Challenging the incompatibility paradigm: a democratic audit of Jordan, 1990-2010

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A DEMOCRATIC AUDIT

OF JORDAN

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Abstract

This thesis assesses the state of democracy in Jordan over a period of twenty years (1990-2010), and revisits the claims of incompatibility between democracy and both Islam and Islamism. It subjects the claims to theoretical and empirical tests. This is possible through a case study of Jordan. The state was established by Britain, and is ruled by a dynasty, which highlights its lineage to the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad. Jordan also allowed the Muslim Brothers to take part in the process characterised by King Hussein in 1989 as the 'resumption of our democratic life.'

Incompatibility is taken to mean that Islamic teachings prohibit adopting democracy as a system of government, as Qutb and Mawdudi have argued; and that democracy cannot take root in a Muslim society because the state and church (mosque) are inseparable, as argued by Lewis and others. The thesis outlines the procedure Muslim jurists use to declare an act or a notion to be allowed (halal) or forbidden (haram). It also engages with various democratic theories including the argument that democracy is 'an essentially contested concept.'

The thesis establishes that, theoretically, Islam is not incompatible with democracy, whether as claimed by Qutb and Mawdudi, or Lewis and Huntington. Moreover, the thesis posits that if the democratic audit establishes that Jordan is a democracy, the compatibility of democracy and Islam is validated empirically. The audit revealed that Jordan was not a democracy. The roles of Islam and Islamism in hindering the development of democracy in Jordan were examined. The evidence indicated that they did not. Therefore, other reasons were examined, such as rentierism, Arab-Israel conflict, and Rustow's modernisation theory. The latter offers the most plausible explanation, as Jordan has not satisfied Rustow's four antecedents to democracy.

The Islamist groups have not yet managed to be in power through democratic means. It remains debatable whether they will adhere to democracy after it brings them to power. The case of Jordan provides counter-evidence that the Islamists can hold the belief that Islam provides a superior form of government, but can simultaneously play by democratic rules. One could even argue that in Jordan there was a case of a democratic paradox in reverse.

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Transliteration System

Arabic words and phrases are transliterated according to the standards of *The International Journal of Middle East Studies* (IJMES), the quarterly journal of the Middle East Studies Association of North America. The only variation is to underline the letter which requires a dot under it. If proper names are not listed in IJMES's wordlist, the most common spelling is used.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACC	Anti-Corruption Commission in Jordan
AFP	Agence France-Presse (French News Agency)
AI	Amnesty International
AVC	Audio-Visual Commission in Jordan
CDFJ	Centre for Defending Freedom of Journalists in Jordan
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSS	Centre for Strategic Studies in Jordan
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
FDW	Foreign Domestic Workers
FH	Freedom House
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
Hamas	Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine
HoD	House of Deputies (Lower house of Jordanian parliament)
HoN	House of Notables (Senate; upper house of Jordanian parliament)
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IAF	Islamic Action Front Party in Jordan
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JD	Jordanian Dīnār (Jordan's currency: US$1.3)
JPA	Jordanian Press Association
MB	Muslim Brothers Society
MDW	Migrant and Domestic Workers
MP	Member of Parliament
NSP	National Socialist Party in Jordan (1950s)
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PM	Prime Minister
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

Glossary

Āya   Qur'anic verse; plural: āyāt

Baʿth   Revival; renewal; renaissance

Bayʿa   Endorsement; mandate; pledge of allegiance

Fatwa   Reasoned opinion or judgment based on Islamic teachings or their interpretations

Fiqh   Generally: Comprehension; knowledge; Specifically: jurisprudence in Islam

Fuqahā'   Learned people in Islamic jurisprudence; singular: faqīh; (cf. fiqh and ʿUlamā')

Hadīth   Generally: conversation; talk; specifically a statement attributed to Prophet Muhammad; plural: ahādīth

Hākim   Ruler; governor; sovereign

Hākimiyya   Generally: dominion; rule; jurisdiction Specifically: Sovereignty of God (Allah)

Halāl   An action or a notion consistent with Islam's teachings

Harām   An action or notion not consistent with Islam's teachings

Hijra   Generally: migration; specifically: the exodus of Muslims from Mecca first to Ethiopia (Habasha), then to Medina

Hudūd   Generally: Limits; edges; boundaries; Specifically: Penal code in Qur'an; singular: hadd

Ijtihād   Reasoning to establish a rule to allow or forbid a notion or an action in a manner consistent with Islamic teachings; more general in meaning than fatwa

Ikhwān   Brothers; same as ikhwa; singular: akh

Jāhiliyya	Era before Islam; erroneously suggested to mean era of ignorance or age of barbarism
Kaʿba	A room-like structure in the Grand Mosque in Mecca; highly revered by Muslims
Kāfir	Non-believer in Islam; plural: kuffar
Muʿallaqāt	Poems posted on the walls of Kaʿba in pre-Islamic era
Murtad	A person who renounces Islam (apostate)
Riba	Interest on loans (usury)
Salafi	An Islamic trend that follows the perceived example of early Muslims (salaf: predecessors)
Shariʿa	Generally: law; specifically: Islamic law
Shiʿa	Generally: Party; group; specifically: people who supported the right of ʿAli to succeed Muhammad; followers of the Shiʿi branch of Islam
Shūra	Consultation; deliberation
Sunna	Generally: law; method; way; specifically: Prophet Muhammad's statements and actions
Sunni	Follower of the Sunna; belongs to the Sunni branch of Islam
Sūra	Chapter in Qur'an; plural: Suwar
Tawhīd	Monotheism; Islamic theology; believing in unity of Allah
ʿUlamā'	Generally: Scientists; scholars; specifically: people learned in Islamic jurisprudence; singular: ʿAlim (cf. Fiqh and Fuqahā')
Uli al-Amr	People of responsibility; people in charge
Zina	Intercourse outside wedlock

Introduction

In October 1989, King Hussein of Jordan declared that the country would return to 'democratic parliamentary life'. This thesis presents an assessment of the state of democracy in Jordan since the resumption announced by the king. After a period of twenty years (1990-2010), the case for an assessment is self-evident: neither early nor late.

The appraisal is based on data provided by Jordanians who live in Jordan, through two questionnaires and elite interviews. One questionnaire consists of fifteen questions. The other has ninety. The interviews are with officials, activists, and others—men and women. The backbone of the thesis is a democratic audit, which is an empirical tool used to assess the state of democracy in a given country.

The assessment is presented and discussed after several hurdles are cleared. The first is what is meant by democracy. The second is why democracy matters. The third hurdle is whether Islam has something to say about democracy. Specifically, whether Islam is a substitute for democracy, or offers alternative forms of it. The fourth hurdle to be negotiated is whether Islamism is inimical to democracy.

Negotiating the third and fourth hurdles is important because the absence of democracy in the Arab and Muslim worlds is attributed often to the incompatibility of democracy and both Islam and Islamism. The incompatibility of democracy and Islam is taken to mean two things. The first, as argued by some Muslims, is that Islam's teachings prohibit democracy as it does other things such as usury (riba) for instance. The second meaning is as argued by some scholars of democracy who base the claim of incompatibility on different grounds, such as secularism, which in their view, cannot prevail in Muslim majority states because Islam is inseparable from the state.

After the above-mentioned hurdles are cleared, a fifth set will arise in relation to the democratic audit: whether democracy can be measured. If so, what shall be audited;

what criteria are used; and how the assessment is carried out. These questions will be discussed as well.

Jordan's case provides all the elements needed to achieve two goals. The first is an assessment of the state of democracy. The second is to test empirically the validity of the claims that democracy is incompatible with Islam and Islamism. The elements needed to conduct the research on these two tracks are that (a) Jordan is a Muslim majority state; (b) it is a modern state at least in the sense that it was created in the twentieth century; (c) it is ruled by a dynasty which claims descent from Quraysh— the tribe of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad; (d) it has a Muslim Brothers (MB) movement which was formed in the 1940s and operated legally since then; and (e) unlike Syria, Tunisia, and Egypt, Jordan allowed the MB and its political party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), to take part in the parliamentary and municipal elections which were held during the twenty years under assessment.

A conventional approach to argue that democracy and Islam/ism are incompatible is theoretical. In this thesis, the task is approached theoretically and empirically. There are Muslim jurists (*fuqahā'*) and others who declare that democracy and Islam are incompatible. They base their arguments on their interpretation of verses in the Qur'an. Instead of choosing different verses to make the opposite argument, the thesis outlines a procedure they use (or should use) to declare something in/compatible with Islam. This procedure leads to the conclusion that democracy is not incompatible with Islam. The claim of incompatibility is made by others, Muslims and non-Muslims, either because of certain prerequisites for democracy, or a certain exceptionalism that characterises Islam. These claims will be engaged with according to the arguments on which they are based.

The empirical part will either support or undermine the conclusion of compatibility. If the democratic audit finds Jordan to be a democratic state, then neither Islam nor Islamism can be regarded as incompatible with democracy. If Jordan is not democratic, all possible reasons must be identified, including Islam and Islamism. If either has hindered democracy in Jordan, the claim of incompatibility will be substantiated by empirical evidence. The empirical part on its own, however, is of prime importance as it produces a detailed assessment of the state of affairs in Jordan in relation to society, government, the media, and other institutions.

Aims of Thesis

The thesis has two major aims. The first is to conduct a democratic audit to assess the state of democracy in Jordan. The second is to revisit and reexamine the claims of democracy's incompatibility with Islam and Islamism.

Research Questions

The research questions to be answered in this thesis are as follows:

(1)   How democratic is Jordan?

(2)   Do the findings of the democratic audit confirm or undermine the claims that Islam and Islamism are incompatible with democracy?

Time Frame

The thesis is concerned with a period of twenty years, beginning with King Hussein's announcement in 1989 that elections will be held in Jordan, the first of their kind since 1967. The period ends with the elections of a new House of Deputies (HoD) in November 2010. Events outside this time span will be referred to where necessary for contextual purposes. It is noteworthy at the outset that towards the end of 2010, the Arab states, including Jordan, saw waves of protests to demand change. In some countries, the protests sought the removal of the head of state. In other countries, such as Jordan, the demands were for reforms. Upon reflection on the impact of these events on my thesis, I have decided to adhere to my original plan. Although I followed the events in Jordan with a great deal of interest, the data have been gathered before the protests broke out. In other words, the data were not influenced by being collected during a volatile period.

Moreover, not limiting the period of the assessment entails the risk of derailing the thesis and diverting it towards dealing with current affairs. It is unrealistic to expect a PhD thesis which had started five years earlier to deal in depth with fast-moving events that happen to erupt while the writing of the thesis is in final stages. Therefore, limiting the assessment to the specified period is dictated by the requirements of scholarly research, and may offer insights into the events that erupted afterwards.

Clarification of Some Terms

The thesis dos not use the term 'methodology' in the section which outlines how the research was conducted. As van Wagenen (1991, p. 66) explains, 'Methodology refers to the general study of methods'. In contrast, method 'refers to the particular method,' used. As defined by Brewer (2000, p. 2), methodology is 'the broad theoretical and philosophical framework within which methods operate and which give them their intellectual authority and legitimacy'. Therefore, the accurate term to use is method/s.

The second term to clarify is 'theoretical framework'. The theories that inform the thesis, and constitute its theoretical framework, are those which I found to be better at explaining and resolving the research problems. That they inform the thesis does not mean that I have adopted them uncritically, as will be shown later.

The third term that needs clarification is 'literature review'. As to be expected, I refer throughout the thesis to what other people have written (literature). The purpose is different from that of the section labelled as literature review. In this section, the purpose is to situate my research in relation to other literature on democracy, Islam, Islamism, and Jordan. In other sections, references to literature have other purposes, such as to support an argument, criticise one, or illustrate a point.

Throughout the thesis, I use Islamism and Islamist for reasons explained in the chapter on the compatibility of democracy with both Islam and Islamism.

Structure of Thesis

The thesis is divided into ten chapters and an epilogue. The first chapter consists of three parts. The first outlines the methods and procedures used in pursuing the research. It explains why they were adopted. In the second part, I discuss the democratic theories that inform the thesis. The literature pertaining to Jordan, democracy and Islam/ism is reviewed in the third part.

The second chapter focuses on the theoretical issues pertaining to democracy and both Islam and Islamism. In addition to the need to engage with these important theoretical issues, it is also necessary to discuss them because they are considered by some scholars as responsible for the absence of democracy in the Muslim world. The

chapter has two parts. The first seeks to identify whether Islam has something to say about democracy. It outlines the claims of incompatibility between democracy and Islam. Additionally, the link, if any, between democracy and Islam, is approached from two perspectives: (a) whether Islam itself is an alternative to democracy; and (b) whether Islam offers alternative forms of democracy, such as shura. The second part discusses Islamism and democracy, and the claims that they are incompatible.

In the third chapter, I set the ground for the empirical part of the thesis. I address issues that can prompt scepticism, such as whether it is possible to measure democracy. If it can be, how it is measured; what is measured; and what standards are used. In addition to these important theoretical issues, examples of assessments of democracy in Jordan are provided. Of interest in these examples are their methods and criteria. Therefore, the advantages of the democratic audit become clearer.

The fourth chapter provides the necessary background which contextualises issues that will be raised in the democratic audit. This chapter covers the modern history of Jordan: how it became a nation-state and the kings who have ruled over it so far. The second part briefly outlines the political system in Jordan. In the third part, the role of Islam in Jordan is discussed—including the suggestion that linage to Prophet Muhammad provides a basis of legitimacy to govern. The fourth part focuses on the economy, which is classified by some scholars as a 'rentier economy'. This aspect is relevant because there are arguments which associate lack of democracy with rentierism. The fifth part discusses the connection between Jordan and Palestine, owing to the entanglement of the history and politics of both, and the fact that nearly half of Jordan's population are of Palestinian origin. This, too, has implications for the democratic audit.

The fifth chapter also provides the background that contextualises the discussion of whether Islamism is inimical to democracy. Therefore, a brief history of the Muslim Brothers Society in Egypt is provided, because some scholars suggest Islamism started with its emergence. It also has organic links with other MB organisations in the Arab world, including Jordan. The bulk of the chapter, however, will focus on the MB/IAF and their attitude towards democracy in Jordan.

The empirical part of the thesis begins with chapter six. A macro-analysis approach, which covers the fifteen overarching questions of the democratic audit, is taken in this, the seventh and eighth chapters. In all three chapters, the question is stated and then the marks collected from the questionnaires are provided in tabular forms. After that, the topic of the question is discussed in light of the data to illustrate the possible reasons for giving high or low marks.

In the ninth chapter, a microanalysis approach is taken. This chapter examines in further detail the state of democracy in Jordan by presenting and discussing data collected through the full questionnaire of the democratic audit. The two questions with highest and lowest marks in each sub-category are selected. In the event of a tie, both questions are included. More than thirty questions not covered in the previous chapters are discussed in this one.

The tenth and final chapter summarises the conclusions of the research. I examine why democracy has failed to take root in Jordan to date. The reasons cited by scholars and others for this failure are outlined. Their plausibility and limitations are discussed. The conclusion of the thesis is that Rustow's antecedents of democracy are best at explaining the failure. Due to the dramatic events that erupted in the Arab world during 2011, the thesis ends with an epilogue to discuss briefly their potential impact on the arguments and conclusions made in the thesis.

Theory, Practice, and Ideology

Hoffman (1988, pp. 3-10) discusses two issues which scholars have debated. The first is whether it is possible for political theory to 'exist as a purely academic enterprise' if it is connected to 'practical politics'. The second issue is that ideology must stay away from political theory, as ideology prevents one from exercising 'critical judgement and rational justification' (p. 7). Hoffman disagrees with the proponents of both ideas.

In recognition of the importance of this debate, I have decided to mention at the outset of this thesis that I am inclined to agree with Hoffman. As far as I am concerned, I will identify issues I am aware of, so that any marks of ideology or judgemental values are identified.

I have no ideology in the sense that I am not a Marxist, capitalist or follower of another type of ideology. However, I do subscribe to a number of principles, including social justice, freedom, equality, and universality of rights. I understand secularism to be a mere separation of state and religion, not as anti-religion. It respects an individual's right to believe and practise his or her religion freely.

I am not an Islamic or Islamist. Therefore, my research is not concerned with extoling Islam or Islamism. I believe democracy is the best form of government despite the fact that it can be manipulated in relation to the outcome of elections, and that it has been used as a tool to justify military interventions. However, I do not subscribe to the notion of the end of history. It is easy to make claims and predictions. As shall be seen in the thesis, some scholars have made various predictions. They have been proved unfounded.

I opted to drop honorific titles such as pasha and sir, because in my view, they perpetuate the aura of inequality and imperialism. My research was self-funded at all stages. All expenses related to field trips were also self-funded. Therefore, I owe no individual, research institution, or government any favour or debt that may have an influence on the conduct of the research.

Chapter 1

Methods, Theoretical Framework, and Literature Review

This chapter consists of three parts. The first outlines the methods used in the research project. In the second, various democratic theories are cited to illustrate the debates about what democracy means and to identify the theories that inform this thesis. In the third part, literature pertaining to democracy and Islam/ism in Jordan is reviewed and critically evaluated to identify the gaps that this thesis fills.

PART 1: RESEARCH METHODS

The research project uses mixed methods. The overarching method is qualitative, narrowed down and applied to a case study. The main element of the case study is a democratic audit to assess the state of democracy in Jordan after twenty years of initiating a process that has been referred to as a democratic one. The democratic audit is based on two questionnaires: a short one for macro-analysis, and a long one for microanalysis. The questionnaires have been supplemented with elite interviews. Moreover, the methods are based on 'grounded theory'. Each element will be outlined below, but the question to be answered at the outset is why the mixed methods approach is used.

Broadly speaking, research methods fall into two categories: qualitative and quantitative. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, pp. 14-26) point out that proponents of each category 'engaged in an ardent dispute' for more than a hundred years, and that 'purists emerged on both side'. They define the mixed methods research as follows:

> *the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research technique, methods approaches, concepts or language into a single study* [their emphasis].

Johnson and Onwuegbuzie explain that mixed methods research 'rejects dogmatism,' which places restrictions on a researcher's choice (p. 17). Although they advocate mixed methods research, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie accept that it has 'weaknesses',

such as being 'more expensive' and 'more time consuming'. It also places on the researcher the burdens of carrying out qualitative and quantitative research (p. 21). Such 'weaknesses' are neutralised by several advantages, which include enabling a researcher to 'answer a broader and more complete range of research questions' (p. 24).

In explaining the merits of qualitative research, Strauss and Corbin (1998, pp. 10-11) assert that 'the nature of the research problem' dictates the choice of method. This reason, I suggest, applies to this thesis. The democratic audit of the state of democracy in Jordan makes it unavoidable to use mixed methods. It should be stressed however that the mixed methods in this research project are applied in a coherent, logical way, not in a disjointed, aimless one. A better description is 'integrative research' which is also suggested by the same two authors.

As explained by Strauss and Corbin (1998, pp. 10-11), qualitative research is 'any type of research that produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of quantification'. They indicate that even if part of the data is quantitative, what matters is that 'the bulk of the analysis is interpretive'. The purpose, they argue, is to carry out a 'qualitative analysis' which they define as 'a nonmathematical process of interpretation'.

Furthermore, Strauss and Corbin (pp. 10-11) identify three components of qualitative research: (1) the data; (2) the procedure used to interpret the data, and (3) the written and verbal report (this thesis and the viva, in my case).

My research project has used questionnaires to collect data. However, it remains within the boundaries of qualitative research. Although I use some basic mathematical procedures when analysing the data, the purpose is not to make generalisations based on the results of the mathematical operations. For example, when I calculate the average of marks given by the respondents, I do not use it to conclude that an x% of Jordanians believe, agree, disagree, prefer, or reject. Instead, I use the marks to explore the reasons that prompted the respondents to give high or low marks.

As defined by Yin (1994), case study research method is 'an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when

the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident' (p. 13). Therefore, as a research method, case study is an effective approach when dealing with a complex and broad issue such as democracy and its incompatibility with Islam/ism.

Eisenhardt (1989, p. 534) defines case study as 'a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single settings'. Furthermore, she points out that case study research mixes data collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires, and observations' (p. 534).

Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 221) lists five misunderstandings surrounding case study research.[1] The first is of a general nature and suggests that 'theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable than concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge'. The second is that it is not possible to 'generalize on the basis of an individual case; therefore, the case study cannot contribute to scientific development'. The third misunderstanding identified by Flyvbjerg is that case study approach 'is most useful for generating hypotheses; that is, in the first stage of a total research process, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building'. The fourth misunderstanding is based on a perception that the case study method 'contains a bias toward verification, that is, a tendency to confirm the researcher's preconceived notions'. The final misunderstanding leads sceptics to believe that it is not possible through the case study approach to summarise and develop general propositions and theories on the basis of specific case studies.

Case study is an established method. Some researchers have used it to study not only a country, but narrowed it down to an individual such as Rachid al-Ghannouchi, Hassan al-Turabi, and Bernard Lewis—to name but a few. Again, the nature of the research problem points to which method is appropriate and valid. Van Wagenen (1991) argues that the best justification for research is that 'it allows us to understand', and he warns against justifying research on the basis that 'it has practical applications' (p. 114). The corollary of this warning is that research should not be justified by the need to make generalisations, as these are inherently flawed.

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[1] I encountered scepticism about case study approach during the stages of discussing my proposal and reports regarding the progress of my research.

The interviews I conducted during the course of the research fall within the category of 'elite interviews'. As defined by Dexter (1970) an elite interview is one 'with any interviewee […] who in terms of the current purposes of the interviewer is given special, non-standardized treatment' (p. 5). Although Dexter is aware that 'elite' connotes superiority and he is unhappy about that, he argues that alternative terms are not more satisfactory. He further argues that 'out of necessity,' elite interviews have 'been adopted much more often with the influential, the prominent, and the well-informed than with the rank-and-file of a population' (p. 6).

I interviewed twenty-three people in Jordan; I endeavoured to have a cross-section of political views. The list of interviewees includes former high ranking officials, activists, women, Muslims and Christians. The interviews I conducted were semi-structured. I would prepare core questions for every interviewee. The questions would cover common themes, but would also seek unique information from the individual interviewee, in relation to his/her position and perspective. This formula allowed me to ask follow-up questions that seek out further information or explanations for what would otherwise be brief or unclear answers. The interviewees chose the venue and time. Some of them preferred their offices; others their homes. In securing an appointment, I sought the help of various individuals either to provide me with a contact number, or to help in getting the appointment.

A democratic audit, as defined by Beetham (1994, p. 25), 'is the simple but ambitious project of assessing the state of democracy in a single country'. It is accurate to suggest that it is 'ambitious'; it is not simple. However, the democratic audit and related issues will be outlined and discussed separately.

To conclude this section, it is necessary to restate that the methods adopted in the thesis are the reflection of the nature of the problem being researched, and that mixed methods are used integratively, not discreetly.

Research Resources

The data used in this thesis consist of interviews, two questionnaires, primary sources, secondary sources, and online sources. As regards primary sources, the research has sought to use as many primary sources as possible, such as policy documents and campaign manifestos. It is inevitable to use secondary sources. These

include books, periodicals, newspapers, magazines and reliable websites, namely, official websites and/or those that are well-established and the individuals/parties behind them are known. Moreover, several field trips were made; one coincided with the tenth anniversary of the accession to the throne by King ʿAbdullah II; another during the elections of November 2010; and a third took place after waves of weekly of protests to demand reforms (April 2011).

Constraints and Limitations

Arrangements to set up interviews require time. An introduction by a local who personally knows the interviewee facilitates making an appointment. During the interview itself, some interviewees prefer to speak in generalised terms, instead of addressing the specifics of the question.

It is known that the Jordanian authorities prosecute individuals who make critical remarks of the regime, especially of the king and the ruling family. Therefore, one should not expect the interviewees to express frank views to someone they are meeting for the first time, and where the interviewer is using a tape recorder. Moreover, it is known that books can be banned if they are considered to contain critical views of Jordan. The authorities may initiate legal proceedings if an author lives in Jordan.

The implications of these constraints and limitation for the thesis are minimal. The number of interviewees and the diversity of their backgrounds and affiliations produced a clear and balanced picture of the state of affairs in Jordan.

A Note on Using The Qurʾanic Verses

When a discussion requires referring to a certain verse in the Qurʾan, I have provided the verse in Arabic and then an English translation. Initially, I wrote a footnote to indicate that relying on the English translation would be problematic. At the latest stage in writing this thesis, I chose to write this note because the point it raises is

very important. It does not matter how a certain word, such as shura, is translated in the various translations of the Qur'an, whether consultation or deliberation. My discussion is based on the Arabic text, not the translation.

I have chosen to rely on the translation by Tarif Khalidi (2009). I switched to Khalidi's translation because he used 'measured modern English'. Another reason is that he has chosen not to 'force a meaning' on ambiguous verses. He has also sought to achieve a 'balance between the familiarly modern and the alienating archaic, while preferring at all times as literal a rendering as possible' (p. xxi). This may help make the translation more accessible. However, relying on a translation of the Qur'an carries the risk of basing a discussion on meanings and connotations in a foreign language. Therefore, I reiterate that my discussion is based on the verses in Arabic.

PART 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

'A theory,' as defined by Brewer (2000, 192), 'is a set of interrelated abstract propositions about human affairs and the social world that explain their regularities and properties'. He also explains that theories are not 'descriptive statements' (p. 192). Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 18) note that the role of the theoretical framework is to explain 'the main things to be studied—the key factors, constructs or variables—and the presumed relationship among them'.

Back in the 1950s, Dahl (1956) observed that 'there is no democratic theory but democratic theories' (p. 1). One can easily imagine that they must have multiplied fifty years later. The first challenge to face a researcher is the definition of democracy, one that goes beyond the denotation of the Greek term which means rule of people. Before that, however, I shall outline arguments about democracy, beginning with the one that contests the notion itself, then different arguments that contest models, conceptualisations, cultural compatibility, and prerequisites for democracy. After that, I shall refer to the arguments that define democracy.

Democracy: Contesting the Concept

Haynes (2001) states 'defining democracy is a tricky task' (p. 8). Keane (1991) acknowledges that 'the concept of democracy is currently dogged by confusion' (p. 168). Hoffman (1988, p. 131) emphatically states: 'Democracy is without doubt the most contested and controversial concept in political theory'. Similarly, Saikal (2003) suggests that 'democracy is an overloaded concept. Historically, it meant different things to different people'. He further explains that 'there is no consensus [in Western countries] as to precisely what the concept means and how best to express the idea'. He also points out that there is no 'widespread agreement among theorists and practitioners as to whether democracy is a form of government, a method of choosing a government, or a term applied to a whole society' (p. 111).

One finds that scholars approach the definition of democracy with some hesitation. Reference is often made to Gallie ([1956] 1968) who argued that democracy is an 'essentially contested concept'. Therefore, the logical start for this discussion is Gallie's argument.

According to Gallie (1968), there are concepts that are essentially contested, such as religion, art, science, *democracy* and social justice (p. 168; my emphasis). To fit the classification, a concept must meet five conditions (pp. 161-168):

> (I) The concept in question must be *appraisive* in the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement. [Emphasis in original].
>
> (II) This achievement must be of an internally complex character, for all that its worth is attributed to it as a whole.
>
> (III) Any explanation of its worth must therefore include reference to the prescriptive contributions of its various parts or features [...] the accredited achievement is *initially* variously describable. [Emphasis in original].
>
> (IV) The accredited achievement must be of a kind that admits of considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances; any such modification cannot be prescribed or predicted in advance [...] any such achievement [is] 'open' in character.
>
> (V) [E]ach party recognises the fact that its own use of it is contested by those of other parties.

In order to distinguish an essentially contested concept from those which are 'radically confused', Gallie has two more conditions (p. 168):

> (VI) [T]he derivation of any such concept from an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept.

> (VII) [T]he probability or plausibility, in appropriate senses of these terms, of the claim that the continuous competition for acknowledgment as between the contestant users of the concept enables the original exemplar's achievement to be sustained or developed in optimum fashion.

Gallie characterises democracy as a term which is 'complicated, highly emotionally charged and confusing'. He rejects the temptation to clarify the confusion. He proceeds to explain how the term, democracy, meets those seven conditions, and therefore validates the argument that democracy is an essentially contested concept (p. 178).

Gray (1977) speculates that such concepts 'occur characteristically in social contexts which are recognizably those of an ideological dispute' (p. 333). Gray is sceptical about Gallie's characterisation of essentially contested concepts, and considers Gallie's to be essentially contested itself (p. 339). Birch (1993), however, points out that concepts and their contestability change, and what might have been contested before may eventually cease to be (pp. 8-9).

Contesting the notion of democracy and what it means takes different forms. One way is to argue that there is more than one model of democracy. Scholars have referred to models of democracy in broad and limited senses of the term. According to Macpherson (1977), a 'model' means 'a theoretical construction intended to exhibit and explain the real relations, underlying the appearances, between or within the phenomenon under study' (pp. 2-3). Held (1995, p. 5), on the other hand, is more specific in his use of the term 'model'. He identifies three models for democracy: (1) direct or participatory democracy; (2) liberal or representative democracy; and (3) one-party democracy.

Macpherson's definition of a model is theoretical and seems close to the next argument to be outlined below, namely, different conceptualisations of democracy. Held's use of the term, model, is more descriptive of how democracy is practised. He

also indicates that as regards the third model, 'some may doubt whether it is a form of democracy at all' (p. 5). The two uses of model suggest that the talk about 'models of democracy' is vague, and it can be understood only when the individuals using it explain what they means by it.

Connolly (1995) notes that 'Macpherson's explorations of the democratic ideal occurred in the context of several debates', such as the 'pluralist-elitist debate, [...] the clash between participatory and representationist ideals of democracy, the relation between economic equality and democratic citizenship, [and] the comparative superiority of capitalism or socialism'. However, Connolly concedes that these debates 'have now been displaced' (p. 76).

In the discussion above, Held identified 'liberal or representative democracy' as a model, but there are two elements in need of clarification: representative democracy and the link between democracy and liberalism.

'Is direct democracy preferable? Is it still possible?' Asks Sartori (1962, p. 253). If it was possible for the people of a Greek city-state to meet in one place, it is no longer possible to accommodate the people of a nation-state in one venue. Consequently, direct democracy is usually seen in smaller bodies, clubs for instance, or on certain occasions, such as referenda. The more practical form of democracy is representative democracy, where voters choose people to represent them in parliament or similar bodies empowered to enact laws and hold the executive branch of government accountable. Sartori points out that all modern democracies are indirect, namely, people are governed by the representatives they elect (p. 252).

The relationship between liberalism and democracy is a more complex issue, and arouses debates between the supporters of both, especially with regard to the right balance between the two. As Bobbio (1990, p. 25) correctly points out: 'As a theory of state […] liberalism is modern, whereas democracy as a form of government is ancient'. Gray (1995) explains that 'liberalism is no older than the seventeenth century'. He notes that the first use of the term 'liberal' to describe 'a political movement' occurred in 1812 by a Spanish party, the Liberales. Before that, it was used by 'Adam Smith when he referred to "the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice".' (p. xi).

As Dworkin (1983) explains, one aspect of liberalism is concerned with government and the individual. In this respect, liberalism requires that the 'government must be neutral on matters of personal morality, [and] that it must leave people free to live as they think best so long as they do not harm others'. The other aspect of liberalism, according to Dworkin, is concerned with economics. In this regard, liberalism requires the government 'to reduce economic inequality, both through the management of the economy and through the welfare programmes that redistribute wealth to soften the impact of poverty'.

Zakaria (2004, p. 20) notes that most of the European countries by 1940 'adopted important aspects of constitutional liberalism—the rule of law, private property rights, and increasingly, separated powers and free speech and assembly'. He further notes that before the twentieth century, 'most countries in Western Europe were liberal autocracies or, at best, semi-democracies. The franchise was tightly restricted, and elected legislatures had little power' (p. 20).

In view of the above, one often finds the adjective illiberal added to democracy to suggest that it is an inadequate form of democracy, which lacks the personal freedoms and elements of the capitalist system—primarily the market economy. For instance, although Iran holds regular elections, and its people have elected several presidents since the creation of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, Iran is referred to as illiberal democracy (Zakaria 2004).

Liberalism nonetheless is preferred by some to democracy. Sartori (1962) refers to Kant's 'blunt rejection of democracy as being a form of tyranny rule' (p. 262). Sartori also indicates that Madison and Hamilton, two of the Founding Fathers of the United States, 'did not think different from Kant on the subject' (p. 288). Such a view is not extinct. As Held points out, Hayek distinguishes 'between liberalism and democracy,' and that Hayek has stated that 'if democracy means "the unrestricted will of the majority" he is "not a democrat".' (Hayek 1982, p. 39 in Held 1987, p. 248).

The idea that democracy is an unrestricted, irrational rule of the majority is out-dated. Sartori (1962, pp. 460-461) has argued that 'without liberty, democracy has no meaning'. Fifty years later, Beetham (2004, pp. 61-75) echoes the same argument:

democracy and freedom are inseparable. 'Without freedom,' Beetham asserts, 'there can be no democracy' (p. 61). Bobbio (1990, p. 37) summarises the debate about liberalism and democracy by saying that 'democracy can be seen as the natural development of liberalism'. This conclusion, however, is not contradictory because it does not imply that democracy has continued since the Greek city-state. It specifically applies to the re-emergence of democracy in modern times, and the debates that surrounded liberalism and democracy.

I subscribe to the views of Sartori, Beetham, and Bobbio. This, however, does not conclude the discussion about democracy.

Another way of contesting the notion of democracy is to suggest that there are other conceptualisations in non-Western cultures which reconcile democracy with cultural identities. Esposito and Voll (1996) accept Gallie's argument that democracy is a contested concept, and go on to say that other cultures have something to offer. To engage with this view, I shall refer to Philip Hitti (1948, p. 15) who suggests that the Arab clan is run along democratic lines:

> In judicial, military and other affairs of common concern the sheikh is not an absolute authority; he must consult with the tribal council composed of the heads of component families. His tenure of office lasts during the good-will of his constituency.

To avoid giving the impression that the above interpretation stretches the comparison with democracy, it is necessary to show that Hitti refers to the Arab as democrat (p. 15):

> The Arabian in general and the Bedouin in particular is a born democrat. He meets his sheikh on an equal footing. The society in which he lives levels everything down. The Arabian almost never uses the title *malik* (king) except in referring to foreign rulers.

Esposito and Voll (1996, p. 23) also suggest that al-Mawdudi has developed an Islamic concept of democracy. I shall discuss their suggestion and the concept in the chapter about democracy and Islam/ism. I will limit myself here to pointing out that in making the argument that other cultures have different conceptualisations of democracy, Esposito and Voll disagree with the next argument in this discussion, namely, that democracy cannot take root in all cultures.

Democracy and Cultures

The idea that democracy can only prosper in specific cultural or religious settings belongs to Max Weber who has argued that capitalism and democracy required Christian Protestant ethics. As regards Islam, Weber compared it to Judaism and concluded that it 'lacked the requirement of a comprehensive knowledge of the law and lacked the intellectual training in casuistry which nurtured the rationalism of Judaism' (in Hunter and Malik 2005: pp. 11-12). Weber was not an orientalist who had immersed himself in studying Arabic and Islam. Therefore, his conclusion should be met with scepticism.

Rodinson (1977, p. 91) contradicts Weber and reaches the conclusion that 'the Koran accords a much larger place to reason than the scared books of Judaism and Christianity'. In addition, Francis Fukuyama (1992, pp. 220-221) disagrees with Weber:

> Weber's account of democracy is, as usual, historically rich and insightful. But he portrays democracy as something that could only have arisen in the specific cultural and social milieu of a small corner of the Western civilization.

Fukuyama is dismissive of the arguments that there are 'cultural "prerequisites" for democracy' and calls for treating them 'with some scepticism,' because 'cultures are not static phenomena like the laws of nature; they are human creations that undergo continuous process of evolution' (p. 222). However, as shall be seen in another chapter, Fukuyama contradicts himself when it comes to Islam and democracy.

Prerequisites for Democracy

There is a variety of other prerequisites which scholars argue should be satisfied before democracy can work as a system of government. Huntington (1991) summarises factors that are supposed to 'explain democratization' (pp. 37-38). The list includes factors such as being 'a British colony' and 'occupation by a prodemocratic foreign power'. If the latter factor was true, it would have produced democratic states in the Arab world, whose regions were occupied by Britain and France.

Lipset (1959) identifies a relationship between democracy and development by looking at indices related to 'industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education'. However, he warns against concluding that 'an increase in wealth, in the size of the middle class, in education, and other related factors will necessarily mean the spread of democracy or the stabilizing of democracy' (p. 103). His warning is sound as the wealth acquired by the oil-producing countries in the Arab world did not lead to democracy, despite the fact that the wealth also led to an increase in education, industrialisation, and urbanisation.

In Przeworski's studies of the link between democracy, dictatorship, and per capita income, he points out that 'democracies survive in wealthy countries' because 'the potential increase in income that would result from establishing their dictatorship is not worth the sacrifice of freedom' (2005, p. 8). Furthermore, Przeworski notes: 'Democracy can survive in poor countries but only under special conditions, namely, when the distribution of income is very egalitarian' (p. 9).

Rustow (1967, p. 228) identifies four 'antecedents of democracy'. They are:

> (1)   A history anywhere from 40 to 130 years of administrative and educational modernization.
>
> (2)   A stable geographic context for the political system throughout the same period.
>
> (3)   A tradition, dating back at least one, two or three generations of parties […] that provided some organic link between rulers and subjects, and that were able to involve progressively larger groups in the political process.
>
> (4)   [T]enacious and bitter conflicts between major social or political groups over issues of profound concern to them (pp. 228-229).

I shall first clarify the difference between modernisation and modernity. The former, as explained by Charlton and Andras (2003), is a 'process' not a 'state', and it 'can be seen as the general mechanism by which the social transformation from agricultural dominance to domination by trade and industry takes place and the permanent continuation of this process' (p. 5). They further explain that 'almost all societies are at least partially modernized' [...] and that 'no society is "completely" modernized' (p. 5).

In contrast, modernity, as defined by Berger (1979, p. 101), is 'the transformation of the world brought about by the technological innovations of the last few centuries, first in Europe and then with increasing rapidity all over the worlds'. As defined by Giddens (1991, p. 1), modernity is based on 'modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the seventeenth century onwards and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence'. However, modernity is not limited to technology. As Berger notes, it had 'economic, social and political dimensions, all immense in scope'. One of its consequences on 'consciousness' was 'fundamentally uprooting beliefs, values, and even emotional texture of life' (p. 101). 'Modernity,' Giddens (1991) argues, 'is universalising'. He asks whether modernity is 'distinctively Western'. His answer is yes, because modernity rests on '*the nation-state* and *systematic capitalist production*', which, according to Giddens, 'have their roots in specific characteristics of European history' (p. 174; italics in original).

It is interesting to note that states in Europe, even those who are members of the EU, do not agree that there is a pan-European identity, and each state insists on its own national identity. Even in some states, such as the UK and Belgium, there are national identities that make a British and Belgian identity more of an official construct. However, all this is ignored in the discussion of notions such as democracy and modernity. The West and Europe become something specific, which Giddens uses to make generalisations in order to contrast the West with the East.

Other scholars are less interested in whether modernity is European or not. They have concerns about the impact of modernity where it has prevailed in the West. For instance, Berger (1979, pp. 102-110) identifies five dilemmas brought about by modernity: (a) abstraction (e.g. capitalist markets, bureaucratised state, and large cities); (b) futurity (the future is the primary orientation); (c) individuation (separation of individual from collective entities); (d) liberation (not determined by fate); and (e) secularization (a threat to the plausibility of religious beliefs).

However, I suggest that the religious revival movements of the 1970s and 1980s undermined the assumptions regarding religious beliefs and secularization.[2]

Of the people who theorised about modernity, I find Rustow (1967) to be the most satisfactory. He suggests that modernisation 'transforms both man and society, but most of all man's mind,'[3] and 'implies an intellectual, a technological and social revolution' (p. 3). I suggest that this provides a better approach to looking at modernity and its impact on non-Western, non-European peoples.

Muslims generally have no problem with the technological aspect of modernity: whether it is cars, TVs, telephones, computers or other technological equipment.[4] The social impact of modernisation is a more complex issue. People take time to adjust. For example, the education of women was considered unnecessary because a woman would most likely get married, and thus stay at home. This attitude however has changed. Parents care about education of their daughters and sons. Moreover, the social transformation does not necessarily follow the Western route. People have adopted and adapted selectively. This, in my view, undermines the unwarranted concern about modernity being Westernisation. However, the process of modernisation does bring with it the some aspects that cause concern even in the West, such as the abstraction and individuation.

The third transformation, the intellectual, is the hardest, and the slowest. When one is brought up to believe that Islam has all the answers, it is hard to accept that there are answers in other notions, such as democracy. I suggest that the intellectual transformation in the Muslim and Arab world not only has begun, but has taken root.

A final point made by Rustow which needs to be brought into this discussion is that modernisation is 'a continuing process, […] and no society can claim to be completely or definitively modern' (p. 16). This, in my view, is a valid conclusion,

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[2] In 1999, Berger acknowledged that he and others who wrote on 'secularisation theory' were wrong: 'The world today, with some exceptions […], is as furiously religious as ever was and in some places even more' (p. 2).

[3] Throughout the book, Rustow uses man. This will make him liable to a feminist critique. Modernisation affects men and women.

[4] Only a tiny minority would oppose the technological aspects. In Saudi Arabia, some people opposed TV broadcasting; so did Taliban in Afghanistan. However, the rejection of technology is selective, as these people may oppose TV broadcasting, but do not mind radios or cars.

and it deprives Giddens and others of the basis on which to say that modernity is Western or European. 'Modernization,' Rustow suggests, 'as an analytical concept has the advantage of being ethically neutral' (p. 8). Having examined other analytical concepts (in this chapter and others), I am inclined to agree with him, even though a completely 'ethically neutral' position is impossible. However, to endeavour to be ethically neutral is necessary. Moreover, it is a better approach than using analytical concepts that are laden with ideological, religious, and cultural prejudices, not in terms of being a personal preference, but in terms of validity of conclusions reached when a particular analytical concept is used.

Before I conclude my discussion of modernity and Rustow's modernisation theory, I propose to elaborate on why I have found it preferable to other theories in relation to Jordan, despite being considered evolutionary and deterministic.

In the methods section of the thesis, I have quoted Strauss and Corbin (1998, pp. 10-11) who argue that 'the nature of the research problem' influences the selection of method. The same applies to choice of theory. I have approached the assessment of the state of democracy in Jordan with an open mind, and the democratic audit itself is not based on a prejudgment about the state of democracy in Jordan. As can be seen in the concluding chapter, other theories were outlined and engaged with, but they were not as plausible at explaining the state of democracy revealed by the audit. The modernisation theory is not dead. It can be found in different forms in many studies, such as those by Przeworski who argues that there is a link between democracy and per capita incomes. Therefore, choosing the modernisation theory is objectively justified.

Moreover, although I find Rustow's reasoning more convincing, I do not uncritically adopt his theory. He is wrong to consider modernisation 'tantamount to Westernization' in the cases of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire (p. 11). He is also wrong to have considered Lebanon a democracy and its 'religious denominations' a substitute for political parties in his four antecedents (p. 228). The Lebanese Civil War, which erupted in the 1970s and continued to the 1990s, has demonstrated that Lebanon was not a democracy, and that some members of the various 'religious denominations' were capable of committing unspeakable crimes against members of

other communities. The Lebanese example negates the argument that religious denominations can be a suitable substitute for political parties.

The different theories about what democracy means, its models, and conceptualisations lead some scholars, such as Mouffe (2000), to note that there is no agreement on how to characterise the 'type of democracy established in the West in the course of the last two centuries' (p. 1). Amongst the names used in this regard: 'modern democracy, pluralist democracy, constitutional democracies [and] liberal democracy'. Mouffe, however, has contributed to the confusion by theorising about 'radical democracy' which she describes as 'the only alternative' and urges 'the Left' to 'adopt a different attitude towards liberal democracy' (1995, p. 1). This makes it clear that the confusion is not real.

Whitehead (2000) acknowledges the diverse connotations of democracy in different cultures, and that it is not possible to 'assume some underlying continuity of meaning for the term' since the Greek city-state (p. 8). However, he pleads for some agreement on the meaning (p. 8):

> Even those who regard 'democracy' as an inherently normative label may have good reason to favour clear and impartial procedures for evaluating the status of claimants to the title. And even those who regard a 'minimalist' or 'procedural' definition as incomplete or culturally biased must consider what may be lost if this consensual language is replaced not by universal commitment to a more ambitious definition but by an inability to agree on a standard meaning, with the resulting licence for subjectivity and arbitrariness.

Moreover, as Ottaway (2007) suggests: 'There is no reason to challenge at the theoretical level the idea that democracy is a political system superior to all others' (p. 604). I agree with second part of her statement. Theoretical challenges are abound. However, unless and until a better system of government emerges and proves itself to be superior to democracy, liberal democracy is the best model available, despite its defects and the arguments that it is a Eurocentric notion.

That democracy is not a 'perfect' notion and system of government is not in dispute. Lefort (1988) acknowledges that 'democratic institutions have constantly been used to restrict means of access to power, knowledge and the enjoyments of rights to a minority' (p. 19). However, he stresses that 'democracy is instituted and sustained by the *dissolution of the makers of certainty*. It inaugurates a history of which people

experience a fundamental indeterminacy as to the basis of power, law and knowledge' (p. 19; italics in original). He goes further and suggests that 'philosophy owes [a great deal] to the democratic experience' (p. 20).

Evolution of Definitions of Democracy

Lipset (1959) defines democracy as 'a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials' (p. 71). In Finer's definition (1970) 'democracy is government which is derived from public opinion and is accountable to it'. He further explains that the public opinion' should be 'overtly and freely expressed'. The third pillar of the Finer's definition of democracy is that the will of the 'majority prevails' (p. 63).

There is a problematic element in Finer's definition: the 'public opinion'. One reason is that he uses it as a substitute for the 'people' when they are different. Another reason is that there is a need to measure public opinion.[5] This is usually done in polls, whose accuracy and reliability are never certain. In a democracy, however, the tangible public opinion (of the majority) is known only after the results of the elections are declared.

Rustow (1967) also offers a definition in which he characterises democracy as 'a modern political system and an egalitarian device,' and 'a method of popular government; it presupposes the existence of a government and of a people' (p. 230-231).

Schumpeter ([1942] 1976, p. 269) explains that what he calls the 'classical' theory of democracy envisages a 'common good', which is achieved by the people through electing individuals who represent them. The classical theory assumes that people have 'a definite and rational opinion about every individual question,' and, on that basis, they elect the individuals who will represent them and 'who will see to it that that opinion is carried out'. However, the decisions that can be made through democracy must not be contrary to some values and ideals. For instance, it will not be acceptable through democratic means to allow 'the persecution of Christians, the burning of witches and the slaughtering of the Jews' (p.242).

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[5] Even the public is hard to define, and there are multiple publics in a state. Also, the broadest possible public hold more than one opinion at a time, and can change opinion overnight.

Democracy, Schumpeter argues, is 'a political method,' and 'an institutional arrangement,' whose aim is to reach decisions, 'legislative and administrative' (p.242). He challenges the basic assumptions of the classical theory of democracy. His definition of the 'the democratic method' is the 'institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote' (p. 269).

In relation to democracy in South Africa, Deegan (1999) adopted the Schumpeterian 'general model of the competitive theory' because 'Schumpeter defined democracy not as a utopian concept concerned with ideal societies, but rather as a descriptive, realistic and empirically accurate process (p. 3). She points out that 'pluralism is identified with liberalism and the acceptance of certain values', such as 'freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly, which a government would be unable to violate' (p. 3).

Brynen, Korany, and Noble (1995) warn against 'the ethnocentric dangers of reading processes derived from one set of historical and political circumstances into other, very different, contexts'. However, they also warn against considering democracy to be dependent on 'the eye of the beholder'. Therefore, they argue convincingly that 'some conceptual rigour is necessary if the notion of democracy is not debased to mean all things to all people' (p. 4). Moreover, O'Donnell (2007) contends that 'there is agreement in most of the contemporary world that, whatever it means, democracy is a normatively preferable type of rule' (p. 3). Sadiki (2004) seems to agree partly with O'Donnell, but argues that 'a normative standpoint should not mean overlooking, for instance, cultural specificity' (p. 54).

As Huntington (1991) explains, there have been three approaches to democracy since the middle of last century. As a form of government, Huntington writes, 'democracy has been defined in terms of authority of government, purposes served by the government, and procedures for constituting a government'. The debate continued from the 1940s until the 1970s, when Schumpeter won the argument. Huntington notes that there are issues of 'ambiguity and imprecision when democracy is defined

in terms of either source or authority and purposes'. Consequently, he adopts the procedural definition of democracy advanced by Schumpeter (p. 6). The advantage of the procedural definition of democracy, Huntington (1991) explains, is that 'it provides a number of bench-marks […] that make it possible to judge to what extent political systems are democratic, to compare systems, and to analyse whether systems are becoming more or less democratic' (p. 7).

Dahl (1989) has developed some benchmarks. He also uses the term 'polyarchy' and considers it the highest level of democracy. According to Dahl, polyarchy has two main characteristics: (a) citizenship is extended to a relatively high proportion of adults, and (b) the rights of citizenship include the opportunity to oppose and vote out the highest officials in government. Furthermore, seven institutions are required to attain polyarchy: (1) elected officials; (2) free and fair elections; (3) inclusive suffrage; (4) right to run for office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) alternative information; (7) and associational autonomy (p. 220).

'Democracy,' as succinctly stated by Keane (1991), 'is best understood as a system of procedural rules with normative implications' (p. 168). The rules are about making decisions, and 'through which *procedures* such decisions are made'. The normative implications, according to Keane, must include: 'equal and universal adult suffrage; majority rule and guarantees of minority rights […]; the rule of law; and constitutional guarantees of freedom of assembly and expression and other liberties' (pp. 168-169; italics are in original).

Interestingly, al-Ghannouchi's (1993) view of democracy is similar to Keane's. He argues that democracy has shakl wa maḏmūn (a form and content/implication). The maḏmūn recognises the value of the human and gives him rights such as equality. He emphasises that a system which is based on the recognition of dignity of the human being is the best (1993, p. 77).

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Keane's definition of democracy is the one adopted in this thesis.[6] Nonetheless, the principle of rule of law requires a cautionary note. It is a very important principle. However, even dictators use the law as a tool of oppression. Therefore, it is necessary to have transparent mechanisms of enacting laws, and a supreme court should be the final arbiter as to whether a law is constitutional or not.

To conclude this part, I would like to state that its purpose has been to establish a definition of democracy which informs this thesis. I approach the assessment of Jordan's state of democracy on the basis that it means liberal, representative democracy (Sartori 1962) and is a system of procedural rules with normative implications (Keane 1991). It will be an absurdity to engage in an exercise to assess the state of democracy in Jordan if it is carried out on the basis that democracy is a meaningless concept. The discussion, however, will continue in the following chapters.

PART 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

In this part, I shall review some primary and secondary sources. The former includes a speech by King Hussein in which he announced holding elections, and policy documents of the MB/IAF. The secondary literature includes published books and unpublished PhD theses.

(A) Primary Sources

In the speech to the nation delivered on 7 October 1989, King Hussein says that many people believe that 'we are knocking on the doors of a new era only because we are **resuming our democratic parliamentary life**' (my emphasis).[7] He explains that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in June 1967 is the reason for not exercising democracy for twenty-two years, as it 'was impossible to hold such elections'. King Hussein's statement has two parts. The parliamentary part of the

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[6] In 2009, Keane published a new book: *The Life and Death of Democracy*. He stresses that the book 'most certainly stands on the side of democracy, with new arguments' (p. xxxiii).
[7] Posted on King Hussein's official website (http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/speeches_letters.html).

statement is correct. There was a parliament before June 1967. The elections for its HoD were held in April 1967, a couple of months before the 1967 war. King Hussein's characterisation of that parliamentary life as democratic is problematic in view of the previous definitions of democracy. If one uses Lipset's definition (1959), the political system in Jordan before 1967 did not provide 'regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials' (p. 71).

Elections on their own, however, do not make a country or a political system democratic.[8] Political parties were banned in Jordan since 1957. Civil and political freedoms were restricted. Even the elections of 1989 were held while political parties were banned. They became legal to form and operate in 1992.

King Hussein warned in the speech of the dangers of mixing politics and religion, citing the example of Lebanon, where the civil war was still going on:

> With attempts to exploit religion for political purposes and their repercussions on Lebanon, in the form of warring organizations, militias and parties, we should be very cautious as to what is intended to be portrayed or become a Christian-Islamic strife in Lebanon.

This paragraph reflects the king's unease at how Islamic candidates might act in the campaign, given that the MB was allowed to participate in the elections. However, he only chose to appeal to the conscience of the candidates and voters to act responsibly.

I shall now refer to major MB/IAF documents: three electoral manifestos (1993, 2003, and 2007), and the MB/IAF's 'vision' for reform in Jordan (2005). The 1993 manifesto introduces IAF to the electorate, emphasises its Islamic nature, and explains the slogan 'Islam is the solution' (p. 1). The introduction also stresses the importance of the Palestine question. The manifesto of 1993 is a booklet of fifty-four pages which contain a detailed programme. Any suggestion that the IAF/MB run on a single slogan is baseless. Moreover, the four documents have a great deal in common. One can consider them as slightly modified versions of each other. The

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[8] In relation to the notion of 'elections without democracy', Sadiki (2009) extensively demonstrates that the Arab world has seen a phenomenon he calls '*electoralism*' and '*election fetishism*' between 1975 and 1997 (p. vii; italics in original).

introductions to the manifestos of 2003 and 2007 are much shorter, and they contain language that is less religious. The fact that the manifesto of 1993 was IAF's first could explain the need for a longer introduction and the use of the religious language, which relied on quoting the Qur'an and hadith.

Moreover, the four documents of IAF/MB have a major common theme in relation to freedoms and democracy in Jordan: dissatisfaction, which led to boycotting the elections in 1997 and 2010. A democratic audit of Jordan will help establish the extent of democracy in Jordan, and consequently will indirectly test the IAF/MB claims with regard to the defects of democracy in Jordan.

(B) Secondary Sources

This part of the review covers research carried out by al-Sharah (1997); Robinson (1998); Boulby (1999); Lynch (1999); Wiktorowicz (2001); Lust-Okar (2001); Moaddel (2002); Noyon (2003); al-Braizat (2003); Knowles (2005); Lucas (2005); Schwedler (2006); Brown (2006); Jamal (2007); Massad (2001), and Gunning (2009).

Boulby (1999) studies the MB movement in Jordan from 1945 to 1993. She points out that in the elections of 1989, the movement 'shied away from references to an Islamic state and indeed focused on the general compatibility of Islam and democracy'. Consequently, the movement attracted support from Palestinians and Transjordanians 'whose primary concern was democratization rather than Islamization' (p. 107).

In addition, she refers to the fact that the MB took part in the elections of 1954, and had done so 'for pragmatic reasons, namely, in order to increase political influence'. In the 1980s, Boulby notes, the movement 'made much of the compatibility of its political goals with liberal democracy,' and 'stressed the central role of the Islamic principle of shura as being similar to the notion of parliamentary representation' (pp. 115-116). She also notes that although 'the attainment of liberal democracy was not the Brotherhood's ultimate goal the movement nonetheless served as a liberating force in Jordanian politics' (p. 116).

Although Boulby's research and mine share interest in the MB and democracy in Jordan, her research spans a period of nearly fifty years, and stops at 1993, a few years after the elections of 1989. The focus of my research is a period of twenty years (1990-2010) during which six rounds of elections took place.

Schwedler (2006) refers to the point of compatibility of Islam and democracy when she quotes ʿAbd al-Latif ʿArabiyyat as saying that IAF sees 'democracy as contemporary form of *Shura*, a mechanism through which we can govern in accordance with God's laws'. She points out, however, that ʿArabiyyat explained that the 'ultimate sovereignty lies in the hands of God, and not the people, as "Western" versions of democracy demand' (p. 157).

Schwedler's approach is comparative. She seeks to examine 'the implied causal link between inclusion and moderation' (p. 2). She has chosen to compare the IAF in Jordan and the Islah (Reform) Party in Yemen. The two parties are Islamic in orientation, and both participated in competitive elections which took place in the two countries. While interest in IAF is common, my research is not comparative. Mine seeks to establish how democratic Jordan is.

Al-Braizat (2003) examines the issue of Islam and liberal democracy with Jordan as a case study. His thesis is highly relevant, as it deals with Jordan and the in/compatibility between Islam and liberal democracy. Al-Braizat disagrees with the culturalist/orientalist tradition dominating the literature on Islam and Middle East politics which argues that 'there is an *inherent incompatibility* between Islam and political modernity' (p. 14; emphasis in original).

Al-Braizat's approach is empirical. He conducts a poll which leads him to conclude that Islam and democracy are not incompatible and that Muslims in Jordan are keen on democracy. According to al-Braizat, 'rational choice theory has a lot to offer in explaining why Arab states have not democratised yet' (p. 16). He faults the scholars who use 'the Freedom House scores for the twenty three Muslim countries as a representation of "democracy and individual rights" in these countries' and fail to recognise 'that these scores represent regimes' performance not attitudes of the populations at large' (p. 44).

Although al-Braizat revisits the claim of incompatibility of Islam and democracy, he does not examine the issue from the perspective of Muslims who have said that Islam and democracy are incompatible. Moreover, although rational choice theory can partly explain the absence of democracy in Jordan, one remains in doubt as to whether people truly wish to live under an undemocratic system of government, despite al-Braizat's finding that there was no incompatibility between Islam and democracy.

Lucas (2005) examines the other side of the coin of the incompatibility claim, namely 'the features of authoritarian regimes that facilitate the stability of autocracy' (p. 1). He seeks to explain how the 'Jordanian regime managed to survive external challenges and control domestic threats'. Lucas asks: 'Can the Jordanian monarchy's success help explain the surprising durability of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world?' His method is based on the 'institutional approach,' which 'blends the culturalist, structuralist and rationalists accounts' (p. 1). The culturalist element in the blend is a cause for concern, especially in light of the fact that the culturalist tradition has been criticised, not least in Al-Braizat's PhD thesis referred to above.

Moreover, as Lucas points out, his study 'concerns itself with the Jordanian regime's manipulation of institutional rules in three venues: political parties, the Jordanian Parliament […] and the press' (p. 7). This is relevant to my research as these issues are addressed in the democratic audit. However, the democratic audit covers many more issues, and the time period of interest in also different.

Wiktorowicz (2001) studies not only the MB, but other Islamic groups, specifically the Salafi movement. His study is useful in alerting researchers to the need to avoid sweeping generalisations, namely, that because the relationship between the MB and regime was cordial in the past, it would remain so permanently. Subsequent events support his inclination not to generalise. Ever since the MB/IAF became the main opposition group in Jordan, the conflicts with the government have been on the

increase, especially during the premiership of Maʿruf al-Bakhit, who had harsh words for the leadership of IAF/MB for boycotting the municipal elections in 2006.

In one chapter, Wiktorowicz looks at the organisations that belong to the Islamic movements. He notes that these organisations are dominated by men (p. 88). He attributes this to the fact that 'the Islamic movements themselves are dominated by men,' and to the 'Islamist values of segregation, which separates men and women and typically places women in less public role' (p. 88). This is hardly surprising. Religious movements are conservative in nature, especially in the Muslim world. The examination of the MB's attitude towards women and their rights required deeper analysis.

Noyon (2003) examines Islam and politics in four countries: Turkey, Jordan, Tunisia and Algeria. According to Noyon, there are four currents within the IAF (p. 92):

> (1) The pragmatists are those who 'advocate working with the government by consensus'.
>
> (2) The activists focus on 'domestic political reform, international Muslim solidarity, and non-normalization of relations with Israel'.
>
> (3) Traditional conservatives concentrate on 'reforms of the sharia religious education'.
>
> (4) Ultra-Conservatives are 'doctrinaire on social issues and rejectionist on foreign policy'.

If the foreign policy concerns relations with Israel, and/or the USA, one can see why the rejectionist term is used by Noyon. A state's foreign policy, however, is not based on the attitude towards a single issue or one country. Jordan has relations with many countries. Therefore, to use the attitude towards the 'peace process' in the Middle East as a basis to describe a group as 'rejectionist' is not justified.

Noyon points out that 'Westernized elites tolerate inept, corrupt and repressive regimes out of fear that an Islamic regime would not guarantee their rights and would be more socially repressive' (p. 25). One wonders whether these elites adopt this attitude only out of concern with their rights. There is also a possibility that these elites have common interests with the rulers and the fear Noyon refers to is a pretext.

Moreover, it is untenable to argue that there are always two choices: authoritarianism or a very conservative way of life. Although the point about Westernised elites is brief, Noyon makes a good case for why the Islamists should be included in the political process (p. 95):

> If change is to be based on the model of multi-party, democratic system, it will of necessity involve the question of integrating political Islamists who address the interest of merging classes and social trends and who seek to participate in government.

In relation to Jordan, this kind of advice has been heeded but, as has been argued by Robinson (1998), what happened in Jordan was 'defensive democratization', as will be outlined below.

Brown's study (2006) of IAF/MB is highly relevant to my own research. Brown notes that IAF 'may be the most democratic party in the region in terms of internal operations' (p. 3). He further notes that the IAF 'has built an impressive set of democratic structures internally. Party leaders are elected by membership and there is regular turnover in top positions' (p. 6). Brown's sole focus is the IAF/MB. In contrast, my research project has sought to explore the conditions in which the IAF/MB operate, and to assess the state of democracy in Jordan.

Al-Sharah's PhD thesis (1997) is about the process which was launched in 1989. He states that his objective is 'to explore and analyse the political liberalization in Jordan,' and 'to review Jordan's experience with representative institutions at earlier periods' (p. 1). The most relevant part of his study is the period between 1989 and 1993. Even in this part, his approach is broad in that he looks at all parties, not just the MB/IAF. Al-Sharah concludes that '[a]n unwritten pact seems to exist between the monarchy and the Islamists, resulting in what could be described as the major potential opposition following the rules of the liberalization process' (p. 323).

Wiktorowicz (2001) makes a similar point in relation to the MB when he notes that it 'never seriously challenged the legitimacy or power of the ruling regime' (p. 95). In contrast, 'the Egyptian Brotherhood experienced violent clashes with president ʿAbd al-Nasser'. Although Wiktorowicz mentions the 'relatively cordial and cooperative relationship with the Hashimite monarchy' (p. 95), he also refers to issues on which both sides disagreed, such as the British presence in the country; the relationship

with the Shah of Iran in 1978 and 1979; Jordan's support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War; and keeping diplomatic ties with Egypt when other Arab states severed them after the signing of the Camp David Accords (p. 99).

Moaddel (2002) studies the relationship between the state and religious movements in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Syria. In the three Arab countries, he studies the relationship with the MB. In Egypt there is an active Christian Coptic religious movement which is not included in Moaddel's book. Nonetheless, my thesis shares Moaddel's interest in studying Jordan and the relationship between the MB and the state. Moaddel advocates a notion of 'Jordanian exceptionalism' because unlike Syria and Egypt, there has been no persecution of the MB in Jordan. Moaddel suggests that 'the state's inclusionary policy towards the MB solidified the MB-Hashimite alliance' (p. 3). This is another uncritical view of the relationship between both sides. It is untenable in light of subsequent events and the change of monarch in 1999. Moreover, the suggestion of an inclusionary policy is in need of scrutiny to establish whether, and to what extent, it is inclusionary. The democratic audit asks specific questions in this regard.

The validity of the statements about a pact, written or not, between the regime and the MB, is not sustainable when one looks at the period up until 2010. The MB/IAF boycotted the elections in 1997 and 2010. The relationship between King ʿAbdullah II and the MB/IAF is different from the one maintained by King Hussein. Moreover, the relationship between the governments and the MB/IAF became adversarial.

Boulby (1999) examines the issue of popularity of the MB in the elections and attempts to explain it. Despite incomplete information about the breakdown of election results with regard to gender and occupation, she notes (p. 105):

> Analysis of this regional breakdown of the Brotherhood's vote highlights its ability to appeal to all social classes and both Palestinians and Transjordanians. The Brotherhood was elected in the urban centers of Amman and Irbid which have the kingdom's highest concentration of Palestinians, ranging from the wealthiest to destitute camp-dwellers. The movement also won seats in the richest constituencies of Amman, home of the East Bank and Palestinian business elite.

Therefore, Boulby disagrees with the suggestion that the appeal of the MB can be explained by 'a single universal economic or political explanation'. She quotes other

scholars, such as Davis, Marty, and Appleby, who disagree with downplaying the importance of religion in people's lives (p.106).

Boulby's study is realistic in its approach, especially when she recognises the fact that the MB enjoys the support of a cross-section of the population of Jordan. However, she too repeats the criticism of the Islamic movements in general that their ideology is vague, and their 'political agenda' is 'ill-defined' (p. 115). The MB/IAF documents briefly reviewed above do not support this conclusion. However, in fairness one can say that these documents were not available at the time she conducted her research in Jordan.

Noyon (2003) observes that Jordan 'has allowed Islamists more freedom to organise and more autonomy in their social and *political activities* than have most other Arab states' (p. 81; emphasis added). There is some generalisation here, especially regarding the political activities towards which the government still shows hostility, and often prevents political activities from taking place.

Robinson (1998) considers Jordan a 'rentier state', namely, one which depends on 'international rents instead of direct taxation for a disproportionate share of its government revenues' (p. 389). In relation to the elections of 1993, Robinson disagrees with the suggestion that the popularity of the Islamists declined. He notes that 'they did so well in an electoral system clearly designed to work against their interest' (p. 399). The measurement of their success is reflected in winning 'more than a quarter of all parliamentary seats', which is equivalent to 'a third of all non-quota seats' (p. 399).

Robinson attributes the success of MB/IAF to three factors: (a) being 'the best-organised' group which was able to provide 'social services in places where the government had little such presence'; (b) the candidates 'were seen as pious, selfless, and incorruptible'; and (c) the Palestine question and support from the Palestinians in Jordanian cities (p. 399).

Lust-Okar (2001) studies political parties in Jordan, including the MB and IAF. She points out that in the 1950s, 'the Muslim Brotherhood never gained more than four seats, or 10 percent, of Parliament in any one election. Hizb al-Tahrir fared worse,

gaining only one seat in the 1954 and 1956 elections' (p. 558). In contrast, the MB/IAF 'won twenty-two seats in the 1989 elections, and sixteen in the 1993 elections' (p. 558).

In explaining the change of fortunes, Lust-Okar attributes the success to three reasons. Firstly, the MB 'operated openly during the 1970s and 1980s […] as a social organization'. Secondly, the MB built 'organizational strength' as a result of having its headquarters in Jordan (unlike other parties). Consequently, the MB 'built social service organizations such as hospitals and charities that raised its profile and strengthened its relationship with the masses'. Thirdly, 'the Islamists have benefited from regional conditions', namely, 'the 'Iranian Revolution and the increased activity of Islamist political organizations across the region'. Consequently, the MB was able 'to capitalize on this regional rise in popularity' (pp. 558-559).

The reasons cited by Robinson and Lust-Okar are in need of re-examination because the MB/IAF could not sustain the good results achieved in 1989 and 1993. The questions to be answered in this regard are related to whether the MB/IAF have exhausted their appeal, become less organised, or there is some other reason.

Knowles (2005) has studied the political economy of Jordan since 1989, which makes his study highly relevant. Knowles focuses on the political economy and does not address the issues of incompatibility of democracy and Islam/ism, or the state of democracy in Jordan. He firmly places Jordan's economy in the rentier category. The relevance of this characterisation is that there are suggestions that democracy is unlikely to establish a foothold in a rentier state. For example, Robinson (1998, p. 390) notes that one of the characteristics of a rentier state is the 'depoliticization' of the society. He observes that 'rentier states are better situated to resist demands for significant democratic expansion if the fiscal crisis is limited in scope and time […] Conversely, if a rentier state is compelled by budgetary realities to permanently extract greater resources from its own society (namely, through taxation), then demands for greater inclusion and substantive political restructuring would be difficult to resist' (p. 389).

Moreover, Robinson characterises the process which started in Jordan in the late 1980s as 'defensive democratization'. His argument is that 'the process is best

understood as a series of preemptive measures designed to maintain elite privilege in Jordan while limiting the appeal of more fundamental political change' (p. 387). He points out that King Hussein has 'sought to undermine the only social force legally able to disrupt key regime policies, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, and its political party, the Islamic Action Front' (p. 387). According to Robinson, 'Parliament's primary task was to legitimate King Hussein's political agenda' (p. 393). In this regard, the democratic audit covers the role of parliament in contributing to democracy. Therefore, there will be a detailed assessment which may support or undermine the assertion.

Al-Sharah (1997) concludes that 'Jordan has emerged as the most democratically open country in the Arab world, in the sense that all political groups and tendencies including the Islamists, can participate in the political process' (p. 323). It is not clear what al-Sharah means by 'most democratically open' and why he only chose to make the comparison in the context of the Arab world. One is left in doubt as to whether there are democratic countries in the Arab world, and how he can reach the conclusion that Jordan is the most democratic. His assessment is not based on one of the various methods used to assess the state of democracy in a given country.

Schwedler (2006) asserts that Jordan does not even come 'close to meeting the most basic manifestations for democracy' (p. 2). Lynch (1999) clarifies that his study is 'not a comprehensive political history of Jordan, or an overview of the Jordanian political system' (p. 31). His study is related to international relations theory. However, of interest is his assertion that since 1989 'political discussion in Jordan has become remarkably free and open on even the most sensitive topics' (p. 31). This is another example of an assessment not based on well-defined criteria.

Robinson (1998) uses 'democratization' and 'liberalization' when he refers to the process which started in 1989. When he uses the former he says it 'has not followed the same path as the recent democratic transitions' elsewhere in the world. When he uses 'liberalization' he argues that it is 'a series of pre-emptive measures designed to maintain elite privilege' (p. 347). In these assessments/judgements, there are no criteria mentioned with regard to how they are reached.

Milton-Edwards (1993) quotes Finer (1970) who classified Jordan as 'façade democracy.' She tests whether this is still valid and concludes that although there have been changes since 1989, 'there is little evidence to contradict Finer's classification of Jordan as façade democracy' (p. 201). Therefore, one must first identify Finer's criteria before further discussion of the point.

Façade democracy, as defined by Finer (1970), is 'a system where liberal-democratic institutions, processes, and safeguards, are established by law but in practice so manipulated or violated by a historic oligarchy as to stay in office' (p. 441). Taking this as a crude form of measurement, one can say Milton-Edwards conclusion is not erroneous. However, the criteria she used were not detailed enough. Moreover, after the war of 1967, Jordan suspended parliamentary life, and after the clashes of September of 1970, there were no institutions that could be appropriately called the 'liberal democratic institutions, processes and safeguards'. It is correct, however, to observer that the prime concern of the ruling dynasty is to stay in office, by means of manipulation and violation as Finer observes.

Finer's criteria are not calibrated well-enough to measure various aspects of a democratic system. This situation leads one to search for better criteria to assess the state of democracy in a given country. The democratic audit provides a detailed assessment.

Jamal (2007) studies barriers to democracy in the Palestinian territories, Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco. She explains that 'the discourse on civil society has remained a key feature of democracy promotion initiatives' (p.1). She sets out to test whether civil society organisations (CSOs) in these countries 'promote or depress' democracy. In her view, the relationship of associations to clientelistic and authoritarian governments is dramatically different from that between associations and democracies' (p. 3). In relation to Jordan, Jamal refers to the Jordanian law concerning voluntary and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) which gives the authorities 'the right to enter the offices of any NGO to review its records' (p. 121).

Because Jamal studies civil society in four countries, one can see that her treatment of each country is brief. While her contribution to the field of civil society is valuable, the assessment of the state of democracy is not her concern. The democratic audit asks relevant questions about civil society which will draw a clearer picture for this sector and the overall state of democracy in Jordan.

Massad (2001) studies identity making in Jordan. He explains that his intention is 'to describe and analyse the processes through which peoples and territories that were constituted as a nation in 1921 came to accept this designation and within a few decades began to agitate for political rights based on it' (p. 14). The most relevant part of Massad's study is his discussion of the Palestinian-Transjordanian relations. The discrimination against the Palestinians, he suggested, 'became increasingly institutionalized: there was less government representation, less employment in the public sector, fewer academic opportunities, and less access to public funds' (pp. 13-14).

 Although my research covers Palestinian-Transjordanian relations in the context of the histories of Jordan and Palestine as well as the context of the democratic audit vis-a-vis the agreement on citizenship, my approach is unrelated to Massad's. His research belongs to cultural and identity studies.

Gunning (2009) studies Hamas, which is the armed group of the MB in Palestine. I chose to include his book in this review because of the organic link been the MB/IAF in Jordan and MB/Hamas in Palestine. Gunning studies Hamas's documents and interviews its leaders to establish how decisions are informed by political and democratic theory. Gunning says: 'Political theory informs both Hamas's utopian worldview, and its day-to-day decisions' (p. 55). I would agree with him to a limited extent in that the leaders of Hamas are educated people, some of whom would be familiar with political theory and informed by it. However, I cannot agree with him that when Hamas leaders meet to make a decision they would discuss political theory and how it can inform the decisions they need to make.

Gunning disagrees with the arguments that Hamas is incapable of change. 'Politics,' Gunning notes, 'is never static. Neither are political organizations'. He further explains that 'Hamas has changed since its inception' (p. 2). The evidence supports

Gunning's contention. For instance, Hamas did not participate in the elections after the Oslo Agreement, but participated and won in 2006. The same principle applies to MB/IAF in Jordan. They change too.

Literature review: conclusion

There are five gaps in the literature reviewed above. The first gap is related to time. The literature reviewed covers part of the period of interest (1990-2010), and stops at the elections of 1993. This reflects a surge in interest in Jordan after King Hussein decided to hold elections in 1989, and appears to have subsided after a while. None of the studies reviewed above assesses the state of democracy in Jordan over a period of twenty years. Because the assessment was for a period of several years after the elections of 1989, the reliability of conclusions is in question. For instance, that the MB or IAF is the most organised party in 1989 and 1993 explains the high number of seats in the elections of these years. However, the same factor fails to explain the dwindling number of seats in subsequent elections, which went down to six in 2007. None of the studies was in a position to evaluate the process at a juncture which calls for such an evaluation, namely, after a period of time which is equivalent to a generation.

Second, there is more focus on the MB/IAF than on the government in assessing the democratic process. The slogans, programmes or lack thereof, and the appeal of the MB/IAF are examined. Yet a detailed assessment of the state of democracy is absent, especially the role of the government in improving or hindering the state of democracy.

The third gap is related to methods. With the exception of al-Braizat, who conducted a poll, other researchers used in-depth interviews and ethnographic research methods. Therefore, there is a distinct advantage to using the democratic audit to produce a detailed assessment by Jordanians. The audit enables comparison with countries that have been audited, or will be in the future.

A fourth aspect is that a case study of more than one country has advantages, especially in attempting to reach generalisable conclusions. However, a distinct disadvantage is that limitations on time and word count of a book or thesis force the

authors to summarise heavily the case of each country to an extent that leaves one disappointed at the lack of depth.

A by-product of conducting a democratic audit of Jordan is to test the method of the audit. A great deal of importance is attached to methods in research projects. No researchers can get away with a thesis or a report without outlining the methods used. Methods that have been used over time, and have become established, require less justification, as they have been tested repeatedly and the scepticism about them has subsided. In the case of the democratic audit, there was an opportunity to use a new method and test it at the same time. Even if the method proved unreliable, which I hasten to add it was not, there would still be a benefit in testing the procedure to confirm the reliability of the method, the need to modify it, or to abandon it all together.

This chapter constitutes the theoretical track of the thesis. It focuses on the claims of incompatibility between democracy and both Islam and Islamism. The part concerned with the claims made by Muslims examines their religious justifications. The chapter also addresses the issue of whether democracy and shariˁa can co-exist. In the discussion of Islamism, the chapter engages with some of the proposals to safeguard against changing the democratic nature of the system if the Islamists come to power.

PART 1: ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY

Islam[1] is a religion which emanated in the cities of Mecca and Medina in what is currently known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Its Prophet, Muhammad, preached a message that there is only one god, Allah, and that he is his messenger. A statement to this effect brings a non-Muslim into Islam. When Muhammad started to preach the new message, he and his followers were persecuted in Mecca. Consequently, he instructed them to emigrate to Medina and he joined them there.

In Medina, the Muslims practised their religion freely, and were able to attract more followers. Their strength increased over the years. They were able to re-enter Mecca and rid it of idols worshiped by its people. Islam branched out of Mecca and Medina, and over the centuries, Muslims conquered vast areas of the world. It is currently followed by a billion people; the majority of whom are non-Arabs.

Prophet Muhammad belonged to the strongest tribe, Quraysh, which had its prominent families and subclans, from which old and modern dynasties take their names—such as the Umayyad, Abbasid, and Hashimite of Jordan.

The history of Islam is full of power struggles and internal conflicts. The first occurred immediately after the death of Muhammad. The dispute was about who was

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[1] The information contained in this section is very basic for a Muslim. Many books introduce and explain Islam to non-Muslims. See for instance John Esposito's *Islam: The Straight Path*.

the most deserving to succeed him: someone from the people who emigrated with him from Mecca; someone from the people who welcomed him and his followers in Medina; or someone from his extended family, such as his cousin ʿAli. The outcome of this dispute was the selection of Abu Bakr, the friend of Muhammad, and his father-in-law, whose title became the successor (khalifa, caliph).

The early disputes produced two branches of Islam: Sunni and Shiʿi. In the former, Prophet Muhammad's statements and actions (sunna) are given paramount importance, only second to the Qur'an. In the latter, Muhammad's cousin, ʿAli (the fourth caliph) and members of his family have a special status, and are considered infallible.

The Sunni branch is the larger one. The CIA (2010) estimates that it 'accounts for over 75% of the world's Muslim population, while the Shiʿi 'represents 10-20% of Muslims worldwide'. The Shiʿa are concentrated in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon. Shiʿi communities, however, live in many other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, India, Pakistan, and Turkey.

Religious practices and interpretations vary from one Muslim country to another. There are variations even within the same country and within the same branch of Islam. In Jordan, 92 percent of the population are Sunni Muslims (CIA 2007, p. 329). Therefore, whenever Islam is mentioned in the thesis, it refers to the Sunni branch which is followed by the majority of Muslims worldwide, and by the vast majority of the people in Jordan. It is also the official religion in Jordan.

Islam and Democracy: The Incompatibility Claims

The claims of incompatibility between democracy and Islam fall into two categories. The first is that of Muslims, parties or people, who base their arguments on religious grounds, or more precisely, on their interpretations of the Qur'an and sunna. For instance, such a claim is made by Hizb al-Tahrir (1990), al-Mawdudi (1976), and Qutb ([1964] 1979). The second category is that of scholars, such as Bernard Lewis (1990), Samuel Huntington (1991 and 1997), Francis Fukuyama (1992), Daniel Pipes (1997), and Martin Kramer (1997). Their claim of incompatibility is based on different grounds, which will be outlined below.

Leaving these claims aside for a moment, it is necessary to outline the way according to which something is considered allowed (halal), or forbidden (haram) in Islam, and by extension compatible or not. Arriving at such a conclusion is part of what is known as the fundamentals of jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh)—a discipline of religious studies which produced the many rules related to inheritance, marriage, and other aspects. I shall focus on the forbidden because it relates to the incompatibility claim.

As Zedan ([1976] 2004, pp. 113-180) explains, when there is a need to establish a rule, a Muslim jurist (*faqīh*) will resort to four major sources: the Qur'an, sunna, ijmaʿ (consensus/unanimity), and qiyas (analogy/comparison). Al-ʿAwwa (2006, pp. 149-150.) confirms that the evidence found in these sources has hierarchical power, namely, that the evidence found in the Qur'an carries more weight than that found in the sunna. In other words, the procedure referred to here is not that of a particular *faqīh* or scholar. Also, for the sake of added clarity, if the evidence is found in the Qur'an, one does not proceed to find evidence to contradict it in the other sources.

I shall use this procedure to explain how a *faqīh* can establish what the rule should be vis-a-vis a matter that Muslims want to practise in line with Islam's teachings.

For something to be declared forbidden in Islam, ideally there has to be a clear instruction in the Qur'an explicitly stating that it is prohibited. For the sake of illustrating the point, I shall outline how it can be decided that gambling and drinking alcoholic beverages are forbidden. A *faqīh* will first consult the Qur'an. He/she will find the following verse (5:90):

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا إِنَّمَا الْخَمْرُ وَالْمَيْسِرُ وَالأَنصَابُ وَالأَزْلاَمُ رِجْسٌ مِّنْ عَمَلِ الشَّيْطَانِ **فَاجْتَنِبُوهُ** لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ

> O believers, wine and gambling, idols and divining arrows are an abhorrence, the work of Satan. So *keep away* [emphasis added], that you may prevail.[2]

On this matter, the Qur'an has something to say, and the instruction is very clear: keep away! A *faqīh* does not need to go further. If one follows this procedure and applies it to democracy, one needs to search the Qur'an for the term 'democracy' to

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[2] The English translation is by Tarif Khalidi. See my note in the methods section on verses of the Qur'an and their translations.

see what it says about it. Democracy is not mentioned in the Qur'an. Therefore, one cannot say it is forbidden in Islam by reference to a clear instruction. This leads to the second stage in the search for evidence.

The next step is to search in the sunna; in particular, the authentic statements of Prophet Muhammad,[3] or things that he had done. It should be noted that the sunna does not contradict the Qur'anic instructions: it may explain them; it may elaborate upon them; and it may introduce something not mentioned in the Qur'an. For instance, how Muslims pray is not described in the Qur'an, but the Prophet taught people how to do it. Muslims now perform prayers according to how Prophet Muhammad taught his companions, not according to a manner prescribed in the Qur'an.

It has been established that the Qur'an did not take a stand on democracy (using the very term). What about the sunna? If the Prophet forbade democracy in a statement or an action, then Muslims will treat that as a powerful religious instruction to refrain from practising it. Nothing in the collections of the sayings of Prophet Muhammad contains instructions about democracy. Therefore, one finds no guidance on the matter to declare democracy incompatible with Islam. This leads to the third stage in the process of searching for evidence.

When guidance cannot be found in the Qur'an or sunna, a *faqīh* will look for a consensus of the views of the companions of Prophet Muhammad.[4] According to Zedan (2004, p. 149), the rule that the mother was entitled to a share in cases of inheritance was established through the rule of unanimity/consensus. The companions of the Prophet all verified the fact that he, Abu Bakr, and ʿUmar applied this rule and gave the mother a share of one sixth. If one attempts to find a rule concerning democracy, one will not find guidance in unanimity/consensus.

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[3] The statements attributed to Prophet Muhammad vary in their reliability of authenticity. The authentic ones are included in volumes compiled by Bukhari and Muslim. However, even the authenticity of the statements in these volumes is not accepted by all, but this is a different point.
[4] In my view, the notion of consensus is problematic. However, my concern here is to illustrate the procedure as used by the Muslim scholars of fundamentals (usūliyyūn).

Therefore, one has to search for guidance in the next stage: qiyas (analogy/comparison).

The Qur'an instructs Muslims to avoid alcoholic beverages, as outlined above. It does not mention drugs: marijuana, opium, heroin, and similar substances. However, because drugs are similar to alcohol in the effect on the mind, it is not illogical to declare drugs forbidden. Applying the same to democracy, a scholar has to find something comparable to democracy, and declare it to be halal or haram, in line with what it is being compared with. If democracy is comparable to something permitted, then it is compatible with Islam. If it is comparable to something that is forbidden in Islam, then it is incompatible with Islam.

For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the procedure has other stages which include *ijtihād* and interests. However, once a *faqīh* reaches the stage of qiyas, the rule ceases to be based on a source that is considered incapable of interpretations.

By making comparisons, two contradictory conclusions are possible. The first is that there is nothing halal in Islam that is equivalent to democracy in order to declare the latter as such. The other conclusion is that there is something allowed in Islam and equivalent to democracy, and therefore it is possible to declare the latter permissible. The notion to compare democracy with in this case is shura, which has two meanings: consultation and deliberation. It is mentioned in the Qur'an in a context that encourages Muslims to practise it. Both conclusions will be justified by their proponents by contesting what shura means and requires.

A whole sura, 42, in the Qur'an is called shura. Verse 42:38 mentions a few traits of Muslims, which include the practice of shura:

وَالَّذِينَ اسْتَجَابُوا لِرَبِّهِمْ وَأَقَامُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَأَمْرُهُمْ شُورَىٰ بَيْنَهُمْ وَمِمَّا رَزَقْنَاهُمْ يُنْفِقُونَ

> Those who answer the call of their Lord and perform the prayers; Those who settle their affairs through *common deliberations*;[5] [emphasis added] Those who expend from what We provided them.

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[5] The translator seems to have contradicted himself and did not choose literal rendering. It is noteworthy that one can see the part of the verse about consultation in parliaments in the Muslim world.

In another verse (3:159), the Prophet is instructed to consult with the Muslims:

فَبِمَا رَحْمَةٍ مِّنَ اللّهِ لِنتَ لَهُمْ وَلَوْ كُنتَ فَظّاً غَلِيظَ الْقَلْبِ لاَنفَضُّواْ مِنْ حَوْلِكَ فَاعْفُ عَنْهُمْ وَاسْتَغْفِرْ لَهُمْ **وَشَاوِرْهُمْ فِي الأَمْرِ** فَإِذَا عَزَمْتَ فَتَوَكَّلْ عَلَى اللّهِ إِنَّ اللّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُتَوَكِّلِينَ.

> It is through God's mercy that you are gentle towards them. Had you been cruel and hard of heart, they would have dispersed from your presence. So forgive them and ask God's pardon for them *and seek their counsel in all affairs.* [emphasis added]. When resolved upon a matter, put your trust in God, for God loves those who put their trust in Him.

However, when and how to consult, and whether the outcome of the consultation process is to be followed or not, is the subject of different views. Al-Būtī (2003), a traditional Muslim preacher,[6] says that Prophet Muhammad engaged in consultation with his companions. The consultation is obligatory when there is no clear instruction in the Qur'an or sunna regarding a certain issue. Moreover, consultation is also a necessity in cases of war, peace, and treaties. According to al-Būtī, consultation is mandatory in these only two situations. However, he points out that the ruler is not required to follow the advice given to him by the people consulted (p. 237).

Al-Ghazali (1990) rejects the views that are similar to al-Būtī's, namely that shura is is highly limited, highly procedural, and devoid of any usefulness to the people being governed. He agrees that shura is not used to decide what is allowed or forbidden according to Islam. He explains that shura covers worldly and ordinary matters, such as collecting taxes and declaring a war. He further argues that it is 'suicidal to leave decisions on these matters to rulers who claim they are geniuses' (pp. 45-47). Al-Qaradawi (1974) agrees with al-Ghazali's view on shura. He considers it binding as well (pp. 227-229). Moreover, Gharaybeh (2000), a Muslim scholar who also served in the senior leadership of the IAF, dedicated a chapter to the issue of shura (pp. 295-328). He argues that shura includes the right of the nation to elect the leader, and that it entails acceptance of majority rule.

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[6] By traditional I mean someone who wears certain attire, which includes a turban.

I shall now return to the claims of incompatibility, having contextualised the procedure of declaring an act or a notion to be permitted or forbidden in Islam.

Incompatibility Claims: Muslims

The claim of incompatibility between Islam and democracy is made by the Liberation Party (Hizb al-Tahrir), which was established in 1953 by the Palestinian, Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani. According to the leader of Hizb al-Tahrir, ʿAbd al-Qadīm Zallūm, 'democracy is a man-made system of government,' and the 'term itself is an alien one'. Moreover, Zallūm argues that 'democracy is related to the principle of separation of state and religion'. All these elements, according to Zallūm, make democracy unIslamic (1990, pp. 2-4).

Contrary to the suggestion made by Esposito and Voll (1996, p. 23), al-Mawdudi (1976, p. 159) claims that Islam and democracy are incompatible. Islam, he argues, is 'the very antithesis of a secular western democracy'. In arguing the case of incompatibility, al-Mawdudi makes two contradictory arguments. In one he argues that Islam and democracy are incompatible. In another, he talks about the 'democratic essence' of Islam and coins a term for it: 'theo-democracy' (pp. 148-170). I suggest that Esposito and Voll (1996) unjustifiably ignored one part of al-Mawdudi's argument and adopted the other. The part they ignored specifically refers to 'secular western democracy'.

I have discussed briefly in the first chapter how it is erroneous to consider democracy or modernity European or Western. Al-Ghannouchi (1993) argues that 'the democratic system as is in the West remains, in the absence of an Islamic one, the best system that resulted from the development of human thought'. He further argues that 'the defects of the [Western] democratic system' should not be used as an excuse 'to reject it', because it is 'better than tyranny' (p. 87).

On what basis does al-Mawdudi declare that Islam and democracy are incompatible? Al-Mawdudi attaches a great deal of importance to the notion of 'sovereignty of God', and contrasts it with the sovereignty of people. 'All prophets,' argues al-Mawdudi, 'conveyed to mankind the guidance which was revealed to them and asked to acknowledge the absolute *sovereignty of God* [emphasis added] and render

unalloyed obedience to him' (p. 149). He further argues that the 'belief in the unity and sovereignty of Allah is the foundation of the social and moral systems pronounced by the prophets' (p. 158).

Al-Mawdudi's argument (1976, p. 158) is based on the notion that democracy is about the sovereignty of people. To him and to other like-minded people, there is only one sovereignty, and it belongs to Allah. His evidence is in verse 2:30:

وَإِذْ قَالَ رَبُّكَ لِلْمَلَائِكَةِ إِنِّي جَاعِلٌ فِي الْأَرْضِ **خَلِيفَةً** قَالُوا أَتَجْعَلُ فِيهَا مَنْ يُفْسِدُ فِيهَا وَيَسْفِكُ الدِّمَاءَ وَنَحْنُ نُسَبِّحُ بِحَمْدِكَ وَنُقَدِّسُ لَكَ قَالَ إِنِّي أَعْلَمُ مَا لَا تَعْلَمُونَ.

> And remember when God said to the angels: 'I shall appoint a deputy [vicegerent] on earth,' and they answered: 'Will you place therein one who sows discord and sheds blood while we chant Your praises and proclaim Your holiness?' God said: 'I know what you do no,'

The context of the verse is unrelated to democracy, or to how human beings should govern others on earth. However, as Abou El-Fadl (2004) points out: 'God's vicegerent does not share God's perfection of judgment and will'. Therefore, what he calls 'constitutional democracy' can constitute 'a basis for pursuing justice and thus for fulfilling a fundamental responsibility assigned by God to each one of us' (p. 6).

Furthermore, al-Ghazali (1990, pp. 44-45) indicated that people detected that his view on shura was different from al-Mawdudi's. He explained that al-Mawdudi was of the view that shura should not undermine the executive branch of government. Al-Ghazali suggested that this was the case in modern systems of government. However, the ruler was not except from abiding by shura.

Al-Mawdudi argues against democracy because it relies on the sovereignty of people. He suggests that 'if the people dislike any law and demand its abrogation, howsoever just and rightful it might be, it has to be expunged forthwith' (p. 160). This is the wrong characterisation of how a democratic system of government works, whether in relation to how laws are enacted; how people behave in a democracy; and how laws are repealed.

I suggest that when al-Mawdudi formulated his argument concerning the sovereignty of God, he was responding to the arguments of his time. When democracy is presented as the 'sovereignty of people,' he will respond that the sovereignty of God

is paramount. I would recall what Huntington (1991, pp. 5-7) said about the debates amongst scholars concerning the meaning of democracy, and that they continued until the 1970s, when the procedural definition became dominant. In other words, al-Mawdudi engaged in a different debate: that of authority and purpose of government. Therefore, al-Mawdudi's interpretation constitutes no basis for rejecting democracy and declaring it incompatible with Islam.

Sayyid Qutb[7] ([1964] 1979) argues that Islam and democracy are incompatible. He employs the notion of sovereignty of God, but calls it _ḥākimiyya_. He uses a phrase which appears in the Qur'an in 6:57, 12:40 and 12:67:

<div align="center">إن الحكم إلا لله</div>

<div align="center">Judgement [Sovereignty] belongs solely to God.</div>

The term 'hukm', from which _ḥākimiyya_ is derived, appears in these verses and others. When one examines the meaning of 'hukm' where it appears in the Qur'an, it is clear that the meaning is not a state, regime, or government. It is usually in a context which states that the ultimate judgement belongs to Allah and that he is the final arbiter. In Khalidi's translation of these three verses, he uses 'judgement' twice and 'sovereignty' once.

There is, however, an artificial point being made when Qutb says that sovereignty belongs to Allah, because a practising Muslim does not dispute that. Even a king or president who offers prayers acknowledges that Allah is superior to him. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the existence of a sovereign state with a ruler (ḥākim) and the sovereignty that belongs to Allah, because the sovereignty of state and that of Allah are two different notions.

Qutb does what Karl Popper (1963) warns against: to seek 'confirming evidence' for a theory and to disregard 'refutations' (p. 36). This approach, in Popper's analysis, leads to some instances of 'myths', namely when a theory is not formulated 'in a testable form' (p. 38). In explaining his views, Popper refers to Marx's 'theory of history' and how its followers rejected 'refutations' by others. Consequently, they

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[7] Arabic version of _Maʿalem Fī Al-Ṯarīiq_ [_Milestones/Signposts_]

'could not open a newspaper without finding on every page confirming evidence for [their] interpretation of history' (p. 35).

Interestingly, another verse in the Qur'an (4:59) is used in Saudi Arabia to confer legitimacy on the ruling dynasty and demand obedience of the people. One can only speculate whether Qutb would consider this verse compatible with his argument that hukm belongs to Allah, or it can be delegated in full or in part to those in charge of the affairs of Muslims (uli al-amr/أولي الأمر).

Qutb marshals verses, in whole or in part, in support of an argument, although the apparent context seems unrelated. He goes to an extreme when he defends 'God's law' [shar'a Allah/شرع الله]. For instance, he says [p. 96]:

> The interest of mankind is embedded in God's law, as Allah handed it down and as conveyed by his messenger. If one day, it appeared to mankind that their interest is in violating what was enacted to them by God they first would be deluded.
>
> […]
>
> And second they would be kafir. No one who claims that one's interest is in what violates the law of Allah remains for a moment of this religion and a member of the people of this religion.

The passage above shows how easy it is to declare that a Muslim is not a Muslim (kafir) by simply accusing him of violating Allah's law.

However, Qutb's views did not go unchallenged. The leader of the MB in Egypt, Hassan al-Hudaybi (1977) faulted Qutb for declaring a Muslim a kafir, marshalling counter-evidence from the Qur'an and sunna. He also addressed the points made by both al-Mawdudi and Qutb about the sovereignty of God, arguing that there were many areas in which it is left to man to make laws (pp. 103-113).

Furthermore, Yusef al-Qaradawi (2001), in his memoirs, faults Qutb for declaring Muslims kafirs. Qaradawi wonders why Qutb disregarded verses related to jihad that make the concept broader than characterised by Qutb. He further deplores Qutb for

accusing those who oppose his views (a) of stupidity and of lacking knowledge, and (b) of being psychologically weak and influenced by the orientalists.[8]

ʿAbdullah al-Nafisi (1999) attributes the appeal of Qutb to the young Muslims who are going through intellectual transformation in their lives to 'his martyrdom, which added meaning to what he used to preach. It made his ideas and reality identical. This is the honour a mujahid [fighter] wants to be inscribed on his grave' (p. 37). Al-Nafisi also attributes Qutb's appeal to the latter's simple writing style, which 'lacks the philosophical abstraction, and intellectual dryness'. His ideas were written in a 'literary style, and dominated by overflowing emotions of an ideological preacher' (p. 38).

Qutb went further than arguing that *ḥākimiyya* is Allah's prerogative. He also considered Muslims to be in a state of *jāhiliyya* that should be changed by following the example of Prophet Muhammad and how he managed to spread Islam. He did not spare 'even Muslims who pray, observe Ramadan, and perform the Hajj' (p. 105). He amalgamated all societies, Muslim and otherwise, and considered them to be in a state of *jāhiliyya* (pp. 88-93).

The logical and pressing question here is what is *jāhiliyya*? This has become a term that in Arabic refers to the era before Islam. Those who refused to accept Muhammad's new message were described as jahilūn (singular jāhil). The contemporary meaning of jāhil is an ignorant person, or someone who is not aware of certain things (a child is considered jāhil). In the contemporary meaning, *jāhiliyya* is the state of ignorance. But was that its meaning 1400 years ago?

Language: Old and New Meanings

How is it possible for al-Mawdudi and Qutb to quote a verse and argue that it stipulates a clear-cut instruction in the Qur'an? After exhausting the four stages outlined above, it becomes possible to resort to *ijtihād*: making a reasoned judgement. To prevent *ijtihād* from being abused, there is a rule which says 'no *ijtihād* with the text' (لا اجتهاد مع النص). Therefore, one who is in favour of Qutb's

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[8] Memoirs were published on Islam on Line, a website which had a close link to Qaraḏawi. They are now available on qaradawi.net.

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argument may say that with a verse like that used by Qutb (6:57 for instance), there is no room for interpretation that democracy is acceptable in Islam. Is this the case?

Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid (2007, pp. 88-105) tackles this matter and puts it in context. Abu Zaid accepts that there are instances where a rule in the text is clear and it does not allow for an interpretation. One such instance is preventing sons from marrying their mothers (2:30). In such an instance, I expect that anyone will agree that this is a sensible, clear-cut rule that should not allow interpretations which lead to negating it.

Abu Zaid specifically deals with the term *jahiliyya*, referred to above. As used by Qutb and others[9], it means a state of ignorance and lack of knowledge (p. 56). Abu Zaid points out that this meaning is not the one from the time of Prophet Muhammad. It meant then a lack of control of emotions. He cites from the same era Arab poetry in which the derivatives of the verb, ja-ha-la, are used to demonstrate the original meaning of *jahiliyya*. He quotes one of the most famous poems of pre-Islamic time, known as muʿallaqat (The Seven Odes), which were posted on the walls of Kaʿba.

One of the Odes belongs to ʿAmr ibn Kulthūm. It contains a verse which clearly shows that the meaning of *jahiliyya* at that time did not mean a state of ignorance:

<div dir="rtl">ألا لا يجهلن أحد علينا، فنجهل فوق جهل الجاهلينا</div>

So let no man act foolishly against us,

Or we shall exceed the folly of the foolhardiest[10]

Moreover, Abu Zaid argues that apart from some instances of clear-cut instructions, the room to interpret the Qur'an is much wider than Muslims are led to believe. He argues that the interpretation of the Qur'an always takes into consideration the reasons why some verses were handed down to the Prophet. The interpretation process also takes into account the meanings of words at the time of the Prophet. He points out that some scholars like al-Mawdudi and Qutb gave words meanings not intended when the verses were handed down. In Qutb's case, the word 'hukm' which, as pointed out earlier, appears in several verses, does not mean the state or the government in today's usage.

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[9] The historian Philip Hitti (1948, p. 20) explains it as 'time of ignorance' and 'barbarism.'
[10] Translation by A. J. Arberry (1957, p. 209)

Giving words in the Qur'an a contemporary meaning is also cited by ʿAbdelwahab El-Affendi (2008) in an article about the phenomenon in which jailed Islamists reconsidered their earlier views.[11] Sayyid Imam was one of those who did so, after he had argued in the wake of the attacks of 11 September 2001 in the US that terrorism is Islamic because it is mentioned in the Qur'an (8:60).

وَأَعِدُّواْ لَهُم مَّا اسْتَطَعْتُم مِّن قُوَّةٍ وَمِن رِّبَاطِ الْخَيْلِ **تُرْهِبُونَ** بِهِ عَدْوَّ اللّهِ وَعَدُوَّكُمْ وَآخَرِينَ مِن دُونِهِمْ لاَ تَعْلَمُونَهُمُ اللّهُ يَعْلَمُهُمْ وَمَا تُنفِقُواْ مِن شَيْءٍ فِي سَبِيلِ اللّهِ يُوَفَّ إِلَيْكُمْ وَأَنتُمْ لاَ تُظْلَمُونَ

> Prepare against them whatever force and war cavalry you can gather to *frighten* [emphasis added] therewith the enemy of God and your enemy, and others besides them whom you do not know but God does. Whatever you expend in the cause of God will be returned in full to you, and you shall not be wronged.

As El-Affendi points out, Sayyid Imam declared that those who think that terrorism is not Islamic are kafirs because they are opposed to what this verse says. El-Affendi is right to point to this abuse of the language and the Qur'an. His condemnation of such an abuse is well justified.

It is possible to raise an issue regarding the views of Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid, given that the book, in which he criticised the Islamic discourse, was the subject of legal proceedings, and the courts ruled against him. The proceedings were initiated against him in Egypt to declare him an apostate (murtad: someone who renounces Islam) and accordingly to annul his marriage to his Muslim wife. Abu Zaid refused to renounce his views and left Egypt. He died in July 2010.

The reason why some overzealous Muslims directed their wrath at Abu Zaid is because he asked whether the rules of interpreting a text can apply to the Qur'an. His answer is in the affirmative, because 'in the final analysis religious texts are nothing but linguistics texts' (p. 204). He rejects the notion that the divine and the human are in conflict (p. 206). (Such a conflict is evident in the arguments of Qutb and al-Mawdudi above). He concludes that religious texts are human texts because they belong to language and the cultures of a specific historic period (p. 209). Therefore, the language and its cultural milieu are a point of reference in explaining and interpreting texts which include the Qur'an (p. 209).

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[11] The Egyptian government organised discussions between Muslim jurists and jailed Islamists. The discussions led some to change their views on the use of violence for example.

To illustrate his point, Abu Zaid refers to verses which he says Muslims of old times did not understand literally. One such verse is 64:17, which talks about giving Allah a loan.[12] No interpretation of the Qur'an suggests that the reference to a loan to Allah is literal. Therefore, Abu Zaid is correct in arguing that the references to trade, buying, selling, and loans in the Qur'an reflect the language of an era known for trade. This is mentioned in the Qur'an in sura 106, about Quraysh and the two trading caravans which travel in the winter and summer.

The Egyptian appeals court which ruled against Abu Zaid decided that his writings deny that the Qur'an is the word of God (al-ʿAwwa 2003, p. 107). This conclusion was reached after citing verses that assert literal meanings, such as God having a throne (2:255: His throne encompasses the heavens and earth), and the existence of jinn (15:27: The Jinn We created beforehand, from the fiery wind). This approach is not different from that of Qutb when he quotes the verses that say 'hukm' belongs to Allah.

I suggest that it is possible to reconcile an individual's belief that the Qur'an is the word of God, and, at the same time, interpret the verses in a way that does not accept the literal meaning. The Qur'an was presented to the Arabs in their language, namely, in a man-made language.[13] Arabic existed before the Qur'an, and the Arabs followed certain grammatical rules in using it. A man-made language is understood according to the cognitive abilities of humans at a certain point in time. Whether words, any words, are those of God, a poet, novelist, columnist, or another author, how they are understood hinges on the reader. If a reader understands words in a way not intended by the author, or not as other readers understood them, it does not follow that this reader has denied that the author wrote those words.

Moreover, although cognitive abilities of humans are ever-increasing, the corollary of this is that they are always limited. Consequently, human beings can only understand meanings in line with the cognitive capacity at a particular time. Interpreters of the Qur'an before modern times were not in a position to interpret it in a manner consistent with modern scientific discoveries and advances. Now, one can find many Muslim preachers and jurists explaining these discoveries by referring to verses in the Qur'an. For example, a verse about how a foetus develops in the womb

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[12] 'If you loan God a goodly loan He shall multiply it for you and forgive you. God is All-Thankful, All-Forbearing' (Khalidi's translation, p. 466).

[13] I would like to thank Professor ʿAli Paya for his insight concerning this point.

(24: 14) is said to match the scientific description of the process. A different interpretation, therefore, does not mean a change of belief and that the words are not of God.

The argument above, I should point out, will not satisfy people who are atheists or agnostics. It may satisfy only the people who believe in God but differ on how to understand and interpret a holy book: literally or not.

When Abu Zaid criticised the Islamic discourse, he was logical and scientific in his approach and analysis. Significantly, also, Abu Zaid did not rubbish Islamic beliefs. He spoke respectfully of Islam throughout the book. In attempting to rationalise the interpretation of the Qur'an, Abu Zaid served Islam in his own way, while those who persecuted him perpetuated ignorance which did not reflect well on Islam and Muslims.

Having discussed the claims of incompatibility made by Muslims, I shall now discuss Esposito and Voll's arguments concerning Islamic democracy, whose elements, they suggest, include tawhid, caliphate, and shura (1996, pp. 21-32).

Tawhid

The importance of tawhid is encapsulated in the first pillar of Islam: the statement that 'there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger'. This principle does not accept the notion that there are other Gods, or that God has a son or children. The notion of trinity is not accepted in Islam as it contradicts the principle of tawhid. Moreover, the principle is extended to mean that there is no need for intermediaries between God and people (Muslims), whether the intermediary is a holy person, a revered object such as a statue, or the grave of a saint. The use of an intermediary is known as shirk, which means God has partners of sorts. The Arabs before Islam used idols in rituals that they thought made them closer to God. Muhammad's message was against that.

Al-Mawdudi's emphasis on tawhid is unnecessary because a Muslim does believe there that are no other Gods but Allah. A Muslim says this many times a day. The

intermediary part is the problematic one. There are people who seek help of pirs, or visit tombs asking God to grant their wishes, such as recovering from an illness, or having children. These practices used to be common; they still exist. I suggest that there is a link between wealth and education and these practices. In the past, a desperate infertile woman would go to a holy place to pray and ask God to enable her to have children. An infertile woman now would seek a medical solution.

The people who engage in such practices do not consider them shirk because they have already acknowledged that there is no God but Allah. The father of Wahhabism, Muhammad ʿAbd al-Wahhab, considers them shirk, and these practices are not allowed in Saudi Arabia. However, they are not banned in other Muslim countries.

I suggest that the importance al-Mawdudi attaches to tawhid is related to this aspect (shirk). Al-Mawdudi has argued in the past that al-Aḥamadiyya sect is not Islamic, and sought to declare it as such. Al-Mawdudi's concern about shirk is artificially connected to the notion of democracy. A Muslim ruler may feel great, and may create a cult of personality around him. Some people may fear him; others may love him. However, this form of 'worship' is different from worshipping Allah at certain times of the day. Moreover, if democracy was implemented in Muslim countries, the chances of creating cults of personality decrease, because the office holder has to leave at the end of a set period. Therefore, to suggest that tawhid somehow makes democracy incompatible with Islam is unjustified.

The Caliphate: Islam's Political System?

According to Esposito and Voll (1996), another element in al-Mawdudi's notion of Islamic democracy is the caliphate. Moreover, in arguing that Islam has its own political system, al-Tamimi (1993) claims that '[m]any contemporary Islamic thinkers consider the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate to be the most catastrophic event in the entire history of the Muslims' (p. 11). Al-Tamimi makes no attempt to criticise this statement for being a gross exaggeration and loaded with inaccuracies. To begin with, there is no mention of some of those thinkers to examine their views on the issue of Islamic caliphate. The claim that the collapse of the caliphate was so

catastrophic seems at odds with many catastrophic events in the history of Muslims. For instance, what about the invasion of Baghdad by the Mughal? What about the driving out of Muslims from Andalusia? What about the loss of Palestine, an event Palestinians and Arabs refer to as the catastrophe (nakba)? What about the loss of Jerusalem, the third holiest shrine for Muslims?

Gross exaggerations aside, I shall subject the point about the caliphate to the scrutiny it deserves.

The most common meaning of khalifa in Arabic is 'successor': one who comes after another, either after death, or one who replaces another in a position in an organisation. Therefore, Abu Bakr was the successor of Prophet Muhammad. He became the leader of Muslims after the death of Muhammad. ʿUmar was the successor of Abu Bakr.

Tamimi overlooks certain facts in Islamic history when he makes his arguments about the caliphate. The title of the ruler of Muslims was not caliph (successor) throughout Islamic history. Soon after ʿUmar became the caliph, a new title emerged: commander of the faithful. The title caught on, because ʿUmar was supposed to have had the title of the successor of the successor of the messenger of God. The title would have become very long after a few caliphs (Sharqawi 1987, p. 60). The title 'commander of the faithful' is still in use in Morocco.

The first four caliphs were selected through varying degrees of consultations amongst Muslims. They did not become caliphs on hereditary bases. The fourth caliph, ʿAli, was beset by wars with Muʿawiya. The advocates of ʿAli's right to rule after Muhammad created their own branch of Islam (Shiʿi). Once Muʿawiya secured his reign, he introduced the hereditary system of government. Is this Islamic? If so, why was it not introduced by the Prophet? If it was not Islamic, why did it continue for centuries? The point here is that al-Tamimi's assertion that caliphate is the Islamic system of government is problematic already.

Ibn Khaldun (2011, pp. 284-285) explains that the title 'sultan' was common, but after the central caliphate disintegrated, different titles were used by the rulers of different parts of the Muslim world. Moreover, by the sixteenth century, as Esposito

points out (1994, p. 62): 'Three major Muslim empires emerged in the midst of the many sultanates', namely, the Ottoman; the Safavid in Iran; and the Mughal in India.

ʿAbd al-Raziq (2000)[14] discussed the issue of caliphate in Islam. He pointed out that caliphate was eliminated in Baghdad by the Mughal in the seventh century, *hijra* (p. 137). Moreover, he disagreed with Ibn Khaldun who suggested that unlike other religions, the religious and political authorities in Islam were merged (p. 150). He concludes that the caliphate is a political matter, not a religious one, and it must be decided by 'reason, experiences of nations and political rules' (p. 182).

ʿImara (2000) explains that there are contradictions in Razik's analysis and that he 'neglected the bright side of Islamic thought' (p. 49). According to ʿImara, there were Muslim thinkers who adhered to the principles of shura and selection even when the rulers usurped power (pp. 49-45). Kahlawi (2007) notes that ʿAbd al-Raziq emphasised general statements, and added to them a brief and naïve historical narrative that would not be acceptable to most contemporary historians, including his denial that there was no government during the Prophet's time' (p. 13). I disagree with Kahlawi's assessment. Although he is entitled to disagree with ʿAbd al-Raziq, the latter's discussion of the caliphate is not naïve.

Furthermore, the advocates of the caliphate are silent about certain facts that reflect badly on the caliph, such as being allied with the colonisers of Turkey. Nor do they refer to the fact that Mustafa Kamal's move was supported by some Muslims such as ʿAbd al-Hamīd ibn Badīs who described Kamal as 'one of the great geniuses of the East' (cited in ʿImara 1984, p. 163). He considered the caliph of the time to be a captive caliph, and the 'ulama' around him to be hypocrites.

Irrespective of the title, two substantives points should be addressed: the first is whether the caliphate has been the Islamic system of government from after the death of Prophet Muhammad until it was the abolished by Mastafa Kamal in 1924. If this has been the case, the second point is to examine whether it is unIslamic to have a ruler with a different title?

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[14] The book was originally published in 1925. Muhammad ʿImara republished it in 2000 with relevant documents, including the decision by al-Azhar scholars to strip Razik of his ʿālim title.

Al-ʿAwwa (2006, p. 25) subscribes to the view that there has been a caliphate system which started with the selection of Abu Bkar and ended with the removal of ʿAbd al-Majid in 1924. Abu al-Majd (2006) is more discerning when looking at the caliphate since Abu Bakr until ʿAbd al-Majid. He points out that the caliphate of the four rightly-guided caliphs is different from that of their successors, who, despite the title of caliph, were effectively kings. They ruled sometimes with coercion and did not respect rights and freedoms (pp. 104-105).

Therefore, the view that there has been a caliphate system that started after Prophet Muhammad and ended in 1924 is not uncommon. However, this view glosses over the differences that characterised the caliphs and caliphate at various stages in history. It also glosses over the fact that there have been three different Muslim regions with different rulers. In the absence of recognition of the differences, I agree with Abu al-Majd, who considers that the arguments concerning the caliphate are sterile (2006, pp. 104-105). Therefore, I will address the more substantive, relevant point: can Muslims be ruled by someone whose title is not caliph?

Both al-ʿAwwa and Abu al-Majd argue that Islam, specifically the Qurʾan and sunna, did not prescribe a system of government; nor did they specify how the ruler of the Muslims should be selected. Al-ʿAwwa suggests the absence of a prescribed method to select the ruler and other details pertaining to the system of government means that these issues are left to Muslims to decide according to their interests, time, place, and circumstance. The only proviso is that these matters are decided with guidance from the general principles and values of Islam (pp. 64-65).

Similarly, Abu al-Majd (2006) explains that there has been consensus in the past that it is not the title that matters; it does not have to be caliph. He rejects the suggestion that the caliphate is a Godly system, namely, prescribed by God. He also rejects the opposite argument that the Islamic system of government is based on *ijtihād*, namely, solely based on human reason. Abu al-Majd takes a centre position and argues that an Islamic system of government must be based on shura, justice, and holding the ruler to account (pp. 104-108). Al-ʿAwwa argues that the term 'caliphate' does not imply a specific system of government, and that the caliphate is not part of shariʿa. That the Muslims in the past called their ruler 'caliph' is a matter that belongs to the realm of history, not religion, according to al-ʿAwwa (pp. 108-109).

Interestingly, the view that a new Islamic system of government can be developed is shared by some Sunni and Shiʻi scholars. For instance, Paya (2010) outlines the views of some 'famous contemporary Iranian scholars' to establish how it is possible to have an Islamic version of democracy (p. 102). He outlines the views of such scholars from three categories: fundamentalist; traditionist (not the same as traditionalist), and modernist. The scholars in the first two categories 'reject the authority of reason'. The modernists do not; they 'try to provide rational interpretations of religious tenets and doctrine' (p. 104).

Paya introduces a fourth category, which he calls 'critical rationalists'. Within the framework of this category, Paya develops a model of Islamic democracy. It is based on treating democracy as a technology. As he points out (p. 110), 'the users of technology [...] try to alter the products they are using to better fit their specific tastes and preferences [...] Car and home owners, almost universally, put their own personal touches on these "technological products" no matter how perfect the products where when they obtained them' (p, 110). Paya argues: 'The more a technology is adjusted to the needs and cherished values of its users and the environment in which they live, the more it is considered "acceptable" or "popular" or "efficient".' (pp. 110-111).[15]

Treating democracy as a technology, and utilising the notion of 'social construct' and the critical rationalist approach, Paya concludes that it is possible to have Islamic forms of democracy which share with their 'standard' counterparts five components: 'civil society, political society, the rule of law, state apparatus, and economic society'. The other common features are 'freedom of association and communication, free and inclusive electoral contestation, constitutionalism, regional-legal bureaucratic norms, and institutionalised markets'. He stresses that labelling it as Islamic does not attach to it 'sacredness'; it implies 'sources of value' (p. 111).

Although I disagree with the need for an Islamic form of democracy, I do recognise that to move away from the rejection of democracy in Muslim countries towards accepting an Islamic version entails some benefits. Democracy as practised now in democratic states is not the same that was practised when it was first adopted as a

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[15] There is an element of over-simplification in treating democracy as a technology. However, if this makes democracy acceptable, the comparison is useful.

system of government. Women had to fight for the right to vote. African-Americans in the US had to fight for their civil rights. Therefore, the Islamic version, whether as proposed by Paya or anyone else, will not remain static. People will demand more and wider rights, and will achieve some or all demands through campaigns or reinterpretations of the Islamic principles and rules which restrict rights.

In contrast, El-Affendi (2010, p. 25) goes further than Paya in making the case for democracy without attaching any labels to it, Islamic or other. He suggests that there is an 'anti-democratic ethos' in the models purported to be 'Islamic'. He further suggests that the ethos is 'underpinned by a further set of interconnected assumptions' made in relation to Islam having all the answers. El-Affendi refutes these assumptions and comes to the conclusion that 'Islamic teachings are not only compatible with democracy, but demand it' (p. 26). He urges the Islamists to 'revise their models in order to reflect Islam's true spirit, which is not only favourable to democracy, but […] finds democracy indispensable' (p. 26).

To conclude the discussion of the above section, I would say it is clear that the incompatibility claim made by some Muslims on religious grounds is contested by other Muslims using religious grounds as well. In my considered judgement, the evidence is in favour of Muslims who reject the incompatibility claim.

Incompatibility Claims: Non-Muslim Scholars

Lewis (1990/2002) has argued that Islam is incompatible with democracy. The essence of his argument in brief is that the separation of church and state is not possible in Islam. Lewis argues that the key to the success of 'Christiandom' is in the separation of 'Church and State'. He traces the inclination to separate them back 'almost to the beginning of Christianity'. Lewis says that 'Christians are enjoined in the Scriptures to "render … unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's [ellipsis in original] and unto God the things which are God's".'[16]

Whether there is a relationship between Islam and a lack of democratisation, Huntington (1991) is not categorical regarding which side of the argument he is on. 'Whatever the compatibility,' Huntington observes, 'of Islam and democracy in

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[16] Lewis's argument is outlined in *The Atlantic* magazine (Sept. 1990) and his book *What Went Wrong?* (2002).

theory, in practice they have not gone together' (p. 308). However, in 1997, he could not be more candid:

> The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. The problem for Islam is not the CIA or the U.S. Department of Defence. It is the West, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the universality of their culture and believe that their superior, if declining, power imposes on them the obligation to extend that culture throughout the world (pp. 217-218).

As indicated in chapter one, Fukuyama (1992, p. 347) rejects the argument that there are cultural prerequisites for democracy. However, he contradicts himself when he discusses democracy and Islam. He does not see it as part of culture, which evolves, as he has argued. Instead, he claims that Islam is incompatible with liberal democracy, and Muslims have no interest in adopting it. He portrays Muslims as a mindless group of people, when he says Muslims 'can, of course, challenge liberal democracy through terrorist bombs, a significant but not vital challenge' (p. 347).

When writing about Islam and politics, Milton-Edwards (2004, p. 116) makes the same claim that Islam and democracy are incompatible: 'In conclusion, there is evidence that the religious fundamentals of Islam are incompatible with secular liberal democracy'. The claim is based on her observation that 'the majority of Muslim societies are characterised by authoritarianism and intolerance for pluralism and principles of popular sovereignty and equality' (p116).[17]

The suggestion by Lewis that Islam is not amenable to a separation of the state and mosque cannot stand even a minimum amount of scrutiny. The separation of church and state in the Christian world did not come naturally, nor was it established smoothly and effortlessly. In the past, the king of Spain was referred to as His Catholic Majesty, and the king of France was called His Most Christian Majesty.

Lewis's approach to declaring the amenability of Christianity regarding separation of state and church is simplistic. By using a statement attributed to Jesus to explain the separation of state and church in the Christian world, Lewis's approach is no different from that of al-Mawdudi and Qutb, who found in one short statement a rule that had magical power to explain complex phenomena. The state and church in the

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[17] She reconsidered her view in 2010 as shall be seen later in the chapter.

Christian world were not separate. There was a conflict between the church and state. That is why secularism emerged, with varying degrees of hostility towards religion.

Moreover, Lewis's area of expertise is the Ottoman Empire. As discussed before, the view that there has been a continuous system of government since Abu Bakr in 632 until ʿAbd al-Majid in 1924 is not uncommon. However, as Abu al-Majd (2006, pp. 104-108) has pointed out, it is not possible to talk about that system and the entire period of time as one, inseparable unit. With regard to the Ottoman Empire, Abu al-Majd also points to a difference of opinion amongst Muslims regarding the Ottoman era, especially before the collapse of the empire and the removal of the last caliph, ʿAbd al-Majid. He notes that some Muslims defended the Ottoman caliphate because they viewed it as Islamic and acted as a bulwark in the face of European political, military, and intellectual invasion. Other Muslims did not view it as Islamic in its latter days; they criticised the Ottoman caliph, and did not mind the collapse of the empire (pp. 104-108).

Therefore, when Lewis makes a sweeping generalisation about Islam, it is highly likely that he relies on his expertise in the Ottoman Empire, which lasted for more than six centuries. It defies logic that one can view this period as a single unit. It defies logic even more when this long period is seen as a continuation of the caliphate that started with Abu Bakr, and as being representative of Islam and fourteen centuries of its history. It is imprudent to use this period, or events from the past, to make sweeping generalisations about Islam and Muslims now and in the future.

As Hitti (1948) notes, the idea of inseparability of political and religious roles of the leader of the Muslims is a 'common fallacy'. He rejects the assertion that 'the caliphate is a religious office' (p. 57). He argues that it is 'misleading' to make comparisons with 'the headship of the Holy Roman Empire', or 'the Catholic Church' (p. 57). Hitti further notes: 'Not until the latter part of the eighteenth century did the notion prevail in Europe that the Moslem Caliph was a kind of pope with spiritual jurisdiction over the followers of Muhammad throughout the world' (p. 58). He attributes the idea to an Ottoman sultan, the 'shrewd ʿAbd al-Hamid II' (p. 58).

The principle of the separation of branches of government is discussed by Gharaybeh (2000, p. 505). He points out that only Prophet Muhammad combined all authorities. With his death, the ability to legislate with divine authority came to an end. Moreover, none of the successors combined all roles. Caliphs appointed judges to adjudicate on matters, and the caliphs were not above the decisions made by these judges.

In response to Lewis and Huntington, Said (2001)[18] points out that Huntington 'relies heavily on a 1990 article by the veteran Orientalist Bernard Lewis'. He argues that 'neither Huntington nor Lewis has much time to spare for the internal dynamics and plurality of every civilization'. Said describes Huntington as 'an ideologist, someone who wants to make "civilizations" and "identities" into what they are not: shut-down, sealed off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and countercurrents that animate human history, and that over centuries have made it possible for history not only to contain wars of religion and imperial conquest but also to be one of exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing'.

Said's characterisation of Huntington as an ideologist applies equally to Fukuyama. These scholars are not only ideologists; they are in some way politicians, or scholars who serve political agendas. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 showed that they were members of the 'neo-conservatives' trend, or had offered advice to the administration of George W. Bush. As Waldman (2004) reported in the *Wall Street Journal*, days after the attacks of 11 September 2001, Lewis 'argued for a military takeover of Iraq to avert still-worse terrorism in the future'.

The claim of incompatibility made by Milton-Edwards (2004) was based on what some Muslims, like Qutb, had argued. Her claim was shaky because she failed to identify the 'religious fundamentals of Islam' that made it incompatible with democracy. The 'evidence' she relies on to support the claim of incompatibility is that 'the majority of Muslim societies are characterised by authoritarianism'. Her own evidence is not in favour of her argument. If there is a minority of Muslim societies which are not 'characterised by authoritarianism', why not investigate the

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[18] An Article in *The Nation*, 4 October 2011. Available online.

matter further to ascertain that it is indeed the fundamentals of Islam are the source of authoritarianism.

In fairness to Milton-Edwards, I should point out that she has updated her views on the matter. She indicates that many Muslim 'thinkers believe that there is a mutual compatibility between Islam and democracy'. She further observes that the majority of Muslims have 'accepted some notion of democracy, but […] they have differences over its precise meaning' (2010, p. 137). In spite of the change, which seems qualified, the fact remains that the opinion she expressed in 2004 should be mentioned because it represents a view subscribed to by some non-Muslim scholars. Unlike Lewis, she reconsidered her view when she familiarised herself with what Muslim scholars have said about Islam and democracy.

Democracy and Shariʿa

There remains another important question to answer. Can democracy and shariʿa co-exist? Can democracy in a Muslim country be adopted, and at the same time shariʿa be applied? This is a valid point and requires consideration.[19] I propose two answers in response to this point. The first is that, in theory, the answer is yes: shariʿa and democracy can co-exist. Shariʿa is an Arabic word for law. The other one is qānūn. The law and democracy co-exist in democratic countries, and the rule of law is very important in a democratic system of government. The laws in such countries differ from one another in relation to rights. The same logic applies to a Muslim country wishing to democratise and implement shariʿa at the same time.

Contrary to a widely held view, shari'a is a body of law, which covers punishments for crimes such as theft and murder, as well as other acts and beliefs which do not warrant punishment under universal human rights, such as sexual orientation or changing one's religion. In Muslim majority states, whether highly secularised such as Turkey, or anti-secular, such as Saudi Arabia, shariʿa does exist in one form or another in the laws in relation to marriage, inheritance, and economy, for instance. Even in the West, the banking sector found that it can attract customers if the business is conducted in a way consistent with the shariʿa. Therefore, some financial institutions created Islamic banking and investment divisions. I need to stress here

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[19] I thank professor Chantal Mouffe for raising the issue in our discussion on Islam and democracy.

that I am only explaining that shariʿa is law and the term is broader than what it is often associated with—the penal code (ḥudūd).

Having said that, I have to explain how shariʿa, specifically the penal code that comes into conflict with the universal human rights, can be reconciled with democracy based on universal human rights. The answer is found through different routes. One is that it is wrong to suggest that the implementation of penal code in particular is wanted in every Muslim state. There are old and new debates about the implementation of shariʿa even amongst those who want it implemented. Some people oppose immediate implementation, and call for gradual enforcement. Others argue that severe punishments, such as stoning and severing hands, were rarely implemented in the past because the conditions that have to be satisfied before the punishment is applied are nearly impossible to be satisfied. For example, the punishment for zina is that the act must be witnessed by four people. In reality, a couple copulate in private, and consequently the condition of four witnesses cannot be easily met. Those who follow this line of argument conclude that the punishments stipulated in shariʿa (ḥudūd) cannot be implemented because the standards of proof are too high.

In Saudi Arabia, there is little doubt that shariʿa, regarding the penal code in particular, is implemented selectively. Therefore, it is not the model that appeals to other Muslim countries. The majority of Muslim states do not implement the ḥudūd. Jordan, my case study, is one of them. Some laws in Jordan are within the rules of shariʿa (family and related issues); others are not (banks and economy).

Laws and the interpretations of laws evolve. In the West, homosexuality was punishable by law. Oscar Wilde was tried for homosexuality and imprisoned. At present, gay couples can marry legally. Some Muslims say that Allah's laws do not evolve. From a critical, rationalist perspective, this rigid attitude will not serve Islam or Muslims, as it rejects refutations (see my previous reference to Popper).

Some Muslim scholars distinguish between shariʿa and *fiqh*. Abu al-Majd (2006, pp. 88-89) explains that those who equate them make a big mistake. The people who

engage in *fiqh* are human beings, and obeying them is not a duty. Similarly, al-ʿAwwa (2006, pp. 232-233) explains that opinions expressed by *fuqahā'* in the past do not bind Muslims of subsequent eras, because the circumstances have changed.

In other words, while the point about implementing shariʿa within a democratic country seems contradictory at first sight, closer scrutiny reveals three points. The first is that there is no single interpretation of shariʿa; the second is that there is no agreement on immediate or gradual implementation; and the third is that not all Muslims want to implement ḥudūd.

PART 2: ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY

In an attempt to be less sweeping in making the claim that Islam is incompatible with democracy, certain scholars felt conscious of the need to make a distinction between Islam, the religion, and the actions of some Muslims. This is apparent in an argument by Diamond, Liz, and Lipset (1988, p. 174):

> What we are witnessing is the transition from a relatively tolerant and open kind of Islam to an Islam that is setting itself as an autonomous political force. Whereas the first type was compatible with democracy, the second is more of an obstacle, for it implies a totalitarian vision of society.

Diamond, Liz, and Lipset further argue that 'Islam has become an ideology of mobilization and protests' (p. 173).

There has been movement away from using 'Islamic' when referring to groups with Islamic orientation. The term 'Islamicist', used by Robins (1991, p. 192) points to an attempt to distinguish the religious aspect of Islam from the one mixed with politics. The formula used to make a distinction is adopted by Halliday (1995), agreeing with Keddie (1986), that Islamic denotes the religious aspect of religion, while Islamist denotes the political (p. 349).

The desire to differentiate between the religious and political comes as well from Muslims who have objected to calling some groups Islamic on two grounds: one is that it implies other groups are not Islamic. The other ground is that when called 'Islamic', such groups are ascribed a role they are not entitled to, nor do they deserve, namely, appearing to be representing Islam and Muslims. Consequently, the term political Islam appeared in Arabic (Islam siyasi), and is in wide circulation.

Others have opted to make a non-standard adjective form Islam, so instead of Islāmī (Islamic), the term Islamawy was coined.

Initially, there was no problem with describing various movements as Islamic. El-Affendi (2002, p. 44) has argued that to call the groups engaged in politics 'Islamic' does not mean other groups are not. He uses the analogy of calling a party democratic, and says the name does not mean that other parties are not. Such an argument is ascertained by political realities in democratic countries. No one will suggest that because there is a party called the Democratic Party in the US, then the Republican Party is not democratic. Moreover, in the UK one party is called Labour, and another is the Conservative Party. No one will suggest that the Labour Party looks after the interests of only working people, or that the Conservative Party looks after people who have conservative attitudes.

The point being made here is that the arguments about the name and its connotations, or an adjective, seem superficial. Therefore, I shall look for more substantive arguments against Islamism.

Objections to Islamism

If the claim of democracy's incompatibility with Islam receded, another one ascended: with Islamism. Kramer (1997) identifies four flawed assumptions, underlying some of the views that advocate involving the Islamists in political processes and power (p. 162):

> = First, that the yearning for democracy is today universal, and stands behind the mass Islamist movements.
>
> = Second, that there are 'extremists' and 'moderates' in Islamist movements, and that they can reliably be identified, classified and separated both for analytical and policy purposes (inverted commas in original).
>
> = Third, that power has a moderating effect upon those who share or exercise it, and would have such an effect upon Islamists as well.
>
> = Fourth, that because Islamism represents the populist will, its triumph is inevitable.

Kramer's first point illustrates the argument that when it comes to the Muslim world, the Muslims will be condemned if they appear not to be interested in democracy. When they express aspirations in this regard, then these aspirations are met with scepticism, if not dismissed. The ultimate judgement on whether the Islamists are genuine in their discourse about democracy is in the establishment of democratic systems in Muslim states. To deprive the Muslims of democracy because the Islamists are not democrats is a bizarre argument.

In the second point, Kramer lumps all Islamist movements in one category. Realistically, however, Islamist movements are not all the same. To begin with, when the term 'Islamist' is used in such a loose manner, confusion is a natural conclusion. The point about policy is also worth discussing. Whose policy? The Israeli foreign policy planners? American planers? Jordanian foreign policy planners? It is absurd to suggest that Jordanian policy makers cannot tell the difference between the MB and groups led by al-Zarqawi and his likes.

Kramer's third point has been put to the test by Schwedler (2006). She studied the IAF in Jordan and Islah Party in Yemen. She correctly observes (p. 194):

> both have been allied with the ruling elites since their early days, so labelling them moderate because they do not seek to overthrow the existing regime fundamentally misses the point: not only were they never radical, they were never really excluded.

Therefore, whether inclusion leads to moderation remains an unresolved point. However, inclusion and consequently working with other parties within a system with defined areas of authority does not allow Islamist parties to have their way. When the MPs of the MB were included in Mudar Badran's government in 1991, the inclusion was the right thing to do on the basis that the MB had a big bloc in the HoD. However, the five ministers were not able to dictate the government's policy. Therefore, whether the MB or these ministers became less radical or not is irrelevant. This instance, therefore, indicates that inclusion is the option with merits that outweigh exclusion.

The fourth point in Kramer's list is also instructive. He is wrong to suggest that other scholars are naïve to assume that the populist will triumph. To start with, the best way to have a free, measurable popular will is to have a democratic system of

government. It is under this system that one can say with some confidence that 'the people have spoken'. In a democratic system, the will of the people (the majority) prevails, and this is the right thing.

In the absence of democracy, any claim in relation to popular will is speculative. As such, it can be dismissed by Kramer and others as 'populist'. Moreover, whether it is a populist will, or democratic popular will, there is no guarantee that it will triumph. In Algeria, the army interfered in 1992 and cancelled the results of the elections. In Palestine in 2006, the democratic will of the people counted for nothing, as far as Israel, US, and EU were concerned because the people chose Hamas. In Chile in 1970, electing Salvador Allende was also unwelcome, and the army staged a bloody coup in 1973. Kramer will have been right if he suggested that the will of the people matters very little.

Pipes (1997, p. 65) argues that the Muslim fundamentalists are Westernised and in a way similar to nationalists in Europe. He predicts that 'fundamentalist Islam will remain a force for some time to come'. However, he further predicts that 'it will wither just as surely as did the other radical utopian ideologies of this century, fascism and communism' (p.65).

There are several problematic assertions in this short statement by Pipes, who fits Popper's description of a historicist. Popper (1957) outlines how historicists tend to make prophecies about the future relying on what they believe to be historical laws (pp. 41-45). Many Muslims wear Western clothes in their own countries, including Muslim 'fundamentalists'. This can be seen as sign that they have no problem with everything Western. However, Western suits and ties do not make one a Westerner, as the identity of a human being is made of more than the clothes he/she wears. Unlike nationalists anywhere, the Muslim fundamentalists are known, in theory at least, to oppose nationalism. They consider all Muslims to be one nation, as described in the Qur'an (21: 92 and 23:52). Other verses (2:13 and 10:19) suggest that all people are one community.

Moreover, it is not hard to agree with Pipes that fundamentalist Islam will continue for some time to come. It will probably remain a force for longer than he thinks, because fundamentalist trends in all religions never die. His prediction that 'it will

wither' is unsound. There is a scholarly misconceived comparison between 'fundamentalist Islam' and fascism. Such a similarity is dismissed by another American scholar, Sciabarra (2006) who points out that the Arab world is

> a mongrel mixture of theocratic fundamentalism, quasi-socialist command economies dominated by state-monopoly control of key resources (such as oil), and hereditary monarchy. It's simply wrong to characterize this mongrel mixture in toto as "Islamofascism." Call it theocratic statism or theocratic authoritarianism or, for its more "secular" forms, monarchical-military dictatorship, but please don't call it "fascism." Not unless you mean something historically specific, as in the "guild socialist" arrangements of Benito Mussolini.

Moreover, Hayes (1973) explains that there has been a 'lack of agreement about the true nature of fascism, both of the past and present' (p. 9). He points out that 'fascist' is an abused term and the intention of using it is 'to make a controversial comment on political developments and at the same time place those who they oppose beyond the pale of human sympathy' (p. 9).

As Forte (2001) explains, 'some commentators […] seek to turn the response to bin Laden into a campaign against religion itself'.[20] With little scholarly scrutiny, one can find that this is the case when one reads the claims made by some scholars such as Lewis, Huntington, Fukuyama, Pipes, and Kramer. It is all done in the name of scholarship, often at prestigious academic institutions.

It will be naïve to suggest that there are no people who genuinely distrust the Islamists' commitment to democracy, and oppose mixing politics with religion. Religious minorities, secularists, agnostics, and even many practising Muslims will be genuinely alarmed. Therefore, these concerns will need to be addressed. Mere assurances form Islamists will not be sufficient.

Al-Sayyid (2003, p. 25) is categorical in his assertion that the 'Islamists' participation in democratic politics undoubtedly presents a serious threat to the maintenance of civil and political rights and democratic procedures in their home countries'. However, he does not go as far as suggesting that they should be prevented from being included. Instead, he argues in favour of 'safeguards to reduce the risk'. These include constitutional changes which enshrine 'the full set of civil

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[20] Guest Comment on NRO, 19 October 2001.

and political rights formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, without the limitations Muslim countries typically impose to make such rights compatible with shariʿa' (p. 25).

The second safeguard recommended by al-Sayyid is the use of 'proportional representation' in the electoral system. This system, he argues, tends to prevent winning a majority of seats in parliaments. The third safeguard is a bicameral system, in which the upper chamber can act as a check on the lower (p. 25).

The fourth safeguard is 'the establishment of a supreme constitutional council' with various powers to protect rights. However, it is also empowered 'to order the armed forces to overthrow, if necessary, any government convicted through judicial channels of violating citizens' fundamental civil and political rights' (pp. 25-26).

It is sensible to enshrine the rights and freedoms of citizens in the constitutions. Governments will argue that they are enshrined already. The point of departure in al-Sayyid's suggestion is that rights and freedoms are enshrined without the usual qualification of being in line with shariʿa. It will take some courage to make these particular constitutional changes, because removing the reservations will be opposed, as has been demonstrated in Jordan when the government removed its reservation on article 15 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). However, the regime that will introduce these changes is unlikely to be one headed by someone who wants to stay in power for life. A change of this nature amounts to an overhaul which intends to take the entire people of the state to a new, higher level of human dignity. Therefore, while this recommendation is sensible, it overlooks the fact that this safeguard protects the citizens not from the Islamists, but also from the state.

The recommendation of using proportional representation (PR) is also sensible. However, this has its justification not only as a safeguard against Islamist participation, but as a general issue of fairness of representation. The debate about the need to adopt PR is a recurring one in the UK, whose electoral system produces majorities in the House of Commons with less than a majority of the popular vote. The system used in the UK is known as 'first past the post'. The candidate with the highest number of votes is declared the winner. As Beetham (2005, p. 173) explains,

this system 'can produce an assembly which is highly unrepresentative of the distribution of political opinion in the country'.

Al-Sayyid's recommendation of a bicameral system is also recognised as being of merit. Despite the fact the House of Lords is often criticised for being an unelected body, there is recognition that it does provide a useful role when laws are rushed through the House of Commons. However, the two chambers should be elected, as is the case in the USA.

The fourth recommendation of al-Sayyid is very problematic. A constitutional court is a good idea. It is a sign of maturity of a democracy when the constitutional court is the ultimate arbiter on what is constitutional or not (even though constitutional courts are not without debates). Al-Sayyid seems to propose a council similar to the one formed in Iran, namely, the Guardian Council, which can restrict the right to run in elections. This is contrary to a basic right in a democratic system of government.

Moreover, to empower a body to order the army to overthrow governments is an ill-considered idea. Firstly, the military should always stay out of politics. Secondly, a party which gains power in a country may enlist the support of the army, and continue to violate the fundamental rights of the citizens. The special role enjoyed by the army in Turkey has been a barrier to democracy in Turkey. In Algeria, the army's intervention prevented the FIS from coming to power in 1992, but thrust the country into years of violence.

Al-Sayyid's last recommendation invites another point of discussion: What if an Islamist party came to power through the ballot box, and then changed the democratic nature of the system? This hypothetical scenario will be better discussed in the Jordanian context. What if the IAF/MB came to power in Jordan?

The first point to recognise in this scenario is that the elections would have been free and fair. This second point is that the political system in Jordan would have gone through a major, substantive change of attitude, which will allow the government to be formed by the party which has the majority, or largest bloc, in the HoD. This happened only in 1956, and the government lasted merely several months. Therefore,

with the powers of the king, a government formed by the Islamists will be dismissed, when the king decides that it is not implementing the policies he favours. In other words, winning the majority in elections, then forming the government will not give the Islamists a free hand to change the system, because the king has superior powers.

It is worth pointing out that the MB pledged not to change the nature of the system. In April 1990, King Hussein appointed a royal commission. The sixty members represented the political currents in the country, including the MB. The task was to produce guidelines on the conduct of political activities. In June 1991, a document prepared by the commission was presented in a national conference and adopted unanimously. The charter stipulated the need to keep 'the civilian and democratic character of the state'. By being represented on the commission and attending the national conference, the MB had given a pledge not to change the system of government.

Assuming that Jordan has undergone drastic changes, and the king has become a nominal constitutional monarch, will the Islamists change the democratic nature of the system?

In the event that the MB and IAF decide not to honour the pledge contained in the national charter, and the king is helpless to stop them, the assessment of Fahd al-Rimawi is that other forces of society (such as civil society organisations) will not allow this to happen.[21] Emily Nafaʻ has a similar view and points out that there are several hypothetical stages to this scenario that makes it unrealistic.[22]

I shall go a step further and imagine that the Islamists in power decide to impose measures which alter the democratic nature of the system. If they do, it will be up to the Jordanian people to oppose and reverse that. This will not be easy, and will take a

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[21] Personal interview. Amman, 14 April 2008.
[22] Personal interview. Amman, 18 November 2010.

long time, but it is not impossible. The peoples of Eastern Europe removed the communist regimes after many years of strict rule.[23]

Conclusion

This chapter negotiated the hurdles identified in the introduction, namely what democracy means; whether Islam is, or provides, an alternative form of democracy; and whether democracy and Islam/ism are incompatible. The conclusion of the detailed discussion of these issues is that there is no theoretical incompatibility between democracy and Islam/ism. However, judgment is reserved until after the democratic audit is presented and discussed. The next chapter will continue the task of negotiating the fifth hurdle, specifically whether democracy can be measured and, if so, how.

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[23] I completed writing this chapter before the peoples in the Arab world rose to demand change. These events reinforce the argument that whoever is in power cannot keep it indefinitely in the name of a good cause, or in the name of religion. Also, see the epilogue.

Chapter 3

Assessing Democracy: Theory and Practice

This chapter consists of three parts. The first cites examples of assessments of the state of human rights, freedoms, and democracy in Jordan. The second outlines the notion of a democratic audit and the debates about the standards to be used in assessing the state of democracy. The third part outlines how I carried out the democratic audit of Jordan. It also identifies the limitations of the audit.

PART 1: CAN DEMOCRACY BE MEASURED?

Suesser and de Miguel (2008) acknowledge the scepticism regarding the measurement of democracy: 'the feasibility, and relevance of "measuring" human rights, democracy, and governance have long been controversial both in the human rights community and also in the international statistical community' (p. 157). They suggest, however, that there is a 'need for indicators for quantifying democracy and human rights', because increasingly they 'are seen as fundamental for good governance' (p. 169).

Human rights violations vary in severity and can have tangible consequences. Therefore, an attempt to establish differences in the violations is feasible. Humana (1987) has compiled a human rights index for 120 countries. In response to the scepticism about measuring human rights violations, Humana (1987, p. vii) cites a conclusion by Banks (1985) in which he says that statistics can be used in the service of human rights, just as they have been used in other areas.[1]

The sources of scepticism will be discussed in a separate section below. In the remainder of this section, I shall cite several assessments which, as will become apparent, are based on different methods and standards to measure human rights, freedoms, and democracy in Jordan and elsewhere.

Humana's index is compiled by using a questionnaire of forty questions. Its version of 1983 'included items not covered by international human rights instruments' (p.

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[1] A paper presented at the American Statistical Association.

viii). However, he revised the questionnaire so that all the questions were 'drawn totally from' them (p. viii). After receiving the answered questionnaires, he assesses each question and uses a scale of four grades: YES, yes, no, and NO. The respective marks for these grades are 3, 2, 1, and 0. He also uses a system of weighing, because a violation, for instance, intimidation, can vary in severity.

In cases of incomplete information, Humana provided a summary report about certain countries. This was a category he created to take into consideration countries about which information was available 'but did not cover all of the specific articles of the questionnaire' (p. 4). The rating system in this category entails a description of 'FAIR' for '75 percent and above'; 'POOR' for '41-75 per cent'; and 'Bad' for '40 per cent or less'.

Jordan appears in Humana's index in summary form and the rating it has been awarded is POOR (p. 150). Humana cites four reasons for this assessment: (a) 'the power of the absolute monarch'; (b) 'the continuing dispute with Israel'; (c) 'Islamic law applies to much of social and personal life'; and (d) 'a significant minority of Palestinians, over a quarter of the population, which continues to create instability' (p. 150).[2] Moreover, Humana cites two additional reasons which affect human rights in Jordan: (1) 'the strategic importance of the country and the regime' to the USA; and (2) 'priority over human rights of maintaining the authority of the present monarch' (p. 150).

It is not clear why Humana thinks the Palestinians in Jordan 'create instability' and what kind of 'instability' he has in mind. However, irrespective of why he thinks so, the democratic audit asks questions about citizenship in order to establish the extent of agreement on the principle in Jordan. Moreover, Humana's reference to the strategic importance of the country is dealt with in the democratic audit through questions about the external influence on democracy in Jordan.

Freedom House (FH) produces an annual report in which all countries of the world are classified into three categories: Free, Partly Free, and Not Free. In the various annual reports, one finds Jordan in the Partly Free category. FH (2010) considers

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[2] This is a problematic view of the Palestinians in Jordan whether in relation to their estimated number, or being a cause of instability.

itself 'a clear voice for democracy throughout the world'. As its name suggests, it equates freedom with democracy.

Sartori (1962, pp. 281-284) classifies freedoms into two categories: freedom to and freedom from. He argues that political freedoms are 'characteristically freedom from'. Described in another way, he considers political freedom to be 'a defensive or protective foredoom' (p. 283), namely, to protect the individual from the power of the state.

FH (2010) defines freedom as 'the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and/or other centres of potential domination'. FH bases its evaluation on civil and political rights, and uses universal standards, for it relies on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The assessment of a country consists of an analytical report and numerical ratings (1-7, where 1 is more free than 2). The ratings and corresponding scores are: 1 for a score of 36-40; 2 (30-35); 3(24-29); 4 (18-23); 5 (12-17); 6 (6-11); and 7 (0-5).

In the political rights category, there are three subcategories: electoral process; political pluralism and participation; and functioning of government. Each category has overarching questions, and each of these has sub-questions. In total, there are seventy-two questions, of which eight are discretionary and reserved for 'traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral system' and occupying powers.

Based on the above method, those who observe that freedom and democracy are not the same are correct. A monarchy for instance might choose to be liberal and allow people the freedom of expression, but the government is not elected. However, the method and the checklist used by FH show that they assess how democratic a county is, but FH prefers to use freedom and free instead of democracy and democratic. One possible reason for using freedom instead of democracy is that freedom has more positive connotations, as the status of 'democratic' was claimed by states which were not, especially during the Cold War, such as East Germany and South Yemen.

The British magazine, *The Economist*, has an 'Intelligence Units' (EIU), which assesses democracy. In 2007 and 2008, it produced 'The Index of Democracy'. Countries of the world are classified into four categories: (1) full democracies; (2) flawed democracies; (3) hybrid regimes; and (4) authoritarian regimes.

The index is compiled according to the EIU's criteria which differ from that of FH in that the EIU considers it insufficient to measure only political freedoms and civil liberties as FH does. Instead, the EIU has developed its own five categories: (a) electoral process and pluralism; (b) civil liberties; (c) the functioning of government; (d) political participation; and (e) political culture (The Democracy Index Report 2008, p. 2).

Each category has a number of questions which total sixty—an average of twelve questions for each category. The answers are marked in such a way that it leads to a mark of 10 for each category. If the average in the five categories is 8-10, then the country is classified as a full democracy. If the average is 7.9-6, the country is considered a flawed democracy. An average of 5.9-4 attracts a hybrid classification. An average less than 4 acquires the label of authoritarian regime (The Democracy Index Report 2008, p. 18).

As regards the scoring system, it uses 'a dichotomous and a three-point scoring system for the 60 indicators'. In the former, 1 is given for a yes answer, and 0 for a no. A half mark is used in many questions to capture 'grey areas'. The EIU argues that although its scoring system is not without problems, it is preferable to scores using 1-5 scale or 1-7 scale.

In the Index of 2007, Jordan was ranked 113, with a score of 3.92. In 2008, the rank fell to 117, but the overall score was slightly higher (3.93). This change would suggest an improvement in other countries which overtook Jordan's almost unchanged status. In 2010 the rank was 117, with a score of 3.74, which put Jordan in the category of authoritarian regimes.

Polity IV is a project which has monitored 'Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2008'. Polity IV (2009) measures: (1) key qualities of executive recruitment; (2) constraints on executive authority; (3) political competition; and (4) changes in the institutionalized qualities of governing authority. According to Polity IV (2009), its 'conceptual scheme is unique'. This is attributed to examining the 'concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in governing institutions'. Polity uses a score based on a 21-point scale, ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The score then leads to

one of three categories: autocracies (-10 to -6); anocracies (-5 to +5); and democracies (+6 to +10).

In relation to Jordan, Polity IV data show that at no time since 1946 did Jordan reach the threshold of a democracy. There are two peaks that brought Jordan close to being an anocracy. The first one was in 1956/1957, when Sulayman al-Nabulsi became the PM, because he was the leader of the Socialist Nationalist Party (SNP), which won the largest number of seats in the HoD. The second peak starts slowly in 1984 and reaches its highest point from 1992 through 2006, before it starts to fall again. Kanaan and Massad (2010) outlined the political and economic factors which would have prompted Polity IV to increase or decrease its rating of Jordan's status as anocracy or otherwise (pp. 87-112). They conclude that 'like most Arab countries, Jordan has suffered from continued autocratic rule'. They attribute this to 'the ability of the Jordanian monarchy to impede real political reforms through various incentives and means, largely financed by rentier (non-tax) public revenue, to co-opt the elite and middle class, and by relying on the Western powers' (p. 111).

The Centre of Strategic Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan publishes an annual report about the state of democracy in Jordan. The report is based on a poll. In 2008, the report was introduced in the following terms:

> The poll aims to identify the views of Jordanians about the democratic transformation in Jordan in general. It measures the level of democracy as perceived by citizens, identifies what democracy means to Jordanians, what type of political system Jordanians prefer, and what political system they perceive as the best to address the issues of poverty, unemployment, and financial and administrative corruption.[3]

Implied in this introduction is a suggestion that Jordan is undergoing a process of democratic transformation. It becomes apparent as well that the definition of democracy is taken for granted, and every Jordanian knows what democracy is. According to CSS (2008):

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[3] Reports are available in electronic form on the website of CSS (without page numbers).

> Most Jordanians conceptualize democracy as closely related to civil and political liberties. This understanding, in essence, does not differ from the concept of democracy in advanced democratic countries. Since the 1999 poll and until the time of this poll, 63% of total responses defined democracy as civil liberties and political rights.

In referring to civil and political rights, the poll seems to be guided by the criteria adopted by FH. The democratic audit does not leave the definition of democracy to politicians or the people for the reasons cited by Beetham in the second part of this chapter. It also did not take for granted, for instance, that Britain under Blair was democratic.[4] The poll by CSS was based on impressions, rather than on defined criteria. Therefore, while the reports of CSS are valuable, they do not provide an assessment based on standardised criteria. For example, the poll quotes a majority of Jordanians as saying that Palestine is not democratic. In contrast, the EIU's Index of Democracy (2007) lists Palestine in the hybrid category (p. 4).

One can say that the Jordanian assessment of the level of democracy in Jordan is more generous than the others referred to above. Two reasons can explain this. While CSS strives to be independent, nonetheless, it operates in an environment where 'loyalty to Jordan' is demanded. Second, CSS does not refer to a standardised procedure. A poll is not a reliable method to assess the level of democracy anywhere, including Jordan.

Measuring Democracy: A Critique of Methods

Klug, Starmer, and Weir (1996) outline various methods used in assessing 'political freedoms and rights' and have found them 'unsatisfactory'. They also consider both quantitative and qualitative approaches to human right studies 'unsuitable'. With regard to the method adopted by FH, Klug, Starmer, and Weir state that: 'The index used to evaluate liberties is very broad and only partially based on international human rights standards […] Consequently, much is left to the judgement of the independent 'expert' charged with answering these questions' (p. 14). An example to justify this reservation is related to measuring the 'independence of courts'. In this criticism, Klug, Starmer, and Weir include Humana's method and state that he 'provides little detail on his coding protocol'. They correctly observe that the 'final assessment' is made by 'Humana himself'.

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[4] A democratic audit was carried out in 1999 by S. Weir and D. Beetham

Moreover, Klug, Starmer, and Weir outline their criticism of the quantitative approach. Taking the number of banned demonstrations as an example, they argue that the question in this regard 'can be misleading' in the absence of a 'reference to the prevailing of political activity in the country' (p. 15). Moreover, the quantitative approach does not reveal the different levels of torture, for example. Similar criticism is levelled at the qualitative approach. While praising Amnesty International (AI) for producing 'the most reliable' reports, they point out that it 'specifically disavows any intention to grade or evaluate governments according to their record on human rights' (p. 15).

This critique, I suggest, applies equally to the method adopted by Diamond and Morlino (2004) who developed criteria to assess the 'quality of democracy'. They acknowledge that their notion is 'a value-laden and hence controversial subject' (p. 1). The definition of democracy they subscribe to involves four elements: universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one serious political party; and alternative sources of information (p. 3). They point out that in 'the industrial and marketing sectors, quality is referred to in three contexts: procedure, content, and result' (p. 4). On this basis, their definition of quality of democracy is 'one that provides its citizens a high degree of freedom, political equality, and popular control over public policies and policy makers through the legitimate and lawful functioning of stable institutions' (p. 4).

Having dealt with the definitions of democracy and quality, Diamond and Morlino proceed to 'identify eight dimensions on which democracies vary in quality'. These are: the rule of law; participation; competition; vertical accountability; horizontal accountability; respect for civil and political freedoms; progressive implementation of greater political (and underlying it, social and economic) equality; and responsiveness (p. 5). Diamond and Morlino argue that 'the analysis of a good democracy should exclude hybrid or "electoral authoritarian" regimes' (p. 3). If one wishes to use their criteria to assess the state of democracy in Jordan, a prejudgment has to be made: if Jordan is a hybrid regime, then a priori, it is not a good democracy. If Jordan is considered a democracy, then one can proceed to use the eight dimensions to assess its quality. This situation illustrates why the democratic audit is a better option, as no such prejudgments are required. On the contrary, the purpose of using the democratic audit is to arrive at a judgment after the audit is completed.

PART 2: THE DEMOCRATIC AUDIT

What is a democratic audit? As indicated before, in David Beetham's definition (1994, p. 25), it 'is the simple but ambitious project of assessing the state of democracy in a single country'. The task is far from simple, especially when one considers the limited resources available to a single researcher. When the idea of a democratic audit was first entertained by Beetham, it was essential to define 'a specification of what exactly to be audited'. Secondly, there must be 'criteria to serve as bench marks', according to which the audit is carried out (p. 25).

Several possible standards were rejected by Beetham: one is to assess democracy 'against the standards of its practitioner claim to be guided by'. Another is 'the values implicit in the political system'. A third standard is 'what citizens themselves understand democracy to mean' (p. 26). To adopt the first two standards would have meant acceptance that they were democratic when in fact an audit should assess how democratic they are (Beetham 1994, p. 26). The third standard was also rejected because of the 'misuse of the term "democracy" in popular parlance has come to mean whatever political arrangements the speaker personally approves of, and has become emptied of any objective referent' (p. 26).

Moreover, basing the standard on 'the existing institutions and procedures of Western political systems' has two flaws: the first is that 'no reason can be advanced as to why we should call these institutions "democratic", rather than "liberal", "pluralist", "polyarchic", or whatever other term we choose'. Another reason is the strong possibility that adopting this standard will lead to the charge that the concept is 'Eurocentric' because it does not offer a way to distinguish between the 'non-Western institutions and procedures which offered genuinely alternative ways of realizing democracy' (p. 26).

Eurocentrism

Before continuing to outline Beetham's response to the objections that can be raised in relation to the democratic audit, I propose to discuss the charge which is frequently directed at concepts and argument, namely, being Eurocentric. As defined by Amin (1989, p. vii):

> Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon in the sense that it assumes the existence of irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the historical paths of different peoples. Eurocentrism is therefore anti-universalist, since it is not interested in seeking possible general laws of human evolution. But it does present itself as universalist, for it claims that imitation of the Western model by all peoples is the only solution to the challenges of our time.

In relation to the Arab world, Sadiki (2009) argues that 'Eurocentric paradigms, especially democratization, are not easily applicable to Arab democratic experiments' (p. 10). He also notes that ''Eurocentric modalities and concepts defy transposition' (p. 11). Sadiki assesses cases of democratisation in the Arab world 'through an anti-foundationalist lens' (p. vii). He argues that 'an anti-foundationalist ontology that recognizes that Euro-American democratization is a function of time and context-specific knowledge is needed for Arab re-reading of democratic transition' (p. 47).

Foundationalism and Anti-Foundationalism

Before engaging with Sadiki's contentious assertions, it is necessary to identify what is meant by foundationalism, and anti-foundationalism. As explained by Ruckmore and Singer (1992), 'foundationalism is an epistemological theory intended to be independent of ontological claims, a theory in which reason is meant to justify its own claim to know' (p. 6). In contrast, anti-foundationalism is 'the negation of one of the various forms of foundationalism' (p. 8). More specifically, however, it is 'any effort to validate knowledge claims without appealing to an absolute or ultimate basis known with certainty, whether the latter is held to be unattainable or the model of knowledge as a unified structure resting on a foundation of certainty is rejected in principle' (p. 8).

Said (2004) situates himself amongst the 'crude foundationalists'. He refuses to accept that 'human rights are cultural or grammatical things', and argues that the

violations of human rights 'are as real as anything we can encounter' (p. 136). Al-Sayyid (2010) observes that Sadiki 'rejects the transitologues' basic assumptions and looks for the building blocks of another analytical structure. However, he does not completely construct the structure, leaving this task to the future—but without any hints as to how the whole construction would look' (p. 185).

Sadiki (2004) acknowledges that 'anti-foundationalism itself is not above reproach, nor is it without challenges' (p. 57). He refers in this regard to Crowell (1996) who accuses the anti-foundationalists of 'foisting new foundations of thought' (p. 57). Therefore, Sadiki's 'anti-foundationalist lens' does not necessarily lead to a better assessment of democratisation in the Arab world.

There is agreement in the studies of democratisation that the transition from dictatorship happens through different paths and for various reasons. Every transition is influenced by local circumstances and considerations. As Geddes (2004) notes: 'Many fine studies of these transitions have been written, but few of the general explanations proposed by scholars have turned out to hold across the full range of cases' (p. 2). However, a judgment that a paradigm, concept, or modality is Eurocentric, in the sense suggested by Samir Amin (1989), must be based on criteria. Otherwise, there is a risk of comprehensively rejecting everything European or Western.

I suggest that the debate about Eurocentrism is similar to the one I have outlined and engaged with in the previous chapter in relation to the definition of democracy. The difference is that instead of challenging the definition of Eurocentrism, the term becomes a convenient charge to dismiss notions, concepts, and arguments. It also seems like adopting Occidentalism in response to Orientalism.

Universal vs. Culture-Specific Standards

An extension of the debate on Eurocentrism is the discussion of whether or not rights should be universal. As the standards in the democratic audit are universal, I would like to cite another reason why some Muslims have no problem with enjoying universal rights. Al-Ghazali (1990) states that '*Western democracies* (my emphasis) developed good controls for correct political life, and we should borrow a great deal

from them to make up for the deficit that resulted from the stagnation which lasted for centuries' (p. 69). This leads me to suggest that Sadiki should be more judicious in rejecting the applicability of European or Western concepts to the Arab world or elsewhere. I should also add that Arab, Muslim, Indian, Chinese, and other concepts should not be rejected as being ethnocentric. Cross-fertilisation is a healthy phenomenon.

Although Beetham should be commended for wishing to avoid Eurocentrism, I would suggest it cannot be avoided despite one's best effort. The reason is similar to the argument about universalism. While Europe (or the West generally) is more developed, an element of Eurocentrism is inevitable. Countries undergoing a process of development emulate the West to a great extent, even when they try to keep a unique cultural identity. If one were to take China as an example to argue that modernisation can be pursued without Westernisation, I would suggest that this argument is half-true. If Westernisation is understood in a superficial sense, such as wearing Western clothes, listening to Western music, and eating Western 'fast food', then I will agree that the Chinese people may wish to retain their Chinese styles and preferences. However, if the argument is extended to suggest that the Chinese people will prefer to have limited freedoms, then this argument is rejected. People all over the world, irrespective of their race, religion, and culture, cherish freedom.

One objection to a democratic audit is that 'the character and quality of a country's democracy cannot be assessed by "ticking off" a set of specified criteria considered independently of one another' (Beetham 1994, p. 31). The basis of the objection is that 'a political system operates through a complex interrelationship between various institutions and practices' (p. 31). Beetham accepts the validity of the objection but argues that 'it does not follow that we should therefore abandon generalizable criteria against which to assess the differing practices of different countries or political system' (p. 31).

Another objection is concerned with 'whether it is appropriate for academics to be engaged in such explicitly evaluative and judgemental exercise' (p. 35). Beetham (1994, p. 35) explains that not all fields of academia have problems with this involvement: 'those who work in the field of normative political theory have less

difficulty with this objection than those whose main work lies in analytical and exploratory political science'. Moreover, Beetham argues that all democratic indices are 'necessarily evaluative and judgemental' (p. 35).

> Assigning measures on a scale is a judgemental exercise, and especially so where they become evidence to be used in the foreign policy of one country towards others. It is not unreasonable for those at the receiving end of such judgement to ask whether countries making them are prepared to be judged by similar criteria.

After making the case for the democratic audit, Beetham lists thirty indicators of democracy. These were further developed, after collaboration with International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), whose questionnaire stands at ninety questions.

Although Beetham responded to various objections, the debate about which standards to use is worthy of further discussion, especially in relation to whether there should be universal rights. One of the criticisms levelled at universal standards is that they 'have a Western liberal bias' (Humana 1987, p. 5). Humana accepts this observation and emphatically states that it is 'undeniably true'. However, he goes on to argue that the states which join the UN do so voluntarily. He points out that even after joining the UN, there remains a gap between the theory and practice. He cites, as an example, the Muslim countries which have joined the UN, yet '[t]heir faith and traditions take precedence over their obligation to the United Nations, a reality that is not in dispute' (p. 5).

Furthermore, Mouffe (2008) opposes the universality approach. She is in favour of a 'kind of pluralism advocated by Carl Schmitt' who 'insisted that the world is *pluriverse* not a *universe* (italics in original). She is in favour of a multi-polar world order, as it guards against hegemony. This is fine if it were true. It is highly likely that in a multi-polar world, hegemony will be divided amongst the major powers, and practised in their respective spheres of influence. This was the case before the bipolar world of the Cold War. Latin America was reserved for the US. The UK and France agreed on the territories to colonise and run in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

The general thrust of Mouffe's arguments is valid. When it comes to specific aspects, it becomes problematic, especially when she discusses human rights: 'there is something problematic about the idea of *human rights* that should be accepted by all culture' (p. 454; italics in original). Schmitt ([1929] 2007) said: 'The political entity cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all of humanity and the entire world' (p. 53). A universal standard of human rights is not the same as a political entity that embraces 'all of humanity and the entire world'.

Moreover, Schmitt makes a valid point: 'The concept of humanity is an essentially useful ideological instrument of imperial expansion and in its ethical-humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism' (p. 54). I agree with him that notions such as liberty, democracy, humanity, and human rights are used as ideological tools of imperial expansion and economic imperialism. However, I agree only when I examine the messenger. When George W. Bush is the messenger, his rhetoric about liberty, democracy, or human rights lacks credibility. When the messenger is the millions of people who have opposed the war on Iraq in 2003, I find something genuine and to be celebrated about the notion of humanity.

Mouffe's multi-polar argument is inherently flawed, in my view. How many poles? Three? Seven? Why any specific number? Similarly, with numerous cultures in the world, how many cultural standards of human rights should the world have? It is worth recalling here what Said (2008) has said in relation to cultures in response to Huntington—namely, that cultures are not 'shut-down, sealed off entities' and throughout history they engaged in 'exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing'. Moreover, it is worth noting that Mouffe (2008) argues that 'different communities' should not be allowed 'to organise themselves according to their own laws' if these 'laws contradict the constitutional essentials' (p. 463). Although I agree with the submission, I suggest it undermines the arguments made already in favour of pluralism.

This flaw of the non-universalist argument is that while the intention is good, the consequences are not. These scholars overlook the debates by the people of various

cultures about how much to retain and change of their cultures. Even scholars who attempt to avoid Eurocentrism by showing respect for other cultures fail to see the variety of views and debates within these cultures. The well-intentioned argument leads scholars like Esposito and Voll (1996) to present an anti-democratic argument by al-Mawdudi, as an example of an Islamic conceptualisation of democracy. Why should al-Mawdudi or Qutb be seen to have spoken for all the Muslims in relation to democracy or other notions?

I am suspicious of the non-universalist arguments, because their ultimate conclusion is that people of non-European race are not worthy of these rights. The anti-universalist argument is also favoured by the authoritarian rulers to perpetuate their grip on power. It is worth reiterating what I have said earlier: that the notions of modernity, human rights, and democracy cannot be appropriated by Europe, the West or the Judeo-Christian world. I do not doubt that some scholars make their arguments out of sympathy with other peoples' aspirations to be different, and in opposition to hegemonic discourse. However, a universal human right will not make the Chinese people European or Western; nor will it make a Jordanian less so.

I suggest there is a better reason for the use of a universal standard. This has the implication that all people across the world are considered equal and worthy of the same rights. The argument against universal human rights is misguided because it can and does open the door to the abuse of rights. One would consider the merits of the anti-universal standards if the culture-specific standards are of higher standards. For example, when the Muslim world was more tolerant of Christians and Jews, some Jews of Spain chose to live in the Muslim world. At that time, it would be possible to argue that the Muslim human rights standards were higher than those of Spain, and therefore, it was natural to be inclined to go and live where the standards are better.

In other words, I concur with those who choose the universal standards as the norm, without losing sight of the fact that the universal standards come qualified, to the point that they can seem 'worthless'. Beetham (2004) cites Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and points to its first part which upholds the freedom of expression. However, its second part qualifies this right with many

restrictions.[5] Therefore, he notes: 'Most students when you give them this text to read will say, well, this right is worthless'. In other words, where the standards of rights are considered universal, enjoying them without restrictions is a struggle that has not yet ceased.

On the basis of the democratic audit, Klug, Starmer, and Weir (1996) have developed the Human Rights Index, arguing that 'political rights and freedoms are singled out for special protection in international treaties because they ought to be exempt, in principle, from everyday commerce of politics' (p. 309). Consequently, Klug, Starmer, and Weir base their questionnaire on UN instruments, namely, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, International Covenant on Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Before I conclude the discussion on which standards to use, I will attempt to identify some Islamic standards, and discuss whether they can or should be used in the democratic audit.

Abou El-Fadl (2004), who reconciles democracy and Islam, identifies 'a set of social and political values that are central to a Muslim polity' (p. 5). The first is 'pursuing justice through cooperation and mutual assistance'; the second is 'establishing a nonautocratic, consultative method of governance'; the third important value is 'institutionalizing mercy and compassion in social interaction' (p. 5).

Can the Islamic values identified by Abou El-Fadl be used in the democratic audit? One possible response is that they are already incorporated without labelling them as Islamic values, because, having reconciled democracy with Islam, Abou El-Fadl concludes that democracy 'offers the greatest potential for promoting justice and protecting human dignity without making God responsible for injustice or the

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[5] Article 10, part 2 states: The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

degradation of human beings' (pp. 5-6). The other possible response is that there is a need for criteria in order to measure these values. The third response is that when these criteria are available, it will be an interesting exercise to conduct an Islamic democratic audit. Moreover, when these criteria are developed, there will be a case to make that Beetham and others should revisit their own criteria to take into account Islamic and other criteria. My democratic audit of Jordan, however, cannot mix criteria, as this will be unsound methodically and procedurally.

PART 3: MY DEMOCRATIC AUDIT OF JORDAN

The democratic audit has advantages over other assessments by asking questions about various elements that are considered by scholars to be part of a democratic system of government. The scholars who consider civil society to be of prime importance in democracy will be satisfied by the part in the audit which asks various questions about it. Others who attach more importance to the social and economic rights will also be satisfied. In brief, the audit takes into consideration various views of democracy. However, there is no room in this approach to argue that democracy is a contested concept. In a democratic audit, the concept of democracy is not contested. On the contrary, it is considered the best form government, and for a system to remain democratic, it has to rest on two pillars: popular control and political equality (Klug, Starmer, and Weir 1996, p. 13). The standards are also universal for reasons already discussed.

Questionnaires to Collect Data

The collection of data for the democratic audit involved using two questionnaires. A questionnaire is an instrument to collect information from respondents. It is part of the survey method widely used in social sciences, as Czaja and Blair observe (1996, p. 1). When using a questionnaire, a researcher will face questions with regard to its design, and the sample of respondents. Czaja and Blair (1996, p. 11) identify five stages of a survey: (1) design and preliminary planning; (2) pre-testing; (3) final survey design and planning; (4) data collection; and (5) data coding, data file construction, analysis and final report.

For the purpose of my research project, I did not need to concern myself too much with the first three stages because the democratic audit uses a standardised questionnaire, which is available from the Democratic Audit (University of Essex), and IDEA (Stockholm). However, I did assess which question is likely to be misunderstood. I also had to consider whether to use the questionnaire in English, Arabic, or both.

Democratic Audit has a 'do-it-yourself' questionnaire. The respondent chooses from a grid one of five options: VH (very high); H (high); M (middling or ambiguous); L (low); and VL (very low). The respondent is also invited to identify the best feature, most serious problem, and a suggestion for improvement. I have used this questionnaire to gather data. However, I have slightly modified it as outlined below.

To entice respondents to answer the questionnaire, I envisaged that it should not take a long time to answer. By making it look shorter, the respondent will feel it can be answered quickly. Therefore, instead of nine pages, the modified questionnaire was reduced to three, including the cover page. This was possible by using only the overarching questions. The original questionnaire used a grid to reduce the number of pages because it had many more questions. More importantly, however, I decided against using the grid because the respondent was asked to choose one of five elastic replies, such as high and very high. Instead, I asked the respondents to give a mark out of 10, which people would find easier, as it did not impose on them a yes or no answer, or pass/fail choice. A mark out of 10 is easier to deal with than very high, very low, and the three choices in between. I retained the part that invited the respondents to supplement the mark with information about best and worst features, and to make suggestions for improvement.

Democratic Audit and IDEA do not give any specific guidance about the sample size. It was left to me to make a considered decision. I endeavoured to have as many as I could get diligently. When one starts to ask potential respondents to answer a questionnaire, it becomes apparent that one cannot get as many as one wishes. Reaching a target of twenty returned questionnaires required sustained efforts, and the help of several people.

The Respondents

For the short questionnaire, the respondent is someone who is familiar with democracy and related issues, such as civil society and freedoms. There are people in four categories that I identified as being able to answer the questionnaire: (1) academics who specialise in democracy and related issues; (2) journalists who report and comment on these issues; (3) activists; and (4) other intellectuals.

During one field trip, I printed thirty copies of the short questionnaire and gave some copies to people who might be able to help me. I made it clear in advance that the respondents should fall within those categories. These printed questionnaires served as a testing stage because it was apparent that despite simplifying the questionnaire, there was some confusion as to how it should be answered. Therefore, I added a hypothetical question about the environment. I answered it, by giving a mark out of 10; identified the hypothetical best and worst features; and made a suggestion for improvement.

Vagueness, real or perceived, is a common issue when questionnaires are used. Czaja and Blair (1996, p. 73) observe: 'Ambiguity is the ghost most difficult to exorcise from survey questions'. Before I sent the questionnaire, I spotted two questions that had the potential of being misunderstood. One (No. 12) asks: 'Is there full participation in public life?' To clarify this question, I added between parenthesis information to explain that it refers to diversity of voluntary organisations; women's participation; and equality. The other question (No. 9) is related to leadership of the army. I expected a reluctance to answer this question because Jordanians are accustomed to refrain from talking about the army or the security services.

Although the questionnaire was not sent by mail (it was given by hand or sent by email), the observation about questionnaires by Neuman (2003, p.243) is valid and applies to mine. Neuman points out that the 'researcher cannot control the condition under which the mail questionnaire is completed […] Also, no one is present to clarify questions or to probe for more information'.

Long Questionnaire

Although the short questionnaire was a reduced version of the full one of ninety questions, it was my considered judgement that it would be open to challenge as to whether it could be considered a democratic audit. Consequently, I decided to use the full questionnaire provided by IDEA. This one has the advantages of providing an in-depth assessment of Jordan's state of democracy. Another important advantage is that it may or may not concur with the overarching questions of the short questionnaire. If it does concur, then one assessment corroborates the other. If it does not, this is equally valuable because it prompts one to try to understand why this is the case.

This longer questionnaire had its own set of issues and problems. To begin with, it consisted of 140 questions. As such, it would have been seen as very long and time consuming, and would have severely discouraged respondents. Moreover, although it was translated into Arabic by IDEA, the Arabic version would further discourage the potential respondents because, in translation, terms acquire meanings that can change the original. For example, when the term 'inclusive' was translated into Arabic, it produced a word that meant 'comprehensive' (shumūli), which implies a totalitarian system.

My inquiries led to information that the standards questionnaire was revised, and the number of questions reduced from 140 to 90. Comparing the two versions, I established that the questions deleted were of one type that asks: 'What measures, if any, are being taken to remedy publicly identified problems in this field, and what degree of political priority and public support do they have?' I agreed that the deleted questions were redundant, and by deleting them the audit would not be less comprehensive.

IDEA's guidance as to the sample of respondents was not specific: 'it depends on resources and design'. I had to make a considered judgement. Although there is a methodology adopted by IDEA, the decisions on implementation are taken by the researchers carrying out the audit. Having found that the audit carried out in Mongolia used five experts, I chose this figure as my target.

To avoid the problems with translation, I decided to use the long questionnaire in English, and changed the type of potential respondent. The additional requirement is that the respondents must have good command of English and be familiar with the concept of democracy and related issues. For the sake of clarity, from this point onwards, I shall refer to the people who answered the long questionnaire as the assessors.

The search for such assessors was harder but more focused. As is the case with the short questionnaire, some ignored the request for help completely. Two candidates gave the impression they would answer but changed their minds subsequently. Others responded promptly. Therefore, the response rate was a great deal higher because the potential assessors were fewer.

The long time spent on securing five answered questionnaires in English was mostly spent on identifying suitable assessors and finding the means to contact them. Eventually, however, I managed to have six assessors with impressive credentials. Two of them are women. This demonstrates that the assessment is sensitive to gender. Initially, I was in favour of providing brief biographies to show that they have highly regarded credentials. However, after some reflection, I thought that I should not, to eliminate the slim possibility that they might be reproached in Jordan if my thesis happened to be read and its content deemed unfair to Jordan. Overall, finding the six assessors took several months, but in the end the goal was achieved.

Problems with Questionnaires

The first problem one faces when using a questionnaire is that potential respondents will ignore the request for assistance, especially when the researcher is not personally known to them. In such a situation, more than three quarter of the potential respondents will ignore the questionnaire and will not even reply to decline. The other problem is that the respondent will delay answering the questionnaire, and when sent a reminder, a few more will ignore the request. The third problem is that a respondent does not understand a question and will send back a questionnaire that is incorrectly answered. This happened initially in in the shorter questionnaire. The first set of answered questionnaires demonstrated that the respondents were not clear about how to answer the questions. Once I recognised this, I modified the cover page

of the questionnaire to include am example of how to answer it. The quality of returned questionnaires improved thereafter.

Quality of Responses

By quality of responses I mean whether the answered questionnaires are usable or not. All of the six long questionnaires were useable because the vast majority of the questions were answered. It is not clear in some instances whether the assessors missed a question or chose not to answer it; one assessor chose not to answer questions related to elected government and indicated that Jordan had no elected government. This points to a shortcoming in this part of IDEA's questionnaire as the questions assume that the governments being assessed are elected. I refrained from inferring that the mark should be zero when I analysed the data, as the thesis is not about marks, averages, and rankings. The marks have been used as a tool to help produce a qualitative assessment of the state of democracy in Jordan.

Size of Sample

Without specific advice on what constitute an adequate sample, the only choice is to make a considered judgement. There might be an inclination to assume that the bigger the sample the better. This is not necessarily true. As Spirer and Seltzer (2008, p. 208) explain 'cost or time needed' do not allow gathering 'data for the entire population'. They also point out that focusing 'resources on gathering data from a smaller number of subjects or units improves the quality on information gathered'.

Other Issues

The generic one-size-fits-all is not suitable for every country. For instance, one question (2.5.4.) asks: 'How free is the country from the operation of paramilitary units, private armies, war lordism and criminal mafias?' If one was conducting a democratic audit of Somalia or Afghanistan, the issue of war lordism would be relevant, but the question in Jordan would puzzle people. This question in particular is more than 'double-barrelled'—the type that Blair and Czaja (1996, p. 77) recommend that researchers must avoid.

Furthermore, part 2.3 of the questionnaire (Effective and Responsive Government) has a question (2.3.1.) which begins with 'How far is the elected government…'. As

indicated above an assessor declined to answer the questions in that part, and pointed out the government in Jordan was unelected. IDEA's questionnaire should not assume that the governments being assessed are elected. Many are not. IDEA should revise this part of the questionnaire.

Tools Used in Analysing Data

I used the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), to generate descriptive statistics, which provide means, frequency of marks, percentages, and tables. The assessment does not require more than these statistics because it is a qualitative appraisal. To improve the presentational aspect of the tables, I used a combination of MS Excel and Word.

Conclusion

This chapter negotiated the fifth set of hurdles identified in the introduction, namely, whether democracy can be measured and the standards used in the measurement. The conclusion supported by evidence is that measuring democracy and other notions is now common practice. For the purpose of this thesis, the democratic audit has been chosen as it has advantages over other methods.

Moreover, in the methods section of the thesis, I have quoted Strauss and Corbin (1998, pp. 10-11) who argue that 'the nature of the research problem' influences the selection of method. The same applies to choice of theory. I have approached the assessment of the state of democracy in Jordan with an open mind, and the democratic audit itself is not based on a prejudgment of about the state of democracy in Jordan. As can be seen in the concluding chapter, other theories were outlined and engaged with, but there were not as plausible at explaining the state of democracy revealed by the audit. The modernisation theory is not dead. It can be found in different forms in many studies, such as those by Przeworski who argues that there is a link between democracy and per capita incomes. Therefore, choosing the modernisation theory is objectively justified.

It should be noted that the overall assessment in this thesis is based on three elements: short questionnaire (macro-analysis); long questionnaire (microanalysis);

and elite interviews. I make no claim that the six assessors, the respondents who answered the short questionnaire, and the interviewees, constitute a representative sample of Jordan's population. This is a qualitative assessment, not a poll. I do stress, however, that the people who contributed to this assessment are diverse. Consequently, the data produced a balanced assessment.

Before the data collected through the two questionnaires will be presented and discussed, there is a need for background information in relation to Jordan and the MB/IAF. This will be the subject of the next two chapters.

Chapter 4

Jordan: History and Political System

This chapter consists of five parts. One will focus briefly on the modern history of Jordan. Another focuses on the political system in Jordan, particularly its branches of government. The third part is concerned with the role of Islam in the state. The fourth is about the economy. The fifth part outlines the Palestinian connection in Jordan's history and politics. The background of these issues is necessary because they will be addressed in the democratic audit.

PART 1: HISTORY OF JORDAN

The modern history of Jordan is related to the downfall of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent colonial era in which France and Britain carved out territories that were under the rule of the Ottomans. During the First World War (1914-1919), in which Britain and France were on one side and Germany and the Ottoman Empire on the other, contacts were established between Britain and Husayn ibn ʿAli, the *Sharīf* of Mecca. According to Storrs (1939), Amir ʿAbdullah, son of the *sharīf*, initiated the contact in 1914 during a visit to Cairo 'as the guest of the Khedive' (p. 129). In Cairo, he met Lord Kitchener. Storrs noted that ʿAbdullah 'appeared to have something to say but somehow did not reach the point of saying it' (p. 129).

Storrs (1939) outlines the details of his meeting with Amir ʿAbdullah during which the latter asked 'whether Great Britain would present the Grand Sharif with a dozen or a half-dozen machine guns' (pp. 129-130). The Jordanian historian, Sulayman Musa (1986) confirms that Amir ʿAbdullah met Lord Kitchener during a visit by the latter to the Khedive's office. Musa says that Kitchener, accompanied by Ronald Storrs, followed the Amir, and that they told him 'the British government was satisfied with the security in Hejaz and the measures taken to look after the pilgrims since his father assumed the role of Amir of Mecca' (pp. 66-67).

At the time of contact, the relationship between Turkey and Britain was not adversarial. Therefore, the British account suggests that ʿAbdullah was not promised any support. Similarly, the Jordanian account does not mention any request for help

during the initial contact. Both sides however were interested in re-establishing contact and developing cooperation after Turkey joined Germany in the war.

The Ottoman Empire lasted for six centuries. With the rise of nationalism in Europe, the peoples of the empire were influenced by nationalist ideas. The Turkish elements of the empire wanted to give it a Turkish character. In the late 19th and 20th centuries, the decaying empire saw the formation of the Society for Union and Progress and Young Turks (1906). Likewise, the non-Turkish peoples started to think of independence. As Sayigh (1966A) pointed out, Arab and Turkish critics of Sultan ʿAbd al-Hamīd succeeded in 1908 in 'restricting his powers and adopting a relatively progressive constitution' (p. 18). They then managed to remove him in 1909 (p.18).

Sayigh (1966A) suggests that the Arabs developed a higher sense of national identity after members of the Young Turks reneged on the promises to be fair to the non-Turkish elements in the empire (pp. 18-19). Instead, 'persecution of Arabs in the empire intensified' (p. 19). Furthermore, other non-Arab elements in the empire managed to breakaway and establish independent states such as Greece, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria (p. 19). Therefore, during 1913-1914, the signs of an Arab nationalist movement were clear (p. 20).

Nationalist sentiments in the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire were suppressed, especially during the reign of Ahmad Pasha, the butcher, who hanged many nationalists in Syria and Lebanon in May 1916. When the Ottoman Empire entered the war on Germany's side, the road was paved for closer cooperation with *sharīf* Husayn. The British officer, Thomas Lawrence, played a leading role in organizing and implementing a revolt against the Ottomans.

There are different accounts as to when and who amongst the Arab leaders initiated contact with *sharīf* Husayn ibn ʿAli. One account referred to by Sayigh (1966A) indicates that the contact occurred in 1911 in the form of a letter from thirty-five Arab members in the Ottoman Parliament (pp. 22-23). However, Sayigh casts doubt on the authenticity of this account. Assuming it was, Sayigh argues, it did not promise the *sharīf* that he would become a king (p. 22). Sayigh also points out that even if this letter was indeed sent to *sharīf* Husayn, he did not respond.

Storrs (1939, p. 160) indicated that *sharīf* Husayn was telling the British that he had 'a general mandate as King of Arabs for a Spiritual Pan-Araby'. However, Storrs said that the *sharīf* 'knew better than we that he could lay no kind of genuine claim'. The reasons outlined by Storrs include the fact the Christians, Shi'a, Zaydis, and even Sunnis of North Africa would not accept him as their leader.

Sayigh asked a necessary question: why did the leaders of the Arab movement choose to contact the *Sharīf* of Mecca to make him the leader of the movement? Sayigh confirmed that the Arab movement in 1915 chose to call upon *sharīf* Husayn to be its leader. They sent him a letter full of praise and offered cooperation against the Turks (pp. 25-26). After a long analysis concerning the lack of credentials for such a leadership, the answer in Sayigh's conclusion is in 'circumstances and the English' (p. 39). The most important circumstance is the fact that the *sharīf* became the Amir of Mecca at a time of tension between the Arabs and Turks (p. 39).

The significance of the alliance between Britain and Husayn ibn ʿAli cannot be understated since Hejaz is the region which has the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Muslims make the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and are encouraged to visit the mosque of Prophet Muhammad in Medina. From a religious point of view, this region is of paramount importance for the Ottoman Empire which ruled in the name of Islam.

Husayn ibn ʿAli was known as the 'Keeper of the Holy Places of Mecca' (ʿAruri 1972, p. 15). He belonged to a family whose members claim to be descendants of Prophet Muhammad. A male member of this family is known as *sharīf* (honourable) or *sayyid* (master). In particular, members of this family claim descent from Hashim ibn ʿAbd-Munaf, the paternal great grandfather of Prophet Muhammad. Husayn ibn ʿAli had four sons: ʿAli, ʿAbdullah, Faysal, and Zayd. They played various roles during and after the revolt launched by their father.

A series of communications which laid the foundation for a revolt by the Arabs against Turkey were exchanged between Husayn ibn ʿAli and the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Henry McMahon. The incentives for Husayn ibn ʿAli were qualified promises that Britain would be willing 'to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sharif

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of Mecca'; that Britain would provide the Arabs with 'her advice'; and would 'assist them to establish what may appear to be the more suitable forms of government in those various territories' (1915).[1]

In the meantime, Britain and France had reached a secret agreement in 1916 (Sykes-Picot)[2] according to which the two powers designated the areas which would come under their respective control after the end of the war. Accordingly, the region that incorporates present-day Syria and Lebanon would be under France's control. The region from Iraq to the Mediterranean coast (including historic Palestine) was to be under British control. Furthermore, in 1917 the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, wrote a letter to Walter Rothschild, a leader of the Jewish community in Britain, to inform the Zionist movement that Britain was supportive of the idea of establishing a national homeland for the Jews in Palestine. This is known as the Balfour Declaration.

Husayn ibn ʿAli launched the revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916. It led to the surrender of Ottoman forces in Hjjaz. Forces led by Faysal, who was working with General Allenby and Colonel Lawrence, managed to seize Aqaba from the Ottomans. In 1918, they entered Damascus, where Faysal set up an administration. Arab representatives in Syria declared him King of Syria.

In 1920, in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement, France decided to remove Faysal from Syria, and managed to do so after a battle at Maysaloun (July 1920). Faysal's brother, ʿAbdullah, led some forces with the declared intention of restoring the throne of his brother. His first stop was at Maʿan, which belonged then to the Hejaz and is now in southern Jordan.

Although Syria was under French control and Iraq and Palestine were under the British, the borders between the areas of control were not clearly delineated. The region on the eastern side of the Jordan River, Transjordan, had three separate administrative districts: ʿAjlun, Salt, and Karak. Each had a British adviser. These three districts became the basis of an entity ruled by ʿAbdullah. This was formalised in a meeting between ʿAbdullah and Churchill in Jerusalem in March 1921.

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[1] Letter from Henry McMahon to Hussein ibn ʿAli, 24 October 1915.
[2] A secret agreement between Britain and France. Named after the two officials who negotiated it: the British Mark Sykes and the French Georges Picot.

ʿAbdullah was informed that 'he could keep Transjordan on a temporary basis under British mandatory 'protection' until some more permanent arrangement was agreed upon with the French' (Salibi 1993, pp. 87-88).

It was on 15 May 1923 that the 'Emirate of Transjordan' was recognised 'as a national state being prepared for independence under the general supervision of the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem' (Salibi 1993, p. 88).

Since then, Transjordan developed into a nation-state in stages. The transformation, however, required 'money, military assistance and goodwill' from the British (Salibi 1993, p. 98). A series of treaties were negotiated between 1928 and 1946. The Emirate of Transjordan was declared a kingdom on 25 May 1946, and Amir ʿAbdullah acquired the title of the 'King of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan'.[3] But even after the officially declared independence of Jordan, the British had considerable control, especially with regard to foreign policy and the army, which was led by a British officer, John Glubb, who was the commander of the Jordanian army, until his dismissal in 1954. King Hussein's decision to dismiss him was influenced by pressure from nationalists in the army and the country.

Scholars who have studied Jordan have three broad explanations as to why the State of Jordan was established. First, it was formed by Britain to stem the French expansion in the region (Wilson 1988, p. 44). Second, that Transjordan was created as a prize for Amir ʿAbdullah for the services he, his brothers, and their father, Husayn ibn ʿAli, rendered to Britain in its endeavours to bring down the Ottoman Empire (Wiktorowicz 2001, pp. 50-51). Third, 'the British were eager to have a buffer between their direct rule in Palestine and both the expanding Saʿudi power to the south and the French Mandate in Syria to the North. The two wishes were fulfilled with the creation of a new entity in Transjordan' (Lucas 2005, p. 14).

Kings of Jordan

The ruling dynasty in Jordan starts with ʿAbdullah, the son of Husayn ibn ʿAli. The latter's ambition to be the king of an Arab state was not realised. Instead, more than one state was created in the region he had hoped to rule, and it was his sons who were the beneficiaries. Ironically, Husayn ibn ʿAli and family lost their position in

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[3] The Jordanian Declaration of Independence Document, dated 25 May 1944.

Mecca, and failed in their attempts to bring present-day Saudi Arabia under their control. While residing in Mecca, the family and its supporters were engaged in clashes with other leaders in the area. There was fierce competition between the local leaders. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz ibn Saʿud was engaged in fighting with rivals from al-Rashid tribes in Ha'el and the Sharif of Mecca. Ibn Saʿud's forces defeated Husayn ibn ʿAli's in Tayef. In order to pacify ibn Saʿud, he stood down in favour of his eldest son, ʿAli, who ruled until 1925, when he surrendered to ibn Saʿud and moved to Iraq.

Faysal was first declared King of Syria in 1918, before the French forced him out in 1920. ʿAbdullah's arrival in Maʿan was supposed to be a step on the way to Damascus to restore the throne of his bother Faysal. However, the journey to Damascus was never completed. Instead, he ended up being the Amir of Transjordan.

Thus far, Jordan has been ruled by four kings: ʿAbdullah I, Talal, Hussein and ʿAbdullah II. ʿAbdullah I is referred to in official Jordanian discourse as the 'founder king'. He acquired the title of King in 1946, and ruled until he was assassinated in Jerusalem in 1951. There is no authoritative account as to who was behind the assassination plot and why. Various accounts blame the Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husayni, and King Faruq of Egypt. King ʿAbdullah's critics blame him for sacrificing Palestine; his admirers argue that he managed to prevent the inclusion of Transjordan in the homeland promised for the Jews in the Balfour Declaration.

As Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001, p. 36) point out 'the real motivations of the assassin and his accomplices remain unclear to this day'. She adds, however, that ʿAbdullah's 'collusion with the Israelis to the detriment of the Palestinians was held at the time to be the most likely reason'. Sayigh (1966B, pp. 227-228) refers to the assassin as 'a young feda'i'[4] which in the context of his book, *The Hashimites and the Palestine Question*, leaves little doubt that the assassination is related to the Palestine question. Hani Akhu Irshaideh (2003, p. 156) indicates that the unity between Transjordan and the West Bank was achieved through the approval of a Palestinian minority, and that 'the assassination of King ʿAbdullah was a protest at this unity'.

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[4] Feda'i is someone who is willing to sacrifice his life for a cause: national or religious. The term feda'i was widely used to refer to the fighters of the Palestinian resistance movement after 1967 war.

Abu Nuwar (1990, pp. 124-137) dismisses the suggestion that those behind the assassination were the Palestinian Mufti, Amin al-Husayni, and ʿAbdullah al-Tall, the leader of the Jordanian forces in Jerusalem during the 1948 war, supported by the Egyptian government (p. 124). An account based on this suggestion is detailed by Satloff (1994) who refers to ʿAbudllah al-Tall as 'one of the plot's ring-leaders' (p. 31). That ʿAbudllah al-Tall was involved with others and backed by Cairo is the account adopted by Jordanian historians, al-Madi and Musa (1988, pp. 550-561). In his memoirs, the British Resident in Transjordan, Alec Kirkbride (1976, pp. 127-139), also blames ʿAbdullah al-Tall.

Abu Nuwar (1990, p. 129) noted that in 1957 he met al-Tall in Cairo and asked him about his role in the assassination. Al-Tall swore that he was innocent (p. 129). Abu Nuwar suggested that Britain was responsible for the assassination. According to Abu Nuwar, Britain had three motives for eliminating King ʿAbdullah: (a) because he was about to end the British presence in the region; (b) because Britain wanted to abort his attempt to 'unite Jordan with Iraq'; and (c) because he revived the idea of 'uniting the Arab East to confront the Zionist invasion' (p. 129).

Abu Nuwar said that the man found guilty of plotting the assassination, Musa al-Husayni, had a German wife, and both were on good terms with the British Generals Glubb and Peake (p. 124). Abu Nuwar suggested that the British chose Musa al-Husayni as it would be possible to make a link between the assassination and Amin al-Husayni and ʿAbdullah al-Tall (p. 131). The more likely reason is that the assassination was indeed related to the Palestine question. ʿAbdullah's role was not synchronous with the Palestinians themselves or the other Arab governments. That he accepted the plan to partition Palestine is cited in the official Jordanian narrative as a farsighted decision which could have spared the Palestinians and Arabs the loss of all of Palestine.

ʿAbdullah's eldest son, Talal, succeeded his assassinated father. The succession was not a straightforward matter because Talal at the time was receiving treatment in Geneva, and there were doubts about his mental stability.

Abu Nuwar (1990) outlines the discussions and manoeuvres which took place at the time to decide who should succeed ʿAbdullah: the constitutional heir, Talal, who was

ill and receiving treatment in Geneva, or Talal's brother, Nayef. Satloff (1994) also outlines the manoeuvres which were taking place to exclude Talal from becoming the crown prince in view of his turbulent relationship with his father. In the words of British officials, including Kirkrbirde, quoted by Satloff, Talal was temperamental and 'deeply anti-British' (p. 16). According to Satloff, ʿAbdullah secretly signed a document in which he appointed his son Nayef as the crown prince (p. 16). However, ʿAbdullah changed his mind and restored Talal in 1947.

According to Abu Nuwar's account, he and other nationalist colleagues wanted Talal to succeed, in line with the stipulation of the constitution. The British army officers had a different view. The then Prime Minister, Tawfiq Abul-Huda, decided to seek medical reports on Talal's mental health. Satloff (1994, p. 38) quoted a report by three Swiss specialists treating Talal as saying that 'the crown prince had been under treatment for "an extraordinary case of mental depression"' (p. 38). He was declared fit and returned to Jordan to succeed his father.

King Talal ruled from 1951 to 1952. During his short reign, the constitution was amended to give more power to the other branches of government. It is noteworthy that Kirkbride narrates anecdotes that raise doubts about Talal's mental stability even before he became king (pp. 120-126). He suggests that Talal 'realised the burdens of office were too much for him and abdicated willingly' (p. 150). This account however is inaccurate. King Talal's mental instability was an issue before after he became king. When it became apparent that his mental condition deteriorated, Abul-Huda initiated the procedure which led to declaring King Talal ill. Consequently, it was possible to remove him according to article 28 of the constitution (Satloff 1994, p. 56). Parliament also named Hussein, Talal's eldest son, as the new king.

When Hussein succeeded his father, Talal, he was two years under the age required. Therefore, there was a 'council of regency' which ruled until he reached the age of eighteen lunar years. He acceded to the throne on 2 May 1953 and ruled until his death in 1999. He is referred to in the Jordanian official discourse as the 'father of modern Jordan'. During Hussein's reign, political freedoms were suppressed and

political parties banned in 1957. The process of reversing that decision started in 1989. This section about him is brief because he will be referred to in many parts of the thesis.

Shortly before his death, King Hussein removed his brother Hassan from the position of crown prince and replaced him with ʿAbdullah, Hussein's eldest son, who was named after his grandfather. ʿAbdullah's mother is the British Antoinette Gardner, Hussein's second wife, who acquired the title of Princess Mona. ʿAbdullah was pursuing a career in the special forces of the Jordanian army. According to some accounts, he was not expecting to be appointed crown prince when he was called for an audience with his father. After ʿAbdullah II became king, he too removed his brother Hamza from the position of crown prince. Hamza is the son of Lisa Najib Halaby, an American of Syrian origin. She was the fourth wife of King Hussein, and acquired the title of Queen Noor. After celebrating the tenth anniversary as king, ʿAbdullah II named his eldest son, Hussein II, in July 2009 as the crown prince at the age of fifteen years.

PART 2: JORDAN'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. However, the king is not a figurehead, as is the case in some European countries, such as Britain, Holland, and Norway. According to article 28 of the constitution, the monarchy is 'hereditary' and reserved for 'the dynasty of King ʿAbdullah Ibn Al-Hussein'—but only for 'male heirs'. Various articles in the constitution give the king the power to dissolve the HoD and the HoN; he appoints and dismisses the prime minister; and he is the supreme commander of land, naval, and air forces.[5] The king is the executive branch, but according to the constitution, his power is exercised through ministers. However, he also has legislative power. According to article 25, the power to legislate is shared by the parliament and the king, who is 'immune from any liability and responsibility', according to article 30.

The king selects the prime minister in Jordan. Instructions on the tasks of the government are given to the PM in a letter from the king. Only once in the history of Jordan has the chosen prime minister been a member of the party which gained the

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[5] A translated version is available from the website of Yale Law School.

largest number of seats in the HoD. This was in October 1956. Sulayman al-Nabulsi's government won the confidence of parliament. However, it was a short-lived government, serving less than six months. King Hussein dismissed him.

According to Lucas (2005, p. 23), the pillars of the regime are: East Bank tribes; religious and ethnic minorities (Christians, Circassians, and Chechens); state bureaucracy; the military; and Palestinians in business. I suggest that these five pillars are not amenable to generalisation. The East Bank's tribes cannot be taken for granted. There are divisions amongst and within the tribes that contradict the often-repeated generalisation about the loyalty of the tribes to the regime. It is also doubtful to suggest that religious and ethnic minorities would prefer oppression of the whole society, which applies to them as well, in return for some special treatment by the regime—a treatment which by international standards is not very special.

The regime relies on the army, police, intelligence services, and a system of patronage. The loyalty of people serving in defence and security forces becomes part of the job. The members have no choice in this matter. However, loyalties can shift according to circumstances and interests. It is also doubtful that the regime considers 'Palestinians in business' one of its pillars. Most likely, Lucas has some wealthy Palestinians in mind, such as the Shomans who own the Arab Bank. Irrespective of how many they are, the vague phrase, 'Palestinians in business', does not capture the divisions discussed later in the democratic audit in relation to citizenship.

Finer (1970) suggested that if King Hussein were to make peace with Israel, the Jordanian army would act to remove him. His predictions proved wrong, because in 1994 Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel. The Jordanian army did not act to remove him. Opposition to the treaty was, and still is, expressed by individuals and political parties, especially IAF.

The Jordanian Parliament is bicameral. The lower house is the House of Deputies (HoD), and the upper is the House of Notables (HoN).[6] The two chambers are known together as the National Assembly (*Majlis al-Umma*). The number of members of the lower house is double that of the upper. The HoN's members are appointed by the king, while members of the lower house gain membership through elections.

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[6] Similar to the British House of Lords

According to the constitution, the power to legislate is not the exclusive domain of the National Assembly. As mentioned earlier, the constitution specifically states that the king shares the legislative power.

After the merger of Transjordan with the West Bank in 1950, the shorthand reference to each part of the kingdom was East Bank and West Bank. Membership of both chambers was equally divided between the two parts. After the independence of Transjordan in 1946, the HoD consisted of forty members, and the HoN of twenty. The number of seats was increased in 1960 to become sixty for the lower house and thirty for the upper, with membership equally divided between the two parts of the kingdom.

The official history of Jordan's parliament shows that the HoD was dissolved several times, because it did not work well with the government. Contrary to the normal practice in democracies, the parliament is dismissed instead of government. In other words, the legislative branch of government is the weakest.

Since the inception of Transjordan, there have been political parties. The elections of 1956 were contested by various political parties, including the Nationalist Socialist Party, headed by Sulayman al-Nabulsi, and the Baʿth Party, whose member ʿAbdullah al-Rimawi, was made foreign minister in al-Nabulsi's government. However, after the dispute between the palace and the government, King Hussein dismissed the government, dissolved parliament, and banned parties. In this dispute, the MB sided with the palace.

Although political parties remained illegal until the political parties law came into effect in 1992, there was a de facto presence of political parties in Jordan, after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. Armed Palestinian groups established bases in Jordan after the war, and political organisations were able to operate without being licensed by the government. The de facto public presence continued until the PLO's presence was eliminated in Jordan in 1970-1971. After that, those who continued to operate did so secretly.

After parties were made legal in 1992, twenty parties applied for a licence, and by the end of 1996, there were twenty-three parties in Jordan (Hourani 1997, p. 19).

However, not all managed to win seats in the HoD. Because of high number of parties, and weak membership, King ʿAbdullah II suggested the idea of having three to four large parties as a way of invigorating the political scene. In 2007, a law required parties to re-register, and new requirements were imposed regarding the minimum number of members, including a requirement of such membership to be spread across the country. IAF passed through this stage.

Multi-party elections which produced significant opposition within parliament occurred on two occasions: 1956 and 1989. In the former, the MB had two members and nineteen in the latter. The change of fortunes is due to the fact that secular parties (nationalist and socialist) were more popular in the 1950s. In 1956, King Hussein reluctantly selected Sulayman al-Nabulsi, the leader of the largest party in the HoD, to form the government. In contrast, although the MB gained the largest number of seats (but not a majority), they were not asked to form the government.[7]

There are three types of courts in Jordan, according to the constitution: civil courts, religious courts, and special courts. The constitution makes references to the independence of judges who are not subjected to 'any interference in their affairs'. In reality, however, there are episodes which undermine the independence of the justice system in Jordan, as shall be outlined in the chapter analysing the data of the democratic audit. As Lucas (2005, p. 23) observes, the courts are 'staffed with staunch supporters of the regime'. However, they usually belong to the 'liberal wing' of the 'coalition' on which the regime relies. He further notes that the 'judges have taken their role seriously and may on occasions reject the government dictates. If the king's will is clear, however, the courts generally will not try to challenge it' (p. 23).

PART 3: THE ROLE OF ISLAM

Islam is the official religion of the state, and the courts follow the Hanafi school of interpretation in adjudicating matters such as divorce, inheritance, and other personal matters. More than 90 percent of the population are Muslims. This percentage

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[7] Al-Nabulsi did not win a seat in parliament. It is thought that this is due to rigging the elections. The choice of PM was not going to al-Nabulsi, but then King Hussein changed his mind and decided to take the results of the elections into account.

includes the Palestinians as well as the Circassian minority. The CIA (2010) provides the following information about Jordan's population:

> Sunni Muslim 92%, Christian 6% (majority Greek Orthodox, but some Greek and Roman Catholics, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Protestant denominations), other 2% (several small Shia Muslim and Druze populations) (2001 est.)

It is customary to broadcast live the Friday noon prayer from a major mosque. This used to be al-Aqsa in Jerusalem before 1967. Also, regular programming is interrupted to broadcast the call for prayer (*azan*). As the Audiovisual Commission (AVC) notes, a radio station wholly dedicated to broadcasting Qur'an recitations and religious programmes was established in 2006. However, the fact that Islam is the official religion does not translate into implementation of shariʿa. For instance, banks (nonIslamic) which deal with interest operate freely. Alcoholic beverages can be purchased and consumed in Jordan.

As Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001) note: 'Jordan's rulers enhance their legitimacy through reference to their lineage to the Prophet Muhammad, but the political philosophy of the state is western constitutional in origin' (p. 102). It is true that the rulers of Jordan refer to their linage to the Prophet. However, does this enhance their legitimacy, or that of other rulers in the Muslim world? There are two points which are worthy of discussion: the legitimacy to rule Jordan by the Hashimite and the popularity of the kings of Jordan.

Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe (2001) are not alone in referring to the lineage as a credential. Al-ʿUkur (2003, p. 88), an Islamic member of the Jordanian HoN, addresses a point which the Islamists in Jordan and elsewhere discuss: whether they should participate in legislative councils and take up leading roles in countries not considered to be following the teachings of Islam. He argues in favour of doing so, especially in countries 'whose constitutions stipulate the Islam is the official religion and the origins of the rulers go back to the honourable household [of Prophet Muhammad]' (p. 88). Similarly, the leftist writer, ʿUrayb Rintawi (2003) suggested that what reinforced the relationship between the Islamic movement and the state was 'the most important [source of] legitimacy of the regime in Jordan: belonging to the Prophet garden [*sic*]' (p. 92).

Both the Sunni and Shiʿi branches of Islam revere Prophet Muhammad and his family. The latter is referred to as the people of the house (āl al-bayt). It is a well-known story to Muslims that Prophet Muhammad was fond of his grandchildren, Hassan and Hussein, the sons of his cousin, ʿAli, and his daughter, Fatima. After the dispute over who should succeed Muhammad, those who argued that it should have been ʿAli, eventually became known as the Shiʿa. In this branch of Islam, ʿAli, his family, and his descendants, enjoy a very special status. There is a belief that one of the grandchildren will turn up one day and save the world (the Hidden Imam).

In contrast, the Sunni branch does not give the same status to the household of the Prophet, even though they are highly revered and praised. Three successors of Prophet Muhammad, Abu Bakr, ʿUmar, and ʿUthman, were not members of the Prophet's household. The caliphs who ruled the Muslims of the Sunni branch did not necessarily have a connection with the Prophet's household.

Various people in the Muslim world proudly refer to their connection with the Prophet and his family. For instance, a Saudi family, al-Sharif, makes such a claim. The Syrian-German scholar, Bassam Tibi, invoked such a connection during an address he gave at the Moshe Dayan Centre in Israel in January 2000.[8] If one is to follow the injunctions of the Qur'an, there is no special status for anyone. God favours people according to their piety, not their lineage (Qur'an 49: 13).

ʿUthman (2002) challenges in unequivocal terms the claim that the lineage is a basis of legitimacy. He argues that this 'absolutely contradicts Islam', and that Islam has nothing to do with lineage. The legitimacy is based on belonging to Islam both intellectually and in practice. Therefore, the ruler gets it from belonging to Islam, not the lineage. ʿUthman further clarifies that the legitimacy of the king in Jordan is constitutional (p. 113).

Moreover, the claim of lineage as a source of legitimacy did matter in the dispute between the *Sharīf* of Mecca, Hussein ibn ʿAli and his rival ibn Saud. The latter removed the former, and established in Saudi Arabia a stricter Islamic state than is the case in Jordan.

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[8] The Sixteenth Annual George A. Kaller Lecture, 12 January 2000.

The Hashimite rule in Jordan was not readily accepted in Jordan. Al-Madi and Musa ([1959] 1988) pointed out that there were two major rebellions: one in al-Kura in northern Jordan in 1921, after Amir ʿAbdullah formed his first government in Transjordan (pp. 156-164). The rebellion was quelled in 1922, after sending a large force which managed to subjugate the area (p. 164). The second rebellion occurred in 1923 by the ʿUdwan tribe of the Salt area (pp. 201-220). Fighters from the tribe and its supporters headed to Amman. They were intercepted, and some of the fighters were killed.

The new ruler resorted to pitting one tribe against another, and favouring one over the other. The control was in the end solidified by a combination of coercion, money, and land. The fact that Transjordanian tribes rebelled undermines the often repeated suggestion that the Hashimites are more popular with Transjordanian tribes than they are with Palestinians. In his memoirs, General Glubb (1948) records his efforts to bring order to the desert. For instance, he had troubles with the Huwaitat tribe in the 1930s (p. 91):

> I had reached the conclusion that the only way to do anything with the Huwaitat was to withdraw all troops from the desert. The resentment between the troops and the tribes was such that the latter were embittered against Great Britain and the Trans-Jordan government as a whole.

Moreover, after some success in getting the Huwaitat to cooperate with him in defending the area from the raids of the Ikhwan of Saudi Arabia, he could not persuade them to join the Jordanian army: 'But enlist as soldiers they would not. The idea that the Government was their bitterest enemy was too deeply engrained in their minds to admit such a novel idea' (pp. 92-93). Al-Budairi (1996) notes that 'the historical record shows that the most vocal and effective opposition to ʿAbdullah […] came from the tribes'. He further notes that the tribes 'were eventually won over by a dual policy of coercion and co-optation' (p. 243).

In recent times, members of Transjordanian tribes expressed their opposition in varying degrees of severity. Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi resorted to violence and killed innocent people in the process. A former MP, and high-ranking officer in Jordanian police, Ahmad ʿUwaidi al-ʿAbbadi, was imprisoned after criticising corruption in Jordan. In February 2010, two prominent activists, Sufyan al-Tall and Muwafaq Mahadin, were imprisoned for taking part in interviews which discussed the

Jordanian involvement in Afghanistan, and were critical of Jordan's cooperation with the CIA.

Another part of the official Jordanian narrative, sometimes repeated by scholars and journalists, is that the kings of Jordan, especially King Hussein, are popular and liked by people. Public personalities who are frequently in the news attract a following, and will be well-liked by a certain number of people. When the personality is a king, the number of admirers is likely to increase manifold because of the system of patronage known in Jordan as *makrumah* (an act of generosity). The makrumah can be applied to an individual or a segment of the population, such as the bedouin.

It is highly likely to be suggested that whenever the king, Hussein or another, visits universities, villages, or patrons an event, there is always evidence that the king is popular, because people will rush to shake his hand or hug him. These images will be shown repeatedly in the Jordanian media. However, it is commonly known in political life that there is a great deal of stage management when politicians, in the West as well as in the East, visit places and attend events. The staff of politicians will always ensure that their man or woman is met by a friendly crowd, and according to a script. This will apply to the king of Jordan as it does to the president of the USA.

Moreover, it is a fact known to school children in Jordan that on certain occasions they get the day off to welcome the king along the route to his palace. When King ʿAbdullah II celebrated the tenth anniversary of ascending to the throne, the Ministry of Education required teachers and students to take part in the public celebrations. The streets of Amman were supplied with tents, chairs, water, soft drinks, and sweets to entice and reward participation. In other words, the images of friendly crowds do not tell how popular the person is across the country. In a state where it is a crime to criticise its king, it is not possible to conduct polls to ask people whether they like him or not.

PART 4: THE ECONOMY AND RENTIERISM

As indicated in official statistics (2007), the area of Jordan is nearly 90,000 km2, of which 70,000 km2 (78%) is classified as semi-desert. Jordan is a country without natural resources that can counterbalance this disadvantage, as in the case of Saudi Arabia and other states in the Gulf. According to 2006 official statistics, the

population of Jordan is 5.6 million, with a growth rate of 2.3 percent. At this rate, it will take thirty years for the population to double. More than 80 percent of the population live in urban areas. More than one-third of the population (37.3%) are under the age of 15. The median age of the entire population is 20.3 years.

The illiteracy rate is 9.3 percent, but it is much higher amongst women (13.7%). Only 10.7 percent of the population hold a bachelor degree or higher. The majority's level of education (53.7%) is below secondary education. The GDP is JD10,108 million, while the GDP per capita is JD1805 (equivalent to $2500). The inflation rate during 2006 was 6.3 percent.

Water resources are scarce in Jordan. Consequently, water distribution to homes is rationed. According to Raddad (2005, p. 1), the water supply per capita is considered 'among the lowest in the world'. It is nearly 135 cubic meters 'for all uses' per year. Only 3.1 percent of the population work in agriculture. In contrast, more than a third of the labour force (35%) worked as farmers in 1964, and agriculture then amounted to '20% of the total production' of Jordan's economy' ('Aruri 1972, p. 50).

As ʿAruri (1972, p. 60) noted, Jordan's economy was weak since its creation. It suffered from 'chronic deficit in the budget and the balance of trade'. He further noted that 'domestic revenue has consistently lagged behind expenditure. Grants from abroad were always needed to cover expenditure, which the country was never able to meet with its own resources'.

Such a state of affairs lends Jordan to being classified as a rentier economy. The characteristic of a rentier economy, as identified by Beblawi and Luciani (1987), is 'one where rent situations predominate' and one which 'relies on substantial *external rents*' (p. 51; italics in original). Another characteristic is that the government is the 'principal recipient of the external rent' (p. 52).

As Brynen (1992) explains, Jordan's economy and politics have the characteristics of rentierism since the state's inception, because of the reliance initially on a British 'monthly subsidy of £5,000', in 1921. It then increased to 'around £100,000 per year by the mid-1920s and to £2 million by the mid-1940s' (p. 78). Moreover, although after independence in 1946 and the merger with the West Bank, which led to the reduction of foreign assistance, 'British (and later, United States) budget support

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continued, with foreign grants accounting for an average of 30 per cent of all government revenue and between one fifth and one third of GDP between 1952 and 1966' (p. 78). After the 1967 war, and having lost the West Bank, Jordan was one of the recipients of Arab aid. 'Between 1967 and 1972,' according to Brynen, 'foreign grants accounted for no less than 58 per cent of all government revenues' (p. 78).

Moreover, Robinson (1998, p. 390) noted that 'Jordan's economic fortunes were in decline well before the beginning of the Gulf War in 1990. Its per capita GNP, hovering around $2,000 since 1985, plummeted to less than $1,500 in 1989'. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Jordan received hundreds of thousands of refugees. Moreover, 'government transfers, primarily from Gulf Arab countries, declined markedly […] down to $164 million' in 1991. In this regard, it is worth recalling that the decline is related to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and King Hussein's attempt to find a diplomatic solution through Arab efforts. This position was ill-received by Kuwait, other Gulf states, and the USA.

 As was the case in other developing countries, Jordan resorted to foreign loans and defaulted on payment. The slowdown in the economy during the 1980s was severe due to the collapse of oil prices, which affected oil producing countries. Consequently, there was a knock-on effect on the aid Jordan received from these countries, and on remittances form Jordanian expatriates in the Gulf. As Harrigan, El-Said, and Wang (2006) explain, 'between 1983 and 1988, the government followed expansionary policies based on external borrowing and running down reserves'. Moreover, the 'budget deficits widened significantly'. Jordan external debts were $9.5 billion. The government ceased to be 'able to service her foreign debt obligations' (p. 267).

As seen elsewhere in the developing world, the IMF and World Bank were involved in the endeavours to resolve Jordan's problems through programmes agreed with both institutions. One of the government's measures was a freeze on 'public wages, salaries and employment and an immediate increase in the prices of petroleum

products, all of which were required to meet IMF loan conditionality to curb the fiscal deficit' (Harrigan, El-Said, and Wang 2006, p. 269).

The measures caused public discontent, manifested in disturbances in the southern cities of Maʿan, Karak, and Tafila. Of significance is the fact that the disturbances were by the Transjordanian section of the population, whose loyalty to the regime is often presented as not being in question. King Hussein discussed with his advisers how best to deal with the situation. According to Lucas (2005, p. 27) the 'advisers had split on recommending a response to the riots'.

The protests in the southern cities are often cited as the reason for the liberalisation. However, I would suggest that it was one of several reasons. Other factors were at play at the time, one of which was the breaking away of Eastern European countries from the Soviet orbit. Internally, moreover, there have always been demands for political reform in Jordan, and King Hussein engaged in informal dialogue with some personalities, such as Jamal al-Shaʿer. However, after the disturbances broke out, using oppressive measures at a time when freedom was sweeping Eastern Europe would have been ill-received internationally.

PART 5: THE PALESTINIAN CONNECTION

Jordan's modern history is entangled with that of Palestine. The Arab Revolt encouraged by Britain took place in 1916. The British promise to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine was made in 1917. Britain used its links with the family of Hussein ibn ʿAli (and Ibn Saʿud as well) to achieve this goal. For instance, in 1919, Faysal reached an agreement with Chaim Weizmann in this regard. Article III is of particular significance:

> In the establishment of the Constitution and administration of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's declaration of the 2nd of November, 1917.[9]

When the UN partition plan was proposed in 1947, the Palestinians and the leaders of Arab states of the time rejected it. King ʿAbdullah was in favour of acceptance. The Arab-Israeli war in 1948 forced hundreds of thousands of Palestinians to seek refuge

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[9] Faisal-Weizmann Agreement, 3 January 1919.

in neighbouring Arab countries. Two parts of Palestine remained in Arab hands; the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. There were attempts to have a Palestinian entity to carry on the fight for Palestine. The embodiment of these attempts was the Pan-Palestine Government, which came into being in September 1948. As Muhammad Khalid al-Azʿar (1998) explains, this government was met with hostility by King ʿAbdullah I, and became an emasculated body, based in Cairo, until it ceased to exist in 1963. The PLO was created soon afterwards.

Al-Azʿar (1998) documents King ʿAbdullah's opposition to this Palestinian government, and his countermeasures to merge the West Bank with Transjordan. His attempts were fruitful, and the merger was agreed in a conference held in Jericho in December 1948. The merger with the West Bank resulted in changes in various laws to accommodate the representation of the new part of the kingdom in the government and parliaments.

In 1954, a law was enacted which gave Palestinians, including the refugees, the right to acquire Jordanian citizenship. Both moves (the merger and citizenship) were controversial, and created identity crises for the State of Jordan, the people of Transjordan, and the Palestinians—as shall be seen in the democratic audit.

When the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 broke out, three Arab states lost territories to Israel: Egypt lost the Sinai and the Gaza Strip; Syria lost the Golan Heights; and Jordan lost the West Bank. After the war, a Palestinian resistance movement emerged and established a presence in Jordan. Friction between the various factions of the Palestinian movement and the government eventually led to the expulsion of the movement in two stages: the first in September 1970, after which Palestinian fighters were forced to relocate to bases in the northern part of the country, and then in 1971, when the presence was eliminated. Following the clashes of 1970-1971, Jordan embarked on a process of 'Jordanisation' of the army and other government institutions. In 1972, Palestinian gunmen assassinated the then Prime Minister of Jordan, Wasfi al-Tall, in Cairo.

The Palestinian national movement, embodied by the PLO, sought to represent all Palestinians. In 1974, the PLO secured a resolution from the Arab summit in Rabat

that declared the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The representation of the Palestinians remained an issue fraught with tension between Jordan and the PLO. Jordan was not willing to consider the PLO the representative of the Palestinians who had acquired Jordanian citizenship.

The relationship between the PLO and Jordan went through stages of tension and cooperation, influenced in both cases by the prospects of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some peace plans had what was called the Jordanian option, which, amongst its varieties, would involve a confederation of Jordanian-Palestinian states.[10]

In February 1985, an agreement between Jordan and the PLO leader, Yasir Arafat, was signed in Amman, calling for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the agreement failed to win the support of the rest of the PLO. King Hussein cancelled the agreement in February 1986. The tension in the relationship between both sides escalated. The end of 1987 saw the eruption of the Palestinian uprising, *intifada*, whose coverage in Jordanian official media was limited. Exasperated by the frustration of attempting to work with the PLO, and the criticism levelled at Jordan's role in the peace process, King Hussein announced in July 1988 a disengagement plan which declared that Jordan was no longer responsible legally or administratively for the West Bank. As shall be seen in the democratic audit, the constitutionality of this decision is debated by two opposite camps: one wants it constitutionalised so that it has a permanent effect; the other considers it unconstitutional.

In October 1991, the Madrid Peace Conference took place. Initially the Palestinians were part of the Jordanian delegation. However, a separate track was established after the negotiations moved to Washington in 1992. While the peace talks were still going on, the PLO reached with the Israelis in Oslo in 1993 a secret agreement, which led to the recognition of the PLO, and a form of autonomy for five years, after which the final status of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967 would be determined. After the Israeli-Palestinian agreement was reached, Jordan wasted no time and concluded its own peace treaty in 1994.

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[10] The 'Jordanian option' was viewed with suspicion by the Palestinian organisations.

Palestinians in Jordan

The issue of Palestinians in Jordan is never discussed openly. For instance, the number of Palestinians in Jordan is shrouded in secrecy. Even when a census is carried out, the figure is not revealed. Some Palestinians who served the regime loyally wrote about the exclusion and discrimination practised in Jordan against the Palestinians. ʿAdnan Abu ʿOdeh, an intelligence officer who served as minister of information in the military cabinet formed during the clashes of 1970, published a book in 1999 in which he referred to the exclusion. After an interview on al-Jazeera TV in 2006, in which the same view was aired, legal proceedings were initiated against him, ostensibly after complaints were filed against him. However, the charges were dropped without an explanation. Similarly, Jawad al-ʿAnani, who served as chief of the royal court, expressed similar sentiments in an article he wrote in *al-Bayan*, a UAE daily, in 2001. Both had to give up their seats in the HoN.

It should be noted that the Jordanian-Palestinian entanglement is not purely political in nature. Religious Muslims do not entertain the idea that Palestine is not their concern, whether in Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, or other Muslim countries, because Jerusalem is considered the third holiest place in the world, after Mecca and Medina. Prophet Muhammad's journey from Mecca to Jerusalem and then ascending to the Heavens (the Night Journey) is part of the faith and is celebrated every year.

Looked at from the perspective of some of the Transjordanians, because Palestinians in Jordan acquired citizenship, as of 1954, resentment is often expressed at the fact that Palestinians identify themselves as such. This is seen as an expression of disloyalty. However, this view is too narrow, as the issue of identity is too complex to be settled by acquiring citizenship in Jordan or elsewhere.

Moreover, one should not believe claims that Transjordanians have no sympathy for the Palestinians and their resistance, especially the movement which emerged after the 1967. Before the relationship between the Palestinian factions and the government descended into hostility, the Palestinian resistance was welcomed and

supported by Transjordanians. This was acknowledged in ʿAbdullah ʿAzzam's memoirs (1990, pp. 69-72). He gives credit to the ʿUbaydat clan whose member, Ahmad ʿUbaydat, became the chief of the GID and then prime minister.

Relationship with Hamas

The rise of Hamas is connected with the Palestinian uprising of 1987, which broke out in Gaza and then engulfed the Gaza Strip and West Bank. After the Arab defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, leftist and nationalist organisations, old and new, launched armed resistance against the occupation. Religious groups, such as the MB, did not do so. They thought that resisting the occupation should be under the umbrella of jihad, and that the Arab/Muslim societies were not Islamic enough. They saw the defeat as a revenge of God, and thought Nasser and fellow Arab leaders deserved the defeat. This explains why the leftist and nationalist organisations won the support of the people after the 1967 war.

The reluctance of the MB to resort to armed resistance led some members to break away and create the Islamic Jihad organisation. Moreover, Hamas refused to join the ranks of the PLO. At times, the unwillingness to join was based on the size of representation in the PLO bodies, such as the executive committee, central council, and the Palestine National Council.

As Hroub (1996) and al-Tamimi (2007) explain, many of Hamas leaders were residents in Kuwait. They moved to Jordan after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and used Jordan as a base for their political and media activities. They were helped by the MB in Jordan.

Israeli agents attempted to assassinate Khalid Mashʿal in Jordan in 1997 by injecting him with poison. King Hussein took advantage of the episode and achieved two goals before the Israel agents were released: (a) he demanded information concerning the antidote to save Mashʿal's life, and (b) he also demanded the release of Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, the spiritual leader of Hamas. After the death of King Hussein,

Jordan's relation with Hamas deteriorated. Four Hamas leaders, who were based in Jordan, were forced to leave in 1999.[11]

After Hamas won the Palestinian elections in 2006, Jordan refused to receive the then Palestinian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud al-Zahhar. Shortly before that, Jordanian news reports claimed Hamas was stockpiling arms in Jordan. The weekly paper, *al-Majd*, reported that the announcement was made months after the alleged discovery and the timing was chosen to coincide with the unwanted visit. In June 2008, the three individuals accused of involvement in the stockpiling of arms were sentenced to five to fifteen years imprisonment.

As shall be seen in the next chapter, the Hamas factor has also been a source of disagreements within the MB and IAF.

Conclusion

This chapter provided the necessary background about Jordan and its system of government. In addition to the history of the creation of the State of Jordan, it referred to the kings who ruled thus far, and the three branches of government. The chapter also discussed the role of Islam in Jordan, as stipulated and practised by the state. The economy and its characterisation as a 'rentier economy' was also discussed, for this is highly relevant in relation to issues included in the democratic audit, such as social and economic rights. Moreover, the chapter discussed the connection between Jordan and Palestine. This matter is also highly relevant to issues that will arise in the democratic audit, such as agreement on citizenship.

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[11] Khalid Mashʿal, Musa Abu Marzūq, Muhammad Nazzal, and Ibrahim Ghosheh.

Chapter 5

Jordanian MB and IAF

This chapter has three parts. The first provides an overview of the MB and its founder Hassan al-Banna. The second part focuses on Jordan's MB since its creation in 1945. The third part is concerned with IAF, the party formed by the MB in 1992.

PART 1: THE MB IN EGYPT

The founder of the MB is Hassan al-Banna, who was born in 1906 in the Egyptian town of al-Maḥmūdiyya, where he received his elementary and secondary education. He was a bright student, and managed to be fifth amongst the top ten students across Egypt in the secondary education examinations (Gharaybeh 1997A, p. 11).

Al-Banna was born at a time Egypt was becoming a region under increasing British influence. It became a British protectorate in 1906. Although it was given independence in 1922, it was of a nominal nature. The foreign presence that came to Egypt brought with it behaviours that were alien to the local culture, such as the consumption of alcohol and Western women dress styles.

Al-Banna's adherence to Islam and its teachings is evident in the fact that he studied and memorised Qur'an at the hands of his father and two Sufi shaykhs: Muhammad Zahran and ʿAbd al-Wahhab al-Ḥaṣafi. Al-Banna continued his higher education at the College of Sciences (Dār al-ʿUlūm) in Cairo, where he met a number of prominent shaykhs, including Muhammad Rashid Rida, who was studying at al-Azhar with Muhammad ʿAbdo, the disciple of Jamal al-Dīn al-Afghani, the Islamic reformer (Gharaybeh 1997A, p. 11).

Before the MB was formed, al-Banna was involved with the other shaykhs in organising the Young Muslims Society, and *al-Fatḫ* magazine (Gharaybeh 1997A, p. 11). In 1927, he started to work as a teacher in Ismaʿiliyyah. He was only 21 years old (Mitchell 1993, p. 6).

In March 1928, he and six other people met at his house and pledged to live and struggle for Islam (al-Banna 2001, p. 69). This is the date when the MB group was

founded. The name of the society seems to have been taken from a verse in Qur'an (49:10: 'The believers are indeed brothers, so make peace among your brothers, and fear God – perhaps you will be shown mercy.').

Scholars have attempted to study the reasons for the MB's popularity and appeal. According to Munson (2001, p. 488), al-Banna realised that if the MB is to expand, he has to be in Cairo. The move produced the desired results. The MB expanded during 1932-1954 and had about fifty branches throughout Egypt.

Hanafi (2003, p. 63) attributes the appeal to al-Banna's ability 'to formulate a clear and simple theoretical and practical Islam that had an activist concept of the Brothers as fighters during the day and monks during the night'. The other factors which increased the appeal of the MB, according to Hanafi, were their involvement in the 1940s in 'the Egyptian national movement', fighting in Palestine, and opposing 'the tyrannical feudal system of the British, the palace, and minority parties' (p. 63).

Munson (2001, p. 487) studied 'how the organization was able to attract an unprecedented number of new members and public support in 1932–1954'. He argues that 'the concept of political opportunity structure in social movement theory offers a possible alternative explanation'. As he explains, the concept 'focuses on the relationship between a social movement and its environment, especially its political environment,' and 'on the relationship between social movements and political institutions to understand movement mobilization' (p. 494).

Munson identifies three elements in Egypt's history at the relevant time to justify the use of the concept, namely: '(1) the role of the British in Egyptian political life, (2) the delegitimation of the once-popular Wafd Party, and (3) the ideological conflict over the creation of Israel'. Munson asks: 'But why did a religious reform society rather than a communist party develop?' (pp. 494-495). The answer he provides is that in addition to the favourable environment, the MB had a 'federated structure of authority' (p. 497). The movement had 'a network of branches throughout the cities and villages of Egypt' (p. 489). Moreover, the branches were 'unified by a central headquarters in Cairo' (p. 497).

Another reason for the success of mobilisation by the MB is that its membership system consisted of three tiers. The first does not require the member to do anything

more than sign a membership form and pay dues. The second would expect the members to be aware of the principles of the movement. The third requires the members to be deeply involved in the organisation, and follow Islamic teachings (p. 497, citing Mitchell 1969).[1]

Munson's explanation, while different from others, nonetheless confirms the fact that the MB appealed to a large number of people. The role of politics is always important in mobilising the masses. I suggest that when many organisations compete to mobilise the masses, the one with the simpler message is more likely to succeed. The simpler message can be in the language used to deliver the message. Alternatively, the message itself can be simpler than the one being delivered by other parties. Judging from the example of the Palestinian resistance movement which emerged after 1967, Fatah was the most successful at attracting support. Unlike the leftist, Marxist organisations, the language used in Fatah's statements and by its leaders was simpler. Moreover the vision that Fatah communicated was also simple: the liberation of Palestine through armed resistance. Other organisations shared the vision, but referred to ideologies and concepts that did not equally appeal to people, such as dialectical materialism, bourgeois, class conflict, to name but a few. Instead of quoting Marx or Lenin, Fatah would quote the Qur'an or examples from Muslim history.

Can religion and politics mix? In his letters to supporters of the movement, al-Banna (1992, p. 37) explains the mission of the movement:

> Our people: We call you with the Qur'an in our right hand and the sunna in the left, and the actions of the good ancestors of this nation as our example. We call you to Islam and its teachings, rules, and guidance. If this is politics, then this is our politics. If the one who calls you to this is a politician, then we are politicians.

Although al-Banna explicitly eschews politics, I suggest that the act of creating a movement of this nature at a time when Egypt was colonised is also a political act even though the stated goal is a religious one. This is a movement which does not want to engage in politics as promoted and controlled by the coloniser. A return to

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[1] Mitchell mentions four categories of membership as of 1935: *musa'id* (assistant); *muntastib* (related); *'amil* (active); and *mujahid* (fighter or struggler). In 1945, there were only two types: *taht al-ikhtiyar* (under examination; tentative); and active (p. 183).

Islam is the equivalent to practising different politics which is not controlled by the coloniser.

Involvement in politics had two opposite effects on the MB in Egypt. As pointed out above, Ḥanafi suggested that when the involvement was in the Egyptian national movement, fighting in Palestine, and resisting the feudal system in Egypt, the MB benefited in terms of appeal and popularity. Involvement in the domestic politics of Egypt put it on a collision course with the authorities when Egypt was a monarchy, and when it became a republic.

Collision with the Authorities

In the 1930s and 1940s, the Palestine question and how best to support the Palestinian people were major issues. The MB supported the Palestinian people who were under the British Mandate. Palestine was being prepared to become, in part if not in whole, a homeland for the Jews, as promised in the Balfour Declaration of 1917.

The MB was officially dissolved on 8 December 1948. A statement by the Ministry of Interior listed thirteen reasons in the decision, which accused the MB of committing acts of violence (Mitchell 1993, pp. 65-66). Three weeks later, on 28 December 1948, the Egyptian Prime Minister, Mahmoud al-Nuqrashi, was assassinated by ʿAbd al-Majid Ahmad Hassan, a young man who was a member of the MB (Mitchell 1993, p. 67). The MB was held responsible for his death. In February 1949, al-Banna was assassinated. No one was held responsible for his death. Ḥanafi (2003, p. 63) suggested that three parties were responsible for his assassination: 'The Palace, the British, and some minority parties'. Mitchell (1993, p. 71) was more specific and indicated that it was believed that the assassination was carried out by 'members of the political police'.

In 1951, the MB won a legal battle which prevented the sale of its headquarters. This decision amounted to legalising its status. Meanwhile, it moved to choose a successor to Hassan al-Banna. Hassan al-Huḏaybi was chosen as the new General Guide. An announcement of his appointment was made in October 1951 (Mitchell 1993, pp. 84-86).

When the Free Officers took over power in Egypt in 1952, they did not ban the MB. Hanafi (2003) points out that 'half of the Revolutionary Council,' were members of the MB (p. 68). Nasser had contacts with al-Banna, but was not a member. The relationship between both sides deteriorated, however. The Free Officers had their own differences and power struggles in 1954. The nominal head of the new republic, Muhammad Najib, entered into a power struggle with the other officers, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser.

While the dispute was still unsettled, the MB sided with Najib. The reason, according to Hanafi (2003) was that Najib 'seemed to unite the two halves of the Nile Valley, since his father was Egyptian and his mother was Sudanese' (p. 66). This reason to side with Najib is not a convincing one. Abu Zaid (2007) offers a more plausible one, which focuses on the ideological orientations of the MB and Nasser. The MB was hoping for an Islamic form of government. Nasser had different ideas, which included socialism and land ownership reforms (Telmisani 1985, pp. 64-68).

The conflict between Nasser and the MB peaked in 1954. A member of the MB, Mahmoud ʿAbd al-Latif, attempted to assassinate Nasser in 1954. The failed attempt resulted in arrests of members of the movement, and executing six of them (Mitchell 1993, p. 96). Some people expressed doubt about this assassination attempt, and considered it stage-managed to prop up Nasser. Al-Mahdawi (1986, pp. 110-116) said that the attempt was suggested by an American propaganda specialist, who recommended a failed assassination attempt. Plans were made, and the implementation took place on 26 October 1954, while Nasser was delivering a speech in Alexandria.

When Sayyid Qutb published his book, *Signposts*, in the 1960s, one of the people who read it was Nasser. According to Hanafi (2003, p. 66), Nasser discerned in the book a reference to a secret organisation. Therefore, he asked the Interior Minister, Shaʿrawi Jumʿa, to investigate. Subsequently, Qutb was returned to prison, and eventually executed in 1966.

The conflict with the MB in Egypt made Nasser a vehemently hated personality. Hanafi (2003) points out that the MB does not give Nasser credit for anything 'except the nationalization of the Suez Canal, [and] the stopping of the tripartite

aggression against Egypt in 1956' (p. 68). They consider everything else he did to be a disaster, notably the unity with Syria (1958-1961), the involvement in Yemen, and the socialist laws (p. 68). Hatred for Nasser led them to welcome the defeat of Arab states in the 1967 war with Israel. The stories of offering prayers of thanks to Allah for defeating Nasser are not propaganda stories to distort the image of the MB. Shaykh Shaʿrawi revealed this information in a TV programme broadcast in 1989. This is referred to by Abu Zaid (2007, p. 20) in his critique of the Islamic discourse. Shaykh Shaʿrawi was happy that the 'communists were defeated and they were abandoned by Allah'.

Radi Sadduq (2009) confirms this information. He used to come in contact with shaykh Shaʿrawi while both were working in Saudi Arabia. Shaʿrawi was a lecturer at a university and Sadduq worked at Saudi Radio. He asked Shaʿrawi about the rumour that he had offered prayers of thanks after the defeat of 1967. Shaʿrawi 's answer was in the affirmative because he considered Nasser a communist, and when there was a choice between communists and people of the book [Christian and Jews], the latter were preferable.

Although the persecution by Nasser earned the MB the sympathy of their brothers in other Muslim countries, the hostility towards Nasser and the attitude towards the defeat of 1967 earned the MB the contempt of many people, especially left and secular leaning intellectuals. Nor did it endear them to ordinary people. Instead, the resistance organisations, such as Fatah and PFLP, were the beneficiaries of the support of the people after the 1967 war.

After Nasser died in September 1970, his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, enlisted the help of the MB to fight against leftist and other currents in Egypt (Esposito 1994, p. 168). Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1978 and Egypt's peace treaty with Israel in 1979 did not endear him to many people in Egypt and in the rest of the Arab world. He was assassinated in October 1981 at the hands of Islamists while he was viewing a parade of Egyptian forces on the 18th anniversary of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Under Sadat's successor, Husni Mubarak, the MB failed to secure legal status. Its members were arrested and imprisoned. Whenever the government decided to hold elections, it took measures to control who would be allowed to run.

PART 2: MB IN JORDAN

Unlike the case in Egypt, the Jordanian MB had a better relationship with the regime as will be outlined below.

The founder of the MB in Jordan is ʿAbd al-Latif Abu Qūra. He was born in the city of Salt, and belonged to a family which came to Salt from Damascus at the turn of the 19th century. The Abu Qūras had relatives in Egypt. A century later, most of the Abu Qūras moved to Amman. ʿAbd al-Latif Abu Qūra had his education in kuttab, a school which teaches students Qur'an, the basics of Arabic, and arithmetic. He ventured into business, and became a successful businessman (ʿUbaidi 1992, p. 8).

In the early 1940s, the MB was branching out of Egypt. Its preachers would travel to other Arab countries, where they would meet prominent people and shaykhs, give lectures, and establish the nucleus for an MB society. As regards Jordan, ʿAbd al-Hakim ʿAbdin visited Jordan and met Amir ʿAbdullah. Another preacher who visited Jordan was Saʿid Ramaḏan, who was a good orator and attracted audiences to the Husayni Mosque in downtown Amman (Gharaybeh 1997A, pp. 11-12).

According to ʿAbd al-Kathem (1997, pp. 16-17), ʿAbd al-Latif Abu Qūra, contacted Hassan al-Banna in 1945 to offer bayʿa (pledge allegiance) and to work with him in propagating the call to adhere to Islam across the Arab and Muslim worlds. He did so after reading some of the issues of the MB's newspaper. He admired the call for jihad and the rejection of the Jewish presence in Palestine.

Moreover, Abu Qūra went to Cairo in 1945 and was selected as a member of the guidance committee of the movement in Egypt. After his return to Amman, Abu Qūra proceeded to make formal arrangements to create an MB organisation in Jordan. The government permitted the creation of a society, and its headquarters were opened under the patronage of Amir ʿAbdullah on 19 November 1945 (ʿAbd al-Kathem 1997, pp. 16-17). The Amir's representative, ʿAbd al-Monʿem al-Refaʿi, delivered a speech at the inauguration event (ʿUbaidi, 1992). The first elections within the society for the administrative committee (the general bureau) were held in 1947.

A few years later, and as a result of the merger of the West and East Banks in 1950, the members residing in both regions belonged to one MB organisation in the new

Jordan. Hroub (1996, pp. 18-19) contrasted the MB members in Gaza with those in the West Bank. The former adopted a revolutionary, military attitude. Those in the West Bank focused on education and political activism. Hroub also noted that the Jordanian government was tolerant of their activities, in the hope that they would act as a counter-current in the face of Nasserism and Baʿath.

Abu Qūra continued to lead the society until he resigned in 1953. There are two accounts as to why he did. According to one account, the issue which prompted him to resign was related to taking part in elections. He held the view that the MB should not participate if it had no prospect of winning the majority of seats. His colleagues thought differently, and saw benefits in participation, irrespective of the number of seats won (ʿUbaidi 1992, p. 108). The other account for his resignation (al-Thbaytat 2009, p. 27) was that he objected to the formation of a special apparatus, as recommended by Najib Jwaifel, an Egyptian who was accused of being an agent of Nasser (ʿUbaidi 1991, pp. 102-108).

Abu Qūra was succeeded by ʿAbd al-Ra<u>h</u>man Khalifa, who was also born in Salt and belonged to one of its tribes: the Nsours. At the time of becoming the leader, he was working as a judge in Madaba (near Amman). He was the first leader of the MB in Jordan to acquire the title of General Guide. Under his leadership, the MB changed status from a charitable society to a general Islamic organisation. In other words, it was not a charitable society, nor was it a political party. This gave the MB the freedom to preach in mosques and other places without the restrictions placed on charitable organisations.

Khalifa was imprisoned on two occasions when the MB criticised the government. The first was in 1958, after the MB issued a statement criticising the decision to invite British forces to Jordan after the coup in Iraq (al-Hassan 1990, pp. 58-59). The second was in 1960, when an ice-skating event was organised in Amman. The MB criticised the government for 'importing naked girls' while Israel 'imports tanks and planes' (pp. 68-69).

Khalifa was the leader of the MB when the elections of 1989 took place. He also swayed the decision of the movement towards participation after the government changed the elections law in a move believed to have been designed to limit the

MB's ability to win many seats in 1993. He continued to lead the MB in Jordan until 1994. Since his replacement, the MB had three leaders, an indication of the change of attitude that was characterised by having a leader for life. The three leaders are ʿAbd al-Majid Dhnaibat (1994-2006), Salem al-Falāḥāt (2006-2008), and Hammam Saʿid (2008-present).

Relationship with the Government

Although the MB had good relations with the government, there were issues which caused friction between both sides. The tensions led the government to arrest and imprison Khalifa on two occasions, as mentioned previously. Disputes occurred at all stages. After the political liberalisation in 1989, the conflict became more frequent.

Foreign relation issues have often caused estrangement: the presence of British officers in the Jordanian army; the Baghdad Pact; the Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East; and the invitation for British forces to Jordan in 1958 after Iraq threatened to annex Kuwait (Abu Fares 2000, pp. 22-47). The MB's opposition to these issues is similar to the attitude of leftists and Pan-Arab nationalists.

The other common theme that causes friction is related to instances in which the MB sees a considerable disregard for Islamic practices. Such an instance happened in 1960, when an ice-skating event was organised in Amman. The MB objected to women skaters who would be wearing revealing costumes (Abu Fares 2000, p. 34).

Despite the frequent episodes of tension, the MB in Jordan sided with the regime on two important occasions: one in 1957, when King Hussein banned all political parties in the country. Abu Fares (2000, p. 39) justified the decision to side with the king as an act of self-defence; the MB members were to be liquidated had the opposition been successful. He also suggested that a civil war had been averted.

The second occasion was in 1970, when King Hussein decided to eliminate the threat of the Palestinian armed resistance in Jordan. The MB presents its position as having taken a neutral stand in the conflict. ʿAzzam (2005), a prominent figure in the MB movement in Jordan, who in the 1980s became associated with Mujahidin organisations in Afghanistan and al-Qaeda during the years of the Soviet invasion, says (p. 72):

> We decided that if the army clashed with the guerrillas, we would not participate in this conflict which we were concerned that it would spill innocent blood […] and the battle would be waged under no clear banner, and especially the resistance movement was overwhelmed by riffraff [...] Fighting the Jordanian army was unacceptable from the view point of shariʿa, reason, and interest. Therefore, we preferred to take a neutral stand.

If it was indeed a neutral position in that situation, it suited King Hussein.

It was in the by-elections of 1984 that the measurable popularity of Islamic candidates was revealed. The Islamist candidate in the Irbid constituency, Ahmad al-Kofahi, was more than 10,000 votes ahead of his nearest rival. Another Islamist candidate, Laith Shbailat, defeated thirty-five candidates (al-Sharah 1997, p. 122). The Shbailat instance is highlighted in Boulby's (1999) study of the MB in Jordan. She pointed out that Shbailat 'won the support of upper class leftists and other secularists, as well as that of Christian men and women' (p. 105).[2]

In the general elections of 1989, five Islamist candidates achieved the highest number of votes, the lowest being nearly 20,000 votes. Al-Sharah attributed the good performance of the MB to being 'one of the first groups to establish a coherent, organized platform' (p. 172). He further noted that 'the Islamic trend won a number of seats equal to that of overt supporters of the regime', namely, 'the tribal leaders and ex-governmental officials' (p. 172).

PART 3: THE ISLAMIC ACTION FRONT

The IAF was created in 1992, soon after a law was enacted to allow the formation of political parties in Jordan. The IAF was supposed to be an organisation which embraced non-MB Islamists. However, when the founding conference was held, the independent Islamists walked out, and accused the MB of attempting to dominate the party (Hourani et al. 1997, p. 20).

As stated in the bylaws, the first goal of the party is 'the resumption of Islamic life in society, and seeking to implement Islamic law in various aspects of life' (IAF bylaws

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[2] Although Shbailat is an Islamist, he is the son of Farhan Shbailat, who served as the chief of the royal court in 1950s, and a professional engineer who was elected as the chief of the Association of Engineers.

2002, article 1). The goals include the 'reinforcement of national unity, shura and democracy; defending the dignity and rights of the human being; and defending freedoms generally' (IAF bylaws 2002, article 1/1/4).

The founding members totalled 353. The first secretary general was Isḥaq al-Farḥan, a former minister of education. The ruling bodies of the IAF comprise the general assembly, general congress, consultative council, and the executive bureau (Hourani et al. 1993).

The members of the general assembly include the founding members and other members admitted in accordance with the internal regulations. It holds a meeting once a year, unless it is asked to meet by a decision of the executive council or the absolute majority of the consultative council.

The consultative council (shura council) has 120 members who represent proportionately the branches of the party. The term of office for the council is four years. It meets once every six months, unless it is asked by one third of its members or the executive council. This council is the body which decides the policies of IAF and monitors their implementation. It also elects, by a secret ballot, the chairman of the council, his deputies and assistants, the secretary general of the party, and other members of the executive council.

There are thirteen members in the executive council, including the secretary general of the party, who is elected to this position separately. Then another twelve members are elected. Members of the executive council elect his deputy and assistants. It forms various committees to run the affairs of the party. The secretary general can be elected for two terms only, each lasting for a period of two years.

IAF: Women's Bureau

The IAF's bylaws list seventeen goals, one of which, stated in article 1/2/9, is 'to respect the woman's being and her legitimate rights; her role in developing society within Islamic virtues; to enable her to participate in public life; and to enable the emergence of women leaders in political action'. In December 2001, the party held its first general conference. The leader of the women section of the party, Arwa al-Kilani, spoke at the conference and reminded the attendees of article 1/2/9. She

called for wider involvement in the decision making by increasing the representation of women in the consultative council. (pp. 88-92).

In 1993, a woman, Nawal al-Faʿuri, was elected to the consultative council. However, she resigned and left the party in 1997. She explained that attitudes towards women in general in the party, and towards the role of woman in society led to her resignation.[3] However, another woman, Hayat al-Msaimi, was elected to the council in 1997, and kept her seat on five consecutive occasions. She acknowledges that there are people in the party, such as Muhammad Abu Fares, who oppose women's involvement in politics. However, as she stresses, he abides by the decisions of the party, and does not let his views undermine the decisions, for example, during election campaigns.[4] This explanation, however, does not resolve the conflict created by holding these views and not acting on them. In a situation like this, the credibility of such a person will be questioned by Islamists and others. Also, holding these views will discourage women, even if Abu Fares and his likes abide by the decisions. These views will have opportunities to be expressed and debated within IAF/MB. They will also attract criticism from others—parties and people.

Al-Thbaytat (2009) has studied the MB, covering a period of more than 50 years (1945-1997). He applies Samuel Huntington's (1965) criteria for political institutionalisation: adaptability-rigidity; autonomy-subordination; complexity-simplicity; autonomy-subordination; and coherence-disunity.

Al-Thbaytat points out that although the MB considers the Qur'an and sunna to be its guidance, it has adapted. Manifestations of this adaptation can be seen in accepting *ijtihād* to deal with new issues. This led to their acceptance of the issue of political pluralism and parties; participation in local and general elections; and serving in the government at ministerial level (pp. 47-53).

Regarding autonomy-subordination, al-Thbaytat assesses two categories: financial autonomy, and relationship with the regime (p. 89). He identifies the sources of funds which include: membership fees; donations by members; donations by non-members; revenues from properties owned by the MB; and revenues from book sales or other fundraising activities (p. 92). He also points out that organisations run by the

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[3] Personal interview. Amman, 9 March 2010.
[4] Personal interview. Amman, 25 March 2010.

MB managed revenues that reached JD200 million, surpassing other social organisations such as the General Union of Charitable Organisations, and the Noor al-Hussein Foundation (p. 93). Al-Thbaytat concludes that the MB has achieved financial autonomy, and does not receive external financial support (p. 92).

In terms of the relationship with the regime, al-Thbaytat goes into the reasons why the relationship on the whole was friendly (pp. 99-127). In the 1950s, the MB sided with the regime in its attempts to stem the nationalist and leftist currents. Moreover, he notes that the MB literature does not call for a revolution. He also suggests that they respect the ruling dynasty's credential of being descendants of Prophet Muhammad (p. 105). Al-Thbaytat's conclusion in this category is questionable. He basically suggests that both sides benefited from one another. What should be noted here is that there have been changes in the relationship, when Jordan signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1994. It underwent further changes when ʿAbdullah II succeeded his father in 1999. (This point will be discussed further in a section below regarding divisions within MB/IAF).

Moreover, al-Thbaytat assesses whether MB and IAF meet the criterion of complexity-simplicity and identifies the fields in which they are active, such as the universities and professional associations. He notes that they have a sizeable presence in these arenas. The decisions are not made by the central leadership, but taken at the local level and take into account the special circumstances. However, he notes that the Jordanian government has enacted some laws to limit their influence.

Al-Thbaytat mentioned the creation of the Liberation Party as a split within the movement in 1960s. However, that the Liberation Party was a group that split from the MB was challenged by al-ʿUbaidi (1991). He asserted that the founder of the Liberation Party, Taqiyyuddin al-Nabhani, was never a member of the MB (p. 121). Some people who left the MB might have joined the Liberation Party. Al-ʿUbaidi noted that there was no organisational relationship between the MB and Nabhani, who did meet Hassan al-Banna and had respect for him, but that was the extent of it (pp. 121-122). Al-ʿUbaidi also denied the suggestions that there were attempts to unite the MB and the Liberation Party in the 1950s (p. 123-124).

Al-ʿUbaidi's information was identical to that of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Khayyat. The latter was a leader in the Liberation Party in Jordan. However, he was co-opted by the regime and served several times as minister of religious affairs in 1970s. He wrote an introduction to a book on the Liberation Party by al-ʿUbaidi (1992, pp. 3-28). He corrected or clarified many points that were mentioned in the book.

If, however, one is to consider that a split did take place in the 1950s, the split is more than fifty years old. As such, it will be too crude a measurement to coherence-disunity. Other examples of disunity mentioned by al-Thbaytat include disagreements over participation in elections and joining the government. Overall, the disunity in the ranks of the MB/IAF is minimal, according to al-Thbaytat. This conclusion, however, is far from categorical, considering the developments within the IAF since the elections of 2007. (See section below on divisions within MB/IAF).

Moreover, Brown (2006, p. 5) concurs with al-Thbaytat in certain areas, such as the criteria of complexity-simplicity. He notes that the MB 'attracted some figures in the religious establishment; ran candidates in professional association elections (such as the bar and the medical syndicate); and began to publish its own periodicals'. In general, Brown is unequivocal about the democratic nature of IAF (p. 6):

> The IAF has built an impressive set of democratic structures internally. Party leaders are elected by the membership, and there is a regular turnover in top positions. At key points it has polled its members for guidance on important decisions (on two occasions to decide whether or not the IAF would boycott elections). It also selects its candidates in a process that begins with branches holding primaries before forwarding names to the party leadership.

Although Brown's observations are correct, IAF's internal disputes have come into the open. Persistent press reports in 2010 indicated that the divisions were deep; and could lead to resignations and to the creation of other groups. Various MB/IAF leaders tend to downplay such press reports. While they acknowledge differences do exist, they argue that in the end, they come together. I suggest that the parties with competing factions are usually more interesting to follow, and their structure tend to be more democratic. If the disputes lead to a split in the IAF or MB, it will not be an unprecedented matter in the Arab world, or elsewhere.

IAF: The First Campaign Manifesto

The manifesto for the elections of 1993 is a comprehensive document in that it refers to the goals of the party, an assessment of the performance of the MB members in the HoD (before IAF was created), and the electoral programme. The latter is divided into four parts. One deals with domestic issues, listing eighteen of them; another covers the question of Palestine; the third covers the issues of Arabic and Islamic unity; and the fourth addresses foreign policy and international relations (IAF manifesto 1993).

The elections manifesto lists a number of achievements, categorised under two headings: (a) legislative achievements; and (b) monitoring the executive branch of government. In the first category, it lists seven achievements, the first of which is amending the law of the supreme court, which repealed the clause that made some of the administrative decisions unchallengeable (IAF manifesto 1993, pp. 4-6). Another achievement in the legislative arena was to amend the law of the Court of State Security, whose decisions were unappealable. The amendment introduced a right of appeal, which would be heard by five judges. The amendment of this law had tangible consequences, and spared the lives of some people who were tried and convicted of organizing a coup. When the appeal was introduced, these people were found innocent (IAF manifesto 1993, pp. 4-6).

A third achievement was repealing the 'law of defence'[5] adopted in 1935, and enacting a new one which can be used in emergencies only. A fourth achievement pertains to legislation that did not go through all the stages, such as a bill to fight corruption, creating a trade union for teachers, and a bill which bans alcoholic beverages (IAF manifesto 1993, pp. 4-6). In the category of monitoring the executive branch, the list of achievements included returning hundreds of people to their jobs after being removed for political reasons. Similarly, thousands of confiscated passports were returned to their holders[6] (IAF manifesto 1993, pp. 4-6).

With regard to domestic issues, it is unnecessary to quote IAF's stand on the eighteen issues listed in the manifesto. I have chosen two issues pertaining to freedoms and

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[5] The full name of the law is 'The Law of Defending Transjordan, 1935.' It gives the Amir sweeping powers in situations of emergency. The Britons in Jordan at the time were exempt.
[6] Confiscation of passports was widespread. It prevents a citizen from travelling, and hinders employment in the public sector in particular.

gender equality, as these are often cited as a cause of concern if the Islamists come to power.

The manifesto pledges to work towards making sure that the state provides the citizens with all public freedoms, including those concerned with belief, religion, politics, press, and science. However, this pledge is based on the religious notion that preserves for the human being his life, mind, freedom, money, and honour. Included in this section on freedoms is the right to preach and to promote virtue and prevent vice. The right is fine if the preacher belongs to any religion or belief. However, the wording in Arabic indicates that it is to be exclusively a right for the Muslim preacher, which makes it problematic (IAF manifesto 1993, p. 10).

The issue of gender equality is listed within the policy regarding 'special social care'. With regard to women, the manifesto talks about 'enhancing the status of women as decided by Islam, away from imported customs, or stagnant traditions'. The manifesto promises 'to activate the laws that are fair to women, and to complete the enactment of laws that reinforce women's rights' (IAF manifesto 1993, pp. 22-23). As regards the latter promise, neither the government nor the IAF demonstrated enough courage to enact a new law, or to amend the existing one, to eliminate the lenient sentences given to the killers of their female relatives under the pretext of protecting the honour of the family.

One cannot ignore the use of the terms 'Jew' and 'Jewish' in the manifesto, such as in referring to abstention from giving a vote of confidence to the 'governments which negotiated with the Jewish enemy' (IAF manifesto 1993, p. 5). In any state, not all segments of the population approve of the agreements negotiated by the government, and may take to the street in protest. In the US, for instance, NAFTA was opposed by some Americans. In the case of the Jordanian-Israeli treaty, preferring to use the term 'Jewish' instead of Israeli or Zionist firmly bases the matter on old religious grounds, instead of keeping it a political matter.

I suggest that basing the objection to the peace treaty on political grounds is more legitimate, because the religious one is founded on the erroneous belief that the enmity between Muslims and Jews is as old as Islam itself, and overlooks the historic

facts that show that Muslims and Jews lived and worked together throughout the centuries. Moreover, if one were to use Islamic terminology, Christians and Jews, are 'people of the book' and also people of *dhimma*. The Islamic rule in treating them is 'they have our rights and duties' (lahom ma lana, wa ʿalayhem ma ʿalayna).

Moreover, even though Israel refers to itself as the 'Jewish State,' and even though Israel commits acts of aggression, no one should fall into the trap of using the term 'Jewish' to condemn Israeli actions, as not every Jew approves of this. This is the same principle that makes it wrong to condemn Islam and Muslims because of the acts of some Muslims who engage in terror in the name of Islam.

When one looks at the reform program published by the MB and IAF in 2005, the issue of equality is outlined in more detail (pp. 48-52). There is more emphasis on the equality of men and women in many aspects. In this document, verses from the Qur'an are cited to support the argument of equality, such as 49:13, 1:4, and 16:97. After the emphasis on equality in rights and duties under Islam, the document lists six specific rights which treat a woman as a complete independent person. For instance, a woman has the right to work, own property, and choose her husband without pressure or coercion. She also has political rights which include expressing her opinion in all aspects of life (p. 51).

A fair comparison of the two documents will discern a substantial improvement in the use of language. Significantly, the use of the term 'Jewish' has disappeared from the section on education which in the manifesto of 1993 (p. 12) talked about keeping a psychological barrier towards the Jews: 'the enemies of God and his messenger'. This is absent from the document of 2005, which uses Zionist instead of Jewish in the section on Arab-Israeli conflict (pp. 75-77).

IAF/MB Internal Divisions

Like all parties, the IAF would like to present a united front. However, generally speaking, there are two wings in the IAF and MB, referred to in the Jordanian press as the 'doves' and 'hawks'. Abu Rumman (2011) identifies four currents. The hawks are those who follow Qutb's line, such as Hammam Saʿid and Muhammad Abu Fares. The doves are those who follow Rachid Ghanouchi's line, such as ʿAbd al-Latif ʿArabiyyat and Isḥaq al-Farḥan. The centrists are a new generation of leaders

such as Salem al-Falāḥāt and Rohile Gharaybeh. The members of the fourth current, such as Zaki Bani Irshaid, split from the centrists and are considered close to Hamas. I shall outline below the issues that have caused internal disputes.

One issue that causes internal conflicts is the relationship with government and how to handle the disputes with it. Occasionally, the relationship between the MB/IAF and the government deteriorates. Sometimes, the IAF/MB may make a statement that antagonises the government. The old formula to resolve a dispute with the government was to leave the matter to the 'wise people of the movement',[7] who usually meet the king or prime minister, and give assurances that they care about Jordan and its supreme interests.

Increasingly, however, the government seems to be escalating the disputes with the MB/IAF. One case of heightened tension with the government and within the IAF and MB was the issue of the 'constitutional monarchy'. The Deputy Secretary General of IAF, Rohile Gharaybeh, attended a conference in the US in 2009 and called for turning Jordan into a constitutional monarchy. Numerous articles in Jordan condemned the call itself, and criticised making it in the US instead of Jordan.

Some commentators suggested that the Jordanian opposition was emulating the Iraqi opposition, which encouraged the US government to invade Iraq. One commentator, Maher Abu Ṭayr, argued in the Jordanian daily, *Ad-Dustour* (14 March 2009) that the proposed notion of constitutional monarchy is 'dangerous and unacceptable'. However, if one leaves politics aside for a moment, there is nothing revolutionary in Gharaybeh's call for a 'constitutional monarchy'. The constitution of Jordan states that Jordan's 'system of government is parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy' (article 1 of Jordan's constitution).

The link with Hamas resurfaces often within the MB/IAF and causes tension. At one stage, the MB of Jordan and Palestine were united, but in 2006, the Palestinian MB (which also means Hamas) sought independence. However, Palestinian and Jordanian members in the Gulf were not separated into different chapters, and continued to belong to the MB in Jordan. Because of their impact on elections and

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[7] Moderate, prominent figures in the MB, from the older generation. In 2007, Prime Minister, Maʿruf al-Bakhit, called upon the wise people of the movement to save IAF from the radicals after a decision by IAF to withdraw from the municipal elections, six hours after they started.

policy making in MB/IAF, the issue became a source of internal division. An attempt to resolve it occurred in 2010 through a decision made by the 'Guidance Council' of the international MB organisation.

Moreover, Zaki Bani Irshaid, who was elected as IAF's general secretary in 2006, is seen by some MB/IAF members as well as the government as too closely linked with Hamas. His leadership was challenged internally, and eventually the entire executive council of IAF resigned in 2009 to avoid the risk of a split.

After Hamas won the Palestinian elections in 2006, the leader of IAF's bloc in the HoD, ʿAzzam al-Hunaidy, said that the MB/IAF were ready to govern as well. He was roundly condemned by pro-government writers in the Jordanian press for making such a remark, although whether Hamas won or not, it is legitimate for a political party anywhere to aspire to govern, and seek to do so through democratic means.

Four members of MB/IAF incurred the wrath of the government when they went to offer condolences to the family of Abu Musʿab al-Zarqawi, after his death in Iraq in June 2006 was confirmed. Such an action would probably have passed unnoticed had Zarqawi restricted his 'jihad' to Iraq, which became Zarqawi's new base after the US and its allies toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Zarqawi chose to bring carnage to Amman on 9 November 2005, when suicide bombers attacked three hotels in the capital, one blowing himself up at a wedding party.

Amongst the many victims was the Syrian-American director, Mustafa al-ʿAqqad, who directed in the 1970s a film about Islam called the 'Message' and another film about ʿUmar al-Mukhtar of Libya. If one compares two examples of Muslims, and the services rendered to Islam, one reaches the well-founded conclusion that al-ʿAqqad, served Islam and its image and that al-Zarqawi damaged them considerably.

Two of the four people who went to offer condolences made speeches in the tent of condolences. The government immediately acted and put the four on trial. Two were

acquitted because they made no speeches, and the other two, ʿAli Abu Sukkar and Muhammad Abu Fares, were given prison sentences. They were transported to al-Jafer prison, a notorious jail, where political prisoners were detained in the 1950s and 1960s. It is located in the southern Jordanian desert. After rapprochement between the government and the MB, the two were released in 2006.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided the background that will be necessary for the assessment of the state of democracy in Jordan, specifically in relation to Islamism and democracy, and whether the Islamists helped or hindered democracy in Jordan since 1989. In the next chapter, the democratic audit will be presented, starting with the major category of citizenship, law, and rights.

Chapter 6

Democratic Audit: Citizenship, Law, and Rights

In this chapter, I present, analyse, and discuss the data gathered through two questionnaires referred to previously. I follow the order and headings of categories and subcategories used in the long questionnaire. I begin with the short questionnaire (the macro-analysis). I then refer to the same issues in the corresponding overarching questions in the long questionnaire because they are identical.

The democratic audit's category about citizenship, law, and rights consists of four subcategories: (1) nationhood and citizenship; (2) rule of law and access to justice; (3) civil and political rights; and (4) economic and social rights. Each overarching question is stated before the marks are given.

Subcategory 1: Nationhood and Citizenship

The overarching question (Q1S, Q7L) asks: 'Is there public agreement on a common citizenship without discrimination?' All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest mark given is 1; the highest is 10. The mean is 5, which is the same as the most frequent answer.

Table 6.1: Agreement on Citizenship

Mark	Frequency	Percent
1	1	4.2
2	3	12.5
3	4	16.7
4	3	12.5
5	5	20.8
6	3	12.5
8	2	8.3
9	1	4.2
10	2	8.3
Total	24	100
Mean	5	

This average does not reflect that such an agreement exists. The issue that explains this absence of agreement pertains to the status of Palestinians in Jordan. The

manifestations of disagreement resurface frequently. For instance, in May 2010 the matter emerged vigorously, ostensibly out of concern that a solution for the Palestine question would be at the expense of Jordan.

The issue of Palestinians in Jordan is often discussed passionately, prompted by external and internal considerations. The external factor pertains to Israel, whose leaders often argue that Jordan is the alternative homeland for the Palestinians. The aim is to absolve Israel of the human, moral, and legal responsibilities regarding the Palestinians and their right to live in, and return to, their homeland—Palestine.

The other reason is internal. In this regard, one will find complaints on both sides: some Jordanians are resentful of any suggestion that the Palestinians who sought refuge in Jordan were more culturally developed than Jordanians, and that it was the Palestinians who made Jordan prosper. Similarly, there is resentment by some Palestinians due to the feeling that they are less favourably treated when it comes to employment in government departments, for instance.

Interestingly, the number of Palestinians in Jordan is not officially acknowledged, even though a national census takes place every ten years. As Abu ʿOdeh (1999, p. 255) points out: 'the government has refrained from publishing the breakdown of Palestinian-Jordanians and Trans-Jordanians'. An old estimate, referred to by Sayigh (1987, p. 14) puts the number of Palestinians in the East Bank in 1967 at 47.1 percent. When the West and East Banks are used to calculate the percentage, it rises to 70.35 percent. In Abu ʿOdeh's discussion of this issue, he refers to information based on statistics collected by the Civil Affairs Department.[1] These statistics indicated that the Jordanians of Palestinian origin in the East Bank in 1988 amounted to 40 percent of the population (1999, p. 255).

The statement of May 2010 by retired military officers cited specific numbers of Palestinians in Jordan. According to the statement, the Palestinians in Jordan fall into three categories. In the first, there are 2.5 million Palestinians, of whom there are two million refugees whose citizenship is not challenged. In the second category, there are

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[1] This department issues passports and identity cards.

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850,000 who are Jordanian citizens but have a 'yellow card', namely, they possess a permit which enables them to reside in the West Bank. In the third category, there are 2.2 million Palestinians who do not have Jordanian citizenship. These are refugees of the 1967 war who sought refuge in Jordan from Gaza and the West Bank. In total, there are nearly 5.5 million Palestinians in Jordan.

The latest official statistics available are those of 2004 which put the population of Jordan at 5.3 million on 1 October 2004. The growth rate is put at 2.5 percent. The figures do not provide a breakdown of national origin. The statistics show that the most populated governorates are Amman (38% of population); Irbid (18%); and al-Zarqa (15%). The urbanisation rate is 82 percent.[2]

Using the figures mentioned in the statement issued by the retired officers, the 2.5 million Palestinians who have Jordanian citizenship are equivalent to 47 percent, nearly half of the population. If the 850,000 Palestinians who hold a 'yellow card' are excluded, the percentage drops to 37 percent which is still high. There is a possibility of a margin of error because of the need to adjust figures in line with the fertility rate, but the percentages will remain nearly the same.

Although the retired officers' statement is not of an official nature, and is open to be challenged regarding its figures, the numbers and percentages nearly mirror the other estimates mentioned above. Therefore, it is likely that the specific figures in the statement are accurate because the retired officers had access to official data, or had been supplied by people who have such access.

The statement by the retired officers encapsulates the recurring debate about the status of Palestinians in Jordan. It claims that Jordan is being pressurised (by unnamed parties) to give citizenship to the third category, and to give the Palestinians a quota in the political system. This, according to the statement, makes Jordan the alternative Palestinian state that Israeli officials often promote.

It is worth recalling that King Hussein's decision to sever administrative and legal links with the West Bank in 1988 is considered unconstitutional by the MB in Jordan. There was no court in Jordan with the power to adjudicate on constitutional matters. If there had been one, it was highly unlikely that it would have been allowed to

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[2] The Jordanian Department of Statistics.

consider the constitutionality of King Hussein's decision. The issue of constitutionality is met with two kinds of responses. One is expressed by the former PM, ʿAbd al-Ra'uf al-Rawabdeh, who argues that decisions of secession do not take place through constitutional means, citing the example of the failure of Syrian-Egyptian unity in 1961.[3]

The other response to the argument of un/constitutionality comes from some people who call for the constitutionalisation of the decision to sever the links with the West Bank. In other words, the constitution must be amended to eliminate any doubt that the West Bank is not part of Jordan, and that the Palestinians of the West Bank are not Jordanians. Such a move eliminates the slim and unlikely possibility to declare the severance decision unconstitutional if circumstances change in the future.

One of the leading voices for the call to constitutionalise the severance decision is Naheḏ Hattar, who presents himself as a leftist and Marxist. His own brand of leftism and Marxism is unique in that it is difficult to tell the difference between it and ultra-right wing, chauvinistic nationalism. In one of his articles (2009), Hattar describes 'national unity,' as a 'deceptive slogan' because 'the Jordanians are united'. His definition of Jordanian does not included the Palestinians. It includes 'Arab and non-Arab minorities who came to the region before the State of Jordan was established'.[4]

The statement by the retired officers has additional significance for three reasons. First, the army and its personnel, including retired servicemen, are traditionally thought of as the bedrock of the regime. Second, the position adopted in the statement was not synchronous with the official line at the time it was published. Third, the involvement of former army officers in this debate seems to be a calculated move by non-military people who espouse the views expressed in the statement. In Jordan, the army is one of those 'red lines' which means either it is an untouchable subject, or anything less than lavish praise is unacceptable.

The statement calls for making a constitutional arrangement to end the overlap between citizenship and membership in professional associations. It also proposes to treat the Palestinians in Jordan in two ways. The first is to continue to treat the

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[3] Lecture I attended in Jordan on 23/6/2009 at the Royal Cultural Centre, Amman.
[4] Article's date is 27 April 2009 as published in 'allofjo.net'. The site publishes his articles, which sometimes were published in the Lebanese daily, *al-Akhbar*, or the Jordanian daily, *al-Arab al-Yawm*.

refugees of 1948 as Jordanian citizens until the fate of UN resolution 194 (right of return) is decided. The statement further proposes that the implementation of this resolution should become a major pillar in Jordan's foreign policy. The second way is to give the refugees of 1967 either Palestinian citizenship (by the Palestinian Authority), or travel documents by Jordan.

Not surprisingly, this recurring theme is a cause of concern for the Palestinians in Jordan. Qamḥawi (2010) considers the measures which lead to the withdrawal of Jordanian citizenship as 'ethnic cleansing'. His choice of words lacks accuracy, as ethnic cleansing involves violence and expulsion. However, the anger shown in the article is not baseless, as the withdrawal of citizenship can have destructive consequences on the livelihood, ability to travel, and prospects of employment.

Although racism or ultra-nationalism can be a motivating factor in these campaigns to keep Jordan Jordanian and only for Jordanians, the recent campaign is influenced by the economic conditions which have led to an increase in poverty. As elsewhere in the world, when economic conditions deteriorate, a segment of the population will feel that immigrants or asylum seekers are to blame. There is usually no shortage of people, politicians, activists, or people in the media, who will exploit such an argument, especially during times of elections.

The statement by the retired officers also betrays the inconsistent logic of their argument. One of the characteristics of the distorted debates which take place in Jordan is that every statement, written or spoken, must praise the king and declare unwavering loyalty, and then make the demands. All criticism is then directed at the government. The critics pretend that those in government are implementing their own policies, and conveniently overlook the fact that the PM is appointed by the king to implement policies under his specific instructions or general guidance.

This position, which lacks political courage, succeeds sometimes in removing an individual or an entire government. However, nothing then changes because the policies being implemented are not those of the individuals removed. Moreover, it often appears that this tug of war is a form of political contestation dictated by the lack of other more organised and rational means. However, it is apparent that this form of political contestation is incapable of producing change because it does not

address the substantive issues of freedom and social justice, and fails to demand reforms from the king no less, and not from the individuals he handpicks.

In the past, this lack of agreement on citizenship was often calmed down by appeals to national unity, and references to Jordanians of all origins. King Hussein famously said in a speech in 1996 that those who wanted to destabilise national unity would be his enemy until the Day of Judgement. When the same debate resurfaced again in 2010, a similar appeal by King ʿAbdullah II did not have the same effect.

The discourse about identity in Jordan resembles the debates on multiculturalism and assimilation in Western countries. The ultra-nationalist rhetoric equates identity with nationality, and the legal consequences of acquiring citizenship. Therefore, some will consider it an act of betrayal if a Palestinian in Jordan identifies him/herself as Palestinian. Equating identity with citizenship is an aberrant preposition in a country from which many people migrate, or work abroad for extended periods. Yet they retain their Jordanian identity. Jordan has appreciated the desire of Jordanians not to lose their sense of identity and attachment to Jordan when they acquire citizenship in other countries. Therefore, the law has been amended in September 1987 to state that 'a Jordanian who acquires foreign nationality remains Jordanian' (article 9 of nationality law, 1987).

Judging from the debates about multiculturalism in Western countries, such as the UK, France, USA, and Canada, one can say that the ultra-nationalist Transjordanians are in favour of arguments which require immigrants to assimilate in the new society. However, the term immigrant will not be an accurate description of a Palestinian in Jordan, considering the fact that nation-states in the Middle East are relatively new, and their borders are arbitrary. There was such mobility before the creation of nation-states in the region that makes the imposition of a narrow definition of nationalism on a group of people living in a small territory a nonsensical proposition. An ultra-nationalist demand for assimilation is absurd because the difference is imaginary. Jordanians and Palestinians share language, culture, and religions. Migrants and refugees assimilate in different cultures, through learning a different language for instance. However, people do not assimilate in their own culture.

At the ruling dynasty level, King Hussein has established strong relations with some Palestinian families, such as the T̲ouqan of Nablus. King ʿAbdullah II continued to follow the same path. Members of the Touqan family served in senior posts such as governor of the central bank of Jordan and minister of higher education.

Moreover, the arguments of the ultra-nationalist Transjordanians are inconsistent with the fact that Jordan has always had a mix of national origins, before and since its creation. One of the prime ministers most admired by Transjordanians is Was̲fi al-Tall, who was assassinated by Palestinian gunmen in Cairo in 1971. What seems to be overlooked is that al-Tall's mother was a Kurd, and as such he cannot be the embodiment of a 'pure' Transjordanian. The masculine mentality chooses to overlook the role of the mother. The maternal half is rarely talked about, and treated as negligible, even though many Transjordanian men are married to women from diverse national origins, including the male members of the ruling family, who chose American, British, Pakistani, Algerian, Lebanese, and Palestinian wives.[5] Moreover, many Jordanian women marry men from other Arab nationalities, especially those who come to work in Jordan. However, the children are not given Jordanian citizenship. Therefore, mothers are left helpless should husbands abandon them.

Even though such feelings do exist, it is naïve to suggest that the Jordanian-Palestinian divide is vertical, and all Palestinians are on one side and all Transjordanians on the other. For every ultra-nationalist Transjordanian, there are many who reject their narrow definition of nationalism. A prominent critic of the ultra-nationalists is the writer Khalid Mah̲adin (2010), who has criticised the statement by the retired officers for using language which undermines national unity. In an article, he refers to Nahe̲d H̲attar without mentioning his name, and ridicules H̲attar's suggestion that the only true Jordanians are the Christians and the bedouin.

Furthermore, there is plenty of evidence which undermines the argument that the Jordanian population is indifferent to the Palestine question. One has to look at the demonstrations and other expressions of support of Palestine on various occasions, especially when the Palestinians are under Israeli attack, as in 2008/09 when Gaza was besieged and bombarded for three weeks. These expressions show that the

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[5] King Hussein married an Egyptian, a British, Palestinian, and an American. Prince Hassan married a Pakistani. King ʿAbdullah II is married to a Palestinian. Prince ʿAli married an Algerian.

support for the Palestinians and their cause is deeply rooted in all segments of the Jordanian society.

In the long questionnaire, five of the six assessors answered the question. The marks given are: 2, 2, 5, 6, and 7. The mean is 4.4. These marks do not depart significantly from those given by the respondents to the short questionnaire. In other words, such an assessment reinforces the validity of the results outlined and discussed above. To deal with this issue more effectively, Jordan should enact an anti-discrimination law.[6] Although this law will not prevent discrimination, because less favourable treatment can be justified on other grounds, the fact remains that there will be a legal option which can have a deterring effect. Moreover, when the discrimination is so blatant, the courts can adjudicate and remedy the situation.

Subcategory 2: Rule of Law and Access to Justice

The overarching question (Q2S, Q14L) asks: 'Are state and society consistently subject to the law?' All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest mark is 1; the highest is 10. The mean is 5.8.

Table 6.2: State, Society, and Law

Mark	Frequency	Percent
1	1	4.2
2	3	12.5
3	1	4.2
4	2	8.3
5	4	16.7
6	3	12.5
7	4	16.7
8	2	8.3
9	2	8.3
10	2	8.3
Total	24	100
Mean	5.8	

The mean indicates that there are misgivings. Some of the respondents identified areas of concern which include: tribal law, selective application of the law, political

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[6] By discrimination I mean less favourable treatment, as in the British Race Relations Act (1976).

influence over judges, formal rights in constitution not practised; absence of a constitutional court; state security courts; and favouritism, nepotism, and wāsṭa.[7]

The state's recognition of tribal laws dates back to 1936 when the government approved a law which gave ten nomadic tribes the right to have tribal courts to make decisions on the basis of tribal traditions. Article 5 permits the punishment of the perpetrator of a crime and many of his relatives (up to fifth degree of kinship). The government officially cancelled the tribal law in 1976. However, the tribal practices are still prevalent, and tolerated by the government as will be outlined below.

As Massad (2001) explains in detail, there was a 'new push for detribalization' which began in 1976 (p. 67). A debate about the issue did not remain within government institutions. It appeared in the press, which published articles for and against tribalism, especially in 1984, when parliamentary by-elections took place. Massad summarises this debate (pp. 70-71) and quotes a public letter sent by King Hussein to Ahmad ʿUbaydat, the then PM. King Hussein indicates in the letter that criticism of tribal traditions 'reflects on the king and his family as well' (p. 70). A letter of this kind, with a clearly defined position from the king on such an issue, amounts to an order to stop the debate.

The Minister of Information, Layla Sharaf, resigned in protest. She distributed her letter of resignation to the international news agencies. Queen Noor (2003, pp. 259-260) said she did so after the Jordanian press refused to publish her letter. It will be a strange editorial decision not to publish the resignation letter of a minister. However, the fact that the resignation is in protest at a position adopted by King Hussein explains why the press refused to publish her letter. Moreover, Queen Noor added that King Hussein was 'furious' (pp. 259-260).

Tribalism was given a new lease of life, especially after the enactment of an elections law known as the single vote law which, contrary to the elections of 1989, allowed a voter to cast one vote in a multi-seat constituency. Moreover, the legacy of tribal laws is still active. The ugly side of tribalism emerges whenever there is a dispute between two tribes, especially in cases of murder.

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[7] Using the influence or recommendation of an influential person; literally means an intermediary.

When one member of a tribe kills another, the tribal practices have dire consequences. One incident took place in ʿAjlun in August 2009. A man from al-Momani tribe was killed while visiting his son at the home of his former in-laws, who belong to al-Smadi tribe. Both sides fought and torched properties. The riot police, darak, had to intervene and impose a curfew. In line with tribal traditions, high profile people formed a delegation and visited the aggrieved party to seek a truce. In this instance, the truce was agreed on the conditions that the alleged killer would not receive legal representation, and the court should sentence him to death. In other words, the conditions contradict the principles of a fair trial. Another consequence of incidents of the kind is *jalweh*, namely, the family of the killer and many of the relatives have to move from their homes to another area.

Furthermore, tribalism is responsible for the many fights that erupt in Jordanian universities in different parts of the country, including the University of Jordan—the oldest and largest university in Jordan. On 23 and 30 December 2010, fighting erupted on campus and resulted in damage to property and injuries. Initially, the fighting was downplayed, but when videos became available on the video sharing website, youtube, the seriousness of the situation was recognised. ʿAdel al-T̲waisi, the president of the university, formed committees to investigate, and disciplinary action was taken against thirty students.

The frequency of fights at universities in Jordan was the subject of an article by Sateʿ al-Zghūl (2011) who collected from different sources statistics which showed that from 1999 to 2010 there had been 624 fights. The average per year is sixty-four fights, which equates to more than one a week. He also indicates that 1999 saw the highest number of fights which reached 102. The latest year he includes in the statistic is 2010 which saw eighty-eight fights.

Jordanian commentators, such as Ahmad Abu Khalil, express concern that the universities have become an arena for tribal fights instead of being the place for intellectual stimulation and competition. Whether the matter relates to murders, nominating candidates in elections, or fighting at universities, it is clear that tribal traditions do not fit in a modern society, even if tribalism is thought to have its good

aspects—known as social capital. Moreover, such tribalism is proof that the ultra-nationalist Jordanians are basing their claims of Jordanian nationalism on quick sand, as this kind of tribalism does not recognise common bonds of nationalism or religion.

With regard to the laws enacted by the state, when one follows the final outcome of court cases, one finds identifiable factors in the use of law as an extension of politics, but with added advantages that judicial proceedings are controlled in terms of how fast and how slowly they should proceed. The decisions of the courts are influenced by a few factors outlined below.

The first discernible factor is in cases of alleged plotting against the king. People in security services have a duty to protect king and country. Two contradictory messages are often sent when talking about the king: that he is very popular, and that there have been many attempts on his life. Samīh al-Battikhi, the head of GID, fabricated a plot to kill King Hussein in 1993. Eventually, the defendants were all released. Al-Battikhi turned out to be a crook, and was tried for corruption and convicted in 2003.

Another factor is noticeable in cases with an impact on, or a link to, a member of the royal family. The case against Ahmad ʿUwaidi al-ʿAbbadi can illustrate this point. He belongs to the ʿUdwan tribe. He was an officer in the Jordanian police, and was elected to the HoD in 1989. He used to publish articles in the Jordanian weekly, *Shihan*, in which he expressed anti-Palestinian sentiments. After his stint in the HoD he continued to write critical articles. The Minister of Interior, ʿEid al-Fayez, sued him in 2007. Al-ʿAbbadi was charged with publishing libellous material on the Internet, and was imprisoned for two years. He denied publishing the material, which involved Queen Rania, and considered the case against him vexatious. In April 2010, a court in Jordan ordered that the case should be dealt with afresh. His lawyer, Feras al-Rusan (2010), pleaded with Queen Rania to prevent ʿEid al-Fayez, from using her name in the court papers.

A third factor that influences the decisions of courts is whether a case is initiated at the behest of a prime minister and is decided while he is still in office. In this situation, the decision is in favour of the prime minister. An example to illustrate this point is the case against Toujan Faysal during the premiership of ʿAli Abu al-Ragheb.

In May 2002, she was tried and sentenced to eighteen months in prison (more on this case in a section below).

If a case is decided after the prime minister is gone, the probability of the decision being in favour of the defendant increases. For instance, a case was initiated in 2007 at the behest of Maʿruf al-Bakhit against Fahd al-Rimawi, editor of *al-Majd*, for having written a critical editorial. However, the case came to trial after al-Bakhit left office. The judge ruled in favour of *al-Majd* in June 2008.

The fourth element amounts to using the law as an arm-twisting tactic against individuals and associations. When it comes to individuals, the legal proceedings are not initiated by a government prosecutor on his own volition. Instead, they are initiated in response to a complaint by one individual or more. A case in point is the legal proceedings brought against ʿAdnan Abu ʿOdeh. They were initiated in response to a complaint by the mufti of the city of Jarash. Another case is that of Eva Abu Ḥalaweh, who attended a meeting with the US Vice President, Joe Biden, alongside a few other individuals in March 2010. In both cases, the proceedings were abandoned, likely due to American interventions. Abu ʿOdeh researched and wrote his book on the Palestinians in Jordan in the US, and Eva Abu Ḥalaweh is an American citizen.

A third court case was initiated against Muwafaq Maḫadin and Sufyan al-Tall: two activists who participated in a TV programme broadcast by al-Jazeera in 2010. The programme discussed the situation in Afghanistan after a Jordanian officer related to the ruling family, ʿAli bin Zaid, was killed in a suicide attack in Khost. The complaint was filed by retired military officers who accused Maḫadin and al-Tall of insulting the army. They were arrested in February 2010. However, there was a robust campaign in their support. They were released on bail, and when they were tried, they were acquitted in May 2011.

Using the law in a selective way against organisations can be illustrated through two examples. In 2007, the General Union of Charitable Organisations was the subject of legal action which was preceded by suspending its executive council and replacing it with a government-appointed one. The suspended members were accused of exploiting office. When the case went to trial, the members of the council were

acquitted. The government also lost the appeal. The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal in July 2010.

A similar attitude was taken towards a charitable society known as the Islamic Centre which was run by the MB. The society owns two hospitals in addition to other charitable bodies. The government suspended the management of the charity, and appointed a committee to run it in 2007. After investigations over three years, legal proceedings were initiated in 2009. This case took place during Maʿruf al-Bakhit's premiership, who adopted a hostile attitude towards the MB/IAF. Hammam Saʿid, the MB leader, suggested that the case was political rather than legal.

Another feature is related to bail, which is either denied or delayed to increase the pressure on the accused. This happened in the case of Muwafaq Maḥadin and Sufyan al-Tall. In a corruption case in 2010, that of a project to expand the country's oil refinery, it took some time before the four defendants were granted bail. Saleh al-ʿArmūti, the former chairman of the Jordanian bar association, and the leader of the defence team, suggested that the case was one of score-settling amongst politicians. In July 2010, the defendants were found guilty and were sentenced to three years imprisonment. The Court of Appeal also upheld the decision in October 2010.

The above cases were referred to the state security court, which in 2006 was described by Human Rights Watch (HRW) as 'a tribunal which does not meet international standards of independence and impartiality' (p. 2). Until the early 1990s, the decisions made by this court were not subject to appeal.

In the long questionnaire, five of the six assessors answered this question. The marks given are 3, 6, 6, 6, and 6. The mean is 5.4. When the means of the two sets of marks are compared, it becomes apparent that the assessment of the six assessors corroborates that of the twenty-four respondents.

The constitutionality of various decisions in Jordan is often questioned. One such decision, referred to earlier, is that of severing links with the West Bank. Similarly, doubts are raised about the constitutionality of enacting interim laws in normal times,

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and not only during emergencies as the constitution states. Moreover, a constitutional issue that has been decided by the government, rather than a supreme court, is that of royal pardon which is of two types: general and special. The government interpreted this to mean that a general pardon absolves the pardonee of all offences. He or she will enjoy all rights, including the right to become a candidate in elections. However, according to the government's interpretation, the special pardon releases the pardonee from prison, but does not restore all his or her rights. This is the interpretation that blocked the candidacy of Toujan Faysal in 2007. The constitutional lawyer, and former Minister of Justice, Muhammad al-Hammouri, argues that both types of pardon are of equal force (2005, pp. 80-81). However, since there is no constitutional court to consider the issue, the government's interpretation is imposed.

There is a high court that reviews decisions affecting employees of the government. It can order reinstatement in cases of dismissal. However, the jurisdiction of this high court does not include deciding constitutional issues.

Before concluding this section, the principle of the rule of law requires some discussion. The notion of rule of law is an important one, as is the principle that everyone is equal before the law. The application, however, is not always consistent with the principle. It can be circumvented and undermined by people in power. Challenging the government in a court of law is not an easy task. Governments resort to excuses such as state security or national interest to block proceedings or refrain from presenting evidence. While decisions can be challenged at the European Court of Human Rights if the decision taken is in a European country, this mechanism is not available in many countries, including Jordan. Oppression in undemocratic countries is done in the name of the law. For the rule of law to be an effective principle, the

laws should be consistent with the freedoms, and there should be a mechanism to challenge their constitutionality.

Subcategory 3: Civil and Political Rights

The overarching question (Q3S, Q19L) asks: 'Are civil and political rights equally guaranteed for all?' All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest mark is 1; the highest 10. The mean is 5.

Table 6.3: Civil and Political Rights

Mark	Frequency	Percent
1	2	8.3
2	3	12.5
3	1	4.2
4	4	16.7
5	5	20.8
6	2	8.3
7	3	12.5
8	3	12.5
10	1	4.2
Total	24	100
Mean	5	

In analysing the data in response to this question, I will adopt two approaches. The narrow approach examines specific rights, such as the freedom of expression, whereas the broad approach examines how equal rights in general are not guaranteed in relation to women and where citizens reside in the country.

Civil and political rights are usually mentioned together. Both are the subject of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The covenant enumerates the rights which include the right to life; the prevention of torture; the right to liberty and security; freedom of movement; equality before the courts; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of expression; freedom of assembly; and freedom of association. These rights are also referred to as civil liberties.

When one examines specific rights such as those mentioned above, one finds variations in the degree to which they are respected. For example, freedom of movement is better respected than freedoms of expression, assembly, and association.

The right to demonstrate is heavily restricted. When people manage to demonstrate with or without permission, one finds heavy-handed measures, as was the case during a strike by workers at the Port of Aqaba in July 2009. Similar heavy-handed treatment befell the demonstrators against Israeli aggression against the Gaza strip in 2008/9.

In the long questionnaire, four of the six assessors answered this question. The marks give are 3, 5, 5, and 7. The mean is 5, which mirrors that of the short questionnaire. I chose to be brief in the discussion of the specific rights because they would be addressed in other questions. Therefore, I will now examine the lack of equal rights in the broad sense—the representation of residents of governorates and of women.

Geographically and administratively, Jordan is divided into twelve governorates. Electorally, it has fifteen, with different numbers of seats. Three of the fifteen constituencies are reserved for the bedouin of the northern, southern, and central regions of Jordan—three seats each. The largest governorate is Amman, where almost half of Jordan's population reside. However, the number of seats allocated for Amman is not proportionate.

Table 6.4: Ratios of Representation

District	Population	Seats	Ratio (1/1000)
Amman	2,027,685	23	1/88
Irbid	950,695	16	1/59.5
Zarqa	838,250	10	1/84
Balqa'	135,890	10	1/83.4
Karak	214,225	10	1/13.6
Mafraq	245,665	4	1/21.4
Jarash	156,675	4	1/61.4
Madaba	135,890	4	1/39.2
ʿAjlun	118,305	4	1/34
Tafila	81,000	4	1/20.3
Maʿan	103,915	4	1/26
ʿAqaba	107,115	2	1/35.7
Bedouin		9	

Source: Adapted from official statistics, 2007.

As the table shows, a vote in Karak is worth more than seven in Amman. The government justifies this by pleading concern for representation of all parts of the

kingdom. Addressing issues of representation should be welcome, but there is a contradiction in the application. All citizens should be represented equally, not least because the constitution states explicitly that all Jordanians are equal before the law. The government has various quotas for the Christians, Circassians, and bedouin. These quotas are from the early days of the kingdom. In 2003, the elections law was amended to allocate women a quota of six seats in the HoD. In 2010, the number was doubled. Given that the number of women is 2,773,000, and men 2,950,000, the ratio of representation is equal to one seat per 462.2 thousand women, when the quota was six seats. The ratio became one seat per 231.1 thousand women when the quota was increased to twelve seats. Moreover, given that 104 seats of the HoD can all be for men, the ratio of representation amounts to one seat per 28,000 men.

With regard to quotas in general, there are arguments that all quotas in Jordan are unconstitutional. The argument is based on article (6)(i) which states: 'Jordanians shall be equal before the law. There shall be no discrimination between them as regards to their rights and duties on grounds of race, language or religion'. Another argument about the quota in relation to the bedouin is that they have been urbanised, and some Jordanian of bedouin roots have held high offices in the states, such as 'Akef al-Fayez, and his son Faysal.

In relation to the quota for Christians, Nahed H̲attar arrives at a higher percentage of Christians in Jordan than the quota gives them. He calculates the percentage by excluding the Palestinians in Jordan. A more important aspect in relation to the Christians in Jordan goes beyond the number of seats allocated for them. Jordan is praised as being tolerant, and indeed Christians in Jordan enjoy considerable freedom of religion. Moreover, some Christians hold senior positions in government, such as the Ministry of Finance and central bank of Jordan.

However, this tolerant image does not hide the fact that the Christians in Jordan are not found in the most senior positions of the army,[8] nor has a Christian ever become a prime minister of Jordan. A Christian, Marwan al- Muʿasher, was made deputy prime

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[8] Medical practitioners serving in military hospitals get high ranks, but that is not the kind of rank referred to above.

minister. However, this post is more symbolic in its value, as a prime minister in Jordan would have more than one deputy at the same time. I suggest that Muʿasher's promotion was a reward for his roles in the peace process which led to a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. He was Jordan's first ambassador in Israel.[9]

Women's political and civil rights are not equal nor are they guaranteed. Women in Jordan were given the right to vote in 1974. Ironically they were given the right when no one in Jordan, men or women, could cast a vote to elect the government. The right to vote was shortly before the inauguration of the Women Year (1975). Inʿam al-Mufti became the first Jordanian woman to hold a ministerial position in 1979. She served as the minister of social justice. While she was a minister, a new woman organisation was established—the General Federation for Jordanian Women.

The second female minister was Layla Sharaf, the wife of ʿAbd al-H̲amīd Sharaf, who is related to the royal family, and served as a prime minister. She resigned in 1985 after King Hussein stopped the debate about whether tribal laws should be abolished or not. Massad (2001, pp. 70-71) criticises the reference made in Sharaf's letter of resignation to 'enlightening the citizen'. Massad says: 'Sharaf, it would seem, had internalized the modernization project uncritically' (p. 71). This interpretation is based on over-theorisation. It fails to recognise that it took a great deal of courage to resign, make the resignation letter public, and incur the wrath of King Hussein. I suggest that Sharaf's use of 'enlightening the citizen' is unrelated to 'the modernization project', as Massad assumes. 'Enlighten' is a commonly used word, and it means 'inform'.

The third woman to hold a ministerial post was Rima Khalaf who served as minister of trade and industry, then as minister of planning. At her time, Jordan's association agreement with the European Union was reached. She was one of three deputies of the PM in the government of ʿAbd al-Ra'uf al-Rawabdeh which was formed in

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[9] In *The Arab Center*, Muʿasher tells that members of his family were not keen on the fact that the first Jordanian ambassador to Jordan would be a Christian from a family which has priests. Also, when Paul Wolfowitz, the neoconservative got into trouble at the World Bank for behaving unethically, only Muʿasher came out in support, in an attempt to save him.

1999—the first after ʿAbdullah II succeeded his father. As already mentioned, the deputy post is of symbolic value in the main.

Through the unelected route, women occupied high-ranking positions in the government. However, going through the electoral route demonstrated that women have a problem winning seats in the HoD. When Jordan decided to hold elections in 1989, women looked forward to the opportunity. Hayfa' al-Bashir said she considered it a duty to run in the elections.[10] The number of women candidates in the general elections of 1989 was twelve. However, none of them managed to win a seat.

In 1993, a woman candidate, Toujan Faysal, contested the seat reserved for Circassians and won. Faysal's earlier bid had failed, having alienated the Islamic current. She pointed out in an article (1989) that the Islamists do not respect women, and yet women elect them. Faysal was an active MP. She was, and still is, outspoken and attacks corruption. She failed to keep her seat in the elections of 1997, and accused the government of rigging the elections in favour of her opponent. In 2002, Faysal accused the Prime Minister, ʿAli Abu al-Ragheb, of changing the law which regulated insurance companies for the benefit of members of his family who own companies in this sector.

Faysal's allegations were made public on a website based in the US. Abu al-Ragheb's government decided she went too far. She was charged with publishing false news which harmed the prestige of the state, *inter alia*. Abu al-Ragheb did not have to give evidence in court. She was sentenced to eighteen months in prison. While in jail, she went on hunger strike. Faysal was pardoned by King ʿAbdullah II in June 2002. She was not allowed to run for elections in 2003 because she was treated as having a criminal record.

Although Faysal was pardoned, the government interpreted the constitution in a way that a special pardon does not invalidate the record. Only a general pardon would have that effect. Faysal believes that the effect of the sentence on here ability to run for elections expires at the end five years after her release, and after that she can run.

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[10] Personal interview. Amman, 24 June 2009.

If the government prevented her from running, she said, she would sue the government.[11] However, in the elections of 2010, she did not run.

In the elections of 1997, which the MB/IAF boycotted, there were seventeen women candidates, considerably higher than the candidates in 1989. However, they were equally unsuccessful in that round, even though it was boycotted by the MB/IAF. This suggests that the attitude towards women is not restricted to those who support the Islamists. In 2001, another woman became an MP for a few months: Nuha al-Maʿayta. A vacancy arose in the HoD after the death of Rashed al-Barayseh. It was decided that there no was need to hold by-elections. It was left to the serving MPs to elect a replacement. The occasion was used to elect a woman. Seventeen candidates were considered, and al-Maʿayta was selected. When women repeatedly failed to win seats, the government introduced a quota, according to which six seats were added to the HoD and reserved for women. This was in response to recommendations made by the so-called 'Jordan first commission'. The elections law was amended in 2003 to introduce the women quota, and it spelled out the formula according to which women would be considered elected.

The formula to win through the women quota converts the results achieved by women candidates into percentages based on the total number of votes cast in their respective constituencies. The women candidates who get the highest parentages across Jordan become MPs, provided that the percentage is not less than 5 percent. In the elections of 2003, this formula meant that one woman, Ḥayat al-Msaimi, running in Zarqa District, became an MP—having secured more than 7,000 votes. In contrast, another woman, Inṣāf al-Khawaldeh, running in the Madaba District, became an MP with only 365 votes. There were women candidates who gained votes in the thousands, but the formula did not allow them to be selected. For example, a woman candidate in Irbid, Aminah al-Khaṯawneh, gained more than 2,000 votes, the second highest

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[11] Personal interview. Amman, 6 June 2009.

amongst women candidates in Jordan. However, she did not become a quota MP because she did not meet the 5 percent requirement. The table below will better explain how the winners through the quota are selected.

Table 6.5: Women Candidates and the Quota Formula

Constituency	Votes Total	Candidate	Votes Won	Votes (%)	Result
Zarqa	67,292	H. Msaimi	7,133	10.6	☑
		F. Khateeb	1,924	2.9	X
Irbid-1	94,578	A. Khasawneh	2,224	2.4	X
		F. Zuʿbi	1,942	2.1	X
Amman-2	83,334	W. Talhūni	1,211	1.5	X
Madaba	13,023	F. Jamʿani	1,048	8.1	☑
Tafila-1	21,743	A. Suʿud	1,132	5.2	☑
Tafila-2	6,512	E. Khawaldeh	365	5.6	☑

Source: Adapted from Official Gazette and other sources.

Based on the figures in the table, a woman candidate in Amman-2 would have needed a minimum of 4,167 votes. The table also reveals the unequal representation of governorates, where the number of seats is not dependent on the number of people.

Hayat al-Msaimi ran as an MB/IAF candidate. She nearly won outright, but fell short of a few votes. The failure to win outright is attributed (a) to being a woman, and (b) to being a Palestinian. This episode is mentioned by Samīẖ al-Maʿayta as an example of the penetration of nationalism into the MB ranks, something that was not the case before.[12] Al-Msaimi said she won outright; however the government declared the other candidate the winner because she would win through the quota.[13]

Although the quota system was introduced to improve women's representation in the HoD, the women I interviewed in Jordan complained about the system. They explained that it had the effect of excluding women candidates in the Amman governorate from winning. The consequence of this is that all women who sit in parliament according to the quota are from outside Amman.

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[12] Personal interview. Amman, 23 June 2009.
[13] Personal interview. Amman, 25 March 2010.

The elections of 2010 produced a surprise in Amman. The Palestinian leftist, ʿAbla Abu ʿElbeh, won in Amman on the basis of the quota. The 5 percent requirement was calculated per single constituency within a multi-seat constituency, rather than per governorate as before. This made the more than 1000 votes she received exceed the 5 percent threshold. Had the old formula been used, she would not have won, and the argument that women cannot win Amman would have been validated. Another woman, Reem Badran, won outright in Amman. Therefore, she rejects the view that women do vote for female candidates. However, women activists believe Badran's case is exceptional. As Emily Nafaʿ explains, 'that Badran won outright did not come as a surprise'.[14] She is the daughter of Muḏar Badran, a former PM.

As mentioned earlier, there are arguments about the constitutionality of the quota allocated for women. However, women argue that according to the single vote law, they have no chance of winning.

To conclude the analysis of data of this question, one can say that Jordan does not meet the international standards of civilian and political rights. The international declaration of human rights stipulates that restrictions on rights must be 'necessary in a democratic society'. In such a society, criticism of the head of state is not a criminal offence. Comedians mock politicians, including the head of state. However, in Jordan, there is a law which makes it an offence to criticise the king. This is euphemistically referred to as 'extending the tongue'. In September 2010, King ʿAbdullah II pardoned eighteen individuals charged with this offence.

Subcategory 4: Economic and Social Rights

The overarching question (Q4S, Q26L) asks: 'Are economic and social rights equally guaranteed for all?' All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest mark given is 1; the highest 9. The mean is 5.3.

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[14] Personal interview. Amman, 18 November 2010.

Table 6.6: Economic and Social Rights

Mark	Frequency	Percent
1	2	8.3
3	4	16.7
4	4	16.7
5	3	12.5
6	2	8.3
7	3	12.5
8	4	16.7
9	2	8.3
Total	24	100
Mean	5.3	

Social, economic and cultural rights have their own international covenant. These rights include equality of men and women; rights related to work; trade associations; social security; family, mothers and children; physical and mental health; and education. The proponents of these rights argue that they are closely linked to the civil and political rights.

Jordan offers free education for twelve years, from the elementary level to the secondary education after which the students are eligible to enter universities to specialise in the subjects for which their marks qualify them. According to the official Jordanian statistics (2007), there are 1.207 million students in basic education (first nine years of education, 6-15 years old). This is equivalent to one-fifth of the total population (5.7 million). In the same year, there have been 184,000 students in secondary education—a level for 16-18 year olds.

Although education is free, a private education sector prospers. Some private schools are well reputed, and charge a great deal of money. The government makes an effort to distinguish some of its schools for both girls and boys, such as the Hussein College, Raghadan College, Zain al-Sharaf, Sukayna, and Samir al-Refaʿi Comprehensive School. Moreover, during times of economic downturns, some families cut expenditure by taking their children out of private schools and send them back to government-funded schools.

In the long questionnaire, five of the six assessors answered the question. The marks give are 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. The mean is 6, which is higher than the mean of the marks given by the twenty-four respondents. The difference in the means suggests that that

the six assessors have a more favourable view of the economic and social rights in the country. However, the difference is not significantly high to suggest a discrepancy worthy of further investigation.

Conclusion

This chapter presented and discussed some of the data collected through the questionnaires. It was focused on the first part of the democratic audit: the broad category of citizenship, law and rights. Four overarching questions were included in this category which covered nationhood and citizenship; rule of law and access to justice; civil and political rights; and economic and social rights. The averages of marks in these subcategories were between five and six out of ten.

The next chapter will present and discuss the data concerned with the second part of the democratic audit: representative and accountable government.

Chapter 7

Democratic Audit: Representative and Accountable Government

In this chapter, I present, analyse, and discuss the data pertaining to the second category in the democratic audit: representative and accountable government. It has six subcategories: free and fair elections; democratic role of political parties; government effectiveness and accountability; democratic effectiveness of parliament, civilian control of the military and police; and integrity in public life. The latter refers to corruption. As in the previous chapter, the overarching question is stated, marks are given, and then the analysis and discussion follow.

Subcategory 1: Free and Fair Elections

The overarching question (Q5S, Q33L) asks: 'Do elections give the people control over the governments and their policies?' All twenty-four respondents answered the question, with 0 being the lowest mark, and 7 the highest. The mean is 3.1.

Table 7.1: Elections and Control over Government

Mark	Frequency	Percent
0	3	12.5
1	3	12.5
2	6	25
3	3	12.5
5	6	25
6	1	4.2
7	2	8.3
Total	24	100
Mean	3.1	

The low marks by the respondents are not surprising. Since Jordan decided in 1989 to hold parliamentary elections, no government was formed as a result of the elections, or in line with the results. The largest party or a coalition of parties would not be offered the chance to form a government. The king retained the prerogative of appointing and dismissing the government. This remained so even after ʿAbdullah II succeeded his father in 1999.

During the twenty years under assessment, six rounds of general elections were held: in 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2007, and 2010. I shall outline below the outcome of each round, and to what extent, if any, it led to any degree of control over the government.

The elections of 1989 took place on 8 November. They were the first of their kind since 1967. There was a consensus amongst the people I interviewed in Jordan that the elections of 1989 were free and fair. This judgement, nonetheless, was not based on international standards of free and fair elections. However, the purpose here is not to challenge the characterisation of the elections, but to establish the extent to which they led to control by the people over the government.

The MB gained twenty-two seats (out of eighty), constituting the biggest bloc in the HoD. The MB was not invited to form the government whether alone or in coalition with other parties. King Hussein named Mu<u>d</u>ar Badran as PM. When its formation was announced in December 1989, there were no MB ministers in it.

After the win, the MB issued a list of fourteen demands to join the government and give a vote of confidence. According to Gharaybeh (1997B, pp. 121-122), the list included demands such as working towards implementing Islamic law; amending the laws which contradict article 2 in the constitution (Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic is its official language); repealing the martial law within six months; and preventing the security forces from interfering in various sectors, including employment and scholarships to study abroad.

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and King Hussein's attempt to find an Arab solution, Jordan strained its relations with Kuwait, the Gulf states, and Western countries. This situation required Jordan to present a united front. Hence, the MB was invited to join the government. There was a reshuffle on 1 January 1991 which led to the inclusion of several ministers from the MB. Badran agreed to some of the demands referred to above, including the opening of a college for Islamic law at Yarmouk University, reinstating those who were sacked, and enacting some laws that partially met the demands of the MB (Gharaybeh 1997B, pp. 71-72).

Although this round of elections was considered free and fair, it did not lead to control by the people over the government. Three governments were formed between the elections of 1989 and 1993. None of them was under the control of the people through parties or MPs.

The elections of 1993 took place in November, more than a year after it became legal to form political parties. The elections were held under a new law known as the single vote law. During the elections of 1989, a constituent was able to vote for a number of candidates equal to the number of seats allocated for his or her constituency. If a constituency was allocated four seats, a voter would be able to vote for four candidates. This formula allowed people to widen their choices by not only voting for the candidate of the tribe. However, under the new law, a voter could only cast one vote in a multi-seat constituency. Faced with a single choice, a voter was pressurised into giving priority to the tribe's candidate.

The consequence of this law was a reduction in the number of seats won by MB/IAF. However, despite the reduction, the number of seats was still considerable, given the fact that, as Robinson (1998) observed, the system was 'clearly designed to work against their interests' (p. 399). It is noteworthy that this round of elections took place while Jordan was still trying to repair its relations with the USA and the Gulf states. In 1993, the PLO reached an agreement with Israel which paved the way for Jordan to sign a peace treaty with Israel in 1994. The speed with which Jordan moved to sign the peace treaty and normalise relations with Israel was too fast even for those who were involved in the peace process such as Taher al-Masri. He and others opposed the Israeli participation in a trade fair held in Amman in 1996. Al-Masri suggested that in moving too fast, King Hussein was trying to compensate for the deterioration in the relationship with the USA over the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.[1]

The MB/IAF and other smaller parties decided to boycott the elections of 1997 as a protest against the single vote law of 1993. The government considered the reason for the boycott unconvincing because in 1993 these parties took part in the elections, which were organised and carried out under the same law. Despite the dissatisfaction

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[1] Personal interview. Amman, 4 January 2009.

with the elections law in 1993, the MB/IAF participated in them. The leader of MB, ʿAbdul-Raḥman Khalifa, accepted the appeal of King Hussein for national unity.

The MB/IAF's statement announcing the boycott was long, and it ended with seven demands: constitutional reforms; cancellation of the single vote law; cancellation of the provisional press law; stopping measures aiming at liquidating political parties and civil society organisations; economic reforms and fighting corruption; lifting restrictions on freedoms; and stopping the normalisation of relations with Israel.

A round of elections was due in 2001. However, it was postponed for two years, and held on 17 June 2003. The number of deputies was increased from 80 to 110, six of which were reserved for women. The IAF participated in these elections and won seventeen seats.

The elections of 2007 were held on 23 November 2007—during the premiership of Maʿruf al-Bakhit, a former army general and a former ambassador to Israel. The IAF/MB nearly boycotted the elections. However, some assurances from al-Bakhit that the elections would be fair and free made them reconsider their position. The decision to participate did not meet the approval of all the leaders of IAF/MB. The Secretary General of IAF, Zaki Bani Irshaid, chose not to join the campaign. This was used against him in subsequent internal disputes which led to the resignation of Bani Irshaid and the entire executive council in May 2009.

An interesting phenomenon that followed the elections was the analyses of the results. The columnist, ʿUrayb al-Rintawi, (2007) saw the results as a sign that the Islamists have exhausted their appeal in Jordan and other Arab countries, such as Morocco. His analysis was unsound because it ignored the claims of rigging. Analysts should not base their analyses on dubious results. The fortunes of political parties change all the time. Parties in power where free and fair elections take place come and go all the time. This applies to IAF as well. However, it is not possible to judge whether IAF is popular, and how popular, until fair and free elections are held.

The elections of 2010 were held under a new voting system, which was supposed to have alleviated the concerns of MB/IAF and others. However, the final version of the

elections law retained the single vote in a multi-seat constituency. The MB/IAF and other parties boycotted these elections which were held during the premiership of Samir al-Refaʿi.

In the long questionnaire, all six assessors answered the question. The marks given are 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, and 3. The mean is 2. The assessment in the long questionnaire confirms its counterpart in the short one. Although the mean is lower, there is no discrepancy that warrants an investigation into the difference.

Subcategory 2: Democratic Role of Political Parties

The overarching question (Q6S, Q39L) asks: 'Does the political party system assist the working of democracy?' All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest mark given is 1; the highest is 10. The mean is 5, which is the same as the most frequent answer.

Table 7.2: Party System

Mark	Frequency	Percent
1	1	4.2
2	4	16.7
3	2	8.3
4	2	8.3
5	6	25
6	4	16.7
7	2	8.3
9	2	8.3
10	1	4.2
Total	24	100
Mean	5	

The elections of 1989 were held without the official presence of political parties. Nonetheless, candidates belonging to various parties, such as al-Baʿth, ran in the elections. However, only one candidate won a seat. Fahd al-Rimawi, editor of *al-Majd* and a candidate at the time, attributed this to the fragmentation of votes. This might have been the case in a few seats, but overall, the failure was due more to the fact that the tides of these parties had receded long before the elections.

After the law of political parties came into force in 1992, there was a rush to form parties. Twenty parties applied for a licence. The government opposed the formation of some parties, refusing to license any party which it did not consider Jordanian.

Parties belonging to, or affiliated with, Pan-Arab parties or Palestinian organisations had to change bylaws to meet the requirement of Jordanianness. This applied to the parties connected with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and the Ba'th of Syria and Iraq. By the end of 1996, Jordan had twenty-three parties (Hourani 1997, p. 19).

Because of the high number of parties, and weak membership, King 'Abdullah II suggested the idea of having three to four major parties as a way of invigorating the political scene. However, al-Nsour (2005, pp. 120-121) considered the idea undemocratic without mentioning the king. He explained that although the US has two major parties, and the UK has three, there are many small parties in both courtiers. 'To limit the number of parties', he argues, 'is an incorrect idea'. He calls for licensing all parties. The government, on the other hand, created a ministry for political development. Its tasks include developing strategies and programmes to 'increase participation at all levels and in all fields' such as local communities, parties, and trade unions.

In the long questionnaire, only two of the six assessors answered the question. The marks given are 0 and 2. The mean is 1. In view of the fact that four of the six assessors did not give a mark, and two gave low marks, it is highly likely that the decision to refrain from giving a mark reflects a high degree of scepticism in relation to the role of parties in assisting democracy in Jordan. The higher marks in the short questionnaire are likely to be due to the fact that some of the respondents are activists who belong to parties, and therefore took a more favourable view of their role (the parties), taking into consideration that they operate within restrictions imposed by the government.

Subcategory 3: Effective and Responsive Government

The overarching question (Q7S, Q46L) asks: 'Is government effective in serving the public and responsive to its concerns?' All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The lowest mark given is 1; the highest is 9. The mean is 5.3.

Table 7.3: Effective and Responsive Government

Mark	Frequency	Percent
1	1	4.2
2	2	8.3
3	1	4.2
4	3	12.5
5	5	20.8
6	5	20.8
7	5	20.8
8	1	4.2
9	1	4.2
Total	24	100
Mean	5.3	

Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. However, the king is not a figurehead, as is the case in some European countries, such as Britain, Holland, and Norway. According to article 28 of the constitution, the monarchy is 'hereditary' and reserved for the 'dynasty of King ʿAbdullah ibn Hussein, in a direct line through his male heirs'. Various articles in the constitution give the king the power to dissolve the HoD and HoN; he appoints and dismisses the prime minister; he is the supreme commander of land, naval, and air forces. The king is the executive branch, but according to the constitution, his power is exercised through ministers. However, he also has legislative power. According to article 25, the power to legislate is shared by the national assembly and the king, who is 'immune from any liability and responsibility', according to article 30

The prime minister in Jordan is selected by the king, and is instructed to form a government guided by a letter from the king. He also dismisses the government whenever he chooses. Only once in the history of Jordan had the chosen prime minister been a member of the party which gained the largest number of seats in the HoD. This was in October 1956. Sulayman al-Nabulsi's government won the confidence of parliament. However, it was a short-lived government, serving less than six months. King Hussein dismissed him.

Considering that the elections do not give people control over government and its policies, it will come as a surprise if the government was found to be effective and responsive to the concerns of the people. However, one has to outline why the respondents feel that the government is not responsive.

One of the characteristics of dealing with problems is to be in a state of denial, or to downplay the problem. Polluted water in the Mafraq, Irbid, and Jarash areas caused hundreds of cases diarrhoea and high temperature. Two ministers had to submit their resignations in the aftermath of the outbreak in the Mafraq area. An old network of pipes was blamed for the outbreak. Jordan is also known for limited water resources, which leads to restricting water supplies to homes on specific days of the week.

In 2007, there was an outbreak of food poisoning due to eating chicken shawarma, a popular meal sold at hundreds of restaurants throughout the country.[2] The initial response was to downplay the extent of the problem. The government initially suggested that poisoning was limited to an area near Amman, and was due to selling shawarma before the meat was cooked to a sufficiently high temperature. However, after the number of cases exceeded 200, the government ordered a ban on selling chicken shawarma throughout the country.

Fahd al-Rimawi (2007) did not limit his criticism to the performance of the government in handling these and other problems. He widened the criticism to include the way governments were formed and how they were copies of each other, irrespective of who was selected as a prime minister. Legal proceedings were initiated in 2007 after this editorial. The charge was 'insulting an official body'.

In the long questionnaire, four of the six assessors answered the question. The marks give are 1, 3, 3, and 5. The mean is 3. Refraining from giving a mark is likely to be indicative of scepticism about the responsiveness of the government. This was reinforced by the marks given by the four assessors who had answered the question.

Subcategory 4: Democratic Effectiveness of Parliament

The overarching question (Q8S, Q55L) asks: 'Does the parliament or legislator contribute effectively to the democratic process?' All twenty-four respondents

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[2] The vast majority of restaurants are small shops either with a few seats or sell food 'to go'.

answered the question. The lowest mark given is 0; the highest is 9. The mean is 4.7, which is close to the most frequent answer, 5.

Table 7.4: Effectiveness of Parliament

Mark	Frequency	Percent
0	1	4.2
1	1	4.2
2	3	12.5
3	2	8.3
4	2	8.3
5	7	29.2
6	4	16.7
7	2	8.3
9	2	8.3
Total	24	100
Mean	4.7	

Parliament in theory is the supreme body in democratic countries. It is one of the three branches of government and is part of the system of check and balances. However, experiences vary from one country to another. In the UK, the PM and ministers are also MPs. In the US, the members of the House of Representatives are separate from the executive branch. Parliament can become docile and defer to the wishes of the president or PM. However, it can also assert its powers. In the USA, there have been two attempts at impeaching the president. In the UK, Parliament defied Tony Blair's governments in 2005 and rejected its Anti-Terror Bill which sought to increase the limit on detention of terror suspects without charge from fourteen days to ninety.

The official history of Jordan's parliament shows that the HoD was dissolved several times, because it did not work well with the government. Contrary to the normal practice in democracies, the parliament is dismissed instead of the government. In other words, the legislative branch of government in Jordan is the weakest.

The marks above reflect dissatisfaction with the performance of the parliament. The HoD of 1989 and 1993 can be credited with some achievements, such as the lifting of martial law, and adopting a political parties law. One important episode is particularly noteworthy. During the speakership of ʿArabiyyat, the will of HoD prevailed when its views on a law were different from those of King Hussein.

ʿArabiyyat adhered to the first article in the constitution which states that Jordan's 'system of government is parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy'. In ʿArabiyyat's view, this makes parliament's power superior to the will of the king when both sides do not agree on a matter.[3]

As ʿArabiyyat pointed out, there was a difference of opinion concerning the law to make all the decisions of the state security court appealable. King Hussein sent the law back to the HoD, but under ʿArabiyyat's leadership, the HoD adhered to its position. Subsequently, King Hussein relented and signed the law. As it reads now, article 9-C gives an automatic right of appeal for those sentenced to death and those with prison terms longer than ten years. The appeal must be referred to the Court of Appeal within thirty days, even if a defendant does not wish to appeal. The beneficiaries of this law were several people, amongst whom were some students at Mu'ta University (a military college), who were accused in 1993 of planning to kill King Hussein when he delivered a graduation speech.

A member of the Liberation Party, Yusef al-Sabatin, was amongst those who were accused of taking part in the plot. Al-Sabatin (n.d.) said, in his memoirs, he heard on radio a speech by King Hussein in which he mentioned the plot (p. 88). Later in the week, he read his name in a newspaper and realised that the plot had been fabricated because he had no involvement in it. In 1994, the state security court sentenced the students to death, but the sentences were commuted to life. The sentences of another three defendants, including al-Sabatin, remained the same (p. 90). In the meantime, the right of appeal had come into effect. When the appeal was considered, the entire case was dismissed. There was a period of seven years between the alleged plot and the decision to acquit the accused.

The most important weakness of the parliament is that it has no control over its own fate. The king can, and did, dissolve it without warning or reason, as happened in November 2009. MPs tend to become intermediaries between the constituents and government officials and departments. The government takes advantage of the absence of parliament to enact provisional laws. When the elections of 2001 were postponed, the government of ʿAli Abu al-Ragheb enacted 220 provisional laws.

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[3] Personal interview. Amman, 7 June 2009.

According to al-Hammouri (2005) the provisional laws are constitutionally allowed only when there are certain situations such as an earthquake or epidemic (pp. 75-85).

The HoD of 2007 was heavily criticised from all sides. Two writers who do not usually agree when writing about the same issue, Khalid Maḫadin and Naheḏ Ḫattar, criticised the HoD. Ḫattar's criticism was in terms that cost him his job as a cultural adviser at al-Ahli Bank. Maḫadin published an article pleading with King ʿAbdullah II to dissolve the HoD, which did not endear itself to the public. Its Speaker, ʿAbd al-Hadi al-Majali, initiated legal proceedings against Khalid Maḫadin, but Maḫadin won the case. A brother of an MP abused the official status given to his car and used it to smuggle drugs across the Syrian-Jordanian border.

Although the HoD of 2007 was the outcome of a heavily-rigged process, it is interesting to observe that the criticism was directed at the HoD and not at the system which allowed the rigging to take place. A more credible position would have been to dissolve parliament as one of many steps, including political reform, and to put on trial the officials who rigged the elections—charged with political fraud.

Moreover, I would argue that Jordan would have been better served by a lame parliament than by no parliament. Those who welcomed the decisions to dissolve the HoD were short-sighted and not democrats. This proved to be the case when a new parliament was in place after the elections of 2010. When the government of Samir al-Refaʿi asked for confidence of the HoD, it received 111 votes out of 120. Consequently, the HoD was the subject of ridicule for being submissive.

In the long questionnaire, the six assessors gave marks, but were less generous than their counterparts in the short one. The marks given are 1, 2, 2, 3, 5, and 8. The mean is 3.5. The mark of 8 is not consistent with the rest of the marks, and considering the evidence in relation to the effectiveness of the parliament, this single mark does not seem justified. Nonetheless, a more realistic appraisal has emerged as a result of the marks by the other assessors, and the collective assessment is similar to that of the short questionnaire.

Subcategory 5: Civilian Control of the Military and the Police

The overarching question (Q9S, Q60L) asks: 'Are the military and police forces under civilian control?' I anticipated that this was a question the respondents would not be comfortable with as the military, police, and the security services are another 'red line'. Because of the confusion surrounding this question, a table will not be helpful to understand the results. The marks and frequencies were 0 (10); 1 (3); 2 (1); 3 (2); 6 (3); 8 (1); 9 (1); and 10 (10).[4] The mark of 0 (zero) is meant to be a positive reply to the question. Therefore, it will be dishonest to suggest that the zero marks reflect a negative view of the issue of the question.

In one way, the question was easy to answer in relation to Jordan. The king is the supreme commander of the army. The defence minister in Jordan is a civilian, often the prime minister. Therefore, there is no issue in terms of the control of the army. It would be naïve of those who devised the democratic audit to have assumed that civilian control of the army and military produces a satisfactory situation. Therefore, one has to look further than who is in control.

According to Glubb (1948), the creation of the Jordanian army (the Arab legion) dates back to 1920, when it was formed by the British officer, Fredrik Peake. It started with 100 servicemen, and was increased to 1,000 in 1921. Glubb himself became the commander of the Jordanian army for two decades (1936-1956). Glubb was dismissed by King Hussein in 1956 in a move that was popular in Jordan, and referred to as the Arabisation of the army.

The Jordanian army has its accolades. In 1948, it was able to keep East Jerusalem in Arab hands. In March 1968, it dealt the Israeli forces a severe blow in the battle of al-Karameh, which occurred soon after the defeat of 1967.[5] Some of the Israeli tanks were left on the battlefield and were put in the public square near the municipality of Amman.

The police force in Jordan was part of the army and remained so until 1956 when it was assigned its own commander, Bahjat Tayyara. In 1958, it became an

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[4] Mark (frequency).
[5] Palestinian resistance fighters, who were the intended target of the Israeli army, took part in this battle which made Fatah the most popular organisation.

independent force which comes under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior. A law was enacted in 1965 to regulate the police force and delineate its tasks and responsibilities.

In 2008, a new police force was created. To distinguish it from the regular police, it was given the name 'darak'. Members of this force were deployed in cases of protests against the Israeli embassy in Amman during the war on the Gaza Strip in December 2008. They were also deployed to deal with a strike by workers at the Port of Aqaba. The darak forces are often deployed to keep the peace between feuding tribes, particularly after the murder of one member by another tribe's member. The common factor in these situations is the use of excessive force.

The overarching question in this subcategory does not mention other security corps, namely the intelligence services. I propose to include them in this subcategory. My focus will be on the GID.

The GID was created in 1964. It has its own ranks, and its head is a general. For many years, the head of GID was a Palestinian, Muhammad Rasul al-Kilani. During this time, the headquarters of GID was euphemistically referred to as the hotel of Abu Rasul. The role of GID is not limited to intelligence gathering or counter-intelligence. The role and influence affect the lives of Jordanians in many ways, including the ability to gain employment in the public sector. The practice of confiscating passports was widespread. It is used as a means to control a citizen's ability to travel.

The GID has the power to arrest individuals and hold them in its own prisons. When a person is arrested by the GID, he or she can be held up to six months without being charged. During this time, the arrested person cannot have access to a lawyer. Family members may be allowed to visit him or her. In 2008, HRW released a report which said the torture was still 'widespread and routine in Jordan's prisons' (p. 1). The report identified the means of torturer (p. 2):

> Most common forms of torture include beatings with cables and sticks and the suspension by the wrists of inmates from metal grates for hours at a time. Guards flog the defenseless prisoner with knotted electrical cables, beat him with hoses and truncheons, or kick him with fists and boots.

In 2006, Amnesty International (AI) described Jordan as 'key hub in secret CIA programme' to torture terror suspects outside the USA.

There is no committee to oversee the intelligence services. Although even in Western countries, intelligence services are given extensive powers, and intelligence matters are not discussed in public, the presence of an overseeing committee is necessary even if it is not a very effective safeguard. A committee may be able to ensure that intelligence departments do not operate without control, as secrecy is an open invitation to corruption and abuse of power.

In the long questionnaire, five of the six assessors gave marks with a majority being low. The marks given are 0, 0, 2, 5, and 9. The mean is 3.2. I reiterate my earlier suggestion that the data related to this question should be considered unreliable.

To conclude the discussion of this question, I should restate the fact that the king is the supreme commander of the army. The defence minister, usually a civilian, is nominally in charge of the army. This question should be revised by IDEA to include the security services, as a strict answer to the question will not include the intelligence services.

Subcategory 6: Integrity in Public Life

The overarching question (Q10S, Q66L) asks: 'Is the integrity of conduct in public life assured?' Twenty-three respondents answered the questions. The lowest mark given is 1; the highest is 8. Notable here is the absence of any 10. The mean is 3.8.

Table 7.5: Integrity in Public Life (corruption)

Mark	Frequency	Percent
1	2	8.3
2	5	20.8
3	5	20.8
4	3	12.5
5	4	16.7
6	2	8.3
8	2	8.3
Total	23	95.8
Missing	1	4.2
Mean	3.8	

Allegations of corruption are rife in Jordan, and get mentioned frequently in the press and by politicians of the opposition. There is now a department in Jordan whose responsibility is to fight corruption. In 2005, King ʿAbdullah II instructed the Prime Minister, ʿAdnan Badran, to establish an independent department to fight corruption. A law was enacted for this purpose. The new department was ready to begin its work in August 2008. The acts that come within the definition of corruption include embezzlement, bribes, and exploiting position for material and other benefits.

Although allegations of corruption are widespread, they sometimes prove unfounded when the cases are brought to trial. For instance, five high ranking officials in government departments and a bank were brought to trial in 2002. The allegations were related to a deal to buy rubbish collection equipment. The trial was concluded only in 2008 and they were found not guilty.

Transparency International (TI) ranked Jordan at 49 out of 180 states. The mark given to Jordan was 5 out of 10. In comparison with other states in the Arab world, Jordan was fifth. As the Head of the of Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), ʿAbd al-Shakhanbeh, explains: 'the rank in relation to other Arab states is good, considering the fact that the other states ahead of Jordan are rich'.[6] The implication that rich states do better at fighting corruption, or there are fewer incentives for people in rich states to engage in corruption, is not necessarily correct.

While the government tries to demonstrate a level of seriousness concerning the fight against corruption, there is often a reminder to people of the need to protect reputations from unfounded allegations. However, this kind or reminder is interpreted as lack of resolve.

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[6] Personal interview. Amman, 25 March 2010.

In the long questionnaire, all of the six assessors answered the question. The marks given are 1, 1, 3, 5, 5, and 8. The mean of is 3.8, which is similar to that of the short questionnaire.

How widespread is corruption? What levels in the state does it reach? Laith Shbailat goes further than anyone else in Jordan. He suggests that corruption has reached the royal court. A Lebanese TV channel, al-Jadid, aired a long interview with Shbailat in February 2011. There were references in the programme to the lavish lifestyle of Queen Rania as indicative of corruption. One of the examples cited as an indication of corruption reaching the royal court was the decision by the government of ʿAli Abu al-Ragheb in 2001 to register hundreds of dunams of state land in the name of King ʿAbdullah II. In a television interview in April 2011, Abu al-Ragheb said he did so after receiving a letter from the royal court. He further said he acted lawfully.

In December 2011, the Jordanian a news agency, Petra, reported that two officials from the royal court, its head Riyad Abu Karaki and media adviser Amjad al-ʿAdayleh, met the editors of the daily newspapers and others to reveal the facts of the land registration. The royal court acknowledged that during 2000-2003 some land (4827 dunams) was registered in King ʿAbdullah's name. Most of it is outside Amman and earmarked for development. Ownership of some of the land was transferred from the king to the armed forces and to the municipality of Amman. The two officials said this process would continue, as the purpose was to expedite decisions of developing the pieces of land in question.

Jordan's fight against corruption needs to widen its scope to include practices which do not come within the official definition of corruption. For example, in 2008, the government decided to exempt MPs from customs duty on new cars. Other practices include allocating cars to ministers and other people in senior posts to be used for private purposes such as taking children to school. These practices encourage a culture of taking advantage of posts, and deepen the gap between the haves and the have-nots.

Conclusion

This chapter presented and discussed data of the second broad category in the democratic audit: representative and accountable government. The six subcategories within in it were; free and fair elections; democratic role of political parties; government effectiveness and accountability; democratic effectiveness of parliament; civilian control of the military and police; and integrity in public life. The averages of the marks of these subcategories ranged from one to slightly over five out of ten.

The next chapter will complete the macro-analysis and will cover the two remaining broad categories of the democratic audit: civil society and popular participation; and democracy beyond the state.

Chapter 8

Democratic Audit: Civil Society and Democracy Beyond the State

In this chapter, I continue the presentation and discussion of the data of the democratic audit. Two categories of the audit are included: civil society and popular participation; and democracy beyond the state. As in the previous chapter, the overarching question is stated; the marks are given; and the results are discussed.

PART 1: CIVIL SOCIETY AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION

This is the third major category in the audit. It asks questions in three areas: the media in a democratic society; political participation; and decentralization.

Subcategory 1: The Media

The overarching question (Q11S, Q72L) asks: 'Do the media operate in a way that sustains democratic values?' The highest mark given is 10; the lowest is 0. The mean is 5.1, which is close to the most frequent mark.

Table 8.1: The Media and Democracy

Mark	Frequency	Percent
0	1	4.2
1	2	8.3
2	1	4.2
3	3	12.5
4	2	8.3
5	6	25
6	1	4.2
7	3	12.5
8	2	8.3
9	2	8.3
10	1	4.2
Total	24	100
Mean	5.1	

The marks reflect a relatively high level of dissatisfaction with the media. It is necessary to take a closer look at the media scene in Jordan to in order to identify the possible reasons.

Newspapers and magazines are the oldest type of media in Jordan. Jordanian radio broadcasting dates back to 1948. Its news bulletins used to be dominated by the news according to hierarchy of positions, starting with the king, prime minister and then the ministers. The news would be about who visited what; who opened which project and other news items that professional editors would not usually consider newsworthy. News programmes improved in recent years, by changing formats and broadcasting reports by correspondents, but the official line remains dominant.

Jordan had its first TV channel in 1966. Its main news bulletin is at 8pm. It used to be dominated by official news. Changes, however, have been introduced, such as news headlines or short bulletins on the hour. The main bulletin is still in the same time slot. Although TV started to have political discussion programmes, the participants in many cases are former officials. A discussion of an external issue, such as the Palestine question, will pay its dues to the wisdom of the king.

Both broadcasting services, radio and TV, are state-owned. An attempt to make Jordan attractive to media organisations had a limited success. A media village did not prosper as did its counterpart in Dubai which became a magnet for various Arab media outlets. However, the media scene has changed to some extent. In 2002, the government created the Audio-Visual Commission (AVC) and empowered it with licensing private radio and TV stations, subject to the approval of the government. There are now private local FM stations, specialising in music and phone-in contests. The army and police also have their own FM radios. Obtaining a licence to establish an entertainment station is much easier than one that wishes to broadcast news, as can be seen in the conditions stipulated by the AVC.

Jordan has a national news agency which is referred to as Petra, instead of Arabic or Latin acronyms. The agency supplies local papers with official news, which the daily papers publish as it is. For many years, there were two dailies in Jordan; *Al-Rai* and *Ad-Dustour*. This was the result of a move by the government to merge several dailies which used to be published in the West and East Bank.

After the elections of 1989, many weekly newspapers appeared on the scene. However, after the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, the government of ʿAbd al-Salam

al-Majali changed the press law to increase the capital required to continue to publish. Many of the weeklies failed to meet the requirement and shut down. One of the weeklies which managed to survive was *al-Majd*, but was subjected to censorship or legal action on several occasions. The Islamic weekly, *Assabeel*, received permission in 2008 to publish daily and it did so in February 2009.

The advent of the Internet offered opportunities to provide news without having to own presses or employ many people. There are now several websites which provide news. The new media outperform the traditional media in being faster with their news, and posting pictures that the dailies do not, because they still avoid the risk of antagonising the government. The effect of the new media on newspapers is a change in attitude which has led the papers to rely on their websites, after resisting the Internet and arguing that it affects sales. The daily papers now update their websites but not in the same degree as the exclusively online news sites. In 2010, the government of Samir al- Refaʿi wanted to control what the online news sites could publish. The owners opposed al-Refaʿi's attempt and succeeded in forcing him to abandon it. Credit was given to the personal intervention of the king.

Having followed Jordanian news websites during the course of the research, I noted that they still lavishly praise the king and the Hashimites. They republish items from Jordanian, Arab, and international papers. It is often clear where the item was originally published. Occasionally, the original source is not acknowledged.

Those who are in new media are not in it solely to contribute to democracy. The Internet and the development of digital technology made it possible to enter the media field with minimal capital in order to make money from advertisement and sponsorship. During the campaign for elections of 2010, news sites were full of pictures of candidates. Moreover, the multitude of media outlets does not necessarily

mean a variety of opinions. Without freedoms enshrined in the constitution and practised without fear, the media will seek to have a niche that guarantees a certain income, and will become more restrained in their coverage.

Although the media contribute to democracy, they can also play a counter-productive role. In the case of Rwanda, for example, the media went as far as inciting genocide. In Jordan, some new media outlets contribute to the alienation of citizens of Palestinian origin, by publishing provocative articles and comments by the readers. Moreover, for the media to contribute to democracy, there are various issues that have to be taken into consideration, including ownership and independence. This is not an irrelevant debate in the case of Jordan. For instance, the site ammonnews.net is co-owned by Samir Hiari, who is also the chairman of the board and editor-in-chief of the largest daily *al-Rai*. The same man is in charge of two different editorial policies at the same time. I suggest that his position in *al-Rai* will prevent him from departing too much from the official line in ammonnews.net.

In the long questionnaire, three of the six assessors answered the question. The marks are 2, 3, and 6. The mean is 3.7, which is lower than the mean in the short questionnaire. The refrain from giving marks is likely to be a reflection of dissatisfaction. The mark of 6 given by one of the assessors is probably a reflection of the fact that the media scene has changed in Jordan considerably. However, overall there is a long way to go before one can say the media 'sustain democratic values' in Jordan. This applies equally to new media.

Subcategory 2: Participation in Public Life

The overarching question (Q12S, Q77L) asks: 'Is there full citizen participation in public life?' I anticipated that this question would be vague without clues concerning what was meant by full participation. The long questionnaire has the clues, so I added an explanation under the question in the short questionnaire. The 'full participation' was referring to the diversity of civil society groups; the participation

of women and their ability to hold office; and ability of people from all social groups to hold public office.

Table 8.2: Participation

Mark	Frequency	Percent
2	4	16.7
3	3	12.5
4	2	8.3
5	6	25
6	3	12.5
7	3	12.5
9	1	4.2
10	2	8.3
Total	24	100
Mean	5.1	

Democratic theorists emphasise various aspects of democracy to make it work in a satisfactory manner. For instance, Shapiro (2003) and Benhabib (1996) emphasise the need for deliberation; thus, there is a 'deliberative democracy' approach. Another emphasis is on 'participation'. Macpherson (1977, p. 94) argues that 'low participation and social equality are so bound with each other that a more equitable and humane society requires a more participatory political system'.

Hourani (2010, pp. 5-8) points out that there has been a considerable improvement in the ability of CSOs to operate in Jordan. After 1989, many new societies have been formed, such as human rights organisations and research centres. He further notes that when Jordan implemented a privatisation programme in the 1990s, which entailed removing subsidies, CSOs stepped in to help alleviate poverty. The CSOs also contributed to women empowerment, community development, and youth training. The data cited by Hourani show that there are 3,200 CSOs, with more than a million members.

Although Hourani's figures suggest the existence of diversity and a high level of involvement, the law regulating CSOs prevents charitable organisations from engaging in political activities. As Jamal (2007) points out, CSOs in Jordan are 'divided according to political access, clientalism, the availability of funding and relationship with the regime' (p. 115). Her observation is correct. One notable aspect of political access is the attendance of activities by ministers or members of the royal

family. The availability of funding is best seen in CSOs which belong to European and American organisations, or have collaborative agreements with them. The connection also provides a level of protection for these CSOs when they do not agree on some issue with the government

Moreover, for a CSO to prosper there is usually an attempt to seek some royal patronage. For instance, a women's society would seek support from Princess Basma. To illustrate this point, two organisations can be mentioned. The first is the Jordanian Women Union, and the Arab Women Media Centre. Both have Princess Basma as their honorary president.

Jamal (2007) correctly notes that despite the increase in CSOs, due to 'a system of rewards and sanctions founded on support for the government,' the CSOs end up being 'supportive of the palace, or […] marginalised in their civic spheres' (p. 119). Therefore, the appearance of diversity is not a reliable indicator of a lively political participation. Other issues, such as the laws regulating the sector of CSOs, should be examined.

With regard to the participation of women and their ability to hold office, the points to recall are that women rose to high ranks through the nonelected path. In competitive elections, women failed to win outright, except in a few cases. The first was in 1993, where competition was limited to members of the Circassian community in Jordan. Toujan Faysal won. The second was Falak Jamʿani. She was a doctor with the rank of general (liwa') in the army's medical corp. She won in the governorate of Madaba in 2007. The third woman was Reem Badran who ran in one of Amman's constituencies in 2010. The failure to win in outright competition led to reserving six seats to women in 2003. The number was increased to twelve in 2010. Through this route, women entered the HoD according to a formula based on a percentage of the votes in the governorates not on the absolute number of votes won.

In relation to the ability of social sectors to hold office, I will focus on the positions of prime minister and minister. Given the fact that governments are appointed, rather than elected, the trend in forming the government is to try and satisfy different regions of the country, the tribes, and the palace. If a minister is selected from the northern part of the country, another from the southern region is chosen. In 2007,

ʿAdnan Badran tried to form a government without these considerations. His government lasted several months only. Members of some families often hold ministerial posts; for example, the Touqans, Majalis, and Refaʿis.

Political participation in the senses outlined above is limited. I will now examine participation in a more procedural sense, namely, regarding the number of registered voters and the voter turnout.

The elections of 1989 were held without an officially-recognised presence of parties. The number of registered voters was 1,020,444. The number of those who cast their votes was 541,426 (53.06%).[1] In 1993, the elections took place after the enactment of the political parties law, but under a new elections law which prevented multiple votes in a multi-seat constituency. The number of registered voters was 1,501,279. The number of those who cast their votes was 822,294 (54.77%).

In 1997, IAF/MB and other parties boycotted the elections. The number of registered voters was 1,489,000. The number of those who cast their votes was 702,260 (47.45%). In 2003, all parties took part. The number of registered voters was 2,325,496. The number of those who cast their votes was 1,342,999 (57.75%). The elections of 2007 were preceded by disputes between the government of Maʿruf al-Bakhit and the MB/IAF. A boycott by IAF/MB was a strong possibility. However, IAF/MB did not boycott, and won six seats. The number of registered voters was 2,455,686. The number of those who cast their votes was 1,326,070 (54%).

The elections of 2007 was characterised by the use of money. The term 'political money' surfaced in Jordan after it was used in Lebanon in reference to al-Hariri phenomena, which bought Rafiq al-Hariri and his son, Saʿd, political leadership through the use of money, whether in the form of hand-outs to the poor, employment in Hariri-owned foundations, or in projects implemented by Hariri's company, Solidaire.

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[1] The data are taken from IDEA.

In 2010, the government of Samir al-Refaʿi toughened the severity of the penalty for the use of money for political purposes, but there were ways to use money indirectly. There were many claims of illegal use of money in this round of elections, but the government said it dealt with all the cases that were reported.

The elections of 2010 were boycotted by MB/IAF. The impact of the boycott was most visible in the low voter turnout in Amman, which was under 40%. However, the government aggregated the percentages across the country. This produced an average of 53%, which the government considered satisfactory. This percentage is based on 2,370,000 votes cast.

The manipulation of the electoral process leads electors to lose interest. Candidates try to stimulate participation through appeal to tribal connections. Others use money to acquire votes by giving a certain sum for a vote, or by facilitating transport to and from polling stations. Legally, the use of money is not allowed. However, candidates offer incentives in a variety of ways. For example, they offer food, or pay the expenses of travelling to Saudi Arabia to perform religious rituals. These practices are of limited success because, in the absence of change in the political atmosphere and the decision-making processes, people refrain from registering and voting.

In the long questionnaire, all six assessors answered the question. The marks given are 0, 2, 3, 3, 5, and 7. The mean is 3.3. Given that the assessors had the benefit of looking at more questions in this subcategory, and not only at the overarching question, I would suggest that their assessment reinforces the scepticism about political participation. The high mark of 7 by an assessor is most likely due to the active involvement in the field of CSOs. However, the positive view is not shared by the rest of the assessors.

Subcategory 3: Decentralization

The overarching question (Q13S, Q81L) asks: 'Are the decisions taken at governmental level the most appropriate for the people affected?' All twenty-four respondents answered the question. The highest mark is 10; the lowest is 2. The mean is 5.1, which is close to the most frequent mark.

Table 8.3: Level of Decisions

Mark	Frequency	Percent
0	1	4.2
1	1	4.2
2	2	8.3
3	2	8.3
4	2	8.3
5	9	37.5
6	1	4.2
7	1	4.2
8	4	16.7
10	1	4.2
Total	24	100
Mean	5.1	

The question takes it for granted the decentralisation is good, irrespective of the size of a given country. The underlying assumption is flawed. For instance, decisions to provide services will depend on budgets. When funds are tight, councils reduce or cease to provide services. One example to illustrate the point in the UK is the collection of rubbish, which used to happen every week. However, councils changed that to once every two weeks, which caused some fears concerning the impact on sanitation. Moreover, the quality of services provided by local authorities may not be as good as when they are provided centrally. As regards Jordan, there are municipal councils, but they may not be able to take the decisions that affect their areas. The councils are at times appointed; at other times they are elected. Therefore, there is no consistency in this regard.

This question also assumes that decentralisation is universally welcome. There are good arguments for decentralisation, but a plan to decentralise government was vehemently rejected in Jordan. It was introduced in 2009 by the Prime Minister, Nader al-Dhahabi. The plan divided the country into three regions: northern, central, and southern. However, it faced opposition from all sides, including the MB/IAF, because it was considered part of a bigger plan to resolve the Palestinian question. After the strength of opposition was appreciated, King ʿAbdullah II signalled in May 2009 that the plan would be implemented at the governorate level instead.

In the long questionnaire, all six assessors answered the question. The marks given are 1, 2, 2, 4, 5, and 6. The mean is 3.3, which is substantially lower than the mean in

the short questionnaire. The two groups agree that the decisions are not taken at the appropriate level. The tendency in Jordan is for central authorities to make decisions, but to expect implementation to take place locally. Also, the government intervened in the work of local councils through appointments. In 2001, the government forced councils to merge. In 2011, the government of Maʿruf al-Bakhit implemented a selective demerger which caused protests in some municipalities to demand separation. The Prime Minister, ʿAwn al-Khasawneh, who succeeded al-Bakhit, calmed the situation by setting a deadline for applications to demerge.

PART 2: DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE STATE

This is the fourth and final major category in the democratic audit. It examines the external influences on democracy in Jordan as well as Jordan's influence abroad in support of democracy in other countries.

Subcategory 1: External Influences on Jordan

The overarching question (Q14S, Q85L) asks: 'Is the impact of external influences broadly supportive of the country's democracy?' Twenty-three respondents answered the question. The lowest mark is 0 and the highest is 10. The mean is 4.8.

Table 8.4: External Influences

Mark	Frequency	Percent
0	2	8.3
1	2	8.3
2	3	12.5
3	1	4.2
4	1	4.2
5	3	12.5
6	5	20.8
7	2	8.3
8	1	4.2
9	1	4.2
10	2	8.3
Total	23	95.8
Missing	1	4.2
Total	24	100
Mean	4.8	

Jordan has been allied with Western powers since its inception; first with the UK, then with the US and the West generally. Ostensibly, the external influence of the

UK, EU, and US is supportive of democracy in Jordan. For instance, under the heading of 'Democracy and Governance' USAID outlined in 2005 its achievements in Jordan in the following terms:

> USAID's programs focus on increasing judicial independence and accountability, expanding civic participation, improving governance, and enhancing local-level decision-making authority. As a result, 100 percent of Jordan's civil courts have been automated. Programs also fuel a demand for democratic reform by promoting independent media, representative political parties, free and fair elections, an engaged civil society, and support for gender equality and human rights. For example, USAID supported the development of a new community radio station in Karak and provides training and organizational support to all community stations in the country.

In the same year (2005), USAID identified five priorities: 'legislative strengthening', which aimed to provide MPs with training; 'rule of law', which aimed to provide judges with training; media liberalization; improving the status of women; and increasing civic participation.

Various NGOs in Jordan have close cooperation with other foreign foundations, such as the German Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, and Sisterhood is Global Institute (SIGI). Research centres in Jordan, such as al-Urdun al-Jadid and al-Quds Centre for Political Studies, work with these and similar organisations. The local societies and centres which establish good contacts with foreign organisations do well in terms of having financial resources to organise conferences and publish reports and books. Nonetheless, foreign funding is not entirely welcome in Jordan. Critics of individuals or local NGOs mention the issue of foreign funding.

In the long questionnaire, all six assessors answered the question. The marks are 2, 2, 4, 6, 7, and 7. The mean is 4.7. The assessment of the six respondents is similar to that by the respondents to the short questionnaire.

There are benefits in programmes that seek to help women, manage scarce water resources better, and other initiatives. However, the overall impact on the nature of political system is limited. Government, whether in Jordan or elsewhere, will not be receptive to initiatives that can be seen to have overt political goals.

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Although the above-mentioned influences are supportive of democracy, there are other external counter-influences, namely in relation to the war on terror and the peace process in the Middle East. In 2006, Amnesty International described Jordan as a 'key hub' in a secret American programme known as 'rendition'. This entails holding individuals without a legal arrest procedure; the transfer of such individuals from one country to another; and the use of torture to extract confessions.

Subcategory 2: Jordan's Impact Abroad

The overarching question (Q15S, Q90L) asks: 'Do the country's international policies contribute to strengthening global democracy?' Twenty-two respondents answered the question. The highest mark is 10; the lowest is zero. The mean is 4.9.

Table 8.5: Democratic Impact Abroad

Mark	Frequency	Percent
0	1	4.2
1	3	12.5
2	2	8.3
3	1	4.2
4	4	16.7
5	1	4.2
6	3	12.5
7	3	12.5
9	2	8.3
10	2	8.3
Total	22	91.7
Missing	2	8.3
Total	24	100
Mean	4.9	

The notion of 'global democracy' implied in the question is explained by Held (2000, p. 28) who has argued that 'the nature and prospects of the democratic polity need re-examination'. His justification is based on the premise that 'we live in a complex interconnected world'. Therefore, he argues, 'a democratic order can no longer be simply defended as an idea suitable to a particular closed political community or nation-state'. Moreover the question becomes ironic when it is related to a country which is not democratic itself. However, the intention here is not to dispute the premise of the question, but to present the data and discuss it.

Jordan's foreign policy has been a contentious domestic issue throughout Jordan's history. For instance, in the 1950s, the Baghdad Pact was one issue which led to disturbances in the country. The views of the people do not usually shape the foreign policy decisions. Adab al-Suʿūd, a former MP (women quota, 2003) explains that 'the foreign policy is the prerogative of the king'.[2] One issue of contention is peace with Israel, and the peace treaty of Wadi ʿAraba (1994). The calls for the abrogation of this treaty have not ceased.

The foreign policy of Jordan towards some issues, such as the ones mentioned above, do not necessarily reflect popular sentiments. However, on one occasion, the foreign policy towards Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait in 1989 was synchronous for a while. King Hussein attempted to reach an Arab solution for the crisis. Demonstrations of support for Iraq were allowed. However, the time given by the US to reach an Arab solution was very short, and a summit in Cairo undermined King Hussein's endeavours. He was treated with hostility by the West. The episode demonstrates that it does not matter how friendly an Arab ruler has been with Western powers. If at any point a ruler's position is not synchronous with theirs, the friendliness will turn into hostility, and no friend is indispensable.

If, as suggested earlier, Jordan pursues a foreign policy without it being a reflection of domestic sentiment, a pressing question will be why the foreign policy towards Iraq was in line with popular sentiments. Had King Hussein disregarded popular feelings, it would not have been the first time. Moreover, it was often suggested that following the wish of the people led Jordan to enter the war of 1967 with Israel without being convinced it was the right move. Consequently, Jordan lost the West Bank. Analytically speaking, not following the popular sentiments in relation to Iraq would have been a reasonable position, because invading Kuwait could not be justified. The invasion was an unacceptable way to settle a dispute between two Arab countries. Moreover, the Arabs have argued against the Israeli occupation for many years on the basis that acquiring land by force contravenes international law.

King Hussein's policy was often explained on the basis that Jordan had been receiving free oil from Iraq, and that Iraq relied heavily on Jordan for its imports and exports during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Another factor can better explain

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[2] Personal interview. Amman, 7 June 2009.

Jordan's policy towards Iraq at the time. As Ṭaher al-Maṣri explains, King Hussein 'developed a close relationship with Saddam Hussein, whom King Hussein visited many times, and praised him to Jordanian officers as being an Arab knight'.[3] Jordan's relationship with the US and other Western countries deteriorated. The Gulf states withheld financial assistance they used to give to Jordan. King Hussein started the process of extricating himself from the situation, especially after a visit to Iraq during which Saddam Hussein spoke to the king about Allah being on Iraq's side. King Hussein is reported to have said to his aides, 'since matters are that bad, let us go home'.

King Hussein started to repair the damaged relations. With regard to Iraq, Jordan changed tact, and went as far as receiving the defecting relatives of Saddam Hussein; a step that was thought to lead to the collapse of the regime in Iraq. In relation to peace with Israel, the Oslo Agreement removed all obstacles from Jordan's way to reach formal peace with Israel. Once the PLO was willing to strike a deal with Israel, Arab states found a reason to say that they could not be more Palestinian than the Palestinians themselves.

As the former Prime Minister, Ṭaher al-Maṣri, explains, 'King Hussein went to the other extreme, especially in relation to the peace treaty with Israel and the steps taken to normalise relations with it'. While his supporters were able to understand the need to reach a peace treaty, they did not feel it was necessary to engage in quick normalisation, especially because the people of Jordan were not only opposed to normalisation, but also to the peace treaty itself.[4]

In the long questionnaire, the six assessors answered the question. The marks given are 0, 1, 2, 2, 5, and 6. The mean is 2.7, which is substantially lower than the mean of marks in the short questionnaire.

If one were to treat Iraq as a case where democracy was in need of strengthening after the American invasion in 2003, it would be possible to suggest that Jordan did contribute to strengthening democracy, particularly in allowing Iraqi expatriates to vote in the elections which were held after the removal of Saddam Hussein.

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[3] Personal interview. Amman, 4 January 2009.
[4] Personal interview. Amman, 4 January 2009.

In the case of Palestine, Jordan followed the line of Western powers by preferring to deal with Mahmoud ʿAbbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority. As al-Maʿayta (2008, pp. 11-13) explains, 'this is due to the fact that King ʿAbdullah II does not have the personal contact his father had with the leaders of the MB. Moreover, the new king made it clear that Jordan has no ambitions in the West Bank and does not compete with the PLO for influence'.

Conclusion

The chapter has presented and discussed the data of two broad categories of the democratic audit. The first was civil society and popular participation. There were three subcategories within it: the media in a democratic society; political participation; and decentralization. The averages of the marks were between slightly over three to a little over five out of ten. The other broad category was democracy beyond the state which had two subcategories: external influences on the country's democracy; and the country's democratic impact abroad. The averages of marks were between slightly less than three and a little more than five.

This chapter concludes the macro-analysis of the state of democracy in Jordan. It is now fair to note that the macro-assessment suggests that Jordanians are dissatisfied. The assessment, however, has a more detailed part, which will be outlined and discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 9

Democratic Audit: Microanalysis

This chapter widens the scope of the assessment by examining more of the data collected in the long questionnaire, which has ninety questions. The limit on the word count of the thesis restricts one's ability to go through all questions in detail. Therefore, I propose to cover two questions from each subcategory: the questions with the highest and lowest means. If there is a tie, I include the questions which tie. Consequently, more than thirty questions will be covered. Discussions of the questions will not go into the same depth of detail as before both for reasons of space and due to some overlap.[1]

Category 1: Citizenship, Law, and Rights

This part consists of four subcategories: nationhood and citizenship (1.1); rule of law and access to justice (1.2); civil and political rights (1.3); and economic and social rights (1.4).

Subcategory 1.1

There are seven questions in this subcategory. The highest mean, 7.7, belongs to question 1.1.2: 'How far cultural differences are acknowledged, and how well are minorities and vulnerable social groups protected?' All six assessors answered the questions. The marks given are 5, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 10.

The cultural differences that can be identified in Jordan are between Muslim and Christian; Palestinian-Jordanian; urban, fellah, and bedouin; and Arab-nonArab.

The cultures of Muslims and Christians in Jordan are largely similar. The religious practices differ, but the common factors such as language and sharing the same geographical roots compensate for these differences. Moreover, cultural differences between Palestinians and Jordanians are hard to discern as both are members of one culture: the Arab/Muslim. The cultural difference between urban, fellah, and bedouin

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[1] Referring to data of the full questionnaire (appendix 2) will make this chapter easier to follow.

are in minor areas, such as costumes and pronunciation of the same Arabic words. With education and urbanisation, these differences have been disappearing.

There are Circassian and Chechen communities in Jordan. Though they strive to retain a distinctive identity, they share the religion of the majority in the country. Both communities settled in Amman and Zarqa long before the State of Jordan was established. A Circassian leader, Saʿid al-Mufti, received Amir ʿAbdullah in Amman in 1921. The palace guards in Amman don Circassian costumes. It is fair to say the Circassian and Chechen communities do not suffer from discrimination. Some of them managed to hold high posts in the government. Ministers of Circassian origin serve in government posts often. The Circassian and Chechen communities have a quota in the HoD: two seats for the residents of Amman and one seat for Zarqa. When the borders of constituencies in Amman were redrawn in 2010, there were calls for increasing their representation.

Three other minorities exist in Jordan: the Armenians, Kurds, and Druze. According to al-Khatib and al-Ali (2005, pp. 12-13), there are about 30,000 Kurds in Jordan. Moreover, they are 'nearly completely integrated' into society. They have no quota in the HoD. The number of Armenians in Jordan is estimated at 3,000-5,000. They are Christians. A neighbourhood in Amman is named after them. They also have no quota in the HoD. The Druze are estimated at 18,000 and their biggest concentration is in al-Azraq area. They are considered Muslims in official statistics.[2]

Another minority is that of Roma, referred to in Jordan as 'nawar', which is also a term of abuse when a person refers to another as such. Gharaybeh (2010) has called for their integration in the Jordanian society. In an article discussing their rights and duties, he points out that they live in poorly made tents on the edges of the cities. They resort to begging. Gharaybeh says some of the Roma have integrated themselves into society, and some of their young people observe Muslim practices. However, they face discrimination especially when it comes to marriage, and they are treated with contempt. Gharaybeh calls for the creation of an authority to look after the Roma, and follow the example of countries that made efforts to settle them. Gharaybeh correctly observes that it is not right that after ninety years of creating

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[2] These numbers are based on estimates that vary from one source to another. There are also some Bahai's and Turkmen in Jordan.

Jordan, the Roma continue to live in squalid conditions at the margins of society. A leader in the Roma community, Fat<u>hi</u> ibn ʿAbdo, was a candidate in the elections of 2010. However, he did not win.

There are three other groups in Jordan that deserve a mention although they do not have citizenship: the Iraqis, Egyptians, and migrant domestic workers (MDW). The number of Iraqis swelled in Jordan especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Jordanian Department of Statistics estimated their number to be 481,000 in 2007. The number of Iraqis has been fluid because Jordan is a stop on their way to another destination, or a temporary home until conditions improve in Iraq. They either return to Iraq when circumstances change, or they move on to other countries.

The second group is the Egyptian workers, who in 2009, were about 300,000 working in construction, agriculture, and services (such as in restaurants). Their numbers are reduced every year because of stricter requirements concerning work permits. Moreover, for a worker to bring his family, a bond of JD500 must be posted, and the children must be registered at schools. The third category is the MDWs. In November 2008, Amnesty International published a report which highlighted their isolation, abuse, and denial of rights. In September 2011, HRW released a report which indicated that there were more than 100,000 domestic workers: 40,000 from Indonesia, 30,000 from Sri Lanka, and 28,000 form Philippines. The report said: 'A combination of deceit, debt, isolation, and lack of support disempowered MDWs and prevented them from seeking their rights' (p. 6).

The lowest mean, 3.8, in subcategory 1.1 belongs to question 1.1.5: 'How impartial and inclusive are the procedures for amending the constitution?' All six assessors answered the questions. The marks are 2, 3, 3, 5, 5, and 5.

The amendment of the constitution requires a two-third majority in the HoD plus the approval of the king. Jordan's constitution was amended in 1952 to give more power to the government and to take into account the merger with the West Bank. As Bani Salameh explained (2011), 'the constitution of 1952 was amended twenty-nine times', all at the request of the executive branch of government.[3] In 1958, it was amended to change the person who would preside over the supreme council, a body

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[3] The study was republished in part or whole in Jordanian news sites. The website arabellanews republished the full version, and indicated that it was originally published in an Egyptian journal.

which has the right to look at the constitutionality of some issues and to try ministers. The chair of the council was changed from the most senior judge in the country to the speaker of the HoN. As Bani Salameh explained, this amendment 'changed the nature of the council from judicial to political, and damaged the judicial branch of government'. Another amendment approved in 1960 gave the king the right to extend the term of the parliament by two years.

The constitution was a major issue during the protests of 2010-2011 to demand reform. Some people demanded a return to the 1952 version. Others demanded amendments to the current version. The government relented in April 2011. A royal commission was formed to recommend amendments. In August 2011, forty-two recommendations were made, and subsequently approved rather quickly. They included the establishment of a constitutional court; the creation of an independent body to supervise the elections; and the reduction of government's powers to make provisional laws. Another amendment prevents Jordanian with dual nationalities from holding high office, such as membership in parliament or ministerial posts. Some members of the HoN stepped down as a result. The opposition groups, such as the MB/IAF, considered the changes to be unsubstantive.

Subcategory 1.2

There are seven questions in this subcategory. The highest mean, 6.2, belongs to question 1.2.5: 'How far do the criminal justice and penal systems observe due rules of impartial and equitable treatment in their operations?' All six assessors answered the question. The marks given are 3, 4, 7, 7, 8, and 8.

Defendants in Jordan are allowed to be represented by lawyers. A court will appoint a defence lawyer if a defendant does not have one. The major areas of deficiency in this regard are the use of state security courts and cases related to the exercise of freedoms—especially when the views expressed are critical of the government. Moreover, the tribal traditions have distorted the implementation of the law. Tribal pressures can force the government to take appeasing measures such as relocating relatives of an accused of murder. Another area of deficiency is the room for leniency allowed in the law in cases of honour killings. Although the leniency is restricted in the law to cases of being caught in the act, the application is broadened

and applies in cases of murder committed on mere, unfounded suspicion, or the protection of honour is used as a pretext.

The lowest mean, 5.2, in subcategory, 1.2, belongs to question 1.2.3: 'How independent are the courts and the judiciary from the executive, and how free are they from all kinds of interference?' The marks given in this regard are 3, 3, 5, 6, 6, and 8.

In theory, the judiciary is independent. The reality, however, is different. Judges started to express misgivings about their independence. In February 2011, about sixty judges in Jordan signed a letter to King ʿAbdullah II and requested improvements in their living conditions and benefits. The signatories called for the administrative and financial independence of the judiciary. The also wanted the Ministry of Justice to have no role in recommending the appointment of judges. In a committee hearing in the HoD, in March 2011, the Vice-Chairman of the Court of Appeal, Mahmoud al-Rashdan, justified subjecting judges to a test after ten years of service by saying it was a way to exclude some of the 'retarded judges'. He later issued an apology.

Subcategory 1.3

There are five questions in this subcategory. The highest mean, 7.8, belongs to question 1.3.3: 'How secure is the freedom for all to practise their own religion, language or culture?' The marks given in this regard are 3, 8, 8, 9, 9, and 10.

The freedom to practise religion is enjoyed by Muslims. The Christians also practise their religion freely. However, building churches in Jordan requires permission. Also, missionaries are not allowed to operate in the country. Although Christians are free to practise their religion, no Christian has been selected to become prime minister or chief of the army. Muslims and Christians share the Arabic language. The Circassian and Chechen communities have their own languages, but Arabic is now a first language for them, having lived in the region form decades. Although people who renounce Islam are punishable by death if they do not re-embrace Islam, apostasy cases are not known in Jordan. In contrast, apostasy law was put into use in Egypt, most famously in the case of Nasr Hamed Abu Zaid. Although the mark of 10 above is too generous, the mark of three is too low. The mean is closer to reality.

The lowest mean, 4.3, in this subcategory belongs to question 1.3.2: 'How effective and equal is the protection of the freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly?' The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 3, 3, 6, 6, and 6.

Freedom of movement internally is not restricted unless it is sanctioned by a court order which may require a person to report to a police station daily or at certain periods of time. Travel abroad can be restricted by confiscating passports. This was a widely used practice.

The freedom of expression is restricted as has been outlined in the macro-analysis. It can be restricted for political and religious reasons. Whether in the form of poetry, memoirs, or others types, books can be banned and their authors tried. In some cases, courts do not agree with the ban, such as the case of a book by Khalil al-Biss, whose memoirs were banned in September 2008.

Jordan has professional associations for doctors, engineers, lawyers, and others. They share a headquarters in Amman. Membership is mandatory in order to practise in these and other professional fields. The government made attempts to audit their accounts, and to make membership voluntary. However, these associations repeatedly asserted their independence. Before political parties became legal in the country, they provided the platform for political opposition in Jordan. Trade unions also exist in Jordan. However, they did not have the same high profiles of the professional associations.

For many years, the government opposed the creation of a union for teachers. However, the teachers actively campaigned for a union, especially since 2009. They organised marches and went on unofficial strikes on occasions. In 2010, they managed to force the Minister of Education, Ibrahim Badran, to resign after making disparaging remarks about the teachers' appearance and their attire. This happened when the government officials were still resisting the call to form a union. The teachers won the right to form a union, and a law to that effect was promulgated in September 2011. The success of teachers in forming a union prompted some university teachers to meet to form an association. In June 2011, a committee submitted an application to the Minister of Higher Education, Wajīh 'Eways, who forwarded it to the office of the prime minister for consideration.

Freedom of assembly is still restricted. Rallies must have permissions from the governors who can decline without giving reasons. Weekly demonstrations on Fridays became common in different parts of the country. In March 2011, a sit-in by youth in the square known as the Ministry of Interior Roundabout was broken up after three days. This was done by thugs, but in the presence of police.[4] One man died. The government insisted he was not killed, but had a heart attack. In July 2011, a symbolic march towards Palestine was also broken up with force near the town of South Shuna. More than twenty of the participants were wounded.

Subcategory 1.4

This subcategory has seven questions. The highest mean, 7, belongs to question 1.4.4: 'How extensive and inclusive is the right to education, including education in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship?' The marks given by the six assessors are 4, 5, 7, 8, 8, and 10.

The right to education is extensive. The government offers twelve years of free education. The curriculum in the final year of secondary education includes a course which focuses on general knowledge. It covers history and old and modern issues. If one takes into account the fights that erupt at universities and between tribes, it is fair to say that the culture of rights and responsibilities of citizenship is weak.

The lowest mean, 5, in this subcategory belongs to question 1.4.5: 'How free are trade unions and other work-related associations to organize and represent their members' interests?' The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 4, 5, 6, 6, and 7.

As mentioned before, the government opposed the creation of a union for teachers. A union for university lecturers is still in the application stage. In the last several years, however, employees have been asserting their rights. Going on strike as a form of industrial action was rare. Now strikes are a common occurrence in the private and public sectors.

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[4] The official name is Gamal Abdel Nasser Square. It is one of the busiest intersections in Amman.

Category 2: Representative and Accountable Government

This part of the long questionnaire consists of six subcategories: free and fair elections (2.1); the democratic role of political parties (2.2); effective and responsive government (2.3); the democratic effectiveness of parliament (2.4); civilian control of the military and police (2.5); and integrity in public life (2.6).

Subcategory 2.1

This subcategory has six questions. The highest mean, 4.8, belongs to question 2.1.3: 'How fair are the procedures for the registration of candidates and parties, and how far is there fair access for them to the media and other means of communication with the voters?' The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 4, 4, 5, 7, and 7.

The registration of candidates does not seem to raise concerns. The cases of rejecting applications to run in elections are few. The procedure for registering parties is heavily regulated. A party must have a minimum number of members in several governorates. Access to official broadcast media, particularly TV, is limited. There was some improvement in discussion programmes, which started to invite figures from the opposition, such as Rohile Gharaybeh. In January 2011, Jordanian TV organised an unprecedented debate between Deputy PM, Ayman al-Ṣafadi, and IAF Secretary General, Ḥamza Manṣūr. Organising the debate deserved credit, but the debate itself was badly managed. Al-Safadi tended to dominate the discussion.

Parties communicate with people through rallies organised on various occasions. During elections times, parties set up tents, distribute leaflets, and hang banners. They also hold press conferences which are usually covered by the daily newspapers. They also use the Internet to disseminate information. A daily newspaper, *Assabeel*, reflects the views of the MB/IAF. Overall, however, the media, primarily radio and TV, do not allocate parties air time to broadcast a message, as is the case in the UK.

The lowest mean, 2.8, in this subcategory belongs to question 2.1.1: 'How far is appointment to governmental and legislative office determined by popular competitive election, and how frequently do elections lead to change in the governing parties or personnel?' The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 2, 3, 3, 3, and 4.

There is no room for better marks in this subcategory. The governmental positions are filled by appointment, not elections. Membership of the upper house of parliament is also by appointment. As of 1989, elections started to be held to elect members of the HoD. There should have been elections every four years, but the round scheduled for 2001 was postponed until 2003. The HoD can be dissolved by the king anytime, without giving reasons, as happened in November 2009. None of the rounds of elections enabled a party to form a government.

Subcategory 2.2

This subcategory has six questions. The highest mean, 5, belongs to question 2.2.1: 'How freely are parties able to form and recruit members, engage with the public and campaign for office?' The marks given by the six assessors are 3, 5, 5, 5, 5, and 7.

Although parties are legal, membership is weak. This can be attributed to their ineffectiveness, but in the current climate, it is hard to envisage how they can be more effective. I suggest that weak membership is not only the result of ineffectiveness. There is an element of distrust in the government. Older citizens still remember when parties were banned in the fifties. Members of parties used to be persecuted. They were encouraged, if not forced, to publish statements in newspapers to renounce their party membership and denounce the party they belonged to as destructive (haddam). It is conceivable that should the government decide at one stage that parties are to be banned, old ways will be reintroduced.

The lowest mean, 0.3 (less than 1), in subcategory 2.2 belongs to question 2.2.2: 'How effective is the party system in forming and sustaining governments in office?' Five of the six assessors gave zero, and one gave 2, which is very low.

This is a damning assessment. Parties do not change governments, or sustain them in office. The king appoints them and keeps them in office. He also dismisses them whenever he wishes. Governments with short lives are common in Jordan. For example, the governments of ʿAdnan Badran, Samir al-Refaʿi, and Maʿruf al-Bakhit did not survive for long. The last government formed before the submission of this thesis was that of ʿAwn al-Khasawneh, who was a judge in the International Criminal Court (ICC). He engaged in some political consultations before forming his government, but there was little to distinguish it from previous ones.

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Subcategory 2.3

This subcategory has seven questions. The highest mean, 3.8, belongs to question 2.3.4: 'How accessible and reliable are public services for those who need them, and how systematic is consultation with users over service delivery?' Five assessors answered the question. The marks given are 2, 3, 3, 5, and 6.

Jordan always had a mix of private and public sectors. However, a programme of privatisation implemented in 1996 meant that the government was no longer in control of water supplies, electricity, and telecommunications, inter alia. The government also managed transport, which relied on fleets of buses. The private sector is now a major player in this arena.

Public and private sectors provide health services. Private hospitals are now thriving. The government offers its employees health cover schemes which provide services at reduced rates. Free health services are provided for the poor who receive assistance from the government at some of its clinics, such as al-Bashir Hospital in Amman.

Consultations with users are rare. For example, Jordanians rely on shared transport, such as buses or multi-passenger taxis (known in Jordan as *sarvīs*). These vehicles had for years known terminals: one is the Raghadan complex and the other al-ʿAbdali. However, in the name of developing them, the government moved the parking lots to less convenient locations. One impact of the change was weakening the business activities in the old areas. Also, the trip to downtown Amman has to be done in two stages.

The lowest mean, 1.8, in this subcategory belongs to question 2.3.5: 'How comprehensive and effective is the right of access for citizens to government information under the constitution or other laws?' The marks given by five of the six assessors are 0, 1, 2, 2, and 4.

The constitution does not stipulate that citizens have a right of access to government information. However, in 2007 Jordan enacted a freedom of information law. In November 2010, Majdulin ʿAllan, published a report on the law, coinciding with its third anniversary. She outlined the difficulties faced by those who seek to use the law. The reporter herself asked the office of the prime minister to see the minutes of

the cabinet meetings in relation to a plan adopted in 2007 to build a casino in Jordan. This was a controversial plan which was abandoned at a cost to Jordan for cancelling the contract. The answer she received stated that there were no minutes.

ʿAllan also resorted to courts to order the Department of Land Registry to release information about the transfer of ownership of state land. She sought to know to whom the land was transferred and at what price. The court, however, said the reporter was not eligible to receive the requested information for she was not recognised as a journalist because she was not a member of the Jordanian Press Association (JPA). The reporter then re-applied for a court order as a citizen.

Moreover, ʿAllan's report indicated that the second application to the court was still being considered. However, this issue proved controversial and subsequently snowballed. The royal court could not ignore it anymore. Officials from the palace met journalists in 2011 and revealed the facts in relation to the transfer and how the pieces of land were used.

Subcategory 2.4

This subcategory has nine questions. The highest mean, 5.5, belongs to question 2.4.7: 'How accessible are elected representatives to their constituents?' The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 3, 6, 7, 7, and 8.

The access itself is not a big problem because the social relationships prevailing in Jordan provide the means for personal contact. This would explain why some assessors gave relatively high marks. However, MPs do not have surgeries in their constituencies, such as the case in the UK. Therefore, the contact between MPs and members of their constituencies is not systemic. This would probably explain why some assessors gave low marks.

The lowest mean, 2.3, in this subcategory belongs to two questions. The first is 2.4.3: 'How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament or legislature to oversee the executive and hold it to account?' The marks given by the six assessors are 0, 0, 3, 3, 3, and 5.

The powers of the parliament are limited. It has no control over its own fate. It can be dissolved by the king without giving a reason. Therefore, its powers are neither

extensive nor effective. In the first parliament after the elections of 1989, there was a promising start. The HoD had its way when its views differed with King Hussein's on the issue of right of appeal from the decisions of the state security court. Subsequent parliaments were tame. The government of Samir al-Refaʿi sought the confidence of the HoD in 2011. It received 111 votes out of 120 (almost 93%), which turned the HoD into a subject for ridicule. Al-Refaʿi formed a government twice; the first lasted less than a year, whilst the second lasted less than six months. His successor Maʿruf al-Bakhit formed a new government in February 2011; however, it was gone in October the same year.

The lowest mean of 2.3 is also shared by question 2.4.6: 'How extensive are the procedures of the parliament or legislature for consulting the public and relevant interests across the range of its work?' The marks given by the six assessors are 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, and 5.

As already indicated, parliament has limited power. The king can dissolve it without giving reasons. The government drafts laws, and the most parliament can do is to scrutinise such laws. When parliament is not in session, the government takes advantage of the opportunity to enact provisional laws. When parliament reconvenes, the government asks it to approve them to become permanent laws. Neither parliament nor government consults the public on relevant interests. Views on proposed laws are expressed in newspapers. However, this does not qualify as consultation.

Subcategory 2.5

This subcategory has four questions. The highest mean, 8.7, belongs to question 2.5.4: 'How free is the country from the operation of paramilitary units, private armies, war lords and criminal mafias?' The marks given by the six assessors are 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, and 10.

This is highest mean in the entire questionnaire. It was only between 1967 and 1971 that Jordan experienced the presence of organisations which challenged the authority of the regime, when Palestinian factions chose Jordan as a base to resist the Israeli occupation. This situation led to frequent clashes which culminated in those of September 1970. Moreover, in 1971, there was further fighting which resulted in the

expulsion of all armed Palestinian forces from Jordan. Since then, Jordan has kept a tight control over the domestic situation. Jordan does not have any of the phenomena referred to in this question, which apply more to other countries such as Lebanon and Somalia (paramilitary units); Iraq (American private army); Afghanistan (warlords); and Columbia (criminal mafias).

The lowest mean, 3, in this subcategory belongs to question 2.5.1: 'How effective is civilian control over the armed forces, and how free is political life from military involvement?' The marks given by the six assessors are 0, 0, 2, 3, 5, and 8.

The supreme commander of the military is the king. A civilian defence minister is also in charge, but the real power is in the hands of the king, not the civilian minister. Control over the army is effective in the sense that it is a professional army which acts when given orders. The concern about the interference of the military in political life stems from using members of the military to vote in certain constituencies to influence the results of elections. The government says in this regard that members of the military exercise their right to vote; the opposition says that members of the military are used en masse and provided with means of transport.

The other form of interference in the political life comes from the GID. Although strictly speaking it is not 'the military' as envisaged in the question, it is a military-like department and is run as such. The interference of the GID is pervasive. Reducing its role in political life was sought by ʿAwn al-Khasawneh, who made it known that it was his aim to restore the government's powers that were appropriated over the years by the GID and royal court.

Subcategory 2.6

This subcategory has six questions. The highest mean, 3.3, belongs to question 2.6.1: 'How effective is the separation of public office from the personal business and family interests of office holders?' The marks given by the six assessors are 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, and 8.

In theory, rules of separation exist, but their enforcement is another matter. In July 2011, the Jordanian daily, *al-Ghad*, detailed a case of conflict of interest in relation to a housing project which was given the name 'decent living' (ʿaysh karīm). The

Ministry of Public Works was put in charge of implementing the project in 2008. The minister at the time was Sahl al-Majali. When bids for building apartments were invited, two were received: one from a company owned by the armed forces; the other by a consortium which included a company owned by the minister himself. When the proposals were considered, the Accounting Office noticed the conflict of interest. The matter was raised in a letter. Bureaucratic manoeuvres, however, circumvented the objection, and the consortium won the tender. In February 2011, the government referred the project to the ACC for investigation.

The lowest mean, 2.5, in this subcategory belongs to question 2.6.3: 'How far do the rules and procedures for financing elections, candidates and elected representatives prevent their subordination to sectional interests?' The marks given by the six assessors are 0, 2, 2, 3, 3, and 5.

Candidates finance their own campaigns if they are not affiliated with parties. Therefore, the wealthier candidates can spend as much as they can afford. Vote buying has been mentioned a great deal during elections, despite it being illegal. The term 'political money' surfaced in Jordan during the elections of 2007. It has been used in Lebanon in relation to Rafiq al-Hariri, who gained leadership through the use of money, by assisting the poor or giving employment in institutions he owns. The Jordanian columnist, Ahmad Abu Khalil (2010), suggested that the definition of 'political money' should be widened to include funds provided by embassies and foreign NGOs to spend on activities they sponsor, such as conferences and training. Money given by charities to the needy during elections with a recommendation to vote for a particular party should count as political money, he suggested.

The subordination to sectional interests can be seen in two ways. First, when a tribe chooses one candidate for the HoD. In this case, the candidate will endeavour to return the favour. The other way is that pro-regime candidates are assisted behind the scenes by the GID. Therefore, when these candidates win, they vote according to the wishes of the GID and government. When 111 MPs out of 120 gave the government of Samir al-Refaʿi their confidence, it was a sign that they did not act spontaneously.

Category 3: Civil Society and Popular Participation

This part of the long questionnaire consists of three subcategories: the media in a democratic society (3.1); political participation (3.2); decentralization (3.3).

Subcategory 3.1

This subcategory has six questions. The highest mean, 4.5, belongs to question 3.1.5: 'How free are private citizens from intrusion and harassment by the media?' The marks given by the six assessors are 3, 4, 4, 4, 5, and 7.

This is one assessment which I am unable to agree with. The editorial standards of some of the weekly magazines and the new media are not high. If the government disapproves of views expressed by individuals, its supporters write against the views and those who expressed them. I am not aware of a case of a media pack following a celebrity, or camping at the doorsteps of someone's house. That Jordan has not known these phenomena does not imply it will not someday in the future. It is more than likely that these phenomena will come to Jordan, especially that the obsession with celebrity is widespread worldwide.

The lowest mean, 2.7, in this subcategory belongs to question 3.1.4: 'How free are journalists from restrictive laws, harassment and intimidation?' The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 2, 2, 3, 3, and 4.

The Jordanian Centre for Defending Freedom of Journalists (CDFJ) published a report on the state of press freedoms in 2007. The report documented complaints reported to the CDFJ. The most frequent complaint (47 in 2007) concerned the prevention of journalists from covering newsworthy events. The journalists also complained about detention, beatings, and threats (pp. 115-139).

The reporter of al-Jazeera, Yasir Abu Hilaleh, was beaten on two occasions. The first in January 2009, when he was covering a demonstration in support of the people of Gaza who were under attack by Israeli forces for three weeks. While being hospitalised, Abu Hilaleh received a call from King ʿAbdullah II to enquire about his well-being. The second occasion was in July 2011 while he was covering a demonstration demanding reform in Jordan. He lost composure and threatened to

bring his tribe from Maʿan to burn half of Amman. This was used against him in the press and websites.

Moreover, in June 2011, the offices of the French News Agency (AFP) were attacked after the agency reported that the procession of King ʿAbdullah II was pelted with stones in Tafila. Randa Habib, the agency's bureau chief, was threatened. The royal court made a complaint to AFP against Habib, but the agency restated its confidence in her reporting.

When a rally was organised in the Palms Square in Amman in June 2011, the police advised journalists to wear reflective jackets. To their horror, they realised that this made them an easier target. In December 2011, the offices of the daily newspaper, *al-Ghad*, were attacked after the paper published a report about a ship carrying maze not fit for human consumption. The vessel was detained at the Port of Aqaba to investigate the matter. However, it was allowed to leave before the investigation was completed.

Subcategory 3.2

This subcategory has four questions. The highest mean, 5, belongs to question 3.2.4: 'How equal is access for all social groups to public office, and how fairly are they represented?' The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 5, 5, 5, 6, and 7.

Public office is open through patronage and loyalty, not through competition. Different social groups benefit through this route. However, there is now a class which supplies the government with high-ranking officials, from families such as the Touqan, to tribes such as al-Majali. When a government is formed, attempts are made to satisfy different regions and tribes.

The lowest mean, 3, in this subcategory belongs to question 3.2.1: 'How extensive is the range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements etc. and how independent are they from government?' The marks given by the six assessors are 0, 2, 2, 3, 5, and 6.

The diversity of voluntary organisations improved dramatically during the twenty years under assessment. However, the most prosperous are the ones supportive of the government's line. Members of the royal household participate in voluntary

organisations, often as honorary presidents. This brings benefits to the organisations, such as funding and media interest, but limits their independence.

Subcategory 3.3

This subcategory has four questions. The highest mean, 3.7, belongs to question 3.3.3: 'How extensive is the cooperation of government at the most local level with relevant partners, associations and communities in the formation and implementation of policy, and in service provision?' The marks given by the six assessors are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7.

In a study of participation of civil society in the programme to reform the public sector, Musa Shtaiwi (2006?) suggested that participation and consultation of citizens occurred through several mechanisms. For instance, the government might seek the views of a professional association, or assign seats to CSOs on certain bodies, such as the one in charge of social security, whose council has four seats reserved for workers and four for employers. Another way to consult is by creating special bodies, such as the National Committee for Women Affairs, which recommended a quota for women in the HoD. Shtaiwi also points out that CSOs make their views known through media campaigns, protests, workshops, and conferences.

The mechanisms and patterns of consultation identified by Shtaiwi amount to limited consultations, and appeared to be elitist in most cases. If one recalled the plan to divide Jordan into regions, and the hostility with which it was met, one would have a typical example of the government's approach. It first devised a plan, and then it tried to sell it to the public. Sometimes a plan was abandoned, such as the case of regionalisation; at other times, a plan was imposed despite opposition, such as the case of merging municipalities in 2001.

I have searched for cases in which the government, or one of its departments, issued a consultation paper on a certain issue and specified a period of time to receive views on it from all interested groups, especially those who work at grassroots level. I was unable to locate a paper of this type. I suggest that the absence of consultation in this manner is a reason why the assessors gave low marks in response to this question.

The lowest mean, 2.3, in this subcategory belongs to question 3.3.2: 'How far are these levels of government [sub-central tiers of government] subject to free and fair electoral authorization, and to the criteria of openness, accountability and responsiveness in their operation?' The marks given by the six assessors are 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, and 7.

The governors of Jordan's governorates are appointed. The mayor of Amman is unelected. Municipal councils were elected at times, and appointed at others. The government resorted to appointing members of municipal councils instead of electing them. Consequently, that accountability will only be to the higher authorities, not to the public. The responsiveness will vary from one place to another, as this will depend of the management and conscientiousness of the individuals in charge.

Category 4: Democracy Beyond the State

This part of the long questionnaire consists of two subcategories: external influences on the country's democracy (4.1); and the country's democratic impact abroad (4.2).

Subcategory 4.1

This subcategory has four questions. The highest mean, 4.3, is shared by two questions. The first is 4.1.2: 'How equitable is the degree of influence exercised by the government within the bilateral, regional and international organizations to whose decisions it may be subject?' The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 3, 5, 5, 5, and 6.

Jordan has bilateral agreements with Arab countries. It is a member of the Arab League and UN. In bilateral agreements with Arab states, the influence will be mutually agreed. The Arab League is not known to be an effective body, especially in relation to agreements over political issues. At the UN, the influence will be similar to other developing countries. Permanent members of the UN Security Council have more influence than any other member state.

The other question which shares the highest mean of 4.3 in this subcategory is 4.1.3: 'How far are the government's negotiating positions and subsequent commitments

within these organizations subject to effective legislative oversight and public debate?' The marks given by the six assessors are 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 6.

The legislative oversight is limited when it exists, as has been stated repeatedly. Parliament can be dissolved anytime by the king without giving reasons. The public debate can take place whether the government wishes or not. If an issue was not debated in the press, it would be debated in the private sphere.

The lowest mean, 3.3, belongs to question 4.1.1: 'How free is the country from external influences which undermine or compromise its democratic process or national interests?' The marks given by the six assessors are 1, 2, 4, 4, 4, and 5.

There are external influences that supposedly promote democracy in Jordan through CSOs by organising conferences and training related to issues such as human rights, gender equality, and good governance. However, there are other influences which undermine reforms that can lead to a meaningful democratic process. The most influential factor is Jordan alliance with the US and the West. Jordan took upon itself to take part in the 'war on terror' and felt this was justified, especially after the hotel bombings in Amman in 2005. Whether this kind of external influence undermines the national interests depends on the perspective. The government considers its position to be in the national interest. The opposition thinks otherwise.

Subcategory 4.2

This subcategory has five questions. The highest mean, 7.3, belongs to question 4.2.2: 'How far does the government support the UN and agencies of international cooperation, and respect the rule of law internationally?' The marks given by the six assessors are 5, 6, 6, 7, 10, 10, and 10.

Jordan is respectful of UN resolutions, and is cooperative with various UN agencies. For instance, UNESCO and UNDP have offices in the country. Jordan also contributed forces to UN peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The size of the force varies from one region to another, and sometimes the involvement includes medical assistance. There are Jordanian forces in Afghanistan. The government considers this a contribution to peacekeeping and a form of assistance to a Muslim country.

However, people in opposition see it as involving Jordan in the American 'war on terror'. In 2010, a committee of ʿulamāʾ affiliated to IAF issued a fatwa which considered the participation of Muslim forces with NATO in the fighting in Afghanistan to be contrary to Islamic principles. The government and supporters reacted with anger. They insisted that the participation was part of peacekeeping and had a humanitarian purpose.

The lowest mean, 3, in this subcategory belongs to question 4.2.4: 'How far is the government's international policy subject to effective parliamentary oversight and public influence?' The marks given by the six assessors are 0, 1, 2, 3, 3, and 6.

The international policy is not subject to parliamentary supervision. The king plays an active role in Jordan's international policy. The government assists rather than initiates or supervises. The public influenced Jordan's policy towards Iraq for a limited period in 1990, as public sentiments were synchronous with King Hussein's desire to find an Arab solution to the crisis caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. His attempt failed. Jordan and King Hussein were ostracised for a while by the Gulf and Western states. He endeavoured to repair Jordan's damaged relations with them. The peace treaty with Israel in 1994 and the eagerness to normalise relationship with it were steps in that direction.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a more detailed assessment of the state of democracy in Jordan. The mean of marks in many cases was low. In addition, because Jordan lacked most of the features of the 'ideal' democratic system, as envisaged by the democratic audit, the discussion of the data contained what could be considered repetitive information. This was due to the design of the questionnaire, whose questions would benefit from a re-examination to see how the same questionnaire could be used to assess democratic and undemocratic countries.

However, the more detail assessment in this chapter was necessary to avoid basing the appraisal on fifteen questions only. Moreover, the detailed examination of the

state of democracy in Jordan provided the opportunity to recognise some positive features. There were means higher than seven, and one was close to nine. Without this detailed appraisal, these could not been identified. Although the assessment did not cover all the questions, the full data are available in the appendices.

After more than half of the questions from all the subcategories had been outlined and discussed, a fair picture of the state of democracy emerged: the system of government was not democratic after twenty years of 'the resumption of democratic life' in 1989. Therefore, the next chapter will discuss why democracy has not yet germinated in Jordan.

Chapter 10

Conclusions

In this concluding chapter, I examine why democracy has failed to take root in Jordan to date. I will outline several reasons often cited to explain the failure, and scrutinise the plausibility and limitations of each. I will then identify the reason that I consider the most plausible.

Characterising the Change in Jordan

The democratic audit presented and discussed in previous chapters had established that Jordan was not a democracy. Therefore, there remains one point to discuss: How can one describe the process that started in 1989? The most appropriate characterisation is that Jordan has undergone a process of liberalisation, according to the definitions theorised by Huntington (1993) and Martins (1993). The former defines liberalisation as a process that entails 'the partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive election' (p. 9). A state wishing to liberalise its system may 'open up some issues for public debate, [and] loosen censorship'. These, and other measures described by Huntington, have indeed taken place in Jordan.

In addition, Martin's definition of liberalisation applies to what happened in Jordan, namely 'the adoption of formal democratic institutions' without 'consensus concerning the rules of the [democratic] game, political accountability of the rulers, the right of ample political representation, and alternation of power' (1993, p. 88). The Jordanian government remains in charge of the 'rules of the game'. The elections law has continued to change without resulting in a system that is fair to all players. The government is also in charge of organising the elections, counting the votes, and announcing the results.

Moreover, political accountability to the people is limited at best. The king is considered above accountability, and the governments are accountable only to him. Political representation is restricted according to the wishes of the government. The number of Islamist candidates that should sit in the HoD, or the number of MPs that

should represent the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin is a matter decided by the government. No alternation of power has taken place in Jordan since 1989. Governments come and go at the discretion of the king.

Why democracy failed to take root in Jordan so far

I shall now examine several explanations reasons for the failure of democracy to take root in Jordan so far. I shall outline each explanation and assess its plausibility. In addition, I shall identify the most plausible amongst them.

1. Islam

This reason is based on the claim that democracy and Islam are incompatible for arguments outlined and discussed in chapter 2. The logic used to explain the failure is that Jordan is a Muslim majority state, and is ruled by a descendent of Prophet Muhammad. If Islam and democracy are incompatible, then it is inevitable that democracy will fail in Jordan.

This explanation is problematic because it overlooks other important factors: first and foremost, the Jordanian state was created on the British model—a monarchy but with a parliament, political parties, and a democratic system of government. Moreover, during the period of 1990-2010, there have been frequent references in Jordan to a 'democratic process'. Two points can be made in this regard. The first is to assume that the king and people of Jordan strictly follow Islam's teachings. If Islam is incompatible with democracy, the king would refrain from calling the process 'democratic'. Similarly, the people in Jordan would refrain from engaging in this process because it contradicts Islamic teachings. What actually happened was that the process was described as democratic, and an Islamic political party participated in it.

The second point is that strict adherence to Islamic teachings is not always possible. There are practices that can be introduced in a Muslim majority state despite arguments regarding their compatibility with Islam. Banking is a case in point, particularly banks which deals with interest on loans and savings. In both cases, interest is considered un-Islamic. However, banks operating in this manner have

existed in Jordan since its inception. Therefore, there is a need for further clarification.

The presence of these non-Islamic banks can be justified on two bases. One is that the economy cannot function without banks. In other words, there is an overriding need that justifies implementing a system that is considered incompatible with Islam. King Hussein talked about a 'democratic process' which implied that he saw no incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Otherwise, different terms would have been used, such as 'shura process,' or he would need to justify why it was necessary to launch a democratic process even though it is not compatible with Islam. Therefore, citing Islam as the reason for a lack of democracy in Jordan is unsound.

2. Islamism

The second reason suggested for the failure of democracy to take root is the ideology of Islamism. As discussed in chapter 2, Islamists are not believed to be committed to democracy. There are also concerns that they will change the democratic nature of the system if they come to power. This explanation of the failure, however, overlooks three facts.

First, the MB/IAF never managed to obtain a majority in parliament. Therefore, they were never in a position to change the political system or alter its democratic nature (which is non-existent). The representation of MB/IAF continued to decline, and they were therefore increasingly incapable of introducing changes. Second, the MB/IAF played by the rules of the democratic process; in other words, they accepted the outcome of elections, and did not replicate the Algerian example. The most drastic action they took to protest was to boycott the elections in 1997 and 2010 to persuade the government to introduce changes that would help democracy, not hinder it. Third, one can disagree with MB/IAF ideologically, but one cannot deny the fact that MB and IAF manage their affairs on a democratic basis, as has been demonstrated by Brown (2006). Therefore, if democracy is not good for Jordan, it will not be good for the MB/IAF. These reasons undermine the conclusion that Islamism in Jordan may be the reason why democracy failed to take root.

3. A State Dependent on Serving a Role

The failure of democracy in Jordan is explained by arguing that the state was formed in order to serve a role in the region. This role was to stem the French expansion in the area (Wilson 1988, p. 44); to be a sort of 'buffer' zone (Lucas 2005, p. 14); and as a reward for Amir ʿAbdullah for his family's contributions to the efforts to bring down the Ottoman Empire (Wiktorowicz 2001, pp. 50-51).

Two of the three roles above are no longer valid, as the British and French left the area decades ago. However, it is still possible to pursue this explanation further by saying that roles change over time. One role was the fight against communism, which King Hussein cited in his decision to dismiss the government of Sulayman al-Nabulsi in 1957. Another role is for the state to have peace with Israel, or to be part of the war on terror. The role, therefore, depends on international developments in which Western countries require support from their allies. Fahd al-Rimawi (2008) subscribes to this explanation.[1] In his view, the role of Jordan at present is to provide protection for Israel, and to act as an intermediary between the latter and the Arab states which do have diplomatic ties with Israel. While it is a state with a role, Jordan cannot develop into a democratic country.

This theory of 'a state dependent on a role' is plausible as Jordan does play a role when asked by the West. Only rarely does it refrain from cooperation with the West, such as during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990-91). The lack of cooperation damaged Jordan's relations with the West and other Arab countries. This explanation, however, cannot resolve the matter satisfactorily, as states can be democratic and serve a role. Western European countries have been democratic while serving a role in the Cold War. These countries distinguished themselves from states run by communist parties by being democratic. Therefore, a state that plays a role does not have to be undemocratic.

The third reason for establishing the State of Jordan, namely as a reward for King ʿAbdullah I, requires some clarification because it is valid to some extent, but should not be accepted at face value. First, as a political act by Winston Churchill, it is true historically speaking. However, neither Churchill personally nor Britain owned the

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[1] Personal interview. 14 April 2008, Amman.

territory and thus did not have the right to give parts of it away as a reward. Second, the notion that a king or queen owns the land, its resources, and the people is outdated.[2] However, even if a monarch entertains any illusion in this regard, historically these types of kings or queens have had to give up some or all of their powers. Therefore, the 'reward' explanation is unsatisfactory.

4. Political Feudalism

Another reason for the failure of democracy suggests that Jordan is controlled by 'political feudalism'. On 12 January 2010, a statement signed by more than seventy figures of different political orientations criticised Jordan's involvement in the war in Afghanistan (Efranews 2010). They demanded the 'lifting of the tutelage of political feudalism', and the creation of a political climate that would lead to 'real political reform and democratic transformation'.

This explanation is not without its merits. The king does appoint and dismiss the government at will. King ʿAbdullah II has dissolved parliament without giving reasons. For instance, in 2007, the royal decree to dissolve the HoD simply said 'the HoD is dissolved as of Monday, 20 August 2007'. However, this explanation fails to recognise that King Hussein had to make concessions on three occasions: in 1956 when parties contested elections and a government reflecting such results was formed. The second was after the 1967 war when he had to tolerate the presence of the Palestinian resistance organisations for three years before deciding to eliminate their presence. The third was in 1988, when the April Uprising (habbat nīsan) took place, and he decided to 'resume democratic life'.

5. 'Certain forces' Work Against Change

One of the often-cited reasons for the failure of democracy to take root is that there are 'forces' in Jordan which have no interest in democracy. The king, therefore, has to proceed with caution and balance the various interests. The explanation does not identify the forces at work, but one of the frequently used terms in this context is 'forces pulling in the opposite direction' (qiwa al-shadd al-ʿaksi). One can speculate that these forces include the beneficiaries of an undemocratic system, such as those

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[2] The ruling dynasty in Jordan is referred to as 'al-ʿāl'la al-mālika' not 'al-ʿāl'la al-malakiyya'. The first literally means the 'owning family'. The latter means the royal family.

who are appointed prime ministers, ministers, high-ranking officials, and special advisers. They will have no interest in a democratic system, in which they have to compete to hold such positions, and be accountable to the electorate. Without a democratic system, they simply have to pledge loyalty and intervene when called upon, whether to launch a crackdown, privatise industries, or sign a peace treaty.

Other 'forces' that may appear to have no interest in democracy will be the intelligence service (GID), tribes, and people in the business sector. The role of GID was pervasive in Jordan. Despite improvements in the past twenty years, activists continued to be detained during the period of protests (2011/2012). In some cases, they were referred to state security courts. With regard to tribes, the government continued to encourage tribalism, and relied on members of the tribes to oppose organising rallies and protests in their areas. Moreover, in relation to people in business, it may be argued that without the accountability that comes with democracy, businesspeople have the freedom to strike deals and run their affairs on the basis of personal connections with people in power.

The explanation of undemocratic forces has its limitations. The forces that seek privilege are not so powerful a force as to block democracy, as privilege-seeking occurs irrespective of whether the system of government is democratic or not. Assuming that these people have worked together to maintain a special status, their effect can be easily neutralised if the king chooses to change the status quo. Similarly, the GID may advise the king against adopting a wholly democratic system of government, or to proceed with caution. The king can reject this advice. In this case, the GID cannot defy the will of the king and people at the same time.

With regard to tribes, although the government encourages tribalism, the demands for change come from all sectors of the population. Opposition figures are invited to rallies organised by tribes. There is not a single attitude that represents all the tribes, or all members of a single tribe. In relation to the business sector, certain people will prefer doing business through contacts with people in power. However, a great deal more will prefer to be able to compete fairly in order to succeed in business.

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6. Rentierism

Another reason for the failure of democracy to take root in Jordan is suggested by 'rentier economy' theorists. According to this explanation, the population of a rentier state tends to be depoliticised. As Brynen (1992) explains in this regard 'the state is expected to provide a certain level of economic security, in exchange for which society grants state leaders considerable political autonomy' (p. 75). This explanation has severe limitations, even when it refers to the rich countries of the Gulf, where there is no taxation. Shambayati (1994) argued that 'rentierism' did not depoliticise the population, and that the Shah of Iran lost his throne in 1979, because he alienated the bazaaris for ideological reasons. Specifically, he considered them 'greedy, backward, reactionary, and unwilling to contribute to the country's development. There was no room for them in a modem Iran' (p. 323). Because the bazaaris did not depend on the state, as did other sectors, they 'had both the financial and the organizational autonomy to challenge the state' when the revolution started (p. 320).

When the rentier explanation is applied to Jordan, it becomes harder to sustain. First, Jordan is not as rich as the oil-producing countries in the Gulf or Iran. This is why Brynen describes Jordan as a 'semi-rentier' state. However, it has provided 'a certain level of economic security', referred to above. 'At the mass level,' Brynen (1992) explains 'the Jordanian state became a central supplier of both social services and employment. Extensive health and education programmes were developed' (p. 81). Nonetheless, as happened in Iran, not all sectors of society have benefited. For instance, the widespread claims of corruption in Jordan are indicative of the level of alienation felt across all parts of the country.

Moreover, Jordan introduced a tax collection system in the 1980s. Although the government claims that the majority of the population is exempt from paying taxes, this statement is true in part at best, because everyone pays indirect taxes on many things, and those who do not pay income tax do not earn enough money to bring them into the tax-paying bracket. Since the Jordanian citizen has become a taxpayer, the demand for representation has been made on this basis.

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The rentier state argument does not satisfactorily explain the failure of democracy in Jordan. The reasons in summary are that the state has not managed to sustain a level of economic security that will pacify the people (poverty in Jordan is widespread); it has alienated many people in the country, including the tribes; and it is not possible to depoliticise the population of any state, let alone the people in Jordan.

7. Arab-Israeli Conflict

The Arab-Israeli conflict has been used by rulers to justify the undemocratic nature of Arab governments. In the case of Jordan, the argument was that it would not possible to hold elections while one part of the kingdom, the West Bank, was occupied. As has been discussed in chapter 1, regarding the definition of democracy, elections are only one of the elements necessary in a democratic state. Moreover, holding elections in the West Bank ceased to be an obstacle because Jordan decided to sever links with the West Bank. Ironically, after the peace treaty with Israel in 1994, one of the first things Jordan was willing to sacrifice was the process of reform which started in 1989. As Robinson (1998, p. 388) observed: 'the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict may well usher in a new era of authoritarianism in Jordan.' Had there been a commitment to establish a democratic system of government, neither the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, nor the peace treaty with Israel in 1994 would have prevented the fulfilment of this goal.

8. The West is Responsible

The absence of democracy in the Arab world as a whole is due to an external factor: the US in particular and the West prefer it this way. AbuKhalil (2011) argues that regimes in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are supported by the West despite being undemocratic; that Husni Mubarak, for instance, stayed in power so long only with Western support. This argument is valid to some extent. In its support, one can cite the example of the attitude towards the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections in 2006. However, my response to this argument is similar to the one I made earlier in relation to considering Jordan as a state formed to serve a role: being democratic and maintaining friendly relations with the West are not mutually exclusive.

9. Rustow's Antecedents

I have argued that all of the above reasons are flawed. I propose, finally, to apply Rustow's modernisation theory to test whether it can better explain the failure of democracy in Jordan. As outlined in chapter 1, Rustow (1967, p. 228) identified four antecedents of democracy. I shall apply these antecedents to Jordan's case in order to establish the extent to which they apply. If they do not, then Rustow is wrong. If they do, I will argue why Rustow's theory is better than the reasons outlined above at explaining why democracy has failed to take root in Jordan. Any limitations concerning Rustow's explanation will be identified.

In relation to the first antecedent, although Jordan's modern history spans more than forty years, this is at the lower end of Rustow's range of years (40-130) of administrative and educational modernization. Jordan would require another sixty years to reach the other end. The first university in Jordan was established only in the 1960s. However, more universities have been established in Jordan, and now there are many private universities.

It is possible to argue that Jordan has satisfied this antecedent because the state has existed for more than seventy years. Conversely, one can suggest that Rustow's lower and higher ends of the range of years (40-130) are too far apart, and therefore, this antecedent is flawed. Two responses are possible. One is that the circumstances in countries making the transition to democracy cannot be identical. Therefore, it is not abnormal to make the transition at different speeds. The other response is that the transition is not assumed to be automatic once the lower end of the scale is achieved, as this antecedent is one of four.

More importantly, one has to look at what else happened during the relevant years. The expansion in education at all levels was not matched by weakening tribal traditions, for example. The universities became scenes of frequent fights between members of different tribes. Despite the abundance of universities in Jordan, they lack the freedoms that students enjoy in democratic countries. On one occasion in May 1986, for example, the students of Yarmouk University organised protests

against increasing tuition fees. The police dealt with them aggressively, and three students were killed. In contrast, students in the UK frequently demonstrate against increasing fees, not only on campuses but also on the streets of cities.

Therefore, it is not the mere number of years of education, but the extent to which such education has contributed to moving the state and society a step closer towards modernity. Moreover, the antecedent of education alone is not sufficient, as there are three other antecedents to be satisfied.

The second antecedent is concerned with 'stable geographical contexts'. The geographical context of Jordan's political system did not remain the same since its inception. It expanded in 1950 after the merger with the West Bank. The merger meant an increase in the population which more than doubled. In 1967, the geographical context decreased after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. It was further reduced politically in 1988 after the decision to sever links with the West Bank (in effect a demerger). After the decision, the notion of Jordanian citizenship was thrown into confusion. Therefore, the second antecedent is not satisfied.

Rustow's third antecedent is related to political parties. One can say that there is now one generation of political parties, but this does not satisfy the third antecedent because Rustow mentions two or three generations of parties. There was a discontinuity in the presence of parties between 1957 and 1991. Although parties operate legally now, they do so with severely restricted freedoms. If this remains the case for two more generations, parties will not make any difference. This is one limitation in Rustow's explanation. However, he must have taken it for granted that the parties will be operating in a free environment—not in a restricted one.

The fourth antecedent is the presence of 'a tenacious conflict'. It is not satisfied. The conflict of September 1970 was short. The uprising of 1988 in southern Jordan was significant and produced changes, but it was short too and lacked leadership. Signs of a tenacious conflict started to appear before the uprisings erupted in the Arab world

at the end of 2010. It can also be seen in protests by workers to assert their rights and improve their conditions, as happened in Aqaba in August 2009. Other workers who work without contracts also protested at the Ministry of Agriculture in 2010. Moreover, the government could not stop or outmanoeuvre the campaign for a teachers' union.

These indications can be regarded as belonging to a bottom-up process that may lead to the democratisation of the political system in the country. Jamal (2007, p. 137) has concluded that 'the bottom-up approach to democracy is seriously flawed.' The context of her conclusion was the assumption made by foreign donors who wish to develop civil society because without it 'there can be no democracy'. Within the context of her conclusion, she is right. However, the bottom-up process unfolding in Jordan is of a completely different nature. It was initiated by teachers, workers, and others who decided to assert their rights without the assistance of foreign donors.

An important corollary of Rustow's antecedents is that they should take place in the context of embracing modernity, especially its intellectual aspects. Education, geographical context, parties, and a tenacious conflict will not lead to democracy if modernity is not ingrained in the political system. Rustow claimed that religious denominations in Lebanon were the substitute for parties. He was mistaken, as could be recognised from the Lebanese Civil War. Moreover, the various religious sects in Lebanon prevent the development of a democratic system based on equality of citizens. Similarly, tribes in Jordan cannot be a substitute for parties. When the government changed the elections law to have more MPs from the tribes, it achieved its objective. However, it also caused divisions within tribes. Moreover, the encouragement of tribalism has produced a situation in which tribes fight each other, and frequently clash with the police.

Despite the limitations identified in the discussion above, Rustow's antecedents better explain why democracy has failed to take root in Jordan. Unlike the essentialist or cultural explanations, Rustow's modernisation theory does not imply that Jordan will remain undemocratic permanently because of Islam or Islamism.

In conclusion, the thesis has achieved its two objectives of assessing the state of democracy in Jordan between 1990 and 2010, and revisiting the claims of incompatibility between democracy and both Islam and Islamism. The democratic audit delivered a detailed appraisal, which identified the unsatisfactory aspects. However, it also provided the opportunity to recognise positive features, particularly those reflected by means higher than seven marks out of ten. Moreover, Rustow's modernisation theory provided the criteria that challenged the Islam-democracy incompatibility paradigm.

Epilogue

I mentioned in the introduction that a series of events erupted in the Arab world at the end of 2010. They had dramatic consequences such as the removal of the rulers of Tunisia and Egypt under the pressure of the people; the overthrow and death of the ruler of Libya with active military assistance from NATO; and the negotiated removal of the ruler of Yemen after a long stalemate. In Bahrain, however, protesters were violently dispersed. Forces from the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) assisted the Bahraini government. In Syria, a stalemate prevailed while this thesis was being finalised.

In Jordan, demonstrations in various parts of the country have taken place. The response to them was mixed: (a) allowing them to proceed peacefully (and distributing bottles of water); (b) subjecting them to attacks by thugs, thus enabling the government to deny that they are members of the security forces; and (c) enlisting the support of members of tribes to call for the cancellation of demonstrations and rallies. When the IAF refused to cancel the demonstration scheduled in Mafraq on Friday, 23 December 2011, the demonstrators were attacked and the offices of IAF in the city were burned.

Meanwhile, elections took place in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco in 2011. In all three countries, Islamist parties achieved good results. The surprise in Egypt was that there were two strands of Islamist parties: one was the MB, and the other was Salafi.

These developments subjected my thesis to a test of time shortly before it was ready for submission. I explained in the introduction why my thesis could not and should not deal with fast-moving events. However, there is a compelling case to discuss their impact on my arguments and conclusions, particularly in relation to the compatibility of democracy and both Islam and Islamism, and what may happen if the Islamists come to power. Consequently, I will revisit the major themes addressed in this thesis and discuss them briefly in light of the above-mentioned developments.

I shall begin with the argument about the notion of Arab and Muslim exceptionalism which tolerates dictatorships. It appears that the proponents of this view were wrong

all along. Moreover, the uprisings in several Arab states at the same time provided overwhelming evidence of the anger of the Arab peoples at the dictatorships that ruled over them.

With regard to the compatibility of Islam and democracy, the uprisings have provided ample evidence that they are compatible. The participation of a Salafi party in the Egyptian elections is significant. My contention will be challenged on the ground that it is too early to judge, and a lot will depend on the behaviour of the Islamist parties in power. This is a valid counter-argument, but it has its flaws. First, it continues to be based on the notion of Arab and Muslim exceptionalism, which has been used by some scholars such as Stepan and Robertson (2003 and 2004) to explain the absence of democracy in the Arab states. The notion is analogous to the claim of incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Second, it continues to assume that the Arab and Muslim peoples are not interested in developing democratic systems of government, ignoring the fact that people did not sacrifice their lives simply to replace one dictator with another.

This leads again to the argument that Islamism, not Islam, is incompatible with democracy. The uprisings have shown that this line of argument is flawed. Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco have not yet developed into democracies. What hindered democracy in the past was not Islamism, but dictators allied with the West. If after the Islamists come to power through the ballot box, they decide to change the nature of the system, those who previously expressed concern may feel vindicated. But this vindication will be momentary.

Democracy was avoided using pretexts such as that the Islamists could not be trusted. Ideologically, one can disagree with the Islamists, but to block their participation in the political systems is inconsistent with democratic principles. A democratic process will be lively if parties of different ideologies compete. The presence of strong parties is good for democracy as well, because they can provide alternatives in styles and programmes of government.

The elections that took place in Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt substantiated the claim of the Islamists that they enjoyed public support, and that they could win in free and fair elections. However, voting for them was influenced to some extent by a factor of

sympathy because the Islamist parties were banned or restricted before the uprisings of 2010-11. The sympathy cannot be taken for granted, and is likely to recede once the elections became a regular event. Therefore, in order to retain the same level of popularity, the Islamists will have to re-earn the confidence of the same group of people. If they want to appeal to other segments of society, they cannot be rigid in their ideas and electoral manifestos. The Islamists were not a political force to contend with after the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. If other parties and coalitions adopt appealing policies and programmes, they can gain the confidence of the people at the expense of the Islamists.

Will the Islamists change the nature of the system after they are in power? The straightforward answer to this question is that the Islamists have sent contradicting signals. Therefore, those who were suspicious would remain so.

The Tunisian al-Nahda was presented as a moderate Islamist party that had reconciled democracy and Islam since the early 1980s. Their positive image was undermined when Hammadi Jabali, a leader in al-Nahda, felt nostalgic for the caliphate, and spoke about the creation of a sixth caliphate. Although he contended that he was quoted out of context, the matter gave others the ammunition to criticise him and al-Nahda. In the inaugural address on 13 December 2011, the new interim President of Tunisia, Muncef Marzūqi, promised the Tunisian people that they would enjoy all the rights mentioned in the International Convention of Human Rights. Al-Marzūqi is not an Islamist, but is supported by al-Nahda.

In Morocco, the leader of the Justice and Development Party, ʿAbd al-Ilah bin Kiran, sought to allay fears by saying that the party would not interfere in the personal lives of the people. In Egypt, is not yet clear whether a combination of MB and Salafi Islamism will coexist and cooperate or compete and fight.

I have indicated that in Jordan, in the twenty years under assessment, the MB/IAF demonstrated a case of democratic paradox in reverse. I adhere to this conclusion in relation to the relevant time. After the uprisings in the Arab world, and the conflicting signals about what the Islamists would do after the positive results they achieved, it became harder to argue that the Islamists would continue to call for

democracy and respect its rules when they are in power. Nonetheless, I shall address the question of whether the Islamists will change the nature of the system, by imposing a stricter adherence to Islamic teachings as they interpret them.

My answer to the question is twofold. One is that political parties who win elections try to implement their programmes, whether socialist or capitalist. When they win, they argue that they have a mandate to change. It should not come as a surprise if an Islamist party made a similar argument: that it had won a majority, and acquired a mandate to implement more or all of shariʿa. The notion of acquiring a mandate through elections is problematic, and therefore, whether all changes a governing party introduces are really mandated is open to question. The same applies to Islamist parties in the Arab world. I therefore think that winning a majority will not automatically mean the implementation of shariʿa or a limited form of it. However, what will happen if they try; can they do it? This leads to the discussion about the other forces in society, such as political parties, civil society organisations, and concerned citizens.

If the Islamist parties in power change the system and impose a strict one, they will be treated with the same hostility any other party would face should it choose to impose its will and ideology on the people. Even if these parties succeed initially, they will eventually fail. The communist parties in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe failed. The Baʿth in both Iraq and Syria failed. Even less ideological parties, such as the National Party of Egypt failed. The opposition to a 'more Islamic' system of government is already vociferous. Critics point out that issues of unemployment or inflation cannot be dealt with by making references to verses in the Qur'an. Others show opposition by mocking the Islamists' attitude towards the arts. Therefore, although it is still premature to say that the Islamists will change the nature of government, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that if they try, they will face opposition from all quarters. If they try to impose their programmes, their future is foretold.

Another point I would like to make is that the involvement of the Islamists in politics should have been welcomed a long time ago. I make this argument for two reasons. One is that it is better to engage with them in the political arena, rather than leaving them to preach in mosques and homes, where their views will not be open to public

discussions. In the political arena, statements made by an Islamist party or a politician will be reported and dissected. With other opinions being expressed at the same time, people can consider other views before they make up their minds. My second reason for welcoming the Islamists' involvement in politics is that the extent of their adherence to principles will become known, and this will be the subject of my next point.

When Bin ʿAli, Mubarak, and others were still in power, the West found excuses for these rulers. The exclusion of Islamists from political processes was justified and even encouraged. Western governments went further than that, and refused to recognise the government of Hamas even though it won a majority in elections judged by international observers to be free and fair. After the Arab uprisings of 2010-11 and the changes of circumstances, the exiled Islamists were able to return. The Islamist parties participated in both the uprisings and the elections. After the dawn of new realities in the Arab world, both the West and the Islamists realised they could not maintain old, rigid attitudes towards each other. The Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia sent reassuring messages to the US in relation to attitude towards Israel. Rachid al-Ghannouchi visited the US and spoke at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in December 2011. In Egypt, both the MB and the Salafi party sent reassuring messages in relation to the Camp David Accords.

I do not agree with people who expect a total change of policies overnight. It will be imprudent of the MB or other parties to say they will abrogate the peace treaty once they are in power. This means the Islamists have not learned any lessons from the Algerian case. However, seeking to please the West in such a manner shows that once parties are competing in a political arena, Islamist or otherwise, principles are secondary. Moreover, Western states reverted to expediency, even though the West had opposed the Islamists and raised doubt about their commitment to democracy. The Western governments changed their attitudes and accepted the new reality. More importantly, the West joined forces with Islamists in Libya. With regard to Syria, the West does not mind supporting the opposition in which the MB is a major player. Furthermore, the Islamists' expediency is evident in their attitude towards foreign intervention, whether in Libya or in Syria. The Islamists of Jordan opposed foreign intervention in Iraq, but supported it in Libya and Syria.

Before I focus my discussion on Jordan, I would like to point out that after the Arab uprisings, some commentators have suggested that they were instigated by the West. Others also ridiculed the notion of democracy. In a Jordanian context, Ṯaher al-Maṣri declared that people in Jordan were not yet ready for democracy. In the wider context, some people, such as Muna (2011) and AbuKhalil (2011), have expressed scepticism about democracy.

The bloody change in Libya reminded people of the gruesome consequences of the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The objections to imposing democracy are valid. Its imposition deprives it of its very nature. As Beetham (2009) has argued in relation to Iraq, imposing democracy does not work. However, to take a hostile attitude towards democracy because it was given a bad name in Iraq or elsewhere is a misguided position. As Rustow (1967, p. 236) says: democracy is about 'self-government'.

Jordan's own protests to demand change also demonstrated that there was no Jordanian exceptionalism. When Bin ʿAli was toppled, supporters of Mubarak said Egypt is not Tunisia. Supporters of regimes in other states said the same. There would always be similarities and differences in circumstance between countries. However, what happened in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere could happen in Jordan as well. The protests continued in Jordan even after constitutional changes were passed and the government of ʿAwn al-Khasawneh was formed.

The difference between the situations in Tunisia and Egypt on the one hand and Jordan on the other is that the demands in Jordan have a lower ceiling: reform, not the removal of the head of state. This gives the regime more room to manoeuvre, and less incentive to use massive force. I suggest that the room for manoeuvre is shrinking all the time. Moreover, there is no guarantee that the ceiling of demands will remain low. Therefore, the incentive to use more force becomes stronger. The level of force required will also have an impact on whether the military will think it is part of its duty to supress demonstrations. Both options are open: a crackdown using the army, or the regime finding itself unable to count on the army for such a task.

The outcomes of uprisings and revolutions cannot be guaranteed for the revolutionaries or the regimes. So far, Jordan has tried to manage the situation with

some coercion and a lot of political manoeuvring, which has included changing the government. However, this tactic is losing its effectiveness in calming the people. Mubarak changed the government to appear to be making changes, as demanded by the people. However, this measure failed. He had to give up his powers to a military council, and he was put on trial soon after he resigned. If the situation is mishandled in Jordan, one should not exclude the possibility that a loss of control could lead to both imaginable and unimaginable outcomes.

APPENDIX 1
Data of the Macro-Analysis

The macro-analysis is based on fifteen overarching questions. These were the only questions answered by the twenty-four respondents. The same questions appear amongst the ninety questions of the long questionnaire, which was answered by six assessors. A slash (/) is used when the respondent or assessor gave no mark. The mean is in bold font.

PART 1: CITIZENSHIP, LAW AND RIGHTS												
1.1. Nationhood and citizenship												
	Is there public agreement on a common citizenship without discrimination? (.../10)											
	1	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	5
Q1S	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	8	8	9	10	10 **5.0**
Q7L	2	2	5	6	7	/	**4.4**					
1.2. Rule of law and access to justice												
	Are state and society consistently subject to the law? (.../10)											
	1	2	2	2	3	4	4	5	5	5	5	6
Q2S	6	6	7	7	7	7	8	8	9	9	10	10 **5.8**
Q14L	3	6	6	6	6	/	**5.4**					
1.3. Civil and political rights												
	Are civil and political rights equally guaranteed for all? (.../10)											
	1	1	2	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	5	5
Q3S	5	5	5	6	6	7	7	7	8	8	8	10 **5.0**
Q19L	3	5	5	7	/	/	**5.0**					

1.4. Economic and social rights	

	Are economic and social rights equally guaranteed for all? (.../10)
	1 1 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 5
Q4S	5 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 **5.3**
Q26L	4 5 6 7 8 / **6.0**

PART 2: REPRESENTATIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT

2.1. Free and Fair Elections	

	Do elections give the people control over governments and their policies? (.../10)
	0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Q5S	3 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 7 7 **3.1**
Q33L	1 2 2 2 2 3 **2.0**

2.2. The Democratic Role of Political Parties	

	Does the party system assist the working of democracy? (.../10)
	1 2 2 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 5
Q6S	5 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 9 9 10 **5.0**
Q39L	0 2 / / / / **1.0**

2.3. Effective and Responsive Government	

	Is government effective in serving the public and responsive to its concerns? (.../10)
	1 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5
Q7S	6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 8 9 **5.3**
Q46L	1 3 3 5 / / **3.0**

2.4. The Democratic Effectiveness of Parliament												
	Does the parliament or legislature contribute effectively to the democratic process? (.../10)											
	0	1	2	2	2	3	3	4	4	5	5	5
Q8S	5	5	5	5	6	6	6	6	7	7	9	9	**4.7**
Q55L	1	2	2	3	5	8	**3.5**					

2.5. Civilian Control of the Military and Police [**DATA NOT RELIABLE**]												
	Are the military and police forces under civilian control? (.../10)											
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Q9S	1	2	3	3	6	6	6	8	9	10	/	/	**2.5**
Q60L	0	0	2	5	9	/	**3.2**					

2.6. Integrity in Public Life												
	Is the integrity of conduct in public life assured? (.../10)											
	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3
Q10S	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	6	6	8	8	/	**3.8**
Q66L	1	1	3	5	5	8	**3.8**					

PART 3: CIVIL SOCIETY AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION

3.1. The Media in a Democratic Society

	Do the media operate in a way that sustains democratic values? (.../10)											
	0	1	1	2	3	3	3	4	4	5	5	5
Q11S	5	5	5	6	7	7	7	8	8	9	9	10	**5.1**
Q72L	2	3	6	/	/	/	**3.7**					

3.2. Political participation												
	Is there full citizen participation in public life? (.../10)											
	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	4	4	5	5	5
Q12S	5	5	5	6	6	6	7	7	7	9	10	10	**5.1**
Q77L	0	2	3	3	5	7	**3.3**					

3.3. Decentralization												
	Are decisions taken at the level of government that is most appropriate for the people affected? (.../10)											
	0	1	2	2	3	3	4	4	5	5	5	5
Q13S	5	5	5	5	5	6	7	8	8	8	8	10	**5.0**
Q81L	1	2	2	4	5	6	**3.3**					

PART 4: DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE STATE

4.1. External Influences on the Country's Democracy												
	Is the impact of external influences broadly supportive of the country's democracy? (.../10)											
	0	0	1	1	2	2	2	3	4	5	5	5
Q14S	6	6	6	6	6	7	7	8	9	10	10	/	**4.8**
Q85L	2	2	4	6	7	7	**4.7**					

4.2. The Country's Democratic Impact Abroad												
	Do the country's international policies contribute to strengthening global democracy? (.../10)											
	0	1	1	1	2	2	3	4	4	4	4	5
Q15S	6	6	6	7	7	7	9	9	10	10	/	/	**4.9**
Q90L	0	1	2	2	5	6	**2.7**					

The microanalysis used a questionnaire of ninety questions. Six assessors answered it. The marks are presented in ascending order, not by assessor. The figure in bold font is the mean. A slash (/) is used to indicate the assessor gave no mark.

PART 1: CITIZENSHIP, LAW AND RIGHTS

1.1. Nationhood and Citizenship	
Q1	1.1.1. How inclusive is the political nation and state citizenship of all who live within the territory? (…../10) 3 5 5 5 9 9 **6.0**
Q2	1.1.2. How far are cultural differences acknowledged, and how well are minorities and vulnerable social groups protected? (…../10) 5 5 7 9 10 10 **7.7**
Q3	1.1.3. How much consensus is there on state boundaries and constitutional arrangements? (…../10) 3 5 9 10 / / **6.8**
Q4	1.1.4. How far do constitutional and political arrangements enable major societal divisions to be moderated or reconciled? (…../10) 4 4 5 7 7 8 **5.8**
Q5	1.1.5. How impartial and inclusive are the procedures for amending the constitution? (…../10) 2 3 3 5 5 5 **3.8**
Q6	1.1.6. How far does the government respect its international obligations in its treatment of refugees and asylum seekers, and how free from arbitrary discrimination is its immigration policy? (…../10) 2 2 6 8 8 9 **5.8**

Q7	**Overarching question: Is there public agreement on a common citizenship without discrimination? (…../10)**
	2 2 5 6 7 / **4.4**

1.2. Rule of Law and Access to Justice

Q8	1.2.1. How far is the rule of law operative throughout the territory? **(…../10)**
	4 5 6 7 7 7 **6.0**

Q9	1.2.2. To what extent are all public officials subject to the rule of law and to transparent rules in the performance of their functions? **(…../10)**
	2 3 6 6 7 8 **5.3**

Q10	1.2.3. How independent are the courts and the judiciary from the executive, and how free are they from all kinds of interference? **(…../10)**
	3 3 5 6 6 8 **5.2**

Q11	1.2.4. How equal and secure is the access of citizens to justice, to due process and to redress in the event of maladministration? **(…../10)**
	3 3 6 6 7 7 **5.3**

Q12	1.2.5. How far do the criminal justice and penal systems observe due rules of impartial and equitable treatment in their operations? **(…../10)**
	3 4 7 7 8 8 **6.2**

Q13	1.2.6. How much confidence do people have in the legal system to deliver fair and effective justice? **(…../10)**
	3 4 5 7 7 7 **5.5**

Q14	**Overarching question: Are state and society consistently subject to the law? (…../10)**
	3 6 6 6 6 / **5.4**

1.3. Civil and Political Rights

Q15	1.3.1. How free are all people from physical violation of their person, and from fear of it? **(…../10)**
	3 5 6 8 9 9 **6.7**

Q16	1.3.2. How effective and equal is the protection of the freedoms of movement, expression, association and assembly? **(…../10)**
	2　3　3　6　6　6　**4.3**
Q17	1.3.3. How secure is the freedom for all to practise their own religion, language or culture? **(…../10)**
	3　8　8　9　9　10　**7.8**
Q18	1.3.4. How free from harassment and intimidation are individuals and groups working to improve human rights? **(…../10)**
	2　3　6　7　8　8　**5.7**
Q19	**Overarching question: Are civil and political rights equally guaranteed for all? (…../10)**
	3　5　5　7　/　/　**5.0**
1.4. Economic and Social Rights	
Q20	1.4.1. How far is access to work or social security available to all, without discrimination? **(…../10)**
	3　4　5　7　7　8　**5.7**
Q21	1.4.2. How effectively are the basic necessities of life guaranteed, including adequate food, shelter and clean water? **(…../10)**
	3　4　5　6　8　8　**5.7**
Q22	1.4.3. To what extent is the health of the population protected, in all spheres and stages of life? **(…../10)**
	4　5　5　8　/　/　**5.5**
Q23	1.4.4. How extensive and inclusive is the right to education, including education in the rights and responsibilities of citizenship? **(…../10)**
	4　5　7　8　8　10　**7.0**
Q24	1.4.5. How free are trade unions and other work-related associations to organize and represent their members' interests? **(…../10)**
	2　4　5　6　6　7　**5.0**
Q25	1.4.6. How rigorous and transparent are the rules on corporate governance, and how effectively are corporations regulated in the public interest? **(…../10)**
	3　5　5　6　7　8　**5.7**

Q26	**Overarching question: Are economic and social rights equally guaranteed for all? (…../10)**
	4 5 6 7 8 / **6.0**

PART 2: REPRESENTATIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE GOVERNMENT

2.1. Free and Fair Elections

Q27	2.1.1. How far is appointment to governmental and legislative office determined by popular competitive election, and how frequently do elections lead to change in the governing parties or personnel? **(…../10)**
	2 2 3 3 3 4 **2.8**

Q28	2.1.2. How inclusive and accessible for all citizens are the registration and voting procedures, how independent are they of government and party control, and how free from intimidation and abuse? **(…../10)**
	3 3 4 5 5 8 **4.7**

Q29	2.1.3. How fair are the procedures for the registration of candidates and parties, and how far is there fair access for them to the media and other means of communication with the voters? **(…../10)**
	2 4 4 5 7 7 **4.8**

Q30	2.1.4. How effective a range of choice does the electoral and party system allow the voters, how equally do their votes count, and how closely does the composition of the legislature and the selection of the executive reflect the choices they make? **(…../10)**
	0 2 3 4 6 6 **3.5**

Q31	2.1.5. How far does the legislature reflect the social composition of the electorate? **(…../10)**
	2 3 3 6 6 8 **4.7**

Q32	2.1.6. What proportion of the electorate votes, and how far are the election results accepted by all political forces in the country and outside? **(…../10)**
	2 3 4 4 4 / **3.4**

Q33	**Overarching question: Do elections give the people control over governments and their policies? (…../10)**
	1 2 2 2 2 3 **2.0**

2.2. The Democratic Role of Political Parties

Q34	2.2.1. How freely are parties able to form and recruit members, engage with the public and campaign for office? (…../10)
	3 5 5 5 5 7 **5.0**
Q35	2.2.2. How effective is the party system in forming and sustaining governments in office? (…../10)
	0 0 0 0 0 2 **0.3**
Q36	2.2.3. How far are parties effective membership organizations, and how far are members able to influence party policy and candidate selection? (…../10)
	1 2 2 2 3 5 **2.5**
Q37	2.2.4. How far does the system of party financing prevent the subordination of parties to special interests? (…../10)
	1 1 2 2 2 4 **2.0**
Q38	2.2.5. To what extent do parties cross ethnic, religious and linguistic divisions? (…../10)
	1 1 2 2 4 7 **2.8**
Q39	**Overarching question: Does the party system assist the working of democracy? (…../10)**
	0 2 / / / / **1.0**

2.3. Effective and Responsive Government

Q40	2.3.1. How far is the elected government able to influence or control those matters that are important to the lives of its people, and how well is it informed, organized and resourced to do so? (…../10)
	2 2 3 4 7 / **3.6**

Q41	2.3.2. How effective and open to scrutiny is the control exercised by elected leaders and their ministers over their administrative staff and other executive agencies? (…../10)
	2 2 2 3 3 / **2.4**
Q42	2.3.3. How open and systematic are the procedures for public consultation on government policy and legislation, and how equal is the access for relevant interests to government? (…../10)
	0 2 2 2 4 / **2.0**
Q43	2.3.4. How accessible and reliable are public services for those who need them, and how systematic is consultation with users over service delivery? (…../10)
	2 3 3 5 6 / **3.8**
Q44	2.3.5. How comprehensive and effective is the right of access for citizens to government information under the constitution or other laws? (…../10)
	0 1 2 2 4 / **1.8**
Q45	2.3.6. How much confidence do people have in the ability of government to solve the main problems confronting society, and in their own ability to influence it? (…../10)
	1 3 3 3 3 / **2.6**
Q46	**Overarching question: Is government effective in serving the public and responsive to its concerns? (…../10)**
	1 3 3 5 / / **3.0**
2.4. The Democratic Effectiveness of Parliament	
Q47	2.4.1. How independent is the parliament or legislature of the executive, and how freely are its members able to express their opinions? (…../10)
	2 2 2 3 5 5 **3.2**
Q48	2.4.2. How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament or legislature to initiate, scrutinize and amend legislation? (…../10)
	3 3 3 3 5 5 **3.7**
Q49	2.4.3. How extensive and effective are the powers of the parliament or legislature to oversee the executive and hold it to account? (…../10)
	0 0 3 3 3 5 **2.3**

Q50	2.4.4. How rigorous are the procedures for approval and supervision of taxation and public expenditure? (…../10)
	1 2 2 3 3 6 **2.8**
Q51	2.4.5. How freely are all parties and groups able to organize within the parliament or legislature and contribute to its work? (…../10)
	2 2 2 3 7 8 **4.0**
Q52	2.4.6. How extensive are the procedures of the parliament or legislature for consulting the public and relevant interests across the range of its work? (…../10)
	1 2 2 2 2 5 **2.3**
Q53	2.4.7. How accessible are elected representatives to their constituents? (…../10)
	2 3 6 7 7 8 **5.5**
Q54	2.4.8. How well does the parliament or legislature provide a forum for deliberation and debate on issues of public concern? (…../10)
	0 2 2 3 5 7 **3.2**
Q55	**Overarching question: Does the parliament or legislature contribute effectively to the democratic process? (…../10)**
	1 2 2 3 5 8 **3.5**
2.5. Civilian Control of the Military and Police	
Q56	2.5.1. How effective is civilian control over the armed forces, and how free is political life from military involvement? (…../10)
	0 0 2 3 5 8 **3.0**
Q57	2.5.2. How publicly accountable are the police and security services for their activities? (…../10)
	0 1 1 5 7 8 **3.7**
Q58	2.5.3. How far does the composition of the army, police and security services reflect the social composition of society at large? (…../10)
	3 4 6 7 8 8 **6.0**
Q59	2.5.4. How free is the country from the operation of paramilitary units, private armies, war lords and criminal mafias? (…../10)
	8 8 8 9 9 10 **8.7**

Q60	**Overarching question: Are the military and police forces under civilian control? (…../10)**
	0 0 2 5 9 / **3.2**

2.6. Integrity in Public Life

Q61	2.6.1. How effective is the separation of public office from the personal business and family interests of office holders? (…../10)
	1 1 2 3 5 8 **3.3**
Q62	2.6.2. How effective are the arrangements for protecting office holders and the public from involvement in bribery? (…../10)
	1 1 3 3 5 6 **3.2**
Q63	2.6.3. How far do the rules and procedures for financing elections, candidates and elected representatives prevent their subordination to sectional interests? (…../10)
	0 2 2 3 3 5 **2.5**
Q64	2.6.4. How far is the influence of powerful corporations and business interests over public policy kept in check, and how free are they from involvement in corruption, including overseas? (…../10)
	2 2 3 3 3 6 **3.2**
Q65	2.6.5. How much confidence do people have that public officials and public services are free from corruption? (…../10)
	1 1 3 3 4 4 **2.7**
Q66	**Overarching question: Is the integrity of conduct in public life assured? (…../10)**
	1 1 3 5 5 8 **3.8**

PART 3: CIVIL SOCIETY AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION

3.1. The Media in a Democratic Society

Q67	3.1.1. How independent are the media from government, how pluralistic is their ownership, and how free are they from subordination to foreign governments or multinational companies? (…../10)
	2 3 3 3 5 6 **3.7**

Q68	3.1.2. How representative are the media of different opinions and how accessible are they to different sections of society? (…../10)
	2 4 5 5 5 5 **4.3**
Q69	3.1.3. How effective are the media and other independent bodies in investigating government and powerful corporations? (…../10)
	0 2 2 4 5 5 **3.0**
Q70	3.1.4. How free are journalists from restrictive laws, harassment and intimidation? (…../10)
	2 2 2 3 3 4 **2.7**
Q71	3.1.5. How free are private citizens from intrusion and harassment by the media? (…../10)
	3 4 4 4 5 7 **4.5**
Q72	**Overarching question: Do the media operate in a way that sustains democratic values?**
	2 3 6 / / / **3.7**

3.2. Political participation

Q73	3.2.1. How extensive is the range of voluntary associations, citizen groups, social movements etc. and how independent are they from government? (…../10)
	0 2 2 3 5 6 **3.0**
Q74	3.2.2. How extensive is citizen participation in voluntary associations and self-management organizations, and in other voluntary public activity? (…../10)
	0 2 2 4 6 6 **3.3**
Q75	3.2.3. How far do women participate in political life and public office at all levels? (…../10)
	0 2 2 4 5 7 **3.3**
Q76	3.2.4. How equal is access for all social groups to public office, and how fairly are they represented? (…../10)
	2 5 5 5 6 7 **5.0**

Q77	**Overarching question: Is there full citizen participation in public life? (…../10)**
	0 2 3 3 5 7 **3.3**

3.3. Decentralization

Q78	3.3.1. How independent are the sub-central tiers of government from the centre, and how far do they have the powers and resources to carry out their responsibilities? **(…../10)**
	1 2 3 3 3 6 **3.0**
Q79	3.3.2. How far are these levels of government subject to free and fair electoral authorization, and to the criteria of openness, accountability and responsiveness in their operation? **(…../10)**
	0 1 2 2 2 7 **2.3**
Q80	3.3.3. How extensive is the cooperation of government at the most local level with relevant partners, associations and communities in the formation and implementation of policy, and in service provision? **(…../10)**
	1 2 3 4 5 7 **3.7**
Q81	**Overarching question: Are decisions taken at the level of government that is most appropriate for the people affected? (…../10)**
	1 2 2 4 5 6 **3.3**

PART 4: DEMOCRACY BEYOND THE STATE

4.1. External Influences on the Country's Democracy

Q82	4.1.1. How free is the country from external influences which undermine or compromise its democratic process or national interests? **(…../10)**
	1 2 4 4 4 5 **3.3**
Q83	4.1.2. How equitable is the degree of influence exercised by the government within the bilateral, regional and international organizations to whose decisions it may be subject? **(…../10)**
	2 3 5 5 5 6 **4.3**

Q84	4.1.3. How far are the government's negotiating positions and subsequent commitments within these organizations subject to effective legislative oversight and public debate? (…../10)
	2 3 4 5 6 6 **4.3**
Q85	**Overarching question: Is the impact of external influences broadly supportive of the country's democracy? (…../10)**
	2 2 4 6 7 7 **4.7**

4.2. The Country's Democratic Impact Abroad

Q86	4.2.1. How consistent is the government in its support for, and protection of, human rights and democracy abroad? (…../10)
	0 1 2 2 6 10 **3.5**
Q87	4.2.2. How far does the government support the UN and agencies of international cooperation, and respect the rule of law internationally**? (…../10)**
	5 6 6 7 10 10 **7.3**
Q88	4.2.3. How extensive and consistent is the government's contribution to international development? (…../10)
	2 2 4 7 8 9 **5.3**
Q89	4.2.4. How far is the government's international policy subject to effective parliamentary oversight and public influence? (…../10)
	0 1 2 3 6 6 **3.0**
Q90	**Overarching question: Do the country's international policies contribute to strengthening global democracy? (…../10)**
	0 1 2 2 5 6 **2.7**

بحث عن الديمقراطية والإسلام في الأردن

الباحث: عدلي الهواري، جامعة وستمنستر – لندن

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عن البحث:

يهدف البحث إلى تقييم التجربة الديمقراطية في الأردن وتقييم مشاركة الإخوان المسلمين وجبهة العمل الإسلامي فيها، بمناسبة مرور عشرين عاما على بدء التجربة. أما الإطار الأوسع للبحث فهو مدى توافق الإسلام والإسلام السياسي مع الديمقراطية.

عن الأسئلة المرفقة:

يضم الاستبيان أدناه خمسة عشر سؤالا لتقييم مدى ديمقراطية بلد ما، والأسئلة جزء من منهجية طورها أكاديميون من بريطانيا من بينهم ديفيد بيثام وستوارت وير، وقد تبنت المنهجية المؤسسة الدولية لمساعدة الديمقراطية والانتخابات (www.idea.int)، التي يوجد مقرها في العاصمة السويدية، ستوكهولم.

عن الباحث: عدلي الهوراي

عمل مقدما ومعدا ومنتجا للبرامج في القسم العربي من هيئة الإذاعة البريطانية من عام 1987 وحتى عام 2003. قام بتغطيات صحفية خاصة من قبيل قمة الشرق الأوسط الاقتصادية في الأردن ومصر ومحادثات سلام الشرق الأوسط في واشنطن. متفرغ حاليا للبحث الأكاديمي الهادف إلى الحصول على درجة دكتوراه من جامعة وستمنستر في لندن.

للمزيد من المعلومات:

للمزيد من المعلومات عن الباحث وبحثه، الرجاء زيارة الصفحة التالية على موقع جامعة وستمنستر: http://www.wmin.ac.uk/sshl/page-2450 . للمزيد من المعلومات عن المؤسسة الدولية لمساعدة الديمقراطية والانتخابات، وعن منهجية البحث المستخدم في تقييم الديمقراطية في دول عديدة، الرجاء زيارة الموقع التالي: http://www.idea.int

كيفية الإجابة عن الأسئلة:

امنح درجة من عشرة للسؤال العام، (10/7 مثلا)

ثم اكتب ما تعتقد أنها السلبية الأكثر في موضوع السؤال، واكتب الايجابية الأكبر، وقدم اقتراحا للتحسين.

سؤال: ما مدى اهتمام الحكومة بحماية البيئة في الأردن؟ (10/7)
السلبية الأكبر: رمي الناس للنفايات في كل مكان.   **الإيجابية الأكبر:** إعادة التدوير.
اقتراح للتحسين: سن قانون لحماية البيئة وفرض غرامات على رمي النفايات.

الرجاء الإجابة عن الأسئلة الخمسة عشر أدناه، وإعادتها لي بالبريد الإلكتروني.

1= هل يوجد اتفاق عام حول المواطنة المشتركة بدون تمييز؟ (- - 10/-).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

2= هل تخضع الدولة والمجتمع لحكم القانون باستمرار؟ (- - 10/-).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

3= هل تتوفر الحقوق السياسية والمدنية للجميع بشكل متساو؟ (- - 10/-).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

4= هل الحقوق الاقتصادية والاجتماعية مضمونة للجميع بشكل متساو؟ (- - 10/-).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

5= هل تعطي الانتخابات للشعب السيطرة على الحكومة وسياستها؟ (- - 10/-).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

6 = هل يساعد النظام الحزبي على توفير الديمقراطية؟ (- - 10/-).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

7= هل الحكومة فعالة في خدمة الشعب والاستجابة لاهتماماته؟ (- - 10/-).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

8= هل البرلمان يساهم بفاعلية في العملية الديمقراطية؟ (- - 10/-).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

9= هل يخضع الجيش وقوات الشرطة لقيادة مسئولين مدنيين؟ (- - 10/-).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

=10= هل ممارسة المسؤوليات العامة خالية من الفساد؟ (- - -/10).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

=11= هل تعمل وسائل الإعلام بطريقة تدعم الديمقراطية وتحافظ عليها؟ (- - -/10).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

=12= هل توجد مشاركة كاملة في الحياة العامة؟ (- - -/10).

(المقصود هنا مدى تنوع الجمعيات الطوعية ومدى المشاركة فيها؛ مشاركة المرأة في الحياة السياسية وتولي المناصب في كل المستويات؛ المساواة بين أبناء الطبقات الاجتماعية في تولي المناصب العامة؛ وما شابه ذلك).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

=13= هل تؤخذ القرارات على المستوى الحكومي الأنسب بالنسبة للمتأثرين بالقرارات؟ (- - -/10).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

=14= هل تسير العلاقات الخارجية للدولة حسب المعايير الديمقراطية، وبعيدا عن الهيمنة الخارجية؟

(-/- - -).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

مقترح للتحسين:

=15= هل تساهم السياسات الخارجية للدولة في تعزيز الديمقراطية عالميا؟ (- - -/10).

الايجابية الأكبر: السلبية الأكبر:

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