achieved was associated with another metonymy, the 6\(^{th}\) of October. Rather than just concentrating on the six hours of the crossing to prove an Egyptian victory in the whole war, the paper also went a further to take the whole day as a metonymical representation of this victory. Within this metonymy, it is simple enough for the paper to refer to the war or Egypt’s victory as ‘October 6\(^{th}\)’ even without any associations or explanations. Therefore, ‘October the 6\(^{th}\) became so linguistically iconic and divorced from its temporal moorings. It is no longer necessary to add the year (1973) to its designation, simply uttering the words “6\(^{th}\) October” has been enough to communicate the significance of the whole event. In effect, the notation “October the 6\(^{th}\)” is no longer fixed in time or geography; it is rhetorical shorthand for the day of Egypt’s victory - a
date whose meaning is no longer contested in Egyptian collective memory.\textsuperscript{200} This is a recurring theme in discourse analysis. 9/11 is used to refer to the attacks in Washington and New York in 2001. Richard Jackson concluded that this could “not have been achieved without the powerful and continuous construction of the attacks as a special day of tragedy with its distinctive meaning”.\textsuperscript{201} Jackson has called this construction deliberate, since few remember the actual date of other events like the Omagh bombing in Northern Ireland, the Oklahoma City bombing, or even the start of the Rwandan genocide. “This is because there was not the same powerful discursive construction of those dates as something to be remembered and mythologised”.\textsuperscript{202}

On the editorial side in the \textit{Ahram}, several editorials said that the day of the crossing is so significant that the “future of the whole people depended on it” (p. 2, October 2, 1980). One exemplary editorial reads: “Then the decision to cross [the canal] on October 6 was taken on, much to demonstrate that Arabs restored their control over their destiny,” (p. 9 October 6, 1974). Space was also dedicated in the paper to ‘crossing’ as a civic phenomenon as well; for example it reported the popularity craze of the crossing to the extent of naming shops after it (p. 4, October 6, 1974). This theme will be expanded further in Chapter Five, however the key point being made here is that the phenomenon of the crossing moved across the broader socio-political milieu. The phenomenon became so entrenched to the extent that towns were named crossing, pointing to a larger socio-political movement to mark the landscape with beacons of reference and meaning.

\textsuperscript{200} Richard Jackson, \textit{Writing The War on Terrorism: Language, Politics And Counter-Terrorism} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), p. 33. Jackson made this reference to the 9/11 events.
\textsuperscript{201} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid.
On the other side, as the paper concentrated the meaning of victory into ‘the Egyptian crossing’, it employed the same term metonymically to convey the opposite meaning; i.e. Israeli crossing the same canal does not mean an ‘Israeli victory’. As a matter of fact, Israel had made its own crossings into Egyptian positions on the other side of the canal. If Egypt can claim ‘crossing the Suez Canal from west to east, Israel can claim crossing the same canal from the east to the west in large numbers. Indeed, there is a mass corpus of literature which contended Israel achieved a victory after its counter-crossing. The incident, which began on October 16, allowed Israeli forces to divide the Egyptian army and encircle thousands of its soldiers. Egypt was even forced to negotiate with Israel to allow supplies such as food to reach the besieged soldiers in the area around Suez. In the description of historian Arnold Blumsberg, the Israeli counter-attack was risky but brilliant as it nearly pushed Egypt’s surrounded Third Army to surrender. Although Israeli forces advanced to some 80 kilometers from the capital Cairo, the event was downplayed in the Ahram enough not to overshadow Egypt’s victory. The paper treated the Israeli crossing (henceforth thagra) in three ways. Firstly, it dismissed the thagra (which literally means a gap) as an act of desperation by a losing Israeli army. Heikal, the editor in chief, was the first to acknowledge the Thagra almost two weeks after its happening. He wrote that the impact of the thagra is “an act of desperation against a solid Egyptian front” (p. 1 & p. 3, October 28, 1973). The same meaning was conveyed elsewhere in the same issue, showing how buildings were destroyed after Israel fired internationally banned weapons on civilian targets as an “act of desperation” by a “losing” army (ibid, p. 8). Secondly, the thagra was trivialised as a mere act of propaganda. “The enemy seeks to distract attention from the main battle by infiltrating into the western bank of the canal,” ran one headline in the front page (p. 1, October 20, 1973). The second headline read: “All military reports agree that

203 Blumberg wrote on the thagra which had been managed by Israeli senior commanders such as Ariel Sharon: “In a brilliant though risky strike, General Ariel Sharon punched through the Egyptian lines, crossed Suez Canal and trapped the Egyptian Third Army… The Third Army was faced with surrender. In the North, the Israelis quickly recovered lost ground… [A]ll fighting stopped with a total military victory for Israel. The United Nations’ call for a ceasefire on October 23 saved Egypt and Syria from further humiliation”, Arnold Blumberg, The History of Israel (Westport, Conn.; London: Greenwood Press 1998), pp. 121-122.
the operations do not serve a strategic target and are doomed” (ibid.). The paper even quoted an Israeli analyst speaking on Israeli radio to call the infiltration “useless” (ibid.). Third, the reports on thagra were countered with a domineering discourse of massive and consistent Egyptian victories on other fronts. When the Israeli counter-attack continued, the paper gave a substantial number of column inches to the speech by Sadat unquestionably asserting the Egyptian victory. As pointed out above, the counter-attack was not mentioned for nearly two weeks, and only after the counter-attack (henceforth thagra which literally means a loophole) expanded enough to lead to the siege of Egypt’s Third Army. The paper simply denied the Israeli thagra’s occurrence and continuance. When mentioned during or after the war on the pages of Ahram, the thagra became a backdrop to of Egypt’s victory as if nothing happened to change the course of war. The paper quoted an Egyptian military spokesman as saying in the midst of the Israeli counter-attack: “A group of Israeli commandos were wiped out completely after they infiltrated into behind lines in the western bank of the Canal with seven tanks.” (p. 1, October 18, 1973).

The imbalance in coverage between the two crossings can be seen even clearer by selecting this crucial day of the war, October 20. Egypt was about to lose the whole war as revealed in a letter sent by Sadat that day to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Sadat told Hafiz Assad that he had to accept a ceasefire on the current positions of both Israeli and Egyptian forces, unlike earlier insistence on an Israeli withdrawal from Sinai as a precondition. Sadat, expressing his fears that with the US supporting Israel, “I cannot accept the responsibility before history for the destruction of our armed forces for a second time,” said at the end of the cable: “My heart bleeds to tell you this”. On this same day, Ahram disregarded these political and military

204 Heikal, October 73, p. 512.
205 Ibid.
developments. On its front page, it mentioned that “the enemy carried out operations of infiltrations but our forces face them courageously and make them incur losses” (p. 1, October 20, 1973). The report said that the Egyptian forces besieged the crossing Israeli forces in the western bank of the canal. It made it clear that the “infiltration has no effect at all”. The paper also gave it a front page space that Ariel Sharon, who commanded some soldiers involved with the thagra, “was injured seriously” in the operation. The paper also included two reports that Israel could not afford “to keep warring for more than 30 days”, (October 20, 1973, p. 3), as the war costs Israel “4.5 million Sterling every hour.” (ibid, p. 2). There is another story supported by images that showed foreign correspondents amidst the burnt out shells of Israeli helicopters and tanks allegedly downed or destroyed by the Egyptian army (p. 8). On the same page, there is an image of a sculpture showing Egyptian soldiers shouting and raising their heads up high, with the caption reading; “insisting on victory” (p. 8).

To sum up this point, Ahram employed this semantic and lexical relational form of metonymy, a concept or a thing is not called by its name but by the name of something associated in meaning with that thing or concept. Therefore, metonymy, as figurative and reductionist as it is, was used in the paper to construct the six hours of crossing the canal on the first day of the war as the declaration of Egypt’s victory in the whole war and to override all the consequences of earlier wars. Interestingly, the paper similarly used the same loose semantic form to construct the Israeli ‘crossing’ into Egyptian land as an Israeli declaration of defeat, a useless act of desperation and a mere show of cheap propaganda on a hollow victory.

Other than the territory claimed by Egypt as evidence of winning the war despite Israel’s territorial contestation after one week of its occurrence, Ahram established another indication of
Israel’s material loss: weapons and equipment. Below are headlines from the front pages of the newspaper during the whole month of October 1973. These headlines, further detailed in Appendix 1, are systematically taken from every single issue during the month of the war, October 1973, much to draw a pattern of continued Israeli ‘losses’ as if the war was a one-sided, definite victory for the Egyptians:

“Losses of the enemy on the Egyptian Front yesterday: 30 Jets, 32 tanks and large number of its armoured vehicles” (p.1., October 8, 1973)

“In the morning: A whole Israeli brigade was destroyed … In the afternoon: 102 tanks for the enemy were destroyed…” (p. 1., October 10, 1973)

“The enemy incurs heavy losses and seek to make up for them by pushing forward new forces.” (p. 1, October 19, 1973)

The paper, on the other hand, made minimal mention of the Egyptian army’s losses of equipment. Once mentioned, Egyptian losses had always been portrayed as non-fatal, superficial and ironically victorious. One example of these ‘victorious losses’ is mentioned in the October 12, 1973 issue. The front page of this issue lead with these headlines: “The Egyptian Air and Air Defence Forces incurred the enemy heavy losses in Phantom, Mirage and Sky Hawk jets, …The enemy lost on the Egyptian front alone 23 jets … Israel loses 11 dinghies near the Syrian coast” (p.1, October 12, 1973). Furthermore, the fourth page printed a small section, written with a smaller font, quoting an Egyptian army communiqué stating that “six Egyptian planes were hit” (ibid, p. 4.). Rather than providing any further information on these planes as they were just ‘hit’, the communiqué followed by stating that “four of the pilots [of these planes] parachuted safely”. (p. 4). Again, the communiqué left it vague whether more pilots were killed in the
war. On October 15, a disastrous time for Egyptian forces which incurred massive losses during their march into Sinai without any air cover, the paper carried all Egyptian army communiqués which showed that victory is still substantial, consistent and unquestioned. While there is a mention of “44 Israeli jets downed” (p. 5, October 15, 1973), only “2 of our jets were hit” (ibid.). As I explain further in the section below, Egyptian losses were also minimised and trivialised via the use of other linguistic features such as modality and transitivity. Therefore, the maximisation of Israel’s casualties and the minimisation of Egypt’s casualties can be taken as a pattern plentiful and ubiquitous at both official and editorial levels.

However, claiming victory on the basis of Israel incurring heavy materialistic losses ran against the facts and figures of the war, as plenty of sources indicate. For example, El-Shazly, the Chief of Staff during the war, said in his published memoirs that Israeli forces accounted for Egyptian army losses of 490 tanks from October 6 to October 15, 1973, contrasting with Israeli losses of 660 tanks.\footnote{Sa’adeddin El-Shazly, \textit{Muzakerat Harb October} (San Francisco: Dar Buhouth al-Sharq al-Awsat al-Amrikkiya, 2003), 4\textsuperscript{th} ed., http://download-laws-legal-pdf-ebooks.com/5699-free-book [accessed on May 1, 2013].} This is an indication that the discrepancy between Egyptian and Israeli losses was not as wide as \textit{Ahram} had portrayed, even in the early days of the war. In one day, October 14, and which is also known in Egypt as the “black Sunday”\footnote{Hussein El-Ashy, \textit{Khafaya Hisar al-Suez: Miaat Yawm Majhoula fi Harb October 1973} (Cairo: Dar al-Huriyya, 1990), p. 73.}, Egypt lost 250 tanks compared to 50 Israeli tanks. Furthermore, as Israeli forces advanced into land on the west bank on October 18, Egypt lost its entire 23\textsuperscript{rd} Brigade, leaving Egypt’s western bank naked with no tanks except for one brigade in Cairo.\footnote{El-Shazly, \textit{Muzakerat Harb October}, http://download-laws-legal-pdf-ebooks.com/5699-free-book [accessed on May 20, 2013].} On October 20, Israel destroyed many anti-aircraft missile defences and downed 19 Egyptian warplanes.\footnote{Ibid.} On October 23, when Israeli forces inflicted heavy casualties upon Egyptian infantry, El-Shazly described his experience at the scene: “I stood in
submission in front of these burnt tanks”. These losses admitted by the Egyptian Chief of Staff are corroborated by those provided by Israeli war historians, such as Chaim Hertzog, who put the Egyptian losses of one day, October 14, at 264 tanks against Israeli losses of 10 tanks, a large loss for the Egyptian army who had a total of 2,200 tanks. During the battles of that day, Israeli losses were minimal. In one battle, while the Egyptian 1st Mechanized Brigade had been destroyed, with 93 knocked-out tanks counted, Israel suffered only three tanks hit. Independent historians concur that Egypt ended the war with more losses in equipment and weapons than the Israelis. Baylis Thomas wrote that in the 19 days of combat Egypt lost 1,100 tanks to Israel’s 840; Egypt lost 223 aircraft and Israel 103.

‘Enemy’s Loss of Morale’

The second element to judge the victory from a Clausewitzian perspective is the ‘enemy’s loss of morale’, a loss which Ahram strenuously drove home in its dominant discourse on the 1973 War. I drew this element on the number of casualties incurred by both Egypt and Israel as an indicator of the morale of both sides. This indication is based on a hypothesis that human loss is associated with the general sentiment within the army. Ahram, throughout the 33 issues under study, made no mention of Egyptian or Arab losses against a focus on Israeli losses. On the contrary, there is a notable feature of regularity in Israel’s loss of soldiers killed or injured as a pattern which becomes obvious in these extracts from Ahram’s texts printed during the war, as below:

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210 Ibid.
212 Ibid.
“A report by the American United Press: convoys of helicopters transfer the casualties of the enemy to hospitals in Be’r al-Sabah, Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem…” (headline, p. 1, October 8)

“Egyptian commandos incurred Israel grave losses in equipment and a high number of casualties; and Egyptian forces went back to their position after carrying out this task with its members having incurred limited injuries”. (October 16, October 17)

On the opposite side, human losses for Egypt were almost none. During the whole period, there is not one single mention of Egyptian soldiers killed or captured during the war. During this month, the paper only mentioned that there were Egyptian soldiers who were injured. Yet again, those injuries were always shown to be superficial and incapable of affecting the celebratory mode of ‘victory’ form early on. Mohamed Oweis, one of Ahram’s reporters, wrote a story comprising a field report from what is named in the report as ‘the military hospital’ and a number of interviews with the soldiers injured in the war. The reporter quoted the hospital manager as saying that the “the number of those injured is small, and that the percentage of those seriously wounded is mentionless.” (p. 4, October 18, 1973). In this field report, there is no mention of the degree of the wounds incurred by those soldiers in the hospital nor the conditions that led to these incidents. The main emphasis in these interviews is on showcasing this ‘victorious’ mood either in the hospital or in the field, a conclusion that I reach through the sub-headlines of the story which consequently run as such: “We went to receive bullets with our chests”, “How we made them lose the air control”, and “How did we liberate the Qantara Sharq [occupied by Israel until the war]” (ibid.). Remarkably, there are no quotation marks used in these sub-headings, as if the reporter and the soldier become one. As will be explained further in the final section of this chapter, this mixture of direct and indirect quotations not only blurs the space between interviewer and interviewees in one single interview, but also allows the interviewer to add and remove from the text freely and with an upper hand to mute the
voice of the interviewee and follow the general editorial line of thought. In the same issue, there is a picture of Sadat’s wife visiting a brave-faced wounded soldier sitting in a hospital bed with no apparent signs of wounds (ibid, p. 8). Again, the image or the caption made no mention of either numbers or degrees of injury.

Egyptian soldiers killed or injured in the war only were only published each issue marking the anniversary of the war later on and within a context reminding the reader of the ‘heroism’ of those soldiers and of the ‘victory’ achieved in the war. Remarkably, giving space to those accounts of Egyptian soldiers wounded in the battle, not relatives of those Egyptian soldiers killed in it, adds to what Caldas Coulthard called the “fictionalisation of events”.214 In other words, Ahram gave voice to real persons and their stories, which gave veracity to the victory. Those soldiers bore superficial wounds enough to commemorate the war as a victory rather than talk about the circumstances and degrees of their injuries. On the other hand, the stories of those killed were de-individualised and their voices were muted and transformed into values such as martyrdom. In the 33 issues spanning the nine years of Sadat’s rule following the war, there is not one single interview with a relative of a war soldier killed in the battle, or even the mention of one single name of a fallen soldier.

Again, this patterning of Israel’s loss of morale due to bigger numbers of its soldiers killed or injured is derived from misinformation on the ground. For example, when the Israeli forces achieved thagra, morale went up, especially as “hundreds of Egyptian soldiers were killed,” according to El-Shazly who was the Egyptian Chief of Staff during the war.215 On October 24-

27, 80 Egyptian soldiers were killed and 42 others injured in ferocious battles to defend the governorate of Suez which was later besieged by Israeli forces.\textsuperscript{216} Israeli historians put the number of Arab soldiers killed in the war at 18,000 against 2,691 Israeli soldiers.\textsuperscript{217} However, these figures are controversial. Independent scholars such as Thomas said that Egypt had 7,000 killed or wounded, Israel 11,600, Syria 9,100\textsuperscript{218}. Regardless, these figures, as variable as they are, indicate that Egyptian casualties were not as minimal as \textit{Ahram} would have lead people to believe.

_The enemy’s ‘open admission of the above by giving up his intentions’_

The third Clausewitzian proof of the ‘victory of Egypt is that the enemy’s “open admission” of the loss of the material strength and morale in the war “by giving up his intentions”. Indeed, \textit{Ahram} worked hard to indicate this element in its coverage of the 1973 War. This element is based on two indicators. First, the paper has always implied that Israel ‘admitted’ defeat by surrounding the Egyptian army in massive numbers to. Second, the paper also showed that ceasefire, which obviously runs against claims of ‘giving up intentions’, was the result of Israel’s urgent appeal and humiliating request to stop the ferocious Egyptian onslaught. Below you will find an exposition of the two indicators and how they constituted the meaning of Egyptian victory.

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{218} Thomas, \textit{How Israel was won}, p. 203.
The first indicator revolves around surrender. In the early days in the war, Mohamed Basha, one of the military reporters on the war, quoted an Egyptian soldier as saying: “many [Israeli] men were running away from us or surrender themselves and their positions; and this is a fact confirmed by the number of POWS”. Basha also quoted another soldier as saying that the “surprise of our breakthrough was stunning to the enemy” (p. 4, October 9, 1973). The reporter made no mention of any facts or numbers or no names of positions the Egyptian army retook in Sinai or losses on the Egyptian side at all, much to keep the statements and quotations generalised as a total surrender of the Israeli army.

This generalised admission of defeat via surrender is repetitive and patterned. The front page story during the war said that in just one morning an entire Israeli brigade “surrendered” (p. 1, October 10, 1973). As the war continued, this ‘pattern’ of Israeli surrender increased. In one issue, there is a picture of Israeli soldiers who “surrendered yesterday after their fortified base was besieged” (p. 1, October 14, 1973). On the following page, there is another picture showing “an Israeli commander handing the white flag to an Egyptian officer as a symbol of peace and raising hand for a military salute” (ibid, p. 2). On the same page, there is a picture of a number of Egyptian soldiers raising their flag on new positions taken from the Israeli army. (ibid, p. 3). The paper also published a story entitled “5 officers and 32 soldiers got out of their positions in surrender”. This is how the reporter, Mohamed Uwais began his piece: “For the first time in the history of battles between Israel and the Arabs, a whole well-fortified Israeli position surrendered including its soldiers and commanders ... the Israeli commander admitted defeat” (ibid, p. 5). Further humiliation for Israel, Ahram showed that this surrender was one-sided. The paper reported, for example, that Israel “abducted a number of local residents of the Canal region to claim they are POWs. It is an attempt to show the outside world that Israel has a large number of Egyptian POWS” (p. 1., October 29, 1973). Also, Israel “violates Geneva
Convention in a desperate attempt to know the number of its POWS in the fighting,” (p. 1, October 30, 1973).

Since admission is an act of self-confession, the paper also kept reporting it in quotes and first person narrative. According to Carmen Rosa Caldas-Coulthard, the use of quotes as a layer of the narrative level in the text is a “strategy of authorial detachment and approximation of reader and character”.219 This not only changes the perspective of telling, but also adds factuality to the discourse.220 However, this factuality is a fiction because the quoted material is still produced by the writer of the article who interprets it according to her or his point of view.221 This holds true in accounts of the war. Ahram used this indirect narrative as well to add factualised elements to the narrative. Israeli sources were quoted as confessing defeat in several verbal processes substantiating this admission. In other words, it is Israeli commanders and soldiers’ own decision to admit defeat, not a judgment of paper that claims such an admission. Below are some examples that were randomly taken from the text under study:

_ “Dayan Admits Losses Incurred and positions Lost” (p.1, October 7, 1973)


220 Ibid.
“According to Moshe Dayan the Minister of Defence of Israel in this war, some Israeli commanders had had to slap their scared soldiers on their faces in order to hold up in their positions” (p. 1, October 6, 1979).

Again, this portrayal by Ahram runs against testimonies of what happened on the ground or original statements misquoted in the Ahram. El-Shazly said that “thousands” of Egyptian soldiers “were taken prisoner even without fighting” after the Israeli forces began their crossing of the canal.222 Meir, the Israeli premier at the time, claimed the upper hand in the exchange of POWS. She said in a speech before the Knesset that the “government of Israel has decided to demand an immediate exchange of prisoners”.223 Published documents substantiate her position. Although Egypt had not announced any exact figures, agreements between the two sides show that Israel submitted a list of 6,796 Egyptian POWs to the Red Cross as Egypt handed over a list of 46 Israeli POWs.224 El-Shazly also roughly affirmed these accounts. Also, claims that Israeli soldiers had “surrendered” on such a massive scale and their commanders had admitted defeat as an act of submission and cowardice, as reported in the Ahram, were debunked by more credible independent sources. For example, the Agranat Commission, a national inquiry set up to investigate failings in the Israeli army in the war, authorised by the Knesset and charged with assigning blame for the shortcomings in the war, made more than one mention of the “unsurpassed manifestations of sacrifice and bravery” of army soldiers.225

The other indicator of Egyptian victory by showing that Israel gave up its intentions is that the defeated enemy is forced into signing a peace agreement. This ceasefire agreement on October

224 See the minutes of the Egyptian Israeli military meeting on November 1, 1973, cited in Heikal, October 73, pp. 619-622 (p. 621).
225 The Israel-Arab Reader, pp. 163-166 & p. 164.
22, 1973, and other peace deals are portrayed by *Ahram* as putting an end to Israel’s ambition to continue occupying the Egyptian territory or even fighting a war with Egypt again. Amidst these peace overtures, the paper intensively and repeatedly quoted Sadat as saying "the October War is the last war". This interpretation is always linked to this statement with official claims that this peace agreement is a byproduct of Egypt’s “military prowess and victory in battlefield”. (p. 8, October 6, 1982.). Kamal Hassan Ali, the Minister of Defence was also given half a page for his press interview in which he confirmed that “the October War proved that security is in peace, not in owning land” (p. 5, October 6, 1979).

The message that Israel had had to give up intentions of territorial expansion in return for peace with the victorious Egypt was repeated in a patterned and recurring manner. The paper issued a three-page supplement marking the war under the title “war is producing the fruit of its labours: peace” (October 6, 1978). Mohamed El-Said Idris noted in an opinion article that the “surprise of October made Israel for the first time able to grasp the facts of history” (p. 3., October 6, 1979). Idris added that the October War “achieved its targets”. These targets were to keep Egypt victorious by engaging in "politics by other means”, to use the Clausewitzian phrase. Therefore, Egypt remains the enabling actor in this power relationship relating to talks with Israel. Lewis Awad, a prominent literary figure, noted in the same issue that the strong people “are those not only with sword but also with wisdom, forgiveness and calling or peace…” (ibid, p. 3.).

This strategy of constructing a victory out of the supposed defeat of Israel – demonstrated by their willingness to hold a ceasefire – ran contrary to what happened in reality. As the ceasefire was agreed and took effect on October 22, 1973, Israel was the one party which continued
violating the agreement, advancing almost 35 kilometres into Egyptian territory and tightening
their encirclement around the besieged Egyptian Third Army. On October 24, 1973, Hafiz
Ismail, the Defence Minister of Egypt, told a special cabinet-based committee that “the
situation is deteriorating, and Israel continues to break ceasefire,” expressing fears that “Cairo
itself can be threatened as the Israeli army is advancing into the Suez-Cairo road.” Hafiz
Badawy, the parliament speaker, nodded in agreement and said that “the situation is
collapsing,” and Abdel-Aziz Kamel, the Deputy Prime Minister, even suggested to “keep
fighting even it requires transferring the capital to the south [of Egypt].” Egypt also was the
one side which was keen to demonstrate commitment to ceasefire in an attempt to make Israel
allow for the provision of non-military supplies such as water and medicine to the besieged
Egyptian Third Army. When the ceasefire was announced, Israeli leaders also showed
triumph. Meir told MPs in a statement to the Knesset on October 23 that, far from admitting
defeat: “The aggressors were thrown back. Considerable portions of their forces were
destroyed, and the I.D.F [Israeli Defence Forces] broke through and crossed the ceasefire
lines.” Meir highlighted that Israel was not the one “who made approaches concerning a
ceasefire” since its forces are making achievements on the frontline. Therefore she insisted
that Israel be the one who enforced their conditions before accepting a ceasefire. Israel had
stuck to its conditions, earlier rejected by Egypt, including “remaining in the position they [the
Israeli army] hold at the time when the ceasefire goes into effect.” Meir also said that the
ceasefire “shall ensure the prevention of a blockade or interference with free navigation,
including oil tankers in the Bab el-Mandab straits on their way to Eilat”, which can be taken

226 Heikal, October 73, p. 569
227 Ibid, p. 570.
228 Ibid, pp. 572-573.
229 The Israel-Arab Reader, p. 157.
231 Ibid, p. 152.
as an achievement since this meant that Egypt no longer had full control of the straits as had been the case prior to the war.

Indeed, due to this diplomatic actuality, it was Egypt which had been keen on giving up intentions, in a Clausewitzian expression on victory representation, or to keep on fighting. On October 16, 1973, Sadat said that his country would accept a ceasefire only on the condition of the Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied territories to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines. The conditional ceasefire draft was also presented to the Security Council, but the council issued a resolution announcing a ceasefire without such a condition set by Sadat. As Egyptian conditions did not materialise, Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban took the resolution as a “staggering victory” since it stipulated Arab acceptance of negotiations, which was again another demand earlier rejected by Sadat, at least publically. Again, the statements of Eban and Meir accord with Egyptian admission of desperately seeking a ceasefire. On October 20, 1973, three days before Meir’s speech Ahmed Ismail, the Egyptian Defence Minister, appealed to Sadat: “if you find a way for an honourable ceasefire, it is favourable to accept it in order not to expose the army and the country to inevitable dangers.” These dangers referred to the grim reality of 45,000 soldiers, 250 tanks, together with the city of Suez, that were completely cut off. There were even a few instances in which Egyptian units “disintegrated in combat.” The whole army became easy prey for the continued attacks mounted by the Israeli army which was in full control of the airspace as the Egyptian army had lost the protection of their surface-to-air missile system. On the same day of talking to Ismail, Sadat sent a letter to Assad telling him “my heart bleeds as I tell you” that Egypt accepted ceasefire and would attend a peace conference for settling the crisis.

Desperate for a ceasefire, Sadat, who also suffered from public pressure as the whole city of Suez suffered from basic needs such as food and water, asked for foreign monitors, and later for a US-Soviet force, to ensure Israeli compliance with a ceasefire. In light of these appeals, the Israeli government sent a message to Egypt asking for “direct military talks not meant to humiliate Egypt or force it into surrender.” This appeal from Sadat for a ceasefire came as the Soviets, Egypt’s main ally and supplier of weapons in the war, “realised that the destruction of the Egyptian Third Army would mean a clear-cut defeat for a country they had supported.”

Chaim Herzog explained that it was also about Russian prestige, “which would suffer if such a client country, armed with Soviet weapons and equipment, were again to suffer a decisive military defeat”. On the other hand, Henry Kissinger was also keen to use rescuing the Egyptian army as a bargaining chip in any final arrangements between the two sides.

Indeed, the ceasefire was to be used by the US to allow Sadat to remain in power on the claim of achieving victory in the war. The assertion is made by Dayan who said the US pushed for a ceasefire since “a continuation of the war would lead to the radicalisation of Arab world, to the fall of moderate governments, and their replacement by extremist regimes.”

Noticeably, Ahram completely ignored this grim reality, and even altered Meir’s comments by quoting statements she did not make. Meir was quoted as saying that a ceasefire should be accepted as its rejection would “make Israel facing ‘great responsibilities’ that it could not probably handle” (p. 2, October 23, 1973). After reviewing the script of Meir’s speech it

238 El-Ashy, p. 168.
239 Ibid, p. 783.
240 Ibid, p. 584.
242 Ibid.
243 Ibid.
244 Dayan, Story of My Life, p. 538.
became clear that *Ahram* constructed this quote as no such statement was ever uttered. Instead, the only way to understand this twist in the speech is for *Ahram* to accord it with its general narrative on the Egyptian victory. This can be proven by broadly probing the content of the same issue in which Meir’s comments were altered. On the front page in this issue, the paper wrote that “losses of the enemy yesterday equal all its losses during several days of ferocious tank battles” (ibid, p. 1). *Ahram*’s research center, the *Ahram* Center for Political and Strategic Studies, in a separate report also sent home the same message that the ceasefire could not have been possible had not “Egypt carried out this great military achievement” (ibid, p. 5). Furthermore, the paper also wrote that as Egypt is portrayed as accepting the ceasefire from a position of power, Tel Aviv accepted the Security Council resolution hurriedly even “before the Security Council session began,” as one report headlined in this issue (ibid, p. 2). A statement from the Egyptian presidency was given space on the front page and highlighted in bold. According to the the paper, the statement read that it was the “great and glorious performance of the Egyptian armed forces which only broke the freezing of the crisis, changed the real situation” (ibid, p.1). This position in the issue is not an exception when it is intertextually compared with later issues. Although the Israeli army kept encircling Suez and besieging the Third Army, the paper reported that the ruling Socialist Party General Secretariat, chaired by Sadat, as insisting in a statement that Egypt had agreed to the resolution “from the position of power and as a natural result of its brave military action” (p. 4, October 24, 1973). The issue also showed “a number of the enemy tanks in Defreswar [where Israeli forces infiltrated into the canal’s west bank] after being destroyed and turned into a debris thanks to direct strikes” (ibid, p .1).

To sum up, the discourse of an Egyptian *massive and consistent victory* was based on three main indicators outlined by Clausewitz. First of all, Egyptian forces made material gains in two
areas: territory in the name of the Suez Canal’s eastern bank and weapons, and second, Israel was portrayed as a defeated army with low morale due to the massive number of its soldiers killed or injured. Third, the Israeli army gave up its intentions as its soldiers surrendered, its commanders admitted defeat and its politicians appealed for a ceasefire to stop the flow of Egyptian attacks. Inasmuch as these elements of the massive and consistent victory macro theme make well-composed credible particular commemorative collectivities on the war, they had to erase the very possibility of rival collectivities on the same war. This means the dominance of the macro theme in the text through a charged language of radical binaries left no space for opposing voices. For example, El-Shazly, always taken as a credible and competent chief of staff until now, was not mentioned after his disagreement with Sadat on how to crush Israel’s counter-attack during the war. From 1973 until 1981, El-Shazly was almost erased from the Ahram narrative.

1.2. War Religionised/Miraclised

This macro theme is concerned with the dominant appropriation of frames on religion and miracles in representations of the 1973 War in the Ahram. The first part of this section provides a theoretical grounding for the significance of this theme to re-appropriate the war meanings. The second part divides this use of religion and miracles four master frames: divine victory, historical analogy, the Tekbir effect and what I call the miraclisation of the war to demonstrate how the state forcefully bestowed a miracle status on the event. The section concludes that the use of the religious frames in the war discourse is a patterned constant in the newspaper.

The role of religion and miracles is significant for a number of reasons. First, portraying the Egyptian victory as religious and a miracle sacralises it and immunises it against any ‘earthly’
doubts or scepticism. In other words, the power of religion makes any questioning of the war or its results impossible. According to David Hume in his seminal work, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, religion sacrifices what is imagined for what is real; a religious person “imagine[s] what he sees has no reality: he may know his narrative to be false, yet perseveres with it, with the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause.”\(^{245}\)

Secondly, miracles, which religions mostly draw on as evidence, add to this scriptural authority over a human being since “the passion of surprise and wonder, arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency towards the belief of these events, from which it is derived.”\(^{246}\)

Third, religion or miracles are untestable; i.e. they need no proof since they depend on ‘untestable’ supernatural metaphysical evidence. As a violation of the laws of nature, religion and miracles are themselves considered external evidences that act as proof against proof. Fourth, in a society such as Egypt’s, the role of religion and miracles achieves further importance not only because Egyptians are taken as religious, but also because the prevalence of illiteracy and the lack of proper education. Therefore, “miracles abound” in “ignorant nations.”\(^{247}\)

Fifth, religion and miracles have historically enacted the power to normalise and legitimise what is political. For example, early Muslims needed miracles to “establish the particular system to which it is attributed” and to “overthrow every other system.”\(^{248}\) In destroying other systems, “it likewise destroys the credit of these miracles, on which that system was established.”\(^{249}\)

The utility of religion and specifically miracles is crucial to this discourse because it illustrates how *Ahram* not only built its discourse on a *miracilised* representation of the Egyptian army, but also how it used this theme to disprove the earlier miracle of Israel’s victory in 1967. Lastly, although Hume admitted that religion and miracles run against common sense and human testimony, he admitted that they enjoy wide acceptance

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\(^{246}\) Ibid.

\(^{247}\) Ibid, p. 125.

\(^{248}\) Ibid, p. 128.

\(^{249}\) Ibid.
as they meet the “propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvellous.” Ahram’s adherence to this propensity served as one of the main strongpoints in its discursive representation of the 1973 War.

_Divine Victory_

_Ahram_ treated the 1973 War as a divine victory. This divinity is expressed through citing verses of the Quran too much and too often from the first day of the war until the end of Sadat’s era on October 6, 1981. In almost every issue released during the war, verses from the Muslim holy book were mentioned in the text. Below, and in Appendix 2, are examples of this ‘pattern’ in the month of the war:

_ Ahmed Ismail, the minister of war, asked his soldiers to keep fighting in a statement that included a Quraanic verse literally saying ‘if you boost the victory of Allah, he will make you victorious’ (p. 5, October 9, 1973).

_An Arabic-written calligraphy is published in which the Quraanic verse ‘our soldiers will are victorious’ is drawn (p. 8, October 11, 1973).

_The state-run the Federation of Egyptian Industries asked Egyptian soldiers to keep on fighting, citing a Quraanic verse that says ‘victory is only from Allah,’ (p. 3, October 13, 1973)

What is remarkable in these quotes is the pattern in which the same verses, or verses with the same meanings, were mentioned again and again. All their meanings centred on binaries of victory/defeat, believers/atheists, and righteousness/falsehood. These binaries could not have been made without the blessing of the state or the editorial board of _Ahram_.

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250 Ibid, p. 123.
One week after the war, *Ahram* published a speech of Sadat in which he cited a Quraanic verse repeatedly mentioned in previous issues: “if you boost the victory of Allah, he will make you victorious” (p. 4, October 17, 1973). Many of the state-sponsored advertisements gave prominence to similar verses. The governorate of Qalyoubiya published an advertisement including this verse: “…It is a duty on is to bring victory to *mu’meneen* [believers]” (p. 8, October 31, 1973). Similarly, in a quote provided above, the Minister of Defence also included verses of the same meaning in a statement made on October 9. Editorially, columnists and op-ed writers conveyed the same meanings in texts full of Quraanic verses. For example, the paper hosted prominent scholars Abdel-Aziz Kamel and Bint El-Shatei (three times in less than two weeks). Both scholars made 24 Quraanic references in their five pieces of writing published in the newspaper. Bint El-Shatei ended her column with a Quraanic verse showing that Allah always supports those ‘who fight for the sake of God’ in him (p. 5, October 13, 1973). Just three days later, another op-ed for Bint El-Shatei repeated the same rhetoric and cited three Quraanic verses on the same meaning of fighting a religious-like war (p. 4, October 16, 1973).

Nevertheless, and after the war ended, there is almost no mention of Quraanic verses at all, although the state remained in control of both the editorial and advertorial line of *Ahram*. Strikingly, religiosity turned out to be linked not with the war or the army, but with the President himself as *Al-Rais al-Mu’min* (the faithful president), a point which will be expanded further in the section on the personification/personalisation of the war.

Since this was a divine victory as outlined by *Ahram* and located within the state narrative, the fighting was no longer between armies but between Muslims and Jews, a conclusion one can draw after analysing *Ahram* texts. These comparisons represent Israel as the historical and

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251 This point will be continued further in Chapter Five
religious quintessential ‘other’ in this oppositional relationship. The fact that Israel has considered itself a Jewish state since its creation in 1948 adds relevance to these religious links and connotations drawn from the Quran which, on occasion, refer to historical incidents in which Jews had been the archenemy of early Muslims. In one example, an open letter was published and directed at the Israeli soldier with a mention of several religious historical connotations. The writer, Hatem Sadiq, said in one reference: “What had brought you to this land in which God judged on Bani Israel to get lost for 40 years and in which your grandfathers perished” (p. 5, October 11, 1973). As mentioned above, the text always add this metaphorical holiness to the war by quoting directly from the Quran, whose verses also refer to the clash between Muslims and Jews. On one occasion, there is a verse that promised godly support for those who ‘believe in Allah’ against the ‘non-believers’ (p. 5, October 13, 1973). Another Quraanic verse described Egyptian soldiers as “the soldiers of Allah” and therefore should be therefore “rewarded with victory” (ibid.). The metaphor, mentioned in an advertisement sponsored by the Public Syndicate for Educational and Health Services, was augmented by a Quraanic verse which says ‘God should bring victory to those who believe in him’ (p. 5, October 11, 1973).

Portraying Egyptian soldiers as those of ‘Allah’ was repeated several times either directly (p. 3, October 24, 1973) or indirectly (p. 8, October 23, 1973). Meanwhile, Israeli army soldiers were similarly portrayed as ‘the enemies of Allah’. This is meaning could not be more observable than in a poem published by Ahram and written by renowned actor Youssef Wahbi. In the poem, entitled ‘God is with us’, Wahbi wrote:

God is with us…

The Symbol of Heroism, bravery and Iman (faith), …

252 For further details see Kai Borrmann, Jews in the Quran (Berlin: Books On Demand, 2010).
I extend my thank you and appreciation

As for our enemies, the enemies of God, ....

And the sufferers of the God-given condemnation

God is with us. (p. 8, October 15, 1973)

_ ‘Historical Analogy’_

Part of identifying the 1973 War with religion is to link it with Islamic history, i.e. finding similarities between this event and other events back in the golden era of Islam. Below are some examples which tended to be repeated during the war. The comparison with the invasion of Badr, the 3rd time Prophet Muhammad led an expedition in which Muslims beat the idolaters and thus regained their military reputation and managed to impose their presence over the whole of Arabia. Bint El-Shatei, the prominent literary figure and op ed writer at Ahram, drew the comparison and even claimed that Egyptian soldiers in the war were supported by “the Badr soldiers, that first brigade in which Islam took over and beat the despots of atheism” (p. 5, October 13, 1973).

Comparison was also made with other events which had occurred in Ramadan, the holy month, the same month in the Islamic calendar in which the October War occurred. Bint El-Shatei made another analogy in a different issue, where she compared the October War to the ‘Mecca Conquest’ by Muhammad in 632, one of the greatest events in the history of Islam (p. 5, October 16, 1973). The same scholar also made links between the October War and the *Lailat al-Qadr* religious anniversary (variously rendered in English as the Night of Destiny and is in Islamic belief the night when the first verses of the Quran were revealed to the Islamic prophet Muhammad around the last ten days of Ramadan). Coinciding with the time of the war, the
anniversary is a reminder that Allah has “soldiers who seek to protect high values and ideals!” and therefore those soldiers would “realise victory in the war” (p. 5, October 21, 1973).

Two days after the war, *Ahram* marked in a prominent space at the end page the anniversary of the *Ein Jallut* battle (p. 8, October 8, 1973). The battle is a very significant event in Islamic history since it marked the first time in which a Mongol advance had ever been permanently beaten back in direct combat on the battlefield. The comparison resonates as the *Ein Jalut* took place in 1260 in south-eastern Galilee, which is now Israel. That *Ahram* celebrated the 712 anniversary of this historic battle, which is not normal in a paper usually celebrating these anniversaries by a decade or a century, adds reasoning to linking Islamic history to the 1973 ‘victory’ discourse. During the war, the paper also published a separate article, counting the Muslim victories which had happened during the month of Ramadan, such as the Mecca conquest, the Andalus conquest, the Saladin liberation of Palestine (p. 8, October 14, 1973). Although the story did not make a direct link with the October 1973 War, it was published alongside a painting in which these words were inscribed: “*Allahu Akbar*; Victory is for us. Allah; we wait for the victory you had promised us” (ibid.).

To sum up this element, my contention is that the state, as evident in state-sponsored advertisements, and *Ahram*, as evident in its selection of hosts and adoption of editorial line, took the 1973 War as a ‘holy’ event, an adoption which depended on the overuse of Quraanic verses and historical analogy. This holiness, carried out in the guise of Quraanic verses and analogous with early days of Islam, simply means that it would be sacrilege to criticise the 1973 War.

_ The Tekbir effect_
Attributing the war victory to religious elements is very obvious through the rhetorical repetition of *Allahu Akbar* [God is the greatest]. The phrase of *Allahu Akbar*, known as a *Tekbir*, is very significant for Muslims as it is used in various contexts, such as formal prayers, the call for prayer and an expression of faith. The argument runs that it was repeatedly mentioned as the Egyptian soldiers crossed the canal on October 6, 1973. Nevertheless, its use turned hyperbolic enough to draw the whole victory on the *Tekbir*.

Three weeks after the war, the paper published a picture of Sadat surrounded by supporters while on his way to the Cairo-based Hussein Mosque for Friday prayers. The caption said that the supporters chanted ‘*Allahu Akbar*’; and ‘Victory for our soldiers’ (p. 1, October 27, 1973). Along with pictures, advertisements dominated by state sponsors were also quite prevalent. These advertisements congratulated the President on the ‘victory’. The public company, *Misr leil Taamin*, sponsored an advertisement starting at the top with the phrase *Allahu Akbar*. The advertisement hailed the Egyptian soldiers raising flag on the other side of the canal after crossing while shouting the same phrase, *Allahu Akbar* (p. 8, October 17, 1973).

The pattern of attributing victory to the *Allahu Akbar* phenomenon continued throughout the remaining years of Sadat. Another prominent medium was state-sponsored advertisements. The governorate of Menoufiyya sponsored an advertisement, marking the war anniversary and citing *Allahu Akbar* (p. 6, October 6, 1974). In this same issue, there are dozens of advertisements which carry the same frame phrase. The Ministry of Electricity, on the first anniversary if the war, published a one-page advertisement in which it repeated the story of the crossing in one whole page including the shouts of *Takbir* (p. 7, ibid). As *Allah* is the one who
brought victory to the Egyptians, the latter accordingly have to protect the consequences of this victory by being closer to God.

The Tekbir was not a thematic structure on the sidelines along with materialistic supremacy mentioned earlier. On the contrary, it occupied the centre stage as it was even adopted by editors and senior writers at the paper. Youssef El-Siba’i, the Editor-in-Chief and a prominent novelist known for his ‘love stories’, built his argument in his column about one incident by saying: “Just crossing while shouting Allahu Akbar, [the soldiers] restored their belief that ‘God is the greatest’” (p. 1, October 6, 1977). In the same issue, one of the military correspondents of the paper recounts the details of one battle between Egyptian and Israeli soldiers in Sinai: “[Egyptian soldiers shouted] Allahu Akbar, [then] the first rocket hit a tank … Allahu Akbar and the second rocket hit a tank … and before the enemy realised what happened the third tank exploded” (ibid). The following year, a whole page was dedicated to convince the readers that “believing in Allahu Akbar was the strongest weapon by which we won the October War” (p. 13, October 6, 1978). The discourse was even supported by secular voices such as Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz. Mahfouz said that the first lesson to be learnt after realising victory is that the role of “Iman [Faith] in the struggle” since we fight and live “by the blessing of God and for the sake God which we should support” (p. 1, October 25, 1973). Mahfouz reminded readers that Egypt has been “the bed of Godly messages and the square of Jihad for messengers and prophets” (ibid.).

Along with this intellectual blessing, the rhetoric of the ‘religionised’ war was also augmented by official approval of the biggest and most influential religious institutions in the country, the Azhar, the highest religious Sunni authority in the world, and the Coptic Church representing the 10 percent non-Muslims in the country. Sheikh Al-Azhar Abdel-Haleem Mahmoud said
that the October War was a “sacred battle” and a “fight of *Aqida* [Islamic principles]” (p. 6, October 25, 1973). He even found the victory as a path to ‘liberating the Aqsa Mosque as well” along with restoring occupied land (ibid.) Just two days after the war, the paper gave prominence to two statements by Sheikh of Al-Azhar and the Coptic Pope Shenouda in which both of them pledged support for Sadat and his army until “they cleanse the land from any aggressors” (p. 4, October 8, 1973). During the war, the war-related activities of the Sheikh of Azhar were given prominence in the newspaper. The newspaper reported several times that he visited the injured (p. 5, October 12 & p. 4, October 27, 1973). The Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs, an institution related to Azhar, published an issue named ‘Al-Jihad’, in which the titles are revealing: one title quoted from the Quran says “our soldiers are the winners”, while others read “Jihad is a Law of Life”, “The Month of Quran” and the “month of Victory” (p. 8, October 21, 1973).

Ironically, the same role of religion which undermines the ‘materialistic’ military achievements in the war brings in other ‘material’ benefits such as money. With the beginning of the war, the state launched bonds, fittingly named ‘Jihad Bonds’, as a “positive contribution in the battle of Victory and Liberation” p. 5, October 15, 1973). They were massively popular, as *Ahram* reported. Prime Minister Abdel-Aziz Hegazi was reported as ordering EGP 50 million of Jihad Bonds to be issued “for Arab, Islamic and friendly nations for people to buy” (ibid.). The campaign for the ‘Jihad Bonds’ was so big that advertisements for it were published almost every day in the paper. Playing on the same religious sentiments in an empowering manner, one advertisement read that it was the “role of the citizen in the battle to buy them” (p. 5, October 24, 1973). “Although these bonds were issued in March [1973], they were popular after the war,” said Salah Abdel-Aziz of the Central Bank which issued the bonds in statements carried by Ahram (p. 8, October 24, 1973). Along with this popularity, Abdel-Aziz said that
state bodies are the ones who boosted this popularity among individuals, mentioning the example of the army which acquired EGP 30,000 worth of bonds (ibid.). Interestingly, the advertisements for these bonds mixed nationalistic goals such as they are the “weapon for bringing victory to Egypt and the Arab nation” (p. 5, October 24, 1973) and a need to “liberate homeland” (p. 7, October 25, 1973) with religious overtones such as highlighting in the advertisement itself Quraanic verses promising “God’s support in return for your support to Him” (p. 1, October 27, 1973).

_Miraclising the war_

Since religion plays a pivotal role in constructing the 1973 War as a divinely ordained victory realized by the divinely blessed leadership and army, miracles stand out as a prominent part of the religionising of victory. Religion is based in faith because it requires a kind of miracle which includes a willing subversion of natural reason and assent to its beliefs which sometimes run against common sense. The following section will describe how miracles were used in the narrative constructed by Ahram.

First of all, the 1973 War was directly called a ‘miracle’ from the beginning. Tawfiq Hakim wrote that the war “was a miracle” (p. 1, October 6, 1975). Depending on this sense of wonder and surprise that the miracle can bring out, Hakim titled his column: ‘The return of Consciousness’ (ibid.). Such direct references to the war as a miracle were also repeated several times during the remaining years of Sadat. The following examples, which are also explained in further detail in Appendix 3, are illustrative of how the war as a miracle frame dominated the narrative during the war:
Again, miraclising the war was blessed both by officialdom and the editors of Ahram. This is one of editorials of the paper: “This war brought Arabs from backwardness to civilization … And Arabs joined the US, Russia, China …and became the sixth strongest [nation] in the world” (p. 1, October 6, 1979). On the same page where the quote mentioned above was published, Ahram quoted Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil as saying “October victory will be always remembered by coming generations as a source of power and inspiration” (p.1, ibid). Conspicuously, neither in this issue nor the previous one is included any discussion of the terms of the Camp David Accords with Israel signed in September 1973, let alone had it published the terms of these accords. Sadat also said in one of his speeches early in the war that “what happened was a miracle by any military standards” (p. 3, October 20, 1973).

Since miracles are meant to face down other ‘counter-miracles’- to use Discourse Analysis’s dialectical approach drawn from binary linguistics and Hume’s oppositional concept on its genealogy as referred to above - Egypt’s miracle of a victory had been painted as overrunning Israel’s miracle of having an ‘invincible army’. The miracle, as an act against natural law, was based on the fact that the Israeli army managed to defeat a group of Arab soldiers in both 1948, leading to the creation of Israel, and even crushed an army as big as Egypt’s in 1967 in just six days. Ahram showed that the Israeli miracle drawn on invincibility was shattered by this new one created by Egypt in the 1973 War. Remarkably, within the atmosphere of Egypt’s own miracle in 1973, the paper downgraded the miracle of Israel into a ‘myth’ due to the implication of the 1973 War. The Israeli miracle always concentrated on the ‘invincibility’ of its army, especially after it had crushed Arab armies in the 1967 war in less than a week. The 1973 War
came not to override the Israeli miracle. These are some examples: “[This is the best and most glorious days of us… The myths of the enemy broke down” (p. 11, October 1975), the war “broke the Israeli vanity” (p. 4, ibid), and the War “broke the myth of Israel’s military supremacy” (p. 3, October 6, 1978)

To sum up and further substantiate these claims of patterning by Ahram and the state to link the war victory to both religion and miracles, it is very suitable to end up with an official statement issued by the army itself only three days after the war occurred:

In the name of Allah, the beneficent the merciful. Oh, the soldiers of Allah, Prophet [Muhammad] are with us in the battle. One of the pious men saw while asleep that the Prophet, clad in white and accompanied by the Sheikh of al-Azhar, pointed his finger forward and said, ‘come with me to Sinai’. It was said that some pious people saw the Prophet walking among soldiers with a smile on his face and an array of light in his surroundings. Oh, soldiers of Allah, it is clear that Allah is with You.  

The day on which this statement was issued by the army also witnessed statements by the official Muslim and Christian establishments to vow the support of the “sha’ab mu’min” (the faithful people) until the end of the enemy’s “aggression” (p. 4, October 8, 1973).

1.3. War Personified/ Personalised

The act of war, a difficult time as it is, is always in a need of “charismatic leader” who, in the words of Knut Bergmann and Wolfram Wickert, helps to “give a sense of direction both at the

253 Heikal, Al-Tariq eilla Ramadan, p. 256.
Sadat played this role, as Ahram had portrayed in all instances below. However, my argument is that Sadat benefitted from the war to the extent that he became the message or the platform more than the war, victory, or the resultant peace did. Since this war ended with a substantial and consistent victory blessed by God and full of miracles and heroism, the two previous macro themes help establish this third macro theme for the end result of sustaining the charisma and legitimacy of Sadat. As Arthur Schweitzer argues, the ability to sustain charismatic leadership is dependent on extraordinary deeds, and this is mainly demonstrated in times of war when the leader gains possession of heroic charisma. On legitimacy, Hackman and Johnson added that through such deeds charismatic leaders can gain public support by helping their followers, “experience feelings of empowerment by submerging their own identities in that of a seemingly superior leader”. The rule of this leader is also legitimised since it exists beyond any questioning or criticism due to extraordinary deeds. Accordingly, Ahram constituted a good source for this argument by linking the three macro themes as such: The victory which was massive and consistent because Sadat was leader and the victory was religionised and miracled as he was faithful and even godly.

This section is divided into two parts: the first shows how the war added visibility to Sadat as the ‘hero of war’, while the second illustrates how the consequences of the war led to a new visibility for him also as the ‘hero of peace’. The first theme of visibility will be called personification, since Sadat became the identity marker of the whole action of the war and the ‘victory’ realised. The second visibility will be termed personalisation since contention runs that the state restructured the whole discourse to personalise its workings to accommodate new.

256 Hackman and Johnson, Leadership, p. 113, cited in Khatib, Matar and Shaer, p. 87.
257 Ibid.
policies that even contrasted with the war rhetoric during the war. These policies mainly include negotiations with the defeated enemy as predominantly framed during the war.

Sadat was war personified. It was a war which he decided to launch and a victory which he secured; this is how *Ahram* portrayed the event throughout Sadat’s rule. The war and victory were also personalised after the war. In other words, the event was used to accommodate new meanings for peace after the war, as the second part of this section will demonstrate.

**War Personified**

Below are examples from one single issue of *Ahram* to show this personification as a deliberate and well-coordinated campaign. In almost all of these advertisements, sponsored and signed off mostly by state bodies, Sadat is mentioned either in name or picture or both as the maker of this victory:

- The Suez Canal Authority sponsored an advertisement dedicated to “the maker of the liberation and crossing decision... President Mohamed Anwar Sadat” (p. 3, October 6, 1974).
- The governorate of Cairo sponsored an ad in which greetings were sent “from the heart to the leader and the maker of the decision maker of the October war” (ibid, p. 4)
- The Cooperative Society for Cargo Transport of the Cairo Governorate sponsored another ad hailing the “wisdom of the decision maker ... Mohamed Anwar Sadat” (ibid, p. 5)
- The governorate of Meounfiyya sponsored an ad thanking Sadat for leading the army to exert a limitless effort that took us from the depression of defeat to the hope of victory” (ibid, p. 5)
- The Ministry of Foreign Trade sponsored a whole page heaping praise on Sadat whose name occupied the middle of the page (ibid, p.6)
- The Ministry of Electricity sent greetings “on this occasion to the hero leader President Mohamed Anwar Sadat, the maker of the brave decision who faced up to the challenge, stood up to danger and bear responsibility for the decision” (ibid, p. 7)
The Ministry of Irrigation sponsored an ad hailing Sadat’s “patience, overbalance, thinking, planning, mobilising and decision-making in the right time, leading the nation to the certain victory” (ibid, p. 8)

The Misr Shibeen al-Koum for Spinning and Weaving (Public Company) sponsored an ad saying that Sadat is an “obedient committed son” of the “mother Egypt” (ibid, p. 8)

The Public Union for Banking, insurance and Financial Works said that all workers in these sectors “insist on walking behind our great leader… Mohamed Anwar Al-Sadat” (ibid, p. 9)

The governorate of Matrouh sponsored a half-a-page ad in which it praised Sadat as “the great President and the victorious leader”. (ibid, p. 10)

The Federation of Industries (a public body) sponsored an ad in which it said that the victory was achieved “under the hands of victorious armed forces led by our leader … President Anwar Sadat” (ibid, p. 10)

Sharaket al-Nasr lesenaat al-Zujaj wal Balour (a public company for glass making) implying that Sadat’s decision is immortal (ibid, p. 11)

Sharekat Memphis al-Kimawaiyya (a public company for chemicals) sponsored an ad saying Sadat’s decision “restored to the Arab nation its freedom and dignity” (ibid.)

The Fund for the Spinning and Weaving Industry Support sponsored an ad in which all members “express gratitude to the leadership for taking up responsibility” (ibid.)

The Ministry of Industry and Mining (whole page) sponsored a whole page saying that Sadat led Egyptian soldiers “to raise the Egyptian flag high and to make the most magnificent of achievements” (ibid. p.16.)

The list of these advertisements, as long as it is, is also revealing of the intensive advertising campaign accompanied with the editorial line in the same issue. For example, the issue opened up with the title to the front-page story: “The leader of victory today observes his victorious troops”, accompanied with a picture of Sadat boastfully making the salute (ibid, p.1). The paper also said that Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail, the Minister of War, was to award Sadat the “Sinai Star”, the highest military accolade in Egypt, as “a token of appreciation for his historic war decision” (ibid.). On the front page as well, there is space dedicated to statements made by
Sadat in which he said that “Egypt is capable with its weaponry to give Israel a new lesson” (ibid.). Although on a lesser scale, these waves of personifying the war continued on every anniversary of the war until the death of Sadat. In this content, Sadat was also described as “the hero”, “the leader”, the “war decision maker” and the “great President”.

As the war was religionised, addressed in the second theme above, the event was also personified with this religious tone reflected upon Sadat himself. In other words, the war ended in victory not only because Egyptian soldiers were committed to God but also because the President himself was committed to God. Indeed, Sadat was mentioned during and after the war as *Al-Rais al-Mu’min* as part of a dominant discourse in what he declared ‘the state of science and faith’. The title has a strong religious connotation as it delineates those believers in the principles of Islam as identified in the Quran. According to the Quran, *Iman* (faith or belief) guarantees the *Mu’min* (faithful or believer) a higher position and a fast track towards Paradise.

The argument being made here is that the link between Sadat and the religious meanings of the war had been deliberate and coordinated formally by the state and editorially by the paper. The link, as will be explained further in Chapter Five on the socio-political discourse practices under Sadat, came within the context of a broader state attitude in favour of political Islam in order to counter the leftist and Marxist threats to Sadat’s regime. What is interesting here is to examine the reflection of this President’s religiosity in the *Ahram*’s text related to the victory in the war. For example, on the second anniversary of the war, the paper showed Sadat performing the Eid prayers in the Suez, one of the frontlines during the war. The paper published four images before and after the prayers (p. 1 & p. 3, October 6, 1975). Ahmed Bahgat, one of the most prominent columnists of the paper, said that the October War victory was realised as Sadat was “endowed with the ability to love … and this ability is endowed by
Allah” (p. 2, October 6, 1976). In one op ed article, Abdel-Moneim Khallaf wrote: “It is the hand of God which made Sadat think [of crossing the canal]… [Sadat] is a godly man cast in the fame of one of those heroic mythical heroes which God said about them [in a Quranic verse]…” (p. 9, October 6, 1974)

This pattern of excessive association between a religious president and the already religionised 1973 victory is again evident in advertisements. In almost all of these advertisements, predominantly sponsored by state bodies, Sadat’s name is never mentioned without the title of *Al-Rais al-Mu’min*. Below, Table 2, is a quantitative account of the frequency of this term followed by an analysis of the data and how it increased after the war:

Table 2 – Discrepancy in mentioning *Al-Rais al-Mu’min* during and after the war

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>Ahram</em> Issue</th>
<th>The number of times <em>Al-Rais al-Mu’min</em> title is mentioned in mostly state-sponsored advertisements</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 7, 1973</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 8, 1973</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 9, 1973</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 10, 1973</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 30, 1973</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 31, 1973</td>
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<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 6, 1981</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: *Ahram* Archives from 1973 until 1981.

What is remarkable here is that the use of the *Al-Rais al-Mu‘min* title at the time of war, October 1973, was used 23 times in 21 issues, against 77 times in just seven issues marking the anniversary of the war. On average, *Al-Rais al-Mu‘min* was mentioned on average once every issue during the war and 11 times each issue marking the anniversary of the war. In the advertisements during the war, there is no ‘unified’ manner in describing Sadat. There is a variation, as some called him the *Al-Zaim al-Qaeed* (“the leading leader”) (p. 7, October 12, 1973), the “revolutionary leader” (p. 3, October 13, 1973), and the “leader President” (p. 4, October 14, 1973). This inconsistency in the title almost disappeared in the issues marking the
anniversary under Sadat and was replaced by more overtly religious themes. Since most of these advertisements are state controlled, as mentioned above, the role of the state in this standardisation cannot be undermined. Still, the diagram mentioned above indicates that portraying Sadat as *Al-Rais al-Mu'min* was not spontaneous after the war but rather constructed within an advertising campaign in which state-run companies took the lead in advertisements.

Perhaps the text most revealing of this religious personification of the war is an advertisement sponsored by the Qalyubia governorate, another state body. As published by *Ahram*, the advertisement addressed Sadat as such:

You believed in God, your homeland and your nation … You believed that we are have a right …

[You believed] that God is with this right and power is in the right… and the power of the right is the power from God… You decided to cross [the canal] with the support of Egyptian people and the protection of God…Go ahead with blessing of God. (p. 8., October 31, 1973).

One outcome of treating the faithful Sadat as war/victory personified is providing a divine quality which added up to his charisma. The leader believes he possesses a divine grace and his people share this belief. Therefore, this belief serves the macro theme of unquestionably portraying Sadat as the one who led the victory in the war, and the previous two other themes religionising the act of war on the one hand while representing it as an Egyptian victory on the other hand which was not only ordained by God but also led by a president charismatically qualified and godly.

_ War Personalised_
The personalisation of this victory came as Sadat initiated a peace settlement with Israel. *Ahram* accordingly stood as his defence and personalised the war as Sadat’s road towards peace. The war was no longer an act of violence, which Sadat initiated, but an act of peace led by Sadat. Below are examples how the discourse was reshaped to function in this new environment of peace-making.

Amidst the heat of the controversial peace settlement, in which Sadat even visited Israel, the analogies with Islamic events deployed in the paper shifted from citing those critical battles in the early days of Islam to citing those ‘peace’ initiatives’ in Islamic history. Columnist Tharwat Abaza defended Sadat’s decision to go to Israel as “the peak of heroism unwitnessed by Arabs since the early days of Islam” (p. 10, October 6, 1978). Abaza, an *Ahram* writer and the editor of the arts section, likened Sadat in his call for peace to Khaled Ibn al-Waleed, who was a military leader at the time of Muhammad and Abu Bakr but who was ousted by the third caliph Omar. Abaza wrote: “Khaled’s peace-making had been greater than his military abilities… Arabs have not known Sadat’s action, taken at the peak of heroism, since the early times of Islam marked with Abu Bakr, Omar, Ali and Khaled and Abu Ibayda” (ibid.). Abaza, a prominent novelist, ended his column with words of Ali Abu Taleb, the son-in-law and cousin of Muhammad: “Do not refuse a treaty with an enemy as long as God is satisfied with signing it.” (ibid).

Sadat came under massive pressure and a wave of boycotts from other Arab leaders because of what they called unilateral and hasty the rush towards reconciliation with Israel, a reality which made the personalisation of the war essential as a legitimating history for the regime. Sadat’s wife joined the construction of this thematic structure. In the *Ahram*, she wrote an op ed headline, “With peace… we can rebuild Egypt” stating that peace efforts should be supported
for the sake of a “better future” (ibid, p. 7). She wrote an op ed arguing that peace is “ibada [exactly like prayers, fasting] since it is meant to save the dearest given by God to us” (p. 7, October 6, 1979). Mrs Sadat even added that “Allah even ordered us to safeguard this peace which is similar to a human life that should not be protected” (ibid.).

Similarly, advertisements came out in support of Sadat, albeit this time with a focus on the President’s peace-making rather than war-making as was the case before. The Ministry of Economy and Trade published a full page ad in which it asked Sadat “Hero, go forward… [down] the road of peace” (ibid, p. 18). Ahram’s editorial also appealed for help, asking its readers to stand behind “Egypt’s struggle for peace” and behind Sadat who was “the great man… the decision-maker … the crossing leader … and the peace leader” (ibid, p. 7). It was through this rhetoric that Sadat has been rebranded as the “hero of war and peace”, a label which was introduced by the Ministry of Electricity and Energy in an ad (ibid, p. 13). Similar calls for Sadat to push forward peace efforts came with emphasis that they would lead to much need prosperity and stability (ibid., p. 3, p.12 and p. 14). This metamorphosis, from war hero to peace hero, was a deliberate move in a carefully constructed pattern. Below are examples from state-sponsored advertisements in one single issue of the paper after signing the peace deal in 1979:

_ Sadat is the “hero of peace, liberation and reconstruction”, in an ad sponsored by the Matrouh governorate (p. 4, October 6, 1980).

_ Sadat is the “leader of victory and the hero of war and peace”, in ad sponsored by the public Egyptian Construction company (ibid, p. 10).

_ Sadat is the “hero of war and peace”, in an ad sponsored by the Ministry of Electricity (ibid, p. 11).

_ Sadat is “the hero of peace”, in an ad sponsored by the Ministry if Transport and Maritime (ibid, p. 13).
Sadat is the “leader of war and the hero of peace” in an ad sponsored by the Public Company for Storage (ibid, p. 15).

All such advertisements carried the same words of peace and prosperity along with pictures of Sadat, mostly showing Sadat as dignified (ibid, p. 1, p. 6, p. 4, p. 5). *Ahram* also dedicated its editorials to mark the occasion and send greetings to the “hero of crossing” (ibid, p. 7).

The God-ordained war victory and its ensuring peace was also personalised for another reason. It allowed Sadat to distance himself from Nasser as he was in search for his own identity and legitimacy, which also led to a massive wave of ‘de-Nasserisation’ campaign (to be further explained in Chapter Five). In other words reflecting the binary nature of language based on opposition and contrast, the faithful Sadat realised a God-ordained victory unlike the unfaithful Nasser blamed for an ungodly defeat. One article explains the two eras:

> We came across two experiences; one in which we forgot God and were less believers against in interest in joking and dancing and distributing artists and their photos to soldiers in battlefield”. The result, the article argued, was that “the first led to a bitter naksa [the 1967 defeat]. The second [experience] was on the Ramadan 10 [the October 6 war] where we prepared for it with enough iman [faith]. (p. 13, October 6, 1978)

This accords with the official attitude in which Sadat distanced himself from Nasser’s era either in rhetoric or policies by, for example, getting closer to the United States, including rather than excluding the Islamists, and initiating an economic liberalisation policy known as *infitah* (the opening).
To sum up, personifying and personalising the 1973 War came during periods of both war and peace. Nevertheless, moving towards peace was more controversial and disputed even within Sadat’s cabinet. Therefore, to keep the President’s post-war peace movements as substantial and continuously victorious as the war itself, religion was used to help maintain the President’s popularity and legitimacy intact. According to Groy, “[Th]eroic act transforms the hero’s body from a medium into a message.” However, this message must always be internalised by a public who regards this hero “beyond the realms of familiarity and into the realms of intimacy.” Internalisation means the message has to be accepted “as normative and thus as binding.” Indeed, this element was applied during the Sadat regime, where Sadat became the ‘hero of war and peace’ after both acts were normalised as massive and consistent victories and fixated by a strong identity marker such as religion. Indeed, this purpose, to keep Sadat in power, was a target of the war and for ensuring peace negotiations, especially as Israel meant no ‘humiliation’ of Sadat by opting not to push forward its counter-attack of the besiegement of Egyptian forces, and as the Americans warned that “a continuation of the war would lead to … the fall of moderate governments, and their replacement by extremist regimes.” The larger discussion surrounding these socio-politics, which corroborate the macro themes identified above, will be continued in detail in Chapter Five.

2. Linguistic Features: Grammar, Semantics and Pragmatics

In addition to the three main macro themes identified in the text, there are also three textual patterns which contribute to the themes: grammar - dealing with how words, clauses or phrases are composed; semantics - dealing with the meanings made of these grammatical units;

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259 Khatib, Matar and Shaer Khatib, p. 90
261 Heikal, *October 73*, p. 584.
pragmatics - dealing with these meanings in context. As these linguistic features overlap, and as this study is committed to the methods of CDA as the overarching approach for the whole project, these features are divided into three sub-elements: transitivity, modality and metaphor. Each of these features is aptly defined in the footnote before analysing it as patterned in texts under study.

2.1. Transitivity

In definition, the transitivity system is all about a process.\(^{263}\) The text under analysis, from October 6, 1973 until October 6, 1981 is marked with a transitivity system which always made the Egyptian forces, in Halliday’s terms, the actor that always represented by Egypt and the goal by Israel which is affected by it. The actor, grammatically identified as the subject, comes first in the clause and the goal, grammatically identified as the object, comes later. These are some of the headlines during the war and which help to draw this conclusion: “Our forces keep on their advance, cleanse the entire eastern coast and liberate the Qantara Sharq town! (p. 1, October 9, 1973); “The Syrian forces launch a ferocious attack” (p.1, October 10).

Even when the Israeli forces are the actors during the war, they are encountered or overrun by more successful actors or are portrayed in the negative sense; the party which incurs losses and comes under attack. These are some examples: “Dayan admits losses” (p. 1, October 7, 1973), “the captured commander of the Israeli battalion: the fighting of Egyptian tanks was superb and

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\(^{263}\) Transitivity is concerned with the ‘ideational’ function of language as identified by Halliday and adopted by CDA pioneers. This function can control the flow of events and ‘goings-on’. This flow is “chunked into quanta of change by the grammar of the clause”, M.A.K. Halliday, *An Introduction to Functional Grammar* (London, Arnold, 2004), p. 170. This transitivity system has three components: the process itself (represented by a verbal group), participants in the process (represented in nominal groups), and circumstances associated with the process (represented in adverbial groups or prepositional phrases). There are four types of processes: material (doing), mental (sensing), relational (being), and verbal (saying), ibid, p. 173. In the material processes, there are two participant roles: the actor (the one who takes action) and the goal (the participant who is affected by the processes, ibid, p. 175.
courageous” (p. 1, October 10, 1973). In addition, Israel comes as occasionally a hesitant, less finite and delegitimized ‘actor’. This is how army communiqués portray Israeli forces, the actor, in a negative light: “the enemy used the ceasefire to push forward its armoured vehicles,” “the enemy grabbed a chance of ceasefire and … attacked the positions of our forces,” “the enemy forces kept on violating the ceasefire…” (p. 4, October 24, 1973), the “Israeli enemy carried out Hugum Ghader (treacherous attack) (p. 3, October 8, 1973), and “the enemy’s air force continues its aggressions on our forces, violating the ceasefire” (p. 5, October 25, 1973). The latter two examples indicate Israel as the unethical or illegal actor.

Within this transitivity system in which Egyptian forces are always the foregrounded ‘actors’, the processes as grammatically identified in the verbs used move in parallel to substantiate this pattern as I explain below.

Ahram consistently adopted an ‘active material process’ of the transitivity process. This makes agency very tangible by declaring Egypt victorious in this war. In the first issue of reporting the war, this is the headline of the front page story: “Our forces crossed the canal”. Furthermore, the material process is all the time an action process performed by an animated actor, which in this case is the Egyptian army. In the first paragraph of this story announcing the beginning of the war, these are the action verbs used where the actor is represented with an active voice: “our forces succeeded”, “captured”, “raised the Egyptian flag”, “mentioning the name of Allah”.

This action process continued throughout the first month of the war. Remarkably, the action process is evaluative, definite and ultimate. Through these action processes, the goal is always realised by the actor. For example, in the first days of the war, Ahram reported: “Our forces
keep progressing towards the east after destroying the enemy’s all counter-attacks” (p. 1, October 9, 1973). On the next day, almost the same action process with the same actors and goals is realised in this front page story: “Our armoury managed, after ferocious tank battles all of yesterday, to break the enemy attempts to stop the progress of our armoured vehicles into Sinai” (p.1, October 10, 1973).

Ahram mostly gives details to the circumstantial elements of this action process. Egyptian army actions are expanded on through quotes from the foreign press, quotes from Israeli commanders, press admitting their losses, or Egyptian army communiqués, which are given more space. Through unbalanced use of circumstantial elements such as time, place and cause, the Egyptian army gains the upper hand textually. If we probe these circumstantial selections, a clear pattern emerges: almost all clauses on Egyptian actions are detailed with temporal and place circumstances. This imposes a factual sense on claims made of Egyptian successes and Israeli failures. For example, mentioning temporal circumstances, such as the precise timing of Egyptian strikes which left Israeli with losses both in equipment and men. In another example, communiqué 50 of the Egyptian army during the war stated that the Egyptian army destroyed 85 tanks “during the past two days in the middle frame areas and Defreswar,” and the enemy attempted an attack “this morning” and attempted to attack “our airports in the north of Delta” (p. 7, October 21, 1973). Temporal circumstances therefore boosted time as concrete and here-and-now while spatial circumstances boosted it as concrete and specified.

This highly concrete construal of time and place when it relates to Egyptian strikes and successes sharply contrasts with Israeli attacks which lack this advantage of temporal and spatial detail. Almost all references to Israeli successes in killing Egyptian soldiers or destroying Egyptian army equipment are mentioned without any detail of temporal or spatial
circumstances (e.g., p. 5, October 9, 1973). This lack drives Egyptian losses into the abstract, unlike Israeli losses which are given time and space. This is not abnormal in war, as it is a tactic used by its makers. The impact of this variation is explained by Butt, Lukin and Matthiessen who argue that the here-and-now sense of time “gives a strongly ‘realis’ sense to the view of the world being depicted and the actions to be taken.” However, the abstract sense of time and space “add an ‘irrealis’ or ungrounded feel of ‘reality’…” This accords with the themes mentioned above in which Egyptian casualties were rarely mentioned by Ahram.

Furthermore, the transitivity system had always attributed to the Egyptian victory reinforcing the macro themes mentioned above. This is how the war is attributed in one single issue randomly selected, October 6, 1978: “The glorious October war”, “The October victories”, (p. 1, October 6, 1978), “The “victory of October”, the “glorious October war” (ibid, p. 3), “The eid of victory” (ibid, p. 6), “The October victory” (ibid, p. 10), “The October victories (ibid, p. 16). Again, Israel is deprived of this positive attribution. Egyptian and Syrian forces are always associated with positive attributes (where adjectives, nouns and phrases are used before the subject) while negative attributes are reserved for Israeli troops. These are examples: “Syrian troops carried out a magnificent operation that broke the waves of counter Israeli attack” (p. 1, October 13, 1973); “emboldened strikes by Egyptian commands moving behind the enemy lines” (p. 1, October 19, 1973). Remarkably, these attributes are always in the superlative mode, serving the thematic structures identified earlier in the chapter which portrayed the war as unprecedented, miraculous and unquestioned. These superlative attributes were excessively used. I randomly choose one other issue to demonstrate this tactic, October 6, 1974, to see some of these attributes here: “The biggest military parade” (p. 1, October 6, 1974), “the greatest impact on structuring the whole region” (ibid, p. 9), “the happiest day in the history of

265 Ibid.
Egypt”, the “most enthusiastic, the most emotionally evocative… day” (ibid.). Remarkably, these superlative attributes were repeated again and again, even identically on certain occasions. On the second anniversary of the war, *Ahram* ran the front page headline: “Egypt witnesses the biggest military parade on the anniversary of October 6” (p.1, October 6, 1975). Two years later, the paper has almost the same headline of its front page: “Sadat today witnesses the biggest military parade” (p11, October 6, 1977) in the fourth anniversary of the October victory.

The paper also used other processes in the transitivity system, such as ‘verbal’. The use of this process, which includes quoted statements, was meant to avoid any speculations that can prove true or false and throw further credibility and distancing through uncritical and unmediated texts between quotation marks. In other words, the text would give the impression that it is unmediated by the newspaper, which is false since the paper can pick and choose which quotes can be highlighted and also can exclude certain quotes. After all, the reader would not be able to verify these quotes since the latter have this authority of direct text. This authority is fully reflected in the excessive use of the verb, one single declarative verb which indicates the verbal process: ‘*Aalana* which literally means “announce”. These are some examples: “The general leader of the armed *Aalana [announced] that the enemy’s losses are …*” (p. 1, October 16, 1973); “Hafiz al-Assad *Aalana in a message to the Syrians that …*” (p. 1, October 16, 1973).

The same verbal system is even used to convey Israeli declarations, albeit only when it provides emphasis to the Egyptian narrative of emphasising Israeli defeat. “Haim Hertzog, the military commentator in the Tel Aviv radio, *Aalana* that “Egypt is using a new tactic in the war with the commandos” (p. 1, October 14, 1973); “the Israeli government *Aalana new changes at the top of Israeli command by recalling six ex-generals into service*” (p. 1, October
11, 1973); “senior military circles in the Pentagon admitted that Israel incurred heavy losses in the three days of the war” (p. 1, October 10, 1973); “‘Aalana American officials” (p. 1, October 25, 1973); “the Soviet union announces …” (p. 1, October 18, 1973). This modal actualisation is supported by the heavy use of quotations and carrying almost all the communiqués of the Egyptian army verbatim. Nevertheless, these verbal process hide a tendency of the paper to change the quotes allegedly taken as they are. One of the starkest examples includes the statements of Golda Meir as mentioned above.

2.2. Modality

In definition, modality is about obligation and inclination.266 The modality formulations in the text under analysis are divided into two periods. The first period is the one during the war reporting itself, from October 7 until October 31 1973, when the war ended with the signing of the ceasefire agreement. The other period is the one witnessed in the issues which commemorated the 1973 War on October 6 every year during the reigns of both Sadat and Mubarak.

During the war, there was minimum dependence on modality and maximum dependence on polarity. According to Halliday, polarity is the positive/negative opposition which is grammatically represented in the form of ‘is’ and ‘is not’.267 In other words, the predominance of polarity, which is about the choice of yes and no, leaves no space for modality which, as I

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266 Modality seeks to answer these questions: What is the degree of affinity in the text as expressed through the text? What sorts of these modalities (e.g. modal verbs or adverbs, Subjective or objective) predominant in the text? Modality is about the various kinds of indeterminacy that fall in between what “is” and what “is not”, Halliday, An Introduction to Functional Grammar, pp. 146-147. Halliday identified two types of modalities; either a “proposition” (statement or question) or “proposal” (offer or command). In the first type of modality, propositions (statements of acts) can be modalised when they indicate degrees of probability (Certainly, probably, possibly, which means ‘maybe yes or maybe no’, with different degrees of likelihood attached) or degrees of usuality (always, usually, sometimes, which means ‘sometimes yes, sometimes no with different degrees of frequency attached), ibid, p. 147. In the second type, proposals (Commands or obligations) can be modulated when they become imperative, either in the varying forms of obligation (required, supposed, allowed) or inclination (determined, keen, willing, i.e. may be or must be.’

explained in detail in the footnote associated with the title of this section, is about the other possibilities or the intermediate degrees which express various kinds of indeterminacy that fall in between, such as ‘sometimes’ or ‘maybe’, ‘supposed to/required to’, ‘willing to/anxious to/determined to’.

This polarity of Ahram’s reporting during the war depended on the use of declarative clauses. As a rule, declarative clauses function as statements involving only once choice between ‘is’ or ‘isn’t’. The effect of that is one of categoriality: past, present and future events are presented without any allowance for uncertainty. As there are few shades of grey, there are no interpretations of detailed discriminations or qualified forecasts. Since declarative clause is shaped by a certain order (subject (s) + verb (v) + x), these are easily identified in the text. On the first day of reporting the war, these were parts of the text dominated by declarative clauses. These are examples from the first page of this issue, and which I italicize here for the sake of emphasizing this ‘patterning’ in the use of this type of clause:

- Our forces crossed the canal and broke the Bar-Lev Line…
- Syrian forces on the northern front broke into Israeli lines and keep progressing…
- Israeli Air Forces did not succeed to stop the advance of Crossing Egyptian forces …

This use of declarative non-modalised clauses also continued all across the war reporting that month, such as these examples below. Mostly these clauses are unattributed, as if they are declared by the paper itself such as “the enemy soldiers surrendered” (p. 1, October 8, 1973), and “keep crossing, cleanse the whole coast and liberate the Qantara Sharq town” (p. 1, October 9, 1973), and the enemy forces “withdrew in disarray, leaving behind tanks, armored

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vehicles, killed and injured soldiers dispersed across big swathes of land” (p. 1, October 13, 1973).

According to the macro themes identified at the first part of this chapter, these declarative clauses affirm the meaning of ‘victory’ from the beginning of the battles until its end without question. In other words, Ahram used a language that was pre-determined to declare Egypt as the victor in the war and Israel the loser. This can be aptly demonstrated when Israeli forces retook control and infiltrated Egyptian lines in the thagra. Ahram did not stop its use of declarative clauses nor did it resort to modal clauses which better suit this period of uncertainty. Below are some examples cited from the issues during the thagra which began on October 14. During the thagra the use of declarative clauses was intensive in order to assert messages reiterating the official line. These are examples: “[the] Egyptian army keep progressing into the depth of Sinai” (p. 1, October 15, 1973), “The enemy attempted to launch a counter attack, but our forces stopped this attack and destroyed six of its tanks and [the enemy] withdrew to the east” (p. 7, October 16, 1973), and the “enemy incurred large number of casualties” (p. 1, October 22, 1973). The use of these verbs in the declarative from such as “stopped”, “keep”, Incure” are very supportive of the assertiveness and consistency imposed on the meanings of victory.

As part of the larger discursive strategy of using modality, modal clauses were used to contribute to this air of certainty and categoriality mentioned above through mood adjuncts. These are some examples: “our Air Forces carried out their mission successfully” (p. 1, October 7, 1973); “the American President is deeply disturbed” by the assault (ibid.); the “battle ended with the enemy forces fleeing the scene leaving 15 M-60 tanks, which are of the most advanced brand in the world, completely intact” (p. 1, October 11, 1973). The overuse of
these adjuncts such as “successfully”, “deeply” and “completely” in these examples support the text with further consistency and definitiveness that Egypt won the war massively and consistently.

*Ahram* also used a predominantly *presentist* modality to too make the war victory a fact not to be questioned and to impose continuity on the actions of Egyptian forces. In the words of Halliday, clauses in the present reflect both a high modal degree in favour of Egypt. For example, “Israel announces that Egypt is using a new war tactic through commandos” (p. 1, October 14, 1973); “the Egyptian army keeps on its push forward into the deep of Sinai determinedly… it breaks its way through bitter fighting with the gigantic enemy forces” (p. 1, October 15, 1973). Furthermore, the use of the present and present continuous tenses also draws Egyptian victory into what is called habitual patterns, much to convey a continuous sense of victory. For example, Butt, Lukin and Matthiessen noted in their analysis of George W. Bush’s first speech after 9/11 is that he used the present tense for the same purpose. “When Bush says these terrorists kill not merely to end lives but to disrupt and end a way of life, the tense selection constructs not an immediate time (‘here-and-now’), but habitual time, so that the action of ‘killing’ is seen as a characteristic behaviour of ‘these terrorists’.”

*Ahram* did exactly the same in the texts throughout the month of war reporting. Again, this modal attitude contributes to stabilising the position of Egypt as the ‘as usual’ winner in the war battles. The habitual patterning of winning on the Egyptian side and losing on the Israeli side through tense selection is obvious during the *thagra*. In the *Ahram’s* front-page report on *thagra*, although Egyptian forces were fighting badly in these battles, the present tense selection was adopted to show the opposite, as evident in army communiqués published by *Ahram*. For example, communiquè 44 on October 16, a time in which Israel extended its infiltration and Egypt incurred massive losses, finished with this sentence: “our forces are now chasing them

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[infiltrating Israeli tanks] in order to destroy them completely” (p. 7, October 17, 1973). The previous communiqué finished with the sentence: “the battle is still going until now” (ibid.). On the next day, communiqué 46 ended with this sentence: “our forces are now striking the infiltrating forces besieged in different points” (P. 8, October 19, 1973).

However, this variable use of tenses did not work properly at certain times, exposing the contradictions on the Egyptian side when it comes to reporting on the war. Although Ahram printed a front-page story headlined “Egypt’s military spokesman: the infiltrating enemy commandos were completely wiped out” (p. 1, October 18, 1973), in which the past tense was used in a declarative clause, it returned to the present continuous tense to convey the opposite in a later article (printed on October 20) in which the paper quoted an army communique as stating “our forces are still violently clashing with the enemy elements which infiltrated into the West bank via the Bitter Lakes” (p. 7, October 20, 1973). On the following day, the headline read, “the adventure of the enemy is being liquidated,” in reference to the Israeli infiltration (p. 1, October 21, 1973). Furthermore, the next day, the paper carried communiqué 52 stating, “clashes are continuing on the east and the west [bank] between our forces and the enemy forces” (p. 7, October 22, 1973).

After the end of the war, and in every issue marking the anniversary of the war, both declarative and modal clauses were used equally. Firstly, declarative clauses were used to continue asserting an Egyptian victory as an unquestioned fact. Secondly, modal clauses were used to impose a high level of obligation on the reader to commit to this conception of victory at a time of doubt and accusation as the regime went into long and protracted negotiations with Israel and which continued for nearly nine years, eventually failing to lead to the return of occupied Egyptian land.
When used as a declarative clause, the meanings of absolute victory were established, such as the “October [war] means success” (p. 7, October 6, 1978). Further examples cited from issues in consecutive years include: “war remains the Arab nation’s greatest day” and “the Arabs will win in the end…” (p. 9, October 6, 1975); “Victory is a prominent milestone in the history of Arab nation” (p. 9, October 6, 1976); “the impact of this great day is growing year after a year” (p. 3, October 6, 1977); “October 6 is the legitimate father of great events that have happened after that” (p. 3, October 6, 1978). When used as modal clauses, the meanings are meant to convey high obligation on the reader not only to accept the war as victory, the first macro theme, but also to show respect and loyalty to those who took the decision to launch this war as well as those who took part in it. In the editor’s column Youssef el-Sibai, in 1977, wrote: “We must mention in the lead those who made this [victory]… we must never forget … we must remember our great people … we must make it greater” (p 11, October 6, 1977). All these rhetorical modal clauses of high obligation act as a command to the audience: do it. El-Sibai repeated these clauses in his columns when marking the occasion each year. In one column he wrote that “We have to as a duty” to build on the October victory (p. 1, October 6, 1976). The position of high obligation as reflected in modality is also in the official statements including that of Sadat. In his spot marking the first anniversary of the war, he confirmed the meaning of victory in a declarative clause, stating that “Egypt has weapons enough to teach Israel a new lesson” (p. 1, October 6, 1974). He however used modal clauses of high obligation to ask that “history must record this lesson” and that “we must keep on and take over this historical and national responsibility” (ibid.)

Essentially, the use of these modalities, in higher obligation forms, such as ‘must be’, ‘is required to be’ and ‘should be’, enacted a sense of enforcement on the audience receptive of
these dominant frames to remember the war in a certain way as dictated by the newspaper or the state. The use of modal clauses of high inclination, such as ‘will be’ for example, is consistent with the Sadat regime’s promise of a better future based on no future wars and a peace settlement with Israel. The fact that this settlement did not materialise for long further contributes to the significance of using such modality best fitting for futuristic action. However, this comes in tandem with the use of declarative clauses to establish the meaning of victory as unquestioned, consistent and unprecedented, which is the main macro theme identified in the texts under analysis.

2.3. Metaphor & Wording

Most significantly, the three discursive themes depended on an excessive use of metaphors. As the text is less informative, closed to questioning what is perceived as an ‘unquestioned victory’, and dependent on religion and miracles as key components, metaphors clearly played a significant role in the re/construction of the discourse. In the first part of this section a theoretical explanation of the significance of metaphors is made, followed by an account of the discrepancy in the use of metaphors during and after the war. The third part of this section deals with wording itself, the choice of words, and how they accord with the macro themes in the text.

Metaphor can help re SHAPE the perception of the war since it is based on analogy, namely using a language belonging to one field in another in a networked syntactical structure.271 Furthermore, once in use, a metaphor signifies the powers of language since it links both the sender and receiver into a dialectical relation based on sharing the same meaning of the metaphor. As language always moves in a dialectical relationship with other elements of social

practices, this explanation gives credence to social agents powerful enough to bring into existence new metaphors and consign others to oblivion. In order to verify any identification of patterns in the use of metaphoric language over this long period (1973-1980), and in an attempt to delimit the number of agents controlling the text for this process, I limited my analysis to the editorials published in the issues under study.

One can identify two metaphorical variations in the editorials during and after the war. During the war, there is minimal use of metaphors. There is more dependence on fact and analysis of the situation during the war. For example, editorials would focus on the means to mobilise internal resources to fight Israel (p. 5, October 31, 1973), or on warnings of the “hard and multi-staged” phases of the battle (p. 5, October 7, 1973), or of Israel’s “fictitious and fallacious” propaganda that needs to be exposed (p. 5, October 13, 1973). Metaphors were so plentiful. Once used, they also tend to be of a low hyperbolic degree as they are still meant to discuss the actuality of the war or mobilise for continued fighting. One editorial warned Israel on paying a “heavy price” if it keeps shelling civilians (p. 5, October 9, 1973). Another accused the West of seeking to “keep peoples of the developing world prisoner by new colonialism” (p. 5, October 14, 1973). The title of a new editorial reads: “After the collapse of the myth” (p. 7, October 12, 1973); another title reads: “Playing with fire” (p. 7, October 26, 1973). Furthermore, metaphors were often repeated in later editorials such as, “Egypt restored its spirit” (p. 5, October 16, 1973), the “Return of spirit” (p. 1, October 10, 1973) and the “determination of Arabs will not be weakened” (p. 5, October 20, 1973). On the contrary, after the war, metaphors were strikingly rhetorical and patterned to celebrate, animate and humanise the war and victory. Animistic metaphors attributed to the war literally animate characteristics, and humanising metaphors attributed to it characteristics of humans.\(^{272}\)

\(^{272}\) Cowie, Semantics, p. 32.
of the war, the editorial said that the war enabled Arabs to “control their destiny”, and “to build the foundations of future”, and “opened the door for Arabs to join the modern age” (p. 9, October 6, 1974). On the following anniversary, the war allowed the Egyptians to be “able to [create] history” as the world realised for the first time that “there is a new sun rising in the southern part of the Mediterranean” (p. 9, October 6, 1975). The war “gave birth the sixth largest power in the world” and also “re-planned the world revolution” (ibid). The editorial of the following anniversary issue: “trumpeting the victory is not enough, as working with the spirit of victory is the one which brings in further victory” (p. 9, October 6, 1976). In the following year, the editorial said the impact of the war “grew up year after another. Internally, its growth takes us economically through the bottle neck out of the suffocation cycle…” (p. 3, October 6, 1977). The editorial of that year after was entitled, “A salute to the makers of tomorrow” (p. 3, October 6, 1978). The war was metaphorically animated and humanised further by describing it as the “legitimate father of all great events happening. From the stomach of the October victory, the peace initiative was born” (ibid). The war “allowed Egypt to write with the blood of its sons the greatest lines of sacrifice,” and it would be remembered as “light dissipating the darkness of desperation” (ibid.). The editorial of the following year also had a metaphorical title: “Egypt [is] in the sky”. It begins by stating: ”With the breeze of this morning still carrying the scent of the armed forces’ great victory six years ago, Egypt turns up its heard … up to the sky…” (p. 7, October 10, 1979).

Remarkably, this difference in the metaphorical patterning in editorials accords with the macro themes mentioned above. The third theme, war personalised/personified, intensified after the end of the war. This personification/personalisation required an overuse of metaphors to glorify the role of Sadat as a mythical hero in the war and to justify the legitimacy of his policies, including the unpopular peace-making, on the basis of aggrandising this victory and his larger-
than-life status as peacemaker, daring and confident enough to visit Jerusalem itself in 1977. From this image painted of Sadat, these are some examples from issues after the war: “Sadat made us cross the desperation of defeat into the hope of victory” (p. 5, October 6, 1974), “[To Sadat], we bless your courageous steps on the road of peace” (p. 4, October 6, 1975), “Allah brought us victory through the hands of Sadat” (p. 3, October 6, 1976). On the other side, as the first theme was partially based on material gains, regardless of how factual and true they are, there was no need to use metaphors. Indeed, this discrepancy on the metaphorical variation also accords with the transitivity and modality systems which depended on declarative clauses during the war (it is/ it is not) much to enhance the ‘factivity’ of these accounts, which runs against the metaphorical language in this crude wary as it is used after the war.

On wording, the most repeated word in the whole text under analysis is, unsurprisingly, victory. The unprecedented repetition of the same words adds up to branding the 1973 War. There are different definitions of brand, and most of them centre on the construction of a certain word as an identifiable repetition linked with several emotionally charged connotations. David Aaker said that branding is based on four elements: brand awareness, perceived quality, brand loyalty, and brand association. What I found is that the discourse of 1973 scored high on all four levels.

The first level of brand awareness is about recognition of a word as a brand name which subsequently dominates in someone’s mind. Lina Khatib in a case study on the discourse re/construction by Hezbollah noted that the latter sought this brand awareness through repetition of the group’s alleged victory in the 2006 war into every day expressions. Ahram and the state of Egypt had adopted the same approach regarding the 1973 War through the literal

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repetition of predominantly one single word: victory. For example, on one page, the word itself was mentioned 17 times (p. 1, October 6, 1974) and 10 times on another page (p. 1, October 6, 1977), and in one single issue 35 times ((p. 1, October 6, 1974). To make this branding more effective and fitting with the three macro themes identified above, the word has always been cultivated in compounds, allowing further variations such as *Eid al-Nasr* (the victory Eid), which add a religious tone since *Eid* is used to refer to holy days. The word was also compounded in a personified/personalised manner, to make the description of Sadat as the *Qa’id al-Nasr* (victory leader) (ibid, p. 8), or technically to describe the first air strikes as *Muftah al-Nasr* (the victory key), (p. 8, October 6, 1976). The compounding also adds further celebratory mood after the massive and consistent victory such as in *Rayat al-Nasr* (the flags of victory) (p. 1, October 6, 1974).

This wording on the 1973 War in the *Ahram* also contributes to Aaker’s second indictor, association, by which he meant the emotional bonds which link a person to a brand. This association was intensive in the case of words which the paper and the state narrative capitalised on. This association accords with the evaluative language generally used to report on the war, and through which “narrators reveal their degree of involvement in the action and their recognition of the audience’s expectation of reportability.”\(^{275}\) For example, military reporter Abdu Mubasher wrote on one battle in the war as follows: Egyptian soldiers “tasted the flesh of the enemy and poked their fingers into [their bodies]” (p. 3, October 6, 1976). Another reporter on one march on the anniversary wrote: “Eyes were tearful when young women shouted in favour of the leader of crossing and the hero of crossing during their protest in Sinai last week” (p. 7, October 6, 1978). Columns were full of this evaluative language, with fewer facts. Some examples include: The crossing is “the most happy, enthusiastic day … in

which the sun rose after a long absence” (p. 9, October 6, 1974); “This was a miracle, as witnessed by foreign experts... How did it happen [?]. I asked myself this question and the answer was immediate: it is the iman [faith] of the Egyptian soldier” (p. 1, October 6, 1975); “October has two values in my heart ...” (p. 1, October 6, 1977). On the other hand, this association of wording, as a necessary part of building a brand, is also reflected in the emotional bond between the war and ordinary people on a more personal, everyday level. For example, the paper dedicated space to report these bonds through, for example, the public craze to name their shops after the ‘crossing’ (p. 4, October 6, 1974).

The wording in the texts under analysis also included the third indicator of branding, brand loyalty, which was obvious through showing public support to the victory and the other macro themes as well. Ahram published one picture of Sadat’s motorcade on its way to Eid prayers along with pictures of the prayers at the Cairo-based Hussein mosque while surrounded by supporters shouting “victory for our soldiers” (p. 1, October 27, 1973). Indeed, those supporters not only express loyalty to the brand of ‘victory’ but also to other relevant brands on Sadat himself as the maker of this victory and on the religiosity of both victory and himself. As if the paper is aware of this branding association, the caption for the picture, which was on the front-page, said the topic of the Eid speech was ‘victory and martyrdom’ (ibid). On the fourth indicator of this branding, perceived quality, the fact that the victory was always presented in the newspaper as God-blessed, guaranteed, a supreme and divine quality, as repeated in several examples either directly (p. 3, October 24, 1973) or indirectly (p. 8, October 23, 1973).

Based on repetition of wording, association and emotionally charged language, this branding of the war was able to be modified according to the editorial and state policy. For example, after the end of the war, Ahram added the first name of Sadat, making it Mohamed Anwar al-Sadat

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that was used almost every time he was mentioned in the newspaper. This is significant since Mohamed is the name of the prophet and since Anwar (the forename of Sadat) is an adjective literally meaning ‘light’ and is appropriate as a Muslim or a non-Muslim name. In other words, inserting Mohamed is another attachment by the regime towards religionisation, especially as Sadat’s title Al-Rais al-Mu’min always preceded his name as a rule. While this example demonstrates adding new words, others indicate the omitting of existing words. For instance, after El-Shazly disagreed with Sadat a few days of the war ended, his name was erased from every single issue of the paper, unlike other war commanders of lesser ranking (p. 8, October 6, 1976 & p.5, October 6, 1979). These words and their meanings were further entrenched into the psyche of Egyptians by taking them out of context. The ‘6th October’ became the name of a central Cairo bridge and a city suburb of the capital, while a whole new city was named ‘The Sadat’.

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with three macro themes and three micro linguistic features. A notable feature is that the massive and consistent victory was the most dominant, and the other two macro-themes built on it. Although this led to variability in space and content dedicated to each theme, the argument being made here is that the trio of themes cleverly worked together to produce a tightly coherent political imagery and an empirically efficient discourse. For example, the first macro theme was based on material gains in territory and equipment as well as battleground details. The second macro theme was based on spiritual gains, linking the war to what is dogmatic and unchallengeable: religion and miracles. The third macro theme capitalised on the other two macro themes, what is materialistic and what is spiritual, by substantiating the charisma of Sadat as a faithful leader of mythical action and heroism, a
secular president and supreme commander whose legitimacy emanates from a real achievement in the name of war.

Furthermore, this complementation is augmented by uniformity. In other words, macro themes and their elements do repeat each other but do not contradict each other. For example, in one single page, there is a headline that reads: “The victory leader attends a military show of his victorious troops” (p. 1, October 6, 1974). The text is accompanied by a photo of Sadat in military attire while saluting, along with another that quoted the Sadat as stating in interview with a Lebanese newspaper that “Egypt is militarily capable to teach Israel a new lesson” (ibid.). The paper published, on the same page, short news items telling readers that Sadat received messages of congratulations on the “eid of victory” (ibid). These frames never acted in contestation with each other, keeping all macro themes as united as possible. Indeed, utilising all these communication tools at the same time presents 1973 as a brand.

Indeed, this uniformity diluted contradictions spotted in the text on the reality of the war itself. This reality consists not in the fact they occurred but in the way they are remembered. In the case of this study, this remembrance is well ordered in a trio of well-connected macro themes that constructs its own chronologically ordered sequence separate from reality. In the words of Haydan White, the “authority of the historical narrative” turns to be the “the authority of reality itself.”276 Analysing this reality at the level of interplay between language and culture on one hand and political mobilisation on the other, I have to conclude that the 1973 War under the rule of Sadat was a successful spectacle of discourse.

Chapter Four
Text Analysis:
1973 War Discourse under Mubarak

Introduction

This chapter demonstrates that the discourse in the 1973 War at Ahram during the reign of Mubarak is a continuation of the other discourse during the reign of his predecessor, Sadat, albeit with a number of significant ‘discontinuities’. This conclusion is based on examining the same trio of macro themes identified in the previous chapter: (a) Egypt made a ‘massive and consistent’ victory in the war; (b) war victory is personified/personalised; and (c) war victory is religionised/miraclised. These ‘macro’ themes are explored alongside other ‘micro’ linguistic functional elements such as transitivity, modality, words meaning and metaphor in every issue marking the annual anniversary over the 30-year span of Mubarak’s rule.

The chapter finds that Mubarak was an extension of Sadat not only politically, but also discursively in both the 1973 War and the ensuing peace with Israel. Nevertheless, the ‘discontinuity’ lies in the order and balance of these macro themes. From its inception, the discourse of Ahram under Mubarak was dominated by one main macro theme, which is ‘war personified/personalised’. Indeed, as the text analysis shows, it was more about personalisation rather than personification, i.e. the Mubarak regime was interested in personalising the war’s ‘massive and consistent’ victory to maintain the regime and stay in power. While the first macro theme illustrating the war as a ‘massive and consistent’ victory still exists, the third
macro theme, ‘war is religionised/miraclised’, was also enormously downsized in both form and structure at the expense of the personification and personalisation of the war.

The three themes are not treated in a fair and equitable manner, since the imbalance in space among them is meant to reflect their variable significance and prioritisation according to each one of the trio. For instance, the second macro theme is given a wider space in content analysis since it is dominantly and constantly recurring in the text in comparison with the other two. This chapter follows the same subheadings as the previous one, in an attempt to neutralise any findings and spot changes and continuities between the two eras of Sadat and Mubarak. The first part of this chapter begins with textual patterns in the three macro-themes while the second discusses the linguistic patterns of the following three main features: transitivity, modality, and metaphor and wording. The division between the two parts is not rigid, as the researcher explained the theoretical/analytical framing in Chapter Two. Some of these linguistic features can overlap or be mentioned in the first part to serve the macro themes.

1. Textual Patterns: Macro Themes

1.1 Egypt Made ‘Massive and Consistent’ Victory

Based on the Clausewitzian classification of a war victory, this section demonstrates that *Ahram* under Mubarak had not deliberately or systematically regulated the war as a ‘massive and consistent’ Egyptian victory. This concluding remark is based on the degree of patterning in the *Ahram* text over the course of 30 years. This ‘victory’, as had been in the case in the previous chapter, is identified on basis of three indicators set out by Clausewitz: “The enemy’s
greater loss of material strength”, “his loss of morale”, and “enemy’s giving up his intentions”. Nevertheless, *Ahram* addressed these three indicators in a random and limited manner. This section also shows that victory was shaped at a figurative and less materialistic level fitted with linguistic features which serve this patterning such as metaphoric repetition.

*Ahram* employed the ‘crossing’ of the strategic waterway of Suez Canal metonymically to symbolise the war and Egypt’s alleged victory within these six hours of its happening and although this war ferociously and critically dragged on for three more weeks. The front page headline on the first anniversary of the war since Mubarak took over reads: “A message from Mubarak to the armed forces at the anniversary of marking the Great Crossing epic” (p. 1, October 6, 1982). In his statement, Mubarak repeatedly highlighted the army’s “crossing” as the turning point in the victory, stating that “So it had been your epical crossing on this blessed day” (ibid, p. 13). This metonymical allusion to the war and ‘victory’ by reducing the latter to these six hours of crossing permeated all texts of Mubarak’s annual speeches, which were quoted in full by the paper over the years. For example, in another year marking the anniversary, Mubarak explained that “we crossed despite the most difficult conditions that could face an army at modern times” (p. 5, October 6, 1988). These references also formed regularity via repetition. The President kept repeating the same metonymical references, always focusing on this “bravery of the crossing” (p. 1, October 6, 1994). In these references, the former president exchanged ‘victory’ and ‘crossing’ in interchangeable ways (p. 1, October 6, 2007). These are examples of one single issue: “The day of crossing and victory”; “the anniversary of crossing”, and the “anniversary of crossing and victory” (ibid, p. 3).

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278 Please note that, as has been the case in other chapters, all textual citations from the *Ahram* is separately mentioned in the text of the study rather than in footnotes. It is an attempt to identify intertextuality and patterning, as well as situate the order in both chronological and spatial sequences.
This concentration on ‘victory’ within these six hours of crossing the canal and within the period of one single day of the war was officially and editorially approved, a judgment reached on the basis of analysing editorials on one hand and state-sponsored advertisements of all the 30 issues under investigation. In just one page of the first issue marking the anniversary of the war since Mubarak came to power, the word ‘crossing’ was mentioned six times (p. 1, October 6, 1982). Ahram’s Editor in Chief, Ibrahim Nafie, wrote on his front page column details of this “great October crossing” (ibid, p. 1). The same issue dedicated headlines to reviews of a book entitled “The Great Crossing: The New Spirit of Egypt” (ibid, p. 8). This pattern continued over decades, as the paper mostly named the war itself “The Battle of the Crossing” (p. 1, October 6, 1988). Columnists joined in this blessing of the metonymy. One columnist wrote: “In six hours, we crossed the canal and broke through the most protected fortresses of the enemy in order to liberate our land and revenge the defeat of June 5 1967.” (p. 7, October 6, 1990). In addition, advertisements, some of them state-sponsored, also followed suit in the same editorial line. These advertisements always stated the occasion as “the anniversary of the Great Crossing” (p. 1, October 6, 1991; p. 13, October 6, 1990). The metonymical adoption of the crossing as a signifier is representing in a meaning ‘massive and consistent’ victory as the signified, in semiotic expressions based on de Saussure’s dyadic signification, which was detailed in Chapter Two. This signification, as dyadic as it is within such relationship between Egypt and Israel, also came in different forms. One caricature of a husband apparently reading a newspaper while telling his wife “do you believe that until now Israel could not solve the ‘puzzle of the crossing’ presented by Egyptian soldiers?!” (p. 13, October 6, 1987).

In contrast with Sadat’s era, the focus on other material gains, or Israel’s losses, was very brief, generalised and not detailed. References to these material gains, as minimal as they were, were eclipsed by a de-actualised superficial and celebratory language in which celebrations ran
supreme over discussing the battlefield intricacies. For example, a retired colonel was given a full page to demonstrate how the Egyptian military performed unexpectedly and handed Israel “heavy losses including a quarter of its air forces within two weeks” due to attacks by “the Egyptian Air Defence missiles” (p. 3, October 6, 1985). On another occasion, one army officer said that in one air battle of 80 jets, just one Egyptian pilot landed down five phantom Israeli jets” (p. 13, October 6, 1982). Abdel-Haleem Abu Ghazala, the Defense Minister until 1989, made a similarly general and brief announcement on Israel’s military losses or Egypt’s gains. On the first day of the war, Abu Ghazala said in an interview with Ahram: “the losses of the third army were 41 killed and 151 injured and those of the second army less than that” (p. 9, October 6, 1983). He made no mention of the Egyptian losses on the other days of the two-week war or even Israeli losses. Abu Ghazala was also at pains to downplay Israel’s counter-crossing, thagra, calling it a “stroke of luck”, and insisted that Egypt could have easily crushed this infiltration (ibid.) 13). As detailed in the previous chapter, these claims are a half-truth and even mere lies as described by the accounts of the army’s Chief of Staff during the war, El-Shazly, as well as Israeli and western historians.

On the second Clausewitzian indicator of victory, which is the enemy’s ‘loss of morale, the researcher can find references made in a few occasions with no patterns identified. For example, references were rarely made on the Israeli Prisoners of War (POWS) either in words or pictures (p. 5, October 6, 1983). Since the surrender of those soldiers had been taken by the Sadat regime and Ahram as signs of Israel’s ‘loss of morale”, making no such mention means the opposite. The absence of POWS can also mean that victory is not prioritised as a thematic structure at Ahram when Mubarak was in power. No further mention was made of facts or figures of these Israeli POWS during the 30 years of covering the war anniversary during the rule of Mubarak.
Under Mubarak, Israeli casualties were mentioned by Ahram as massive and fatal yet in a brief way on the side-lines. Once mentioned, those casualties never made a coherent and patterned form to relate to the Egyptian ‘victory’. On the few occasions of mentioning those casualties, there were contrast and confusion. On one occasion, Salah Montasser, the paper’s most renowned daily columnist, said that Israeli losses during the crossing on the first day of the war “were 30 warplanes, 300 tanks and thousands of soldiers killed” against limited Egyptian losses of “5 warplanes, 20 tanks and 280 martyrs killed”. In contrast to these figures, the paper said in a report with no by-line indicating who wrote it that those Israeli losses on the first day of the war “were 25 warplanes, 120 tanks and hundreds of killed soldiers” (p. 4, supplement, October 6, 1998. Abu Ghazala, the Defense Minister, came with a different count. He said that on the first day of the war “the 3rd Army [of Egypt] lost 41 soldiers and had 151 other soldiers injured” (p. 9, October 6, 1983). Much to add confusion, Ahmed Bahgat, another columnist of the newspaper, quoted one American historian as saying that 250 Egyptian soldiers were killed on the first day of the fighting. These accounts not only contradicted each other, and confused readers, but also mentioned no references sourcing their figures, again another outcome of keeping the war records classified.

Regardless of this speculative data on the war, the regime and the paper resorted to a figurative and rhetorical commemoration based on Egyptian casualties in the war. Mubarak said in one of his speeches that there was “no family in Egypt which had not given a martyr, an injured or a fighter” during the war (p. 3, October 6, 1998). Noticeably, this mention is meant by Mubarak not to throw doubt on the results of the war but rather to symbolically confirm the price paid for realising victory. Those Egyptian ‘martyrs’ were winners since their ‘sacrifice’ is little in
comparison with the ‘massive and consistent victory’ realised for the whole army. In one
speech, Mubarak mentioned those “martyrs who cleaned the land of homeland with their
precious blood” (p. 1, October 6, 1988), and in other speeches, he repeatedly invoked the
“spirits of those dear martyrs” (p. 5, October 6, 2003, p. 3, October 6, 2006, p. 3, October 6,
2007, p. 5, October 6, 2010). In the editorial part, the paper took the same editorial position in
highlighting “Egyptian martyrs” within a context of asserting victory (ibid, p. 3, October 6,
2009).

On the third Clausewitzian indicator of victory, which is the ‘enemy’s giving up his intentions’,
the paper also did not seek to present patterns to show Israel’s humiliating ‘surrender’ or ‘rush
for peace’ with Egypt or an appeal to Cairo for exchanging POWs, as had been the case in the
period under Sadat. A few testimonies by foreign or western sources were mentioned timidly to
confirm this indicator (p. 11, October 6, 1999 & p. 2, October 6, 2004). The paper also
published a few reports and quoted Israeli commanders or politicians who admitted defeat (p. 5,
October 6, 1982), and also reviewed books on the war as far as they substantiated the official
and editorial lines adopted in the discourse. Again, these references were very dispersed in the
text with no regularity in either content or form.

As the three Clausewitzian levels of victory were therefore minimised, Ahram celebrated the
meaning of victory at a similarly figurative level in which Israel was no longer painted as the
military ‘other’ or the ‘goal’, in Halliday’s expression, in this linguistic binary relationship.
This is evident in three ways. First, this message is communicated through decontextualized
repetitions; i.e. just naming the war a ‘victory’ without providing enough contest or reasoning
for this position. Second, there is a massive dependence on unified figurative metaphors such as
the ‘spirit of October’ and the ‘Crossing’. Third, the macro theme in the text is not directed at establishing the meaning of victory, as had been the case under Sadat. It was rather geared towards ‘celebrating’ what was already established of this victory. As the first and second reasons are to be detailed in the section on ‘metaphor and wording’ in this chapter, the third one is analysed here within the remit of reconfiguring the meaning of the event within these new socio-political atmospherics.

On the other hand, *Ahram* rather dedicated space and content to celebrate what it treated as fixed and established meanings of war as an Egyptian victory. On several regular occasions, the reported musical and singing ceremonies were attended by Mubarak himself (p. 13, October 6, 1986, p. 14, October 6, 1988, p. 3, October 6, 1989, p. 30, October 6, 1994, p. 20, October 6, 1995, p. 36, October 6, 1996, p. 36, October 6, 1997, p. 35, October 6, 1998). Noticeably, Mubarak attended these musical celebrations for many years, including five consecutive occasions counted by the researcher as reported at *Ahram*. Celebrations were reported on the widely-read final page of the paper, along with pictures detailing these celebrations (p. 14, October 6, 1988). Meanwhile, the paper also published yearly reports on other musical and singing celebrations, also organised by the state or the army, such as an operatic performance in which 400 dancers took part (p. 13, October 6, 1991), fireworks filling in the skies along with shows by the Air Force warplanes (p. 32, October 6, 2002), seminars and movie shows in the state’s cultural centres (p. 33, October 6, 2003), giving gifts to the public with the army soldiers themselves doing the distribution (p. 32, October 6, 2005), free access to national museums on October 6th (ibid.), cinema festivals (p. 28, October 6, 2010), or sports events (p. 12, October 6, 1983). A notable feature is that these ceremonies were organised by the army along with different state bodies such as the ministries of culture, youth and media, while some of them presigiously held in the capital’s main conference centre (p. 36, October 6, 1996, p. 36,
On one occasion, narrated in Chapter Six, the Minister of Information himself called a composer to commission songs on the war ceremony attended by Mubarak. The country’s most famous artists and musicians, such as Egypt’s top singer Amr Diab, were commissioned for these ceremonies (p. 20, October 6, 1995). Ministers, ambassadors and war commanders were lined up for seminars and conferences, marking the occasion (p. 32, October 6, 2007, p. 28, October 6, 2010). These ceremonies substantiate the macro theme of Egypt’s ‘massive and consistent victory’ adopted by *Ahram*, as will be probed in detail in Chapter Six dedicated to broader forms of ‘national narrative’ on the war. It is evident that these ‘celebratory’ and ‘entertaining’ markings of the war were not there during the years of Sadat. During the reign of Sadat, the anniversary was rather marked with serious tones, such as military parades, in which weapons and equipment were exhibited in the presence of the President himself. As Sadat was killed in one of these parades on October 6th, 1981, Mubarak cancelled these parades and alternatively focused on attending the musical-based celebrations. This change of marking the occasion officially reflected on the pages of *Ahram*, as explained above, and also indicated a re-prioritisation of macro themes, as to be explained below.

1.2. War Personified/Personalised

This section is divided into two patterns of this macro theme: personification which addresses the portrayal of Mubarak as the main ‘hero of war’ due to his role as the Commander of Egypt’s Air Force at the time of the 1973 battles, and personalisation which addresses the manufacturing
of this war legacy to legitimise and sustain his political power. The conclusion drawn on this patterning is that this macro theme predominates the text against the two other macro themes. Furthermore, wider and broader space were dedicated to the personalisation of victory, especially as the war specifics receded to the backseat position in a legacy rather related to the ensuing peace and its consequences.

On the first war anniversary after the President came to power, Ahram focused on the role of Mubarak in realising this ‘massive and consistent’ victory. The patterning sounds abrupt since the focus in earlier war anniversaries was on Sadat as the main commander behind this victory. On the issue marking the first anniversary, one report reads: “The miracle made by the Egyptian Air Force led by Hosni Mubarak” (p. 13, October 6, 1982). These are also other subtitles in the same story: “Unprecedented figures made by the Air Force during the 1973 October battles”, “one Air Force battalion carried out several thousands of sorties during the battle”, “the NATO modifies its design of warplane bunkers to follow suit Egyptian Engineers,” and “when training jets of the Airforce College took part in facing the Israeli infiltration.” (ibid). The report is based on a book review of one of the officers who took part in the war, Colonel Sa’d Sha’ban, who referred to the role of Mubarak in guaranteeing a top performance for the Air Force under his command in the war (ibid).

Treating Mubarak as the ‘war personified’ continued as the masterframe over decades of his rule. On the second anniversary since Mubarak held presidency, Ahram dedicated one page to an interview with the Commander of the Air Force. In the interview, more space was given in the interview to praise Mubark as the war commander in an answer to the first question (p. 3,
October 6, 1983). The second answer was on the personality of Mubarak. The interviewee answered:

“As I worked under his command, I can confidently say that Mubarak is mostly characterised by an overall integrity ... He was so active as witnessed by all of his contemoraries in the Air force college ...” (ibid). Two years later, a retired colonel, Kamaleddin Abul Azayem, wrote a one page op-ed in which he hailed the “the skills of the Egyptian pilot to fly supersonic jets” and the “skills of the Egyptian commander to plan for the first air strike and protect his planes whose 150 of which led the attack” (p. 3, October 6, 1985). Again, these opinions were based on a meticulous process of state control over the interviewees and op-ed writers, as to be explained in the macro-politics of discourse in Chapter Six. It was also editorially approved and sustained. The editor in chief of the newspaper concluded his front page column of another issue: “greetings to President Hosni Mubarak [who is] the owner of the first air strike [in the war]” (October 6, 1989, p. 1).

Indeed, as Sadat had his own branding of Al-Rais al-Mu’min and the ‘hero of war and peace’, Mubarak also created his own branding. The most widely used brand of Mubarak is naming him Sahebb al-Darba al-Gawiyya (the master of the air strike). Abdel-Rahma Aql, a senior journalist at the paper, expressed in one article his appreciation for the “the master of the first air strike” (p. 11, October 6, 1992). Mohamed Basha, a senior military reporter who had had the plans to show Sadat as the personification of war, shifted his discoursing to hail Mubarak at the commander position. In one issue, he sent “greetings to the commander of the brave Air Force strike which opened the door for peace” (p. 11, October 6, 2003). Osama Saraya, the Editor in Chief from 2005 until 2011, wrote that the “commander of the air strike opened the door for victory realised by other parts of the army” (p. 1, October 6, 2005). Mubarak himself mentioned this achievement in his speeches in a form of self-praise. In one of them he said that
the “first spark of the victory had been the successful air strike which stunned the world powers and paralysed their thinking and movement and destroyed centres of guidance and command at the heart of Sinai” (p. 3, October 6, 1997). Indeed focusing on the air strike, which had been launched in the first few hours of the war, added another layer of metonymical abbreviation of the war by limiting its happenings the first day which witnessed the ‘crossing’ and ‘first air strike’ commanded by Mubarak.

Attributing victory to Mubarak’s role and status as the Air Forces Commander was also approved editorially at Ahram and officially at the upper echelons of the state. Hussein Tantawi, the Minister of Defense from 1991 to 2012, said in an army briefing that “the air strike by the Air Forces commanded by Mubarak had been the key of victory in 1973” (p. 3, October 6, 2004). Military Reporter Mohamed Abdel-Moneim accommodated this discourse, earlier taking Sadat as the focus, to praise Mubarak. He said he had predicted that “Egypt would strike Israel after Hosni Mubarak had been appointed the Air Forces Commander” (p. 6, October 6, 2007). On another anniversary, the paper interviewed Salah El-Menawy, one of the Airforce commanders during the war. El-Menawy heaped praise on Mubarak for “standing up to the challenge of taking part in the war with jets inherited from the 1967 defeat” (p. 17, October 6, 2009). Op-eds were also dedicated to show the “unprecedented” achievement of the Air force during the war, with one which explained some of Israeli losses incurred by the Egyptian air strikes (p. 12, October 6, 2001)

The other part of this patterning is wider and broader, treating Mubarak as war personalised, i.e. reconstructing the war discourse to accommodate new meanings legitimating Mubarak’s new policies rather than focusing on his role in the war. After all, this legitimacy was at the centre
stage of Mubarak’s rule since he, as Sadat’s Deputy, took over after Sadat’s assassination on the same day marking the war anniversary. Part of the narrative re-constructed argued that due to Mubarak’s role in making this victory, he deserved the chance to keep leading the country to similar civil ‘victories’ and new ‘crossings’. It was even explicitly styled as a ‘social contract’ (p. 9, October 6, 1993). Three years after Mubarak came to power, the paper gave space to Member of Parliament, Fahmy Nashed, who said in his op-ed that Mubarak ruled on the basis of “the public constitutional legitimacy of October [war]. This is the permanent legitimacy” (p. 7, October 6, 1984). Nashed also wrote:

…. The character of Mubarak has both the means and the symbol… the means of battle in which he was the commander of victory, and the same time the symbol of the public will of October… Therefore 11 years after the October war, we witness a stage which is an embodiment of the public constitutional legitimacy of October. (ibid).

Building on this war legitimacy, many other policies executed by the regime of Mubarak also carried this dual legitimating element of ‘Mubarak the Commander/Mubarak the President)’. These policies are both related to what is military and what is civil. The next section explains what is military, economic and political of this personalisation was reflected on the pages of Ahram.

On a military angle, several mentions were made to show Egypt’s military prowess under Mubarak while marking the anniversary. For example, on one anniversary, the paper gave a central space to the first Egyptian produced missile, named “the Eye of the Falcon”, during its launch “from the shoulder of one of our soldiers towards the targeted aircraft in less than 4 seconds” (p.1, October 6, 1983). The missile is more advanced than the SAM7 missile, models of which took part in the 1973 War , the same report added (ibid). On another anniversary five years later, the paper also gave a similar front page space to a similar achievement, an
Egyptian-made armoured vehicle, while taking part in a military show marking the anniversary (p. 1, October 6, 1988). On the same day, Mubarak also opened a new army exhibition displaying weaponry and equipment that had been used earlier in the war (ibid). On another anniversary two years later, the paper also published on the front page an image of a recently produced anti-aircraft and anti-tank armoured vehicle (p. 1, October 6, 1990). The home-made vehicle was named “Fahd [leopard] 30” (ibid). The paper also carried statements by the Commander of Navy Forces Ali Gad as disclosing a plan to “make the Egyptian Navy one of the strongest in the Middle East” (p. 5, October 6, 1983). Remarkably, Israel is rarely mentioned in these reports. Therefore, these reports lacked one significant feature of language, a carrier of binaries which had been heavily used by Sadat under the rubric of (Egypt versus Israel, or victory versus defeat, etc…). Nevertheless, these achievements were geared not to enhance the meaning of victory or capability to subdue Israel, but rather to enhance the image of Mubarak regime by employing another element of political marketing, an element which Bruce Newman called ‘situational contingency’. The element was used by “triggering hypothetical scenarios” which “creates the illusion” that the protagonist would be better able to deal with them than any other entity. The fact that the archenemy of Israel is systematically obscured under Mubarak came as dually purposeful: the display of force made Mubarak a further powerful peace-keeper following in the footsteps of Sadat and an adopter of self-defence discursive framework based on Sadat’s pronouncement of the October 1973 as Egypt’s ‘last war’. At the same time, these military exhibits shifted the ‘meaning potential’ of this victory beyond what is military into what is eminently political or economic, as explained below.

281 Khatib employed in the case of Hezbollah after the 2006 War to “convince its people that defeating Israel was becoming easier to achieve, that Nasrallah was the person who would give them a sense of control over their own destinies and that, in Nasrallah’s words, the ‘age of defeats has gone, and the age of victories has come’, Khatib, Matar and Alshaer, p. 91
On what is economic of this civil-based personalised war legacy, there are several examples in
the text. Strikingly, the army, a military institution related to war as it is, was part of this
association. In one speech marking the anniversary of the war, Mubarak said that the army is a
“school of decision-making that should be emulated in other state institutions” (p. 1, October 6,
1992). This material achievement of the army in civil fields continued to be highlighted in the
Ahram reports. One report mentioned that it were the Armed Forces which built Ahmed Said
Bridge (mainly a civil project) in just 1800 hours as “a great achievement embodying the
serious team work the armed forces are best known for” (p. 13, October 6, 1984). On another
anniversary of the war, Ahram gave central space to a report on the launch of a project marking
the war by “opening food security projects” (p. 1, October 6, 1986). The paper said that the
opening ceremony was attended by Defense Minsiter Abu Ghazala himself. along with Youssef
Wali, the Minister of Agriculture. The project carried out by both ministries was meant to satisfy
the need of both the army and local markets (ibid.). While the project was given a broader
central space on the front page, the speech marking the 1973 War anniversary was only
mentioned in just two short paragraphs in the same page. The paper also interviewed the head of
the army supply apparatus who expressed commitment to support to civil institutions in different
fields including transport, fire fighting and printing (p. 7, October 6, 1994). The fact that this
interview is made on war anniversary is revealing. According to Sayegh, these forms of the
army’s expansion into civil life was part of “new ways to become the mainstay of Mubarak’s
crony system”. 282 This ubiquity of the army, which included “enmishing of the officers’s
republic in the civilian life”, Sayegh added in his seminal project, “became so pervasive as to
be deemed normal and natural”. 283 Indeed, the discourse of Ahram on the role of the army on
these economic and reconstruction projects contributed to this normalisation.

282 Sayigh, ‘Above the State’, p. 4.
283 Ibid.
This level of discourse kept Muabrak safe in power as the army, a holder of the ‘use of force’, was thus ‘coopted and depolitized’ without losing the 1973 War as the lynchpin of legitimating the regime of what had become known as the ‘October [war] generation]. This new shape of the legacy of the 1973 ‘war victory’ grew in the 2000s. The paper published a speech of Mubarak in which he said that a strong army is necessary for “defending homeland and contributing to development” (p. 1, October 6, 2004). Mubarak mentioned that the armed forces “plant land, produce food and build roads” (ibid). On another occasion, the paper wrote that Mubarak would mark the anniversary of the 1973 War with launching “the 20 year achievements under Mubarak” exhibition which included service and production projects (p.1, October 6, 2001). The paper heavily quoted from an army-produced magazine in which references were made to achievements under Mubarak such as ‘an increase in the number of telephone lines, electricity networks and education projects’ (ibid, p. 3). Although the newspaper mentioned that Egypt had been able to restore all of its occupied territory, this mention was brief in comparison with his references to civil projects carried out by his regime or the army (ibid). The paper also dedicated other pages to the ‘achievements of Mubarak’, naming the headline of one page as such: “28 years of victory for peace and development (ibid, p. 24).

Again, this dual track policy of personification/personalisation was neither incidental nor accidental, as evident in editorials. In a front page column by Saraya, the Editor in Chief, he wrote that “Mubarak not only played the historical role of leading Egypt during the war and making victory, but also helped build the infrastructure for political and economic systems which were the basis of his political transformation…” (p. 1, October 6, 2005). The following year’s column of Saraya reads that “Mubarak came from the ranks of the strong fighters of the October War to lead the march of Egypt after the war” (p. 1, October 6, 2006). Two years later,
Saraya wrote in another front page column: “Those who led the nation to the victory of October still lead it in the face of challenges of reconstruction, building and development with the same vigour and determination” (p. 1, October 6, 2008). One year later, Saraya wrote in the same front page that “[war] commander, Mubarak, won the war, and became the hero of peace and development” (p. 1, October 6, 2009).

On what is political, the most striking example of this personalisation of the 1973 War victory to serve Mubarak’s legitimacy is presidential referendums which allowed him to remain in power. This personalisation, out of analysing the whole text, was a patterned regularity on every referendum. In the 1993 Referendum, these were the first four headlines of the front page:

96.28 percent said yes to the President

Mubarak: This trust and support lead me to bear further responsibilities in the next stage

Mubarak is sworn for a third term in parliament next Tuesday

The glorious war of October opened the door to peace for all peoples of the region

Mubarak on the 20th anniversary of the October victories: I hail the people of Egypt and I will do my best to improve the living standards of the common people in this great country (p. 1, October 6, 1993).

Along with mixing the past and present, two pictures opposite each other were published on the same front page: the picture on the right hand reads the caption: “President Hosni Mubarak is handed the official result of the referendum by the Minister of Interior Hassan Al-Alfi”, and the same equally sized picture with a caption that reads “… [and him] while chairing the meeting of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces yesterday on the occasion of the 20 years of the October victory” (ibid).
In the 1999 Referendum, also held in the same week in October, the same trend was repeated. The paper said that Mubarak gave a speech in which he said that “the victory of October taught us that realising great objectives require true belief and accepting sacrifice” (p. 1, October 6, 1999). He also promised further economic plans such as increasing exports and facing down corruption and enhancing the private sector (ibid, p. 3). The paper said that the speech, made while Mubarak was sworn in front of the Parliament, was followed by playing the National Anthem (ibid, p. 3). On the same page, a picture was shown with Mubarak attending the meeting of the Supreme council of Armed forces, and the picture was very similar to the one published in the previous referendum (ibid.). Again, the paper was fully dedicated in coverage to the sworn-in ceremony of Mubarak with a few op-ed articles which substantiate this personalisation which went as extreme to relegate the war anniversary itself to a second place. For example, columnist Ahmed Bahgat made no mention of the war in his column, unlike his habit of doing so on the war anniversary (ibid, p. 3). The final page dedicated a wider space to a story of a Mubarak painting embedded on the three new stamps on the occasion of his new term. The war mention was limited to a story headlined: “Nagat [a singer] sings Egypt” in a ceremony held by the Ministry of Information (ibid, p. 35). Only when one reads the fourth line in the story that one realises that the occasion is held to mark the October War anniversary. The editorial was also dedicated to the new term of Mubarak with no mention of the October War (ibid, p. 11).

This pattern of political manipulation of the war personalisation via referendums also continued in the 2005 Presidential Elections, as the front page story of Ahram was no longer dedicated to the speech of Mubarak marking the war anniversary but rather to his cabinet meeting to be held
one week later. The meeting “will discuss the electoral platform of President Mubarak with top priority” to reducing unemployment rates, making more spending on health, education and social security (ibid.). In the page, there is slight mention of the war in the column of the Editor in Chief which was also dedicated to the historical role of Mubarak in the war (ibid.)

Indeed, the fact that the war is pushed into the back seat, the time of the presidential referendums is another indication of the dominance of this macro theme (war personified/personalised) over the other macro theme of the ‘massive and consistent victory’ mentioned above. That patterning is clear even in earlier referendums. In the 1987 Referendum, symbolically held at the October anniversary, there is almost no mention of the October War at the paper as full space was given to the re-election of Mubarak. The front page, for the first time ever in marking the anniversary, there is no mention of the October War at all (p. 1, October 6, 1987). The first pages were dedicated to the referendum (p. 3, p. 8, p. 9, p. 11, p 13). The first mention of the war came in page 7, with an editorial and two columns. On the final page, while it was dominated by pictures of actors and singers queuing to vote in the referendum, a small two-paragraph piece of news that tells in less than 40 words that tell of an exhibition showcasing the weapons used in the October War. The piece has on its right hand a picture of an actor voting in a referendum as if it is part of the story (ibid, p. 13). The researcher is not sure whether adding the picture to the story is a deceptive editorial act by the paper. However, incidents revealed later on indicated that Ahram went as far as to doctor pictures related to Mubarak to give him a central position.  

284 In 2010, Ahram published a doctored photograph that appeared to put President Hosni Mubarak at the forefront of key figures at the Middle East peace talks in Washington. The original photo showed US president Barack Obama walking in the lead on a red carpet, with Israel's Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, the Palestinian President Mahmoued Abbas, Mubarak and Jordan's King Abdullah II slightly behind.  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/17/al-ahram-newspaper-doctored-photo-hosni-mubarak [accessed on August 20, 2014].
Remarkably, *Ahram* established the personification/personalisation of the war under Mubarak on a continuity with a personification/personalisation of Sadat, of course, at a variibly lesser degree that kept the first at the central stage and the other at the supporting periphery. In other words, Mubarak is an extension of Sadat in that secured victory in the same war and took the country towards the same road of both peace and development. The adequacy of this continuity is that the war’s personification/personalisation of Sadat provided a solid ground for Mubarak’s rule. In other words, Mubarak inherited a war established as a victory and a policy adopted as viable and durable. There is no wonder, Mubarak was keen in his speeches to highlight this connectivity. In every speech made by Mubarak and published mostly in full text by the paper Sadat is always mentioned as the mastermind behind the war. These are some examples below. Remarkably, Mubarak used the same frames and even the same words in almost every speech. As detailed in a list in Appendix 4, this is one example of Mubarak’s speeches in the 1990s and 2000s:

- “Greetings to the loyal son of Egypt Anwar Sadat who courageously took part in war and peace” (p. 5, October 6, 1993)
- “Greetings to the maker of this decision, the hero fo war and peace, the martyr of Egypt, ..” (p. 3, October 6, 1994)
- “Greetings to the decision maker Anwar Sadat who took up this enormous historic responsibility and …..” (p. 3, October 6, 1995)
- “The late President Anwar Sadat took the war decision … greetings to the hero of war” (p. 5, October 6, 1988)
- “Greetings to the martyr of Egypt …[and] his initiative which set out peace as the goal of war …” (p. 3, October 6, 1997)
- “Greetings to the maker of war decision and maker of peace” (p. 5, October 6, 1999)
Editorially, *Ahram* took the same position of Mubarak, with Sadat always mentioned alongside Mubarak. On the first anniversary since Mubarak came to power, the picture of Sadat in the operations room was shown in the front page (p. 1, October 6, 1982). Pages were dedicated to Sadat with his pictures showing him and Mubarak being published (ibid, p. 3, p. 5, p. 6, p. 7, p. 8, p. 9). The paper also gave a front page space to the family of Sadat while marking the third anniversary of his assassination (p. 1, October 6, 1984). Again, this duality of personification/personalisation of the war continued in a heavily patterned manner, as in the columns of one of the paper’s most prominent and long serving writers Salah Montassser. Montasser hailed the role of Sadat whom he called the “the late commander and martyr” (p. 7, October 6, 1985). One year later, Monatasser repeated the same praise for Sadat “on the same day of victory and the anniversary of his death” (p. 7, October 6, 1986. On year later, Montasser also hailed Sadat “as he should not be forgotten” (p. 7, October 6, 1987). Three years later, Montasser also wrote in his column that “a one thousand million greetings should be sent to Anwar El-Sadat as he firstly restored confidence to the Egyptian people, homeland and the Armed Forces” (p. 7, October 6, 1990). One year later, Montasser made the same reference to the role of Sadat “who took the decision and bear its consequences” (p. 7, October 6, 1991). One year later, Montasser also said the “role of Sadat could not be denied” (p. 9, October 6, 1992). One year later, Montasser hailed Sadat’s ability to deceive the Israelis on the war day (p. 9, October 6, 1993). One year later, Montasser said the war “is a day immortalised for the leader of its great victory Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat” (p. 9, October 6, 1994). Indeed, this patterning, as repetitious and monotonous as it is here, is very revealing of the intensity of the personality politics on the the war. The Editor of *Ahram*, Ibrahim Nafie who was appointed by Mubarak as detailed in Chapter Five, dedicated his column to Sadat (p. 1, October 6, 1982.). In the following year, Nafie highlighted the “bravery of Sadat” in his column” (p. 1, October 6,
1983). Still, the most evident example of this dual personification/personalisation is this quote from Nafie a few years later:

As Sadat deeply admired the great achievement in October 1973 of the young Commander Pilot, Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, who managed with his bravery and determination as well as planning to stand up and defeat Israel’s strongest army, the air force. Only with this performance, Sadat admired this man who was later selected as the Vice President … (p. 1, October 6, 1986)

Meanwhile, Nasser was not given the same privilege. On the contrary, any attempts to link him to the war were dismissed. Nafie, the Editor in Chief from 1984 to 2005, said that any attempt to claim that Sadat was carrying out an already outlined plan of Nasser is a ‘lie’ and ‘illogical’ (p. 1, October 6, 1982). Several columnists and writers also set the 1973 War in an oppositional relations to the 1967 War. Montasser wrote that the 1967 War lacked planning and organisation and was based on sentiments and claims of bravery, in an implicit criticism of Nasser especially as the title of the column was “October and Sadat” (p. 11, October 6, 1996).

This criticism of Nasser at the paper accorded with an official position demonstrated in Mubarak’s visit to the tombs of Sadat or Nasser on the war anniversary. It was only after 1988, that Mubarak began to visit the tomb of Nasser, as concluded after following all annual issues of Ahram under Mubarak. In 1989, the paper published a picture of Mubarak in his visit to the tomb of Nasser. (p. 1, October 6, 1989). The paper also quoted statements of Mubarak in which he dismissed this controversy over the role of Nasser against that of Sadat in the war. Mubarak said that “every one of them carried out a prominent role in preparing the armed forces and people for the war.” (p. 3, October 6, 1998). Again, this reconciliatory position is
different from the statements of Mubarak at the beginning of his rule which he established the continuity of Sadat’s policy by distancing himself from Nasser via statements as such: “nationalisation [which is associated with Nasser] is no longer valid for our society now” and that “no alternative to infitah [which is associated with Sadat] and no return backwards” (p. 1., October 6, 1982). Remarkably, the paper followed suit in this official reconciliatory tone towards Nasser. News of the Mubarak’s visit to the tombs of Sadat and Nasser on the war’s anniversary were equally treated by securing a space in the front page (p. 1, October 6, 1988, p. 1, October 6, 1997, p. 1, October 6, 1998). In 2009, the paper published two pieces of news below each other and almost equal in words, with the first reporting Mubarak’s visit to Sadat’s tomb and the other to Nasser’s tomb (p. 1, October 6, 2009). Columns and op-ed articles generally stopped the attack on Nasser, with one going as far as to argue that “there is no exaggeration that preparing for the war began on June 9, 1967 straight on after the defeat”. (p. 7, October 6, 1988). In this same issue, the paper reported that Mubarak did visit the tombs of Nasser as well as Sadat where he laid a wreath of flowers equally on the two tombs. Again, this is another difference between Sadat, who built his legitimacy on distancing his rule from Nasser and his military defeats as indicated in Chapter five, and Mubarak who built his legitimacy on the consequences of the war rather than the war itself or its preceding events. This building allowed Mubarak to reconcile with Sadat and Nasser, as will be demonstrated in Chapter Six, and to serve the main macro theme, war personification/personalisation, mainly meant for legitimating his rule.

1.3. War Religionised/Miraclised

This macro theme is still existent under Mubarak as it had been under Sadat. However, there is a difference. First; Mubarak, as reflected in the text, was not interested in a ‘religious’
personification/personalisation of the war as his main target was rather securely keeping his power as identified above. Second, Mubarak was not interested in a ‘religious’ victory albeit he kept the miraculous part of this war, again to enhance his legitimacy at this level of being a mythical war hero. Although the researcher earlier addressed miracles as part of religion, the *miracleisation* by Mubark and *Ahram* separated them with citing ‘scientific’ rather than ‘supernatural’ reasoning or with citing non-Islamic historical references such as the Pharaonic civilisation. Although the religionisation of the war remains in the text, the element was limited and non-patterned. This section begins with evidence from Mubarak’s speeches and statements of the patterned *miracleisation* of the war at the figurative non-religious level. The second part indicates how this type of miracleisation was also adopted by the *Ahram*. The third part focuses on showing how the use of religion was both limited and scattered.

In the speeches made by Mubarak, as quoted at *Ahram*, this frame of war as a miracle was dominant. On the first anniversary of the war after he took power, he called Egypt’s military performance at the war a “miracle” which “broke down the myths of backwardedness and stood up to the logic of defeat” (p. 1, October 6, 1982). In the following years, the same frame was repeated again. As detailed in Appendix 5, and as mentioned in these examples below, there is a pattern:

_ The “the heroes made the miracle as they crossed [the Suez canal] with minimum damage” and made “the greatest historic victory” (p. 5, October 6, 1988).

_ “The miraculous performance” of the army “restored confidence to the Arab self and corrected the calculations of everything” (p. 3, October 6, 1993).
The army demonstrated a “miraculous” performance which “corrected the course of history” (p. 1 & p.5, October 6, 1997)

The armed forces made a “miracle” by the best use of weapons available to them’/This is “the greatest glory of the Egyptian and Arab people” (p. 3, October 6, 1998)

“The epic of October … proved the ability of Egyptians to make miracles” (p. 3, October 6, 2007)

This miracalisation was based on repetitions and binaries which are two of the features of language. Repetition in Mubarak’s speeches as quoted in full by the paper includes not only the word of ‘miracle’ but other words associated with it such as ‘epic’ (p. 1, October 6, 1993, p.11, October 6, 1999, p. 11, October 6, 2001, p. 11, October 6, 2003, p. 6, October 6, 2007, p. 11, October 6, 2009) and ‘a genius act’ (p. 2, October 6, 1991, p. 30, October 6, 2006, p. 11, October 6, 2008). On binaries, the miracle of the war in its impact as “making the pre-1973 world different from the post-1973 War world” (p. 1, October 6, 1983), or in shattering other miracles related to Israeli dominant discourse of ‘invincibility’ of ‘occupation-based safe borders’ (p. 1, October 6, 2002). Along with repetition in wording and an overuse of binaries, there is another related linguistic feature such as the use of superlative attribute to indicate the unprecedentedness of the ‘miraculous’ Egyptian victory. These are some phrases mentioned in Mubarak’s speeches: “the greatest historic victory” (p. 5, October 6, 1988), “the greatest glory of the Egyptian and Arab peoples” (p. 3, October 6, 1998). Again, this hyperbolic use is based on repetition even of the same phrases serving emphasising these macro themes such as “correcting the course of history” (p. 3, October 6, 1995 & p. 1 & p.5, October 6, 1997).

Nevertheless, Mubarak also sought to downplay this ‘religious’ miracalisation of the victory by linking it to logic, reality and science. For example, a speech was made by the President in an
international seminar in the war and carried fully by the paper. He identified a number of reasons for victory including “adopting science and its methods, as well as making accurate calculations on basis of well-drawn plans” as well as a “solid internal public front” amidst nationalist sentiments (p. 3, October 6, 1998). Mubarak made no mention of the role of religion and, on the contrary, he described the example of cooperation with Syria in the war as a act of mutual interest: The cooperation was based on “full trust and deep belief in the unity of goal and destiny” (ibid.). Mubarak repeated the same objective causes of the “Egyptian victory in the war’ in other speeches such as having a “strong army” and a “solid internal front” in the form of public support (p. 3, October 6, 1996). Although on occasions, he mentioned the role of belief in God, it was accompanied by reference to “believing in insisting on realising the right goal” and “self-confidence” among the lessons of ‘victory’ (p. 3, October 6, 1994).

Mubarak benefitted from a continuity of Sadat’s legacy and also built on Sadat’s personification/personalisation of the war. However, he was keen to cut links with Sadat by non-religionising Sadat, whose preferred title had always been the Al-Rais al-Mu’min. In his speeches, he never referred to Sadat at the Al-Rais al-Mu’min although he knew that would have been endearing to Sadat in his grave. Mubarak always refered to Sadat as a capable military leader adept at “having faith in the Egyptian fighter’s efficiency and ability to realise victory” (p. 5, October 6, 1988). However, it took Mubarak two years to execute this separation from what is ‘faithful’ in his predecessor’s qualities. The only Qur’anic references mentioned by Mubarak came at the speeches on the first two anniversaries of the war after he came to power. On the first one, he ended this message to the army with the Qur’anic verse “who was made a winner by Allah could not be defeated” (p. 13, October 6, 1983). The same verse was repeated by him the following year of marking the anniversary (p. 1, October 6, 1983). However, after two years in office, all religious references were made briefly and a de-religionised context was
used instead. Mubarak even took up the occasion of his speeches on one war anniversary to affirm that “we work for creating a modern civilian state that does not mix religion with politics” (p. 1, October 6, 2010). This non-religionisation ran against a context of ‘internal Islamist threats’ that pushed the Mubarak regime to distance itself from what is religious as will be explained in Chapter Five.

Following suit, the patterning of the war at this figurative miracilised yet non-religionised level was also adopted by the paper itself, as evident in editorials and stories by its writers of all issues under analysis. As detailed in Appendix 6, these are some examples in which miracles were repeated in a patterned manner and in consistency with Mubarak who set the war in the same patterns:

- “The miracle of the Egyptian Airforce in the October War under the command of Hosni Mubarak (p. 13, October 6, 1982).

- A story was published with the headline is the “miracle of wars” (p. 8, October 6, 1983).

- The editor’s column was headlined: “the other side… the miracle of October” (p. 1, October 6, 1989).

- Mustafa Bahgat Badawi wrote a column in the Ahram saying that the six hours of crossing the canal were “a bless and a miracle from God” (p. 11, October 6, 1996)

Again, as Mubarak had done, the paper also cultivated this miracalisation in a non-religious context by giving victory a sense of ‘realis’ and attributing it to scientific logical reasons. For example, claims are made that the war is being studied in all military academies as a ‘miraculous act’ is repeated and patterned in the editorial content of the paper under Mubarak, a
phenomenon which was not there under Sadat. As detailed in Appendix 6 as well, below are some examples of this patterning:

- Editor Ibrahim Nafie wrote: “the war is still being studied in “the biggest political centres and military academies” (p. 13, October 6, 1982)

- The editorial reads: The “heroism of the Egyptian military in the war is taught in military research academies as a unique act of war …” (p. 1, October 6, 1984)

- Morsey Attalah, one of the editors of Ahram, said that the war led “the world’s military science institutes to reconsider many of the theories and beliefs which had existed for a long time as solid facts” (p. 9, October 6, 1994)

- Ahram’s editorial was also titled “the epic of October”, arguing the war introduced a “new military strategy now taught in many of the world universities” (p. 11, October 6, 2003).

Furthermore, the paper also made this secular 

miraclisation by linking it other ‘miraculous’ acts in pre-Islamic cultures such as Ancient Egypt, which had been rarely done under Sadat. Salah Montasser, a prominent columnist, wrote “If the Ancient Egyptians had built the Pyramids of Giza, they also built other pyramids … [by crossing] the Suez Canal”, said Montasser (p.9, October 6, 1992). Ni’mat Ahmed Fouad, another prominent columnist of the paper, linked the October War victory to the greatness of the “Ancient Egypt civilisation” (p. 12, October 6, 2004). On the same page, Ahmed Abdel-Mo’ti Hegazy, a renowned poet, highlighted that “religion is for Allah, and the nation is for all” to highlight the nationalist rather than religious sentiments of the Egyptians (ibid.). In other parts, the reports in the Ahram included links between the October War heroes and Ancient Egyptian heroes such as Ramsis (p. 36, October 6, 1996).
As a result, religious references made by the paper were minimal, occasional and unpatterened. The paper published an op-ed by War Commander Sa’d Maamun in which he began with a Quraanic verse and ended with another in which the ‘victory’ is promised to those ‘believers’ (p. 6, October 6, 1983). However, the text was dominated by other references attributing victory to courage and military skills (ibid.). The only enduring religious references that continued from the Sadat era is the first shouting of the war, taken as *Allahu Akbar*. Columnist Ahmed Bahgat noted that the first yelling in the war was “*Allahu Akbar*… It was the shouting of the Mijaheddeen, so the October War in its first days was a sort of Jihad and justice” (p. 2, October 6, 1989). Bahgat repeated the same meaning over the years. He once wrote that the army soldiers “shouted *Allahu Akbar* then they raced towards death” (p. 2, October 6, 2000). Two years later, he repeated the same meaning: “The first shout pronounced by the Egyptian army after the crossing: *Allahu Akbar*” (p. 2, October 6, 2002). Montasser, a columnist in the paper, made the same reference, claiming that “during the crossing, there were 70 microphones across the canal, all shouting *Allahu Akbar Allahu Akbar*, with 400,000 soldiers repeating the same words which filled their souls with faith, strength and sacrifice” (p. 9, October 6, 1994). Huseein El-Shayer wrote in his column that the armed forces depended on the “spiritual *aqida*” of the Egyptian fighter (p. 11, October 6, 1997). Remarkably, this patterning of the ‘*Allahu Kabar*’ shouting is consistent with the state-controlled macro-economics, as to be explained in Chapter Six. Still, generally speaking, these religious evocations are not patterned, a conclusion the researcher draws on lack of regularity and repetition and lack of consistency through word association or intertextual chains, which means that religionisation in one part is bolstered by other parts in the text.

To sum up, *Ahram* and the state took the 1973 War as an act of miracle guaranteeing its ‘massive and consistent victory’ and keeping Mubarak as war personified/personalised.
However, this miraclisation is designed without the overdose of religion or irrealis which Sadat had injected in the whole official discourse and which Ahram followed suit to do so. On the contrary, Mubarak, who saw his superior killed by Islamist officers on the anniversary of the war, and accordingly Ahram injected heavy doses of realis to make this miracle a hyperbolic act of hard work and scientific development. The socio-political practices under Mubarak dictating such a discourse are detailed in Chapter Five. Finally, the Mubarak regime and Ahram used the miraclisation element to perpetuate the two other macro themes and fixate their claims beyond any criticism or wrongdoing.

2. Linguistic Patterns: Grammar, Semantics and Pragmatics

2.1. Transitivity

As conceptually detailed in the previous chapter, transitivity focuses on the ideational function, i.e. the use of language to express content and to communicate information. This function is realised through verb-based processes and subject/object (or actor/goal as named by Halliday). This section will analyse the two features in the transitivity system at Ahram under Mubarak: the lack of actor/goal dichotomy, unlike the heavy use of it under Sadat and the absence of non-action processes evident in the use of behaviour verbs fitting in with celebratory peaceful tones reflected in the variability of the three macro themes mentioned above.

In the transitivity system, Israel is almost no longer as the goal (the one who is affected by the action or receiving it). On the other hand, Egypt turns to be an actor (the one who does the action) with no ‘goal’ or affected participant. When the army announced the home-made
manufacturing of a new anti-aircraft vehicle in 1983, the paper quoted an army commander who made the announcement as the equipment was meant to “make the Egyptian Navy one of the strongest in the Middle East” (p. 5, October 6, 1983). Also, when the army announced the production of a missile, named “the Eye of the Falcon”, it also obscured Israel or even the enemy as a goal to be targeted by these missiles. The missile can be carried “from the shoulder of one of our soldiers towards the targeted aircraft in less than 4 seconds” (p.1, October 6, 1983). Furthermore, the event was de-circumstancised, i.e. deprived of any circumstances that link to the conflict with Israel and rather linking it to broader and general scenarios as noted above.

Moreover, on this transitivity level, there are no ‘action processes’ usually identified by such verbal processes such as ‘strike’, ‘attack’, ‘defeat’, ‘kill’, ‘capture’ and destroy’ within a binary relationship setting the Egyptian army against its Israeli counterpart. The only action process identified in the text is that of a ‘new war’ of production and development. As Ahram said in one editorial, as “Egypt went through the battle of liberation, it also went through the battle of building and reconstruction in the same vigour” (p. 11, October 6, 2004). This process is ensured by Mubarak himself who said in one speech, “our victories opened the road for deepening the democratic path and radical reform for policies and aims” (p. 3, October 6, 1997). In that sense, the war no longer refers to a military action but to a means to a broader end of peace settlement. Mubarak focused on the “battle of reconstruction” (p.1, October 6, 1988). As he said in a speech that was dedicated to these conciliatory ‘action’ processes of the war, “the October 73 War opened the door to a just settlement for the Middle East conflict” (p. 1 October 6, 1996). Mubarak repeated this ‘action process’ uniformly in his speeches. These are some examples: “The October victories “opened the opportunities of peace in the region for a new stage of coexistence and cooperation” (p.1, October 6, 1995), “made the will of peace
victorious”, according to Mubarak (p.1, October 6, 1994), “encourages investment and capital enhancement without fear or hesitation” (p.1, October 6, 1992). This peaceful action process was also evident editorially though headlines including similar action verbs: “Mubarak opens the exhibition of peace and attends the military parade” (p.1, October 6, 1988).

Since the war takes on this celebratory shape, behaviour rather than action processes of transitivity were more dominant in this transitivity system. These are examples from Mubarak’s speeches all over the years of his rule: “we are pleased” with the return of Taba as part of the post-war peace negotiation (p.1, October 6, 1988), the Egyptians should be “proud” and grateful” for the army to make its victory in the war (p.1, October 6, 1982), “the victory made us get through the humiliation of Naksa” (p.1, October 6, 2006). Editors followed suit in the use of these behavioural processes. Editor in Chief Osama Sarayya said the “October War is alive and reinvigorating ” (ibid.) Sarayya’s column is full of behaviour processes: Egypt “retrained the instinct of survival” by the war, “removes the shame of earlier wars”, “restored our self-confidence, allowed the army soldiers to “plant hope with their blood and sweat” (ibid.). Also in editorials, the behavioural processes dominated. These are examples from one editorial: “Those who read the memoirs of the leaders of the war will be surprised by this level of meticulous attention to every detail in the war”, and “will discover the sophistication and scientific planning of it” (p. 11, October 6, 2007). Another editorial reads that the war “changed the world perception of us” (p. 3, October 6, 2006).

These transitivity tropes fit in with the division of dominance of the macro-themes. That the ‘massive, consistent’ victory is no longer the main macro theme means that action processes are no longer the main processes. In fact, the personification/personalisation of the victory is
the biggest macro theme reflected on the heavy use of behaviour processes to reflect a symbolic figurative language meant to legitimise the Mubarak’s 30-year old rule.

2.3. Modality

Remarkably, the issues of *Ahram* during the reign of Mubarak maintained the mixed use of non-modalised (declarative in the form of ‘is’ and ‘is not’) and modalised clauses (of inclination such as ‘may be’ or of obligation such as ‘must be/must not’). This mixture fits in with the dual purpose of asserting the victory of Egypt in the war and broadly building the legitimacy of the regime by this achievement in which Mubarak had taken part.

Declarative clauses were repeatedly used again and again to confirm the first theme; Egyptian victory was both massive and consistent. On the first anniversary since Mubarak came to power, *Ahram* quoted him in a front page story as saying to the army soldiers: “You created Egypt’s most magnificent glories and made its greatest victories” (p. 1, October 6, 1982). In the same page, modalised and declarative clauses were used. In the column of Editor Ibrahim Nafie, this is an example of using declarative and modal clauses in the same sentence, “the Great Crossing Day is – and will be – considered the greatest event in the Arab nation’s history” (ibid.). Nafie added that “we must not discuss claims” devaluing this war decision by Sadat. Clearly, this mode is of high ‘obligation’ and ‘inclination’, through the use of ‘will be’ and ‘must be’ in this example, continued all along the years with a sense of consequentiality as other issues are demonstrated below in examples (modal clauses were italicised by the researcher):
- “We must begin the year 1983” by drawing on the “spirit of October” (p.1, October 6, 1983).

- “Despite the passage of years, the anniversary of October will remain a light pushing forward the strength of the past and leading up the future” (p. 1, October 6, 1984).

- “The life of peoples must include these light moments” such as the October War (p. 1, October 6, 1986).

- “we should take it for granted ... that Sadat is the one who had inspired the modern Egyptian spirit” (p. 7, October 6, 1987). Montasser, one of the main columnists of the paper, wrote that “October 6 was and will remain the date of the great achievement … 14 years passed since this day, will we ever forget it?... will remember .. we will rememer .. we will remember…” (ibid.)

Noticeably, these clauses depended on repetition to form a solid pattern In 1998, Mubarak massively used modal clauses. The clause “will remain” was repeated four times consequently as such: “The spirit of October will remain interacting with our reality … The spirit of October will remain running in the body of our nation … the spirit of October will remain a reservoir that never dry up… the spirit of October will remain live and blessed ...” (p. 3, October 6, 1998). Mubarak also used ‘high’ obligation modualtion such as “the new generation must realise that the October War was a crossing of Egypt and the Arab nation into a new dawn” (ibid.) In another speech marking the anniversary that the “Armed Forces must remain strong in order to defend the nation” (p. 1, October 6, 2004). This modality of ‘high obligation’ adds commitment on the public to abide by the declarations made either by the President or the paper, as well as ascertains authority of both over the reader asked to sustain his loyalty to Mubarak.

On tense, the text was also full of massive references to the present and the present continuous tense, again for the purpose of extending the legitimacy of the war to Mubarak as a continuity
from Sadat. For example, *Ahram* editorial said that “those who say that the spirit of October is no longer there as it had been on October 6 are ignorant of the Egyptian people and superficial in their perspective” (p. 7, October 6, 1989). Also, Mubarak always used the present sense in his speeches. In one speech, he said “October War is the *eid* (feast) of solidarity between the army and the people” (p. 3, October 6, 1994). He also used the present continuous tense to argue that “October spirit will still be running in the minds of every Egyptian” (p. 3, October 6, 1995). *Ahram* did the same when it noted in one editorial that the war “is continuing to reflect the depth of relations between Egypt and Syria [who joined forces in the war]” (p. 11, October 6, 1996).

### 2.4. Metaphor and Wording

As demonstrated above, the dominant thematic structure of *Ahram* on every issue marking the anniversary of the war during the reign of Mubarak had been the personification/personalisation of the event ultimately meant to legitimise Mubarak as a former 1973 War commander and as a president who has his own path based on this legacy. Accordingly, metaphors were employed down that line. The two mostly used metaphors are “the spirit of October and the “crossing”, much to convey that the war is still ‘alive’ and is affecting many elements of life and that ‘the crossing’ is not stoppable since Egyptians do ‘cross’ many hurdles as they had done with the Bar-Lev line in 1973. This section is divided into two parts, the first on the extensive use of these two certain metaphors to enhance the trio of macro themes above and the second on the words used for the same purpose.
First of all, there is the metaphor of the “spirit of October” which was used in a patterning deliberate manner, judging by the number of occurrences during the 30 years of Mubarak’s rule and the texts under analysis for that period. More strikingly, this pattern has been innovated since it had not been used during the era of Sadat. This judgement is based on three phenomenon, the speeches of Mubarak were the metaphor “spirit of October” is used, the editorials of the paper and the columns of the editors of the newspaper who followed suit.

Speeches of Mubarak were full of this metaphor, as traced in the paper’s texts. The paper said that Mubarak would give a speech on the war anniversary in which the President would call for “embracing the spirit of October which made the great victory” (p. 1, October 6, 1985). The use of the metaphor was consecutive over the years. In one year, the paper headlined one paragraph of the speech of Mubarak: ‘The spirit of October runs through the conscience of Egypt’. Mubarak added that this spirit “gave Egypt a confident belief that it is too strong to be targeted by anyone” (p. 5, October 6, 1993). One year later, the paper quoted Mubarak as saying in a speech that the October War anniversary “marks the return of the spirit”. (p. 3, October 6, 1994). One year later, the President was quoted as saying in a new speech that the “spirit of October still runs in the conscience of every Egyptian, making him confident of the ability to realise our objectives” (p. 3, October 6, 1995).

This metaphor was used to reinforce the main macro theme, war personified/personalised. Again, it was used by Mubarak in line with the paper’s adoption of it. In one anniversary, Mubarak was quoted by the paper as saying the “spirit of October will remain interacting with our reality … the spirit of immortalised October will remain a source and a torch always alight … the spirit of October will remain a piece of blessed fire always reminding us that our unity is
our strength” (p. 3, October 6, 1998). A few years later, the paper’s headline of one of the front page stories is “in a speech to the Armed Forces magazine [Mubarak says]: We need the spirit of October to stand up to the challenges of today and tomorrow” (p. 1, October 6, 2008). In the interview itself, Mubarak said that “we should all know that the spirit of October pushed forward a new spirit in the body of the nation … This spirit will remain a Ma’yeen (a pot of water) that never runs out” (ibid, p. 4). The same call was repeated again and again. The metaphor was also given a headline and a front page status, much to add eminence and prominence to its usage.

On the editorial side, the metaphor of ‘the spirit of October’ was heavily used from the first issue marking the war since Mubarak came to power. Again, most of the content is also dedicated in this metaphoric use to the personification/personalisation of the war macro theme. The paper urged in its editorial the “dire need to establish the spirit of October and revitalise its interaction in ourselves” (p. 7, October 6, 1982). Furthermore, as had been the case in Muabrak’s speeches, the use of the metaphor came in consecutive war anniversaries, much to indicate this continuity, intensitivity and coordination. In one year, Ahram said in the editorial that Egypt restored Taba, the point last occupied by Israel, after a battle “in which Egypt was committed to the same spirit of the October War victory”, and that “those who feared the disappearance of this spirit restored their belief in its existence” (p. 7, October 6, 1988). One year later, the headline of Ahram’s editorial was: “the spirit of October in renewal” (p. 7, October 6, 1989). One year later, another editorial hailed the “October spirit, the purity, the immortality and the justice” (p. 7, October 6, 1990). One year later, another editorial read that October War gave an impetus to the “Egyptian spirit” (p. 7, October 6, 1991). As explained above, the metaphors were used with a modality system of ‘high obligation’, reflected in the use of such clauses as ‘must be’ or ‘should be’, which plays a role of dictation on the reader.
One editorial was entitled: “The necessity to bring back the spirit of October” (p. 11, October 6, 2007). The editorial reads: “[the need to] restore this spirit in all facets of our life” (ibid.). A full list of these references in a more patterned war is detailed in Appendix 7.

The second metaphor, ‘the Crossing’, was also repeated on the three levels: official statements, editorials or columns by editors, and variable content. Again, the purpose of this employability of this metaphor enhanced the dominant macro theme, the war personified/personalised. It focused on the non-military developments since Mubarak came to power, i.e. Egyptians had ‘crossed’ many of hurdles thrown in their way. The most indicative example of the consistency and patterning of this metaphor is in the reports and columns of the economic editor of the paper, Abdel-Rahman Aql.

Aql, from the first anniversary of the war since Mubarak came to power, worked hard to attribute what he described as mega economic projects to the war and its ensuing peace atmosphere which Mubarak was part of. These peace deals, he wrote on this first anniversary, led to “investments worth 35 billion pounds” and reopening of the Suez Canal” (p. 11, October 6, 1983). Three years later, on the war anniversary, Aql wrote a story of the same content, entitled: “local, Arab and international economic crossing... after the military crossing” (p. 9, October 6, 1986). Two years later, again on the same war anniversary, Aql repeated almost the same words mentioned in one of his articles entitled: “the economic crossing … the challenge we face after the military crossing” (p. 9, October 6, 1988). A few years later, the same editor wrote the same content, arguing that Egypt after the war “the crossing of the economic crisis with the same spirit of October” (p. 11, October 11, 1992). He wrote that the end of the war brought in the 1980s a Tafra Hayela (a great jump) “in infrastructure and rebuilding and
renewing factories” (ibid.). Remarkably, the same content was repeated in a new report by Aql as entitled: “After the victory: the economic crossing” (p. 6, October 6, 1995). Three years later, again on the same day, a new report of Aql came in with the title: “The battle of development with a new economic crossing which included reforming the infrastructure and making the environment conductive to further investments (p. 15, October 6, 1999). Three years later, Aql mentioned the same logic, ending his report with an urge to “stick to the spirit of October in order to cross” any hard times at the level of world economy (p. 17, October 6, 2002). This intensification of the ‘crossing’ at the economic level was also based on no facts since the Egyptian economy was suffering from stagnation and rising debts and spending crises from the beginning of Mubarak’s first five-year plan.

Again, this repetitive use of the metaphor of ‘crossing’ was blessed both officially and editorially. In one issue in which Aql’s report was published, the Ministry of Agriculture sponsored five pages of advertisements to highlight its “achievements within a year”, much to implicitly indicate a similarly successful ‘agricultural crossing’. (pp. 14-18, October 6, 1986). In one single page, the paper quoted the former Minister of Supply Nagy Shatla as saying “we crossed the supply shortage crisis and reformed our internal markets”, and quoted the then Minister of Trade and Supply Ahmed Guweili in a report entitled “crossing into foreign markets” as saying that Egyptian exports are bigger and more varied than was the case in 1973 (p. 14, October 6, 1988). The same metaphor was also used by other columnists and op-ed writers hosted by the paper, all meant to serve the legitimating role of the macro-theme of personification/personalisation of the war. For example, Ahmed El-Tabrani wrote in an op-ed that “the crossing of October 1973 was followed by other waves of crossing”, citing economic

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projects in Sinai (p. 10, October 6, 2000). El-Tabrani said the “crossing is continuing” with further projects by the Mubarak regime (ibid.). Furthermore, the metaphor was also widely used non-economically to serve the same purpose. Osama Saraya, the Editor in Chief, said the presidential elections held in 2005 is “a new political crossing” (p. 1, October 6, 2005).

To sum up, this metaphoric hyperbole, the state and Ahram depended on a hyperbole on the war which found in these two metaphors of the ‘spirit of October’ and the ‘crossing’ two examples best fitting to consolidate the macro themes, especially the main one related to legitimating the rule of Mubarak based on the legacy of the war. What is clever about these two metaphors is that they indicate, in their lexical and semantic nature, a continuity; i.e. the ‘spirit’ is a transient entity that can remain alive across eras and the ‘crossing’ is an act of vibrancy and movability. This continuity is enhanced not only by linking the war to the present but also by intensive repetition. Perhaps it is better to conclude this section with one single quote from Mohamed Basha, who was also the war correspondent under Sadat, in which he wrote:

I do hope that the October spirit would be our way of life, as it is the spirit of the courageous decision, the spirit of scientific planning, the spirit of challenge by blood, sweat and morals, the spirit of achievement and winning against all odds (p. 7, October 6, 1985).

On the other part of this section, wordings had been used to reflect the nature of metaphorical employability of language. For example, the word ‘victory’ was repeated de-contextualised and mostly with no reference to Israel attached. On one front page, the word ‘victory’ was mentioned’ more than ten times, let alone citing many other words associated with the meaning of victory (p. 1, October 6, 1982). One year afterwards, the word ‘victory” was also repeated in
twelve pages (p. 1, p. 2, p. 3, p. 5, p. 6, p. 7, p. 8, p. 9, p. 10, p. 11, p. 12, p. 13, October 6, 1983). One year later, the same waves of repetitions continued at a figurative and symbolic level such as citing the event as “turning defeats into victory” (p. 1, October 6, 1984), or showing that Egyptians “know no desperation or defeat” (p. 2, October 6, 1985). Furthermore, certain words were associated with others to fit in with the macro-themes mentioned above, such as the ‘economic crossing’ which was a novice at the beginning of Mubarak’s era as it came to no such a widespread mention under Sadat’s.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed the discourse in the 30 issues of Ahram since Mubarak came to power. It found out that the paper is not acting like any other medium of communication whose main mission is to develop “an informed public opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas”, and to expose these ideas even if they come from “diverse and antagonistic sources or meeting the “informational needs” of the audience on such a significant event. On the contrary, the paper’s content over the 30-year-span was dominated by the proliferation of the same macro themes identified in the era of Sadat. Still, there is a change in the their ordering. The dominant and mostly proliferated macro theme is no longer establishing the ‘massive and consistent victory’ but rather the one about the personification/personalisation of the war. Attributing this victory to Mubarak, the pilot who took part in the war, is meant to legitimise and widen the appeal of Mubarak, the President. Indeed, elevating this macro theme came as Mubarak has always suffered from the lack of charisma or leadership skills as his predecessors.

were. On other occasions, he was also described as “colourless and cautious”, “culturally limited”, which means that he is unlike his two predecessors known for their communication skills.

As one main benefit of keeping the same ordering of benchmarks as identified in the previous chapter on Sadat, differences can be spotted as a discontinuity from the previous rule such as the use of no religion and the minimisation of the first macro-theme on victory as a materialistic action to be established and facilitated in discourse. Furthermore, since there is no war mood amidst peace context, the discoursed used linguistic features which justify this mood such as employing behavioural celebratory processes rather than military-oriented action processes and depending on a modality system of high obligation dictating the legitimisation of Mubarak on the reader as a ‘should be’ or a ‘must’. Furthermore, metaphors acted accordingly to guarantee the division of macro-themes, with the two main ones are ‘the crossing’ and the ‘spirit of October’. In a word, Mubarak made best use of the 1973 War as a ‘political instrument’ to serve a ‘political view which is the object’, in Clausewitz’s expressions, as effectively as Sadat had done. However, differences remain between both presidents in that the war is no longer a physical act to be proven or not. The war turned into a figurative symbolic illustration of a glorious past going 40 years back in time. Evoking this ‘celebratory’ past, the chapter found the Mubarak regime sought self-legitimation.

287 The statement was made by Ahmed Okasha, one of the most renowned psychiatrists in an interview with al-Masry al-Youm, on August 16, 2011, [http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/138880][1] [accessed on August 13, 2012]. The fact that Okasha is the brother of Tharwat Okasha, one of the Free Officers in the July 23, 1952 coup and a cabinet minister under Nasser add relevance and credibility to his opinion.

288 K.V. Nagarajan, ‘Egypt’s Political Economy, 22-39 (28.)


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Chapter Five
Socio-Political Practices under Sadat

Introduction

This chapter unpacks the various socio-political practices that had fed into the carefully woven formal and semi-formal narrative of the 1973 War represented on the pages of *Ahram*. Based on CDA as an overarching analytical framework, these practices include Sadat’s ‘authoritarianism’ as identified in the first section. The media system is the focus of the second section. The relation between the state and the media system including *Ahram* is also investigated. This critical investigation does not merely unravel the powers through which the state dominated the media system, but also exposes how the media system itself acts similarly ‘authoritarian by subduing opposition emanating from, in Gramsci’s words, ‘subaltern thought’ or counter-hegemonic forces. Focusing on the media system in the second section, this chapter explains how these differing voices were muffled. Within this context-rich scale, the third section of the chapter takes a wider view of another phenomenon standing behind the predominant hegemonic discourse on 1973; i.e. the so-called Islamic revival of the 1970s. This ‘islamisation’ was related to Sadat’s distancing from Nasser and his wrangling with Marxists and communists whose voices were mostly dismissed as ‘anti-Islamic’. This distancing left a void that Sadat filled in with the ‘October legitimacy’. 'October legitimacy’, as un-textual as it is, was part of the broader socio-political intricacies related to any biased perceptions on the war.
The final section addresses findings based on the textual semi-formal level of the *Ahram* newspaper by testing them through a comparative analysis with ‘national narrative’ facets, which are more or less formalised within the still-arbitrary macro themes identified in previous chapters. Among these channels, formal education textbooks are analysed. Beyond the formal discourse present within these textbooks, the investigation includes less formal and more nationally saturated symbols such as stamps about the war, the Cairo-based Unknown Soldier monument and, further, state-produced songs. Since the state acts as the main enabling force in all these discursive (re)productions of the war, the chapter concludes that these different channels - formal, semi-formal or popular - dictated the same macro themes on the 1973 War discourse. In other words, when an Egyptian watched TV, listened to the radio, went to school, visited war monuments, or even bought stamps, the message was the same due to these omnipresent socio-political practices.

1. **Authoritarian President**

The first part of this section defines ‘authoritarianism’, before applying the concept to Sadat’s presidency. Following this definition, ‘authoritarianism is then linked to the war discourse, i.e. how far this discourse is made to *hegemony*, and how anti-hegemonic thought and forces were suppressed or eclipsed for the sake of the dominating thematic structuring identified in the texts under analysis. The section found a correlation between the personal and political ‘authoritarianism of Sadat and the three macro themes identified in Chapter Three. It concludes that the authoritarianism through wide-ranging tools of power had dictated a uniformly structured discourse that blunted any forms of discursive dissent.
Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg defined authoritarianism as a system of government whereby “persons take precedence over rules, where the office holder is not effectively bound by his office and is able to change its authority and powers to suit his own personal and political ends.”290 Within such a system, the rule of law takes a backseat as the government made up of powerful men occupies the stage. Identifying these features within Sadat’s regime, Maye Kassem concluded that Sadat’s presidency had rendered the Egyptian political system one of the most resilient personal authoritarian system in the world.291 The outcome of political actions under Sadat, Hinnebusch contended, were shaped “by informal jockeying for political support in which personal rivalries, connections and clientage played a part.”292 Examples of this political behaviour were abundant during Sadat’s presidency. For example, Sadat began his rule by getting rid of older guard loyal to his predecessor Gamal Abdel-Nasser and led by Vice-president Ali Sabri, henceforth the pro-Sabri faction. Once he realized his objective, Sadat constituted a loyal team at the top and extended his sway over the structural bases of the regime. Pro-Sabri elements were replaced with trusted stalwarts in the ruling Arab Socialist Union (ASU), as Sadat could tolerate “neither the previous accumulation of power by its executive nor its pretensions to a revolutionary legitimacy potentially at odds with his legal authority.”293 Once he removed the threat from the right wing, he moved to demolish the persisting threat from the Left. In early 1973, university campuses were shut down in a crackdown on student protests calling for end to the ‘no war, no peace’ relationship with Israel. Similarly, the regime launched a wave of purges against the remaining left-wingers at the ruling Arab Socialist Union, the media establishment and in

293 Ibid, p. 49.
university facilities.” Furthermore, Sadat dismissed his premier, Aziz Sidqi, and assumed the portfolio himself, thereby removing an ambitious and independent personality from the centre-left of the political spectrum. These measures were also bolstered by a legal cover, especially as Sadat had claimed adherence to the law and further freedoms from the start of his presidency. The 1971 constitution legally enshrined the preeminent position of the president over other government and state institutions in Egypt. It combined legal prerogatives with personal political judgement and enabled the president to remain unchallenged at the apex of the governance structure.

With regard to the authoritarian urge to control the army, Sadat claimed himself as the 1973 War personified. In a word, it became Sadat’s own victory since he planned and decided the war. As demonstrated in the literature from Ahram, and also in other channels of national narrative explored below, Sadat also claimed ownership of the ensuing peace after the war. Some biographers even linked this drive towards peace with Sadat’s authoritarian nature. When peace talks were stalled, “Sadat felt impatient” partly as his prestige would dissipate in the absence of a new movement towards the goals in which the October War was fought.” Therefore, Sadat built the validity of peace deals on an exaggerated war discourse of ‘massive and consistent’ victory to justify this shift in attitude and policies towards Israel. As reflected in text analysis in Chapter Three, it was represented as a peace made ‘from the position of power’, as the latter phrase was widely repeated in the media and in official circles. Indeed, Sadat lent a hand to this discourse by capitalizing on the same macro themes patterned through texts. For example, exactly as Ahram built the ‘massive and consistent’

294 Hinnebusch, p. 53
295 Ibid.
296 Kassem, Egyptian Politics, p. 25.
298 Hinnebusch, p. 66.
Egyptian victory macro theme on a metonymical practice of reducing this victory to the ‘canal crossing’ and subsequent land reclaim on the eastern bank of the Suez, Sadat repeated this tactic when he propagated the significance of further land to be reclaimed after signing the peace accords. This focus on gaining territory came regardless of the sovereignty claims which such a step would ultimately involve. Security arrangements prohibited all but a token Egyptian force and inserted an international force between Egypt and Israel, much to “dilute Egyptian sovereignty and virtually remove Egypt from the Arab-Israeli equation.”

For Sadat, peace and land, a formula adopted by the regime in the name of ‘land for peace’, seemed more important than these concessions. Again, these peace movements were based on Sadat’s authoritarianism since the president’s biggest claim became that, “he was the man who planned and executed for Egypt a successful war and then planned and executed a successful peace.”

Kirk Beattie explained how authoritarianism drew the portrait of Sadat’s ‘hero of war and peace’ image:

The principal beneficiary of this victory could be none other than Sadat. Long maligned as fearing to engage in the “battle,” Sadat now became the strategic genius who had patiently and surreptitiously crafted the surprise attack and victory. He became in short, the battal al-‘ubur (the hero of the crossing). His popularity soared to an all-time high….

This personification/personalization of the war also helped Sadat boost his egoistic authority which he habitually expressed in patriarchal terms. Sadat always portrayed himself as the head of the family in the name of Egypt, a title which he consistently associated with obligations of respect and obedience. This was reflected in the way he used to address his

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299 Ibid, p. 68
300 Ibid.
302 Kirk Beattie, Egypt During the Sadat Years (New York: Pelgrave, 2000), P. 135
There was a patrimonial quality in Sadat’s rule as well. He habitually spoke as if the Egyptian political system were his personal property, referring to ‘my constitution’, ‘my political parties’ and even ‘my opposition’. A ‘cult of personality’ also reflected on Sadat’s lifestyle such as wearing pompous uniforms and choosing, unlike the austere life style of Nasser, to reside in numerous luxurious presidential residencies even related to the pre-1952 era such as King Farouk’s Abdin Palace. He also often appeared wearing his traditional dress, mostly worn by residents of his village where he was born in the Nile Delta. This personality cult also incorporated mundane daily activities which also ‘humanized’ Sadat such as shaving his chin while wearing pants in bathroom like any ordinary Egyptian. This humanization, nevertheless, came with a reverential touch, represented in his mostly preferred title, Al-Rais al-Mu’min, and reminiscent of the caliphate in his use of religious authority against opposition. Furthermore, his displays of public piety fused areligious of political authority typical of the historical Islamic monarchy. Again, Ahram, in its texts, analyzed in detail in Chapter Three, shaped the war discourse to reflect the personality cult of Sadat such as showing him on his way to prayers while surrounded by cheering supporters or by using the title, Al-Rais al-Mu’min, every time Sadat was mentioned, which is again an emulation of an Islamic practice limited to Muhammad whose name must be associated with the prophetic association of ‘peace be upon him’.

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303 Hinnesbusch, p. 84
304 Ibid.
Viewing himself as being on a mission to bring peace and prosperity to the country, as a ‘master of decision’ who is able to change the status quo, as a ‘Hero of War’ and ‘Hero of Peace’ that led him to daringly visit Jerusalem, disregarding his advisors, Sadat acquired a mythic quality; a quality which can be even linked to the pharonic heritage as well. One manifestation of this pharaonic mythical connection is Sadat’s field-marshall baton, held by him in many photographs in a scepter-style manner. It is no wonder that his address to the Knesset on November 20, 1977 was replete with his own sense of self-importance and heroism. “No one would have expected that the president of the largest Arab state, which bears the heaviest burden and the highest responsibility regarding the issues of war and peace in the Middle East, would declare his readiness to go to the land of the enemy.”306 In Cairo, on 8 December 1977, he even ridiculed his rival Arab countries, which boycotted Egypt after the peace deals, by using such words: “We are still carrying the dwarfs on our soldiers, but this is the fate of Egypt, and this is Egypt’s big heart,” and that, “I will bow to no one but the people of Egypt, and I will kneel only to God.”307

Due to these developments in the personality politics under Sadat, Kassem said the state went beyond authoritarianism to become a “neosultanic regime”.308 A neosultanic regime is a form of personal ruler, the system’s underlying structure is that “loyalty to the ruler is motivated not by his embodying or articulating an ideology, or by a unique personal mission, nor by any charismatic qualities, but by a mixture of fear and rewards to his collaborators.”309 In other words, the “ruler exercises his power without a restraint, at his own discretion… unencumbered by rules,” and without, “any commitment to an ideology or value system.”310

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306Brand, pp. 82-83.
307Ibid. p. 83.
308 Kassem, Egyptian Politics p. 12.
309 Ibid.
310 Ibid.
This ‘neosultanism’ was most demonstrated in the final few years of Sadat’s rule.\(^{311}\) Following the ‘food riots’ of 1977, President Sadat declared a number of emergency decrees and called for a referendum to endorse them; this subsequently became a recurring practice.\(^{312}\) Although Sadat advocated ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ as the main focal points when contrasting his regime with that of President Nasser, in reality, he ended up with more posts and titles in his name than Nasser ever did. Nazih Ayubi wrote:

In addition to his favourite title of the ‘Elder of the Egyptian Family’, Sadat in 1981 had the following official posts: President of the Republic, Prime Minister, Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Higher Chief of the Police Forces, Higher Chief of the Judiciary, Head of the National Democratic Party (the ruling party), and Commissioner of all military and economic matters and accords touching on national security.\(^{313}\)

It was logical, within this authoritarianism of Sadat, for such a channel of communication as \textit{Ahram} to personify and personalise the 1973 War. As indicated in the analysis of \textit{Ahram} texts, pictures of Sadat within the text had been an essential component of all material under study. Furthermore, this authoritarianism permeated the two other macro themes discussed in this study.

2. Authoritarian Media System

\(^{312}\)Ibid.
\(^{313}\)Ibid, p. 3.
This section relates *Ahram* to the broader practices of a media system which acted exactly like the authoritarian state. The first part of this section sets out the definition of ‘authoritarian media system’ and reconciles it with broader theoretical classification. The second part relates this classification to Egypt’s media system. Lastly, this section concludes with a case study of *Ahram* and other outlets vis-à-vis the 1973 War in an investigation of the practices of this media system. These case study highlight many authoritarian practices such as appointing and ousting editors, or rewarding or punishing opponent journalists violating the editorial line draconically drawn by the state.

According to the four-approach theory of the media systems, there are four generalizable types: ‘authoritarian’, ‘libertarian’, ‘social responsibility’ and ‘totalitarian’.\(^{314}\) Egypt’s media system is taken as a type of the first category. The system, for example, includes many features of authoritarianism such as its tendency to “support and advance the policies of the government which controls the media either directly or indirectly through licensing, legal action, or perhaps financial means.”\(^{315}\) For its part, the regime in this model allowed “the media some discussion of society and the machinery of government, but not of the people in power” as comment and criticism were “carefully guided, and articulated goals for the community conform with the goals of the regime itself.”\(^{316}\) However, established as it is, this theory remains general and misses the dynamics and intricacies of this relation between the state and the media. William Rugh devised a more comprehensive classification, with a focus on the Arab region.


\(^{316}\) Ibid.
Within these classifications, Egypt under Sadat can be characterized as a ‘mobilization’ model. In this model, the regime “attempts to mobilize the media, giving them considerable guidance on goals which should be emphasized, on how to interpret events, and even on news presentation.” Rugh identified three characteristics of this model, all of which correspond to the media under the Sadat regime. First, there is no criticism of policy. Second, there is a ‘sanctity of the leaders’, as the mobilized press “never criticizes the personalities leading the national government.” “Negative information about the character, behavior, or the personal lives of the top rulers does not find its way into print, no matter how well known by the newsmen or even the public.” Third, there is a lack of diversity on important political issues. “Since they are highly respectful of the national leadership and its fundamental policies, their editorials and news stories on these matters tend to be strikingly similar.” In devising this model, Rugh used *Ahram* along with newspapers from six other countries to exemplify these characteristics. What is remarkable here is that these three characteristics directly correspond with the three macro themes identified in the representations of the 1973 War found in the *Ahram* during the era of Sadat. For example, the first characteristic guarantees consistency in portraying victory, the second asserts the personification and personalization of the war, while the third leads to patterning due to the lack of diversity in reporting.

The ‘authoritarian’ regime controlled the media system at different ways. This control took legal and procedural shape under Sadat. Egypt’s Law no. 156, enacted May 24, 1960, stipulated that no newspapers could be published without the permission of the country’s only political organization, the National Union (later renamed the Arab Socialist Union

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317 Ibid, p. 28.
318 Ibid.
319 Ibid.
320 Ibid.
ASU). The law also transferred ownership of the four large private publishing houses - including *Ahram* - to the state-controlled National Union. The Union, according to this law, appointed the board of directors for the newspapers and controlled licensing, financial, and personal powers over the press. Sadat modified the system in 1975 by creating the Higher Press Council. However, this was another form of *de facto* state control, since the key members of the Higher Council were the Minister of Information, ASU officials, and various media officials, all appointed by the regime.321 Despite other legal changes, the basic state-controlled press structure was still intact.322 Within these legal restricting measures, severe punishments imposed on journalists such as imprisonment. Just one month before he was gunned down by a squad of Muslim fundamentalists in October 1981, Sadat arrested 3,000 dissident journalists and opposition leaders, including Heikal, the renowned editor of *Ahram*, in the strongest crackdown of his eleven years in power.323

*Ahram* was an exemplary case of these state control measures as the story of the creation of the newspaper as well as the appointment of its most renowned editor and Head of the Board of Directors, Heikal. *Ahram*’s golden era came when Heikal took over as editor. It became a household name in world journalism, and the assets of *Ahram*, when Heikal took over its editorship in 1957, were estimated at EGP 400,000. When he left it in 1974, the assets were estimated at EGP 40,000,000.324 The paper was also one of the most authoritative and dependable sources for understanding the ongoing political situation in the Middle East.325 However, this was not only due to matters of professionalism, but also as a result of the

325 Ibid, p. 17.
affinity between Nasser and Heikal. In 1964, a number of Marxist and socialist writers were given important editorial positions in the press in order to help sell Arab socialism to the masses.\textsuperscript{326} Criticism of Nasser and the regime, however, remained a taboo, and the Egyptian press acquired a reputation for being dull in handling domestic issues.\textsuperscript{327} However, Heikal was an exception. Heikal was influential enough for his suggestions to turn into laws, such as ‘nationalizing’ the press in 1960.\textsuperscript{328} Furthermore, Nasser, despite being a staunch authoritarian, found in Heikal a useful sounding board for various political ideas. As a result, Heikal gained insights into the Egyptian leader’s planning which made his columns more interesting.\textsuperscript{329} During the era of Sadat, Heikal lost his prestige and status in the aftermath of the 1973 War. Heikal was, in the beginning, influential enough to write down the so-called strategic guidance in which the president set out the goals of the war. This closeness allowed him unprecedented freedom banned to other journalists. For example, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Heikal was the first in Egypt to publish information about the Israeli infiltration west of the Suez Canal. He went as far as to defend the right of the public to know truth about this military setback, much to challenge official accounts downplaying or even denying the Israeli counter-attack. After the war ended, Heikal expressed fundamental opposition to the way Sadat had conducted the war and to Sadat’s direct appeal to the US for solving the Arab-Israeli problem. In February 1974, Sadat, in his capacity as chairman of the ruling ASU, finally removed Heikal from \textit{Ahram}.\textsuperscript{330} The same presidential decree which dismissed Heikal named the latter to the post of the “presidential press advisor”, a position which Heikal himself was not consulted on or even one he sarcastically rejected. After deposing Heikal, Sadat appointed Ali Amin, who had returned to Egypt after nine years of self-imposed exile under Nasser and known as an archrival of Heikal, as editor. Sadat also

\textsuperscript{326} Ibid, p. 17
\textsuperscript{327} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{328} Ibid, p. 16.
\textsuperscript{329} Rugh, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{330} Ibid.
appointed Abdel-Qader Hatem, the Minister of Information, as the Head of the Board of Directors. Munir Khalil, a specialist who authored a number of publications on the Egyptian media, contended that Sadat abruptly removed Heikal from the editorship of *Ahram* because of Heikal’s criticism of the way Sadat handled the war.\(^{331}\) Indeed, in one of his weekly columns before his ouster, Heikal opposed the ceasefire arranged by Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State, and the swift resumption of relations with the United States.\(^{332}\) He even warned Sadat that he was falling into Kissinger’s negotiations trap and insisted that there had been no basic change in the US’s pro-Israel policy. This was apparently more than Sadat could stand and ultimately led to the end of Heikal’s position at *Ahram*.\(^{333}\) As a contrast, the editors following shortly after Heikal supported Sadat in all his steps as evidenced in their analysis and editorial columns which mirrored the state’s official position.

Nevertheless, it is justifiable to argue that Heikal’s opposition to Sadat does not mean his reporting of 1973 was unbiased or totally accurate. On the contrary, *Ahram* under Heikal adopted the state-devised editorial line almost completely. This is not only evident in the textual patterning of the three macro themes as probed in previous chapters, but also as evidenced in the testimonies of those who have also studied or followed this coverage. For example, Khalil noted, *Ahram* resorted to what Khalil called, “distorted statements and sometimes outright lies to hide the truth about the military setbacks” when the tide turned against the Egyptian Army after the first week of the war.\(^{334}\) According to Egypt’s Chief of Staff during the war, El-Shazly, the official statements following the initial setbacks, which were carried verbatim and unquestionably by *Ahram*, had “succumbed to straightforward

\(^{331}\) Khalil, *Egyptian Mass Media*, p. 12
\(^{332}\) Ibid.
\(^{333}\) Ibid.
\(^{334}\) Ibid, p. 12.
lying.”

Therefore, it is fair to argue that it was only after Heikal criticized Sadat and his post-war policies that he was removed from office by the president himself. The step can be also understood within the context of Sadat’s measures to further personalise the 1973 War by gearing it towards legitimating his role and status as ‘the hero of war and peace’, a sweeping descriptor which Sadat preferred so much that it was scripted on his own grave.

Ahram was not an exception, as the state also tightened control on other media outlets. For example, in November 1977, Sadat surprised the world by going to Jerusalem. As critics expressed their views in *al-Ahaly*, where left-wing intellectuals were allowed to contribute, the opposition newspaper was closed down and several of its editions were confiscated. Furthermore, Sadat’s crackdown included an order to 30 Egyptian journalists working in foreign countries to return home to face charges of “defaming their county abroad.” Copies of their articles and tape-recordings of their broadcasts, which were critical of Sadat, were referred to the Socialist Public Prosecutor, a political post created by Sadat to investigate political offenses. As Sadat came under further criticism after signing the Camp David peace agreement with Israel in 1979, the purge against critics at home continued. Sadat himself launched a sharp attack on the press syndicate and accused the press of committing crimes against the people “for failing to publish all the facts.”

Further controlling the state-editorial line of the 1973 War, the state itself had to approve the press appointments of military reporters during the 1973 War and afterwards. Both during the time of Sadat, and later during the Mubarak regime, to be appointed in the *Ahram,* as a

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335 Ibid, p. 12, quoted from Saad El-Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez* (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1979,) p. 293,
336 El-Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez* (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 1979,) p. 293,
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
339 Ibid
military reporter, was a daunting task. Firstly, the army needed to authorise this appointment. “In order for a journalist to be a military reporter, the army’s Department of Intelligence and Moral Affairs [a department in the army responsible for managing the Egyptian Armed Forces’ public image] had to approve the appointment,” said Abdel-Moneim, a former military reporter in the Ahram under Sadat and Mubarak. In an interview conducted for this study, in his flat Cairo district of Dokki, Abdel-Moneim stated that he even took part in the ‘deception plan’ set up by the Egyptian state to keep news on the war classified, and included such practices as “publishing false news.” In one example, a report released just before the 1973 War mentioned that Sadat and the Chief of Staff allowed army officers and soldiers to go for Hajj that year. “The report was published although I was aware of its falsity,” Abdel-Moneim said. Mubasher, another military reporter at Ahram under Sadat, told me in an interview that he had been commissioned by an army commander to take part in the release of Egyptian POWs before the war to avoid further demoralisation of Egypt’s army soldiers. Furthermore, the press content related to the 1973 War and the army had been closely monitored and regulated. “On every anniversary of the 1973 War, Ahram received a list of potential army or ex-army interviewees as well as the general thematic structures to be focused on in these interviewees,” said another military reporter for the paper who preferred to remain anonymous. “Of course, this approach led to a pattern of commemorating the war on the pages of Ahram. Every journalist had known the lines that he should not cross such as mentioning disagreements in the war command between Sadat and El-Shazly after the first week of the war,” this source said. That meant that some of the state-controlled reporting from these appointed war reports ran against their personal convictions and motivations.

340 The researcher’s interview with Mohamed Abdel-Moneim, Cairo, June 20, 2014.
341 Ibid.
342 Ibid.
344 The researcher’s interview with anonymous source holding a senior position in the Ahram, speaking on condition of anonymity, Cairo, June 26, 2014.
In a similar vein, with a self-reflective attitude, Abdel-Moneim questioned the role of ‘Allahu Akbar’ shouting in the war. He admitted that Ahram under Sadat exaggerated the Islamic shouting made by Egyptian soldiers while crossing the canal and during subsequent operations during the rest of the war. “The shouting was symbolic, automatic reply and random reaction out of fear. It was a defence mechanism adopted by Egyptian soldiers fearing the wrath of Israeli warplanes while crossing the canal rather than an expression of religiosity,” he said.\(^{345}\) When asked why he and other military reporters focused on this ‘Allahu Akbar shout on the pages of Ahram, Abdel-Moneim claimed that the focus was part of a “politically motivated religionisation” of the war under Sadat.\(^{346}\) That other war reporters of the paper during the era of Sadat agreed that their newspaper had exaggerated is so revealing on how far the state exercised powers to reconstruct the war as a religionised act. This war religionisation was part of a broader phenomenon, which the state encouraged and even got in alliance with, in the name of the ‘Islamist revival’.

3. ‘Islamist Revival’

This section divides the ‘Islamist revival’ according to its tactical usefulness to the regime of Sadat. The first part of this section relates the phenomenon to a larger ‘de-Nasserisation’ process that distanced Sadat from his past and left a void needing to be filled by a new ideology. The second part associates the phenomenon with Sadat’s self-portrayal as Al-Rais al-Mu’min, a title widely adopted both officially and editorially. Third, within the macro process, politicisation of religion, the last part of the section illustrates how the Sadat regime

\(^{345}\) The researcher’s interview with Mohamed Abdel-Moneim, Cairo, June 20, 2014.

\(^{346}\) Ibid.
materialistically benefitted from this rhetorical ‘Islamisation’ whose features included closer ties with Saudi Arabia.

Sadat distanced himself from Nasser’s regime through the regime’s early slogan, “science and faith”, and went to great lengths to demonstrate the religiosity, if not the divinity, of his rule. Again, this slogan came after the collapse of pan-Arabism and the socialist-populist ideologies in the late 1960s and the resultant ideological void. Sadat filled this void, and even fought the remnants of the Leftists and Nasserists, with political Islam. According to John Esposito, Sadat used Islam “to blunt the power of the Nasserists and Leftists as well as to enhance his legitimacy and mobilize popular support.”

However, the ultimate move to Islam came in the aftermath of the 1967 War, a war in which the Israeli army crushed the Egyptian counterpart in six days. This defeat was widely attributed to ‘God’s punishment’. According to Mubasher, Ahram’s military reporter for over 40 years, the Nasser regime was itself a creator of this ‘divine retribution’ discourse. “This discourse was necessary to get the army out of defeat in order to convince soldiers that still have to fight for the sake of Allah and homeland. The regime even appointed an Imam for every war battalion to talk to soldiers about religion.”

According to Mubasher, there are “several manifestations of this transformation, such as the paintings on the walls of army units, where Quraanic verses such as those promising victory for Muslims over the kafirs are written down.” Although these measures began with Nasser after the 1967 defeat, they were adopted modestly and discreetly unlike Sadat’s open manifestations. Since Sadat’s legitimacy was based on the 1973 War,

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347 John Esposito, “The Islamic Factor”, in Egypt at the crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role, ed. by Phebe Marr (1999), pp. 47-64 (p. 49).
349 The researcher’s interview with Abdu Mubasher, Cairo, June 6, 2014.
350 Ibid.
to be explained below, religion became an essential part of establishing and restoring this legitimacy.

Sadat built his authoritarianism partially on religious terms. Calling himself *Al-Rais al-Mu'min*, his policies were also coloured by this ideological shift. The shift was evident in the relationship between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood. Sadat released hundreds of members of the group imprisoned by Nasser. Those released figures included high profile names such Omar El-Telmeissani, who had spent nearly two decades behind bars prior to his release in 1971. In 1974, El-Telmeissani became the new Supreme Guide of Ikhwan, all under the eyes of the Sadat regime who secured a *bay’a* (oath of loyalty) from the group within a few years of becoming president.\(^{351}\) As active in civil society, the released Islamists increased the Islamisation by controlling trade unions that had been earlier under the grip of the state.\(^{352}\) Legally, Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution stated: “The principles of Sharia are main source of legalization.”\(^{353}\) Again, this is unprecedented since “Sharia has never been mentioned in an Egyptian constitution before.”\(^{354}\) Sadat meant to benefit from this Islamisation by getting rid of his political opponents. This had been evident in universities, where Marxists and leftists had kept a broad influence since the time of Nasser. Sadat established religious-oriented groups in order to counter the Nasserists and leftists who were already engaged in protests against Sadat’s rule. Furthermore, these campuses acted as a recruiting ground, resulting in many students joining Islamist groups.


\(^{353}\) See the website of the State Information Service for a full access to the 1971 constitution. http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=208#.U8r4_bEpdcB [accessed on June 12, 2013]. In 1980, also under the reign of Sadat, the constitution was amended after a referendum on May 22. Article 2 was amended to make the Sharia “the main source of legislation” instead of “Sharia is a main source of legislation” as in the 1971 version. For copies of the original texts as published in the official gazette, https://matnwahawamesh.wordpress.com/%D9%86%D8%B5%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9/ [accessed on June 22, 2013]

This Islamist revival brought Egypt closer to oil-rich Saudi Arabia, an absolute Islamic monarchy. Saudi Arabia dominated the regional scene after the defeat of Egypt in 1967 as had been the case during the Arab Summit held on August 29, 1967. Recently defeated, Egypt needed the financial support of Saudi Arabia to fix the former’s internal problems. This affected the clout of Nasser and the prestige of his model of governance based on Socialist terms. Financial dependency on the Saudis meant a loss of these ideological associations such as pan-Arabism since the kingdom had come up with its own ideology based on political Islam. When Sadat came to power, the Saudi influence and assertiveness contributed to the rise of Islamism in Egypt. Resources and assets of these two powerful regimes were fully deployed in the service of conservative religious narratives and the reinterpretation of contemporary Arab history. Sadat not only used Saudi funds to suppress Nasserists and other leftists who claimed the legacy of Nasser after his death, he profited from these funds for other purposes. In 1971, for example, King Faysal of Saudi Arabia offered to send $100 million to the Sheikhdom of al-Azhar for the sake of launching a campaign against what he called forces of “Communism” and “atheism”. The regime officials later ordered payments of this sum to be transferred to the state coffers. Similarly, King Faysal arranged a meeting between Sadat and the Muslim Brotherhood leaders, which took place in the autumn of 1971 in Egypt. In the meeting, Sadat agreed with the attendees on “resisting atheism and communism.” During the second half of the 1970s, further religious radicalisation further indoctrinated Egyptian public opinion through the proliferation of free publications financed mainly by Saudi Arabia. This wave of Islamisation was enhanced by the wealth of Egyptian migrant workers in the Gulf. Social remittances from the Gulf,

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356 Ibid.
357 Ibid, p. 269.
including the spread of conservative religious discourse, consolidated as the Egyptian economy became pinned to that of Saudi Arabia in particular.\textsuperscript{358} Furthermore, the second half of the 1970s witnessed many intellectuals of nationalist and Marxist inclinations such as Tariq al-Bishri to migrate to the Islamist camp.\textsuperscript{359}

It was against this background that the 1973 War was launched and portrayed as a ‘religious’ event ordered by a ‘religious leader’, executed by a ‘religious’ army, and supported by a ‘religious society’. As previously mentioned, it was three days after the war started on October 6\textsuperscript{th}, that the armed forces’ information section published a pamphlet for distribution among the troops, which framed the conflict in religious terms by claiming that Prophet Muhammad was fighting with Egyptian soldiers.\textsuperscript{360} The Saudi king, Faysal, even visited the front line in which he said the Egyptian ‘victory’ was a “bless[ing] from God.”\textsuperscript{361} The Saudi king expressed wishes to pray and visit the Israeli-occupied Aqsa mosque one day after a similar liberation.\textsuperscript{362} Islamists, for their part, backed the macro thematisation of the 1973 War as a religious victory. Abbas El-Sissi, a leading Ikhwan member detained under Nasser in 1965 and released by Sadat, put it bluntly: “I was released after the Ramadan War, which was a chance for me to tell people about the impact of [the verse] ‘God is great’ in securing victory.”\textsuperscript{363} Islamist activist Montasser El-Zayat said that the fact that God had endowed Egyptians with victory was the main reason that he committed to “returning to God.”\textsuperscript{364} El-Zayat believed that Sadat won the war because he raised the slogan of “there is no God but


\textsuperscript{359}http://www.islamtoday.net/nawafeth/artshow-99-162119.htm [accessed on August 10, 2014].

\textsuperscript{360}Heikal,) Al-Tariq ila Ramadan, p. 256.

\textsuperscript{361}Musa Sabri, Wataha'iq Harb Uktubir (Cairo: Akhbar al-Youm, 1977), 3\textsuperscript{rd} ed., p. 80

\textsuperscript{362}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{364}Montasser Al-Zayat, Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya: Ru'ya min al-Dukhil (Cairo: Almahrusa, 2005), pp. 33-34.
In keeping with the growing religiosity of state discourse, Sadat started after the war to add Muhammad to his name - thereby calling himself Muhammad Anwar El-Sadat - and his title began to be as a rule Al-Rais al-Mumin. Therefore, this transformation reflected in the Ahram, which adopted the new changes accordingly as indicated in Chapter Three.

Once he shifted the discourse from the war to peace, religion continues to be used. Sadat’s speech in the Israeli Knesset (November 20th, 1977), for example, was replete with religious themes. He drew further on religious symbolism, seemingly comparing himself to Abraham, inasmuch as his speech coincided with ‘Eid al-Adha, the Islamic feast that ends the month in which the pilgrimage, which also commemorates Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son, take place. He followed up the Knesset speech with an address in Cairo on December 8th. His speech was punctuated with verses from the Quran. As he faced massive criticism on the Camp David agreements, he also stated that he was responsible first before God, and only then to the people. He addressed the same themes in his speech on November 23rd, 1978 following the conclusion of the Camp David Accords, when he referred to the ‘law of shame’, which targeted political opponents, as a move against “those who wanted to smash the values and virtues of religion by casting doubt and propagating anarchy.”

4. National Narrative
In its simplest sense, the national narrative is the story that the national collective tells about itself and identifies with. “It tells the individuals constituting the nation (and anybody else who is interested) who they are [and] what comprises the past (the national, the common one), the structure of their characteristics as a collective and where they are heading - that is, how they should act in political realm.”\(^{370}\) Indeed, several scholars such as Brand used this national narrative to explore characteristics in cultural, linguistic, religious and confessional forms which acted as “the identity markers of the national community.”\(^{371}\) This section addresses the national narrative on the 1973 War in order to examine the extent to which they substantiate the *Ahram* narrative and the macro themes identified within it. In other words, this section answers the question, are the three macro themes acting as anomalies limited to *Ahram* and its texts, or are they part of a broader national narrative which adopt the same consistency and patterning in discourse? In order to dissect this national narrative, three genres will be addressed: the general books published about the war, state school history text books also dealing with the same event, and the miscellaneous assortment of what the researcher calls ‘arts such and features’ such as the Unknown Soldier Monument in Cairo, the postage stamps and songs scripted on the war during the Sadat era. Since the state is in control of all these processes of national narrating, the section concludes that there is a massive similarity between these forms in the national narrative on one hand and the *Ahram* narrative on the other.

### 4.1 General Books

Almost all of the general books published during the reign of Sadat were written by two groups: military reporters who wrote for the newspapers and media outlets before publishing their own books, or war commanders who are either still in service or have since left the

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\(^{371}\) Brand, P. 9.
service. What is striking is that the same patterns of macro themes identified in the *Ahram* were adopted by both groups of authors as an examination of literature below indicates.

In the first category, books written by military reporters, the main theme was that Egypt made a ‘massive and consistent victory’, exactly as the case had been with *Ahram* texts from the same period. Abdel-Moneim, a military reporter at *Ahram* during and after the war, wrote *6 October* in 1975. He employed these three Clausewitzian indicators of victory such as the enemy’s materialistic loss, loss of morale and giving up intentions. For example, Abdel-Moneim wrote that losses incurred by Israel were devastating, “enough that corpses of Israeli soldiers could not [be] found after ceasefire.”\(^ {372}\) He wrongly quoted Ariel Sharon, the then Israeli war commander, as “having admitted that after the [withdrawal from the Suez Canal West bank] accord that thousands were killed in this operation.”\(^ {373}\)

Mubasher, another war reporter at *Ahram*, wrote his book, *Yawmiyat Uktubir*, published three years after the war. Mubasher, albeit to a lesser degree, repeated the same macro theme of ‘massive and consistent victory’. He also downplayed the Israeli crossing, also known as the *thagra*, as an act of desperation or, “what the military men call ‘fighting before the end’ to refer to attempts by the wounded [defeated] party to save what could be saved…”\(^ {374}\) Indeed, this is the same wording to describe the Israeli counterattack as mentioned in Abdel-Moneim’s book, and both authors had never named those “those military men” or even question the testimony with credible counterarguments. Both the works of Mubasher and Abdel-Moneim were published by state-run publishing houses. Again, as noted in Chapter

\(^ {372}\)Ibid.
Three, this group of books cited untrue information which ran against credible testimonies. Abdel-Sattar El-Tawilla, the military reporter of magazine *Rose al-Youssef* at that time, wrote *Harb al-Sa’at al-Sit wa Ihtimalat al-Harb al-Khamissa*. El-Tawilla also dismissed any doubts on the macro theme of ‘massive and consistent’ Egyptian victory to the extent of claiming that “Egypt, as a definite victor as it had been, went as far as to downsize the number of Israeli casualties.” The same allegation was made by other authors, illustrating how the Egyptian army attempted to sound as credible and believable as possible in the discourse of a ‘massive and consistent’ victory.

On the other hand, the same macro theme is present in books written by existing or former military commanders who took part in the war. Abu Ghazalah, a war commander promoted to Minister of Defence in 1982, wrote in 1975 *Wa intalaqat al-Madafi’*, asserting that Egypt was the victor in the war. Supporting his argument with pictures that include Israeli losses, Abu Ghazalah said the Israeli *thagra* across the canal was meant to “save the face” of Israel by creating a “false victory” for the Israelis. Colonel Hassan El-Badri, Colonel Taha al-Magdoub and General Diaeddin Zuhdi wrote *Harb Ramadan: Al-Gawla al-‘Arabiyya al-Israeliya al-Rabe’a*. The book, published in 1974, adopts the same metonymical concentration of the victory on the first few hours of crossing the Suez Canal. It also consolidated the victory by referring to Israel’s losses and intention not to fight among its soldiers. These elements can be easily spotted in the pictures used in the book. There is a picture of coffins of Israeli soldiers killed in the battle which included a short caption

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reading: “And they carried their casualties and left …”\textsuperscript{379} Another picture shows an Israeli flag-studded helicopter laying in the ground after being downed.\textsuperscript{380} There is another picture of military tank, with the caption reading: “the enemy abandoned its weaponry intact and escaped away.”\textsuperscript{381} Therefore, the book concluded on this thematic structure by contending that “Israel was heavily defeated” in the war.\textsuperscript{382} Meanwhile, Israel was denied any achievements, with its \textit{thagra} having had been downplayed again as part of a propaganda war which was only granted four pages of the entire book.\textsuperscript{383} Another example of these books written by military men is \textit{Misr Baada al-Ubir}, which was published in 1975 in which its trio of authors conveyed the same thematic structure. Building this victory on the territorial gains, the title of the book itself is aptly ‘Egypt after the crossing’. The book published one vague picture showing a piece of land with small dots of what appeared to be human beings. The caption read: “thousands of Israeli casualties killed in one location.”\textsuperscript{384}

The second macro theme, war religionised/miraclised, is also easily identifiable in this literature as part of the national narrative. With regard to the first category of books, written by non-army commanders, the theme is evident. Hamdy Lutfi, the military reporter of \textit{Al-Musawer} wrote \textit{Al-’Askariya al-Misriyya fawqa Saynaa} (the Egyptian Military over Sinai) which was published in 1976. In the book, the Egyptian military performance was hailed as miraculous.\textsuperscript{385} This ‘miraculous performance’ was also imbued with religious terms, applied to all other parts of the Egyptian army. \textit{Al-Musawer} magazine quoted the then Egyptian Air Force Commander Hosni Mubarak lengthily as such:

\begin{flushright}
381Ibid, P. 17.
382Ibid
\end{flushright}
While the world rate for sorties is 3-4, our pilots carried out up to 7 or even 9 sorties… while the world rate is destroying one plane requires 2 to 3 attacks, it took our pilots just 1 attack to destroy a convoy of Israeli vehicles … In one single air battle of 80 jets, one Egyptian hero pilot downed 5 warplanes … the planes blew up in the air while the hero shouts *Allahu Akbar.*

Abdel-Moneim also repeated the same theme, directly calling the Egyptian victory “a calculated miracle” in which “the time stopped” amidst ‘epic’ Egyptian operations. El-Tawila wrote how Egyptian soldiers “threw themselves in the minefields in an unprecedented heroic act meant to clear the road for their colleagues.” The victory was also religionised in his book. He wrote that “Egyptian soldiers were shouting for their fellow soldiers to follow them. Soldiers would shout back: *Allahu Akbar* … In 20 minutes past two, in the zero hour, the west bank of the canal as full of shouts ‘follow me ... *Allahu Akbar...*” Moussa Sabri, one of the most important journalists during the time of Sadat, adopted the same macro theme in his book, *Wathaha’iq Harb Uktubir* (the documents of the October War), published in 1974. He wrote on the dedication page these sentences in large font: “*Allahu Akbar:* This was the shout which resonated and crossed … broke through [the Bar-Lev] … and destroyed the myth of the indefensible army.” He attributed the Egyptian ‘victory’ to religion elsewhere in the book arguing, “*Iman* (faith) is the secret first and foremost” behind this victory.

Books written by exiting or previous war commanders also adopted the same macro theme. In *Misr Baada al-Ubir,* Quranic verses were mentioned heavily. In a 25-page chapter, over 32 Quranic verses and hadiths (wordings of the Prophet Muhammad) were mentioned and

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386 Ibid, p. 94
387 Abdel-Moneim, p. 77 & p. 160.
388 Al-Tawilla, p. 130
389 Ibid, p. 121.
390 Sabri, p. 2
391 Ibid, p. 403
highlighted in bold, mostly to link the 1973 victory to a religious awakening. Remarkably, the chapter repeated the same Quranic verses mentioned by Ahram texts such as “victory is from God and God is the one who makes you conquer.”

The war was also represented as a miracle that altered military conceptions forever. Other war officers adopted this macro theme. Ahmed Ali Zeiko, an officer with the Air Force during the war, wrote in 1974 Abtal al-Tayaran fi Maarakat Ramadan, in which he emphasised the meanings of victory in the war, supported with pictures. This is the caption of one picture of an Egyptian soldier raising the V sign: “Allahu Akbar … Allahu Akbar … Hay Allah al Qital [come to the fighting] … Hay Allah al-Jihad [come to Jihad].” The first part of these phrases - come to - is taken from the Islamic call to prayer.

The third macro theme, war personified/personalized, was also quite evident in books written by both military and civilian authors. Although the title of Sabri’s book is literally translated as ‘the documents of the war,’ a big portrait of Sadat in a military gear marked the cover page. In the image, Sadat appeared smiling while surrounded by burning tanks. Sabri dedicated his introduction to praising Sadat, both at the personal and professional level. For example, Sabri wrote that Sadat never changed since they met in 1940s. Sadat kept these two characteristics: a life of [national] struggle…and working in silence.” On the next page, Sabri wrote that Sadat was always a “ferocious fighter, a brave combatant, a reticent person with unlimited patience, and a flexible politician who adores writing and maneuvering.”

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393 Ibid, p. 306.
394 Ibid, p. 65.
396 Sabri, p. 4.
397 Ibid, p. 5.
The military authors adopted the same position. In *Misr Ba’da al-Ubir*, written by a trio of war commanders, a three-part supplement was tucked into the beginning of the book, with three different pictures of Sadat in military uniform and in different poses. Quotes from Sadat on the war were also repeated again and again in the book. This is one paragraph in the book which epitomizes the extent of this *personification/personalization*.

Anwar Sadat entered across the doors of history not as a well-versed political leader nor as a courageous military commander, but as an Egyptian and Arab who embodies all meanings of dignity … Anwar Sadat will remain embedded at hearts as the maker to the most important decisions in the history of Egyptian and Arab military; restoring dignity to the Egyptian military and putting this military in a war to prove its presence.

On the use of other linguistic features such as transitivity, modality, metaphors and wordings, these books used similar patterns identified in the *Ahram* texts. For example, victory is described in declarative non-modalised clauses, enough to add credibility to the war and its meanings. In *Harb Ramadan*, the book stated in this declarative form that the war “turned the military balance upside down,” as it, “pushed forward the Middle East crisis to an unprecedented extent, and made the whole world to the east and to the west wonder on the rights of the Palestinian people.” These features, omnipresent in the *Ahram* as well and detailed in Chapter Three, added *factivity* to the macro themes imposed by the state. Furthermore, these language features were also patterned in consistency with the thematic patterns based on repetitions, for examples, a metaphor was mentioned in this sentence in *Harb Ramadan*: “The armed forces were just the big drum amidst an orchestra that comprises

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400 El-Badri, al-Magdoub and Zuhdi, p. 286.
a symphony not performing any solos.” On another page of the book, the authors mentioned the same metaphor as such: “the weapon is like a musical instrument…who plays it well produces the best tunes and compositions… therefore our air defense fighters composed a symphony which was magnificent and well-synchronized, except for there were sad notes as they were written by the blood of martyrs.” These examples further indicate how the war representations were based on regular hyperboles.

Lastly, there is a patterning in these texts with regard to the identity of authors and how they coordinated their texts to construct almost the same macro themes and sometimes the same wordings. The study found that those authors are always related to each other. Mubasher and Abdel-Moneim shared Ahram as the location of their work, and they both shared the type of their jobs as war reporters with Lutfi. Furthermore, the genre of books written by military men also shared stronger ties. For example, Ahmed Ismail Suhei, another officer in the war, wrote Ubūr al-Mehna, published in 1976, which includes an introduction written by Hassan El-Badri. Interestingly, El-Badri was also a professor of military history in the Nasser Academy and published a similar book on the war entitled Harb Ramadan. Zeiko’s book, as another example, includes introductions by Ahmed Ismail, the Defence Minister, and Hosni Mubarak, the then Air Force commander. Books also written by journalists such as Sabri’s Wathaha’iq Harb Uktubir were full of references and testimonies of Ismail among other war commanders.

401 Ibid, p. 309.
402 Ibid, p. 213.
403 Ibid, pp.6-7 & pp.11-12 & pp. 13-14.
The patterning identified above had to be attributed to the state control. Sabri, appointed by Sadat as the editor of the *Akhbar* newspaper and author of *Wathahāʿīq Harb Uktubir*, once said that ‘I am a shoemaker. On writing, I am a shoemaker.’ 404 The shoemaker metaphor is meant to denote that Sadat would order the article’s size and shape, and Sabri would produce it. The statement also serves as another indication of how the war was tailored to reproduce certain themes which many writers, such as Sabri, adhered to. Even El-Tawilla admitted in the introduction of a new edition of his book, *Harb al-Ayyam al-Sit*, that Sadat summoned him for a meeting after the first edition of his book and “gave me the task of re-writing the book in light of the new information that would be made available through interviews with the army commanders and its heroes.” 405 At the end of the introduction, El-Tawila said clearly his first target was to “meet the trust bestowed by the supreme commander of the victory.” 406 He said he was “honoured by this trust shown by Sadat’s request to rewrite the story of October 6, 1973.” 407 The foregrounding of the three macro themes in El-Tawilla’s new edition is a clear indication of Sadat’s involvement in the publishing and approval of historical accounts.

4.2 School Textbooks:

History textbooks are another source of constructing a national narrative on the war. Children study textbooks, Eric Hobsbawm argued, “not to understand society and how it changes, but to approve of it, [and] to be proud of it.” 408 Combined with education, history itself is also an

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404 Beattie, p. 182.
405 El-Tawilla, p. 4
406 Ibid, p. 5.
407 Ibid.
ideology since it has a “built-in tendency to become self-justifying myth.”\textsuperscript{409} Identified by Althusser as the most significant ‘Ideological State Apparatus’, education in this sense is all about ‘subjection to the ruling ideology’ and the mastery of its ‘practice’.\textsuperscript{410} In Egypt, the significance increases especially as school textbooks are heavily regulated and controlled by the state and patterned by keeping the same authors and same content for years.\textsuperscript{411} The October War was mentioned in pre-university education in a few textbooks taught to students at Year Six of primary school education and the Year Three of secondary school education. The section analyses these representations as part of the overall national narrative.

With regard to the first macro theme, the three Clausewitzian indicators of victory, this feature is present within these textbook accounts. Israel “had had to sign two agreements in 1974 and 1975 which led it to withdraw Israeli forces to Sinai land and to Egyptian restoration of oil wells. Israel also gave up part of the Golan Heights to Syria.”\textsuperscript{412} The quote indicates Israel’s defeat, evidenced by territorial loss and that it gave up intentions since it had to sign these peace deals. This victory was consistent in all the textbooks analysed. Similarly, these textbooks also downplayed and dismissed the Israeli \textit{thagra}. In the history textbook for Year Three of secondary school, the \textit{thagra} was described as a “lie” and “propaganda”.\textsuperscript{413} According to the textbooks, in the \textit{thagra} Egyptians had the upper hand as “our brave armed forces made Israeli \textit{thagra} a matter of concern for the security of Israel, much to lead the US to be at pains to seek the separation of forces.”\textsuperscript{414}

\textsuperscript{409}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{410}Althusser, \textit{Essays on Ideology}, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{411}The researcher’s interview with a member of the curriculum consultation office at the Ministry of Education, speaking on condition of anonymity, Cairo, August 6, 2015.
On the second macro theme, the textbook made it clear that the Egyptian victory established a miracle that ended another ‘miracle’. The war “removed the snobbery of Israel and put an end to the myth of Israeli army’s invincibility.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 321.} Alongside these meanings, the Egyptian victory also led to “a radical transformation as both friends and enemies began to look to the Egyptian people with respect.”\footnote{Ibid.} The same macro theme was repeated in other textbooks. “The world has become respectful of Egyptians’ heroism, and the war led to the ruse of status in front of the whole world.”\footnote{Nawar and Radwan, \textit{Tarikh Misr al-Hadith}, p. 158.}

With regard to the third macro theme, the war personified Sadat was consistently represented as the one who brought this war to victory and resultant peace. In a history textbook for Year Six of primary school, there a picture of Sadat taken during the war surrounded by the military commanders in a war briefing.\footnote{Ibid, p. 153.} Consolidating the legitimacy of the Sadat rule, the victory brought by Sadat in the October War was contrasted with the defeat brought by Nasser in the 1967 war. The reasons for the latter’s defeat included an “inability to develop the military sector”, the “monopoly of power,” and “the economic and cultural narrow-mindedness that separated Egypt from the rest of the world.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 148.} Further linking the legitimacy of Sadat’s regime to de-Nasserisation the secondary school textbook described the ruling elite during Nasser as ‘despots’ and ‘corrupts’, contrasting Sadat’s elite as ‘democratic’ and ‘law-abiding’. These characteristics were then used to explain the 1967 defeat under Nasser as a contrast to the supposed victory in 1973 under Sadat.\footnote{Abdel-Kareem and others, \textit{Tarikh al-Arab al-Hadeeth}, p. 162.} Furthermore, Sadat was legitimised through his post-war achievements such as “the launch of projects of reconstruction” especially in the governorates overlooking the canal, “reopening
factories…and achieving prosperity.” The war also led to the reopening the “Suez Canal, much to bring to Egypt millions of hard currency.” The same meanings were repeated in textbooks at other stages of education. References were also made to the October paper in which the president designed a number of targets seeking to achieve after the war such as “creating a new generation armed with science and experience” and “bringing in civilizational progress based on science and faith,” as one textbook reads.

1.2. Features and Arts

In addition to the extensive sites made by government institutions and primarily ministerial offices, the war was also represented at less formal sites such as stamps, war memorials and in musical works. The first part of this section addresses the ‘Unknown Soldier Monument’ whose construction was ordered by Sadat. In the second part, there is an exposition of another official production: stamps. In the third part, the scripts of songs recorded and played by the state radio and TV during the war are analysed. Remarkably, I found that these features and arts were exactly repeated in patterns similar to the ones identified in the Ahram and the other aforementioned facets of national narrative. Furthermore, the re-scripting of these songs reflected shifts in the macro-politics in the state such as the discursive adoption of peace instead of war.

One channel of understanding a ‘national narrative’ can be found at the Unknown Soldier monument. The significance lies in the public ceremonial reverence which “accorded these

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421 Ibid, p. 161
422 Nawar and Radwan, Tarikh Misr al-Hadith, p. 159
423 Ibid.
monuments precisely because they are either deliberately empty or no one knows who lies inside them.”

According to Benedict Anderson, these cenotaphs and monuments, devoid of identifiable mortal remains of real people, are “emblems of the modern culture of nationalism.” Since these tombs are based on the concept of death, Anderson found affinity between what is nationalist and what is religious in these imaginings constructed by the tombs and cenotaphs. There is no more arresting evidence of this affinity than the killing of Sadat himself at the Unknown Soldier monument, which he himself erected, and the insistence of his family to bury him there, guaranteeing that he would remain ‘alive’.

The main Unknown Soldier monument was erected in the suburb of Madinat Nasr, in the eastern Cairo, where it was inaugurated by Sadat himself on October 6, 1975. Part of the monument is designed as an avenue for the October celebrations’ military parade. Although the monument took the shape of a pyramid, it carried other elements of the three macro themes. Only names of the 71 fallen soldiers were carved in large, even-sized letters of the four walls of the monument, much to reflect the smaller number of those Egyptian soldiers killed during the war. A marble panel on the wall includes these words engraved on it as such: “This monument of the Unknown Soldier is to commemorate the Shuhadaa [martyrs] in the battles of liberation in which they took part on 6 October 1973 - 10 Ramadan 1393.”

Meital concluded that the mention of ‘martyrs’ and references to the war in its Islamic calendar had made religious and national elements “entwined in the monument.” During the years 1975 to 1981, Sadat used to open the events marking the war with a well-publicized visit to the monument, accompanied by government ministers and senior army officers. The soldiers guarding the monument stood as a guard of honour presenting their weapons, while

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426 Ibid.
the band played the national anthem in the background. Afterwards, the president and his companions recited *al-Fatih* – a prayer said in memory of those who passed away, another reminder in the role of religion in the war discourse in the state under *Al-Rais al-Mu’min*.

Indeed, the burial of Sadat himself at the Monument of the Unknown Soldier acts as an asserting frame for the socio-politics in representations of the war. The wife of Sadat, who had been active in the portrayal of the war, said that it was the family who took the decision to bury him at the monument, which is a rare step since most Egyptian leaders in recent decades were buried in mosques, and a few in special lots in the cemeteries of Cairo.\footnote{Ibid, p. 156.} Indeed, the burial is indicative of the third macro theme, war personified/personalised, since the choice of this location “supported the intention of his family and state officials to preserve his memory as an integral part of the commemoration of the October War victory and the subsequent adoption of the road to peace.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 158.} Indeed, this purpose was reflected in the burial place itself. A quotation from a Quranic verse was inscribed on the tombstone, which means, ‘think not of those, who are killed in the way of Allah, as dead. They are living.’ This verse echoes those of the fallen soldiers named at the entrance of the monument as ‘martyrs’. Another title favourite to Sadat was also inscribed - *Al-Rais al-Mu’min* - along with these words: “Lived for peace and *istushhida* [martyred] for principles,” which resonates with his other title of ‘the hero of war and peace’.

Stamps come as another commemorative activity of socio-political significance. An official production, stamps “tell about the interests of governments rather than of private...
individuals.” Indeed, other researchers such as Donald Reid used stamps to gauge the continuity and change in pre- and post-revolutionary period of Egypt in which Sadat was part of. Upon analysis of all stamps during the rule of Sadat, nearly all of them show a portrait of Sadat in the foreground, with all other details in the background. However, this background was adapted to the needs of the present context. The first stamp to commemorate the war, issued in December 1973, was Sadat in uniform and smiling with forces crossing the Canal and Bar-Lev Line, and a flag in which the date of the crossing was written both in the Western and Islamic calendars. Here the focus was the ‘spark of Liberation’ as written under the picture in the stamp. One the third anniversary of the war, and as Egypt signed an interim peace agreement with Israel that included an initial Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, a stamp was issued with a map of Sinai Peninsula with seven oil wells spotted and highlighted on it, in reference to Israeli land and oil wells reclaimed after the war. After signing the peace agreement in 1979, a white dove carrying an olive branch marked the stamp issued in that year. The caption adequately read: Ifiqayat al-Salam [the peace treaty]. Still, the metonymical and metaphorical references to the war as a crossing were repeated in several stamps. On the fourth anniversary, there is a stamp of Sadat in a military gear with the word ‘crossing’ inscribed beneath it. One year later, there is another stamp with the picture of Sadat above the phrase Egypt the crossing.

There were other forms of national narrative more artistic and less formalised levels such as songs. On the first week of the war, Egyptian TV and radio produced and played songs which affirmed that Egypt already won the war. One of these songs was scripted by adopting the

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431 Ibid.

432 The analysis is based on the stamps collected by Bibliotheca Alexandraria’s portal: http://modernegypt.bibalex.org/Collections/Stamps/StampsLucene.aspx [accessed on August 8, 2013]. The conclusion of Sadat’s centrality in the stamps is also reached by Meital, ‘Who is Egypt’s “Hero of War and Peace”’ 150-183 (p. 154).
same phrase published in the *Ahram* by El-Hakeem - “we crossed defeat” - two days after the war.\(^{433}\) The song, played on radio only one day after El-Hakeem’s column, also asserted that the victory was miraculous and limited the meaning of victory metonymically in the crossing by adding, “we crossed the canal, we crossed the impossible.”\(^{434}\) Another song, which was recorded in the first day of the war, is *Bismellah Bismellah Besmallah* (in the name of Allah, in the name of Allah, in the Name of Allah). The song repeated ‘In the name of Allah, Allahu Akbar’ couplet around 100 times.\(^{435}\) Another song recorded on the same first day of the war also repeated the same word of “victory” and its derivatives. Interestingly, some of these songs made clear references to Sadat by being scripted as such: “long live this one who said that we should return our usurped land… long live this one who said to soldiers ‘cross the canal.”\(^{436}\) Other songs kept on commemorating the war as such. Shahrazad performed a song whose script reads: ‘In the name of Allah’ then crossed the canal with help of God’s hand… we crossed the road victory.”\(^{437}\)

Remarkably, these songs were also adapted to accommodate changes in the context. Instead of promising more fighting, the songs turned to peace. With these peace initiatives and subsequent attacks on Sadat, the songs took a *personified/personalised* tone. Sayyed Mekawy performed a song that includes these lines: “Long live, Sadat... God bless you…you are always victorious...you did not say no to righteous peace.”\(^{438}\) Mekawy even likened Sadat to Islamic fighter, Saladdin, singing that, “[Sadat] made victory in Ramadan, as witnessed by

\(^{433}\)http://daily.rosaelyoussef.com/news/44932-%D9%88%D8%AC%D8%AF%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%8A%D9%85-%D9%8A%D9%81%D8%AA%D8%AD-%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%83-%D8%B1-%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%AA-%D8%A5%D9%83%D8%AA%D9%88%D8%A8%B1-%D8%AD%D9%83%D8%A9%D9%88%D9%80-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%BA%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B1 [accessed on August 3, 2015].

\(^{434}\)https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x6LWwOZWGb4 [accessed on June 20, 2015]

\(^{435}\)http://gate.ahram.org.eg/Malafat/127/934-%D9%83%D8%B4-%D9%8A-%D9%86-%D9%80-%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%A8-%D9%88-%D8%A8-%D8%B1_%D8%AA-%D9%84-%D8%B9-%D9%8A-%D8%B1_%D8%AA-%D8%8A_%D8%8B_%D9%88-%D8%B4-%D9%88-%D8%B4-%D9%88-%D9%80-%D9%8B-%D8%AA-%D8%8A-%D9%88-%D8%A8-%D8%B1 [accessed on June 20, 2015]

\(^{436}\)Ibid.

\(^{437}\)https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZzlGqD1WfAU [accessed on June 15, 2015]

\(^{438}\)https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZzlGqD1WfAU [accessed on June 13, 2015]
the circles of fire and the shout of Adhan [in reference to Allahu Akbar].” Fayda Kamel’s song adopted the same theme by repeating this couplet: “Sadat, you are our beloved, our president… [and one] of Egypt October and its young people.”439 Indeed, these songs do consist with the emphasis on the personification/personalisation after the war as state-sponsored advertisements and Ahram editorials had shown.

Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the broader socio-political practices that influence, or are influenced by, the predominant textual discourse on the 1973 War. The core meanings of these practices carried a considerable sense of repetition over time and space since they detach the war from its original happening and move towards representations and constructions of the three macro themes identified in the analysis of Ahram. Victory for Egypt in the war was further consolidated as ‘massive and consistent,’ and Sadat remained the centre of the realisation of such an achievement which was also coloured in tones of miracles and religious references. As diverse and rhetorically powerful as they are, these practices also included a national narrative which linked these macro themes to both identity as a collective sense of the self and nationalism as an ‘imaginary’ sentiment best triggered by monuments such as the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier where Sadat was later killed and buried. Controlling these two levels of identity and nationalism, the state turned October 6th into a national holiday. The chapter therefore not only identified the same macro themes as well as the socio-politics supporting them, but also unveiled the sense of coordination and synchronisation in the relationship between ‘what is text’ and ‘what is context’. This

439 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k-tkmewxGjk [accessed on June 13, 2015]
relationship will be further analysed in Chapter Six as the coordination and synchronisation of this relationship was continued under Mubarak.
Chapter Six:
Socio-Political Practices under Mubarak

Introduction

The chapter examines the socio-politics which lie behind the textual patterns identified during the rule of Mubarak such as political dynamics and inner workings of the regime. These socio-politics include change and continuities with the previous regime of Sadat such ‘authoritarianism’ both in the political and media systems. After he came to power, Mubarak paid the price of “costs of undoing the existing institutions”, which meant that many of Sadat’s political experiences and institutions survived.440 The chapter addresses how this ‘status quo’ bias in politics reflected on the evolution of the 1973 War discourse under Mubarak. Relatedly, the chapter also seeks to test the efficacy of the war discourse as formulated in the Ahram within this broader socio-political milieu. The testing experience includes exploring variegated facets of national narrative such as books targeting general public and school text books and song scripts are also explored all for the sake of my argument that the role of these discursive instruments was significant in validating in amplifying the state-controlled discourse from the beginning of Mubarak’s rule in 1981 until his resignation in 2011. The national narrative also includes more formalised, object-based and nationally evocative instruments such as the ‘Panorama’, the big 1973 War memorial site whose construction was ordered by Mubarak shortly after he came to power following the assassination of Sadat in another 1973 War memorial located in the same Cairo suburb nearby.

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The chapter begins with authoritarian settings which helped Mubarak consolidate his grip over power and accustom the 1973 War discourse to accommodate changing circumstances and exigencies during his rule. Electoral authoritarianism is taken as a case in point. The second section, and of great consequence, brings analysis to bear on the rule of Mubarak’s predecessors, especially Sadat. The section traces change and continuities from Sadat, much to identify the extent to which Mubarak benefitted from this path dependence to impose unity and to demonise dissent also related to the war discourse. Since the chapter is mainly about the exercise of power in the deployment of language, the final section investigates other forms of this exercise in addition to the Ahram texts already detailed in Chapter Four.

1. Authoritarianism President

This section argues that Mubarak’s rule was as authoritarian as had been the case with Sadat. The existing features of this authoritarianism (as already defined and conceptualised in the previous chapter) also took legal, political and procedural shapes in the guise of opposite claims of democratisation. As far as the 1973 War, the section includes examples of how Mubarak enacted power to guarantee stability not only in power but also stability in the war narrative which constituted the legitimacy of this power. However, what distinguishes Mubarak’s regime is his capacity to “upgrade” his authoritarianism to be adaptive and his highly flexible style of rule as Steven Heydemann argued.441 Ironically, this adaptation and flexibility were only meant to impose a fixed type of rule.

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As Vice President at the time of Sadat’s assassination, Mubarak ascended to power straightforwardly. During his first few years in power, the new president portrayed himself as a prominent advocate of democracy and promised not to monopolise decision-making and fight corruption. As a sign of this transformation, opposition figures and high-profile intellectuals such as Heikal were released from prison and were even asked to meet Mubarak who repeated these pledges. The new president event went as far as to declare his disapproval of long-term presidential rule. In 1984, Mubarak also said that his presidency would not exceed two terms. Nevertheless, these commitments did not materialise, as Mubarak remained in office for five terms spanning 30 years and only left power after three weeks of mass protests calling for his removal in 2011. In 1987, a year that witnessed the beginning of his third term, Mubarak said that democracy cannot be achieved “overnight”. As democracy receded in distance in his statements, Mubarak began to highlight what he called the priority of economic development in the country. “If we cease economic activity and grant freedom … we consequently place people in an unstable state.”

According to Kassem in her seminal book on Egypt’s modern history, Mubarak’s change of views indicated that he projected the image of being an advocate of democracy “in order to legitimise his position and consolidate his power”.

This shift in rhetoric by Mubarak can also be illustrated into his policies and dynamics of governance. These dynamics included more stable turnover of ministerial elite and have been more stable under Mubarak. Some political figures, such as Zakaria Azmi and Kamal El-Shazli, have held their elite positions for three decades. In some cases, there have been no circulations of elite

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442 Maye Kassem ‘Democratization: Reforms as a Means of Stabilizing Authoritarian’, in Democratisation and Development: New Political Strategies for the Middle East, ed. by Dietrich Jung (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 129-151 (p. 130). There has been no formal limitation on presidential two terms since 1980. According to Article 77 of the 1971 Constitution, there was a two-term limitation, but the law was amended in 1980 so that Sadat could enter his term.


445 Kassem, ‘Democratization: Reforms as a Means of Stabilizing, pp. 129-151 (p. 27).
positions since Mubarak’s ascent to power. For example, the government of Prime Minister Atef Sidqi (1986–1996) was Egypt’s longest-serving cabinet since the establishment of the country’s first modern cabinet in 1914. As explained below, keeping such a high profile post in Mubarak’s administration to guarantee that his ‘authoritarianism’ was not challenged. This meant that those holding positions or got into the political limelight had to be marginalised swiftly and brutally by Mubarak, regardless of the degree of challenge they pose. Abu Ghazalah is a case in point.

Abu Ghazalah was appointed Minister of Defence in 1980. After Sadat’s assassination, Mubarak took over power and also inherited Sadat’s appointed cabinet including Abu Ghazalah. As a popular and charismatic leader who managed to establish a sprawling patronage system within the armed forces, Abu Ghazala posed a threat to Mubarak from the beginning of his presidency. Furthermore, a former military attaché to Washington, Abu Ghazala’s political connections and his public anti-communist position further elevated his status within the inner circles of US policy makers at that time. After slowly consolidating his position in power, Mubarak abruptly removed Abu Ghazalah in 1989 and replaced him with the less charismatic Hussein Tantawi. While Abu Ghazala has been confined to political exile, Tantawi’s less charismatic persona has allowed him to maintain his position even after ousting Mubarak.

Mubarak also controlled the other branches constituting the state such as the legislature and the judiciary. On legislative powers, he was keen to tighten or loosen control according to his own vested interests. Following the 1983 electoral law, then Prime Minister Foaud Mohieddin admitted that “one of the clauses, which outlawed independent candidates, was intended to limit access to the

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446 Ibid, p. 28.
447 Kassem, ‘Democratization: Reforms as a Means of Stabilizing, pp. 129-151 (p. 28).
448 Ibid.
449 Ibid.
legislature of individuals who might not be ‘known’ to the regime’. Mubarak’s interest was therefore assessing the degree to which legislatures are contained and controlled within the Parliament. One of the most prominent indications that the legislature was a weak entity under Mubarak leadership is the discrepancy in the number of executive-initiated laws in comparison to its own members, for example, following the first (1984) legislative elections of Mubarak’s rule, the number of bills and international agreement initiated by the executive totalled 427 while members of parliament initiated a meagre 27 bills. The Parliament did not prevent Mubarak’s regime from interfering into the legislature, even to expel members against the immunity rules at some cases. Mubarak also extended his control on the judiciary. According to Law 46 of 1972, which remains in effect, the President is responsible for appointing and promoting judges. Furthermore and according to the same law, the President is also responsible for the appointment of the Public Prosecutor, attorney generals, and court of cassation judges. The President’s powers of appointment extend to the appointment of Supreme Constitutional Court judges. Accordingly, the intertwined relationship of the President with the judiciary is as prominent feature under Mubarak.

The law on the state of emergency, applied since the assassination of Sadat until the overthrow of Mubarak, has proved enormously beneficial to the maintenance of personal authoritarian rule under Mubarak. Under a state of emergency, its application for the maintenance of political control is prominent. For instance, emergency laws allow for censorship over political activity that can range from the monitoring of political activity to the limiting of political expression. Furthermore, individuals can be arrested solely on the basis of suspicion of political crimes or posing a threat to the “public order”. In regard to the judiciary, the imposition of a state of emergency proved useful to

451 Kassem, Egyptian Politics, p. 29.
452 Ibid.
453 Ibid, p. 36.
455 http://www.aljazeera.net/specialfiles/pages/46609207-599c-4f9d-ad6e-618fece366c14 [accessed on September 2, 2014].
the regime in that it limited the judiciary intervention due to several reasons. The role of the judiciary was overlooked in trials under this law, since the President himself was given the powers to appoint judges and refer crimes he found punishable under the law. This means that the President is given a virtual carte blanche to “detain and prosecute civilians in military courts regardless of whether their activity endangers fundamental interests”.456

On the ground, the emergency law was extensively used to consolidate the ‘authoritarianism’ under Mubarak by targeting opposition to him. For example, indicative of this, prior to the 1995 legislative elections, the security forces arrested 54 prominent Muslim Brotherhood leaders to pre-empt their electoral participation in legislative elections. Placed in front of a military court, the 54 leaders were sentenced to between three and five years in prison with hard labour. Largely as a consequence, only one single Islamist won in parliamentary elections of this year. A similar pattern emerged in almost all parliamentary elections during Mubarak’s rule. To sum up, despite this adaptation and flexibility in internal political trajectories of the state, the system itself remained a distinct and resilient form of authoritarian rule. It was this ‘authoritarianism’ that allowed Mubarak to get closer to Sadat without ruptures either in history or discourse.

2. Getting Closer to Sadat

The discursive continuities from Sadat to Mubarak identified in Chapters Three and Four are linked to another level of continuity at the socio-political level. In this section, these socio-political continuities are explored along with the change which also left Mubarak distancing from Sadat on policies related to the ‘Islamic revival’ and Nasser’s legacy.

456 Kassem, Egyptian Politics, p. 37.
Unlike Sadat, who attempted to distance himself from Nasser from the beginning of his rule, Mubarak sought the opposite, getting closer to his predecessor. Mubarak adopted almost all of Sadat’s policies after he came to power. Ayubi said there was a difference of ‘style’ only between the two presidents.\footnote{Nazih Ayubi, ‘Government and the State in Egypt Today’, in \textit{Egypt Under Mubarak}, ed. by Charles Tripp and Roger Owen (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 1-20 (p. 12).} He also continued that after “a few flirtations with certain aspects of Nasserism, and after a short-lived campaign against corruption, the regime appeared to continue with basically the same personnel as from the Sadat era.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 12.} With the main thrust of policies unchanged, Mubarak’s rule did not begin with a power struggle to settle. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Sadat began his rule with what he declared as a ‘corrective revolution’ in 1971 and through which Nasserists were excluded from power, and formalised his ‘open door’ policy in 1974 through which many economic policies of Nasser were abandoned and replaced by economic liberalisation. Nasser also sought to consolidate his power in 1954 after a power struggle with other elites who claim legitimacy to run the state after the 1952 coup. Nasser started his economic transformation in 1956 with the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and other foreign concerns.\footnote{Ibid, p. 14.}

As Mubarak had not witnessed these socio-political transformations, he sought stabilisation in policies and war discourse. In his first cabinet after taking power, Mubarak brought in new ministers to replace those associated with Sadat’s policies, but the new cabinet’s task was Sadatist in essence; making \textit{infitah} more attractive to Egyptian and foreign investors alike.\footnote{Derek Hopwood, \textit{Egypt: Politics and Society: 1945-90}, 3\textsuperscript{rd} edition, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 192.} According to Derek Hopwood, continuity also meant that the legacy of Sadat remained intact. Although Mubarak promised to face the corruption that had become rife under his predecessor, his steps were timid and weak. For example, Sadat’s brother Ismat was brought to trial for acquiring millions of pounds in
corrupt deals. He was sentenced to one year in prison. However, he was released after six months, and the drive against corruption also lost some of its urgency. Unlike Sadat in his de-Nasserisation campaign under his watchful eyes, the image of Sadat was kept untainted. Mubarak made it clear that there is a distinction between the policies of Sadat and who corruptly benefitted from them. He refused, as he said, to put the whole of Sadat’s regime which Mubarak himself was an integral part of it on trial.

As far as the 1973 and its implications are concerned, Mubarak also stuck to the legacies of Sadat on relations with Israel and civil-military relations. On the former, the President from the beginning vowed commitments to the agreements with Israel and the rapprochement with the United States. In a speech he delivered on October 6, 1981 to announce Sadat’s death, Mubarak said he would not stop “pushing the wheel of peace forward”, a reference to the newly-enacted peace treaty with Israel. It was on this ‘peace’ platform that Mubarak also bolstered his image as a peacemaker. It was during his first years in power that Sinai was entirely restored after over a decade of Israeli occupation. The whole of Sinai was retrieved in 1989. As far as the war discourse is related, this reflected on a similar continuation of both personifying and personalising the 1973 War. Mubarak himself took over the title of Sadat as the ‘hero of war and peace’. In 2001, he opened the Mubarak al-Salam (Mubarak the Peace), a project that constructed a bridge crossing over the Suez Canal, and the regime also at the same year opened the first stage of a mega project to transfer the Nile water to Sinai through the Tera’t al-Salam (the peace waterway). On civil-military relations, the influence of the army under Sadat expanded with a de-politicised formula of control. One common feature of this continuity is that the army had been tasked with the economic development which both Sadat and, consequently, Mubarak promised in the aftermath of peace agreements with Israel. In 1978, the National Service

461 Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society, p. 189
462 Ibid.
Projects Organisation (NSPO) was created to redirect the military from war to economics, after Sadat declared that the 1973 October War would be Egypt’s last war.\footnote{Hazem Kandil, ‘Back on Horse? The Military Between Two Revolutions’, in Arab Spring in Egypt: Revolution and Beyond, ed. by Bahgat Korany and Rabab El-Mahdi (Cairo, American University in Cairo Press, 2012), pp. 173-198 (p. 182).} The portfolio of this budding military-economic complex included activities as diverse as construction, land reclamation, agro-industries, and, most importantly, over thirty factories producing civilian durables and weapons.\footnote{Ibid.} As referred to in the textual analysis of Ahram, these projects and the role of the army were highlighted as part of the so-called ‘fruits of peace’.

Nevertheless, there are also elements of rupture between Sadat and Mubarak, mainly including the latter’s limitation of the Islamists’ role into politics. Unlike Sadat, Mubarak did not need Islamists to face down another rival such as Nasserists and Marxists as had been the case in early 1970s. Having seen the assassination of Sadat by an Islamist army officer in front of his eyes, Mubarak also realised the danger of employing political Islam. However, Mubarak always eliminated Islamists and never unleashed their powers in the same form of an ‘Islamic revival’ as his predecessor had done. This is evident in the accommodation of Islamists during elections. According to Mona El-Ghobashy, elections under Mubarak were never free and fair, as the ruling National Democratic Party always manufactured a whopping substantial majority and never obtained less than 70 percent of the seats.\footnote{Mona El-Ghobashy, ‘The Dynamics of Elections Under Mubarak’, in The Journey to Tahrir: Revolution, Protest And Social Change in Egypt, ed. by Jeannie Sowers and Chris Toesing (London, New York: Verso, 2012), pp.132-148, p.132.} The opposition, including Islamists, were kept on a tight leash, restrained by police intimidation, rampant fraud and severe limits on the outreach of voters.\footnote{Ibid.} Nevertheless, Mubarak used these elections to accommodate and keep control of Islamists or bolster the legitimating power of the regime itself by raising the scare mongering warning of an Islamist ascendance to power. In that, elections were meant to accentuate authoritarian rather than alleviate it. Running against a plentiful scholarship exploring the links between authoritarianism and democratisation, there are other
scholarly trends led by Jennifer Ghandi and Ellen Lust-Okar who argued that the voting process as helping leaders such as Mubarak to tighten the grip on his power. Indeed, Mubarak’s approach is consistent with the latter school of thought since his regime created what can be taken as authoritarian elections. In the 1980s and 1990s, the continuation of the emergency law was justified on claims of the need to combat the Islamist insurgency which began in 1992. In the 2000s, the regime released its grip after pressures from the West in the aftermath of 9/11. In 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood, then the most organised opposition group with an organisational structure and effective mobilisational machine secured a record number of 88 seats or 20 per cent of the whole legislature’s seats. However, the victory ushered in a new narrowing of the political economy structure and the regime moved on to reclaim spaces receded to Islamists during the preceding years. The regime resorted to the use of large scale violence and fraud in the last stage of the 2008 elections, leaving the Muslim Brotherhood with 76 seats. As the security crackdown continued, the Brotherhood opted to boycott the 2008 elections. The group was also effectively eliminated from the 2010 elections as well, with many members and leaders of the group were arrested and its activities curtailed. Mubarak had always limited the influence in Islamists in trade unions, unlike Sadat who almost unleashed an Islamist to grab full control of these unions.

3. ‘Authoritarian’ Media System

In another form of continuity from the Sadat regime, Mubarak’s rule left the media system fully authoritarian and mobilisational. This section addresses how the system was fully controlled by the regime on one hand and how this media system acted to propagate the discourse through a similar mechanism of ‘authoritarianism’ based on reward/punishment of obedient/disobedient journalists.

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469 Jennifer Ghandi and Ellen Lust-Okar, ‘Elections Under Authoritarianism’, Annual Review of Political Science, 12 (June 2009), 403–422
Overall, macro-politics of state-press relationship worked within the same classification of Rugh as established in the previous chapter.

Exactly like Sadat, Mubarak began his rule with measures which sounded supportive of press freedoms before abandoning them once his rule was established. After a few months in office, Mubarak lifted many of these direct press restrictions. He also let opposition leaders and journalists out of jail and allowed the opposition party newspapers to resume publications. By the spring of 1982, the opposition party newspapers *Al Sha'b* and *Al-Ahali* had resumed publication after they had been closed under Sadat partially due to their opposition to what they called a faulty and lacking peace settlement with Israel. The newly reinstated Wafd Party published its own newspaper, *Al-Wafd*, which demonstrated the party’s appeal by selling half a million copies every week. During the period after 1982, there were five party weeklies, making the paper comparable to the leading dailies in readership such as *Ahram*. Nevertheless, the state retained many instruments of control and influence over the press, and even used them on various occasions. This control took the shape of various forms. Anti-terrorist Law 97, passed in July 1992, strengthened penal code provisions allowing the state to take action against a publication, which was believed to threaten the public order by “disrupting social peace or “spreading panic” which are terms subject to different definition. In May 1995, the Egyptian Parliament passed Law No. 93 which increased criminal penalties for “publishing false information or forged documents liable to harm the public interest or the national economy. It placed the burden of proof in libel cases on the press. Prominent journalists strongly criticised the law for its severity. The new and more liberal Press Law 96 was passed after a massive campaign against the older one. However, in 1996, a Cairo court, citing Law 93 of 1995, sentenced the *Al-Sha'b*’s editor Magdi Ahmed Hussein to jail because of the paper’s ‘libellous’ articles against Interior Minister Hassan El-Alfi. By this time, at least twenty journalists from various papers had

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been tried in court under Law 93.\footnote{Committee to Protect Journalists made the update in a letter to Mubarak, cited Rugh, \textit{Arab Mass Media}, p. 159.} In May 2000, the authorities suspended the newspaper \textit{Al-Sha’b}, and the Political Parties Committee, which is controlled by the regime, ordered the freezing of the opposition Labour’s party’s activities on the grounds that the newspaper incited riots against a Syrian novel then claimed to be blasphemous and anti-Islamic. The Press Syndicate Council, representing all Egyptian journalists, on one occasion issued in 1999 an urgent appeal to Mubarak, asking him “to give priority … to the revision of laws and legislation that restrict freedoms, guaranteed by the constitution, such as the freedom to publish and own newspapers and have access to information.” This appeal was a rarity since the state was already tightening its grip on the mechanisms by which journalists can express their rejection of these measures against them such as trade unions or representative civil society bodies.\footnote{See Naomi Sakr, \textit{Transformations in Egyptian Journalism} (I.B. Tauris, 2013)}

These restrictions continued in the 2000s and extended to different outlets of the press. Shahira Amin, a presenter on the Egyptian TV and a Cairo-based correspondent with CNN, ran a story on the authorities’ brutalisation of Sudanese refugees. After the story was broadcast, she was visited by a member of the intelligence apparatus. The message delivered was that she could “disappear off the face of the Earth”.\footnote{Edward Webb, \textit{Media in Egypt and Tunisia: From Control to Transition?} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 40.} She even said in a January 2012 interview that she had been approached by journalists representing themselves as working for \textit{Ahram} newspaper, and these interviews were never published.\footnote{Ibid.} If anything, this had left journalists with a sense of self-censorship in the \textit{Ahram}, as I was told in several times in my interviews with the paper’s reporters. Edward Webb in his book ‘Media in Egypt’ based on field interviews with Egyptian journalists concluded that all the media under Mubarak “was manipulated” and displayed “weak ethical standards”.\footnote{Ibid, p. 41} He referred to the lack of independence of the Journalists’ Syndicate, which depends on state financial support to offer

\footnote{Ibid, p. 41}
subsidised housing and health insurance as well as pension, much to limit its effectiveness on campaigning on higher standards.\textsuperscript{476} The syndicate was always dominated by state-owned newspapers due to the excessive number of employed and the ease with which these employees obtained membership.\textsuperscript{477}

Indeed, Mubarak accommodated the press the same way he did with the Islamists. Although there was an opening in the media environment in 2004, partially due to foreign pressures especially from the US as part of democratisation efforts, state media remained under Mubarak’s authoritarian control. Furthermore, these media outlets, including \textit{Ahram}, were even used to attack these “fallacious American claims” after American press and the White house joined forces in the push for democracy in 2004.\textsuperscript{478}

The 2006 press law allowed forms of censorship and continued to appoint editors for the national press. It also maintained provisions for custodial sentences for “endangering national interests”, “displaying bad publicity” and “insulting the head of state”.\textsuperscript{479} Publishing a newspaper also requires a license or forming a political party (which can publish a newspaper after its formation), both of which require lengthy and costly procedures.\textsuperscript{480} In 2006, long-standing editors in chief of many state-run newspapers were replaced after years in post, in what some took as sign of impending reforms. Instead, it became clear that the new appointees’ chief qualifications was their closeness to Gamal Mubarak and his business associates, and their willingness to use the papers to promote Gamal’s succession to the presidency.\textsuperscript{481} “They saw themselves, as having a partial task, which was to prepare the ground for Gamal Mubarak, to be president,” according to Khaled Dawoud, a journalist for

\textsuperscript{476} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{477} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{478} Nael Shama, \textit{Egyptian Foreign Policy From Mubarak to Morsi: Against the National Interest} (London: Routledge, 2014), pp. 184-185
\textsuperscript{480} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{481} Webb, \textit{Media in Egypt and Tunisia}, p. 44
Ahram, in February 2012.\textsuperscript{482} Among the changes, Hani Shukrallah was removed from the editorship of Ahram Weekly, which became more docile and friendly in editorial line with its Arabic version.\textsuperscript{483} According to late prominent columnist of Ahram Salama Ahmed Salama, they brought more “servile” and “obedient” editors such as Osama Sarayya for Ahram. Salama described Sarayya as implementing the orders without any kind of journalist sense, a description repeated by other interviewees.\textsuperscript{484} Morsi Atallah, who was a military reporter and later appointed by the army as a deputy army spokesperson, also became the chair of the board of directors of Ahram from 2007-2009, allowing him wider space to propagate the state-approved discourse on the war as the next section of this chapter details. On the contrary, non-state newspapers were given different treatment. In September 2007, a Cairo court sentenced four editors in chief of private newspapers to prison for publishing libellous reports against Mubarak and his son Gamal.\textsuperscript{485}

As the authoritarian regime imposed these restrictions on the media, the latter itself acted ‘authoritarian’ when it comes to internal dynamics and power relationship. This has become evident where Ahram acted further as a propaganda organ in 2010, the year of blatantly mismanaged parliamentary elections which allowed the ruling party to have full parliamentary control.\textsuperscript{486} Ahram Online’s editor, Shukrallah, received several phone calls from his editors to edit or change some of the website’s content to be more in line with the state-controlled editorial policy.\textsuperscript{487} In one occasion, he was told that Sarayya, the editor himself appointed by the state-controlled Supreme Press Council, came in person to the website’s offices to warn that Interior Minister Habib El-Adly was “very angry” of the coverage of the website.\textsuperscript{488} This is how Andrew Hammond described the atmospherics of the press freedom in a book published around that time: The Press Freedom in Egypt “operates in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{482} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{483} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{484} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{485} http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2007/09/13/39078.html [accessed on June 25, 2015].
\item \textsuperscript{486} Webb, Media in Egypt, p. 45
\item \textsuperscript{487} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{488} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
a culture where the political and moral spheres are subject to rigid controls … It is a model of how to maintain state control and allow freedom with certain strictly patrolled boundaries.”

This authoritarianism of both the regime and the media worked hard to protect the discourse on the 1973 War by providing immunity against any such editorial alterations or political accommodation. The war had always remained fixated within the same trio of macro themes identified in Chapter Four analysing the texts of Ahram over the 30 years of Mubarak’s rule. For example, the war discourse was always propelled into full gear to keep Mubarak as the war personified and personalised, i.e. it was Mubarak who brought in the victory in the 1973 War as the Air Force Commander and who brought peace and prosperity as the President. This led to the marginalisation and elimination of any media limelight thrown on any other war commander such as Abu Ghazalla, who was promoted to the defence minister post and widely popular inside and outside the army. For example, on one occasion marking the anniversary of the October War, Abu Gazallah was hosted on TV, only to end up impressing on audience with his charisma, cultural knowledge and sense of humour. “This was disturbing news for Mubarak. The latter called Abu Ghazallah asking him: ‘do not appear on TV or give an interview to any newspaper without my permission’.” Abu Ghazalla heeded the warning, to the extent that he rushed out through the side doors of any location once he knew there were journalists around”. One of Abu Ghazalla’s successors, Tantawi, was also pushed outside the media light for the same reasons. On another occasion, the former editor in chief of Ahram Abdel-Azeem Hammad tells of one occasion in 1997. Hammad was called for an investigation by the military prosecutor because he allowed the publication of television statements made by Tantawi during an official visit to Greece. “The accusation is that Ahram ‘published a

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491 Ibid.
492 Ibid, p. 38.
report without the approval of the army’s security apparatus,’ Hammad was told, ridiculing the accusation as the statements were already broadcast by the Greek TV and they included no sensitive or classified information.\textsuperscript{493} After the military interrogation, the editors of \textit{Ahram} were asked by the head of the military section to publish the same report again with this lead sentence at the beginning of the story: “President Hosni Mubarak yesterday met Tantawi … who updated him on the results of his visit to Greece”\textsuperscript{.494} Applying the rules of modality and transitivity here, the changes in text meant to indicate to readers that Mubarak was the ‘actor’ in this text not Tantawi who should not be a competing actor making his own statements without the superior’s. In this context, the text can also be understood to mean that Mubarak, in this modal context, is the one who takes action and order Tantawi even to be hosted by the Greek TV.\textsuperscript{495} 

Although this authoritarianism is restricting for journalists, it is also rewarding as well. It is within this reward/punishment dichotomy the regime managed to keep the discourse on 1973 intact for 30 years. For example, Atallah, the military reporter at \textit{Ahram} during Sadat and a defender of Mubarak’s role as a commander and a president as explained later on, was promoted to be the editor of an \textit{Ahram} publication in 1990 and to the board of directors of the whole institution of which \textit{Ahram} daily is part, in 2007. Abdel-Moneim was appointed the editor in chief and a member of the board of directors of \textit{Rose Al-Youssef}, another state journalistic institution 1997. Yasser Rizq, the military reporter until 2005, was appointed the editor of Radio and TV magazine in 2005, asked if there was a link between these editorial appointments and their work experience as military reporters, one editorial member of \textit{Ahram} told the researcher on condition of anonymity: “I do think so, as these appointees are already known to and trusted by both the regime and other influential state
bodies including the army". Another current editor in chief, who was appointed in his post after January 25, 2011 in which the army expanded its influence, also agreed on this conclusion.

On a lesser level, the status of an Ahram ‘military reporter’ who was not promoted to these higher levels of editorial positions had come with rewards as well. An Ahram senior military reporter working during the Mubarak era said that on duty trips “army reporters are being treated as army colonels when it comes to status and facilities offered such as food, sleeping areas”. Although he denied that army reporters are offered any financial advantages, other editorial sources told otherwise. On one occasion, a group of military reporters, including those working at Ahram, were awarded in a an army ceremony “with each one of us offered an envelope which had cash in it”, said Galal Nassar, currently the editor of Ahram Weekly, a sister publication of Ahram daily. One source mentioned that army reporters are offered material gifts from the army such as electronic equipment on certain occasions such as the October 1973 War anniversary. Nassar and Affifi denied this. Indeed, this information can be corroborated by other testimonies on such a relationship between the military reporter and the army. Hammad, who was also a respected journalist who founded the credible private newspaper of Al-Shourok, described one occasion on which the army’s Department of Political Affairs sent him a cheque of 25,000LE along with a voucher for a plasma TV. When he asked about the reason, he was told it is a gift from the Department on the occasion of the October 6th war anniversary. Hammad said he ended up accepting the TV not to offend the army and donated the whole sum of the cheque to one of the country’s charities. This came after another incident in which the Defence Minister, Tantawi, asked Hammad and other Ahram editors not to publish critical reports on the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces ruling the country at that

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496 The researcher’s interview with Gamal Affifi, Cairo, June 16, 2014.
497 Ibid.
498 The researcher’s interview with Galal Nassar, Cairo, June 21, 2014
499 The researcher’s interview with a senior journalist in the Ahram, speaking on condition of anonymity, Cairo, June 25, 2014.
500 Hammad, pp. 90-91.
501 Ibid.
time of the occasion after the January 25, 2011. Tantawi was quoted as directly appealing: ‘take whatever you like of money and do not worry about [the paper’s] distribution figures’. The offer had been refused, to be followed by the gift-dispatch incident, according to Hammad.

To sum up, the regime guaranteed that the media system during his rule acted as authoritarian as his regime did. These guarantees took the form of physical action such as imprisoning opponent journalists or threats and intimidation based on the carrot/stick approach. Within the remits of these state-press relationships, obedient editors or military reporters were offered promotion or lucrative financial gifts or even status. The outcome is what the regime desires and what the press freedom campaigners loathe. The Committee to Protect Journalists sent a letter to Mubarak in 1996 asking for the press to take up its role and complained that national newspapers such as *Ahram* “still fundamentally support the policies of the government”.

4. ‘National Narrative’

In this section, elements of national narrative, in its capacity as a maker of curious cultural, linguistic and national collectivities as identified in the previous chapter, are analysed. Analysis begins with school textbooks then moves into general books, two formal representations of the war discourse. The final section is dedicated to arts and features mainly including the Panorama war memorial and songs scripted mainly for the celebrations marking the war anniversary and mostly attended by Mubarak.

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502 Ibid, p. 89.
4.1 School Textbook

This section analyses the whole texts of history books taught at the pre-university stage all the 30 years of Mubarak’s role. The researcher can conclude that the three macro themes identified at Ahram texts are similarly existent with the same ordering and hierarchical prioritisation. Continuities and change from the Sadat era, as explained both in text in previous chapters and in socio-political context in this chapter, are also eminently represented.

The war personified/personalised macro theme is the most dominant macro theme, as identified via its proliferation in texts of these history books. For example, a history textbook for secondary schools focused on portraying Mubarak in his role and status as the dignified war commander behind the first air strike in the 1973 War. It was the “strike which made the enemy lose its balance from day one in the war”.\(^{504}\) It also “was able to paralyse the enemy’s air control” since it was executed by the “self-confident pilots whose high morale also allowed them to supersede world record records”.\(^{505}\) The same frames were repeated in another text book for later years. It was Mubarak who “commanded pilots who carried out the air strike during the glorious war, and [it was Mubarak who] got promoted to Lieutenant General after the war”.\(^{506}\) Once in the presidency, the history textbook tells students, Mubarak announced that he would keep “the course of peace and prosperity and end Israeli occupation of Sinai according to the peace deal”.\(^{507}\) As Israel ended its occupation on April 25, 1982, with the return of the borderline area of Sinai, the textbook said that “Sinai returned to the Egyptian homeland and Egypt accordingly restored its international borders”.\(^{508}\) However, the centrality of discourse was based on Mubarak’s economic policies and mega construction projects linked as part

\(^{505}\) Ibid, p. 62.
\(^{507}\) Ibid, p. 171.
\(^{508}\) Ibid.
of the legacy of the war and resultant peace. Again, this was consistent with the mechanisms of the state encouraging a new generation of entrepreneurs and businesspeople who embraced the more substantial neoliberal reforms later adopted by Mubarak in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{509} From this perspective the focus on economic development, also witnessed in Sinai after the retrieval from Israel, gave impetus this economic centrality in the war discourse in these curriculums. However, Mubarak is still the connecting point between this war legacy and the economic development. Reflecting this duality of the personification/personalisation, the caption of one picture of Mubarak in the text reads: “President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, the Commander of the air strike in October War 1973”\textsuperscript{510}

Remarkably, the textbooks from the start were keen to portray Mubarak as a continuation of Sadat in war and in peace. Sadat remained also the war personalised/personified. In a 1988-1989 textbook, the section on the war began by hailing Sadat as the one who prepared for the war “by strenuously garnering the internal, Arab, African and international support … convinced Syria to take part in the war … and at the peak of victory over Israeli forces announced the peace initiative”.\textsuperscript{511} Remarkably, in the revision section of the same chapter on the war, the book asked students to “remember that it was Sadat who prepared for the war, then designed October 6 for the great crossing … Remember my son that Sadat … announced at the apex of his victory his peace initiative in 1973 … and remember that Sadat went to Jerusalem and announced in parliament principles through which Israel accepted a fair and comprehensive peace with Egypt”.\textsuperscript{512} That this information takes shape through an imperative verb and in a patronising manner by calling pupils ‘son’ is not only revealing of the dictation of the message but relevant how Sadat used to call Egyptians in his speeches as ‘my sons

\textsuperscript{512} Soliman and Radwan, \textit{Tarikh Misr al-Hadith}, p. 178-179.
and daughters’. 513 This personification of Sadat a maker of peace is a recurring theme in other textbooks for different ages and levels of education. 514

On the second macro theme, these textbooks also highlighted the 1973 War as an overwhelming and consistent Egyptian victory, although at a less level of emphasis. For example, in a 1988-1989 textbook for students in the 6th year of primary school, the authors announced that Egyptian forces “On the afternoon of October 6th, a spark was lit and the Egyptian forces crossed the canal and the Bar-Lev Line and defeated the Israeli army”. 515 The statement is supported by a picture of Israeli soldiers captured by the Egyptian army, with a caption beneath reading: “Israeli soldiers surrender after the Egyptian forces made victory in the October War”. 516 Victory was also mentioned in other parts of the chapter. 517 In other text books, the meanings of victory were asserted as well either in text or in pictures showing Israeli forces withdrawing from Sinai or their surrender. 518 Victory was also based on other Clausewitzian indicators such as gaining material gains such as land secured after the ‘crossing’. 519 On thagra, the school text books adopted the same official and public position, i.e. the Israeli counter-attack was either dismissed as a cheap act of Israeli propaganda or as an act of desperation to save face before a final defeat. 520

On the third macro theme, war is thought of as a miracle, which was mentioned with less focus and regularity. On the few occasions of comparing the war to a miracle, there are no religious references attached to the representations. This dissociation of miracles and religion is also resonant with the

513 This is an excerpt of one of Sadat’s speeches in which he addressed the members of the ruling party at a convention as ‘sons and daughters’. http://www.moqatel.com/openpage/Whaek/Khotob/Khotob1/22_7.htm_Ext.htm [accessed on September 3, 2014].
515 Nawar and Radwan, Tarikh Misr al-Hadith, p. 158.
519 Ibid.
520 Mohamed and others, al-Derasat al-Ijtima’iiyya, p. 233. The text book argued that infiltrating Israeli forces met with “military and public resistance, so the Israeli forces failed to occupy Suez” (ibid.).
same pattern adopted in the *Ahram* texts. The war was a “miracle by all measures,” according to a 2000-2001 textbook.\(^{521}\) As had been the case at *Ahram*, this miracle was based on a linguistic dichotomy meaning that Egyptian miracle had destroyed Israel’s existing miracles. Egypt “destroyed the other miracle of the Israeli army’s invincibility” or the other which is based on “security theory to keep occupying lands of the other as secure borders of Israel,” according to a 1991-1992 textbook.\(^{522}\) As earlier mentioned on Hume’s definitions of miracle, the phenomenon is always associated with these sentiments of surprise and wonder. These associations were also there in the text books such as these examples demonstrate: the Egyptian army “surprised the world” by crossing the canal,\(^{523}\) This surprise was due to “glorious victories’ by the Egyptian army in the war.\(^{524}\) In all the pages of textbooks under analysis, there is only one mention of religion as part of the rhetorical representations on the war, where the text book mentioned that Egyptian forces “crossed the eastern bank of the canal while shouting *Allah Akbar*, therefore announcing the beginning of a sacred battle to liberate Sinai”.\(^{525}\) Indeed, this reference to the shouting ‘*Allahu Akbar*’ is almost the only enduring reference continuing from Sadat’s era. However, it was always used in a de-religionised context. For example, after mentioning ‘*Allahu Akbar*’, the text book added that the reasons behind the Egyptian victory were mainly because of the fighting skills of the Egyptian soldiers.\(^{526}\)

After this overview of text books during the era of Mubarak, there are two other linguistic patterns along with the thematic patterning identified above. On wording as one of these linguistic features, I noticed that exact words, phrases and even sentences were repeated again and again over three decades of Mubarak’s rule and in different text books designation for education at different levels, as well as in continuity from textbooks written during Sadat. For example, this sentence, “the October War had a direct impact on developing the system of governance in Egypt towards more democracy

\(^{521}\) Hammad and Ramadan, *Mulhaq al-Tarikh*, p. 58.
\(^{522}\) Nawar and others, *Tarikh Misr wal-Arab al-Hadith*, p. 190
\(^{523}\) Soliman and Radwan, *Tarikh Misr al-Hadith*, p. 158.
\(^{524}\) Mohamed and others, *al-Derasat al-Ijtimi‘iyah*, p. 233
\(^{525}\) Hammad and Ramadan, *Mulhaq al-Tarikh*, p. 51
\(^{526}\) Ibid, p. 59.
and rule of law” was mentioned verbatim in textbooks published in 1984, 1991, 1995-1996.\textsuperscript{527} The sentence, the peace led to the “return of navigation in the canal ... and Egyptian retrieval of large swathes of Sinai land including oil wells” was also repeated verbatim in the same textbooks.\textsuperscript{528} Further strikingly, the two sentences were first written in a 1977 text book when Sadat was still in power.\textsuperscript{529} Repetitions of other sentences also continued over the years, especially when references are made to peace efforts and the post-war reconstruction projects. The other pattern is that the same authors, despite different ages and stages of education and despite the fact that the Ministry of Education has ordered the writing of these books through tenders. In these tenders, the ministry invites bids from publishing houses to write and publish the text books with the script. After being submitted, the script is revised by the Ministry of Education ‘consultants’ in each subject, a stage after which the publication process starts.\textsuperscript{530} Nevertheless, analysing these text books from the Sadat era, the pattern is that almost the same authors kept writing text books for decades. For example, Assem Desouki, a professor of history at \textit{Ein Shams} University, kept writing history books from 1991 even until 2014/2015, while Soliman Nawar, a history professor at the Azhar University, kept writing history text books from 1976 onwards. The fact that many of these same books were published and republished for decades had guaranteed fixed and repetitive frames. However, my argument is that these fixed and repetitive frames did not change not mainly because text books are written by the same authors but because of the broader socio-politics in the name of the state control. One evidential demonstration of the validity of this argument is the content of history text books written and published after the January, 2011 events. In the 2013-2014 textbook for the third year of secondary school education, written also Desouki and Nawar and others whose name appeared in earlier history textbooks, mentioned El-Shazly for the first time in 40 years.\textsuperscript{531} Those authors not

\textsuperscript{528} Ibid, p. 180, ibid, p. 192, p. 255.  
\textsuperscript{530} The researcher’s interview with a member of the curriculum consultation office at the Ministry of Education, speaking on condition of anonymity, Cairo, August 6, 2015.  
only ended the ban on El-Shazly, a fierce critic of Sadat and Mubarak, but also attributed to him making the war plan to cross the Suez Canal and a “sophisticated level of professionalism”, which led him to the Chief of Staff post.\footnote{Ibid, p. 154} On the opposite side, Mubarak was erased from text even when referring to the first air strike in the war.\footnote{Ibid.} His picture was also removed, and pictures of other war commanders were inserted including that of El-Shazly.\footnote{Ibid.} Having the same authors writing texts of opposite meanings leaves the variable of state power as the only variable in this equation. I interviewed Assem El-Dessouki, a history university professor whose name appeared as an author in the different versions of the history textbook for the third year of secondary school education since 1992.\footnote{The researcher’s interview with Assem El-Dessouki, over phone, London, September 25, 2015.} El-Dessouki said that changes in content always came after he had submitted the manuscript. “Changes in the curriculum are a politically motivated process. They [the Ministry officials] doctored the content by allowing politics to affect the history curriculum,” he added.\footnote{Ibid.} El-Dessouki was asked to publish the book by the Ministry directly in 1992. In the 2000s, the Ministry made the writing based on tenders inviting authors to bid for writing the history textbook. However, El-Dessouki and co-authors, including former Ministry of Education officials such as Brince Ahmed Radwan who is now retired, remained the authors of these history books for the past 23 years despite the biddings for new authors and new content. When asked about discursive shifts in history textbooks by adding chapters on the January ‘revolution’ and removing any mention of Mubarak, El-Dessouki admitted and nervously told me that “such content on the former president was too much so we have to take it out”.\footnote{Ibid.}

### 4.2. General Books

This section reviews most of the books on the 1973 War, which were aimed at the general audience as published during the reign of Mubarak. It concluded that these books remained committed to the same state-drawn thematic lines either evident at Ahram or other channels of communication as
identified below. As was the case in the previous chapter on Sadat, the books are chosen to reflect diversity either in authorship or in genres. War reporters and military/ex-military authors were also the main authors of these books.

The most dominant macro-theme in these books is that of the 'war personified/personalised’. For example, Atallah, the former military reporter for *Ahram* under Sadat and the editor and chairman of the board of directors under Mubarak, highlighted this macro theme in *6 October: Harb al-Sit Sanawat (the war of 6 years)*. In the book, published in 1998 by the state-run Egyptian Public Association of Books, Atallah dedicated the first chapter to Mubarak’s dual achievements as both War Commander and President. He wrote:

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Now as we look back at the past 22 years since the realisation of the October victory, including 14 years with Mubarak in power over the whole country, there is a consensus that there is a similarity in his style in the two missions; rebuilding the Air Force able to cross the plight of defeat into victory and rebuilding a state capable to cross the consequences of war and conflict into prosperity, development and peace. 538
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Atallah linked this legacy to Sadat who remained the personification and personalisation of the war. In the book, Sadat was mentioned several times. In a chapter entitled the “ingenuity of the Egyptian mind”, Atallah said that Sadat will be “gloriously remembered as the maker of the war decision” 539. He also repeated the same metaphors in the *Ahram* newspaper, such as the need to have “the spirit of October”. 540 Indeed, these words were repeated by Atallah in his columns at *Ahram* at the same time as well, much to add impetus to the macro theme among readers exposed to both mediums. Taha El-

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539 Ibid, p. 123.
540 Ibid, p. 240
Magdoub in his book *Harb October... Tariq al-Salam* (the October War: The Road to Peace), also focused on the same macro theme, exploring how peace led to a massive Egyptian economic development.\(^{541}\) He called one of his chapters, “the [peace] agreement and the fruits of peace”.\(^{542}\) The fact that the book is published by the State Information Service, the main media representative of the state, is revealing of the state influence on this discourse.

At a less degree, the books also addressed the second macro theme of ‘massive and consistent victory’. Staff Brigadier General Kamaleddin Abul ’zayem wrote on the 10\(^{th}\) anniversary of the war *Leman Turf’ al-Rayat* (For whom flags are raised), published by the army’s publishing department in 1983. The book affirms the meaning of victory, with the cover picture of Egyptian soldiers raising the flag in a Sinai post during the war. The second page has another image of a soldier grinning with two hands stretched as a sign of victory. The book focused on how the Egyptian army realised victory. These are several mentions of these losses in different pages: “In two weeks, Israel lost half of its armoured vehicles”\(^{543}\); “In two weeks, Israel lost a quarter of its Air force”\(^{544}\); “the Israeli forces incurred massive losses because of the Egyptian Air Defence missiles”\(^{545}\); Egyptian snipers destroyed 200 tanks along the Suez Canal coast\(^{546}\); The Israeli Air force sorties to the [Suez] Canal were called the no-return flight\(^{547}\); the Israeli Air Forces “were completely incapacitated”\(^{548}\). Youssef Affifi, the Commander of the Battalion 19, which first crossed the canal during the war, also detailed this massive and consistent Egyptian victory in his book, *Abtal al-Firqa 19* (the Heroes of the Battalion 19). Affifi mentioned how “Egyptians crossed defeat” and how the Egyptian army “besieged one position for seven days before taking control of it after the surrender of

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\(^{542}\) Ibid, p. 186.
\(^{544}\) Ibid, p. 105.
\(^{545}\) Ibid, p. 107.
\(^{546}\) Ibid, p. 87.
\(^{547}\) Ibid, p. 93.
\(^{548}\) Ibid, p. 95.
the Israelis”. He also downplayed the *thagra* as “a TV operation of show off”, although he admitted that his commanders were initially less effective of believing its seriousness. On *thagra*, these books showed a thematic uniformity. Atallah in his book also downplayed the *thagra* as “tactical success … but it did not downplay Egypt’s full strategic success”. Indeed, this is the same statement made by the head of the war operations Abdel-Ghani El-Gamsy in an interview a few years before. *Ahram*’s military reporter Abdu Mubasher wrote a new book under Mubarak. In *Asrar wa Hakaiik al-Huroub al-Misriyya al-Isra’iliyya*, (Secrets and Facts of the Egyptian-Israeli Wars), Mubasher reiterated victory as massive and consistent despite his mention of certain failings. Any doubts on the Egyptian “victory” either at local or international levels is “unsubstantiated”, he wrote.

The third macro theme of ‘war made miracle remained very active as well in the books published under Mubarak. Affifi, for example, described the first hours of crossing the canal as “a historical event not far from the fairy tales”. He noted how Egypt “broke the myth of the invincibility of the Israeli army” and the “invincibility of [Israeli] Air Force”. Although mostly factual as he is, some details carried these miracles as Egyptian “bodies face down tanks” and “a man who carried his intestines in his hands and attacked well-fortified position of the enemy”. Atallah also wrapped his text in miracles. Egyptian forces was able to “cross the impossible” on the first day of war; “the myth of the invincibility of the Israeli soldier was destroyed”; the Egyptians “destroyed all the impossibilities”; the performance of the Egyptian armed forced “went beyond all calculations due.

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551 Atallah p. 216.
552 In an interview with Moussa Sabri, Ghamsy admitted, for the first time ever, that the *thagra* was a ‘tactical success for Israel, but it was a step doomed strategically as it could not have overrun the strategic failure of the enemy,” Sabri, *Wataha’iq Harb Uktubir*, p. 439.
557 Atallah, p. 157.
559 Ibid, p. 29.
to the accuracy of planning and the greatness of execution”\textsuperscript{560}, the “whole world will as of now look respectfully at the Egyptian military which broke the myth of Israeli supremacy”\textsuperscript{561}. The same frames on miracles were repeated again and again in the book of Atallah. In the book, Atallah reiterated that the war “brought unprecedented respect and appreciation to the Egyptian military”\textsuperscript{562}; and on another occasion, he wrote that the Egyptian victory “is a clear-cut declaration of the destruction of the myth of the invincibility of the [Israeli]” army. He made the title of one of his chapters: “The Fall of Imaginations, Myths and Impossibilities”\textsuperscript{563}. Again, these imaginings had an authoritative backing since Atallah noted in the book itself that he had been working in the army press office “before and during the war”\textsuperscript{564}.

Furthermore, this narrative depended also on hyperbolic emotionally evocative metaphors. Remarkably, similarity of metaphoring between \textit{Ahram} and these books are existent, which is predictable since both genres were written by the same authors, even some of the military historians mentioned above were also hosted to write an opinion articles for \textit{Ahram}. For example, Atallah focused on the metaphor of crossing which was repeated again and again such as writing, the “war of October was a crossing from desperation to hope”.\textsuperscript{565} He even made the phrase “Crossing the Impossible” the title of one of another chapter.

As the state propagated and protected this dominant discourse as mentioned above, it also worked hard to prevent any counter-discourses that challenge it. For example, a furore erupted over the publication of Heikal’s book, the Autumn of Fury in 1983. The book depicted Sadat as a man more

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{560} Ibid, p. 27
\textsuperscript{561} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{562} Ibid, p. 18
\textsuperscript{563} Ibid, 23.
\textsuperscript{564} Ibid, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{565} Ibid, p. 31.
\end{footnotesize}
concerned with showmanship than statesmanship through extravagance and superstar politics. Pro-
Sadat editors, especially al-Akhbar’s Moussa Sabri defended the policies of Sadat and attacked
Heikal in long articles using the “meanest expressions they could print”.\footnote{566} Mubarak promptly
ordered that Heikal’s book be banned from Egypt and the excerpts published in \textit{al-Ahaly} to be
stopped. Mubarak even contacted the heads of state of the Arab countries in which Heikal’s book
was serialised and asked the series be discontinued.\footnote{567} Most of them agreed. In a public speech,
President Mubarak attacked Heikal personally and scolded him for minimising Sadat’s achievements
in the October 1973 War.\footnote{568} Furthermore, the Supreme Press Council issued a statement
condemning Heikal and other writings for criticising Sadat’s personal life and humble origins.\footnote{569}
El-Shazly’s memoirs, in which he criticised Sadat and discredited the Egyptian official narrative by
questioning claims on victory, the book was banned for three decades, to be only published after
Mubarak’s resignation.\footnote{570}

\section*{4.3. Features and Arts}

This section examines less formal channels of communicating the official discourse on the 1973 War,
such as the October Panorama war memorial and the state-produced songs for the war anniversary
celebrations attended by Mubarak.

If the construction of the Unknown Soldier monument, not far from the Panorama Site, had been
ordered by Sadat whose family also asked for his burial in the site, Mubarak sought to order the
construction of his own memorial, the Panorama. The construction of the site, extending over a wide area over 31,000 square kilometres, was initiated in 1984 at a time when Sadat’s centrality in the images of the October War has been reduced drastically. 571 Based on South Korean expertise, the site was inaugurated in 1989 to be used as the central site of commemorating the 1973 War. 572 It includes an open air exhibition of the weapons used in the war. As I visited the museum more than once for the purpose of this research, several elements of the dominant official discourse in the war can be found. Still, most significant is the centrality of Mubarak in the narrative. Mubarak was the war personified/personalised in this memorial site.

In the central exhibition housed in the main round-structured hall of the site, there had been a large mosaic portraying Egypt’s Supreme Command at a briefing about the battles of 1973. However, the mosaic placed Mubarak at the centre while briefing Sadat and Chief of Operations Gamassy. Absent from the mosaic is El-Shazly, already absent form Ahram and all other similarly state-dominated discourse until Mubarak’s resignation as mentioned above. Although the mosaic exhibits the hierarchy of the Supreme Command, which means that the Commander in Chief El-Shazly should replace Mubarak who was the Air Force Commander, the ordering is conspicuously different. After January 25, 2011, when Mubarak was forced to resign, the mosaic was removed and replaced with another in which El-Shazly was added and Mubarak removed. On October 6, 2012, the army admitted that old mosaic was “wrong” since it is El-Shazly who stood next to Sadat, not Mubarak”. 573 The daughter of al-Shazly Shahdan was more direct in describing the old mosaic as “a falsification of history”. 574 Indeed, the same ordering in which El-Shazly was taken out and Mubarak

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572 http://www.sis.gov.eg/Ar/Templates/Articles/impArticles.aspx?CatID=5297#.VF7XHzZRHIU [accessed on September 2, 2015].


574 Ibid.
inserted appeared in pictures published by *Ahram* on more than one occasion during the era of both Sadat and Mubarak. Shahdan called this act politically motivated and deliberate, an interpretation which accords with the patterning of discourse identified in this study.\textsuperscript{575}

Also in the Panorama, the memorial site also displayed elements to enhance the macro theme of ‘massive and consistent victory’ victory by displaying the spoils of the war and showing how the army managed to realise ‘massive and consistent’ victory from the first moment of launching the war. Spoils of war including various equipment and weapons of the Israeli army are exhibited. A hall of central revolving platform and which seats around 50 people also displays a show five times a day in which the meanings of victory are reiterated through a focus on crossing and ‘liberating land’. References in the audio-visual spectacle made no mention of any Israeli counter-attacks or Egyptian military failings in the war. In addition, the Ministry of Defence produced a pamphlet about the Panorama in which is meaning of ‘massive and consistent victory’ by asserting its results: “we achieved a decisive victory, which led to the liberation of all Sinai on April 25 1982”.\textsuperscript{576} On the third macro theme, the Panorama also treated the war as a godly miracle in accordance with official position. For example, the war was linked with other victories across Egypt’s history from the Ancient Pharonic Period, the Mohammed Ali period and until the 1965 Suez War. Starting from the pharaohs, Meital argued that the Panorama meant “to depict contemporary Egypt as a direct continuation of the Pharaonic civilisation, from the Period of King Menes five thousand years ago.”\textsuperscript{577}

\textsuperscript{575} Meital, ‘Who is Egypt’s “Hero of War and Peace”’ 150-183 (p. 164).
\textsuperscript{577} Ibid.
Another channel of communicating this official discourse on the war is the corpus of songs played during the musical ceremonies marking the anniversary of the war, which Mubarak and his wife usually attended. Again the predominant macro theme in these songs is Mubarak himself. One of most famous songs is the one which includes this couplet: “Therefore, we chose him [Mubarak].”\(^{578}\) The song went on to mention different reasons for “choosing” Mubarak as president such as “his crossing [canal]”, “his liberating Taba [the last point in Sinai and which Egypt retrieved in March 1989]”, “his beginning an age of peace” and “his tactful and peaceful manners”. Another famous song is entitled: “the first air strike opened the door to freedom”, in a reference to the title mostly preferred by Mubarak as the “master of the first air strike”.\(^{579}\) The eight-minute song hailed the “makers of victory without whom we would not know the meaning of eid (festival)”. This same macro theme was repeated again and again. The repetition even included the same singers performing in these ceremonies marking the war anniversary. Safaa Abu al-Su’od who performed a number of songs all heaping praise on Mubarak, including one which was played with sentences such as “our day is Mubarak [which literally means blessed]”, \(^{580}\) Mixing the legacy of both the war and peace, the personification and personalisation of the 1973 War bore on the authoritarian nature of both the regime and even the media. In a song entitled ‘Mubarak Habib al-Sha’b’ (The beloved of the people of Egypt), the script further reads: “You are a true Arab leader… the symbol of nationalism … not a compromiser when it comes to the rights of the Arab nation… From October 6 and the first air strike, God had blessed your steps”.\(^{581}\) The performer, the famous Warda, addressed Mubarak who was in attendance of this ceremony by singing: “I do not need to describe your heroism as your heroic acts are indescribable”. Warda had another song in another war anniversary ceremony marked by Mubarak’s presence at the front row. The song’s title is: “This hero is from my

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578 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8PD2z9vFexc [accessed on September 2, 2015].
579 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfT26ODKoOQ [accessed on September 2, 2015].
580 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ozz35UwYy_w [accessed on September 2, 2015].
581 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JXFPJUrQd [accessed on September 2, 2015].
Further to add consistency with the official discourse, the macro theme of ‘the miracle of the war’ was also present in these songs. One song described the crossing of the canal as “an earthquake”, the army’s victory as “sky-moving”, and Egyptian soldiers as the “eagles that just spread their wings and all calculations positively changed”.

Again, the only religious reference repeated in these songs is the shout of “Allahu Akbar” during the crossing. As the shouting was allowed at Ahram, text books and general books and the audio-visual spectacle in the Panorama, songs were no exception, another indication of how macro theme was well patterned, widely coordinated and accurately synchronised.

The performers of those songs were paid by the state. On one occasion, prominent composer Ammar al-Shir‘i was reluctant to do the job to be called by the Minister of Information then Safwat El-Sharif told Shir‘i: These [war anniversary] ceremonies are like weddings in which ‘we have to have songs in praise of the bridegroom’. This is another indication to Mubarak’s centrality in thematic structuring of these songs. Shireen, a famous singer known for her song praising “Mubarak the Father, the Great Heart” said after Mubarak’s resignation that she regretted singing for the former president, and that she had been requested to do that by El-Sherif. El-Sherif, a leading figure in the ruling party with wide powers in hand, was imprisoned after Mubarak’s resignation on charges of corruption and abuse of power. Warda, who performed two songs in different war anniversary ceremonies attended by Mubarak, said she regretted singing for Mubarak. “It was the mistake of my life as one should sing for the people not the President,” she added.
Conclusion

The chapter addressed the socio-politics which influenced the production and containment of the 1973 War discourse. The lynchpin of this influence is the authoritarianism of Mubarak, a distinct and resilient as it is, modified the war discourse to accommodate the new challenges facing the regime or its legitimacy. Frequently, this authoritarianism also affected the state-press relations. Within this rent-seeking system, also based on rewards and punishment, journalists had to serve the gaols set by the regime, much to justify a discursive uniformity on the war and its implications. Since the state acted in the same manner, the discourse and its producers were no different. This similarity was reflected in ‘national discourse’ represented through the Panorama war memorial, books targeting the general readership and textbooks targeting students of pre-university education. Consistent with the *Ahram* discourse, these national narrative facets blunted any possible contestation or de-segmentation of the coherent messages meant to be beaming out of this discoursing.
Conclusion

Since this 1973 War occurred more than four decades ago, one expects multiplicity and fragmentation of accounts in a never-ending process of revision, with new testimonies adding to or subtracting elements from any collective memories built and dedicated to the war. Nevertheless, the study hypothesised that the dynamic multiplicity of the historical ‘reality’ of this war – the most significant in Egypt’s modern history – had been deposited in a timeless perfection of a uniformed structure under the rules of both Sadat and Mubarak. Preliminary research had suggested that this imposed uniformity was structured around three meticulously synchronised ‘macro themes’: (a) a massive and consistent Egyptian victory; (b) war personified/personalised; and (c) war religionised/miraclised. The identification of this trio of macro themes was based on their regularity and repetition in texts as variable as *Ahram* newspaper, school text books, general books, stamps and even war-related song scripts during the eras of both Sadat and Mubarak. To test the validity of these macro themes, and explore their coherence and inter-relations, analysis was also conducted on object-based and nationally constitutive discursive products such as the war memorial constructed by the Sadat regime, and the Panorama site constructed by Mubarak. Comparing the results of analysis at textual and objectified levels has revealed how these artefacts coordinated discursive understandings into durable and even credible representations of the war. Within this coordination, my main three findings are as follows:

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The first relates to the micro level of analysis, focusing on language and texts. The selection and ordering of content representing official and semi-official discourse on the war over a time span of 40 years was not incidental or accidental, but rather a deliberate process of shaping and reshaping patterns of this discourse. Tracing this deliberate process over time reveals a shifting hierarchy in the aforementioned macro themes. For example, the macro theme of ‘massive and consistent’ victory was more extensively constructed and well documented in the analysed texts from the Sadat era. This same macro theme receded into the distance after Mubarak came to power. Under Mubarak, and in spite of his characterisation as uncharismatic and cautious as some of his confidantes admitted, the macro theme of ‘war personalised/personified’ was privileged, and its legitimating force was only heightened by the extended (30-year) duration of Mubarak’s rule. Similarly, while the macro theme of war religionised/miraclised was emphasised under Sadat, it was downgraded under Mubarak.

The second finding relates to the macro level of analysis, focusing on textual and ‘intertextual’ meanings. Content commemorating the 1973 War was found to be deliberately and systematically biased. A dichotomy between discourse and reality was discovered, in that the discourse constructed under both presidents departed significantly from the actuality of what happened in or after the war. This thesis contends that the discursive construction of the war does not simply represent one version of ‘reality’ among many, but rather is demonstrably characterised by intentional falsehoods. This falsification is evidenced, for example, by the inclusion of certain statements apparently quoted verbatim in the Ahram which did not exist in the original texts: the clearest examples being the misquoting of Israeli officials as admitting defeat or succumbing to Egypt’s empowering diplomacy and so forth.
Facts and figures were also twisted and obscured through a barely noticeable mobilisation of features of functional linguistics such as modality, transitivity and metaphors. Under this rubric of what I call ‘discursive beautification’ to keep the macro themes uniform and intact, any opposition was muted. For example, El-Shazy, despite being the chief of staff who was competent and capable enough to be commissioned with setting the original plan of the whole war, was rendered invisible in all the texts and objects under analysis. Following his disagreement with Sadat on war tactics after the Israeli counter-attack in the second week of the war, El-Shazly was ultimately erased from history in the 66 issues of *Ahram*, and all general and school books spanning 40 years. This erasure, an intentional falsification of history, included the doctoring of photos taken during a 1973 War briefing, whereby El-Shazy was removed and replaced by Mubarak in the distinguished position of standing next to Sadat. The most revealing evidence of this falsification emerged after Mubarak was removed from power. In a 2014-2015 text book, El-Shazy was textually cited for the first time in 40 years as the maker of the original *al-Maazen al-A’liyya* (high minaret) plan to cross the Suez Canal.589 The original picture of the 1973 briefing, in which Mubarak does not appear, was published.590 Also after the overthrow of Mubarak, a mosaic was removed from the Panorama memorial site, whose construction was ordered by Mubarak himself. This mosaic had also been doctored to replace El-Shazly with Mubarak at a pre-war meeting.591 The original picture, in which El-Shazly appears in Mubarak’s place, was then instated. These examples provide an indicative stark contrast with the fixed patterning under both Sadat and Mubarak, which erased the very possibility of rival discourses. Furthermore, the producers of those newly reconstructed discourses were often the same ones who had constructed it differently under both Sadat and Mubarak. For example, Assem al-Desouki and Brince Ahmed Radwan, the authors of the aforementioned textbook which erased the picture

590 Ibid.
of Mubarak and criticised Sadat’s peace drive, had previously heaped praise on Sadat and Mubarak in the textbooks they also authored for secondary school history curriculums in the 1990s.

The third finding relates to the ‘macro macro’ level of analysis, focusing on the socio-political context, as addressed in Chapters Five and Six. The finding is that the texts under analysis harmonised very well with their socio-political surroundings. For example, the personal ‘authoritarianism’ of Sadat and Mubarak synchronised with a similarly ‘authoritarian’ media system of which Ahram was a part, to produce a formal and rigorous process guaranteeing appropriation and re-appropriation of war discourse as politically designated. In other words, the war discourse constituted a serious, and crucial, test of political authority under Sadat and Mubarak. For example, the state appointed loyal editors for Ahram, commissioned certain journalists to report the war in the newspaper and even author general books for the public after the war, and boosted a clientelist system based on rewards for abiding to, and punishments for departing from, the officially approved discourse on the war. Heikal, among most famous journalists in Egypt, did not escape these rules when Sadat himself interfered to oust him from the editorship of Ahram.

As has been emphasised in the thesis, the analytical target of this project has not been the media itself, but rather the systematic socio-political repression represented in and through this media. Since discourse is also about ideology, hidden as it likes to be, I worked hard to demonstrate how this socio-political repression had been carried out in the guise of reconciliation and harmony. As ubiquitous and mundane as they are in text, the trio of macro themes were so tightly modelled that they co-produced a smooth and coherent ‘falsified’
version of war ‘truths’. The efficacy of these macro themes even lured Mubarak to use them in the face of tens of thousands of protestors in the 18 days before his resignation, which is another ‘finding after’ to testify the existence and centrality of the macro themes which I have identified in both text and context:

I have never, ever been seeking power and the people know the difficult circumstances in which I shouldered my responsibility and what I offered this country in war and peace.\(^{592}\)

I lived the days of defeat and occupation … I also lived the days of the (Suez) crossing, victory and liberation. It was the happiest day of my life when I raised the flag of Egypt over Sinai. I faced death many times as a pilot…\(^{593}\)

Hosni Mubarak who speaks to you today is proud of the long years he spent in the service of Egypt and its people …here I have lived and fought for its sake and I defended its land, its sovereignty and interests and on this land I will die and history will judge me and others for our merits and faults.\(^{594}\)

However, this is an apparent inconsistency with this argument. The dominant discourse of the state, as reflected in Mubarak’s pronouncements above, failed to continue offering the war commander/president the legitimation of power. Nevertheless, in testimony to the findings of this study, the discourse was brought down when it was co-opted by the Tahrir protestors and when surrounding socio-politics shifted allegiance towards this counter-discourse. The symbolically charged 1973 crossing appearing in official discourse was subverted by a new metonymical crossing in protestors’ slogans such as: *Ehna sha’ab Al Obour: sha’ab 25 January* (We are the youth of the Egyptian Crossing: The youth of the 25 January). The

\(^{592}\)http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/02/president-hosni-mubarak-egypt-speech [accessed on March 3, 2013]


The personalisation of Mubarak as the war commander/president was also subverted by the counter-discourse of his corrupt career, as in this other slogan: ‘Hosni Mubarak ya Tayyar gebt menein sabe’en milyar (you, Hosni Mubarak the pilot, where did you get the 70 billion pounds?!).\(^595\) The master frame of “Mubarak the owner of the first air strike of the war” was ridiculed in slogans such as: Akher tala’ gawiyaa lazem tukun ala So’diya “The last air sortie must be to Saudi Arabia”, in simultaneous reference to the first air strike in the 1973 War under Mubarak’s command and to protestors’ desire for him to escape to neighbouring Saudi Arabia (just as his Tunisian counterpart Zein Alabeddin Bin Ali had done after similar protests). Even patriotic songs usually associating Mubarak and the war victories in Egypt’s histories, as indicated in Chapter Six, were discarded for new songs meant to invalidate any claims of legitimacy for Mubarak or his regime.\(^596\) The suddenness with which these vehicles of counter-discourse emerged is itself an indication of their suppression during the four decades in which Sadat and Mubarak scripted their own discourses physically protected by their ‘authoritarianism’ and discursively mediated by various channels under their control such as Ahram (the most widely circulated newspaper in the country), books for schoolchildren and general readers, and two main memorials symbolically built next to each other in the capital.

To conclude, I contend that the study fulfilled the original aims set out in the introductory chapter. In Chapters Three and Four, the analysis was mainly textual, systematically including every single issue of Ahram during the war and every single issue of the paper marking the annual anniversary over a wide time span of 40 years of Sadat’s and Mubarak’s

\(^595\) This comes after The Guardian published a report claiming that family fortune could amount to 70 billion pounds. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/feb/04/hosni-mubarak-family-fortune [accessed on March 3, 2013]

\(^596\) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=palLFyEncro&feature=relmfu [accessed on February 2, 2013]
rule. The clear temporal and spatial delineation of the scope of the research enabled me to identify patterns of discursive similarity under each president individually, as well as to detect broader patterns of change and continuity between Sadat’s regime on one hand and Mubarak’s on the other. Reflecting the main aim of the thesis to explore the interplay between language and politics as controlled by the state, it was argued in chapters Five and Six that the shifting macro-political context had a strong constraining effect on the war discourse representing reality over the 40-year span. These exterior constraints included thick layers of ‘authoritarianism’ at the levels of both the state and the media, as well as relations with Islamists as part of the present and with Nasser as part of the past. Admittedly, there are still gaps in my account that might usefully be filled by further research. In particular, I intend in a future project to explore the extent to which the public was receptive to this body of discourse at different times. It is hoped nevertheless that the current thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge on our collective understanding of the relationship between war and discourse in Egypt – a subject which has to date been under-researched by scholars specialising in the Arab region.
Appendices

Appendix 1: Patterning Israel’s Material Loss at Ahram’s Wartime Reporting:

_ “Dyan admits losses incurred and positions lost” (p.1., October 7, 1973)

_ “Enemy losses in Sinai: 24 Phantom and Skyhawk jets, 36 tanks and a number of armoured vehicles” (p. 1., October 9, 1973)

_ “Israel incurred heavy losses from Syrian jets” / “Pentagon concerned over rising losses by Israel” (p. 1, October 11, 1973)

_ “The Egyptian Air Force and Air Defence Forces incurred heavy enemy losses in Phantom, Mirage and Sky Hawk jets … The enemy lost on the Egyptian front alone 23 jets … Israel loses 11 dinghies near the Syrian coast” (p. 1, October 12, 1973)

_ “Israel announces that Egypt is using a new tactic in the war with the Commandos participating; An Israeli commander told journalists: Egyptian Special Forces enter Sinai from everywhere and by all means” (p. 1, October 13, 1973)
“After 12 hours of attack, our forces advanced on massive swathes of land after destroying 150 Israeli tanks” (p.1, October 15, 1973)

“[Minister of Defence] Ahmed Ismail: Our losses in comparison with the enemy’s losses are 5:1 in air battles and 1:3 in armoury battles (October 16, 1973). No details were given by Ismail on Egyptian losses beyond this general statement.

“Sadat announces that … Egyptian missiles await the order to be launched and travel deep into Israel …” / “Tel Aviv announces that Syria attacks with a huge number of tanks” (p. 1, October 17, 1973)

A London-based military report: SAM7 [used by Egyptian army] changed the nature of the war [as] American electronic equipment failed to resist them”/ “America is in race against time to compensate Israeli losses: Emergency shipments of fighters, rockets and up-to-date tanks” (p. 1, October 18, 1973)

“Resistance [fighters] bomb targets in Galilee [Israel”/Syrian army launches violent attack” (p.1, October 20, 1973)

“The Israeli commander in Sinai: the Egyptians attack ferociously with heavy fire” (p.1, October 21, 1973)

“The losses of the enemy in equipment just yesterday; 70 tanks, 40 armoured vehicles, 25 jets including 12 helicopters, …”/“The losses of the enemy until yesterday morning: … 303 launchers and fighter jets, 25 helicopters, 600 tanks, 400 armoured vehicles, 23 navy units (p.1, October 22, 1973)

“There were land and air battles between the two sides in which seven of the enemy’s jets were downed” (p. 1, October 24, 1973).

Heavy fighting with artillery and armoury in the south-western and eastern parts of the canal in response to enemy aggression” (p. 1, October 25, 1973).

“Two attempts by Israeli forces to invade the Suez city were aborted; (p. 1, October 26, 1973)

“Countering two enemy attacks against Suez … with the first leaving 11 Israeli tanks destroyed … and the other eight destroyed before Israeli forces withdrew to avoid Egyptian fire” / “Crisis explodes over Dayan because of his war position and the considerable losses” (p. 1, October 26, 1973)

“Israel complains to the UN about Egyptian military actions on the frontline and in the Red Sea, [and] Israel tells [UN Secretary General] Kurt Waldheim said that units of the Third Army {of Egypt] launched a violent attack with tanks and artillery yesterday, an Israeli petrol carrier (32, 000 tonnes, sank at the entrance of the Suez Gulf in the Red Sea” (p. 1, October 27, 1973).
“Israeli soldiers ran in all directions to be saved from Egyptian artillery which were fired from a position outside the Suez Canal on October 26’ ”/“3000 million dollars: the losses of Israel in two weeks of war” (p. 1, October 28, 1973).

“Israel complains to the UN that Egypt had launched an attack using mortars and heavy weapons in the southern part of the [Suez] canal” (p. 1, October 29, 1973).

“Tel Aviv: Egyptian commandos attack Israeli positions” (p.1, October 30, 1973)


Appendix 2: Patterning the 1973 as Divine Act at the Wartime Reporting in the Ahram:

Ahmed Ismail, the minister of war, instructed his soldiers in a statement to keep fighting. The statement included a Quranic verse literally saying ‘if you boost the victory of Allah, he will make you victorious’. In the selected verse, the word ‘victory’ was mentioned twice. He urged his soldiers to continue their defeat “of the enemy of Allah and the homeland” (p. 5, October 9, 1973).

A statement from the Public Union of Agriculture Workers began with the ‘In the name of God, the most gracious, most merciful’ and ended with the same Quranic verse mentioned by Ismail at the issue of one day earlier and which means ‘if you boost the victory of Allah, he will make you victorious’ (p. 5, October 10, 1973)

The paper published a piece of Arabic-written calligraphy in which the verse ‘our soldiers will be victorious’ was inscribed (p. 8, October 11, 1973). The same verse was repeated in an advertisement for a private furniture company (p. 6, ibid).

An op-ed by Abdel-Aziz Kamel, in which he urged readers to benefit from the ‘Crossing victory in Ramadan’, as the title reads. Kamel urged his readers to give further donations and stand up to the battle between al-Haq (truth) and al-Batel (falsehood), which are terms with religious connotations. In order to send home the meaning, he used direct quotations six times from the Quran and two times from the Hadith (the wordings of Prophet Muhmammad (p. 7, October 12, 1973). In the same issue, a car seller published in an advertisement a verse to the meaning that ‘if Allah brings to you victory, you must not be beaten’ (p.10, ibid).
Prominent religious scholar Bint al-Shatei said in an op-ed that Sadat “insightfully made the historical decision to go to war at the peak of the month of Ramadan in which the Quraan came down” (p. 5, October 13, 1973). She ended her column with a Quraanic verse showing that Allah always supports those ‘who fight for the sake of God’ against those “kafera [atheist] groups” (ibid.). Al-Shatei mentioned another verse on fighting in the Quraan.

The state-run Federation of Egyptian Industries asked Egyptian soldiers to keep on fighting, citing a Quraanic verse that says ‘victory is only from Allah,’ (p. 3, ibid)

The state-run al-Nasr company for pipe production sponsored an advertisement asking Egyptian soldiers to move towards victory, citing a Quraanic verse meaning that ‘God will bring victory to those who bring victory to Him as He owns power’ (p. 4, October 14, 1973)

A number of companies sponsored advertisements which include Quraanic verses repeated above on ‘victory guaranteed by Allah’ (p. 4 & p. 8, October 15, 1973)

Several advertisements, mostly sponsored by state-run bodies, carried Quraanic verses, including the most repetitive one such as: ‘if you boost the victory of Allah , he will make you victorious’, and also new ones in which God says ‘it is a duty to bring victory to the believers’ and that Muslims ‘should fight for the sake of Allah .. As they will be rewarded massively’ (p.2, & p.8, October 16, 1973). Al-Shatei also wrote an op-ed, just three days after the paper published another op-ed by her, in which she also repeated the same rhetoric. She cited three Quraanic verses on the same meaning of ‘fighting’ and ‘rightful’ war against ‘non-believers’ (ibid, p. 4).

Sadat made a speech in which he ended with prayers and a Quraanic verse repeatedly mentioned in previous issues [of the paper]: ‘if you boost the victory of Allah , he will make you victorious’ (p. 4, October 17, 1973). The same verse was repeated in a grocery supermarket-sponsored ad on another page of the same issue (p. 6, ibid.). A private company sponsored an advertisement which includes another verse saying that ‘Allah is able to bring victory’ and another of the meaning that those who behave ‘unfairly to others would be beaten’ (p. 8, ibid)

A private company sponsored an advertisements that included the same verse: ‘if you boost the victory of Allah , he will make you victorious’ (p. 6, October 18, 1973)

One Quraanic verse on the victory and another citation of the Bible, ‘Blessed are the people of Egypt’ are made on two different occasions; the first a privately sponsored advertisement and the other in a piece of calligraphy (p. 10, & p. 12, October 19, 1973).

Within a painting of soldiers fighting, the text comprises a Quraanic verse urging them to ‘fight for the sake of God those who are fighting you’ (p.8, October 20, 1973)
Several articles and advertisements in a single issue all cite Quraanic verses including some repeated in earlier issues and other new ones such as that saying ‘our soldiers will have the upper hand’ (p. 5). Titles of one article is ‘the month of Quraan’ in reference to the war timing coinciding with the symbolic month of Ramadan according to the Islamic calendar (p. 8).

Religious scholar al-Shatei published her third op-ed in two weeks. She repeated the same argument and even demonstrated links between Quraanic prophecies and the war reality. Two verses were mentioned including one in which God promises ‘victory’ to the believers’ (p. 5, October 22, 1973).

An Islamic calligraphy was published, promising the believers ‘victory and ultimate conquest’ (p. 8, October 23, 1973).

An Islamic calligraphy was published, ordering Egyptian soldiers to keep fighting as a godly order in a verse which means that ‘get them out from the same place they had got you out’ (p. 8, October 24, 1973). The paper also published an advertisement that brings in the same verse mentioned one issue earlier: a godly promise to Muslims of ‘victory and an approaching conquest’ (ibid, p. 3, ibid).

Another Islamic calligraphy was published, citing a Quraanic verse repeatedly mentioned in other issues since the war began. The verse promises that ‘God brings victory to those who bring victory to him as He owns power’ (p. 8, October 25, 1973).

Abdel-Aziz Kamel, the same columnist who wrote another op-ed earlier in the war, published a new op-ed sending the greetings of Eid (the end of the month of Ramadan which coincided with the war), mentioning 11 quoted verses from the Quraan (p. 7, October 16, 1973). Again, verses have the same meanings that fighting is a religious duty, a need to beat the non-believers, Muslims must end up victorious. In the same issue, there is a calligraphy of another verse that promises Muslims that ‘the hand of Allah is above their hand’ (p. 8, ibid)

On the front page, the public Ahli Bank called for buying Jihad bonds and making donations to the army. The advertisement ended with the same Quraanic verse repeated all over the war in the newspaper: ‘if you boost the victory of Allah, he will make you victorious’ (p. 1, October 27, 1973)

The governorate of Qalyoubiya’s social affairs department published an advertisement with the pictures of the governor along with those of Sadat and the Minister of Social Affairs. Above the profile pictures, one can read the verse as a quotation: ‘In the name of Allah, the most gracious most merciful: it is a duty on is to bring victory to mu’meneen [believers]’ (p. 8, October 31, 1973)
Appendix 3: Patterning the 1973 as Miracliced Act at the Wartime Reporting in the Ahram:

_ “A miracle happened”, said Nobel laureate Naguib Mahfouz. Mahfouz linked the miracle to the return of an overpowering all-inclusive spirit to one man. “At a certain point of time, Sadat stood up as representing all the spirits of [Egypt]’s dead leaders, took his decision and launched his attack. The miracle happened.” (p. 1, October 10, 1973)

_ “It is surprising that “a miracle happened at a time of no miracles”, said Ahmad Bahaeddin, one of Ahram’s most renowned columnists (p. 5, October 12, 1973)

_ “… With [the Egyptian army’s] bravery the great miracle happened … God is with us,” said Youssef Wahabi, one of the most famous actors in Egypt at the time (p. 8, October 15, 1973).

_ The wounded soldiers “made miracles” (p. 8, October 16, 1973).

_ A state-run company sponsored an advertisement that quoted Sadat as saying that ‘what happened was a miracle by any military standards’. The advertisement includes such words as “heroes” and “self-sacrifice” (p. 3, October 20, 1973)

The Egyptian man “regained his self-confidence and became the real miracle” p.3, October 22, 1973

_ The war is “a miracle of the people”, in an opinion article (p. 5, October 24, 1973). Yet the article added that 50 percent of the victory can be attributed to Sadat himself.

_ An op-ed calls on its readers to “make whatever myths that we can imagine in order to come with an understanding of what happened in the October victory”, which is “the moment when we made miracles” (p. 4, October 25, 1973. Make sure of the page)

_ The war still lives on as a “miracle” (p.6, October 6, 1978)

_ The war is a “miraculous” act (p. 6, October 6, 1979), as it represents the “peak in the history of the Arabs” (p. 1, ibid) and “a testament to Egyptian ingenuity” (ibid.)

Appendix 4: Patterning Sadat as War Personified in Mubarak’s Speeches Quoted in the Ahram:

_ “Greetings to the loyal son of Egypt Anwar Sadat who courageously took part in war and peace” (p. 5, October 6, 1993)
“Greetings to the maker of this decision, the hero of war and peace, the martyr of Egypt.” (p. 3, October 6, 1994)

“Greetings to the decision maker Anwar Sadat who took up this enormous historic responsibility and …” (p. 3, October 6, 1995)

“The late president Anwar Sadat took the war decision … greetings to the hero of war” (p. 5, October 6, 1988)

“Greetings to the martyr of Egypt …[and] his initiative which set out peace as the goal of war …” (p. 3, October 6, 1997)

“Greetings to the maker of war decision and maker of peace” (p. 5, October 6, 1999)

“Greetings to …the hero of war and peace/ The war decision which was taken by Egypt’s obedient son…. “ (p. 7, October 6, 2000)

“Greetings to … Sadat who couragiously broke the no war no peace status and set peace as the goal of war” (p. 5, October 6, 2003)

“Greetings to the obedient son of Egypt late President Anwar Sadat who courgously challenged the no war no peace status and set out peace as the goal of war.” (p. 3, October 6, 2004)

“Greetings to Sadat … who took the war decision courageously and while confident of Allah, his people and his armed forces and opened by the victory of October the road for peace.” (p. 3, October 6, 2006)

“Greetings to …Sadat who took the war decision confident of Allah, his people and his armed forces. He restored to Egypt land, and dignity, and opened the way for peace” (p. 3, October 6, 2007)

“Greetings to the soul of President Sadat.. He took the war decision courageously, confident of Allah, his people and armed forces… so he realised victory and became the hero of war and peace” (p. 3, October 6, 2008)

“Greetings to the soul of Presidnet Sadat who took the war decision confident of Allah, his people and his armed forces, and so he opened with the October victory the way for peace” (p. 3, October 6, 2009)
“Greetings to Sadat... who imposed with victory a new reality and opened the road for peace” (p. 5, October 6, 2010)

Appendix 5: Patterning the 1973 as Miraciled Act in Mubarak’s Speeches:

_ The war is “the greatest military victory of our modern history” as it “created a new world” (p. 1, October 6, 1983). The world after the 1973 War, he said in the message addressing the army, “is different from the world before 1973 because the new facts introduced by the war and the conceptualisations overturned by your glorious victory” (ibid.)

_ The “heroes carried out the miracle as they crossed [the Suez Canal] with minimum damage” and “went through the hardest barriers”, only to make “the greatest historic victory” (p. 5, October 6, 1988). There is another report in which this is the beginning: “On October 6, we remember this legendary great epic made by the people of Egypt” (ibid, p. 6). Salah Montasser, a columnist said that Egyptian armed forces also “broke the world record by crossing the greatest defence barrier Bar-Lev in 18 hours” (ibid, p.7)

“The miraculous performance” of the army “restored confidence to the Arab self and corrected the calculations of all” (p. 3, October 6, 1993).

_ This is “the greatest and most glorious day in Egypt’s history” (p. 3, October 6, 1994). In the following year, Mubarak said the war “corrected the course of history” (p. 3, October 6, 1995).

_ The army demonstrated a “miraculous” performance which “corrected the course of history” (p. 1 & p.5, October 6, 1997)

_ The armed forces “carried out a “miraculous” effort to make best use of the weapons available to them”/This is “the greatest glory of the Egyptian and Arab peoples” (p. 3, October 6, 1998)

_ This is a “magnificent military achievement which has changed the balance, concepts and positions; and whose impact went beyond the limits of reality and the present to the depths of the future” (p. 5, October 6, 1999)
The October War “broke down the theory of realising security through occupation” (p. 1, October 6, 2002)

“On this occasion, we should be inspired by the spirit of challenge, patience and bravery which made the miracle of the crossing” (p. 5, October 6, 2003)

The army “regained land and dignity to us in a magnificent epic” …as the victory “because a lighthouse in our modern history” (p. 3, October 6, 2004)

“The epic of October …proved the resilience of the Egyptian people and their ability to stand up and create miracles” (p. 3, October 6, 2007)

“The anniversary of the crossing and victory will remain a turning point in modern history” (p. 3, October 6, 2007)

“The epic of victory is evidence of the ability of our people to Qahr al-Mustaheel [breaking the impossible]” (p. 3, October 6, 2008)

The October War will remain a symbol of Egypt’s greatness and the solidness of its will” (p. 3, October 6, 2009)

The October War is a “historic turning point and a symbol of Egypt’s loftiness and highness” (p. 1, October 6, 2010)

Appendix 6: Patterning the 1973 as Miraclised Act by Reporters, Editors and Writers in the Ahram During the Era of Mubarak/Patterning the 1973 War as Part of Curricula in International Academic and Military Schools:

On the first anniversary since Mubarak came to power, the editorial said the war led to “Qahr al-Mustaheel (breaking the impossible)” and to a “great restoration” (p. 7, October 6, 1982). The headline of a one report reads: “the miracle of the Egyptian airforce in the October War under the command of Hosni Mubarak” (ibid, p. 13). In the column of editor in chief Nafie, these are some of the sentences used: This is the “most dangerous decision ever taken by an Egyptian president in modern history”; the war is still being studied in “the greatest political centres and military academies” (ibid.).
One year later, a story was published with the headline the “miracle of wars” (p. 8, October 6, 1983). The paper’s editorial likened the October victory to an “earthquake” (ibid, p. 9). Nafie in his new front page column hailed the “epic of heroism and the legend of crossing” during the war (ibid, p. 1).

One year after, the editorial said that the “heroism of the Egyptian military made the war being taught in military research academies as a unique war in its conditions, performance, operations and heroisms” (p. 1, October 6, 1984).

One year later, the paper published a story highlighting how Egypt “broke a military impossibility” in the war (p. 3, October 6, 1985).

One year later, Morsy Attalah, the war correspondent, indicated how the the Egyptians “crossed the impossible” and performed an “epic of courage and sacrifice (p. 5, October 6, 1986). Attalah wrote:

> We cannot look at the October War as a military action whose impact is limited to the battlefield. Indeed, it is a overall human action whose consequences extended to all facets of life in Egypt. These consequences would be recognized for thousands of years into the future within a strongly flowing current getting stronger every day and sweeping all negative elements in front of it (ibid, p. 1)

One year later, Mohamed Abdel-Moneim wrote a column in which said the war day would be remembered as a “historic achievement” “for millions of years” (p. 7, October 6, 1987).

One year later, the editorial called the war “the long Egyptian epic of struggle” (p. 7, October 6, 1988)

One year later, Nafie’s column was headlined: “the other side… the miracle of October” (p. 1, October 6, 1989). The miracles of the war were mentioned in a story describing heroic acts by Egyptian soliders during the war. One soldier, Abdel-Atti, “broke the record and destroyed 26 tanks” (ibid, p.5). He was named the “hunter of tanks” and given an award by the Minister of Defence as a picture in the newspaper shows (ibid.).

One year later, October is a “turning point between two histories, a history of humiliation and another of honour and prosperity” (p. 7, October 6, 1990)
The following year, the paper’s columnist Ahmed Bahgat said Sadat, who led the war, was a “political and human genius” as he managed to “deceive the Israelis” (p. 2, October 6, 1991). The editorial of Ahram said that the war witnessed a “new birth of the Egyptian character” (p. 7, October 6, 1991).

The following year, the editorial said that the war cited that Egypt introduced new war tactics for the first time ever in history such as using water pipes to break down the Bar-Lev Line (p. 9, October 6, 1992). The event was an “inspiration for all of the free people of the world” (ibid).

The following year, the paper sent “greetings to the loyal Egyptian people in one of its most glorious days, and to its Armed Forces in the anniversary of its great victory, and to every one who took part in planning or fighting in this epic” (p. 1, October 6, 1993).

The following year, Morsy Attalah said that the war led “the world’s institutes teaching military science to reconsider many of the theories and beliefs which had existed for a long time as solid facts” (p. 9, October 6, 1994).

The following year, the editorial said that the war “overturned the balance in the region and made Arabs able to talk about peace from a perspective of equality not surrender …” (p. 3, October 6, 1995).

The following year, Mustafa Bahgat Badawi wrote a column in the Ahram said that the six hours of crossing the Canal were a “a blessing and miracle from God” (p. 11, October 6, 1996).

The following year, columnist Hussein al-Sha’er said that the war proved the Egyptian soldier “is an example of heroism and bravery and sacrifice, and that he is the best soldier in the globe indeed” (p. 11, October 6, 1998).

The following year, the same columnist, Hussein El-Sha’er, said the war victory came as the Egyptian soldier had a “invincible will” (p. 11, October 6, 1999); columnist Salah Montasser said the “epic of October did not settle in the museum of history and time, as it still sheds light on our future direction” (ibid.).

Two years later, the editorial was entitled: “lines from the epic of victory” (p. 11, October 6, 2001).
Two years later, the editorial was entitled: “the epic of October”, arguing the war introduced a “new military strategy now taught in many of the world’s universities” (p. 11, October 6, 2003).

Two years later, Morsy Attalah called these achievements of the army in the first hours of the war “beyond description .. beyond our dreams and ambitions” (p. 11, October 6, 2005)

One year later, Abdu Mubasher wrote one page in which he described the Egyptian plan for the war as “ingenious” (p. 30, October 6, 2006)

One year later, Morsy Attalah said that the “epic of October 6 made the Egyptian negotiator ready to leave talks and return to the battlefield at any moment” (p. 6, October 6, 2007).

At the same issue, the paper published a no-bylines story of one of the battles during the war in which one soldier whose ammunition ran out faced a fully armed tank. The title of the story reads “a memorable legend in the name of the Tekrit battle… How an Israel tank surrendered to an armless Egyptian soldier?” This is how the story reads:

What reason can tell us is that the tank would make a certain victory. It is a full tank supplied with full weaponry and ammunition against an isolated soldier who had no weapons at all. What happened was different. The soldier went out, shouting Allahu Akbar before moving towards the tank and suddenly all those inside the tank went out and surrendered. Indeed this had happened. (ibid, p. 7)

On the following year, the paper’s editorial said that the war is evidence of the “the Egyptian ingeniousness” and bravery in battlefield (p. 11, October 6, 2008)

On the following year, the editorial said the Egyptian soldiers carried out the “epic of crossing” and that the anniversary would remain “indelible in the conscience of the Egyptian people, and always present in this [Egyptian] people’s imagination” (p. 11, October 6, 2009). Salah Monatsser also named his column the “Egyptian ingeniousness” and called the October 6 a “new birth” for the Egyptians (ibid)

One year later, the editorial of Ahram went far in miraculizing the war to describe it in these words:
.... [In] the October War victories, the Egyptian fighter had been able to break through the hurdles, remove the shame of defeat and make the first military victory on the Israeli enemy on October 6, 1973... It has been 37 years since this greatest victory in the world military history, as this record is written in words of light by the Egyptian fighter’s spirit and precious blood which had planted the sinai sands... The October 1973 War is a real epic ... (p. 11, October 6, 2010).

Appendix 7: Patterning the 1973 War as Maker of the ‘October Spirit’:

_Ahram_ said in an editorial that there is “a dire need to establish the spirit of October and revitalise its interaction in ourselves” (p. 7, October 6, 1982). The editorial warned against “vicious attempts and sabotage operations to destroy the spirit of October” (ibid.)

One year later, the editor, Ibrahim Nafie, said “we need to be armed with the spirit of October which truly symbolised the national spirit of the Arab nation” (p. 1, October 6, 1983). He also repeated the “need for the spirit of October to restore other lands occupied by Israel” (ibid). Again, Nafie highlighted that Mubarak “reaffirming this spirit at every platform during his tours of the US and Europe” (ibid.) Another report was published whose title is “the culture and arts ... and the spirit of October” (ibid, p. 13). Columnist Ismail al-Baqari said that the “spiriti of Crossing marked the sports victories as well as military ones” (ibid, p. 12).

One year later, Ahram said that its correspondent in the presidency understood that the speech of Mubarak would focus on the achievements made “on the basis of the October spirit” (p. 1, October 6, 1984). In the same issue, a journalist of _Ahram_ interviewed three war commanders who are now senior officials (ibid, p. 3). Remarkably, the three described how far they are ‘inspired’ by the ‘spirit of October’. The first, the minister of housing Mohsen Sediqi, said ‘on the basis of the October spirit I attempt to solve the housing problem”. The second, Bakir Mohamed Bakir the governor of Suez, said that ‘the spirit of October has never been so needed, so people should be mobilised as the spirit of October is based on sacrifice for raising the Egyptian flag’. The third, the head of the Transport Agency Ali Said, said that “we are surrounded by the spirit of the great October” (ibid.).

One year later, _Ahram_ said that Mubarak would give a speech on the war anniversary in which the president would call for “embracing the spirit of October which made the great
victory” (p. 1, October 6, 1985). The paper published a column for Mohamed Basha, the former war correspondent, in which he said:

I do hope that the October spirit would be our way of life as is the spirit of the courageous decision, the spirit of scientific planning, the spirit of challenge by blood, sweat and morals, the spirit of achievement and winning against all odds (ibid, p. 7).

Two years later, Ahram said in its editorial that Sadat is the “real source of the new Egyptian spirit” (p. 7, October 6, 1987). The editorial added that “Mubarak depended on this spirit in his first term in office” (ibid.).

One year later, Ahram said in the editorial that Egypt restored Taba, the last area occupied by Israel, after a battle “in which Egypt was committed to the same spirit of the October War victory”, and that “those who feared the disappearance of this spirit restored their belief in its existence” (p. 7, October 6, 1988). Naguib Mahfouz said on the same page that the October 6 is a very significant day in “our spiritual history” (ibid.).

One year later, the headline of Ahram’s editorial “the spirit of October in renewal” (p. 7, October 6, 1989)

One year later, the editorial of Ahram hailed the “October the spirit, the purity, the immortality and the justice” (p. 7, October 6, 1990)

One year later, Ahram’s editorial said that the October War gave an impetus to the “Egyptian spirit” (p. 7, October 6, 1991).

One year later, the paper reported that the state-run Egyptian Centre for Children Culture “sent a message to the children of Egypt asking them to be inspired by the spirit of October” (p. 15, October 6, 1992). Economic editor Abdel-Rahman Aql wrote that “the spirit of October” emerged after crossing the Bar-Lev and led to many achievements by Mubarak (p. 11, October 6, 1992).

One year later, the paper headlined one paragraph of the speech of Mubarak: ‘The spirit of October runs through the conscience of Egypt’. Mubarak added that this spirit “gave Egypt a confident belief that it is too strong to be targeted by any one” (p. 5, October 6, 1993).
One year later, the paper quoted Mubarak as saying in a speech that the October War anniversary “mark the return of the spirit”. (p. 3, October 6, 1994) Morsy Attalah on another page called it the “return of conscience” (ibid, p. 9).

One year later, Mubarak’s aid that the “spirit of October still runs in the conscience of every Egyptian, making him confident of the ability to realise our objectives” (p. 3, October 6, 1995). Aql wrote that the “spirit of October augmented the course of economic reform in the 1990s” (ibid, p. 6).

One year later, El-Sayyed Amin Shalaby said in an op-ed that the October War “represents a resurgence of spirit and Egyptian national will” (p. 6, October 1996). Aql hailed in his column “Mubarak’s announcement after he came to power, and on basis of the spirit of October, the continuation of the economic opening policy” (ibid, p. 14).

One year later, the paper’s headlines for the front page story was “greetings to the spirit of Anwar Sadat” (p. 1, October 6, 1997).

One year later, the paper quoted Mubarak as saying: the “spirit of October will remain interacting with our reality … the spirit of immortalised October spirit a source and a torch which is always lit.. the spirit of October will remain a piece of blessed fire always rekindling our unity as our strength” (p. 3, October 6, 1998). A report noted that the economic growth in Egypt is “the result of the spirit of victory” in the war (ibid, p. 14).

One year later, columnist Hussein El-Shair said that “the spirit of the crossing is immanent (internalised) in us” (p. 11, October 6, 1999). Aql, another columnist, said that the state is introducing new systems that “cope with the spirit of October” (p. 15, October 6, 1999). Aql made another mention of the “spirit of October which made best use of the potential of the Egyptians” in order to sort out their problems (ibid.)

One year later, columnist Ahmed Bahgat mentioned the “dominant spirit of perseverance” in the Egyptian army (p. 2, October 6, 2000). There is another report whose title is “how do we instill the spirit of October in our children?” (ibid, p. 6, supplement)

Two years later, Salah Montasser, a columnist in the Ahram, hailed the “1973 spirit” (p. 11, October 6, 2002). In the same issue, the paper reported that the Opera House is to host a musical ceremony in which songs “the spirit of October and the spirit of victory” would be performed (ibid, p. 32).
One year later, Mubarak was quoted as saying that Egyptians should be inspired by the spirit of challenge, patience and courage which made the miracle of crossing” (p. 5, October 6, 2003). Aql said that Mubarak came to power “with the same spirit of October” (ibid, p. 17).

One year later, a column was published by Mohamed Magdy Morgan was entitled “the spirit of October and the government of the people” (p. 10, October 6, 2004). The editorial of Ahram reads that “the anniversary of the October War is till running in the spirit and conscience of every Egyptian”. The editorial said that the “with the same spirit Egypt went through the battle of reconstruction” and that this “spirit of giving and sacrifice would remain forever in the blood of the Egyptians in order to cross the battle of development and progress.” (ibid, p. 11.)

One year later, the editor in chief, Osama Saraya, said the “spirit of October will remain inspiring for the Egyptians and the Arabs” (p. 1, October 6, 2005)

One year later, Ahram published a report on a seminar held by a cabinet minister “on the new spirit of October which allowed the Egyptians to win the 1973 War”. (p. 38, October 6, 2006). The paper quoted Mubarak as sending “greetings to the spirit of Sadat who opened with victory the door for peace”, and “greetings to the spirit of those killed in the war who sacrificed their spirits for Egypt to restore both land and dignity” (ibid, p. 1)

The editorial of Ahram was entitled “the necessity to bring back the spirit of October” (p. 11, October 6, 2007). The editorial called for “restoring this spirit in all facets of our life” (ibid.)

One year later, the paper’s headline for one of the front page stories is “In a speech to to the Armed Forces magazine [Mubarak says]: We need the spirit of October to stand up to the challenges of today and tomorrow” (p. 1, October 6, 2008). In the interview itself, Mubarak said that “we should all know that the spirit of October pushed forward a new spirit in the body of the nation . . . This spirit would remain a Ma’een (a pot of water) that never ran out” (ibid, p. 4)

One year later, the paper’s editor in chief said that “we need the spirit of October in every position to face down our problems and challenges” (p. 3, October 3, 2009). The title of his column is “October a permanent force in the conscience of the Egyptians” (ibid.). A caricature of a man carrying a board in which “education and health!” were written. The man said “I hope that October ‘spirit’ would be here [in these fields as well]” (ibid, p. 2).
_ One year later, the paper quoted Mubarak in his speech as hailing “the spirit of Sadat who was inspired on the war decision because of Egypt’s solidness and determination of its people” (p. 5, October 6, 2010). The editorial sent “greetings to all martyrs who sacrificed their soul for Egypt” (ibid, p. 11).

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