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The Praxis School's Marxist Humanism and Mihailo Marković's Theory of Communication

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Abstract

Mihailo Marković (1923-2010) was one of the leading members of the Yugoslav Praxis Group. Among other topics, he worked on the theory of communication and dialectical meaning, which makes his approach relevant for a contemporary critical theory of communication. This paper asks: How did Mihailo Marković conceive of communication? Marković turned towards Serbian nationalism and became the Vice-President of the Serbian Socialist Party. Given that nationalism is a particular form of ideological communication, an ideological anti-praxis that communicates the principle of nationhood, a critical theory of communication also needs to engage with aspects of ideology and nationalism. This paper therefore also asks whether there is a nationalist potential in Marković's theory in particular or even in Marxist humanism in general.

For providing answers to these questions, the article revisits Yugoslav praxis philosophy, the concepts of praxis, communication, ideology and nationalism. It shows the importance of a full humanism and the pitfalls of truncated humanism in critical theory in general and the critical theory of communication in particular. Taking into account complete humanism, the paper introduces the concept of praxis communication.

Keywords: praxis, praxis philosophy, Yugoslavia, Praxis School, Praxis Group, Mihailo Marković, critical theory of communication, Marxist theory, humanism, nationalism, ideology, praxis communication

1. Introduction

The Praxis Group was a community of scholars in Yugoslavia. It was predominantly based at the University of Zagreb and the University of Belgrade. The founders included Gajo Petrović, Milan Kangrgra (both based in Zagreb) and Mihailo Marković (based in Belgrade). The Group edited the Praxis journal from 1964 until 1974. The international edition was published from 1965 until 1973. Between 1963 and 1974, the group also organised the annual Korčula Summer School. Having supported student protests in 1968, members of the group came under increased criticism and were expelled from the Communist Party (Bogdanović 2015). In 1975, eight of them (the Belgrade Eight) were suspended from their jobs at the University of Belgrade’s Faculty of Philosophy (ibid.). It became impossible to continue organising the journal and the summer school. In 1981, the group founded the journal Praxis International that existed until 1993.
Mihailo Marković (1923-2010) was the Group’s internationally most active and visible member. This for example becomes evident when one looks at the biographies and bibliographies of group members published in the 1979 volume Praxis: Yugoslav Essays in the Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences (Marković and Petrović 1979, 389-398) that collected English translations of the Praxis journal’s key articles. The bibliographies indicate that Marković was the only member who had in 1979 published two monographs in English: From Affluence to Praxis (Marković 1974a) and The Contemporary Marx (Marković 1974b). The only other Praxis Group-monographs that had at that time been published in English were Svetozar Stojanović’s (1973) Between Ideals and Reality: Critique of Socialism and its Future and Gajo Petrović’s (1967) Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century. Marković’s (1984) book Dialectical Theory of Meaning (first published in Serbo-Croatian in 1961) is explicitly dedicated to the analysis of the mental, symbolic, linguistic, communicative realm, which makes his work particularly interesting for engagement when one is interested in foundations of a critical theory of communication. This paper therefore asks: How did Mihailo Marković conceive of communication?

Ideology is a particular type of communication. Marković became in the 1980s a spokesperson for Serbian nationalism. From 1990-1992, he was the Vice-President of Slobodan Milošević’s Serbian Socialist Party (SPS). So one can observe a peculiar contradiction of internationalism and nationalism. When dealing with communication in Marković’s works, we therefore have to inevitably also ask questions about ideology and nationalism. This paper proceeds by engaging with the concepts of praxis (section 2), communication (section 3), ideology (section 4), and nationalism (section 5). Section 6 draws general conclusions.

2. Praxis

Marković (1974a, 63) discerns between three types of activity: work, alienated labour and praxis. Work is general production, whereas labour is an alienated form of work, in which humans do not control the conditions and results of their activities. In another work, he adds the term practice: Practice is “any Subject’s activity of changing and object” (Marković 1979, xxviii). Practice can be alienated. Praxis in contrast is “a specifically human activity” that is “characterized by self-determination, i.e., by a conscious purposeful commitment to practically realize one specific, freely chosen possibility among a set of alternatives” (Marković 1979, xxxi). Praxis is “free creative activity” that realizes “specific potential faculties and satisfies the needs of other human individuals” (xxviii). “Work becomes praxis only when it is freely chosen and provides an opportunity for individual self-expression and self-fulfillment” (xxix). Praxis is “a free human activity with definite esthetic qualities, in which man objectifies all his potential powers, affirms himself as a personality, and satisfies the needs of another person” (1974a, 53). It “enriches the lives of others and indirectly becomes part of them” and shows “direct concern for another person’s needs” (65). Praxis “establishes valuable and warm links with other human beings” (65).
Marković’s concept of praxis is not consistent. In *Dialectical Theory of Meaning* (Marković 1984), he uses praxis and practice synonymously, i.e. he does not give any political meaning to the praxis concept. “Praxis is *subjective-objective*” (xiv). Practice is “activity by means of which people transform their nature and social environment in order to improve their living conditions” (38), it is human subjects’ “purposeful creation of inorganic and organic objects and the social conditions of human life” (39). Praxis, or what he also calls practice or practical interaction, has for Marković two dimensions: the interaction with nature, i.e. the “utilization of natural resources for human purposes, growing production”, and social interaction, in which “we become aware of ‘other minds’” (xvi). It here already becomes evident that there is a certain dualism inherent in Marković’s approach that separates the physical and natural world from the mental and communicative world. Praxis is a uniting concept, but the two forms of praxis are left separate.

Are there advantages of discerning between practice and praxis? In Marxist theory, the distinction goes back to Marx’s *Theses on Feuerbach*: “#3 […] The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary praxis. […] #8 All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human praxis and in the comprehension of this praxis” (Marx 1845, 3, 5). It becomes clear that Marx sees human life as practical in the sense that humans change the world in and through their practices. When he speaks of praxis, he means a particular form of practice, namely political practice that aims at creating a humane society, understands the needs of such a society, and deconstructs ideologies that mystify domination. For Gramsci (1971), the philosophy of praxis is critical because it criticises common sense (330). Praxis aims at “absolute humanism” (417). Both Marx and Gramsci show that praxis is the critical and political dimension of theory and human activity. By using praxis in parts of his works as synonymous with practice, Marković depoliticises social theory.

In contrast to Marković, Gajo Petrović, who was another important member of the Praxis Group, argues in his book *Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century* for an axiological-political concept of praxis: “‘Man is praxis means’ man in society, freedom, history and future” (23). “There is no praxis without freedom, and there is no free Being that is not praxis” (118). Praxis aims at a “free community of free personalities” (133). Praxis is the “authentic ‘mode’ of Being that reveals the true meaning of Being”, it is the “developed Essence of Being” (189).

Most of Yugoslav praxis philosophy took the Marxian understanding of praxis serious and focused on the political goal of a self-managed society and economy. In Yugoslavia, Tito’s 1948 break with Stalin created foundations for such a form of democratic socialism. “Yugoslavia today is the only country in the world that is attempting to create and apply an integrated system of workers' self-management” (Supek 1975, 3). Workers’ self-management in

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1 In the English translation of the 3rd and 8th Feuerbach-theses, the term “practice” instead of the term “praxis” was used. I have in the quotation changed in all three
Yugoslavia was “the first successful implementation of an integrated system of workers’ self-management” (Horvat 1975a, 36-37). The Praxis Group analysed Yugoslavia self-management and showed its potentials, problems and limits. On the ethico-political level, human praxis demands self-management. According to Rudi Supek (1971/1979, 253), self-management means that “man as the producer has the right to make decisions about the results of his work, that the state is not entitled to appropriate and dispose of the work surplus, that the right to manage an enterprise is shared by all workers and employees who work in it” (Supek 1971/1979, 253).

Yugoslav self-management’s basic idea was that all workers formed a general assembly and elected a workers’ council that in turn elected a management committee: “All workers and employees of a firm constitute the work collective [radni kolektiv]. The collective elects a workers’ council [radnički savet] by secret ballot. The council has 15 to 120 members elected originally for one year and recently for a two-year period. The council is a policy-making body and meets at intervals of one to two months. The council elects a managing board [upravni odbor] as its executive organ; the board has 3 to 11 members, three-quarters of whom must be production workers. The director is the chief executive and is an ex officio member of the managing board” (Horvat 1975b, 165).

The Praxis Group argues that self-management as a form of participatory democracy needs to be used at multiple levels of society. “Socialist self-government should be constructed as an integral social system. This means, first, that it must embrace all parts of society, and second, that in addition to the self government of individual elements, it must be seen as the self-government of society as a whole. This assumes the governance of self-governing elements into a complete self-governing society” (Stojanović 1975, 467). One of the Group’s criticisms was that Yugoslavia was not a self-governing, self-managing society, but limited self-managing to the level of economic organisations: A “vivid dualism exists in practice – self-managing groups in the base and a rather strong statist structure above them” (Stojanović 1975, 469). Another problem was that banks and trade organisations took on a monopolistic role that they used in order to control self-managed companies and “to illegally draw off profits from the producing organizations” (Supek 1971/1979, 258). There was also a “middle class liberalism” (257) that that tried to foster entrepreneurialism and that atomised society into competing individuals. The results were “uneven compensation for the same work” and that unions “were forbidden to fight for a uniform standard” by which laborers were compensated” (259). The workers’ council elected the company-director from candidates nominated in public competition by a selection committee that to a majority consisted of representatives of the commune (Horvat 1975b, 166). Workers often considered the director as “a representative of ‘alien’ interests in the firm” (166).

Yugoslav self-management certainly created its own contradictions that had to do with the contradictory relation between state power and workers’ power in transitional society, but it is clear that it was a very important attempt to foster
democracy in the economy.

Marxist humanism is based on Marx’s insight that in approaching a problem, humans need to “grasp the root of the matter. But for man the root is man himself”, “man is the highest being for man” (Marx 1844a, 182). So it is convinced that all humans deserve a good life and the good life for all is an important political goal worth struggling for. Therefore Marx formulated the “categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being” (182). The Praxis Group was guided by Marx’s humanism and so assumed that “all relationships in which man is a humbled, oppressed, abandoned and despised being should be destroyed” (Vranicki 1972/1979, 234). For Stalin, humans and their practices, praxis and knowledge were in contrast mere reflections of the objective world (ibid.).

The Praxis Group was an important representative of Marxist humanism. But what are the most important assumptions of Marxist and socialist humanism in general? Erich Fromm (1965) edited a collection on Socialist Humanism that presented 36 chapters written by Marxist humanist scholars. Taken together, the volume outlines Marxist humanism’s basic assumptions:

**Ontology:**
- Society is grounded in human practice and social production.
- Only humans themselves can achieve a humane society by their practical self-activity in social struggles. Praxis is a key aspect of achieving a humane society.
- Capitalism, class and domination constitute a form of human alienation that constitutes a difference between how social life is and how it could potentially be.

**Epistemology:**
- Marx’s early writings, especially the Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts, are important intellectual foundations of Marxist humanism.
- There is no epistemological break in Marx’s works that led him away from humanism. Marx’s later works are guided by the general principles formulated in his early works.
- Humanism requires an open form of theory, dialectic and praxis. Orthodoxies such as Stalinism turn socialism into a dogmatic, deterministic, mechanistic, reductionist and quasi-religious practice.

**Axiology:**
- Given society’s grounding in human praxis and social production, humans should be collectively in control of the conditions and results of human activity.
- Democratic socialism is the society adequate to humans. It is not limited to politics, but the collective self-management of the economy and society.
- Democratic socialism is the foundation for the full realisation of humans’ and society’s potentials.

Based on the analysis of practice and praxis, we can next have a look at the concept of communication.

**3. Communication**
Communication is for Marković besides sense development, reason, imagination, creativity, harmonisation of interests and aspirations, evaluative choice among alternative possibilities, and self-consciousness a fundamental human capacity (1974a, 13-14). Communication involves language and the "ability to understand the thoughts, feelings, desires, and motives of other persons from other social groups, nations, classes, races, religions, and cultures" (13). Language plays a key role in communication: Language "is an activity (energeia) which is a medium used by people to communicate and coordinate their praxis" (1984, 262), it is the "activity of speaking and writing, i.e. a system of operations with signs" (320). Language is one of the human means of communication that are used as means for the production of meanings and social relations. Raymond Williams (2005, 50-63) therefore speaks of means of communication as means of production.

Marković in his analysis of communication again mixes up praxis and practice. Communication is certainly a human practice that in ethical and political action can turn into praxis communication. All praxis communication is communicative practice, but not all communicative practices are praxis communication. The problem of Habermas’ (1984) theory of communication is as in Marković’s terminology the mix-up of the ethico-political and the ontological level of communication (for a critique of Habermas, see Fuchs 2016, chapter 6). Communicative action for Habermas (1984, 285) aims at transcending "egocentric calculations of success", but at "reaching understanding". Communication is not naturally fair and does not naturally and automatically stand above or outside of structures of domination. Communication is the basic human practice of creating and reproducing social relations through symbol-use, which implies that it is used both in domination and emancipation from domination. That humans make meaning of each other in communication does not include and automatically imply that they understand and agree with each other. The transformation of communicative practices into praxis communication is a political task of social struggles that is not automatically given. Praxis communication is communication that acts within democratic-socialist structures or aims at establishing such structures and a society built on them.

In Dialectical Theory of Meaning, Marković (1984, 39) defines communication as one of six forms or elements of practice. The others are work/material production, co-operation, experience, evaluation, and thought/intellectual activity. "Communication is that specific form of practice, which consist in operations with signs, by means of which people come to mutual understanding and stimulate one another to engage in a particular type of action" (39). This distinction’s problem is that it separates work and communication. Work is seen as material production and “purposeful creation” (39). The implication is that communication is neither material nor purposeful. But communication’s purpose is that humans make meaning of each other and the world. It is a purposeful activity. And in cultural and communicative work, which is a form of work that has become widespread, humans create use-values that offer opportunities for making meanings to others. Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (1983) and Raymond Williams (1977) therefore stress that
communication and work should not be separated, but be seen as material practices (see Fuchs 2016, chapter 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objects</th>
<th>Mental objects</th>
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<td>Physical objects</td>
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Table 1: Marković’s (1984, 72) typology of objects

Marković (1984) draws a strict separation between the material and the mental world (see table 1). He sees the realm of the material as the world of physical objects that are either created by nature or by humans in society. Individual ideas or collective mental phenomena, “including common experiences, feelings, ideas, value judgements, interpretations of symbols, […] ‘class consciousness’, […] public opinion” (70) are in contrast for him mental and “nonmaterial” (71). Matter “consists of all objects that exist in space and time” (70). Mental is a “synonym of ‘psychic’” (73). The problem of such an approach is that it draws a crude distinction between base and superstructure that renders the realm of culture and communication secondary and of minor importance. The problem is not just that one thereby cannot explain the importance of communicative and cultural work, but also that the result is a philosophical idealism that postulates two substances of the world (matter and mind) and cannot answer the question of how the world is at the foundational level grounded. Mental processes are not, as Marković argues, non-spatial and non-temporal: Individual ideas and values are stored in the human brain for a particular period of time (until an individual dies, forgets them or gives them up). And collective ideas have space-time because a particular community shares them during specific time periods. A community of humans has certain structures of feeling, it shares particular collective “meanings and values which are lived in works and relationships” (Williams 1961/2011, 337).

Now you can ask: What about dreams, the characters in a novel, fantasies, ideologies, lies, myths, or the idea of God? Are these not ideas that do not have a material correlate and are therefore “immaterial”? No, like all ideas, these ideas are material because particular humans or groups of humans live and express them. But we can say that certain ideas are material, but not real. They are unreal. Any idea has a relation to an object. In the case discussed here, the object is imagined and does not exist in the world.

For Hegel (1830), reality is being-there (Dasein), “being with a determinacy” that is immediate and is something with quality (§90). Reality is not just “inner and subjective”, but has “moved out into being-there” (addition to §90). So reality is an aspect of qualitative being (Sein). Reality that does not have a referent in reality external to the human is unreal being. For Hegel, actuality (Wirklichkeit) is the unity of essence and existence (§142). Actuality is reasonable being.

<168:> A house that I build is real just like the thoughts I have about it. Thoughts about how a house I want to build should look like are unreal being
that is however potential reality. A dream about a house built out of chocolate on the imaginary chocolate planet Chocolate Moon is material being, but it is unreal and impossible and therefore no potential reality. It is imaginary being. What are the implications of these distinctions for the notion of communication? Communication is a material and real process that creates and maintains social reality by offering in symbolic forms interpretations about real and unreal being, potential and imaginary being to other humans, who based on it produce particular meanings of the (real, unreal, potential, imaginary) world. Communicative practices turn into praxis communication when they are oriented not just on how society is or can be, but on how it can be made an actual society.

A form of communication that invents imaginary existence and proclaims that the imaginary is actuality in order to defend and legitimate domination is termed ideology. Ideology is an important dimension of critical communication theory.

4. Ideology

Ideology is one of the most difficult concepts in cultural theory because there are multiple understandings and uses of it.

Marković writes that ideology can on the one hand be understood as “any conceptualization of values, needs and interests, any theory about an accepted ideal, any choice of a general value orientation, any project of a future for which we are ready to engage, and consequently, a critical attitude toward existing social realities” (1974a, 53). He on the other hand contrasts this understanding with the definition of ideology as the expression and disguise of “particular group interests […] in the form of indicative statements, creating the impression that they refer to obvious facts, and thus demand acceptance as indubitable truths” (1974a, 54). In the book From Affluence to Praxis, Marković (1974a) says Marx’s theory is an ideology in the first sense and anti-ideological in the second sense, but he leaves open his own understanding of ideology.

In the article Science and Ideology, Marković (1974b, 42-80) argues that both understandings of ideology can be found in Marx’s works: Marx and Engels in the German Ideology understand ideology as “inadequate, twisted, mystified” consciousness (44), whereas Marx in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy speaks of the legal, political, philosophical, religious, aesthetic and philosophic realms as ideological forms that constitute “the superstructure of an historical epoch” (61). Marković <169:> clarifies that he prefers the general definition because the other one does not allow speaking of the “revolutionary ideology of the proletariat” (73). He therefore defines ideology as “the ensemble of ideas and theories with which a class expresses its interests, its aims and the norms of its activity” (74).

Marković’s justification for the superiority of the general ideology concept is confused. The proletariat’s consciousness is neither automatically unitary nor progressive, as the contemporary tendency of blue-collar workers’ support for
far-right parties shows. It is possible that we simply speak of a “revolutionary worldview”, which does not require the notion of ideology. Also not all revolutions are politically progressive, so there can be revolutionary worldviews that are ideological, in which case we can speak of a “revolutionary ideology”. The problem is that the general concept of ideology is ethically and politically relativist. If praxis is progressive social action, then situating the consciousness associated with it on the same level as fascist consciousness (“socialist ideology”, “fascist ideology”) denigrates the first and trivialises the second. One can now interpose that Stalinism is certainly an ideology in the negative sense of the term. The critical concept of ideology, however, allows us in such cases to argue that Stalinism is an ideology and opposed to socialist worldviews. General concepts of ideology, such as the ones by Marković, Louis Althusser, Antonio Gramsci or Karl Mannheim, “thoroughly purge from the ideology concept the remains of its accusatory meaning”² (Horkheimer 1972, 28).

Nationalism is a particular form of ideology, an ideological anti-praxis. We will next focus on this concept.

5. Nationalism

According to Bogdanović (2015, 461), the Serbian part of the Praxis Group in the context of the breakdown of Yugoslavia “practically overnight turned coats” and “turned into nationalists and/or liberals”. Marković from the mid-1980s onwards propagated Serbian nationalism. We will in this chapter analyse this development, which however requires that we first take a look at the context of the Yugoslav wars (5.1) and discuss left-wing positions on it (5.2) before we then more closely engage with Marković’s perspective (5.3).

5.1. The Crisis and Break-Up of Yugoslavia

After Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia entered a phase of permanent economic and political crisis, featuring high unemployment, high inflation, high inequality, high national debt, strongly falling average income, etc. It started disintegrating. Yugoslavia had to take on IMF loans that brought along structural adjustment programmes. Over decades there had been an uneven development, in which Slovenia and Croatia developed and Kosovo, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia were lagging behind. Economic problems are a frequent trigger and context of the rise of ideologies, including nationalism that invents scapegoats that are blamed for social problems. Nationalism and independence movements were on the rise in the 1980s and 1990s in all parts of Yugoslavia. According to the documentary film Yugoslavia: The Avoidable War, Germany armed Croatian separatists³. In 1990, Serbia limited the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In June 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence from Yugoslavia. War broke out between Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Croatia. In late 1991, the Serbs of Croatia proclaimed the Republic of Serbian Krajina that

² Translation from German
³ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u04IL4Od8Qo
was not internationally recognised. Also Macedonia proclaimed independence. In 1992, the EU, the USA and the UN recognised Slovenia and Croatia, which further spurred nationalism in the Balkans. Especially Germany’s foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his Austrian equivalent Alois Mock played important roles in recognising the two newly formed states. In 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared independence and the Bosnian Serbs declared the independence of the Republika Srpska. The Bosnian war started. The USA, the EU and the UN recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbia and Montenegro formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) that was not internationally recognised. In 1993, Croatia got involved in the war in Bosnia. Macedonia was internationally recognised in the same year. NATO bombed the Republika Srpska in August and September 1995. In December 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY signed the Dayton Peace Agreement. In 1998, war broke out between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the FRY. From March until June 1999, NATO intervened militarily and bombed the FYR and Kosovo. The FYR forces withdrew from Kosovo. The NATO intervention in Kosovo set a precedent that was later repeated in the 2003 Western intervention in Iraq: It was a war without a UN Security Council decision that was undertaken although no NATO country had been attacked or threatened and that NATO justified on humanitarian grounds (Chandler 2000).

5.2. The Left-Wing Discourse on the Yugoslav Wars

There are at least two characteristic positions in the left-wing debate on the Yugoslav wars. Noam Chomsky represents the first position. He focuses in his analysis on NATO’s bombing of Serbia and Kosovo in 1999. Chomsky argues that the US chose to “escalate the violence” (2000, 44), which would have resulted in an escalation of Serbian attacks on Kosovo-Albanian civilians in Kosovo, hundred thousands of refugees fleeing the bombings in Kosovo, and in unpredictable long-term consequences. Chomsky says that in the situation of humanitarian crisis, it would always be possible to act according to the principle “First, do no harm” (2000, 48) and to do nothing if that elementary principle cannot be upheld. But the situation of having to do nothing would never arise because “[d]iplomacy and negotiations are never at an end” (2000, 48). The NATO bombings of the Balkans in 1999 are for Chomsky characteristic of international politics that do not rely on a universal framework such as the UN Charter or the International Court of Justice, but are based on the principle that the “powerful do as they wish” (Chomsky 1999, 154). Whereas the US would tolerate the ethnic cleansing of Kurds in Turkey, it would intervene into ethnic cleansings in Kosovo. “Serbia is one of those disorderly miscreants that impede the institution of the U.S.-dominated global system, while Turkey is a loyal client state that contributes substantially to this project” (1999, 13).

Herman and Peterson (2007) in a detailed analysis whose content is comparable to the one by Chomsky argue that internal and external factors played a role in the breakdown of Yugoslavia and that the external factors have often been denied. These factors would include finding a justification for NATO’s existence after the fall of the Soviet bloc, the global assertion of the
“Washington consensus”, the role of the Arbitration Commission of the Peace Conference on Yugoslavia, and liberals and leftists’ support of Western military intervention. Herman and Peterson also argue that the wars and bombings in the Balkans stimulated al-Qaeda and Islamic fundamentalism and resulted in a massive wave of displacement and refugees.

Slavoj Žižek (1999) is a representative of the second position. He argues that Yugoslavia did not disintegrate when Slovenia declared independence, but already when Milošević deprived “Kosovo and Vojvodina of their limited autonomy” (40) so that Yugoslavia was already dead and could only I have lived on under Serbian domination. Žižek’s assessment is comparable to Chomsky in respect to the critique of NATO’s selective interventions in the name of the defence of human rights based on its “strategic interests” (41) and the “the end of any serious role of [the] UN and [the] Security Council” (50) in international relations. However, Žižek much more than Chomsky also focuses his critique on Serbian nationalism, arguing that the NATO interventions and the Milošević-regime are not opposites, but symptoms of the New World Order that should be <172:> opposed (44). “When the West fights Milošević, it is NOT fighting its enemy […]; it is rather fighting its own creature, a monster that grew as result of the compromises and inconsistencies of the Western politics itself” (46) that over years mistook Milošević as a factor of stability in the region, not seeing his “anti-Albanian nationalist agenda” (49). “The way to fight the capitalist New World Order is not by supporting local proto-Fascist resistances to it, but to focus on the only serious question today: how to build TRANSNATIONAL political movements and institutions strong enough to seriously constrain the unlimited rule of […] capital, and to render visible and politically relevant the fact that the local fundamentalist resistances against the New World Order, from Milošević to Le Pen and the extreme Right in Europe, are part of it?” (50).

Jürgen Habermas (1999) took a comparable position, arguing that NATO acted without a UN Security Council mandate, that “[n]ationalistic dreams of a Greater Albania […] are not the slightest bit superior to the nationalistic fantasies of a Greater Serbia which the intervention is supposed to contain” (266). He also stresses that NATO intervenes in the case of the Kosovo, but not in favour “of the Kurds, Chechians, or Tibetians” (269), which shows the selectivity of the politics of military intervention. Habermas concludes that the only adequate answer in such situations is to establish “a global democratic legal order” based on “UN institutions” (270) and “strengthened diplomatic efforts” (271).

The analytical difference between the first and the second left-wing position on the Yugoslav wars is that the first is based on an analysis of empirical facts and data, whereas the second on uses political-theoretical reasoning. They reflect a certain difference between Anglo-Saxon empiricism and European continental philosophy. The political difference is that the first position takes an anti-imperialist position that opposes US interventions and seems to have some sympathies with Serbia, whereas the second rejects the logic “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” and argues that there should be no
sympathies with any side because they are all barbaric and classical anti-imperialism is mistaken here.

Given that war always involves psychological war waged via the media and in public, it is always difficult to trust any sources that report on the causes and consequences of war. Often there are very different stories about the extent and perpetrators of war crimes. So it is best that one encounters reports about war with scepticism and critically and compares different sources. In respect to the war in Bosnia, there were several investigations. Human Rights Watch (1992, 5) found that “all <173:> sides have committed serious abuses, Helsinki Watch found that the most egregious and overwhelming number of violations of the rules of war have been committed by Serbian forces” (Human Rights Watch 1992, 5). A United Nations expert commission concluded that “[a]ll of the combatant forces, in significantly different degrees, have committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions” (UN Security Council 1994, §127). The International Committee of the Red Cross (1999, v) reported: “The war enveloped all the communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A third of both Serbs and Bosniacs (31 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively) say a close family member was killed. The Serbs report the highest incidence of being forced to leave their homes (54 per cent). A near majority (45 per cent) of Croats lost contact with a close relative; more than a third (36 per cent) were forced to leave home; and 18 per cent report the death of a close family member. The Bosniac community experienced the highest level of injuries related directly to the war: 18 per cent of the total Bosniac population were wounded in the fighting, 10 per cent were imprisoned, 7 per cent were tortured and 5 per cent know somebody who was raped. In each instance, the percentage was two or three times that for the other communities”.

No matter to which extent one trusts these sources or not, they taken together suggest that in the Yugoslav wars, all sides committed war crimes. Nationalism was a driving force on the Croatian, Slovenian, Serbian, Bosnian, Kosovo-Albanian, Macedonian and Montenegrin sides. The Yugoslav war reminds us first and foremost of the violent dangers of any form of nationalism.

Given this context, we can now turn to the discussion of Marković and Serbian Nationalism.

5.3. Mihailo Marković and Nationalism

Marković co-authored the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU Memorandum) that was published in 1986 and that according to observers incited Serbian nationalism (Magaš 1993, 4, 123, 199-200; Naimark 2002, 149). Marković was from 1990-1992 the Vice-President of Slobodan Milošević’s Serbian Socialist Party’s (SPS). In 1995, Milošević dismissed Markovic from the SPS’s executive committee (Djukic and Dubinsky 2001, 86).

<174:> The SANU Memorandum argues that, in the 1960s, Yugoslav self-management was “pushed into a backseat” and remained limited to the micro-
economic realm of the enterprise, lacking an expression at the macroeconomic and political realms. “Consequently, self-management is mere window dressing and not the pillar of society” (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 1995, 103). “Sovereignty of the people” and “[s]elf-determination of nations” (117) would (besides human rights and efficiency) have to be part of the solution of Yugoslavia’s crisis. Yugoslavia would have unevenly developed national autonomies at the expense of the Serbs, who would suffer from “persecution and expulsion […] from Kosovo” (118) and political discrimination. Because of discrimination, Serbia would also have an underdeveloped economy (120). The Memorandum speaks of the “physical, political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in Kosovo and Metohija” (128) via the “Albanianization of Kosovo” (128). Serbs would also have been suppressed in other parts of Yugoslavia. “Prominent Serbian writers are the only ones featuring on the black lists of all the Yugoslav mass media” (135). “The establishment of the Serbian people’s complete national and cultural integrity, regardless of which republic or province they might be living in, is their historical and democratic right” (138).

Also in 1986, Marković and other Praxis intellectuals such as Ljubomir Tadić and Zagorka Golubović signed a petition that argued that there was a continuous Albanian takeover of Kosovo and that called for the abolition of the autonomy of Kosovo (Magas 1993, 4, 51, 52). It spoke of the need for the “defence of the foundations of Serb national culture” and the right “to the physical survival of our nation on its land” (51). Golubović, Marković and Tadić wrote in 1987, “In Kosovo the pursuit of a project of an ethnically pure Kosovo has resulted in a flat refusal of any policy of family planning. […] In 1940 there were 55 per cent Albanians in Kosovo, in 1985 it is already 80 per cent […] something can be done and must be done about the forceful assimilation and expulsion of the non-Albanian population from Kosovo” (59-60).

In a New York Times-report, Marković argued in 1992 that the EU’s recognition of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia as states, which was led by Germany, led to war. The “United States and European countries suddenly decided to recognize Bosnia without any guarantees for the Serbian or Croatian community. That made war inevitable. […] We Serbs don’t understand why our three traditional allies – Britain, France and the United States – don’t recognize that Germany is returning to its old role, this time using economic and political means rather than military invasion” (Kinzer 1992). "The alternative is creation of a Muslim state in the heart of Europe. Perhaps the Americans want to support this in order to be doing something for the Muslims, hoping they could exercise influence here through their Turkish allies. […] But we find this very disturbing […] and we don't like the idea that Turkey, which invaded our land and ruled us for 400 years, would consider this territory as part of the Muslim world" (Kinzer 1992)

Marković in such statements completely forgets his Marxist roots. Strong population growth has social causes. Kosovo was in the late-1980s Yugoslavia’s poorest region, with an income of only 27 percent of the Yugoslavian average (Herman and Peterson 2007, 4). In 1993, Marković contributed a chapter to a book on the democracy-theorist C. B.
Macpherson’s intellectual legacy. The editor Joseph Carens had, given Marković’s role in Milošević’s SPS, doubts about including the chapter and prefaced it with a cautionary note, to which Marković responded. Marković argued that there was widespread media manipulation in reports about Serbia’s role in the war and that “Serbia has not committed any aggression against its neighbors” (1993, 240).

So it is evident that at least between 1986 and 1993, Marković, a key figure of Yugoslav democratic and Marxist humanism, resorted argued for Serbian nationalism. Mira Bogdanović, who studied Marković’s (2015, 464) intellectual and political life, argues that his turn towards nationalism is for her “inconceivable”. How can one explain such an intellectual development from Marxist humanism towards nationalism? Was it a radical rupture and break? Or was there an element in Marković’s interpretation of humanist Marxism that was prone to nationalism? According to Magaš (1993), the Praxis editors’ alignment with Serb nationalism “delineates a complete break with the political and philosophical tradition represented by the journal” (52). So her argument is that Marković betrayed Marxist humanism. Keith Doubt (2006) takes a different position and in contrast argues that “there is something in Marković’s writing that allows us not to be surprised by his ignoble conduct supporting and planning Milošević’s genocidal campaign of terror throughout former-Yugoslavia” (45-46). Doubt says that Marković’s identified six aspects of praxis: Intentionality, freedom as self-determination, creativity, sociality, rationality, and individual self-realization. These dimensions would for Marković be independent and detachable.

“In Marković’s reasoning, one’s practice can exemplify intentionality but not creativity, sociality but not rationality, individual self-realization but not freedom as self-realization. […] Unless the six optimal dispositions that constitute Marković’s concept of praxis are seen as coinciding within a whole, ‘a higher order of normative <176:> principle’, it is difficult to see how Marković’s notion of what good practice is is anything except chaos. Marković’s understanding of praxis is nihilistic. Marković’s theorizing within the tradition of critical theory foreshadows, indeed predicts, his bad faith with which he cynically supported and promoted evil in Bosnia. […] Although Marković is not a philosopher of Heidegger’s stature, the issues that Marković and Heidegger’s biographies raise are comparable. […] The argument here is the opposite: it is the deficiency of metaphysical thinking in Marković’s work that explains his ignoble promotion of genocide in Bosnia” (Doubt 2006, 49-50).

In order to analyse whether there is a nationalist potential in Marković’s theoretical thought, we need to have a deeper look at his works. One can in his writings find anti-nationalist proclamations, as is typical for Marxist-humanist thought. Marković (1974a) for examples argues that “nationalism and racialism” are “disintegrative and regressive processes” (Marković 1974a, 79). Explaining the causes of nationalism, Marković (1974b, 90) argues that “scarcity, weakness, lack of freedom, social and national insecurity, a feeling of inferiority, emptiness and poverty […] give rise to […] nationalism and class hatred, egoism, escape from responsibility, aggressive and destructive
behaviour, etc.". Fascism is distinct from capitalism and socialism in that “the
nation or the race” is “the aim of politics” (1974a, 147). Fascism “tries to
mobilize all social classes for the promotion of national and racial interests”
(1974a, 152). Fascists aim at “grabbing the possessions of other nations and
races” (1974a, 156).

The latter quote is on the one hand critical of racism and nationalism, but
seems to assume that different human races exist. We saw in section 3 that
Marković sees language as a way of how social groups, “including nations,
classes, races” (1974a, 13) communicate. In this general definition, Marković
assumes that different human races exist. The assumption that nations exist
is ambivalent because the term is often used either as actually existing nation-
states or as ideological construct that proclaims the existence of a community
based on biological or cultural ties.

Marković was always critical of Marx’s concept of essence. He says Marx
“smuggled values into ‘essences’” (Marković 1993, 242). For Marx,
“selfishness, greed, envy, and aggressiveness” are not part of human
essence, but of alienation (Marković 1974a, 218). The twentieth’s century
was “an age of incredible eruptions of human irrationality and bestiality. The
scope and character of bloodshed and mass madness […] can no longer be
explained by the romantic, dualistic picture of a latent positive essence and a
transient bad appearance. Evil as a human disposition must lie very deep.
Obviously it is also a latent pattern of human behaviour, which is the produce
of the whole previous history of the human race, always ready to unroll as
soon as favorable conditions arise” (Marković 1974a, 219).

Marković (1974b, 156-157) argues that Machiavelli’s Prince sees
humans as inherently egoistic, whereas Marx’s Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts advance “an over-optimistic utopian conception of man as
essentially free, peace-loving social, creative being” (156). Both would have a
“reified conception of human nature” (158). “Human nature is constituted by
contradictory latent predispositions” (1974b, 151). Human history would show
the existence of such essential contradictions, for example “a striving for inter-
group and international collaboration and solidarity but also class, national,
and racial egoism” (159).

The question arises whether there is a contradiction between human essence
and human existence in class society or whether a fundamental contradiction
between solidarity and egoism forms human essence. The problem is that the
transferal of nationalism and racism onto the level of human nature (although
in a contradictory manner) does not allow us to provide an ethical grounding
of the argument that nationalism and racism and all other forms of domination
are harmful. The consequence is a certain naturalisation of domination.

We know from studies in development psychology that in the “9 month
revolution”, babies because of the recognition and care they receive start
perceiving attachment figures whose perspectives they take over, which
contributes to their social development (Tomasello 2008). Care for others is
absolutely essential for human development. In contrast, violence towards
babies harms their development. This example shows that care, co-operation, solidarity, altruism and recognition are more fundamental than neglect, competition, separation, egoism and hatred. Society and human development are not possible without the first, but without the second.

The theoretical implication is, as Marx (1844b, 299) says in the Economic and Philosphic Manuscripts, that the “individual is the social being” and that structures of domination harm the development of humans and society. Marković in contrast wants to make his readers believe that the social and the anti-social are two equally essential features of humans. It is surprising that Marković rejects the Economic and Philosphic Manuscripts’ notion of the human, but operates within the theoretical and political universe of Marxist humanism. It is not an understatement to say that the Manuscripts are one of Marxist humanism’s foundational texts. As a consequence, Marković’s approach does provide an adequate foundation for the critique of ideologies such as nationalism and racism.

Marković not only assumed that nations and races have a real existence, but also that they have a right to self-determination and state-formation. This becomes for example evident in the SANU Memorandum’s demand for the “[s]elf-determination of <178:> nations” (Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts 1995, 117), or when the 1986 petition that Marković signed talks about the “defence of the foundations of Serb national culture” (Magaš 1993, 51), or when Marković (1989, 408) writes that in Kosovo, “[t]wo nations [Serbs and Albanians] claim the same territory” (Marković 1989, 408). Such assumptions naturalise and essentialise the existence of nations. They disregard the basic insights of Marxist critiques of nationalism. Rosa Luxemburg (1976) applied Marx’s fetishism critique to the nation and nationalism. She argues that nationalism and the assumption that biologically, historically or culturally determined nations exist ignore “completely the fundamental theory of modern socialism – the theory of social classes” (135). “In a class society, ‘the nation’ as a homogeneous socio-political entity does not exist” (136).

Marxist critiques of nationalism commonly assume that nation-states are the results of wars, domination, violence and political conflict and that the nation is an invented, ideological, fabricated and illusionary product (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983, Özkirimli 2010). Nationalism is an ideology that veils the class and domonative character of society. That I speak the same language, hold the same passport, live in the same region or nation-state, am ruled by the same elites as others does not constitute a real bond that defines a particular group as superior to another. National bonds are illusionary, unreal, imaginary, ideological bonds that always constitute an outside and a potential for violent defence of the imaginary border between the inside and the outside of the nation. A worker has much less common interests with the owner of the company that employs him than he has with the worker in a distant country, who works in the local branch of the same company or in the same industry.

Humans are different. When humans live together or next to each other, one needs to take into account both their diversity (different ways of life) and what
unites (basic human needs). Living together will fail when either diversity or unity are fetishised. Such fetishisms can lead to the eruption of violence and sectarianism. Living together requires human unity in diversity, a dialectic of the common and plurality. Unity in diversity requires also that the basic needs of all can be fulfilled. It is therefore not compatible with the principle of class.

There is also a nationalist potential in Marković’s (1975) peculiar interpretation of self-management. He argues that self-management means self-determination (329). A subject creates new conditions in order to achieve “self-realization, [...] the actualization of basic human capacities, [...] the satisfaction of genuine human needs” (330). Self-management requires a federation of councils made up of representatives from different economic levels, critical information sources, and a “powerful, democratic public opinion” based on free expression, open communication, and dialogue (331) “The fourth condition of self-determination is the discovery of the true self of the community, the development of consciousness about real general needs of the people” (331). The individual, nation and class would need “a full sense of self-identity” (331).

The theoretical problem of what the “self” in self-management is becomes in Marković’s interpretation a question of nationality. For Marxist humanism, the self is the community of humanity that produces society in common and whose interest as a common humanity is therefore undermined by divisions such as class, nation and racism that play off one group against another. Rosa Luxemburg (1970, 391) warned that nationalism resulted in the First World War, in which “working men kill[ed] and destroy[ed] each other”. The right to national self-determination was for Luxemburg (1976) a “metaphysical cliché” (110). There would only be a right of the working class to self-determination (108).

The right of the working class to self-determination is a universal demand for humanity without the class principle, the demand for a classless society without domination. Marx’s argument that humans are social beings that should jointly control of the products of their common production implies a universal moral right to democratic socialism. Although humans have different individual realities, preferences and choices, they all share the status of being human and as such deserving a good life. Marković’s assumption that there is a right to national self-determination is based on the acceptance of the ideological constructs of nations and nationality, which undermines humanism’s universality. Marković can only make such an assumption because the principle of division, including national division, is for him part of human essence.

Praxis International in 1989 published Marković’s (1989) paper Tragedy of National Conflicts in “Real Socialism”. The Case of Kosovo. It says that “race, blood or biology” (409) have nothing to do with the conflict between Kosovo-Albanians and Serbs and argues that the conflict has national, political, socio-economic, religious and ideological causes. Marković’s formulation that “[t]wo nations claim the same territory – one, Albania, on ethnic grounds, the other, Serbian on historical and cultural ones” (408) implies, however, that
nations are not ideological constructs resulting from class and political conflicts, but are unitary historical, cultural and “ethnical” realities. Such an assumption reifies nations. Whereas he criticises Albanian nationalism that aims to establish Greater Albania, he rather lauds Milošević for having “invited people everywhere to an ‘anti-bureaucratic’ revolution” directed against the discrimination of Serbs and focused on “Serbia’s having state functions on its entire territory as did other republics” (411). Marković complains that the “Kosovo has the highest birth rate in Europe” (414) and calls for population policies directed at Kosovo-Albanians in order “to prevent overcrowding of Kosovo” (424). Here Marković is actually, other than initially indicated, resorting to biological logic, indicating the view that procreation is a political threat to Serbs.

Seyla Benhabib was co-editor of Praxis International from 1986 until 1992. She says that Marković at the time of the publication of the above-mentioned paper had become a “theorist of the ‘great Serbia’ dream” (Benhabib 1995, 676). She argues that the article is “racist-nationalist propaganda” (676). It “exhibits the tragic mixture of forward-looking social engineering (use of monetary incentives to control birth rates) with paternalistic racism (if the Moslem Albanians do not stop reproducing at this rate, they will never be able to advance themselves economically)” (680, footnote 1). “Many of us felt that the wool was being pulled over our eyes by our colleagues in former Yugoslavia in what they were or were not publishing in the pages of the journal” (675). This development contributed to Praxis International’s termination.

For Marković, selfishness, greed, envy, and aggressiveness are part of human essence. He thereby downplays the role of solidarity as essential feature of humans and society, which opens up a potential for the reification of nationalism in his theoretical approach. It is therefore theoretically consequent that Marković uncritically accepts the demand for the right to self-determination of a “nation” that is based on the reification of nations. The foundational problem of Marković’s approach is that he rejects Marx’s concept of the human in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscritps, which makes his approach prone to theoretical nationalism. There are therefore certain potentials for anti-humanism and nationalism in Marković’s theoretical approach.

6. Conclusion

Marković has an ambivalent use of the praxis concept and tends to depoliticise it by using it synonymously with the notion of practice. He sees the realm of communication and ideas as immaterial and standing outside of material production, which results in an idealist and dualist approach. His unclear distinction between practice and praxis lacks an ethico-political dimension and therefore fails in being able to discern between the ontological concept of communicative practice and the ethico-political notion of praxis communication. Both Habermas and Marković collapse communication’s ontology and axiology into one and thereby limit
communication theory’s critical potential. Whereas Habermas interprets the ontological as axiological (“All communication is morally good”), Marković reduces axiology to ontology (“The concept of communication praxis is ontological”). Marković propagates a general notion of ideology that is purely analytical and robs it of its potential as intellectual weapon of critique.

Marković rejects Marx’s insight that there is a positive social essence of humans. Marx’s assumption has however been confirmed by contemporary development psychology. As a theoretical consequence, Marković introduces division and separation into the concept of human essence, which poses a potential for theoretical and political nationalism. The divisionary and dualist character of Marković’s approach also manifests itself in his theory of meaning and communication that separates the material realm from the mental realm.

There is a latent nationalist potential in Marković’s theory that derives from his ambivalent equalisation of the concepts of practice and praxis, his general concept of ideology that depoliticises critical theory, and the filling of this depoliticised vacuum by the political assumption that diversion, separation, egoism, selfishness, nationalism, greed and envy are just like sociality, cooperation, altruism and solidarity part of human essence. Development psychology has shown that such an assumption is mistaken. The dualist concept of essence is, however, not just mistaken, but also politically dangerous because it opens up a divisive potential in social theory that can undermine humanism’s universality. The problem of Marković’s theoretical approach is that it is not humanist enough. It is a truncated form of humanism that at the political level turned into anti-universalism, anti-humanism and nationalism.

The analysis in this paper does however under no circumstances imply that Marxist humanism has in general a latent nationalist potential. To the contrary, the positive, universal concept of the human is an intellectual defence against nationalism. Truncated humanism is no humanism at all because it is anti-universalist and makes division and separation part of human essence. Rudi Supek (1971/1979), who was another key member of the Praxis Group, points out the democratic character of Marxist humanism’s universalism. He stresses that humanism is opposed to “ethno-centrism, every stressing of one’s own social group or nation at someone else’s cost” (270). Nationalists “are not capable of solving the problem of equality among peoples” (270). Equality would only be achievable “from an international standpoint, from the standpoint of <182:> a huge communion of peoples from whom should be expelled every ethno-centrism, international hatred and prejudice” (270).

The part of the Praxis Group that advocated a complete humanism as it can be found in Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts has left a positive and constructive legacy for a contemporary critical theory communication. Gajo Petrović (1967, 42-43) summarises the humanism the can be found in the Manuscripts: “A fundamental idea of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts is that man is a free creative being of praxis who in the contemporary world is alienated from his human essence, but that the radical
form man’s self-alienation assumes in the contemporary society creates real conditions for a struggle against self-alienation, for realizing socialism as a de-alienated, free community of free men” (42-43)

The ethico-political concept of praxis allows us to discern between communicative practice and *praxis communication* and to thereby situate communication as *praxis communication* in the context of the struggle for a complete humanity and democratic socialism.

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