Deliberation, Democracy and the Systemic Turn

David Owen and Graham Smith

Deliberative democracy as a theoretical enterprise has gone through a series of phases or ‘turns’. The most recent manifestation of this dynamic is the idea of the ‘deliberative system’, of which a variety of formulations have been proposed. An important initial attempt to offer a reflective synthesis of work on deliberative systems is the recent essay, ‘A systemic approach to deliberative democracy’. Co-authored by an impressive range of deliberative theorists (Jane Mansbridge, James Bohman, Simone Chambers, Thomas Christiano, Archon Fung, John Parkinson, Dennis Thompson and Mark Warren), the essay has become a manifesto for the systemic turn (henceforth we refer to the essay as the ‘Manifesto’). In this article, we offer a critical reconstruction of the systemic turn and, more particularly, the theoretical trajectory proposed by the Manifesto. Specifically, we distinguish the characteristics of currently dominant approaches to deliberative systems, arguing that there are good reasons to be cautious concerning the merits of this systemic

---

1 We wish to express our gratitude to Jane Mansbridge who has been generous in offering extensive reflections on several versions of this paper and pushing us to clarify our critique. We would also like to thank André Bächtiger, Simone Chambers, John Dryzek, Archon Fung, Tony Laden, Michael MacKenzie, Peter Neisen, John Parkinson, Tomer Perry and Dennis Thompson for comments on earlier versions as well as audiences at APSA (Chicago 2013), the Harvard Ash Center Democracy Seminar, Stockholm University and the University of Warwick. Thanks are also due to two anonymous referees for their constructive suggestions.

2 Owen, Politics and International Relations, University of Southampton; Smith, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster.


4 Mansbridge et al. 2012.
turn and sceptical in respect of its credentials as an expression of deliberative democracy as a political ideal. We offer a sustained critique of the current trajectory of the deliberative systems literature, before sketching two constructive alternatives.

**Contextualising the Systemic Turn**

The initial wave of work on deliberative democracy focused on the emergence and refinement of the ideal of deliberation and the articulation of deliberative democracy. Conceptual debate over the specification of the nature of the ideal of deliberation continues apace, incorporating, for example, feminist theorists’ expansion of what can reasonably be understood as reason-giving.

In the second phase of scholarship, its ‘empirical turn’, scholars have studied applications of deliberative democracy, including, for example, forms of mini-publics, constitutional courts and legislatures both in open and closed session. Although these studies help clarify the institutional conditions under which good quality deliberation might be enabled, a reasonable criticism is that too often the analysis prioritises ‘discrete instances of deliberation, investigated with little if any attention to their relationship to the system as a whole’.

---

5 Habermas 1996; Cohen 1996; Gutmann and Thompson 1996.

6 E.g., Young 1990.


8 Mansbridge et al. 2012, p. 25; see also Parkinson 2006; Thompson 2008; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014.
Many have seen the systemic turn as a natural development in the life-history of deliberative democracy, a third phase that extends the conception of deliberative democracy to take into account the deliberative characteristics of the political system as a whole. As the Manifesto argues:

No single forum, however ideally constituted could possess deliberative capacity sufficient to legitimate most of the decisions and policies that democracies adopt. To understand the larger goal of deliberation, we suggest that it is necessary to go beyond the study of individual institutions and processes to examine their interaction in the system as a whole. We recognize that most democracies are complex entities in which a wide variety of institutions, associations, and sites of contestation accomplish political work – including informal networks, the media, organized advocacy groups, schools, foundations, private and non-profit institutions, legislatures, executive agencies, and the courts. We thus advocate what may be called a systemic approach to deliberative democracy.⁹

But just as there has been theoretical contestation in the first two waves of deliberative democracy scholarship as to the nature of the deliberative ideal and how and where it should be applied, this is also the case with respect to conceptualizations of the deliberative system. This article provides an overview of, and critical contribution to, this emerging debate.

Theories of deliberative systems

While reference is often made to Mansbridge’s essay ‘Everyday talk in the deliberative system’\textsuperscript{10} as the first time the term ‘deliberative system’ has been used explicitly, a systemic approach to deliberative democracy is already in evidence in Jürgen Habermas’ earlier conceptualisation of deliberative democracy offered in *Beyond Facts and Norms*.\textsuperscript{11} In a conception frequently referred to as the ‘two-track model’ of deliberative democracy, Habermas distinguishes between opinion formation in the informal public sphere and will-formation in formal representative institutions, placing emphasis on the transmission mechanisms between the two spheres of activity.

Mansbridge adopted the term ‘deliberative system’ for a different purpose: as part of a strategy to extend the conception of the type of ‘talk’ that should be considered by deliberative democrats. Her aim is to extend the dominant conception of deliberative democracy in three ways: broadening the forms of communication that fall under our conception of ‘deliberation’; including the wide variety of forms of ‘everyday talk’ addressing matters that should be discussed by the public (including societal norms) within the conception of a deliberative system; and, in so doing, moving the field of deliberative democracy beyond its obsession with formal political forums and processes. In developing a more systemic account, she offers a refrain that is to become common in the deliberative systems literature: ‘the criterion for good deliberation should be not that every interaction

\textsuperscript{10} Mansbridge 1999.

\textsuperscript{11} Habermas 1996.
in the system exhibit mutual respect, consistency, acknowledgement, openmindedness and moral economy, but that the system reflect those goods’. 12

As the idea of the deliberative system developed, we can see the influence of both Habermas and Mansbridge. John Dryzek has been prolific in popularising the systemic turn and in a number of publications has offered a schematisation of the components or elements of a deliberative system that develops Habermas’ original characterisation. His most expansive and recent characterisation of these components is:

• private sphere (akin to the site of Mansbridge’s everyday talk)
• public space
• empowered space
• transmission (from public space to empowered space)
• accountability (of empowered space to public space)
• meta-deliberation (about the deliberative qualities of the system itself)
• decisiveness (in relation to other political forces) 13

For Dryzek, a deliberative system should be judged by the extent to which it is ‘authentic, inclusive and consequential’, 14 although ‘the component parts of a system can themselves be more or less authentically deliberative’. 15 Dryzek’s account of deliberative democracy pays specific attention to the contestation of discourses within public space and the extent to which these discourses are recognised and considered within empowered space. For

12 Ibid., p. 224.


14 Ibid, p.32.

15 Ibid.
Dryzek, along with theorists such as Bohman, the deliberative system is de-centred from a focus on the state, enabling analysis of deliberative systems at any level and form of governance.\(^{16}\)

Variations on the systems approach are offered by Goodin and by Parkinson, who both draw on and develop the idea of sequences. For Goodin, the virtues associated with deliberation can be dispersed between and across different institutions. He explicitly establishes his approach as:

An alternative to the ‘unitary’ model of deliberation that presently dominates discussion among deliberative democrats. In this model of ‘distributed deliberation’, the component deliberative virtues are on display sequentially, over the course of this staged deliberation involving various component parts, rather than continuously and simultaneously present as they would be in the case of a unitary deliberative actor.\(^{17}\)

Using a schematised understanding of the institutions of representative democracy – caucus room, parliamentary debate, election campaign, post-election bargaining – he argues that although none of these institutions alone realises deliberative standards, as a system they express the relevant deliberative qualities. For Goodin, the key is that these qualities or virtues are realised at some point in the system, in the right order or combination and with positive interactions among parts of the sequence.\(^{18}\) Similarly, Parkinson offers an account of a sequence of institutions again using what he recognises as a highly stylised approach to

---

\(^{16}\) Dryzek 2011, p. 227; Bohman 2012, p. 85.

\(^{17}\) Goodin 2008, p. 186.

\(^{18}\) Ibid., p. 201.
the different stages of decision: define, discuss, decide and implement. He argues that different actors – activist networks, experts, bureaucracy, micro-techniques, media, elected assembly, direct techniques – play different roles in each of these stages: \(^{19}\) ‘Each element in such a system may not be perfectly deliberative or democratic in its own right, but may still perform a useful function in the system as a whole’. \(^{20}\) For Parkinson, as with Goodin, the ‘timing and sequencing’ of institutions is critical for the deliberative system. \(^{21}\)

The 2012 Manifesto authored by Mansbridge and her colleagues is an explicit attempt to synthesize these varying accounts of the deliberative system. \(^{22}\) They offer the following definition of a ‘deliberative system’:

> A system here means a set of distinguishable, differentiated, but to some degree interdependent parts, often with distributed functions and a division of labor, connected in such a way as to form a complex whole. It requires both differentiation and integration among the parts. It requires some functional division of labor, so that some parts do work that others cannot do so well. And it requires some relational interdependence, so that a change in one component will bring about change in some others. A deliberative system is one that encompasses a talk-based approach to political conflict and problem solving – through arguing, demonstrating, expressing, and persuading. In a good deliberative system, persuasion that raises relevant considerations should replace suppression, oppression, and thoughtless

---

\(^{19}\) Parkinson 2006, pp. 166-73.

\(^{20}\) Ibid., p. 7.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., p. 165. See also Bächtiger et al. 2010, p. 59.

\(^{22}\) The first footnote in the 2012 essay highlights these and other precursors (Mansbridge et al. 2012, p. 2).
neglect. Normatively, a systemic approach means that the system should be judged as a whole in addition to the parts being judged independently. We need to ask not only what good deliberation would be both in general and in particular settings, but also what a good deliberative system would entail.\(^\text{23}\)

The authors of the Manifesto argue that this approach can be applied to systems understood as sets of institutions or issue-areas. The elements of the deliberative system that they highlight indicate the influence and development of the earlier accounts of both Habermas and Mansbridge:

Deliberative systems include, roughly speaking, four main arenas: the binding decisions of the state (both in law itself and its implementation); activities directly related to preparing for those decisions; informal talk related to those binding decisions; and arenas of formal or informal talk related to decisions on issues of common concern that are not intended for binding decisions by the state.\(^\text{24}\)

By focusing on Mansbridge’s contributions to the development of the systems approach, we can see a significant change in emphasis in how the deliberative system is conceptualised: from a concern with an _expansive_ account of deliberation to a _systemic_ account of deliberative democracy. In her 1999 essay, the expansive account foregrounds two points. The first draws attention to the fact that talk in its everyday sense can be part of a process of practical reasoning in some formal or informal group oriented to practical judgment, and that the larger deliberative system can correspondingly be understood as a process that includes many forms of exchanging reasons between equals oriented to a shared practical

\(^{23}\) Mansbridge et al. 2012, pp. 4-5.

\(^{24}\) Ibid., p. 9.
judgment. Deliberative democracy, which is concerned with the mutual reasoning of citizens qua citizen, is simply one species of communication within a deliberative system. Hence, there is no necessary connection between the parts of the deliberative system and either governmental settings or binding decision-making. The second point is that deliberation does not occur in isolation but is situated within a wider context characterised by a plurality of non-deliberative forms of discursive action and interaction that shapes it in various ways that are liable to affect its quality. Hence, anyone concerned with deliberative democracy must also be concerned with the wider discursive context – and indeed the institutions and practices that structure that wider context. Reference to a ‘deliberative system’ on this expansive view is a shorthand way of foregrounding these points.

A more explicitly systems-level approach is proposed in the 2012 Manifesto as well as the broader literature on deliberative systems. This systemic account advances an altogether stronger claim, namely, that the discursive totality (including everyday talk, formal deliberation, and the discursive context in which all of these forms of communication take place) can itself be treated as a system of deliberation. On this view, practices that are not themselves deliberative can be seen from a systemic perspective as constitutive elements of a deliberative process that issues in societal decisions and can be judged by the kind of criteria that we standardly apply to deliberative democratic practices.

**Deliberative systems and the ideal of deliberative democracy**

Our critique of the systemic approach to deliberative systems is that this turn, as currently elaborated, stands in a relation of considerable tension to deliberative democracy as a
political ideal. We offer a number of interconnected criticisms sharing a common concern that, with the systemic turn, deliberative democracy threatens to lose its normative moorings. The currently dominant articulations of the deliberative system could, we argue, result in judging a system as deliberative with little, or even nothing, in the way of actual democratic deliberation between citizens taking place. This would be an ironic outcome indeed given the classic commitment of deliberative democrats to, what Mansbridge calls, ‘a democratic theory that puts the citizen at the center’. In our analysis, we take as the core justification of deliberative democracy as a political ideal that the legitimacy of our collective political arrangements (institutions, laws, policies) rests on mutual justification enacted through deliberative practices amongst free and equal citizens. We argue that this political ideal is easily lost in the current articulations of the deliberative system.

Our analysis turns primarily on the way in which deliberative systems theorists consider non-deliberative speech acts and practices. While we share with these theorists the insight that it is crucial to be attentive to the ways in which non-deliberative acts and practices enable or disable democratic deliberation, the manner in which dominant accounts of the deliberative system consider these non-deliberative elements generates significant problems that places proponents in an uncomfortable position vis-à-vis the central tenets of deliberative democratic theory.

---

Deliberative Dilemmas I

What Goodin and Dryzek (and those who follow their approaches) share is a desire to judge the deliberative system *at the level of the system*; in other words, to apply criteria drawn from the theory of deliberative democracy to the system as a whole. Consider, first, the ‘distributed deliberation’ model proposed by Goodin. As the name implies, this approach breaks down the ‘unitary’ notion of democratic deliberation into its constituent elements and looks at the ‘distribution’ of these elements across a range of institutions. Non-deliberative speech acts and practices may have an important role to play in such sequences and, indeed, may be constitutive of the overall ‘distributed deliberative’ quality of the system. Thompson has raised cogent doubts as to whether the division of deliberative labour assumed in such a distributed account can be sustained and effectively coordinated, however, our particular concern is that within this conception of a deliberative system, no actual deliberation between citizens need take place as long as the process embodied in the sequenced institutions is *functionally equivalent* to a deliberative democratic exchange. In this somewhat reductionist approach, democratic deliberation is conceived instrumentally as a way of generating decisions that are sensitive to the relevant range of public reasons. Because only the end of appropriately sensitive decisions matters, any functionally equivalent democratic way of generating this end will count as equally legitimate. The model does not rule out the inclusion of deliberative institutions within a sequence, but does not require their inclusion.

Such a ‘distributed’ approach to deliberative systems sets aside any concern for the deliberative capacities and powers of citizens. It thus loses sight of two important points.

First, part of the political ideal of deliberative democracy is that its (normative) stability is generated by citizens being able intelligibly to conceive of (adopt a stance towards) themselves as equals engaged in a process of public reasoning oriented to a shared practical judgment, where such a process involves citizens reflectively taking up each other’s standpoints. Second, part of the importance of actual (unitary) deliberation as a practice of public reasoning is that it is a creative process in which novel shared reasons can emerge within the activity of reasoning together as equals. The reasons to which rule is responsive are liable to be process-dependent and bound to whether citizens in such a process can conceive of themselves as reasoning together as equals. There is no reason to think that a ‘distributed deliberation’ process would track this aspect of unitary deliberation. The difference is between ‘we, together’ (unitary deliberation) and ‘we, all’ (distributed deliberation) – a difference that might be glossed in terms of Rousseau’s distinction between the general will and the will of all. If this is the case, we have reason to be sceptical of the claim of functional equivalence that a ‘distributed’ process of the kind envisaged by Goodin simply assumes. In this respect, although the ‘distributed deliberation’ approach may be a cogent piece of institutional design for a democratic system, it has a problematic relation to deliberative democracy as a political ideal. It essentially presupposes (perhaps on Humean grounds) that ‘reasoning together’ is not realistically attainable and is offered as a ‘second best’ response to this condition.

Compare Goodin’s distributed deliberation model with Parkinson’s account of the different decision stages of a deliberative system. Parkinson appears to be following Goodin’s focus on system-level analysis, with the timing and sequencing of the contributions of different actors being critical in judging deliberative quality. However, he argues: ‘it would be a
strange deliberative system indeed if none of its elements met deliberative democratic
criteria.27 Goodin’s ‘deliberative Schumpeterianism’ sequence28 is one such ‘strange
deliberative system’. What distinguishes Parkinson’s account, therefore, is his incorporation
of civic practices of reasoning together within the sequential system.29

If Goodin represents one variant of systems-level analysis in deliberative systems theory,
then those inspired by a more Habermasian model offer a second approach. In its simplest
formulation the idea is that the full range of discourses are present within (using Dryzek’s
language) public space and that the deliberative quality of the system rests on the inclusion
and reflection of these discourses in empowered space where political decisions are
enacted. Parkinson offers a succinct characterisation of this type of approach:

A system with a division of labor is deliberative to the extent that it increases the
pool of perspectives, claims, narratives, and reasons available to decision makers,
and whether those perspectives are generated deliberatively or not is neither here
nor there so long as the decision-makers’ processes themselves are deliberative.30

This position shares Goodin’s commitment to a systemic locus for judgments of deliberative
democracy but introduces deliberation, in the ‘unitary’ sense, in the final decision-making
processes. In this respect, it seems prima facie to cohere with deliberative democracy as a
political ideal. The ideal of unitary empowered space in which all perspectives are present

28 Goodin 2005, p. 202
resonates with Dryzek and Simon Niemeyer’s idea of a ‘chamber of discourses’ as well as Bohman’s argument for the insertion of mini-demoi within systems of trans-national governance.

In this type of approach, there are two criteria governing the comparative evaluation of deliberative systems: (a) the quality of deliberation amongst decision-makers which is, in part, dependent on (b) the quantity of ‘perspectives, claims, narratives, and reasons’ that the system makes available for their consideration. There are two immediate problems with this view.

The first problem is that it treats ‘perspectives, claims, narratives, and reasons’ as if these were given, independent of political structures, simply waiting to be uncovered. The plurality of perspectives, claims, narratives, and reasons that characterise a political society cannot however plausibly be construed as independent of the social and political institutions and practices of that society. Imagine an institutional reform that generates more perspectives, claims, narratives, and reasons for the decision-making body to consider. On this view, it follows that this reform has necessarily improved the quality of the deliberative system, whereas it may simply be the case that the reform has further fragmented and/or polarised political society.

A second and related problem is that many crucial features of a political system depend on the capacity of citizens to deliberate to produce the perspectives, claims, narratives and reasons on which the decision-makers depend, the capacity of citizens to (s)elect good decision-makers, and the capacity of those decision-makers to deliberate cogently. These

\[31\] Dryzek 2010, pp. 42-65.

\[32\] Bohman 2012, p. 87.
capacities themselves depend on the extent to which deliberation is a feature of political society outside of the decision-making body. By simply eliding this point, this approach renders itself unable to address a central issue for any deliberative system: that of the production and distribution of deliberative capacities. Both of these problems might be overcome if we turn to Dryzek’s recent influential accounts of the deliberative system, which share a similar Habermasian distinction between opinion formation in the informal public sphere and will-formation in formal institutions. However, a more fundamental problem remains: the question of the evaluation of non-deliberative acts and practices.

Dryzek is explicit that in his model of the deliberative system, ‘the systemic test should take priority’. One of the attractions of the systemic turn is that it promises to develop the entirely plausible claim that non-deliberative speech acts and practices may well have positive systemic properties: ‘taking a systems perspective means that we should be alive to the possibility that intrinsically non-deliberative acts or practices may have consequences that are positive for the deliberative qualities of the system as a whole’. As such this position foregrounds the function of any communicative input in considering systematic deliberative properties. Dryzek makes this point clear. In discussing the often extreme rhetoric of the populist Australian politician Pauline Hanson (and in a similar vein, the sectarian rhetoric in the lead-up to the 1998 Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland), Dryzek distinguishes between the intent and the systemic effects of Hanson’s rhetoric:

She has little in the way of commitment to any categorical deliberative norms, and was not averse to racial stereotyping. Yet the net result of her activities was a more

33 Dryzek 2010, p. 82.

34 Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, pp. 32-33; see also Dryzek 2011, pp. 226-7.
deliberative polity, at least in the sense that a number of discourses that were either taken for granted or had yet to crystallize or had been marginalized took shape in a way that *could* have allowed for their engagement in the public sphere (though the *actual* interchange that occurred was not always salutary). The general point here is that we cannot read off the systemic effects of rhetoric from the intentions of the speaker.\(^{35}\)

The prevalence of non-deliberative speech acts of the type exemplified by Hanson is likely to be symptomatic of deliberative failures, that is, of a constituency who feel excluded from the democratic system – and this has functional value. However the claim being advanced by deliberative systems theorists is the stronger one that such non-deliberative acts, independent of their symptomatic value, can improve the overall quality of the deliberative system.\(^{36}\) The key feature of a deliberative system for Dryzek then is that the full range of discourses emerge within public space and are considered within empowered spaces with decisional effect.\(^{37}\)

Although such a systems-level account is one logical response to the question of evaluating deliberative systems, the dilemma is that it all too easily becomes a functional defence of non-deliberative acts and practices that does not cohere with even the minimal requirements of mutual respect that all theorists consider central to deliberation per se. As

\(^{35}\) Dryzek 2010, p. 82. See also Bohman 2012, p.85.

\(^{36}\) We thank an anonymous referee for pressing us on this issue.

\(^{37}\) There is a degree of ambiguity in Dryzek’s work about whether he is concerned about how those discourses emerge. If he is serious about a systems level evaluation, then this may be of little concern and all that is important is that the full variety of discourses are present and considered within the system. However, occasionally it appears that the deliberative quality of the parts is of concern.
in the case of Pauline Hanson, the acts defended by deliberative democrats may involve epistemic or hermeneutic injustice\textsuperscript{38} that encourage or reproduce the marginalisation or oppression of vulnerable groups. To avoid such an implication, Dryzek,\textsuperscript{39} following Thompson, appeals to ‘meta-deliberative’ justifications of non-deliberative practices. We should ‘not insist that every practice in a deliberative democracy be deliberative, but that every practice should at some point in time be deliberatively justified’.\textsuperscript{40} The challenge, however, is how such meta-deliberation is to be established and sustained: Dryzek recognizes that such ‘deep and widespread reflection and debate about the character of the system’ are rare moments and typically relate to constitutional crisis.\textsuperscript{41} How then to justify more ‘mundane’ non-deliberative acts remains unclear. But the requirement appropriately poses the question of how system and parts are to be judged in relation to each other. Certainly in his more recent work, Dryzek is aware of this problem. As Stevenson and Dryzek argue:

This need to keep an eye on the system as whole when evaluating practices means sometimes forgiving non-deliberative actions. It therefore runs the risk of being too forgiving, by making too much that is non-deliberative seem functional for the system as a whole… The general analytical point here is that we should not leap too

\textsuperscript{38} Fricker 2007.

\textsuperscript{39} Dryzek 2010, p. 12; 2011, pp. 226-7.

\textsuperscript{40} Thompson 2008, p. 515.

\textsuperscript{41} Dryzek 2010, p. 12; Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, p. 29.
soon to find positive deliberative consequences in intrinsically non-deliberative practices.\textsuperscript{42}

One reasonable-looking response to this problem offered by Dryzek is ‘deliberative capacity building’.\textsuperscript{43} However since the criterion that meta-deliberators must apply is that of the ‘deliberative capacity’ of the system as a whole, this way of framing the question ignores the \textit{distribution} of deliberative capacities across the diverse actors who compose the deliberative system, at least beyond the minimal requirement that all discourses should be represented (Note again the presumption that discourses are given, waiting to be represented). Such a systemic approach is compatible with highly unequal distributions of deliberative capacity across the demos. One deliberative system will count as better than another if it exhibits greater deliberative capacity in sum, even if the creation of such greater capacity involves a more unequal distribution of deliberative capacity across the relevant actors. This neglect of what can be termed ‘deliberative equality’ is hard to square with the requirement that the subjects of a deliberative democracy can coherently represent themselves to each other as the equal co-authors of the rule to which they are subject. Indeed, the problem can be seen as an analogue of Rawls’ objection to utilitarianism, namely, it does not take the distinction between persons seriously.\textsuperscript{44}

We can summarise our objection briefly. In embracing the function of non-deliberative communicative acts, deliberative systems theorists often fail to recognise and account for the \textit{deliberative wrongs} that such acts involve and the harm that they frequently cause.

\textsuperscript{42} Stevenson and Dryzek 2014, p. 33.

\textsuperscript{43} Dryzek 2010.

\textsuperscript{44} See Laden 2004.
Pauline Hanson’s populist rhetoric, for example, was regularly racist, often targeting particularly vulnerable social groups. Recognising the deliberative function of this rhetoric in opening up the public sphere requires overlooking, or trading off, a deliberative wrong that both instrumentally and constitutively undermines the standing of these targets as free and equal members of the democratic polity. Thus in defending the ‘systemic’ deliberative function of non-deliberative speech acts, deliberative systems theorists face the real danger of treating certain subjects as means to ‘deliberative’ ends. The appeal to meta-deliberation invoked to address this problem simply reproduces the neglect of the distinction between persons that the initial problem exhibits. For a theory that rests on ideals of autonomy and mutual respect for the subject, such conclusions are uncomfortable at best. There may be democratic justifications for such acts and practices, but the onus of justification is on deliberative democrats to offer an account of the circumstances in which these can be deliberative democratic justifications.

**Deliberative dilemmas II**

The authors of the Manifesto follow the systems-level theorists in recognising the way in which non-deliberative acts and practices may strengthen the overall deliberative quality of the system:

A systemic approach allows us to analyze the division of labor among parts of the system, each with its different deliberative strengths and weaknesses, and to conclude that a single part, which in itself may have low or even negative deliberative quality with respect to one of several deliberative ideals, may
nevertheless make an important contribution to an overall deliberative system. For example, highly partisan rhetoric, even while violating some deliberative ideals, may nonetheless help to fulfill other deliberative ideals such as inclusion.\textsuperscript{45}

However, it is clear that they are chary of an approach to evaluation of deliberative systems conducted solely at the systemic level, arguing for a synthesis of judgments of whole and parts.\textsuperscript{46}

Normatively, a systemic approach means that the system should be judged as a whole in addition to the parts being judged independently. We need to ask not only what good deliberation would be both in general and in particular settings, but also what a good deliberative system would entail.\textsuperscript{47}

Like the systemic accounts that we have already encountered, the Manifesto authors consider the way in which a communicative input that in its own terms is difficult to justify from a deliberative perspective – for example highly partisan media and rhetoric – may well help realise particular deliberative qualities when considered in systemic terms. However,

\textsuperscript{45} Mansbridge et al. 2012, pp. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{46} In this analysis, we put to one side a series of problems related to the specification of systems (simply, what is in and what is out) and the potential interactions between different systems (Young 2007; Owen 2010). The Manifesto’s desire to define the system in terms of either institutions or issues generates little analytical clarity as to how far deliberative systems extend or their potential interaction with other systems (e.g. legal, economic, or kinship systems). The same is true of identifying what is a ‘part’ and how this interacts with the system(s).

\textsuperscript{47} Mansbridge et al. 2012, pp. 4-5, our emphasis.
they recognise the dangers implicit in focusing too heavily on the function of communicative acts at the systemic level alone:

A systemic analysis must be able to make judgments and must have the analytic tools to do so. Without criteria to evaluate when non-deliberative, weakly deliberative, or even anti-deliberative behaviour nevertheless enhances the deliberative system, one risks falling into the blind spot of old style functionalism: everything can be seen as, in one way or another, contributing to the system.48

The authors make this point in a discussion of the potential systemic contribution of ‘certain disruptive and only weakly civil Radical Left or Tea Party protests... if they can be reasonably understood as giving voice to a minority opinion long ignored in the public sphere, or in bringing more and better important information into the public arena’.49 They continue: ‘In this analysis much would depend on a combination of empirical and conceptual-analytic findings regarding the short-run and long-run inequalities redressed by the protesters and the short-run and long-run chilling effects of their actions upon deliberation’.50

Three criteria are sketched to guide judgments of the deliberative system: its ‘epistemic, ethical, and democratic functions’.51 Just as Mansbridge argued should be the case for the analysis of everyday talk in her earlier 1999 essay, the criteria for analysing the deliberative system are here modified and loosened. They are far weaker than the standards usually articulated within theories of deliberative democracy and, as they currently stand, these

48 Ibid., p. 19.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 11.
criteria give us little purchase in guiding our judgments on either the justification of non-deliberative speech acts and practices or the relative weight to give these particular acts and practices as against the deliberative system as a whole.\textsuperscript{52}

In this essay it is not our intention to develop such criteria and standards. We suggest only that theorists who take a systemic approach to the deliberative system have much more work to do in order to develop an analytical framework within which the justification of the inclusion of non-deliberative speech acts and practices can be addressed. It is always possible to point to ways in which non-deliberative communicative acts are, or can be, precursors to more deliberative conditions. As we have seen, much of the discussion within the deliberative systems literature draws on apparently counter-intuitive examples of the contributions of unreasonable rhetoric, partisan media, disruptive activities and the like, stressing (rightly) that systemic effects cannot simply be read off from the actor’s intentions. Although we agree with this larger point, we argue that proponents of the systemic approach need not only to provide evidence that any particular non-deliberative speech act is to be preferred to speech acts that that have more deliberative qualities (simply indicating that non-deliberative acts can play a causal role in generating functionally beneficial deliberative effects is hardly sufficient), but also to develop appropriate normative criteria for determining when deviations from deliberative norms are legitimate.

In some situations non-deliberative acts and practices may be justified from a deliberative perspective. For example, Fung cogently argues that unreasonable acts by the oppressed and disenfranchised can be justified to the extent that current political circumstances are

\textsuperscript{52} This objection was raised by Gutmann and Thompson (1999, p. 274) in their response to Mansbridge’s 1999 essay and remains salient.
characterised by material and political inequality and failures of reciprocity. Indeed, ‘the extent of permissible deviation from deliberative norms increases according to the adversity of political circumstances’. Fung’s argument is explicitly driven by the normative ideal of deliberative democracy; it asks what deviations from deliberative norms can be justified in terms of the deliberative democratic ideal given current non-ideal conditions. This form of meta-deliberative justification provides an example of the kind of criteria that systemic theorists need to develop if their project is not to collapse into what they acknowledge as the incoherencies of ‘old style functionalism’.

For the reasons given above, we contend that it is important how perspectives are generated. Thus, deliberative systems theorists need show why non-deliberative processes are to be favoured over potentially deliberative ones with an account that does not conduct its evaluation only at the systemic level. Any such account should indicate how to evaluate the trade-off between the deliberative quality of the parts and of the system as a whole and do so by reference to the deliberative democratic ideal. It should suggest ways of assessing both the value of non-deliberative practices and any deliberative wrongs they may involve. It should, in particular, consider potential deliberative alternatives to any practices that involve deliberative wrongs.

One possible way of addressing these concerns is to argue that, barring circumstances of the type highlighted by Fung, any component part of a deliberative system should achieve a ‘deliberative minimum’. The Manifesto provides some indication of such an idea in the way in which it briefly treats mutual respect as part of the ‘ethical’ criteria for judging a

53 Fung 2005, p. 397; see also Bächtiger et al. 2010, p. 59.
deliberative system. This is one of the few occasions in which these criteria for judgment refer to a ‘thicker’ conception of deliberation:

We stress mutual respect, however, because even more than other ethical considerations, it is intrinsically a part of deliberation. To deliberate with another is to understand the other as a self-authoring source of reasons and claims. To fail to grant to another the moral status of authorship is, in effect, to remove oneself from the possibility of deliberative influence. By the same token, being open to being moved by the words of another is to respect the other as a source of reasons, claims and perspectives.\footnote{Ibid., p. 11.}

This crucial point expresses the core of the objection we have to evaluation solely at the systemic level. However, the Manifesto leaves it unclear what this stress on the importance of mutual respect could amount to given the types of activities – e.g. forms of highly partisan media and protest – that the authors are willing to include within their discussion of the deliberative system. Any account of mutual respect compatible with, for example, the radical populist rhetoric of the Tea Party is likely to be so thin as to be negligible. However, if we drop the ‘deliberative minimum’ and consider ‘mutual respect’ solely at the systemic level, then it is entirely plausible that one system may exhibit greater overall mutual respect than another while also exhibiting a greater lack of respect in regard to a specific group. Either an appeal to mutual respect disavows such rhetoric (a deliberative minimum is in place except under the kinds of circumstance specified by Fung) or a systemic approach aims to increase the overall level of mutual respect in the system even if this is maximised
through active disrespect to certain groups of subjects within the polity (empirically, often the most vulnerable).

A final uncomfortable conclusion emerges from these considerations of the deliberative system. As we pointed out earlier, it might be possible to imagine a deliberative system – one that realises the generally weak criteria offered by Mansbridge et al. – without any actual democratic deliberation between citizens taking place. We can certainly see this in the sequence of institutions offered by Goodin, a model that he ‘semi-provocatively dubbed “deliberative Schumpeterianism”’.\(^\text{56}\) The only role for citizens in his schematic sequence of the institutions of representative democracy relates to voting in the election campaign in which competing party platforms are presented. Deliberation occurs only between elite actors. Similarly, the type of account offered by Dryzek and Bohman pays little attention to the way in which perspectives emerge from public space, and deliberation in empowered space may be some distance from citizens. In her contribution to the *Deliberative Systems* volume, Chambers focuses on the potential of social science surveys of public opinion to enable mass democracy.\(^\text{57}\) Commenting on this idea in his conclusion to the collection, Parkinson notes that it ‘would be ironic indeed’ if we could imagine a deliberative system in which public participation were generally passive.\(^\text{58}\) Yet this possibility remains live given the manner in which the deliberative system is typically articulated. Our critique is continuous with the concern of André Bächtiger and colleagues that in loosening the account of deliberation, ‘One danger is that almost every communicative act may qualify as


\(^\text{57}\) Chambers 2012.

\(^\text{58}\) Parkinson 2012, pp. 151-2.
'deliberative’ (at least in function), leading to the problem of concept stretching\textsuperscript{59} and conceptual confusion between deliberative and non-deliberative speech acts and practices. However, it goes considerably further in drawing attention to the normative costs that currently accompany the systemic approach and its unmooring from the ideal of deliberative democracy.

On the one hand, our analysis has exposed weaknesses in the conceptualisations of deliberative systems that dominate current debates within deliberative scholarship. It may be that theorists of deliberative systems are able to counter these concerns, offering more suitable and robust criteria for judging deliberative quality at the systemic level that deal more adequately with non-deliberative acts and practices. This is a relatively young theoretical enterprise: time may lead to the generation of more theoretically robust accounts. On the other hand, precisely because this is a relatively new theoretical endeavour, it is valuable to sketch systemic alternatives that offer significant contrasts to existing formulations such as those we have reviewed thus far. We offer two such alternatives. The first remains within the normative framework of deliberative democracy, while the second poses a more radical challenge to the articulation of democratic ideals such as deliberative democracy and proposes that thinking through the systemic turn may require adapting the kind of theoretical enterprise in which democratic theorists engage.

\textsuperscript{59} Bächtiger et al. 2010, p. 48.
An alternative systemic formulation I: The deliberative stance and the deliberative system

In the opening section of this article, we noted that Mansbridge’s 1999 essay that introduced the term deliberative system intends this concept to serve in fostering a citizen-centred democratic theory and sketches what we have called an expansive approach to deliberative systems which uses this concept to draw attention to two points. First, that deliberative democracy is simply one species of the genus of democratic deliberation (i.e. deliberation between equals orientated to a shared practical judgment) and can be extended to aspects of everyday talk. Second, that anyone concerned with deliberative democracy must also be concerned with the wider context of discursive action and interaction that shapes and affects its quality. In this section, we briefly elaborate this expansive conception of deliberative systems in order to articulate an approach to theorising deliberative systems that maintains its relationship to the normative core of deliberative democracy as an ideal.

To begin sketching this alternative, we start with the presumption that it is crucial to distinguish between democratic deliberation and the broader discursive system, where the latter might be seen as the ‘scaffolding’ or ‘support’ for deliberation. This does not entail falling back on the highly delimited account of deliberation within some ideal theoretical accounts: the scope of democratic deliberation can encompass empowered space, public space and/or everyday talk. However, in contrast to Mansbridge’s account from 1999 of everyday talk in which she is willing to loosen the criteria for deliberation to encompass a broad range of talk, we have a more restricted account of the type of everyday talk that can be considered deliberation, namely, forms of political talk that involve taking what we term a ‘deliberative stance’, namely, a relation to others as equals engaged in the mutual
exchange of reasons oriented as if to reaching a shared practical judgment. This stance is not restricted to any particular setting, formal or informal, decision-making or not, although its demands on individuals will vary across such settings dependent on the norms that structure the context of discursive interaction and the extent to which these norms are institutionally entrenched. Our interest is in the extent to which citizens have the capacity and disposition to take up a deliberative stance, whether towards actual formal decisions or towards issues that ought to be subject to public consideration, including extant social norms. 

Such an approach resonates with Mansbridge’s expressed commitment in her turn to everyday talk in ensuring ‘a democratic theory that puts the citizen at the center’, a commitment that we have suggested is overlooked in the more recent systemic turn.

The deliberative stance is a particular type of orientation; one that is challenging and fragile. The aim for deliberative democrats is to consider the ways in which the system enables (or obstructs) the deliberative stance on the part of citizens. We agree with Mansbridge that it is crucial to focus on democratic deliberation (in our sense) in the everyday, particularly because unlike deliberation in many formal institutional settings, the rituals and structures that inculcate and cultivate the deliberative stance are likely to be less resilient. In other words, we need to better understand the challenges of adopting and cultivating the deliberative stance within the unruly politics of social life. The kinds of forces that the Manifesto focuses on in its account of the deliberative system are thus worthy of investigation, but in terms of the role they play in upholding or undermining democratic deliberation. So, for example, to what extent and under what circumstances do

---

60 See Chambers 2012, p. 61 for a similar formulation.

partisanship, expertise, consumption practices and the like sustain or undermine the conditions for taking up a deliberative stance? To what extent does the existing discursive field enable a deliberative stance? Such factors will be constitutive of the sites and occasions of democratic deliberation; but are not themselves forms of democratic deliberation.

This expansive approach ties the concept of a deliberative system much more closely to the normative core of deliberative democratic theory. This contrasts with systemic approaches that fail to attend to the capacity and disposition to adopt the deliberative stance, that do not adequately recognise democratic deliberation as a distinct type of activity or practice: a practice which itself must be practiced. Attending to the deliberative stance gives us a way of better understanding this practice and the conditions for its cultivation. However, where we criticised deliberative systems theorists for the possibility that a system judged to be deliberative may be one in which no (or at least very little) deliberation between citizens actually takes place, they could advance the reciprocal objection that this proposal for thinking about a deliberative system could leave open the possibility of a system within which there are a multitude of sites and occasions for citizen deliberation, but that such deliberation is not empowered in respect of political decision-making within that system.\(^6\)

The objection would be that if we compare two deliberative systems, A might trump B in terms of the overall and distributed capacity of citizens to take up the deliberative stance but that B’s decision-making might be more responsive to citizen deliberation than A. Our stress on the deliberative stance needs to be tied into a conception of the deliberative

\(^6\) We are grateful to Dennis Thompson for this point.
system that integrates the sites and occasions of civic deliberation with those that embody decision-making power.

This way of thinking about the relation between deliberation and the broader political system has a clear affinity with the model of the ‘integrated deliberative system’ briefly sketched by Carolyn Hendriks. But where Hendriks privileges the connections between formal ‘discursive spheres’ such as ‘parliaments, committee meetings, party rooms, stakeholder round tables, expect committees, community fora, public seminars, church events and so on’, we broaden the scope of this approach to encompass the deliberative stance in everyday settings. This is critical if we are to attend adequately to both how perspectives are generated and how capacities are developed.

What are the implications of this approach for judging deliberative systems? In emphasising the capacity and dispositions of citizens to take up the deliberative stance, it considers this capacity and disposition both in terms of democratic society as a whole and in terms of its distribution across democratic society. These two dimensions can, as our discussion of systemic approaches stressed, conflict. However, on this expansive view, the latter (and hence deliberative equality) has presumptive priority. This priority is presumptive because in any particular instance it is open to meta-deliberation (otherwise the deliberative system would not be a democratic system). Crucially though, to be legitimate, such meta-deliberation would itself have to be structured by the general presumption of priority such that those who would be disadvantaged in terms of deliberative equality by a particular arrangement of overall deliberative capacity would enjoy a degree of power, for example a qualified veto right, over the decision to adopt that arrangement. It is in this way that the

---

commitment to the distinction between persons in the normative core of deliberative
democracy retains its place in the notion of a deliberative system.

**An alternative systemic formulation II: Deliberation within the democratic system**

According to its advocates, much of the motivation of the systemic turn is in response to the
limited account of deliberative democracy that emerged from the second wave; from the
tendency to focus on single forums, be they innovative mini-publics or more traditional
parliaments and courts. As Stevenson and Dryzek argue: ‘it may be expecting too much of
any single forum to redeem the promise of deliberative democracy – especially in a complex
world of multi-level governance’. For Chambers, though, the focus on discrete sites or
initiatives represents attention to *democratic deliberation as an institutional practice* rather
than to *deliberative democracy as a political ideal*. Chamber’s point is an acute one but it
can cut both ways. One of the features that emerges from the focus on institutionalised
forms of democratic innovation is a concern that abstract and idealising normative theories
of democracy, such as deliberative democracy, offer a set of principles and rules that
provide only a partial analysis of our democratic condition and over-simplify the complexity
of democratic practice. From this standpoint, and acknowledging the limitations of the
single institution focus of the ‘second wave’, the systemic turn in democratic theory need
not direct us to the project of ‘deliberative systems’ but rather to a recasting of the form of
normative theorising in which we are engaged to what Thompson has called ‘institutional

---


political theory’.\textsuperscript{66} This is a form of theorising that stays close to actual democratic institutions and practices, building an acknowledgment of the feasibility constraints of this focus into the construction of its democratic ideal.

Consider briefly the relationship between deliberative and aggregative models of democracy. Deliberative democrats have generated a powerful critique of the tendency within democratic theory to privilege the aggregation of preferences as a mode of legitimization with little consideration to the process of formation of those preferences. But in presenting this critique as ‘deliberative versus aggregative’ democracy, they pay a price. As Warren contends:

The costs of this initial framing to the development of deliberative democracy have been high. The problem is partly substantive: deliberation and voting accomplish different political tasks. But the problem is also about theoretical strategy: framing the debate in terms of ‘models’ has led to theoretical closure around partial mechanisms of democracy.\textsuperscript{67}

Moving beyond ‘models’ thinking – the idea that deliberative (or any other theory of) democracy captures all relevant aspects of democratic practice – democratic deliberation can be understood as one amongst many practices through which democratic institutions and systems realise a range of democratic goods.\textsuperscript{68} It is not the only democratic practice and will not always be appropriate. Similarly, Warren argues that democratic systems have at

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{66} Thompson 2002.

\textsuperscript{67} Warren 2014, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{68} Smith 2009.
\end{flushleft}
their disposal a limited range of mechanisms to realise critical democratic functions. Deliberation is one of those mechanisms; while it is particularly important to achieving certain functions, for example communication and will formation, it is of less value in realising others.

The systemic question thus becomes one of the role of deliberation within democratic systems, rather than whether democratic systems are deliberative in nature. Relevant questions to pose to a democratic system would include: what is the appropriate place of deliberation within a given democratic system and how can it be embedded, protected and enhanced? What is the requisite balance between deliberation and other modes of interaction and coordination within a given democratic system? Echoing our first alternative to current deliberative systems thinking, the deliberative stance becomes one possible stance amongst many: the question then is when is it appropriate to take up such a stance (rather than, for example, a contestatory or agonistic stance) and what are the institutional settings within which this and other stances might be encouraged?

These questions and the responses to them are contextual, tied to the particular composition of a given democratic system and its similarities to, and differences from, other democratic systems. In contrast to the ‘grand theory’ of deliberative systems, this alternative form of systemic turn directs us to the comparative project of working through the roles and sites of democratic deliberation in different democratic systems, that is, to building normative democratic theory in close relation to comparative analysis of

---

69 Warren 2014.

70 It is interesting to note that Warren, one of the co-authors of the Manifesto, appears to have shifted away from the approach articulated in that essay.
democratic practice. Such an approach to systemic analysis has the advantage of being clear as to the nature of deliberation (it avoids the twin dangers of ‘concept-stretching’ and ‘criteria weakening’ to which much of the deliberative systems literature is prone) but also the limitations that the idealisation of deliberation and deliberative criteria can involve.

Conclusion

In summary, let us be clear about what we have and have not claimed. This essay poses two challenges to systemic theories of deliberative democracy. The first challenge consists in identifying a problem with the relationship of existing dominant variants to deliberative democracy as a political ideal. We argue that paying attention to the emphasis on the functional value of non-deliberative practices in currently dominant systemic approaches reveals their neglect of the normative significance of practices of deliberation between citizens and of the distribution of deliberative capacities and mutual respect. While we recognise that the Manifesto acknowledges this tendency, we also contend that its initial efforts to address this problem are unconvincing. We do not claim that the systemic approach cannot develop the conceptual and normative tools needed. Indeed, in introducing ideas such as the ‘deliberative minimum’ we offer an example of the kind of work necessary for this task. We stress that the burden lies on theorists of the deliberative system to provide criteria that are robust enough to guide judgment but are intelligible expressions of the normative core of deliberative democracy.

Our second challenge to the systemic approach consists in sketching two contrasting approaches that are worthy of consideration as the systemic turn gathers pace. The first is
located firmly within the deliberative democracy tradition; one that places the citizen at the centre of deliberative systems thinking, focusing on the cultivation of ‘deliberative stance’ among citizens in their formal and informal civic interactions. The second alternative steps away from the deliberative system as the organising idea and focuses instead on deliberation within the democratic system. Such an orientation is an example of institutional democratic theory where deliberation is recognised as one amongst a number of democratic practices through which the goods or functions of democratic systems are realised. The value of these two sketches, we propose, is to make explicit the fact that adopting a systemic approach involves a number of conceptual and methodological choices that have implications for our understanding of deliberation, of democracy and of their relationship; and that different, perhaps more attractive, choices are available. We offer some defeasible reasons for making different choices, choices that issue in an approach to systemic analysis that puts the citizen at the heart of considerations of deliberation and of democracy. Whether either of these alternatives are judged attractive, they suffice to demonstrate, at this early stage of research on deliberative systems, that reflection and debate on the assumption and presuppositions that structure distinct approaches to, and conceptions of, systemic analysis is necessary for the flourishing of this third turn in the intellectual history of theorizing the relationship of deliberation and democracy.

**Bibliography**


available at

<http://www.southampton.ac.uk/C2G2/media/2011%20discussion%20papers/Owe
n%20-%20Responsibilities%20of%20Justice.pdf>.


Participation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Steiner, Jürg, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli and Marco R. Steenbergen. 2004.

*Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse*. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

Stevenson, Hayley and John Dryzek. 2014. *Democratizing Global Climate Governance*.

Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Thompson, Dennis F. 2008. Deliberative democratic theory and empirical political science.


the University of Amsterdam (20 May 2014).

Press.