

WestminsterResearch

<http://www.westminster.ac.uk/westminsterresearch>

**Hegemony of BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera's Framing of Protests in
China: The Cases of Wukan and Hong Kong
Zhang, Ruiyue**

This is a PhD thesis awarded by the University of Westminster.

© Ms Ruiyue Zhang, 2023.

<https://doi.org/10.34737/w41z4>

The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or copyright owners.

UNIVERSITY OF WESTMINSTER (CAMRI)

Working title:

Hegemony of BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera's Framing of Protests in China:

The Cases of Wukan and Hong Kong

By Ruiyue Zhang(w163158462)

SUPERVISORS

1. Winston Mano (PhD)
2. Xin Xin (PhD)

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professor Winston Mano, my first supervisor, for his dedicated efforts to lead me on this path via face-to-face lecturing and supervision. He has also given me great encouragement and reassurance during the hard times. I feel honoured to be led by his aspiration to give more voices to the second and third world, and I want to continue this path, no matter what lies ahead.

I also want to thank my second supervisor, Dr Xin Xin, who gave me inspirations on globalisation and ideology, and strengthened my belief that I could finish my research ahead of time.

I am grateful for the academic help from Dr Anthony Mcnicholas and Dr Alessandro D'Arma, who gave me some helpful suggestions during my PhD journey. I want to especially thank my Internal Examiner Dr Anastasia Denisova, who read my thesis meticulously and gave me many constructive ideas during the annual progress reviews. I am equally grateful to Professor Jingrong Tong for acting as my External Examiner.

Furthermore, I want to thank the University of Westminster for providing a good academic environment with all the necessary resources and facilities.

I want to extend my special thanks to the Fusion Table Tennis Club, which has provided me with the physical and mental health to finish my PhD. It has taught me that success has to come with perseverance and hard work. It also gives me a family in England, with whom I have spent my birthdays and Christmas.

I would like to thank my parents, and especially my mother for her unconditional support. She has been encouraging me to take up the challenge and to strive for the life that I've envisioned for myself. I also want to thank my closest friend, Chloe, who always believes in me and comforts me through tough times, even if we are at the two ends of the globe most of the time.

Lastly, I want to thank God, for granting the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to change the things I can, and the wisdom to know the difference.

Abstract

This study focuses on how the global news media report on protests in China. It contributes an original analysis of the global news media coverage of protests in China from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. The research is based on the purposive sampling of the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera English, in order to discuss how international news media outlets report on protests in mainland China and Hong Kong, especially given that they are non-Western contexts. Samples from Wukan and Hong Kong are evaluated by using both quantitative and qualitative methods, including qualitative analysis software (NVivo), framing analysis and critical discourse analysis to determine the ways in which they are represented by the selected news outlets. The main findings have revealed hegemony in the news representations of protests in China, which includes biases, domestication, and geo-politicised news angles. The analysis in the Wukan case showed that the reports offered a limited voice to the Chinese side, while carrying frames of bias from Western journalists. The analysis of the selected global news reports unmasked ideological presuppositions about Chinese political reform, including the perception that the Chinese regime was monolithic, and that most Chinese protesters craved Western democracy. On the contrary, the evidence from the Al Jazeera documentary analysed in this study illustrated a Chinese government that is loosely structured, and that the protesters were more concerned about the land issue than they were about political ideology. As for the Hong Kong case, the results indicated that there were traces of domestication and the geo-politics of news regarding HK protests in both CNN and the BBC in relation to several topics, whereas Al Jazeera had a slightly different approach to reporting the protests: The BBC and CNN tended to relate protests with domestic politics and topics, while AJE balanced pro-Britain and pro-America discourse among the protesters. The study also discussed Orientalism, which is still highly relevant to Hong Kongers' identity issues, and how Western media report on China today.

The research findings add to work by other scholars in media and journalism that has questioned the partiality of leading international or global (Western) media, particularly when it comes to reporting on non-Western and less developed countries. The research adds original evidence and insights to debates on the hegemony of international news coverage of protests, in the context of the Global South. It should be noted that leading media from the dominant Global North, in this case, excluding Al Jazeera, project the interests of the developed countries while voices from the Global South are less heard.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	2
Abstract	3
Chapter 1 Introduction	8
1.1 Overview	8
1.2 Research Context	9
1.3 Aims and Objectives	10
1.4 Rationales of the two cases	10
1.5 Ethics.....	10
1.6 Conclusion	10
Chapter 2: Literature review	11
2.1 Introduction.....	11
2.2 Why BBC News, CNN and Al Jazeera English Online News?	11
2.3. Protest Groups	14
2.4 Foreign correspondents in China	16
2.5 The Concept of Hegemony	17
2.6 Hegemony, ideology and the capitalist order.....	17
Hegemony in the concentration of international media companies	18
2.7 Images of Chinese protesters in international media.....	19
2.8 Hegemony in reports about China	22
2.9 Hegemony in everyday practice in journalism.....	23
2.10 Rediscovery of ideology: the source of hegemony from the dominant	25
Ideology, hegemony and language/discourse.....	27
Hegemony in dominant discourse: an achieving of consent instead of coercion	27
2.11 Global journalism: 'professionalism': A game of power, or the circulation of 'common sense'?.....	28
2.12 Conclusion	31
Chapter 3: Methodology	32
3.1 Introduction.....	32
3.2 Research design	33
3.3 Data collection and analysis (news/documentary as sources of data).....	34
3.4 Framing analysis.....	36
Domestication and stereotyping of news.....	37
3.5 Language and social power	40
Discourse analysis	41
3.6 Critical linguistics.....	45
3.7 Critical discourse analysis.....	45
The representation of news.....	46
Functional grammar (Halliday)	47

Presences and absences in texts: presupposition	48
Ideology in texts	49
3.8 <i>Mixing methods: qualitative and quantitative methods in content analysis with CDA</i>	50
3.9 <i>Ethics</i>	51
3.10 <i>Data storage</i>	51
3.11 <i>Conclusion</i>	51
Chapter 4: Case Study 1: The Wukan Protests	53
4.1 <i>Introduction</i>	53
4.2 <i>Background to the Wukan Protests</i>	53
4.3 <i>Data</i>	55
4.4 <i>An overview of the framing methodology</i>	55
4.5 <i>Framing analysis of the Wukan protests</i>	56
Data interpretation: common themes and discrepancies among the frames of the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera	59
4.6 <i>CDA on reports</i>	62
Conjunction and presupposition	62
Horizontal and vertical intertextuality	64
Representation of news—is news the truth, or the representation of a one-sided voice?	67
Indications in presupposition: blurred boundary between the reporting and the reported.....	69
Representation in clauses: relations between protesters and the State—who are the patients and actors?.	72
4.7 <i>Ideology and hegemony in the reports</i>	76
4.8 <i>How do Chinese perceive ‘democracy’—is it really a symbol of hope?</i>	77
4.9 <i>Protest banners— why ‘Long Live the Party’?</i>	79
The incongruent evidence: protesters’ banners	79
Political opportunities in China—how protesters write their messages?.....	79
Histories of Chinese protest slogans.....	80
4.10 <i>Voices of the documentary</i>	82
<i>Negative them:</i>	85
Grammatical role of the discourse: the use of pronouns	85
Argumentation: justification of negative attributions.....	86
<i>Positive us:</i>	87
Nominations of social actors	87
Argumentation: justification of positive (innocent) attributions	88
4.11 <i>Conclusion</i>	89
Chapter 5: Case Study 2: Hong Kong Protests	91
5.1 <i>Introduction</i>	91
The Extradition Bill.....	91
5.2 <i>Research Questions and Assumptions</i>	91
5.3 <i>data</i>	92
5.4 <i>Sources and Discourses</i>	92
Discourse of CNN.....	100
Discourse of the BBC	100
Discourse of AJE	100
5.5 <i>discussion</i>	102

Chapter 6 Discussion	104
6.1 introduction.....	104
6.2 Confucian politics and political opportunities in China: a unique way of protesting.....	107
6.3 Another reality of the Wukan protests: What Al Jazeera’s documentary shows to the audience.....	109
6.4 Indications of the Wukan case in the globalisation of news.....	111
6.5 How does ideology work in the international news system? The possibility of the establishment of political belief systems	112
6.6 A counter-power to the existing international news flow—Al Jazeera: see Asia from Asians	116
6.7 Hong Kong case: An unbalanced international news flow—a postcolonial case	118
Hongkongers’ hybrid identity: overlapping between the West and China	118
6.8 International reports: Have they reported the whole picture of Hong Kong people’s struggles?	125
6.9 Hong Kong’s identification and social stratification in the post-colonial era	127
6.10 Orientalism: the colonial remnants from the West.....	128
(1) Oriental mentality	129
(2) ‘Us’ and ‘Them’	130
(3) Eurocentrism—the powerless East	130
(4) Intertextuality became knowledge	131
(5) Orientalism proceeds to imperialism (political).....	131
(6) Orientalism in Hong Kong: the root of identity issues.....	132
6.11 China in international news	134
6.12 Decolonised Orientalism: the importance of decolonisation and the pluriverse	135
(1) Coexistence and collaboration	137
(2) Dissolution and negotiation	137
6.13 Conclusion	138
Chapter 7: Conclusion	140
7.1 Introduction.....	140
7.2 Main Findings and Implications	140
7.3 Contributions	141
7.4 Limitations and recommendations	142
7.5 Implications for further studies.....	143
Bibliography	145
Appendices	176
Appendix A: CNN texts	176
Appendix B: BBC texts	178
Appendix C: Al Jazeera (text and documentary).....	181
Appendix D: Xinhua news agency	183

List of tables

Table 4.1. Reasoning Devices (CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera)	57
Table 4.2. Frame Matrix (CNN and BBC)	59
Table 4.4. Negative Attitudes Towards Democracy (2007)	79
Table 4.5. Fluid Identification of 'Us' and 'Them'	84
Table 5.1 Negative 'Us' and Positive 'Them'	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Table 6.1. HK people's identity (Fung, 2004; Chan, 2014)	120

List of figures

Figure 4.1. Percentages of Voices in CNN and BBC	68
Figure 4.2. Percentages of Voices in Al Jazeera's documentary	69
Figure 4.3. Percentages of Voices in Al Jazeera documentary	82
Figure 6.1. Seliger's Theory of Ideology (Thompson, 1984)	113
Figure 6.2. Types of HK People's Identities	122

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Overview

This study deals with how leading international broadcasters, namely, the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera, report Chinese protests. The political protests in Hong Kong, and, more recently, in Wukan, have attracted varying coverage from international/Western or global media, especially from those leading cross-country broadcasters who report on the protests as being examples of a dictatorship and poor democracy. However, incongruent evidence in pictures shows that the Wukan protesters waved banners saying ‘Save us CPC’ and ‘Long Live the Party’, which indicate that the Chinese protesters and the regime might have a more symbiotic relationship rather than one that is merely conflictive, as the reports describe. The framing and stereotyping of protests in news and documentaries is an important but understudied topic. This dissertation has sought to investigate the coverage by examining specific cases and as reported by international media. As will be seen, the international news and documentary coverage of protests in China reveal biases and nuances that illustrate geopolitical angling in the reporting.

The chapters are as follows:

Chapter 2 introduces the background to the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera English’s online coverage. The concept of protest groups and studies of images of Chinese protesters are included. Furthermore, the concept of hegemony and its relation with ideology and capitalist order, or the concentration of the mass media, are also discussed in this chapter..

Chapter 3 introduces the methodology, which mainly includes framing analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA). Both methods/theories are introduced in detail. Meanwhile, concepts like language and power, ideology in language, and hegemony, are mentioned as facets of CDA. Apart from the two qualitative methods, quantitative methods are applied too, in order to show the proportions of voices demonstrated in reports so as to discuss the representation of these voices in the news.

Chapter 4 discusses the Wukan case. The background to the protests is introduced, and so is the data information. All the data articles are from online reports by the BBC and CNN, 2011-2016. As mentioned previously, the study conducts framing analysis and CDA on data taken from articles. As for Al Jazeera, a documentary with 6 episodes, published in 2017, is analysed via framing analysis and CDA, too. This study has found that the image of different levels of government is quite static in reports from the BBC and CNN, but is more nuanced and complicated in Al Jazeera’s documentary. Meanwhile, this chapter discusses the incongruent banner language, such as ‘Long Live the Party’, which relates to how the Chinese utilise their political opportunities to protest.

Chapter 5 discusses the case of the Hong Kong protests during the proposal for the extradition law 2019-2020. Both qualitative and quantitative methods are used to analyse the data articles (236 in total). Official sources and intertextuality (CDA) are major methods to analyse the texts. Domestication and the geopolitics of news are found in how the BBC and CNN reported on HK protests. Both were trying to emphasise the political and cultural bonds with Hong Kong in the British and American contexts, whereas Al Jazeera English showcased concerns about the overall humanitarian issues in HK.

Chapter 6 is the discussion of the results, which brings the findings against the backdrop of the globalisation of news. Previous studies of the political economy of the media (seen in the literature review) have pointed out that international media companies are very much concentrated, in terms of their source gathering and information dissemination, and the research has proved that such concentration leads to the capitalist hegemony in their reports, which deny the legitimisation of other political beliefs or systems. The research does this by linking the findings with Seliger's (2019) notion of ideology operation. Seliger pointed out that all ideologies mix up factual descriptions with moral prescription of what is good and right (Thompson, 1984; Seliger, 2019) so as to maintain a certain dominant ideology. In fact, the moral prescription of the dictatorship of the Chinese regime is showcased in both the Wukan and Hong Kong cases. However, in Hong Kong's situation, apart from the issues above, the historical background, in relation to being colonised by Britain, should be discussed. This chapter therefore discusses Hong Kong people's identity in a post-colonial era and points out that some of the behaviours and ideologies may be the remnants of colonialism and Orientalism, which are much more divided, if compared to the more one-sided reports from CNN and the BBC. Meanwhile, decolonisation is briefly discussed in the last part of the chapter.

Chapter 7 is the conclusion to the study, including its main findings and its implications, contributions, limitations and implications for further studies.

1.2 Research Context

In mainland China, tens of thousands of protests erupt each year, especially those driven by anger over the illegal takeover of communal land (Al Jazeera English, April 10th, 2017). In Hong Kong, there were demonstrations and protests in 2014 and 2017, at the time of the election of the Chief Executive. Leading Western media have paid much attention to all kinds of protests, and most of them are categorised as being political protests, ones which are “anti-government” or “anti-Communism”. The political protests in Wukan are also discussed as being more of demonstrations of class struggles or pro-democracy movements, while the political protests in Hong Kong and Taiwan are taken to be unresolved national identity issues from the post-colonial era. The international news reports from ABC, CNN and the BBC seem to simplify the conflicts in China and also seem to fail to appreciate China's politics and people's views. While leading Western media portray protests as being “pro-democracy” activism and rebellions, (ABC, 14th September, 2016), (BBC, 13th September, 2016), the video recorded by a village journalist shows that the wording on the protesters' banners “Long live the CPC, Crack Down on Corruption” or “Central Government Has Justice”, which indicates the incoherence of the theme of ‘villagers try to topple the central government’ seen in the Western media coverage. Video sequences are also deliberately linked—video editors on ABC have linked two irrelevant videos together—the one that shows police raids in Wukan, and the other, in which Xi Jinping is waving to the army—in order to emphasise an increasingly dictatorial and militarised image of the Chinese regime.

Meanwhile, there are questions about the differences and imbalances among the international news broadcasters when it comes to reporting on Chinese political events. Are they really biased? How similar and different are the frames used by leading broadcasters, such as ABC and the BBC? To what extent do they use local views in their reports? Who is interviewed? Given restrictions on news gathering in China, to what extent are Western broadcasters' news reports based on views from all of the sides involved in political protests, for example, anti-democracy or pro-Beijing groups? The study will investigate the character of the international news broadcasts.

1.3 Aims and Objectives

Media reporting of China in the “West” has been debated due to accusations of bias. One of the most frequent criticisms from the West is that the Chinese regime has authoritarian power over the populace. Western media, especially the American and British reporters, would be very interested in covering Chinese protests as hard news. However, most international broadcasting will produce biases, which are inevitable, due to cultural barriers and strong political interests. The incoherence and distortions of Western media coverage of Chinese protests, a few of which I mentioned in the research context, are worth international, especially Western audiences’ and media’s attention. My aims are, firstly, to analyse what kind of language has been used to frame the news; secondly, to detect ideological hegemonies in the news; thirdly, to shed some light on the relations between the circulation of ideas, the market and media power. For example, is the circulation of ideas, especially the production of news, in this case, framed by daily journalism or by the dominant power, or by other personal/institutional discourse? More importantly, if a discourse has been circulated long enough in the market, even if it were to be framed, and has become, common sense, how do the media react towards this ‘common sense’? Do they never change the discourse or, out of professionalism, will journalists strive to find ‘the truth’, despite the fact that it might go against the common sense?

1.4 Rationales of the two cases

Rationale for using Wukan as a case

The Wukan protests lasted long enough to draw attention from the world. The village was called “the first democracy experiment” by the foreign media (BBC, 2011) (Al Jazeera English, 2011). Meanwhile, the Wukan protestors come from the peasant class, which resembles the peasant revolutions in Mao’s era, and the belief was that history was about to repeat itself. It is newsworthy that the peasant movements led by Mao have been repeated in the 21st century, triggered by the same issues, but with different slogans.

Rationale of using Hong Kong as a case

The ideological battle between the East and the West are more evident in Hong Kong since the hand over. While, in Wukan, these battles are mainly class struggles, in Hong Kong the postcolonial ideology clashes have more weight in the protests, with British media almost always backing the protesters. This study is interested in how, in 2019, Hong Kong’s occupation, and the second Wukan protests, happened in the same year; this may provide a good basis for comparison and analysis. Since the Wukan protests happened within the national political framework, while Hong Kong’s were outside of it, the differences between the two protests may reveal more political and cultural nuances than what appears to be an over-generalised “anti-government” framing in the Western media narratives.

1.5 Ethics

This study will adhere to the University’s research ethics and guidelines. Privacy will be respected and consent will be sought at all stages.

1.6 Conclusion

The first chapter has introduced the key focus of the study and has outlined its structure. The next chapter will review the literature, focusing on the frameworks that inform the research.

Chapter 2: Literature review

2.1 Introduction

The rationale and background to the three media sources are introduced in this chapter. The BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera English (AJE) online news will be discussed; the concept and discussion of protest groups will be included. The chapter will justify the focus on images of Chinese protesters in international media outlets, as well as defining the concepts of hegemony. Furthermore, the study will explore the link between hegemony, ideology and capitalist order, which, in this case, is the concentration of mass communication; a brief review on hegemony in reports of China will be included, as well as an operationalisation of how hegemony may be achieved in the daily practices of journalists. Lastly, a more detailed discussion about language and ideology will be included, in terms of the implementation and results of hegemony. Language and ideology are also relevant to the methodology chapter, which will put emphasis on the nexus between language and social power.

2.2 Why BBC News, CNN and Al Jazeera English Online News?

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News Online

The BBC operates a vast and influential global news service. Studying it requires a rationale in regard to how and why it was established. The online service officially launched on 4th November, 1997 (Allan et al, 2010). The new BBC website represented a significant initiative within the Corporation's strategy to reaffirm its public service ethos in a multi-channel universe, and thereby to be better placed to challenge commercial rivals, such as the Cable News Network (CNN), MSNBC, EuroNews and News Corp. 'We are this autumn only at the starting block,' stated Tony Hall, Chief Executive of BBC News, the day before the launch. 'My ambition is, first, to ensure that we preserve and build a public service in news for the next generation. And, second, to ensure that BBC News develops as a global player' (cited in the *Guardian*, 3 November 1997). By early 1998, BBC Online had been confirmed as the leading British Internet content site, with BBC News Online recording 8.17 million page impressions in March, according to the Audit Bureau of Circulations (BBC Online overall recorded some 21 million page impressions from direct requests by over 900,000 users that month) (Allan et al, 2010, p.24). More recently, the concentration of online news in the UK is still quite significant. With the BBC traditionally dominating the news space online, although that dominance has recently been challenged by some newspaper websites (Schifferes & Coulter, 2013). As well as network effects, the BBC also had a first mover advantage, as it made a major investment in its website well before most newspapers (ibid.).

During the Iraq War, the BBC News Online showed a different news agenda, if compared to its broadcast network. Compared to how the BBC news went along with CNN during the war (see Chomsky & Barsamian, c.2001), the BBC online coverage was not supportive of the war and sometimes seemed to be anti-coalition in nature (Dimitrova, 2006). Dimitrova pointed out that the BBC online news about the war had three frames: the war frame, which presented human casualties of war as well as the destruction of cities, roads and other infrastructure; the human interest frame, which brought attention to personal stories involved in the war— the coalition soldiers, the Iraqis, and the journalists themselves; the anti-war frame, which, for example, included a story (with a photo) about demonstrations against the war in Asia, entitled "Thousands March for Peace." In some cases, the home page contained as many as three stories about anti-war protests (ibid., p.97).

Few other research projects have pointed out the different news agenda between the BBC News and the BBC Online News, but according to the research mentioned above, the BBC Online News may present a more global and humanitarian angle than the BBC network. However, considering it is a British public service, the study assumes that foreign news on the website still represents the interests of the Great Britain.

Cable News Network (CNN):

The international media reporting has been dominated by news and videos focusing on Europe, Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Americas, with CNN contributing to it. Studies are needed to examine how CNN covers specific topics, particularly outside the USA, where it is based. Operating for more than 35 years, CNN has become one of the leading global news networks, and thus has garnered support as well as criticism over the years (Damanshoury and Saleh, 2017). Apart from the critiques from scholars, that CNN and CNN International have been pro-America and Eurocentric (see Al-Najjar 2009: 8; Bossio 2013), Chomsky and Herman's book, *Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of Mass Media (2010)* has revealed how American political interests are closely intertwined with its media, including CNN, particularly in relation to the affairs in the Middle East and Latin America. When Bashri et al. (2012: 21) argue that CNN follows the tradition of American journalism, in which the press serves as a watchdog over the government and is often referred to as the fourth estate, others, as mentioned above, claimed that CNN takes some part in creating and spreading American propaganda, especially during the Iraq War. As one American writer, agonised by the atrocities and the aftermath of 11th September 2001, put it: 'Humanity is the subject of the global public sphere, not the United States' (Buck-Morss 2001:16). In the aftermath of 11th September 2001, the network found itself under heavy criticism internationally for carrying too much US domestic coverage, and it responded by separating its US news agenda from that of its international broadcasts (Sparks, 2006, p41). Noam Chomsky "cheerfully adopts the US Army's definition of terrorism as 'the calculated use of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature...' (Callinicos, 2003). Meanwhile, American media narratives on Muslims underwent a noticeable change. Jackson (2005) pointed out that American media have framed a contra-narrative of "terrorism vs. America" as "evil vs. good" in order to demonise Muslims, since 9/11. Except for a few of the American media, such as *Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy*, who "condemn the 'new imperial grand strategy' of the Bush administration (Chomsky, 2007), most mainstream media, including FOX news and CNN, backed up the Bush administration with enthusiasm.

As for American media's news agenda on China, some scholars (see Mcnair, 1988; Thussu, 2006) have pointed out that there is a continuity of the 'Cold War' narrative when it comes to reports about communist countries. For example, following the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the US priority was to stop the expansion of communism into other parts of Asia (Thussu, 2000). More contemporarily, after China broke its diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, China was depicted in major American media as an even more domestically oppressive nation, and one with strained relationships with the US (see Stone & Xiao, 2007). However, positive discourse about China, and even about the Chinese regime, appeared in those newspapers both during and after Nixon's visits to China in the '70s and '80s (ibid.). However, the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident seemed to mark a return to the dominant anti-Communist frame (Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad, 2000). In more recent research, American media has reported HK news more in its print media than on TV (CNN News) (see Lee et al, 2012). The PRC finds itself becoming the chief villain of the U.S. media in the post-Tiananmen era and in the post-Cold War order. Seeing Hong Kong through the ugly

mirror of the Tiananmen crackdown, they proclaim the United States, to be a “new guardian”, one that will prevent Hong Kong’s fragile democracy and existing freedoms from China's abuse (ibid., p18). To sum up, changes in how American media have reported on China and Hong Kong indicate that there is no static frame in the news, therefore this study is trying to discover whether there are any more changes in the discourse about China and Hong Kong regarding protests against the Extradition Bill from 2019 to 2020.

Al Jazeera English (AJE)

The Al Jazeera Network’s entry into international news sought to provide a “non-Western” perspective on World Affairs. This caused reactions. For example, what is immediately intriguing is its troubled history when it comes to its access to the English-speaking world. After the English website was hacked, in 2003, it re-launched Al Jazeera English (AJE) in 2006 (see Powers, 2009). It hired journalists who worked for the BBC, and, therefore, they brought the Western reporting skills and knowledge to AJE with another news agenda: to counter the mainstream Western information flow (ibid., see p119). AJE did nothing short of declaring war on the Western global media outlets, CNN and BBC World (“Al Jazeera Launches English-Language Version” 2006) (ibid., p159). In the United States, AJE was received with hostility, functionally boycotted by every cable and satellite provider, and it was described as being “enemy media”, whose intent was to “infiltrate our country” (Stillwell 2006).

However, AJE embraces its role as a cultural ambassador between the Arab world and the West: “We do very much see ourselves as a bridge between cultures, offering that bridge of understanding” (Power, 2009, p161). Its goal of reversing the flow of communication is symbolically aligned with the Arabic broadcaster whose origins lie in combating the dominant media discourse in the region. (ibid., p162). ‘AJE’s architects created a news organization that hoped to bridge cultural differences, particularly between the Western and Arab worlds’ (ibid., p157). Despite a reputation of not being interfered with by its sponsor—the Qatari government, AJE has still faced several accusations. According to Ahmed Mansour (see Power 2009), one of Al Jazeera Arabic’s most famous on-air personalities, AJE has failed to meet its goal of reversing the flow of communication. He argues, “the channel is currently managed by a Western mentality. They don’t know the Middle East and the South, and they haven’t studied it and they will not study it.” (ibid., p165)

Although the network is funded by the Qatari government, one of the keys to its success was its perceived independence, both from the government of Qatar and from other political and religious establishments in the region (Power, 2009, p20). Every government in the Arab world has at one point or another taken action against the network, either by arresting its journalists, closing its local bureau, or removing ambassadors from Doha, Al Jazeera’s home base (ibid., p24). The independence of the network has allowed it to report affairs in the Middle East from different angles.

However, there is not too much research about whether AJE has a major difference from the mainstream Western media networks when it comes to news in Asia, or in HK, in this case, although its pioneer Managing Director, Parson (2008 cited in Powers 2009: p.161), said,

‘We want Africans to tell us about Africa. We want Arabs to tell us about the Middle East and Asians to tell us about Asia.’ The current study will offer a nuanced perspective on these claims that is based on the evidence below.

2.3. Protest Groups

Protest groups, in contemporary society, are involved in highlighting and championing causes that are politically contentious. These contentious issues take many different forms, ranging from identity politics, to cultural, social, economic, or political issues (Cable, 2016, p.2). Protests in China have particularly drawn much attention from global (Western) media, as the country is seen as being authoritarian and undemocratic. Although it deals with national and regional censorship, Steinhardt’s study (2015) in the *Asian Studies Review*, which draws on a diachronic analysis of news media reporting on major events, shows that protests in China have become not merely more frequent, but also a great deal more visible. Major incidents, which were previously suppressed in the news, have emerged as recurrent subjects of reporting over the first half of the 2000s (Steinhardt, 2015, p.3). In 2010, ‘China was rocked by 180,000 protests, riots and other mass incidents – more than four times the tally from a decade earlier’ (Orlik, 2011). According to research by the Chinese Academy of Governance, this number of 180,000 incidents in 2010, is double the number of protests that were reported for 2006 (Taylor, 2012). Amongst those protests, there are massive levels of labour unrest in China’s new factory zones, together with constant rural conflicts over land and environmental issues while, in Hong Kong, pro-democracy activism continues (Cox, 2018, viii).

Despite those huge and increasing numbers of protests, sociological methodologies and theories that are applied to the study of Chinese societies and social phenomena are predominantly produced in the USA and Western Europe, from where they are disseminated to the rest of the world (see Connell, 2007; Qi, 2014), and the main reason is probably because the theories and methodologies which underwrite research on social movements in China are mostly adopted from studies of US and European cases, experiences and theorisation (Qi, 2012; Wu, 2009), and thus Western social movement theories may not be applicable to China’s case.

Speaking of the incompatibility of Western theories of social movements/protests with Chinese protests, one very distinctive character in Chinese protests is that, unlike the mainstream Western protests, which typically target the State (Gamson, 1990), no collective action with similar expectations could operate by directly targeting the State in mainland China (Chan and Ngai, 2009: 289; Chen, 2006; O’Brien and Li, 2006). A common pattern in China is for mobilised workers, or peasants, to charge that local officials have failed to carry out the central policy, and to hold that local officials are corrupt and despotic, and to suppose that, if informed of local injustices, the central State authorities will respond with sympathy and upright morality (Qi, 2017, p.117). Aggrieved villagers, reported in some studies (see O’Brien and Li, 2006), believed that their chances of getting justice are higher the further from local leaders, and the closer to central leaders they pitched their appeals (Qi, 2017, p.118).

The reasons may be political—collective actions are deemed to be threats to the Chinese government and, therefore, protesters have to choose their messages carefully. In fact, political opportunities are essential to protests. According to Cable (2016), there are many issues that might influence protest groups, but among all of them, the definition of political opportunities ties the relative success and failure of protest groups to political, institutional, and

environmental variables that shape collective action (Eisinger 1973; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Meyer 1993; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Sireau 2009).

There have been several attempts to update the concept of political opportunities in the protest context, but the important work of Cammaerts (2012) has begun to link political opportunities and protests with the media (Cable, 2006, p.3). Under what Cammaerts has called the ‘mediation opportunity structure’, he has added media opportunities, networking opportunities, by way of access to communications technologies and social media, and discursive opportunities, or what he refers to as ‘self-mediation by protest groups’ (Cammaerts 2012, pp.120-130). The choice of protest tactics thus becomes increasingly important, because maintaining open media and political opportunities requires adapting media and protest tactics to the prevailing media and political contexts. Amongst those tactics, the message and modes of communication used by protest groups are both subtle and critical (Cable, 2016, p.4). For example, and as will be seen in this study, protesters in Wukan village used ‘Long live the Party’ to protest against the village-level land corruption, in order to attract attention from the Central government in Beijing, and villagers leaned more on the Chinese media than on the Western media, whereas the Hong Kong 2019 Anti-Extradition Law protesters used ‘Free Hong Kong’ (in English) to attract world attention, but mainly Western political attention, and some Hong Kong protesters boycotted mainland China’s media, and even beat up a mainland Chinese journalist. As mentioned above, to bring these issues to public attention, protest groups utilise a number of different protest and media tactics, according to different political opportunities (McAdam and Su 2002; Lipsky 1968; Eisinger 1973).

However, some international news organisations tend to deal with different protesters’ messages as a whole, while ignoring the nuanced discrepancies. As Cable (2016) points out, the impact of media frames on protest group messages are numerous, because messages can be changed, challenged, incorporated, co-opted, depoliticised, ridiculed, and manipulated by the press (Cable, 2016, p.20). The international news reports from ABC, CNN and the BBC seem to simplify the conflicts in China and also seem to fail to appreciate China’s politics and its people’s views. While leading Western media portray protests as being “pro-democracy” activism and rebellions, (ABC, 14th September, 2016), (BBC, 13th September, 2016), the video recorded by a village journalist shows wording on protesters’ banners that read “Long Live the CPC, Crack Down on Corruption”, or “Central Government has Justice”. Video sequences are also deliberately linked—video editors on ABC linked two irrelevant videos together—one that showed police raids in Wukan, and another that showed Xi Jinping waving to the army—so as to emphasise an increasingly dictatorial and militarised image of the Chinese regime.

Meanwhile, the differences in cultures between the reported countries and the reporting press will also result in the domestication and stereotyping of news. This study will examine the contemporary and historical reasons for which international news organisations, in some circumstances, fail to understand the foreign politics and culture. The research will now give a brief review of foreign correspondents in China about their work ethics and overall attitudes to reporting Chinese affairs.

2.4 Foreign correspondents in China

When it comes to local Chinese reports, another layer should be paid some attention—foreign reporters and journalists who are based in China. The presence of major media outlets, especially from countries such as the United States and Britain, has remained strong for decades, since China formally opened up to the Western press in the late 1970s. The number of registered foreign correspondents in China in 2015, for example, was 636, employed by 277 news organisations.¹ (Zeng, 2018, p.1399). China is a transitional and mixed society (see Curran and Park, 2000), better labelled a ‘partially liberalised authoritarian’ system (Chan and Qiu, 2002, p.36) or ‘Communist capitalism’ (Lee, 2005: p.108). The media system in China started as a Maoist adoption of the Leninist press theory and the Soviet model (see Zhao, 1998). It is heavily controlled by the ruling Communist Party, displaying ‘the highest level of political instrumentalization’ (Zhao, 2012, p.161). Meanwhile, the legal process to approve foreign journalists to work in China has been very strict. The ‘Temporary Rules Regarding the Management of Foreign News Organizations and Journalists in China’, issued in 1981, consisted of 14 rules. This document required that foreign journalists and their organisations go through a mandatory and strict process of application, documentation and registration, and foreign correspondents’ activities, including entering and exiting the country, visa extension, accommodation, interview itinerary and communication set-up, were to be closely monitored (Sun, 2015, p.127) Although the policy regulation was less strict during the Beijing Olympics (see Sun, 2015), the doctrine of the media strictly serving the Party has been further reinforced by its current President, Xi Jinping, since early 2016, and the tight media and ideology control has intensified (Zeng, 2018). In this very strict and politicised environment, there are different work attitudes from the foreign correspondents. Correspondents from Liberal Model countries (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland, Australia) clearly demonstrate a higher degree of identification with the monitorial role (such as being the watchdog for Chinese government and elite business society), whereas non-Western correspondents are more likely to stay loyal to the political power of the Chinese government, if compared with their Western counterparts (ibid., pp.1405-1406). However, overall, foreign correspondents are, as a whole, not interested in cultivating citizenry in the host country, as shown by the uniformly low interests of ‘*motivating citizens in China to participate in civic activity and political discussion*’; nor are they interested in ‘*supporting Chinese official policies*’, according to the study (ibid., p.1404). It is important to point out the seemingly paradoxical attitudes from different foreign correspondents, particularly those from the West. On the one hand, they are the watchdogs of the regime but, on the other, they are uninterested in changing the overall Chinese political discourse or in cultivating citizenry in China. In other words, they care more about bringing the messages home. Before the study reviews hegemonies in those messages, the concept of hegemony will be briefly reviewed.

1. ¹ The figure is based on registration information of 2015 from International Press Center of China’s Foreign Ministry.

2.5 The Concept of Hegemony

Scholars have discussed hegemony in news language from different angles, and some of the approaches are relevant to the ways in which we tackle dominant language in the media. Hegemony has been updated since Gramsci's definition in the *Prison Notebooks* (see, for example, Chomsky 2009) According to Gramsci (1971), hegemony is a necessary method of State control and of maintaining stability. Whether it is implicit or explicit, in post-Gramscian writings, the term *hegemony* has come to mean the taken-for-granted, almost invisible, discourse practices of symbolic domination (Blackledge, 2000). More importantly, in Gramsci's later understanding of the concept, hegemony did not consist of a simple confrontation between antagonistic classes, but always involved complex relations of forces (Mouffe, 2014, p.180). What Gramsci found transcended the previous Leninist conception of hegemony, which was 'seen as the leadership of the proletariat over the peasantry, that is to say that...hegemony was thought of in terms of a *class alliance*' (ibid., p.179). Instead, Gramsci began to become aware that hegemony could represent the corporate interests of different classes, which serves as a mainstream discourse for a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate ones (ibid., p.180).

Moreover, Gramsci began to link hegemony with 'collective will', or 'expansive hegemony'— This had to consist of the creation of an active, direct consensus resulting from the genuine adoption of the interests of the popular classes by the hegemonic class, which would give rise to the creation of a genuine 'national popular will' (ibid., p.182). Gramsci gave a valid explanation of it because, 'in fact, the exercise of hegemony involves economic and corporate sacrifices on the part of the aspiring leading class, the latter cannot, however, go so far as to jeopardise its basic interests.' (ibid., p.183).

It is through ideology that this collective will is formed, since its very existence depends on the creation of an ideological unit which will serve as 'cement'. The discussion of ideology is intertwined with hegemony. More discussion of both concepts will be introduced in a later chapter, together with critical discourse analysis/studies. The most important aspect of ideology, in this chapter, is that the discussion of it goes beyond the previous definition from Marxism, that ideology is 'a false consciousness' (Marx and Engels, 1975). According to Gramsci, the idea that the subjects are not originally given, but 'are always produced by ideology through a socially determined ideological field, so that subjectivity is always the product of social practice. This implies that ideology has a material existence and that far from consisting of an ensemble of spiritual realities, it is always materialised in practices'. (Mouffe, 2014, p.186).

2.6 Hegemony, ideology and the capitalist order

Since then, other Marxist scholars have continued to enrich the concept. One of the most important arguments is around the relationship between hegemony and material reality, or economism, in Mouffe's term (see Althusser; Habermas; Mouffe). Similar thoughts have emerged since the Frankfurt school—Althusser (2014) pointed out that ideology has to be materialised in different institutions, and media and the press belong to them, serving as a material basis for the circulation of ideology.

The media hegemony has therefore to be considered against the backdrop of social production. Hall (1979), for example, has argued that media products are messages in code about the nature of society, the nature of productive relations within the media themselves and institutional domains and social processes. Golding and Murdock (2005) argue that decoding media in order to uncover the true messages of capitalist ideology is important, but it is more essential to see the mass media as organisations which produce and distribute commodities within a late capitalist economic order.

This study will discuss how such hegemony may be achieved under the capitalist order, in this case, the concentration of international media outlets.

Hegemony in the concentration of international media companies

After reviewing the necessity to link the creation and circulation of hegemony with the social production, hegemony in international news will be discussed against the background of the concentrated ownership of the media companies. According to Curran (2014), in shorthand form: ownership>--programming>--social use. This formulaic representation indicates relations and influences, rather than strict determinations. Ownership does not simply dictate norms. Capitalist owners, corporate managers, production supervisors, writers and creative workers, technical professionals, and more, all have different effects on the production process that are relative to their social positions and the relations of power that have been lost or won in previous negotiations for control (Therborn, 2008).

First, it is imperative that the debates on these topics be widespread, open and transparent: they must be democratised. If there is a lesson to be learned from history it is this: if self-interested parties make decisions in relative secrecy, the resulting policies will serve the interests primarily of those who made them. As the old saying goes, ‘if you are not at the table, you are not part of the deal.’ (McChesney and Schiller, 2003, p25)

A similar argument has been made by one of the Frankfurt School scholars (see Adorno, 2014). He has foreseen the symbiotic, instead of the conspiratorial relation between media production and news/information dissemination. He points out that the corporate mass media: ‘create commercial goods, corporations marketing these goods, multi-national media corporations, and finally ideology, inventing and supplying institutions (think tanks, corporate lobbying, certain political parties, managerialist universities, etc.)’ (Klikaurer, 2018, p.80) It is thus necessary to discuss how the mass media corporate achieves such a symbiotic relation among these different parties. In global media outlets, connections between ownership, production, content and cultural activity appear continually in all of the global media programmes (Blackledge, 2000). It is imperative to discuss how the US system goes global because, in this context, it is the US model of communication provision (including both the media and telecommunications) that is being exported across the planet (McChesney and Schiller, 2003). The emergence of powerful systems of public broadcasting in most of the world’s democracies in the twentieth century is a testament to the strength of anti-corporate citizens’ lobbies (Ibid.). As far as issues of global communication policy— telegraphy, telephony, spectrum allocation, and so forth—are concerned, these have almost always been hashed out among the elite of the nation-states, with minimal public involvement. The most powerful nations have dominated successive rounds of negotiations, the United Kingdom before the First World War, and the United States after 1945 (Headrick 1995). However, scholars (McChesney and Schiller 2003; Schiller, 1982;1996) have discussed the concentration of international media conglomerates. In short order, the global media market

came to be dominated by nine transnational corporations (TNCs): General Electric (owner of NBC), Liberty Media, Disney, AOL Time Warner, Sony, News Corporation, Viacom, Vivendi Universal and Bertelsmann. None of these companies existed in its present form as recently as 15 years ago; today, nearly all of them rank among the largest 200 non-financial firms in the world (Wall Street Journal, 2000). “Of the nine, only five are truly US firms, though all of them have core operations there. Between them, these nine companies own the major US film studios; the US television networks; 80-85 percent of the global music market; the majority of satellite broadcasting worldwide; all, or part, of a majority of the cable broadcasting systems; a significant percentage of book publishing and commercial magazine publishing; all, or part, of most of the commercial cable TV channels in the US and worldwide; a significant portion of European terrestrial television; and on and on and on” (McChesney and Schiller, 2003, p9). The two authors further note that media concentration results from heavily market-driven environments where profit-seeking corporations dominate.

In the 1990s, neoliberalism thrived, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s Reform and Opening Up, with more shares of the market to be explored by those international corporations. Corporate foreign direct investment shot skywards, and a spectacular surge ensued in cross-border corporate mergers and acquisitions: the value of completed cross-border buyouts rose from less than \$100 billion in 1987 to \$1.14 trillion (current dollars) in 2000 (UNCTAD 2001:10). ‘Under way was a reconfiguration of ownership and operations that was remaking nationally integrated markets and production systems into a global market for goods and services, and an international production system, complemented by an increasingly global market for firms’ (UNCTAD 2000:xx). For example, Murdoch spun off Sky Global Networks in 2000, thus consolidating his satellite television services, which run from Asia to Europe to Latin America (Goldsmith and Dawtrey, 2000). His Star TV dominates in Asia, with 30 channels in seven languages (Jacob, 2000). News Corporation’s television service for China, Phoenix TV, in which it has a 45 per cent stake, in 2000 reached 45 million homes there, and enjoyed an 80 per cent increase in advertising revenues (admittedly from a small base) over that of the previous year (Groves, 2000). And this barely begins to describe News Corporation’s entire portfolio of assets: Twentieth Century Fox films, Fox TV network, HarperCollins publishers, television stations, cable TV channels, magazines, over 130 newspapers, and professional sports teams (McChesney and Schiller, 2003).

2.7 Images of Chinese protesters in international media

There are studies focusing on the comparative analysis of Chinese protests in different media, mostly in Chinese, and a few Western ones, and some trace how specific frames and hegemony have been found within discourses. For example, a representative piece of research compared *China Daily* and *The Guardian* thoroughly, using reports of the Umbrella Movement protests in Hong Kong in 2014 (Veneti et al, 2016). They compared their frame of news, official sources, historical references, and some texts from the two newspapers. Other news sources were mentioned, too, such as *People’s Daily* and the Xinhua News Agency from China; *The New York Times* and AP from America (Ibid. p.4). The conclusion was that *China Daily*’s tone was generally more negative than *The Guardian*’s and ‘the Guardian tended to distance itself from any direct attack toward the protesters,’ (p.10), while *China Daily* identified Western governments (mainly referring to the US and the UK governments), HK universities, pro-democracy parties, as enemies (Ibid. p. 11).

As for more recent HK protests, Wang and Ma's research (2021) compared how the *China Daily* and *The New York Times* reported on the Hong Kong protests, 2019-20. Their conclusion is that the two newspapers reported differently, in terms of problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation/consequences, and the treatment recommendation to/of the Hong Kong protests. In short, 'The main differences lie in that *China Daily* labelled the protests as illegal, and the protesters as rioters, whereas *The New York Times* considered the protests to be a pro-democracy movement against the Communist Party's excessive control over the territory (p.95). The research also indicates that 'the usage of authoritarian with Communist Party seemed a "set phrase" in this regard, therefore, the ideological underpinnings eventually become "invisible" to the audience with the naturalization of this collocation (Fairclough 2015, p.113)

Some other researches have compared HK protests' reports among a few Chinese media. For instance, in the coverage of the "Occupy Central", Bhatia (2016) found that the *China Daily* and the *South China Morning Post* both used the discursive tools of temporal referencing, metaphor, category pairings, and recontextualization in the representation of discursive illusions. On the other hand, Ho (2019) illustrated that these two newspapers deployed the strategies of predication, nomination, and perspectivisation, but portrayed different images of the Chinese government, the Hong Kong government, the protesters, the students, and the police. In addition, Feng (2017) revealed ideological divergences in Hong Kong by analysing concordance lines of two words "佔中" (Occupy Central) and "佔領" (occupy) in four influential Chinese-language newspapers published in Hong Kong, and concluded that news reports exacerbated the divergence by reinforcing attitudes of the audience.

Another interesting discussion about the discourse variation during the post-handover period has also provided some refreshing aspects to the study. Flowerdew (2012) has contributed a chapter on comparing how *Apple Daily* and *Ta Kung Pao* constructed Hong Kong's patriotism via critical discourse analysis. *Apple Daily* is known as one of the major pro-democracy and anti-Beijing newspapers, whereas *Ta Kung Pao* is pro-Beijing and is regarded as being Beijing's mouthpiece (p.159). The two newspapers had opposite discourses over themes of 'the family, war and traitors'. Political stance has decided the main discourse in both newspapers. *Ta Kung Pao* made the Chinese government the 'primary definer' of the entire discourse, which 'enabled the pro-Beijing discourse to manipulate social information to its advantage, leaving less room for competing alternative discourse, as any other source of information would be deemed as secondary to the primary definers and therefore less credible', whereas *Apple Daily* quoted mainly pro-democracy lawyers and other professionals as defining the resistance against the agenda (p.159). Both newspapers used 'othering' and presupposition to refer to completely different niches of audience (p.167).

As for mainland protesters, political protests have been rarer, if compared to those in Hong Kong. More economic and environmental protests are seen across the country. For instance, in 2007, the coastal city of Xiamen made headlines because of a large-scale environmental protest against a proposed para-xylene (PX) plant (Brunner and Li, 2018); the Dalian chemical plant protests in 2011; anti-PX protests in Ningbo in 2012; anti-chemical plant protests in Kunming in 2013 and in Maomin in 2014. However, little research has been conducted on how different media report on those protests, apart from Liu and Li's research (2017), which compared the smog pollution articles in *China Daily* and a few Anglo-American newspapers (*The New York Times* from the United States and *The Times* and *The Guardian* from Britain), although there was no protest against such pollution. Amongst them, political opportunities for the success of protests (see Sun and Huang, 2017), the impact of

social media and digital media on such protests (see Liu, 2018; Brunner, 2017 ; Brunner, 2019; Grano, 2016) the responses/strategies on the Chinese government (see Zhang et al, 2013; Li et al, 2022) and civil rights and activism (see Hauf, 2015; Gunter,2015; Yang, 2022) are the main research topics on protests in mainland China, whereas discrepancies or frames in reports on such protests are rare in academia.

Amongst all these environmental activism protests, the Wukan protests stood out as a series of major anti-corruption protests on land issues from 2011-2017. Researchers have explored the relation between the migrants and resistance (see Lu et al., 2017), and the rising of civil rights/society amongst Chinese protesters (see Hua et al, 2016; Lagerkvist, 2012). Among those, Hess's research (2015) has reviewed the details of the protests, in terms of the cause of series of protests, as well as the ebb and flow of the resistance. More importantly, the article suggests that, unlike 'many popular understandings of the People's Republic of China and authoritarian regimes in general (that) the state is treated as a unitary, monolithic entity... the system is both multi-layered and decentralised' (ibid., p.180). This conclusion will serve as one of the hypotheses that CNN and the BBC might not showcase different levels of the Chinese regime in their reports.

Meanwhile, Vukovich (2015) has mentioned both the Hong Kong and Wukan protests and has made interesting points by comparing the two. He pointed out that the Wukan protests succeeded to some extent, since '330 hectares of stolen land have been returned and provincial officials have 'earmarked' tens of millions of yuan for improving village livelihood.'², but Hong Kong's protests did not gain the universal suffrage demanded. The main difference between the two is that 'the (Wukan) protesters invoked the liberal or foreign "model" of it, but only to distance themselves from it in an expression of support for the Party's right and duty to intervene politically, even in the form of new elections ' (ibid., p. 37), while Hong Kong's slogans are all very ' "independent", "autonomous" and "civil" – in other words "Western" – to a more mainland or even postcolonial orientation. But the costs of this were and are enormous: you get ignored and left alone, and business proceeds as usual. Property values keep climbing' (ibid., p.41). The points above require more discussion, and the later chapter will discuss how much orientalism has influenced the mentality of Hong Kong protesters, thus, to some extent, alienating themselves to both the mainland people and the Chinese government.

The literature gap here is that among all the comparative research on media coverage of both protests (Wukan and HK), none have analysed the leading international media in detail, but only compared a few Western media outlets with one/two Chinese one(s). There are major differences in coverage from the Chinese and Western sides, but few studies have illustrated the nuanced differences among the Western/international media and if there is any, the indication of it. As for Chinese and Hong Kong cultural and political research, due to the nature of their topics, there is little solid evidence shown to support the claim of there being a 'Western hegemony' in the realm of Chinese politics. In other words, the scholars have used it as a conclusion, or a phenomenon, with which to discuss further issues, while the actual operation of such hegemony in the media, or in any other aspect, is absent. My research finds it necessary to clarify that there are potential hegemonies, or even propaganda in both Chinese and international media, in accordance with evidence reviewed above, but the study focuses more on the discourse of the three international media as the working title suggests. Any result of hegemonies from those media outlets does not indicate that there is no

2

hegemony or propaganda in Chinese media. Contrarily, the review of Hong Kong protesters in Chinese media already concluded that propaganda and hegemonies have been produced systematically. However, they are not the focuses of this research. The immediate focus of this dissertation is to apply relevant methods of critical discourse studies (CDS) to the analysis of reports from CNN, the BBC and Al Jazeera. This will determine if there is any solid evidence of ideological hegemony in texts. It will build on Vukovich and others' research, to further discussion of contemporary aspects (such as the extent to which the Chinese protesters are bound by the culture and the political opportunities in China) and historical ones (such as the extent to which orientalism has impacted HK protesters). The study will now discuss hegemony in reports about China, since it is pivotal in the discussion of Western biases in discourse of news about China.

2.8 Hegemony in reports about China

Hegemony in reports about communist countries has been related to propaganda against communism. The dominant 'anti-communism' propaganda in international broadcasts in the leading Western media, especially American media, has been observed to be significantly anti-Communist and anti-Chinese since the Second World War (Thussu, 2006). Cold war propaganda in the Third World was another battle for people's hearts and minds Thussu, 2000, p.36). The Cold War, which arose from the fall out of the victorious Allies—the communist Soviet Union and the capitalist West—gave rise to 'communist propaganda' and 'capitalist persuasion' (pp.16-17). In fact, during the Cold War, leading countries in the Western world perceived the Soviet Union to be their enemy, who, even if there were "...few opportunities to meet Soviet citizens here...In fiction, cinema, and television entertainment the Soviet threat has become a staple theme...and the red menace are regularly and lucratively pitted against freedom and democracy." (McNair, 1988, p.4.). In Asia, in addition to direct broadcasts from the USA, VOA (Voice of America) operated from Japan, Thailand (where the Voice of Free Asia was part of VOA) and Sri Lanka. Following the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the US's priority was to stop the expansion of communism into other parts of Asia (Thussu, 2000). In 1951, the CIA funded the Manila-based Radio Free Asia, notable for its anti-communist stridency. It was later replaced by Radio of Free Asia which continued until 1966 (Taylor, 1997, p.43). (Taylor, 1997) (Thussu, 2002, 2nd edition) During the Vietnam War, US propaganda reached new heights (Chandler, 1981; Hallin, 1986). The Joint US Public Office became the delegated authority for all propaganda activities, the chief aims of which were to undermine the support for communists and to keep the support of the South Vietnamese. These messages were conveyed mainly through dropping leaflets and broadcasting from low flying aircraft (Thussu, 2000, p.37). The Cold War narrative has continued in reports of the Ukraine conflict in 2014. Among the findings of the study was that the social media postings reflected international media coverage of the Ukraine conflict, which was generally characterised as being a 'Cold-War'-style confrontation between the Russian Federation and the United States/NATO alliance (Allam 2014; Linnell 2014; Parry 2014; Rothrock 2014; Snyder 2014; Stern 2014; Walker 2014).

However, in recent times, there is a literature gap in studies of hegemony in reports about China in the international media outlets. Most studies are the other way round, i.e., the hegemony and propaganda in Chinese media when it reports domestic and international issues (see Latham, 2000; Jing, 2002; Zhang, 2011; Fairbrother, 2008; Zhang, 2011); a few others have discussed the hegemonic power between China and America and how the two superpowers have responded to each other in terms of geopolitics and international media

(see Wang, 1991; Foot, 2006; Campbell, 2008). Amongst those studies, Wang (1991) has tried to provide some empirical evidence to prove the hegemony theory. Although the research was carried out back in the '90s, her points are still inspiring for the study of mass media. She pointed out that there were three ideologies in reports on two events—Nixon's visit to China in 1972, and the Tian'anmen protests in 1989, in the *New York Times*: dominant ideology, which has been anti-communist since the Cold War; contingent ideology, which was related to Nixon and Bush's administrations, and which was surprisingly China-friendly; and journalist ideology, which has not provided too much evidence to explain the relation with the other two discourses. Studies since then have not gone into detail about how news constructs such anti-communist discourse, let alone whether there are some discourse changes in such hegemony. This study will examine the news via critical discourse analysis (CDA) and content analysis, and will, in Chapter 6, trace the historical discourse in regard to Orientalism, particularly in the case of Hong Kong, since it was a former British colony.

2.9 Hegemony in everyday practice in journalism

The existing hegemonic discourse of the Chinese regime, is one in which the discourse of 'China vs. the West', resembles the Cold War narrative. This narrative has been circulated in news discourse long enough to become common sense, or normality. Scholars (Laclau et al, 2014; Hall, 1995; van Dijk, 1992a) have discussed historical discourse, practices and social powers which will result in the possibility of hegemonic discourse being hidden in similar patterns in discourse.

Hegemonic struggle takes place at a range of sites, including those at the local (for example, family, workplace, community), national (for example, education policy, welfare policy, naturalisation testing), and international (for example, globalisation) levels (Blackledge, 2000).

Specifically, the notion of media hegemony includes assumptions about:

- (1) the socialisation and ideology of journalists,
- (2) the tendency of journalists and their reports to support and perpetuate the *status quo*, and
- (3) the negative character of foreign news coverage, especially the coverage of Third World countries (Altheide, 1984).

The three arguments above are important in positing the coverage of protest in China. As Antonio Gramsci (1971) articulated, media hegemony refers to the dominance of a certain way of life and thought, and to the way in which that dominant concept of reality is diffused throughout the public, as well as the private, dimensions of social life (Altheide, 1984). According to Gramsci (1971) and Hall (1991), hegemony has been found in the media language which serves the interests of the dominant social power. However, since the advent of the concept, hegemony has been articulated through Marxism. The contemporary definition of hegemony is conceptually rooted in the Marxist view of the economic foundations of a society as being the most important shaper of culture, values and ideology; the ruling classes who control the economic structures and institutions of society also control its political and primary ideological institutions (Marx and Engels, 1960), and thus the concept of hegemony in media seldom transcends itself from class struggles, let alone those relating to national borders. The

incongruity of Altheide's and others' definition of media hegemony in international news is disconnected from its roots.

However, this study has found that it is necessary to discuss details of the everyday practice of journalists, together with a cultural approach to news workers, against the backdrop of such a capitalist institutional and economic order (see, Belair-Gagnon, 2019). To be more specific, the decisive impact of news production and dissemination on international news could be listed as being the following, to which Altheide (1984) referred:

- (1) *Journalists' socialisation involves guidelines, work routines, and orientations replete with the dominant ideology* (ibid., p.478).

Journalists' work routines are claimed to incorporate language rules and codes which resonate with the dominant ideology (cf. Mueller, 1973; Hall, 1979: pp.342 ff; Hall, 1980: pp.15 ff, pp.117 ff) The upshot is that journalists can unwittingly promote ideological hegemony by using their cultural categories and symbols as they do their work, although some media hegemonists assert that journalists use these codes both consciously and strategically, in order to promote dominant ideological interests (Chaney, 1981, p.117).

Although there is no clear illustration of how different journalists' political views are from those of institutions or editors, the policy reports are undoubtedly subverted, in order to become covert policy, and that, most of the time, journalists have to write what editors want and prefer, otherwise the stories will be cut (Breed, 1995). The media hegemonists claim that journalists contend that the work routines and bureaucratic organisational procedures used by them are imbued with implicit and explicit ideological referents, which consistently lead to the production of messages emphasising particular norms, values, and sanctions (Murdock and Golding, 1979, p23).

Meanwhile, journalists' personal values may appear in news reports too.

At the personal level, the majority of journalists are in favour of liberalism, as it is the mainstream ideology in elite news. According to Altheide, Eastern seaboard publications were regarded as being the leaders in journalism standards, and their management and staff in the "elite press" tended to be more Democratic and left-leaning than their counterparts in smaller operations throughout the rest of the United States (Altheide, 1984).

- (2) *Journalists tend to cover topics and present news reports which are conservative and supportive of the status quo* (ibid., p.478).

As mentioned in the literature review, scholars (Sparks, 2006; Barsamian 2007; Chomsky, 2007) have criticised the heavily one-sided reports from journalists in the aftermath of 9-11, and during the Iraq War. The rhetoric around Muslims has undergone great changes since 9-11. Jackson (2018) pointed out that the American media have framed a contra-narrative of "terrorism vs. America" as "evil vs. good" in order to demonise Muslims since 9/11, while the media unanimously backed up the Bush administration during the Iraq War. "Most of the media are echo chambers for the war on Iraq", (Barsamian 2007), and Chomsky said "When the media had to go along, they went along. So, if you watched BBC or CNN when the war started, it was like cheerleading and continued that way" (Chomsky, 2007: p.52).

(3) *Journalists tend to present pro-American and negative coverage of foreign countries, especially of Third World nations* (Altheide, 1984, p.478).

As the literature review has shown, scholars such as Richard W. Mansbach and Kirsten L. Taylor (2012), in their *Introduction to Global Politics*, pointed out that globalisation has been accompanied by the spread of culture, originally Western culture, featuring shared norms that are based on free-market capitalism (Mansbach and Taylor, 2012: p.183). ‘Media imperialism’ and ‘information imperialism’ are mentioned by different scholars (Sparks, 1998; Schlesinger, 1999b; Thussu, 2006). According to the proponents of media hegemony, news emphasis on negative stereotypes of foreign countries and the slanting of information that is compatible with American and Western ideologies promote further control, through a kind of information imperialism (Dahlgren, 1982).

It seems that the cause of hegemony in news discourse is not ambiguous. *hegemony is contained in the news reports sustaining the pervasive ideology*, due to an attribution to a late capitalist order, an *effect* of the efforts by the dominant class to keep its control and to legitimate itself, (cf. Gitlin, 1980). ‘However, despite the insights and efforts of the scholars mentioned above in relation to the topic, and to the concept of hegemony, the compelling logic of the media hegemony thesis has not been matched by a research programme that has systematically assessed the nature and extent of such domination on either foreign or domestic topics’ (Altheide, 1984, p.479). The reasons are the ambiguity of the concept of hegemony and, as mentioned before, the limitations resulting from discussing hegemony within the boundaries of the class struggles in individual societies.

2.10 Rediscovery of ideology: the source of hegemony from the dominant

Despite all the ‘evidence’ and theories relating to how journalists and the newsroom may influence news content, the claim of there being a ‘conspiracy’ among journalists and media companies is too inadequate to explain the phenomenon of the distorted reports that have been found in this study, or to answer the question as to why they would do it in international news reports. After all, media workers are proud of themselves for being the advocates of social justice under the principles of professional journalism. To further analyse the issue, the researcher must go beyond a discussion of whether media workers are subject to codes of professional journalism, as has already been discussed by McChesney and Schiller (2003), in that professional journalism has proven to be mostly a stenographer for those in power. However, it is highl inadequate and unfair to claim that media workers report news in certain ways intentionally. Although techniques of all kinds of content analysis have pointed out that there are patterns of reporting in texts, they have not achieved a deeper analysis of the fundamental reasons for such patterns.

Stuart Hall (1984) advocated that media studies have to go beyond mere scientific or technical methods, such as content analysis. The framing evidence found in texts barely scratches the surface of the fundamental issue: ideology. This study has no ambition to review how the concept of ideology has been formed and argued but, as mentioned before, it is defined strictly within class struggles by early Marxists that ideology is ‘the idea of the ruling class, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force’ (Marx and Engels, 1960, pp.51-2). What Marx and Engels disapproved of is the autonomous function of ideology, free from the material, but such arguments limited

themselves to the possibility that ideology's existence does not have to rely on the ruling class. This blind spot gave Bell (1960) a loophole to dismantle the concept of the ruling class in America, and they thus legitimised themselves to deny the continuity or expansion of ideology beyond class divisions.

However, the publication of *The End of Ideology* by Bell (1960) did not end the ideology, but somehow stimulated a brand-new round of discussions which inject broader definitions and possibilities into the concept. The Post-Marxist, Laclau (2014), and the culturalist, Stuart Hall (1995), point out that the ideology is founded on the struggles between the dominant and the peripheral, the majority and the minority, the privileged and the less privileged, and thus the discussion of ideology transcends its original definition of class struggles and extends to the power struggles of racial, political and cultural minorities.

One of Hall's most distinguished works is that he links ideology with language. In *The Rediscovery of Ideology: Return of the Repressed in Media Studies* (1982), he defines ideology from linguistic perspectives. He points out that specific meanings are produced in the language by the social practices involved.

Language has to be seen as a medium in which specific meanings are produced. What this insight put at issue, then, was the question of which kinds of meaning get systematically and regularly constructed around particular events. Because meaning is not given but is produced, it followed that different kinds of meaning could be ascribed to the same events. Thus, in order for one meaning to be regularly produced, it had to win a kind of credibility, legitimacy, or taken-for-grantedness, for itself. That involved marginalizing, down-grading, or de-legitimizing alternative constructions. Indeed, there were certain kinds of explanations which, given the power of and credibility acquired by the preferred range of meanings, were literally unthinkable and unsayable (see, Hall *et al.*, 1977).

This linkage between ideology and language gives new angles from which to look at the production and circulation of ideology. Hall (see 1982) pointed out that the 'class determination' of ideology ignored the autonomy of ideological processes, but he also pointed out it was unwise to abandon any relationship between the ruling-class and dominant ideas. He said that the meaning of the words did not have to rely on which classes they described, or belonged to, since ideology could be produced in social practices and circulated as historical texts or 'common sense' in various social classes and even contexts, but the imbalance of social powers produced the dominant language that contained specific ideology.

Another important aspect of the circulation of the discourse that is discussed by Hall is that such articulations have been historically secured (Hall, 1982).

They (articulations) do have effects. The equivalences have been sustained, they are constantly reproduced in other discourses, in social practices and institutions, in 'free societies.' These traditional couplings, or 'traces', as Gramsci called them, exert a powerful traditional force over the ways in which subsequent discourses, employing the same elements, can be developed. (Hall, 1982).

The attempt to relate a discourse to a previous one is not only restricted to Hall. Fairclough (1992a) also developed Bakhtin's (1986) concept of intertextuality, as mentioned in the methodology chapter. Fairclough explained intertextuality in news analysis in *Media*

Discourse (1995), and he pointed out that genres, voices and discourses could be drawn upon and articulated together to produce a certain ideology.

Ideology, hegemony and language/discourse

Since this study has the intention to review patterns of discourse in the Chinese protest reports in international news, it is necessary to expand the discussion into the broader context of discourse and hegemony.

Hall regarded discourse as a complex of three elements: social practice, discursal practice (text production, distribution, and consumption), and text. Ideology enters into the picture, firstly, in the ideological investment of elements which are drawn upon in producing or interpreting text, and the ways in which they are articulated together in the order of discourse, and, secondly, in the ways in which these elements are articulated together and orders of discourse rearticulated in discursal events (Hall, 1984).

Hall's theory of hegemony is different from Altheide's (1984) conclusion about media hegemony, which has been mentioned before. The latter blames media workers for the homogeneous content or ideological biases in texts, while Hall pointed out a more complex picture of the definition and production of hegemony.

'Hegemony is leadership as well as domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a society. Hegemony is a power over society a whole of one of the fundamental economically defined classes in alliance (as a bloc) with other social forces, but it is never achieved more than partially and temporarily, as an 'unstable equilibrium'. Hegemony is about constructing alliances, and integrating rather than simply dominating subordinate classes, through concessions or through ideological means, to win their consent. '

(Hall, 1984, p.110)

It is quite possible, therefore, that the production of hegemony could develop into the willing consent of the mass, instead of the coercion from the top.

Hegemony in dominant discourse: an achieving of consent instead of coercion

Although the extension of the discussion of ideology in the texts leads us to a broader context, one has to know that hegemony in texts is not usually intentionally or consciously produced by individuals. One has also to see that dominance was accomplished at the unconscious as well as the conscious level: to see it as a property of the system of relations involved, rather than as the overt and intentional biases of individuals; and to recognise its play in the very activity of regulation and exclusion which functioned through language and discourse before an adequate conception of dominance could be theoretically secured (Hall, 1984). Hall also pointed out that the dominant discourse effectively circulated and secured mastery over social practices, 'which not directly paying immediate profits to the narrow interests of any particular class, favours the development and expansion of the dominant social and productive system of life as a whole' (Hall, 1984). Hall's argument was actually developed based on Gramsci's contribution (1971), that hegemony is understood as being accomplished, not without a due measure of legal and legitimate compulsion, but principally by means of winning the active consent of those classes and groups who are subordinated within it (Hall, 1984;1980a).

This approach could also be used to demonstrate how media institutions might be articulated in the production and reproduction of the dominant ideologies while, at the same time, being ‘free’ of direct compulsion, and, ‘independent’ of any direct attempt by the powerful to nobble them (Hall, 1984). Unlike Althusser’s theory of ‘ideological state apparatuses’, which pointed out that state controls are the main drivers influencing media content, Hall argued that it is the unconscious and autonomous circulation of consensus that produces hegemony in the discourse. For example, when the late Director General of the BBC, Sir Charles Curran, remarked that ‘the BBC could not exist outside the terms of parliamentary democracy’, what he pointed to was the fact that broadcasting, like every other institution of the State in Britain, must subscribe to the fundamental form of the political regime of the society, since it is the foundation of society itself and has been legitimated by the will of the majority (Hall, 1984).

What Hall (1984) started to say, but did not dwell upon, is the legitimacy of another ‘reference’ of ideology, which could make a contrast to the dominant one. He hinted that ideology in one certain discourse could be observed from other discourses, which are potentially outside of the existing dominant discourse.

Hall argued that it is the ‘State’, instead of particular political parties, or of economic interests, in which the ‘production of consensus’ is represented and shaped. He pointed out that ‘the will of the majority’ comes to a consensus about what the national interests are, i.e., the capitalist order of social production. The ‘impartiality’ of the media thus requires the mediation of the State—that set of processes through which particular interests become generalised, and have secured the consent of ‘the nation’, which carry the stamp of legitimacy (Hall, 1984).

In this case, against the backdrop of international communication with different national interests which are clashing with each other, Hall’s argument, on the one hand, indicates that ideology in the media could be interpreted by units of nations but, on the other hand, does not provide us with a clear explanation of how conflicts among different national interests and ideologies are shown in practice.

This study will explore how news can be geopoliticised, especially via Hong Kong’s case. However, the discussion of journalists’ professionalism cannot be ignored against the backdrop of global journalism.

2.11 Global journalism: ‘professionalism’: A game of power, or the circulation of ‘common sense’?

The macro-level of international news has been discussed through international news agencies and national news organisations, which, as the basis of the majority of European media research, has focused more on the ideological and institutional levels (Reese, 2001: pp.641-658). However, global journalism cannot be neglected, as it can be regarded as the ‘micro’ level of global media and as part of ‘the global public sphere’, which aims to explain how international news is constructed through individuals and within social and individual settings (Reese, 2001). After discussing some of the problems of international news, such as stereotyping and propaganda in the news, this study raises questions related to the research questions and to the later discussion: Do Western journalists write according to ethical codes or other principles? Do they uphold justice, as they always claim? Can they realise, and try to modify, the domestication and stereotyping of news, as mentioned above? After all, it is those journalists

who embrace their identity as ‘global citizens’ and ‘global journalists’ and who try to produce culturally diversified global news.

Firstly, the notion and practicality of professionalism will be discussed. Western journalism upholds ‘professionalism’ as part of their ethical code. ‘Professionalism’ tends to be implicit in journalism studies, but studies (as well as countless commentaries) have fused professionalism with the observance of certain ethical principles, most notably, objectivity, fairness (impartiality and neutrality) and public service (Waisbord, 2013: p.4), (Tumber and Prentoulis, 2005: p.64). Howard Tumber and Marina Prentoulis have discussed objectivity in detail, saying that:

- (1) it marks the separation of the press from party politics;
- (2) as an ideological ideal, ‘objectivity’ is interconnected with some notion of ‘truth’;
- (3) a set of norms related to objectivity, e.g., truthfulness, factuality, completeness and accuracy, have underpinned the claim to objectivity (Tumber and Prentoulis, 2005, p.64). As for fairness and public service, other scholars (Hallin, 2006; Waisbord, 2013) have pointed out that professional journalism has developed an ethic of public service, and they denote journalist practice as being guided by the ideals of the public interest, civic-orientedness, social responsibility and altruism (Waisbord, 2013: p.5).

In earlier times, professionalism was used to emancipate the media from State intervention, censorship and commercialisation. In democratic media studies, ownership and government intervention are always “threats” to freedom of speech or publishing. In the late 1940s, the Commission on the Freedom of the Press articulated the argument for what came to be called the “social responsibility” theory of the press (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1973). Meanwhile, the Commission was concerned with the increasing concentration of media ownership, which, it felt, meant that the public interest could no longer be protected simply by preventing government interference with the “market-place of ideas” (Hallin, 1991). It was concerned both with the danger that media owners would exclude political views that are contrary to their own, and that the danger of commercialisation would undermine responsible reporting (Hallin, 1991). This struggle between the “professional” and the “commercial” was not only exhibited in the American media, but also in the British media. Fairclough pointed out, in his critical analysis discourse, that the entertainment trend in news generates an order of discourse which is “conversationalisation”, and this appeared in an article covered by *The Sun*, in which a formal official document had been written in more colloquial language, full of rhetorical devices, in order to attract and entertain the audience. (Fairclough, 1992)

This “professionalisation” was mostly consolidated by the mid-1940s, when the Commission on the Freedom of the Press was preparing its report as a model of journalism (Hallin, 1991), while the “conflicts” between professionalism, ownership and commercialisation dominated some media production and distribution studies (Hallin, 1991; Curran, 2000; Bennett, 2005),

However, scholars doubt the practicality of professionalism within social and occupational settings. Professional ideas, such as those of impartiality and objectivity, are likely to be operationalised in ways which privilege this institutional ethos and its priorities (Allan, 1998: p.120). More specifically, Reese (2001) pointed out that there is a hierarchy in the newsroom which puts professionalism in doubt. The ‘hierarchy-of-influence’ model addresses the top-down power from the individual, routines’, organizational, extra-media and ideological levels. This study conforms strongly with Breed’s study of media policy in the newsroom (Breed, 1995).

At the individual level, both Breed (1995) and Reese (2001) found that, among western elite journalists, there is a homogeneous tendency to favour one side—the majority of journalists are liberal, even if they work for a ‘conservative’ paper. Staff subordinates (reporters, etc.) tend to have more “liberal” attitudes, especially in elite newspapers such as *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* (Breed, 1995). A study by Lichter, Rothman and Lichter, culminating in *The Media Elite: America’s New Powerbroker (1986)*, makes the case that news in the United States is ‘biased’ in a liberal direction, because journalists at the elite news organisations are themselves liberal (Schudson, 2011: p.272). Meanwhile, Schudson found that these elite journalists are more socially liberal, rather than being economically liberal (only 13% think that the government should own big corporations) (Schudson, 2011: p.274).

However, according to Fowler (1991), news discourse is constructed according to the stylistic and ideological conventions of newspaper, not of the writer. That means, news discourse activates an institutional voice rather than a personal voice (see Flowerdew, 2012, p.222). The broader discussion of the institutional level should therefore be considered. At the routine and organisational levels, although Breed (1995) has pointed out that journalists and reporters have been subversive to the covert policy of the news organisations for which they work, and there are social and individual reasons why they consciously and unconsciously subject themselves to the policy (Ibid.), he did not clarify the political discrepancies between the staff and the editors. However, the policy reports are undoubtedly subversive to the covert policy, in that, most of the time, journalists have to write what editors want and prefer, otherwise the stories will be cut (Breed, 1995). Individual journalists or reporters are subjected to media policy and the hierarchy of the newsroom. There was a downward trend in measures of perceived autonomy from 1971 to 2002, especially in relation to deciding story emphasis, which dropped from 76% of reporters saying they had almost complete freedom to decide in 1971, to 42% in 2002. Likewise, the perceived freedom to select stories dropped from 60% in 1971 and 1982, to 40% in 2002, another significant decline (Weaver et al. 2007: p.72). The largest drops in perceived freedom were those notified by journalists working for daily newspapers, wire services and television (Weaver and Willnat, 2016).

Furthermore, one of the few functions of top editors may undermine objectivity, and this is the maximising of the news value. Making the most of a story is the copy editor’s prime function. Most copy editing is designed to maximise news value—to make the lead ‘harder’ and more striking, the source’s credentials more authoritative, the writing more crisp, the appeal to the audience more compelling (Bell, 1991). Rich empirical experience enables Allan Bell to conduct an editing example, which showed how a ‘typical low interest’ story (Bell, 1991: p.81) can be edited so that it becomes more newsworthy through cutting, shortening, and finding territorially alternative words (changing ‘the U.K. and Europe’ to ‘European’) in order to make an item a ‘harder’ lead and with harder content (Ibid: p.80). However, the harder and more ‘newsworthy’ version results in ‘a semantic price for these syntactic and discourse changes’ (Bell, 1991: p.82).

The ideological level has been discussed in relation to different subjects and topics. From Reese’s perspective, he asked how the levels of media organizations function in order to add up to a coherent ideology result (Reese, 2010). In other words, why is certain content not favoured by journalists and editors, and what ideological pattern results from the routine?

The discussion of ideology has never faded, especially in the media context. Since Marx’s time, similar opinions have been raised over and over again, which suggests that ‘the ideology in the media is to maintain the dominant group’s power’ (Hall, 1982: p.54). Although media studies,

especially American media studies, have focused on empirical studies, or, as Stuart Hall (1982) calls them, ‘behaviourist’ studies, the ‘return’ of ideology in media studies has made the ideological perspective ‘the centre of the media studies’, since then (Hall, 1992: p.105). Stuart Hall’s (1982) *the Return of Ideology* has sparked the discussion of ideology in the media in more recent studies. Scholars, such as Reese (2010) and Stuart Hall (1982), tend to regard Western journalism and media as being means to maintain the capitalist order. The repetitive circulation of elite-favoured messages will circulate actively enough to minimise any concerns about concentrated power (Reese, 2010), and the “common sense” of both audience and broadcasters, in that “unwittingly, unconsciously, the broadcaster has served as a support for the reproduction of a dominant ideological discursive field (Hall, 1989). Hall’s argument has transcended the discussion around the government intervention and commercialisation “dilemmas” of the media, and has challenged the core of media values. He pointed out that the essence of the media is to reinforce the “common sense” within a society, which is to serve the “national interest” at large. This media behaviour is not confined to propaganda, because there is no specific political party that would gain direct political interests from it. This serves the majority in a society, while the sub-cultural group has no choice but to be assimilated into the mainstream (Hall, 1989).

2.12 Conclusion

Previous studies have concluded that both Chinese and Western media have reported on Chinese protests relating a hegemony that suit the political agenda of China and the West. Protests in one place, for example, Hong Kong, have been depicted as having different stories and stances. In Chinese media, protests were illegal and invalid, whereas Western media or anti-Beijing HK media regarded protesters as legitimate fighters. In this study, the researcher acknowledges hegemony in both Chinese and Western media, but the focus is on critically reviewing reports from the three leading international media outlets— CNN, the BBC and AJE, on the Wukan (2011-2017) and Hong Kong protests (2019-2020).

As the literature review mentioned, hegemony in Western media against China has existed since the Second World War, despite a few discourse changes occasionally. The production of hegemony has been guaranteed by the concentrated ownership of international media outlets, which are dominated by the West in terms of news collection, production and dissemination. When it is broken down to the daily practice of journalists, ‘information imperialism’—certain discourse, such as the Chinese government being a monolithic entity, has been circulated long enough in every institution to become common sense that it is both a collective will and an individual choice to describe the Chinese government within frames. In the next chapter, we focus on methodology.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the research methods used, the research type, the research design, and will explore the necessity of applying qualitative methods as major methods. Firstly, the objectives of mainly using qualitative methods is related to the research type, which is interpretative research. Researchers are increasingly aware of the value of interpretive research which has been shown to produce findings that address social issues effectively (Bullock, et al., 1995). Initially, the principles underpinning the use of qualitative research approaches became more clearly established, and a broader literature is now available to help researchers fashion a design, interpret results and write up their findings (e.g., Woods, 1986; Measor, 1985; Harre, Clarke and De Carlo, 1985; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983).

According to Neuman (2014: 100), interpretative research or, more broadly defined, interpretative social science (ISS), can be traced to the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). Neuman (2014) points out that interpretative social science is rooted in an empathetic understanding of people's everyday lived experience in specific historical settings. More importantly, interpretative social science is related to **hermeneutics**. The term comes from a God in Greek mythology, Hermes, who had the job of communicating morals to the gods, and hermeneutics 'literally means [to] make the obscure plain' (Blaikie, 1993: p.58). However, later, in recent research, hermeneutic methods usually emphasize texts, symbols and pictures. The humanities (philosophy, art history, religious studies, linguistics, and literary criticism) use hermeneutics. It emphasizes the conducting of a very close, detailed reading of texts in order to acquire a profound and deep understanding (Neuman, 2014: p.103). Just as Neuman said, what people see and experience is socially constructed (Ibid.: p.105), and the purpose of conducting ISS is to explore the social practices by analysing texts and pictures. This study aims to analyse the social practices that are embedded in texts, which means that the majority of the research will apply qualitative methods, such as content (framing) analysis, and discourse analysis, other than the use of computer-aided quantitative methods, whereas quantitative techniques will be used as complementary methods. The reasons for using mixed research methods will be explained, along with the specific methodologies used, later.

The study will also use another qualitative method—critical discourse analysis, which is related to critical social science (CSS). Critical social science can be traced to the writings of Karl Marx (1818-1883), Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) and, later, Theodor Adorno (1903-1969), and they were then developed by the Frankfurt School in the 1930s and, later, by Jürgen Habermas (1929-). CSS researchers conduct studies that aim to critique and transform social relations by revealing the underlying sources of social control, power relations, and inequality (Neuman, 2014: p.111). Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a specific methodology in CSS, which is a major method that analyses ideology through language/discourse. It was regarded as being pioneering in theoretical and empirical studies of news (such as: Chibnall, 1977; Fishman, 1980; Gans, 1979; Glasgow University Media Group, 1976, 1980; Golding & Elliott, 1979; Tuchman, 1978), which appeared at more or less the same time, over thirty years ago, as the first book in critical linguistics, which was edited by Roger Fowler and his associates (Fowler, Kress, Hodge, & Trew, 1979). According to van Dijk (2009), the most detailed, systematic and influential studies of news and ideology in recent decades may be found in the books by the Glasgow

University Media Group, which are about television news on industrial strikes (1976, 1980, etc.), and later on other topics, followed by another classical study that pays extensive attention to the roles of ideologies in news rooms and news reports, which is Gitlin's (1980) analysis of the media coverage of the students' movement in the United States.

Since the '90s, scholars, including Norman Fairclough (1991; 1995; 2007), van Dijk (1991; 1993; 1995), Theo van Leeuwen (1993a) and Ruth Wodak (1999; 2000; 2001) have developed CDA with different emphases on language and social change, but a similar purpose in analysing the ideology in texts.

More recently, Van Dijk (2013) has updated the definition of CDA. He points out that instead of calling CDA a 'method', there should be a more systematic way of looking at it. Since there are many linguistic and semantic methods in critical discourse analysis, Van Dijk proposes that critical discourse studies would be a more appropriate designation. van Dijk (2013) explains the confusion with CDA thus:

'Being critical, first of all, is a state of mind., an attitude, a way of dissenting, and many more things, but not an explicit method for the description of the structures or strategies of text and talk. So, in that sense, people who want to practice CDA may be supposed to do so from a perspective of opposition, for instance, against power abuse through discourse. [...]. Methodologically, CDA is as diverse as DA in general, or indeed other directions in linguistics, psychology or the social sciences. Thus, CDA studies may do so in terms of grammatical (phonological, morphological, syntactic), semantic, pragmatic, interactional rhetorical, stylistic, narrative or genre analyses, among others, on the one hand, and through experiments, ethnography, interviewing, life stories, focus groups, participant observation, and so on, on the other hand. [...]. A good method is a method that is able to give a satisfactory (reliable, relevant, etc.) answer to the questions of a research project. It depends on one's aims, expertise, time and goals, and the kind of data that can or must be generated—that is, on the context of a research project. [...]. Do critical discourse analysis by formulating critical goals. and the explain by what specific explicit methods you want to realise it.'

(van Dijk, 2013 in Wodak & Meyer, 2016, p.3)

The study will therefore have specific research questions, and different explicit methods of CDA will be applied in order to answer them. Both research questions and methods will be explained in detail later in this chapter.

3.2 Research design

The objectives in choosing qualitative methods as the major methodology have been illustrated in the introduction. However, it is also necessary to explain the necessity for mixed research methods.

The integration of qualitative and quantitative approaches is an interesting issue, and it continues to be one that draws much debate (Bryman, 2004; Morgan, 2007; Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2005). Mixed methods research can be viewed as being an approach which draws upon the strengths and perspectives of each method, recognising the existence and importance of the

physical, natural world as well as the importance of reality and the influence of human experience (Johnson and Onquegbuzie, 2004). Neuman also points out that most researchers develop an expertise in one approach, but the approaches have complementary strengths. A study that combines both tends to be richer and more comprehensive (Neuman, 2014: p.167). The research will therefore focus on hermeneutic methods, thus the major methodology will be qualitative methods, including framing analysis, discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis. Secondly, quantitative methods will be applied to show proportions of voices in reports.

The methodology utilised in this study aims to answer the following questions:

1. How have global/Western news organizations reported on recent protests in mainland China and Hongkong or, more specifically, what expressions and vocabularies have been used to cover those protests?
2. What are the results or indications that arise from the analysis of the news reports in different global news sources?
3. To what extent has the portrayal of protests in China reflected the reality on the ground?
4. What are the implications of the social practices, relations of power and ideologies behind the global news coverage, for both China and non-Western societies?

As will be seen in later chapters, the research has answered the questions above, and has offered valid conclusions about the way global (Western) news media cover protests in China.

3.3 Data collection and analysis (news/documentary as sources of data)

Data gathering is crucial in research, as the data is meant to contribute to a better understanding of a theoretical framework (Bernard 2002). It then becomes imperative that selecting the manner of obtaining data, and from whom the data will be acquired, be carried out with sound judgment, especially since no amount of analysis can make up for improperly collected data (Bernard et al., 1986).

This study collected all word-based news (exclusive of editorials, comments or opinions) from CNN and the BBC in relation to the Wukan protests' coverage, and 6 episodes of a documentary of Wukan protests from Al Jazeera, a more detailed but not comparative analysing the coverage of Chinese protests. Considering the data base about Wukan protests is small (CNN has 9 articles and the BBC has 23), the researcher will conduct a qualitative study with a few quantitative methods.

As for the Hong Kong case, purposive sampling on the online coverage is used to collect data articles. The key words to search the news are 'the Extradition Bill, Hong Kong protests'. The first 12 pages of word-based news (exclusive of editorials, comments or opinions) are selected in each news outlets. The studies collected 83 articles from the BBC news, 81 from CNN news, and 72 from Al Jazeera English. Since the data is larger, a quantitative study with some content analysis will be conducted.

The goal of sampling, using qualitative methods, is to deepen understanding of a larger process, relationship, or social scene (Neuman, 2014: p.247). As for samples in qualitative research, ‘it is their relevance to the research topic rather than their representativeness which determines the way in which the people to be studied are selected’ (Flick, 1988: p.41).

In this study, purposive sampling is conducted in the HK case as a result of a certain rationale. The purposive sampling technique is a type of non-probability sampling that is most effective when one needs to study a certain cultural domain with knowledgeable experts who work within it (Tangvo, 2007).

In this study, articles that are selected to be samples therefore do not represent a specific ideology or institution. They are selected only due to their relevance to the research topic.

Meanwhile, documentaries from Al Jazeera will also be used as one of the data sources.

Dealing with data is another critical step, especially in such complex and interpretative social research. In this study, the researcher will use two steps, which Neuman (2014) has mentioned, in order to analyse the data. The first is to use **open coding** to code the data, and then **axial coding** to further analyse the themes and subthemes and, finally, **selective coding** to go through the codes, themes and categories.

Open coding is a first pass through recently collected data. Researchers locate themes and assign initial codes in their first attempts to condense the mass of data into categories (Neuman, 2014: p.481). In this study, articles will be categorised under several major themes via framing analysis. There are different approaches from which to conduct framing analysis, but, in this study, considering that it is related to hermeneutics, a linguistic approach will be the major method applied. However, other framing analysis approaches will also be discussed briefly.

Axial coding is a second pass through the data. During this pass, researchers focus on codes’ themes, rather than on the data. Axial coding is more concerned with the causal relations, or coherence, between the themes when researchers look at categories that cluster together (Neuman, 2014: p.483).

Neuman has suggested that researchers bear the following questions in mind while conducting axial coding:

Can I divide existing concepts into subdimensions or subcategories? Can I combine several closely related concepts into one more general construct? Can I organise categories into a sequence (i.e., A, then B, then C), or by their physical location, or their relationship to a major topic of interest?’ (Neuman, 2014: p.484)

In this study, critical discourse analysis (CDA) will be used to analyse the themes, and the answers to the following questions are the aims of CDA:

1. Can those categories/themes be divided into subcategories/subthemes?
2. Can different categories be combined into a more general construct?
3. What are the components of those categories/themes or, in other words, how does the language construct those themes?
4. Do those themes have a hierarchy or sequence? How does the hierarchy or sequence help in constructing the major topic?

Both framing analysis and CDA will be introduced in detail later. Other concepts, such as discourse analysis and critical linguistics, will also be mentioned.

By the time the study is ready to go through the last pass: selective coding, the major themes have already been identified. According to Neuman, selective coding involves the scanning of all the data and of the previous codes, looking selectively for cases that illustrate themes, and making comparisons after most, or all, of the data collection has been completed (Neuman, 2014: p.484). In this study, data/codes from the three news organisations will be compared, and new themes may emerge from the comparison.

The study will review framing analysis first, since it is one of the major methods, discourse analysis, secondly, as a progression to CDA and, finally, the specific methods of CDA.

3.4 Framing analysis

Framing theory and methods have been used in this study. According to Entman (1993) and Scheufele (1999), framing is a 'scattered conceptualization' (Entman, 1993: p.51) with previous studies lacking clear, conceptual definitions and relying on context-specific, rather than generally applicable, operationalizations (Scheufele, 1999: p.1). Due to its unclear and broad conceptualization, 'framing' is used inconsistently in academia (Johnson-Cartee, 2005). Some are more interested in the sociological aspects of issue framing, examining the cultural narratives, mythologies, and rituals that are utilized in constructing the frame (Bennett, 1996; Bennett and Lawrence, 1995). Others examine how ideologies and cultural values permeate the news frames (Gamson, 1989; Gitlin, 1980). For this study,

Framing is the process by which a communication source, such as a news organization [or a political leader, public relations officer, political advertising consultant, or news consumer], defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy' (Nelson, Clawson and Oxley, 1997: p.567),

and 'a frame is a central organizing idea for news content that supplies a context and suggests what the issue is through the use of selection, emphasis, exclusion and elaboration' (Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, et al, 1991: p.11). To make it more conceptual, we can examine some key elements from one of the earliest descriptions of the concept in Goffman's essay, 'Framing as Media Effects' (1974).

When the individual in our Western society recognizes a particular event, he tends, whatever else he does, to imply in this response (and in effect employ) one or more frameworks or schemata of interpretation of a kind that can be called primary. I say primary because application of such a framework or perspective is seen by those who apply it as not depending on or harking back to, some prior or 'original' interpretation: indeed, a primary framework is one that is seen as rendering what would otherwise be a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful.' (Goffman, 1974, p.1).

There are three distinctive elements in this description of framing.

1. Framing is primary frameworks of interpretations
2. The interpretations do not have to be original
3. The interpretations have to make sense

These three characteristics can explain news framing from the news workers' side, the reported countries' side, and the audience, respectively. For the first point, framing could be conducted due to social settings, such as the newsroom hierarchy, which will be discussed later; Secondly, any news from other countries, or from the other side, could be framed as primary frameworks, due to geographical and cultural distance, as previously mentioned, so that the interpretations are possibly not aligned with the original political or cultural indications. Thirdly, framing does not always have to be practiced intentionally. In some cases, framing has to be applied to the news so that it makes sense to the audience, especially in foreign news (such as domestication and stereotyping) but, in some situations, framing has been used to fulfil certain political settings or agendas to such an extent that we can call it propaganda in international relations.

Domestication and stereotyping of news

News reports are also prone to domestication and stereotyping. As mentioned above, broadcasters and agencies alike argue that agencies provide only the raw material; and that the meaning of stories is shaped by the broadcasters and journalists (Gurevitch et al., 1991; Malik, 1992; Paterson, 1998). However, news workers tend to conform to the past and to the stereotypes of certain events, partially to fit the Western audience's common sense about certain countries, because audience and readers tend to believe what fits in with their common sense and their memories of previous stories (Hall, 1982). This study will analyse how CNN, the BBC and Al Jazeera cover protests in China, and will seek to evaluate the characterisation of news about the Wukan protests, the Tian'an Men Square events, or the Hong Kong protests. The framing of protests in relation to economic and political issues will be discussed.

This framing method can be categorized as the domestication and stereotyping of news. Domestication and stereotyping of foreign news are commonly found in Western national news outlets' reports. Both can be regarded as an adaptation of international news to home markets. As for domestication, the foreign news broadcast by national news networks aims to make the content meaningful for the national viewing audience by creating a connection between news items and the different realities of the viewers, such as their history, culture, policy and the society (Cohen, 2002), that is, the tendency for national news media to report foreign events in such a way that the news stories become more understandable for, relevant to, and/or resonant with, local audiences. (Lee, Chan and Zhou, 2011). This reporting technique was also understood to refer to the practice of using a home angle in foreign news, such as focusing on a national who has become a victim of a foreign disaster, like an earthquake or a plane crash, in which most of the victims were not nationals, or featuring an entrepreneur from a home county who has achieved notable success overseas (Tanikawa, 2018). Hafez (2007: 25) argues that international reporting by the influential media are not in the least global but "concentrate upon national markets, whose interests and stereotypes they largely reproduce." In her study of BBC World, Dencik (2013: 5) finds that the television channel is steeped in a domestic order and that it does not promote global citizenship. Biltereyst (2001) asserts that local journalism runs strong amid the current towards globalisation, referring to widespread "domestication," a journalistic approach to peg international events in easily comprehensible national frameworks, which has been noted as a curious phenomenon in the age of globalisation due to its decidedly inward cultural orientations (Alasuutari, Qadir, and Creutz 2013).

The domestication of news has been shown in the recent coverage of Ukraine war which began in 2022. Reports from the Western media have portrayed Ukrainian victims and refugees as being ethnically and economically close to white people in the West. Anchors and journalists from American and British news outlets frequently describe Ukraine refugees as

‘white’, ‘Christian’, ‘blue eyed’, ‘middle class’ and ‘Facebook and Instagram users’ (see Bayoumi, 2022). Such domestication of foreign news will generate more sympathy among the Western audience, which then, seemingly, condemns the war even more. However, the method has been doubted as being ‘racist’ or ‘unfair to refugees of other countries and races’ (see, Allsop, 2022). For example, the comedian Michael Che once said on SNL, ‘In my lifetime I’ve seen footage of attacks like this on other countries, but never a white one’ (Allsop, 2022). This questionable point of view indicates that it is normal or morally acceptable that wars and conflicts happen in countries in the Third World, and thus those examples of ‘normality’ can be seen as being less shocking or they are less condemned.

Meanwhile, stereotyping is regularly employed as a method to enhance the understandability of foreign news subjects, and scholars often argue that this is a common diet in international news reporting (Camaj, 2010; Fowler, 2013; Shaw, 2012). According to Hall, a stereotype is:

...a one-side description which results from the collapsing of complex differences into a simple “cardboard cutout”. Different characteristics are run together and condensed into one. This exaggerated simplification is then attached to a subject or place. (Hall 1992, 308)

The media language scholar, Roger Fowler (2013: 17), observes that a stereotype is “a socially-constructed mental pigeon-hole into which events and individuals can be sorted, thereby making such events and individuals comprehensible.” As used by the news media, a stereotype is thus a process that renders an unfamiliar culture comprehensible to the audience by activating well-established mental categorization or associations between certain objects and the culture of their origin. Such mental association is spawned and strengthened by processes that take place within one’s own culture, not by coming in direct contact with the foreign culture and learning from such direct experience. (Tanikawa, 2018, p. 33),

Overt deployment of cultural stereotypes is one indication that the news reports fail to transcend a national outlook, as this signifies a reliance on the national lens to make sense of the other. Stereotyping is looking to oneself—one’s own cultural logic—for a clue and understanding of the different peoples (Desmarais and Bruce, 2010), rather than seeking to directly and candidly engage with and to understand other cultures (Tanikawa, 2018). Journalists recurrently ‘use prejudicial stereotypes to represent and characterize Britain’s minority communities in general’ (Richardson 2004, p.49). For example, minorities such as Muslim is portrayed by stereotype as ‘terrorists’ in Western media (Tanikawa, 2018).

The study will examine whether news in the three media outlets is domesticated or stereotyped according to the home audience.

The approach to the framing analysis method was productive. As mentioned previously, framing analysis will be conducted in order to identify the themes and frames in the articles; and discourse analysis will link the language with the social practices and power which proceed to the discussion of critical discourse analysis; critical discourse analysis (CDA) will be used to analyse the components of the themes, i.e., how language functions to create such themes and frames through the selection of vocabularies and grammar.

Furthermore, to compensate for the situation in which those methods are too interpretative in some critiques, this study will apply some quantitative methods:

(1) to calculate the percentages of voices, based on Fairclough’s theory of the representation of news (see Fairclough 1995) in both cases;

(2) the proportions of official sources in the Hong Kong case. based on Veneti, Karadimitriou and Poulakidakou's findings (2016), that different official sources reflect the respective national interests.

Framing analysis is a major qualitative content analysis method. While there have been many different definitions of frames, Entman's general definition is possibly the most widely accepted; i.e., framing is:

...selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and make(ing) them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation" (1993: p.52).

Entman (1993) referred to framing as "a scattered conceptualization" (ibid.: p.51), believing that previous studies lacked clear conceptual definitions and relied on context-specific, rather than generally applicable, operationalizations. Framing theory emphasizes the ability of any entity—whether the media, individuals, or organizations—to delineate other people's reality, highlighting one interpretation, while de-emphasizing a less favoured one. A frame then becomes the central idea around which the attributes of events are organized within individual schemata.

However, there are always some controversies around framing theory and framing analysis, since the theory itself is not systematically defined, and research on framing is characterized by theoretical and empirical vagueness. This is due, in part, to the lack of a commonly shared theoretical model underlying framing research.

However, in essence, frame analysis examines the selection and salience of certain aspects of an issue by exploring images, stereotypes, metaphors, actors, and messages (Matthes & Kohring, 2009). Matthes and Kohring (Ibid.) categorise framing analysis into four types: the Hermeneutic Approach; the Linguistic Approach; the Manual Holistic Approach and the Computer-Assisted Approach. The Computer-Assisted approach was eliminated from the research, as it is not appropriate in such semantically-oriented research. As for the Hermeneutic Approach, there is a major defect, which has been mentioned by several scholars. Although most of these studies are well documented and exceptionally thorough in their discussion of media frames, it is fairly difficult to tell how the frames were extracted from the material. (Scheulfele, 1999). For instance, Hanson (1995: p.384) simply states that the anticolonial frame "emerged from the analysis"; Haller and Ralph (2001: p. 412) indicate that "news frames were found"; Coleman and Dysart (2005: p.13) assure that "a deep reading [...] informed the authors of the emergent frames"; and in Boni's (2002) study, there is no hint at all about how the frames were extracted. As Simon (2001) puts it, this raises questions about the selection bias and robustness of the frames that have been identified. Likewise, Tankard (2001) states that "there is a danger in this kind of lone-scholar analysis that the identification of a set of possible frames can be done arbitrarily" (Ibid: p.98).

The Manual Holistic Approach has the same defect. This is another line of research, and the frames are first generated by a qualitative analysis of some news texts and are then coded as holistic variables in a manual content analysis (e.g., Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998; Meyer, 1995; Simon & Xenos, 2000; Segvic, 2005). As an example, Simon and Xenos (2005) conducted an in-depth analysis of some newspaper articles, in the first step, in order to generate six working frames. After that, these frames were defined in a codebook and coded during a subsequent quantitative content analysis. However, in some studies, it remains unclear how

researchers determine their frames (Matthess and Kohring, 2008). For instance, Meyer (1995: p.178) merely “identif[ies] three master frames,” Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998: p.144) assure the reader that “the qualitative assessment of framing was based on careful reading,” and, in Segvic’s study, it remains entirely unclear how the frames were found. (Matthess and Kohring, 2008).

The last approach, which is the Linguistic Approach, will be applied to analyse the news content in this study. In linguistic studies, frames are identified by analysing the selection, placement, and structure of specific words and sentences in a text (e.g., Entman, 1991; Esser & D’Angelo, 2003; Pan & Kosicki, 1993). The linguistic approach is similar to the hermeneutic studies described above. However, the crucial difference is that linguistic researchers clearly determine the linguistic elements that signify a frame (Matthess and Kohring, 2008). Pan and Kosicki’s (2003) approach has been called ‘the most elaborate linguistic approach’ (Matthess and Kohring, 2008). The authors point out that the frames can be measured from the syntax, script, theme and rhetoric.

‘Pan and Kosicki (1993) identified four types of structural dimensions of news that influence the formation of frames: **(a) syntactic structures**, or patterns in the arrangements of words or phrases; **(b) script structures**, referring to the general newsworthiness of an event, as well as to the intention to communicate news and events to the audience which transcends their limited sensory experiences; **(c) thematic structures**, reflecting the tendency of journalists to impose a causal theme on their news stories, either in the form of explicit causal statements, or by linking observations to the direct quotation of a source; and **(d) rhetorical structures**, which refers to the “the stylistic choices made by journalists in relation to their intended effects’ (Ibid. p.61).

Although the linguistic approach is more systematic and less ambiguous, it is still a bit unclear how all these features are finally woven into a frame (Matthess and Kohring, 2008). The study will therefore use some critical discourse analysis methods to compensate for the ambiguity of the framing analysis.

3.5 Language and social power

Before we get into discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis, language and power should be discussed, considering that they are the very reason why discourse should be analysed. It seems quite coincidental that socialists or revolutionaries, like Karl Marx, Weber, Foucault, Gramsci, Althusser, Habermas, and linguistic scholars, like Norman Fairclough, Van Dijk, Fowler, Fraser, Halliday, etc., and other scholars who have researched on ideology, such as Stuart Hall and John Thompson, all link language (only English, in this case) with social foundations, ideology and power. The 1970s saw the emergence of a form of discourse and text analysis that recognized the role of language in the structuring of power relations in society (see Anthonissen, 2001, for an extensive summary of this development). At that time, much linguistic research elsewhere was focused on those formal aspects of language which constituted the linguistic competence of speakers and which could theoretically be isolated from specific instances of language use (Chomsky, 1957). Where the relations between language and context were considered, as in pragmatics (Levinson, 1983), with a focus on speakers’ pragmatic/sociolinguistic competence, the sentences and the components of sentences were still regarded as being the basic units. Much sociolinguistic research at the time

was aimed at describing and explaining language variation, language change, and the structures of communicative interaction, with limited attention being given to issues of social hierarchy and power (Labov, 1972; Hymes, 1972).

However, the scholars mentioned at the beginning focus more on the social relations behind the language. For example, Foucault's work on discourse analysis makes an important contribution to a social theory of discourse in such areas as the relationship of discourse and power (Fairclough, 1992: p.38), Halliday remarked that 'language is as it is because of its function in the social structure, and the organization of behavioural meanings should give some insight into social foundations' (Halliday, 1973: p.65), Marxists point out that language contains the ideology of the dominant class, and Althusser's ideological state apparatuses (institutions such as education and the media) 'points to struggle in and over discourse as a focus for an ideologically-oriented discourse analysis' (Fairclough, 1997: p.87), and linguists such as Norman Fairclough point out that: 'discourse analysis is concerned not only with power relations in discourse, but also with how power relations and power struggle shape and transform the discourse practices of a society or institution' (Fairclough, 1992: p.36). Meanwhile, both Hall (1992, c1980) and Fairclough (1997: 87) pointed out that 'the ideologies embedded in discursive practices (discourse) are most effective when they become naturalized and achieve the status of "common sense", and Foucault has also pointed out that the production, regulation and circulation of information may be a system of ordered procedures for making 'truth' (Rabinow, 1984: p.74). The research will begin with Michel Foucault's discourse analysis theories and will then use the linguistic methods developed by Halliday (2004), and later extended by other linguistic scholars, in order to analyse the pattern of the news coverage, and how they become 'common sense' through the repetitive usage of certain grammars and vocabularies.

Discourse analysis

There can be little doubt that discourse analysis has come to represent something of a 'growth industry' in research psychology (Hook, 2001). There has indeed been such growth, together with a proliferation of the various models of the process of discourse analysis (cf. Bannister, 1995; Fairclough, 1995; Parker, 1992; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). According to discourse analysts and scholars, discourse is socially constructive (Pêcheux, 1982, Potter and Wetherell, 1987), constituting social subjects, social relations, and systems of knowledge and belief, and the study of discourse focuses upon its constructive ideological effects (Pêcheux, 1982; Labov, 1972; Fairclough, 1992: p.36).

The identification and analysis of discourse is now a preoccupation across the humanities and social science. Foucault (1972,1984) has been a decisive influence. Almost no paper or article is to be found that does not revisit these notions, quoting Michel Foucault, Jurgen Habermas, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau, or many others (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). In this study, Foucault quotations will be the major discussion. He commented on his own use of the word 'discourse' thus:

I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements.
(Foucault, 1984)

Foucault's theory of discourse analysis is the foundation of various discourse analysis approaches and theories. Fairclough referred to Foucault's work as 'a huge influence upon the

social sciences and humanities, and the popularization of the concept of “discourse” (Fairclough, 1992: p.37). Compared to linguistically-oriented discourse analysis, Foucault’s work makes an important contribution to a social theory of discourse in such areas as the relationships of discourse and power, the discursive construction of social subjects and knowledge, and the functioning of discourse in social change (Fairclough, 1992: p.38). It is thus necessary to briefly review Foucault’s theory on discourse analysis.

In a succinct introduction, Young (1981) notes that the central focus in Foucault’s work is on the rules, systems and procedures that constitute, and are constituted by, our ‘will to knowledge’. These rules, systems and procedures comprise a discrete realm of discursive practices—the order of discourse—a conceptual terrain in which knowledge is formed and produced (Hook, 2001, p.2). Foucault pointed out that these rules and systems produce the effect of discursive practice, i.e., discourse, to make it virtually impossible to think outside of them; to be outside of them, by definition, to be mad, to be beyond comprehension, and therefore reason (Foucault, 1970 in Young, 1981, p.58).

Norman Fairclough summarises those rules and systems as: the formation of objects; the formation of enunciative modalities; the formation of concepts; the formation of strategies.

The formation of objects

By ‘objects’ Foucault means objects of knowledge, the entities which ‘particular disciplines or sciences recognize within their fields of interest, and which they take as targets for investigation’ (Fairclough, 1992, p.41). Foucault gave an example of the constitution of ‘madness’, as an object in the discourse of psychopathology from the nineteenth century onwards; other examples might be the constitution of the terms: ‘nation’ and ‘race’, or ‘freedom’ and ‘enterprise’ (Keat and Abercrombie, 1990) in contemporary media and political discourse. According to Foucault, ‘mental illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it...’ (ibid.,1972: p.32). Moreover, Foucault pointed out that the discursive formation of the objects is not limited to the discourse around the object, but the construction of the whole discourse involves a continuous transformation, both between discourses and within a discourse (Foucault, 1972: p.32). What is of major significance here, for discourse analysis, is the view of discourse as being constitutive—as contributing to the production, transformation, and reproduction of the objects. This entails that discourse is in an active relation to reality, that language signifies reality, in the sense of constructing meanings for it, rather than that discourse is in a passive relation to reality, with language merely referring to objects which are taken to be given in reality (Fairclough, 1992: p.42).

The formation of enunciative modalities

Foucault’s main thesis, with respect to the formation of ‘enunciative modalities’, separated the social objects and their authors. He pointed out that the social subject (the author) who produces a statement, is not an entity which exists outside, and independently of, discourse, but which is a function of the statement itself (Foucault, 1972: pp.95-96). For example, in clinical discourse, the terminologies that the doctors use, such as the organs and the laboratory technician, involve the whole group of relations, including others’ subjects of teaching, preserving, describing, etc., and the institutional and technical site [hospital, laboratory, private practice, etc.] (Foucault, 1972: p.53). In this case, the discourse the media use, e.g., ‘authoritarian, democratic, protests, etc.’, involve other contemporary political concepts and subjects. This separation of the social subjects and the objects points out the significance of the context—without the context, the discourse cannot be comprehended. Fairclough further

claims that this view has significant consequences for the claims of discourse analysis to be a major method of social research: an expressive theory of subjectivity in discourse allows discourse to be seen as a secondary and marginal dimension of social practice (Fairclough, 1992: p.45), i.e., the ‘truth’ may only be true within certain contexts, but not in others, if the objects are different.

The formation of concepts (and intertextuality)

Intertextuality emerged as an important element. By ‘concepts’, Foucault means the battery of categories, elements and types which a discipline uses as an apparatus for treating its field of interests. He gives the examples of subject, predicate, noun, verb, and word as concepts of grammar (Fairclough, 1992: p.45). He further pointed out that the description of the ‘field of interests’ in which its concepts ‘appeared and circulated’ is organized (Foucault, 1972). This strategy gives rise to a rich account (Ibid.) of the many different sorts of relationship that may exist within and between texts (Fairclough, 1992: p.46). Foucault sums up this perspective in the claim that ‘there can be no statement that in one way or another does not reactivate others’ (1972: p.98). In other words, every statement or discourse is intertwined with each other.

Embarking on Foucault’s theory, other scholars (Fairclough (1992,1995) Bakhtin (1981); Kristeva (1986a) created the concept of ‘intertextuality’. The term ‘intertextuality’ was coined by Kristeva in the late 1960s, in the context of her influential accounts for Western audiences of the work of Bakhtin (see Kristeva, 1986a). Bakhtin points to the relative neglect of the communicative functions of language within mainstream linguistics and, more specifically, to the neglect of the ways in which texts and utterances are shaped by the prior texts that they are ‘responding’ to, and by subsequent texts that they ‘anticipate’ (Fairclough, 1992: p.101). For Bakhtin, all utterances, both spoken and written, from the briefest of turns of conversation to a scientific paper or a novel, are demarcated by a change of speaker (or writer) and are oriented retrospectively to the utterances of previous speakers (be they turns, scientific articles, or novels) and, prospectively, to the anticipated utterances of the next speakers (1992, p.102). Fairclough then further defines intertextuality as ‘horizontal intertextuality’, which includes texts that proceed and follow each other in the chain of texts; and ‘vertical intertextuality’, which includes texts that are historically linked in various time-scales and along various parameters, including texts which are more or less contemporary with it (Kristeva, 1986a: Fairclough, 1992: p.103). In other words, horizontal intertextuality is more immediate and simultaneous than vertical intertextuality. because vertical intertextuality expands across a longer time and through history.

Another contribution of Fairclough is that he links intertextuality with hegemony. According to him, the concept of intertextuality points to the productivity of texts, to how texts can transform prior texts and restructure existing conventions (genres, discourses) in order to generate new ones. However, this productivity is not, in practice, available to people as a limitless space for textual innovation and play; it is socially limited and constrained and is conditional upon relations of power. However, the theory of intertextuality cannot itself account for these social limitations, so it needs to be combined with a theory of power relations and how they shape (and are shaped by) social structures and practices (Fairclough, 1992, p103). Here, he points out that the combination of hegemony theory with intertextuality is fruitful and more socially inspiring.

Hegemony and discourse

The concept of hegemony, which is the centrepiece of Gramsci’s analysis of Western capitalism and revolutionary strategy in Western Europe (Gramsci, 1971; Buci-Glucksmann,

1980), harmonizes the view of discourse that Norman Fairclough has been advocating (see Fairclough, 1992: p.92), and provides a way of theorising change in relation to the evolution of power relations, which allows a particular focus on discursive change (Ibid).

Hegemony is leadership, as much as it is domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a society (Fairclough, 1992: p.92). In the academic field, hegemony is always discussed in connection with the concept of ideology, when ideology is ‘a concept of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in the manifestations of individual and collective life’ (Gramsci, 1971: p.381). According to Fairclough, hegemonies have ideological dimensions, a way of assessing the ideological investment of discourse practice (1992: p.95). Although it was established by Gramsci, Althusser, Hall and Fairclough that ‘ideological complexes come to be structures and restructures, articulated and rearticulated’ (see, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), there are two perspectives on hegemony. The first is that hegemony impedes heterogeneity in discourse, through repetitions of the ‘common sense’ and the ‘truth’. Even if there are oppositions to the existing discourse or ideology, the conflicting narratives serve to enhance the reliability of the ideology (see Hall, 1982; van Dijk, 1990a); the second perspective is that, because of the flexible nature of the ideological complexes (Gramsci’s conceptions of ‘the field of ideologies in terms of conflicting, overlapping, or intersecting currents or formations’ (Hall, 1988: pp.55-56), Fairclough believes that the rearticulation and reconstruction of the ideology allow the discourse to have a bearing upon hegemonic struggles (see Fairclough, 1992). In this research, a discourse analysis will be conducted by using intertextuality as one of the methods, and testing whether the intertextuality of the media coverage of Chinese protests serves to strengthen certain ideologies, or to weaken them. The research will also aim to discover whether there is any discourse that is in opposition to the main discourse, and either they function as the enhancement of the event’s reliability or they indicate hegemonic struggle.

The formation of strategies

The audience (reception) side.

The rules of formation that have been discussed so far constitute a field of possibilities for the creation of theories, themes, or what Foucault calls ‘strategies’, not all of which are actually realized. The rules for the formation of strategies determine which possibilities are realized (Fairclough, 1992: p.48). According to Foucault, the possibilities of realizing the purpose of the strategies of the discourse are determined ‘from outside’ (Foucault, 1982: p.67). He firstly refers to the function of the discourse in- and outside of the described field, e.g., ‘the function carried out by economic discourse in the practice of emergent capitalism’ (1972: p.69). In this research, the expansion of the media coverage of Chinese protests is from international political media discourse to contemporary politics. Secondly, to return to Foucault, to the ‘rules and processes of appropriation’ of discourse, in the sense that the ‘right to speak’ and the ‘ability to understand’, as well as the right to draw upon ‘the corpus of already formulated statements’ are unequally distributed between the social group (Foucault, 1972: p.68). This concept has been discussed in the section of the literature review which relates to Stuart Hall’s encoding-decoding theory. According to Hall’s encoding-decoding theory, there are three levels of the audience comprehension of the information in media discourse. The first is that audiences understand the information in a way that the messengers expect them to, and those messengers are normally the dominant power in social relations. The second level is that the audiences begin to detect the opposite side of the dominance, and they can critically reject the information that has been reaching out to them. The third level is that audiences completely stand on the opposite side from the dominant discourse and treat such discourse as information about the

‘other’ side. He points out that most audiences are on the first level, and a few are on the third, due to audiences’ social, educational, political, religious, etc., background. (see, Hall, 1994a, 1980).

3.6 Critical linguistics

Halliday and functional grammar

‘Critical linguistics’ is a type of discourse analysis which was developed by a group that were based at the University of East Anglia in the 1970s (Fowler et al., 1979, Hodge and Kress, 1979.). According to Fairclough, texts are ‘built out of choices from within available systems of options in vocabulary, grammar, and so forth’ (Fairclough, 1995: p.25). The ‘Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’: that languages embody particular worldviews, is extended to varieties within a language; particular texts embody particular ideologies or theories, and the aim is the ‘critical interpretation’ of texts: ‘recovering the social meanings expressed in discourse by analysing the linguistic structures in the light of their interactional and wider social contexts’ (Fowler et al., 1979: pp.195-6). He points out that critical linguists have ‘tried to marry a method of linguistic text analysis with a social theory of the functioning of language in political and ideological processes, drawing upon the functionalist linguistic theory that is associated with Michael Halliday (1978, 1985), and which is known as “systemic linguistics” (Fairclough, 1992: p.27). As Fairclough pointed out, Halliday’s functional grammar links linguistics with the social meaning of language, which is the foundation of critical linguistics, and even of critical discourse analysis. For example, Halliday analyses the theme of a clause, the logico-semantic relation of conjunctions, nominalisation and passivisation (which was later used by Norman Fairclough) and so forth, which indicates the social or political meanings of specific grammar usage. For example, both nominalization (the conversion of a clause into a nominal or noun) and passivisation (the conversion of an active clause into a passive clause) may be associated with ideologically significant features of texts, such as the systematic mystification of agency, because both allow the agent of a clause to be deleted (Fairclough, 1992: p.27). These are called functional grammar, which analyses the social semantic aspects of the language that might point out the social struggles and power behind the words. This study will use these critical linguists’ methods to analyse the news discourse. However, scholars (Fairclough, Fowler et al.) have pointed out that there are certain limits to critical linguistics. According to Fairclough, in critical linguistics, there tends to be too much emphasis upon the text as product, and too little emphasis upon the processes of producing and interpreting texts (Fairclough, 1992: p.28). Both Fairclough and Fowler found that critical linguistics puts too much focus on the unchangeable relations between the descriptive rules of the language and ideologies, and tends to consider readers to be uncritical, or they ‘cannot read off the ideologies in the text’ (Fowler et al., 1979: 190). Fairclough even links this ‘top-down view of power and ideology’ in critical linguistics with an Althusserian approach to revealing social stasis, rather than change (Fairclough, 1992: p.29).

3.7 Critical discourse analysis

Norman Fairclough, van Dijk, Halliday (ideologies)

The terms *Critical Linguistics* (CL) and *Critical Discourse Analysis* (CDA) are often used interchangeably. In fact, in recent times, it seems that the term CDA is preferred and is used to denote the theory that was formerly identified as CL. 3CDA, and which relates to ‘language as social practice’ (Wodak, 2019), and takes consideration of the context of language use as being

crucial (Wodak, 2000c; Benke, 2000). The term CDA is used nowadays to refer more specifically to the critical linguistic approach of scholars who find the larger discursive unit of text to be the basic unit of communication. Compared to discourse analysis, CDS is not interested in investigating a linguistic unit per se but in analysing, understanding, and explaining social phenomena that are necessarily complex and thus require a multidisciplinary and multi-methodical approach (Wodak, 2012c, van Dijk, 2013).

This research specifically considers the institutional, political, gender and media discourses (in the broadest sense) which testify to more or less overt relations of struggle and conflict (Wodak, 2019). This shared perspective relates to the term ‘critical’ which, in the work of some ‘critical linguists’, can be traced to the influence of the Frankfurt School or Jürgen Habermas (Thompson, 1988: pp.71ff.; Fay, 1987: p.203; Anthonissen, 2001). Most critical discourse analysts would endorse Habermas's claim that:

...language is also a medium of domination and social force. It serves to legitimise relations of organized power. In so far as the legitimations of power relations, ... are not articulated, ... language is also ideological’ (Habermas, 1977: p.259).

CDA, as a network of scholars, emerged in the early 1990s, following a small symposium in Amsterdam, in January, 1991. Through the support of the University of Amsterdam, Teun van Dijk, Norman Fairclough, Gunther Kress, Theon van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak, spent two years together, and had the opportunity to discuss the theories and methods of discourse analysis and, specifically, critical discourse analysis (CDA) (which was the term used in the 1990s and 2000s) (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). The start of this CDA network was also marked by the launch of van Dijk's journal *Discourse and Society* (1990), as well as through several books, like *Language and Power* by Norman Fairclough (1989), *Language, Power and Ideology* by Ruth Wodak (1989), or Teun van Dijk's first book on racism, *Prejudice in Discourse* (1984), but there are still disagreements amongst them. For example, Ruth Wodak does not regard CL or CDA as being too linguistically-oriented, as Norman Fairclough does. Wodak points out that, unlike some of the research in pragmatics and traditional sociolinguistics in which, according to critical linguists, context variables are somewhat naïvely correlated with an autonomous system of language (for example, Kress and Hodge, 1979), CL and CDA try to avoid positing a simple deterministic relation between texts and the social (Wodak, 2019). Meanwhile, Norman Fairclough also regards CDA differently from van Dijk. van Dijk conducted CDA in order to analyse contemporary media discourse and points out that there is ‘a new form of racism’ in news discourse (Dijk, 1984) while Norman Fairclough thinks van Dijk’s conclusion has not predicted, nor perceived, the potential or existing changes in both the discourse and society. Although there are disagreements and differences among CDA scholars and methods, this study will review their theories and methods (mainly, those of Norman Fairclough and van Dijk), which can be appropriately applied to analysing the selected news discourse.

The representation of news

The representation of news is another major aspect of analysing the news discourse in this study. Media representation refers to the media’s creation of concepts and images of individuals, communities, places and countries, and the recurring presentation of the constructed identity (Gabore, 2020). In the representational practice, the news media bring a particular definition to an event, attaches the interpretation to the selected information on the event, and presents evidence from the event in order to promote, strengthen, legitimise, and naturalise this

interpretation (Erjavec, 2001; Gamson et al., 1992). An important variable in the representation of discourse is the degree to which boundaries are maintained between the representing discourse and the represented discourse—between the voices of the reporter and the person reported (Fairclough, 1995: p.81). Fairclough gave an example of analysing representations in a BBC report about how the West, the Libyan Foreign Minister, and the U.N. reacted to the coming trial of the Lockerbie bombing. Fairclough points out the representations of the report includes the BBC, the Libyans, ‘the West’, the UN Secretary-General, and an unspecified reporter. The conclusion of this brief analysis is

The represented discourse is integrated into the representing discourse, summarised rather than quoted, using indirect speech in many cases. One feature of indirect speech is that although it is expected to be accurate about the propositional content of what was said, it is ambivalent about the actual words that were used—it may simply reduce them, or it may transform and translate them into discourses which fits more easily with the reporter’s voice. (Fairclough, 1995, p.81)

Fairclough points out that reports are rarely even-handed, with all the various voices reported. Some are given prominence, and some are marginalised. Some are used to frame others. Some are legitimised by being taken up in the news reader’s or reporter’s voice (Fairclough, 1995: p.81). Moreover, he points out that the prominence of voices is not about how much space they are given. It is also about the location of the information, normally the heading and the end of the report, which demonstrates that there is more dominance, if compared to the middle part of the article (Fairclough, 1995: p.82). Apart from the location, other grammatical and lexical usages can also indicate which voices are most dominant throughout the report.

Since the study will include three news organisations: the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera, different representations (correspondents, protesters, the Chinese government, Chinese and foreign media, Chinese officials, etc.) in the news discourse will be analysed through the framing analysis, as well as by using relevant methods from the Hallidayan Functional grammar (presuppositions/nominalisation/passivation), intertextuality (whose concept has already been discussed), and the thematic structure of the news.

Functional grammar (Halliday)

In CL and CDA, the analysis of the grammars used in relating to ideologies and power is inspired by Hallidayan functional grammar. According to Wodak (2019), whether analysts with a critical approach prefer to focus on micro-linguistic features, macro-linguistic features, textual, discursive or contextual features; whether their angle is primarily philosophical, sociological or historical – in most studies there is reference to Hallidayan systemic functional grammar. This indicates that an understanding of the basic claims of Halliday's grammar, and of his approach to linguistic analysis, are essential for a proper understanding of CDA (Wodak, 2019). CL and CDA scholars have been inspired by the Hallidayan functional grammar, too, and they have not only applied it, but also elaborated upon it (Wodak, 2019).

It is thus both important and necessary to elaborate upon some of the Hallidayan functional grammars which are useful to the study, but which have also been found to overlap with CDA scholars’ work (mainly from Fairclough, 1991, 1995 and van Dijk 1990, 2013).

Presences and absences in texts: presupposition

Presupposition is one of the elements in pragmatic analysis, it is thus also a major element in CDA. ‘Presupposition’ was the object of heated theoretical debate among semanticists and pragmaticians during the 1970s and early 1980s. Currently, it is also evoked as a useful category for the critical analysis of discourse, and is linked to the ideology underlying texts, as well as positioning the hearers as powerless (Polyzou, 2015). This study will elaborate more upon this concept.

Any text is a combination of explicit meanings— what is actually ‘said’— and implicit meanings—what is left ‘unsaid’, but is taken as given, as presupposed (Fairclough, 1995: p.107). A text’s presuppositions are important in the way in which they position its readers or viewers or listeners. How a text positions you is very much a matter of the common-sense assumptions it attributes to you (Ibid.: p.107). It also postulates that our perception of the world is mediated by discourse and ideology, and that, in turn, the world is not simply described, but is indeed shaped by language (Polyzou, 2015).

Presuppositions are what French discourse analysts call ‘preconstructed’ elements in a text, elements which have been constructed elsewhere in other texts (Pêcheux, 1982; Williams, forthcoming). Intertextuality therefore also offers major foregrounding and backgrounding resources for presupposition. In CDA, Fairclough (1995) and Halliday (1985) put extra attention on what is ‘there’, and on what is not, or, in Fairclough’s words:

...it is important to be sensitive to absences from the text, to things which might have been “there”, but aren’t—or, and this really comes down to the same thing, to things which are present in some texts appertaining to a given area of social practice, but not in others. (Fairclough, 1995: p.106).

He also points out that if something is presupposed, it is in a sense present in the text, but as part of its implicit meaning. If something is explicitly present in a text, it may be informationally backgrounded, or informationally foregrounded (Ibid.), and the presupposition of information is actually discussed within the concept of representation, as mentioned above. How information is presented and deleted are actually linked to how social practice parties want to be represented. Questions about the social motivations for particular choices, and about ideologies and relations of domination, are a constant concern in the analysis of the presupposition (Ibid.: p.104). Fairclough analyses language from a linguistic perspective so as to point out that: ‘the unsaid, the already said, the presupposed, is of particular importance in ideological analysis, in that the ideologies are generally embedded within the implicit meaning of a text rather than being explicit’ (Fairclough, 1995, p.108). He points out that several presuppositions are achieved by the use of logical conjunctions, like ‘because/so’. Meanwhile, the sequence of clauses, vocabulary usage, coherence and intertextuality are also the main constructions of presuppositions. Others, like passivisation and nominalisation, which have been previously mentioned, can also indicate presuppositions.

Polyzou (2015) categorises presupposition into three levels:

- (1) the lexical level;
- (2) the clause/sentence level;
- (3) the discourse level.

Since this study will analyse texts involving all three levels, a brief introduction to all three is needed here.

(1) Lexical level (presupposed frames)

Every concept evoked by a word is associated with a frame, or mental model – a set of concepts forming a cluster in the mental representation of the concept. These concepts do not surface in discourse, but are also triggered when a word is used, and can be said to be presupposed in that sense (Polyzou, 2015). In this study, words like ‘the Communist Party of China’ would trigger readers’ shared knowledge of Communism in the Cold War period, or even in the time before. Presupposed frames are significant for the critical analysis of discourse, in that they contribute to the constitutive function of discourse: a noun or noun phrase as a ‘label’ for a person or group, and a verb or verb phrase for an action (to use some very simple examples) have often been taken as perhaps the most obvious way to ideologically conceptualise groups and situations (see Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). The study will list some words that may trigger shared knowledge of such groups and analyse the context in which they appear, and whether they trigger certain ideological implications.

(2) Clause/Sentence Structure Level (Sentence-Level Presuppositions)

This level of presupposition focuses on the analysis of grammar and syntax, i.e., how a sentence may convey ideology through certain grammar usages and syntax structures. More recently, cognitive linguistics has argued that grammar is conceptualisation (Croft & Cruse, 2004: p.1) and syntax interacts with semantics, tenets which can also be found in Systemic Functional Linguistic analyses of transitivity within critical linguistics and critical discourse analysis (most prominently, in analyses of transitivity; activation, passivisation and agent deletion, see, e.g., van Leeuwen, 1996).

This study will put some emphases on the grammar and sentence structure in reports on Chinese protests. The analysis will be based on Halliday’s functional grammar, as well as on Norman Fairclough’s theory on presupposition.

(3) Discourse level (discourse presuppositions)

This is where we start considering presupposed ideological knowledge that is related to larger units of discourse, as manifested in a text, or part of a text, which Bekalu (2007) calls ‘discourse presuppositions’. This includes knowledge, both about the content and the genre of the text.

The study will draw upon van Dijk’s structure and strategies of news (1991), which falls into the category of the discourse level of presupposition, so as to analyse how the three media outlets (CNN, the BBC and Al Jazeera) reported on the Hong Kong protests. The study will look at the content and the genre of the texts, which will be elaborated upon more in the case study.

To sum up, this study will analyse the presuppositions in the stories by looking closely at the lexical level (vocabulary usage), the clause/sentence level (logical conjunctions, sequence of clauses, passivisation and nominalisation, coherence and intertextuality), and the discourse level (the structure and strategies of news).

Ideology in texts

All of the methods and concepts mentioned above have paved the way to revealing the ideology in texts. Although the whole framework is Marxian, it is not the Marxian type of

ideology, according to the economic base/superstructure dichotomy, that is of specific interest for CDS. It is, rather, the more hidden and latent ideas that are inherent to everyday-beliefs, which often appear to be disguised as conceptual metaphors and analogies (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). Dominant ideologies appear to be ‘neutral’, linked to assumptions that remain largely unchallenged. When most people in a society think alike about certain matters, or even forget that there are alternatives to the *status quo*, we arrive at the Gramscian concept of ‘hegemony’ (ibid).

Fairclough links ideology and language on a more practical level:

‘Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. They may be enacted in ways of interaction (and therefore in genres) and inculcated in ways of being identities (and therefore styles). Analysis of texts...is an important aspect of ideological analysis and critique... ‘
(Fairclough, 2003, p9)

Other Marxists who work in the field of ideology also link ideology with language/discourse. Eagleton (1991) points out that, instead of a particular set of discourses, ideology is more of a particular set of effects within discourse. To be more specific, those effects in the discourse can be achieved in lexical, syntactic and grammatical structures, as previously mentioned—so that, for example, the use of an abstract noun, or a switch of mood from active to passive, may serve to obscure the concrete agency of a social event in ways that are convenient for the ruling ideological interests (see, Voloshinov 1973).

The study will also refer to Seliger’s (2019) theoretical framework of regarding ideology as a belief system which can be constructed through descriptions, moral prescriptions and rejections in the texts. It will be a conclusion, or a final broad perspective of how language supports certain ideas/systems, while it rejects other alternatives.

However, CDA also has some limitations that mean that it cannot fulfil some of the goals of the study, for example, the percentage of voices represented in news. The study will therefore also use some quantitative methods in order to investigate reporting patterns and the representation of news.

3.8 Mixing methods: qualitative and quantitative methods in content analysis with CDA

The study finds that to analyse a range of texts that have a broad scope, the qualitative methods mentioned above have their own limitations. Firstly, the nature of the approaches largely depends on researchers’ capability to analyse the data, and thus some scholars doubt if the findings might be too interpretative; Secondly, qualitative methods cannot provide more scientific or authoritative data. Although they lead to a much greater understanding of the meaning and context of the behaviours and processes that take place within the observed patterns of interrelated social factors (Bullock, Little and Milham, 2017), Not so long ago, the various qualitative methodologies carried a distinctly second-rate status, on the grounds that interpretative forms of investigation did not quite count as being properly scientific (Gregor, 1995).

The researcher thus finds content analysis very suitable for analysing texts in the first round. The content analysis method is increasingly employed as a means to facilitate the data analysis of researchers in the field of marketing and media studies, to literature, ethnography and cultural studies, gender and age issues, sociology and political science, library, psychology and cognitive science. and many other fields of inquiry (Devi, 2009). Most relevantly, Content analysis is the analysis of text documents. The analysis can be quantitative, qualitative, or both (ibid., 2017). However, nuances in words have to be examined via CDA to reveal hegemony and ideology beyond the texts, especially in Wukan's case.

The Wukan's case relies on content analysis (framing analysis) in analysing the texts. It also deploys critical discourse analysis (CDA) to examine the texts in more detail. Quantitative methods will be applied among CDA analysis of AJE's documentary, to provide more straight-forward evidence.

As for the Hong Kong's case, due to a much larger database, the research mainly relies on NVivo, a qualitative data analysis (QDA) computer software which enabled me to code topics and subtopics. As for the coding process, this study will apply intertextuality (as mentioned in 3.5), to categorise subtopics in texts, and then analyse them. Official sources will be counted as additional analysis.

3.9 Ethics

I have tried to adhere to all the ethical policies required of a researcher, as much as possible, especially in terms of accuracy in data gathering and analysis. However, potential questioning about my biases would emerge in terms of my positionality as a Chinese national and its influence on my choices and balance in qualitative analysis. I consciously made sure that my being Chinese does not necessarily have a bearing on my research approach or results. My starting point was not pro-China. The major purpose of the study is to investigate the hegemony in news about China in international media and I came to the research with an open mind. It would not be academically justified if one's research interests should be compromised due to his/her nationality. I am interested in being critical of media, whether they are Chinese or international. I made a conscious attempt to avoid bias in data analysis. Secondly, as I mentioned in 2.7, both Chinese and international media have been discussed in terms of hegemony in news, but this study focuses on analysing hegemony in international media in relation to protests in China. This specific angle leaves open other approaches to investigate and analyse hegemony in Chinese media over the same events (in this case Wukan and HK protests). Thirdly, in terms of qualitative methods, I have tried to mitigate the interpretative nature of them by performing quantitative methods in both case studies, with alternative evidence such as percentages of actual voices and sources in the news. The study still has some limitations as will be discussed in 7.4.

3.10 Data storage

All the information from the interviews will be encrypted and stored in the researcher's personal device and sorted by use of the interviewees' names and other details. Conversations will be recorded and stored on the researcher's mobile phone, or on another personal recording device, and any notes and transcriptions will be saved on the same devices and encrypted.

3.11 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the research design and data collection and then proceeds to discuss the three important methods— framing analysis, discourse analysis and critical discourse analysis. Firstly, a brief introduction to them has been reviewed so as to provide more complete concepts of the three frameworks. Other related important concepts, such as language and power, hegemony and ideology, are also discussed in the chapter.

These three methodologies are not exclusive but, on the contrary, will help to answer the research questions step by step: Firstly, framing analysis helps to categorise texts into themes. Secondly, discourse analysis will link those themes or patterns with social relations, such as the hegemony in the texts. However, since the concept only helps the discussion to proceed to CDA, the study will not include any specific method of discourse analysis in order to avoid confusion and redundancy, and, finally, specific methods of CDA, including those from Halliday's functional grammar, intertextuality, presupposition and van Dijk's structure and strategy of news, will be used to analyse the hegemony in texts and to try to unmask the ideology that is hidden within them.

Apart from the qualitative methods, the study will also use quantitative methods to analyse Wukan and Hong Kong case as mentioned before.

Chapter 4: Case Study 1: The Wukan Protests

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the study will briefly introduce the background to the Wukan protests (including data information), and the reports will be analysed by using both framing analysis and critical discourse analysis. As for framing analysis, the study will use Gamson and Lash's research (1983) on the frame matrix, as well as Entman's (1993) four functions of framing, which will be explained in more detail later. As for the CDA on the reports, the study will utilise the methods that are mentioned in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. The study will also conduct CDA on the Al Jazeera documentary in order to present a potential contrast to the reports from CNN and the BBC. Lastly, this chapter will try to analyse the historical and contemporary reasons for the banner language, which showed wording such as 'Long Live the Party' at the protest site.

4.2 Background to the Wukan Protests

The Wukan protests, which are also known as the **Siege of Wukan**, was an anti-corruption protest that began in September, 2011. It started when local officials sold farm land illegally, and escalated in December, 2011, with the expulsion of officials by villagers, the siege of the town by the police, and the subsequent détente in the village of **Wukan**, in the East of **Guangdong** Province (Hess, 2015). Before late 2011, Wukan was a little-known coastal village home to 13,000 people in southern Guangdong. In collusion with property developers, primarily a large Hong Kong-based firm named Country Garden, local cadres had appropriated over 80 per cent of the farmland in Wukan and sold it off for a personal profit of over 700 million yuan (US\$110 million). As compensation, each individual villager received only a pittance—550 yuan (US\$87)—in exchange for losing the land many depended on for their livelihoods.

The protests drew attention from around the globe, and major international media outlets started reporting on them in 2011.

The Wukan protests, unlike others that broke out in China, had a political meaning. During the protests, one of the activist leaders, Xue Jinbo, who was a former village representative, died in police custody. The police claimed that Xue died of a heart attack, while the villagers believed that he was beaten to death. Villagers were outraged and a series of protests broke out. In 2011, the government allowed for a democratic election, in order to ease the tension. 13 representatives were elected by the villagers and they formed a village committee to solve the corruption and land issues.

The newly elected committee was reported upon by several major Western media outlets as **“a symbol of democracy”** (BBC, 2016/7/21) that **“gave people around the country hope”** (CNN, 2016/7/20). However, incongruous discourse appeared in the protesters' banners, such as 'Long Live the Party' and 'the Central Government Has Justice', taken from the picture that were shot on sight.



Picture 4.1. Banner language: 'We are Begging the Central Government to Save People in Wukan'
Picture from: Symbol of Wukan rebellion ends her political career, CNN, by Steven Jiang, March 5th, 2012



Picture 4.2. Banner language (the left corner): "We support the Communist Party and the Central Government".

Picture from: *Wukan: China's Democracy Experiment* (documentary), Episode 2, by Al Jazeera, 2017, April 10th.

The inconsistent discourse between some of the major media outlets and the on-site situation is worth researching.

4.3 Data

The data articles are from two news organisations: CNN, the BBC news online and the documentary is from Al Jazeera. The study includes all the news online, since all of them have manageable amounts of articles (from CNN & BBC) and episodes (from Al Jazeera) relating to the protests. The following shows the period of time and the numbers of reports (or episodes).
CNN: Dec. 14th, 2011—Mar. 15th, 2012 (6 reports)

Set. 13th—16th, 2016 (3 reports)

BBC: Sep. 23rd, 2011—Dec. 22nd, 2012 (15 reports)

Jun. 21st—Sep. 13th, 2016 (8 reports)

Al Jazeera: March 3rd-4th, 2012 (2 articles)

June-September, 2016 (2 articles)

Apr. 3rd—May. 8th, 2017 (6 episodes)

The study will analyse the reports from the BBC and CNN, as well as the documentary from Al Jazeera, via framing analysis and critical discourse analysis. The study will not analyse articles from Al Jazeera, considering there are only 4 articles, but will quote some examples when it is necessary to compare texts from CNN and the BBC. The following section is to introduce the framing methodology that is relevant to the case analysis.

4.4 An overview of the framing methodology

As mentioned in Section 3.4 Framing analysis, the definition of framing is unsystematic, but Entman's general definition is possibly the most widely accepted; that is, framing is:

...selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and make(ing) them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem's definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.

(Entman, 1993, p51)

Gitlin (1980) defines frames as “principles of selection, emphasis, and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters” (ibid.: p.6). Gamson and Modigliani (1987) consider frames to be “a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Ibid: p.143).

The unsystematic nature of framing is not only due to its verified definitions, but also the purpose or function of the application of framing methodology. Researchers have the flexibility to choose the methodology that they define as being the most effective one through which to analyse their data. Here, the researcher will review a specific framing analysis on texts from CNN and the BBC, as well as the documentary from Al Jazeera.

Firstly, the framing analysis of Gamson and Lash's research (1983), on a frame matrix which is based on a 'media package' definition, is highly relevant to this study. They regarded the frame as being a media package that consists of all of the indicators or framing devices through

which the frame can be identified: metaphors, catchphrases, visual images, lexical choices, selection of sources, graphics, stereotypes, dramatic characters, etc. (Gamson and Lash, 1983; Pan and Kosicki, 1993; Tankard, 2001). Those elements are connected to the four functions of framing: defining a problem, assigning responsibility, passing a moral judgement and reaching possible solutions (Entman, 1993). Likewise, the study will review framing devices, including lexical and rhetorical choices, as well as the moral and emotional basis. Meanwhile, the Wukan protests' problem definitions, problem sources and policy solutions will also be reviewed.

4.5 Framing analysis of the Wukan protests

The framing analysis will be separated into three parts—CNN, the BBC, and Al Jazeera, respectively, considering that there might be discrepancies among the three. However, in Table 4.2, considering that there is no text from journalists in Al Jazeera's documentary, the Table only lists the frame matrix from CNN and the BBC, while analysis of the documentary will be conducted later.

<i>Types of frame matrix</i>	<i>Problem definition</i>	<i>Problem source</i>	<i>Policy solution</i>	<i>Moral and emotional basis</i>
<i>Pro-protest</i>	CNN: How to tackle the illegal selling of lands and the corruption	The tight grip of the authorities	Need a more democratic political environment	Supportive; sympathetic
	BBC: (the same)	Farmers do not have ownership, according to China's land law	A land law that includes more farmers' rights to involve in land selling	Supportive; sympathetic
	Al Jazeera: (the same)	Corruption; undoing of the county/city government	The provincial or central government	Punishment from the provincial or central government
<i>Anti-protest</i>	CNN: How to stop villagers and some officials protesting	Villagers' eagerness to riot	Lockdown the village and send police to crackdown until the village is silent	Condemning;
	BBC: How to stop villagers and some officials protesting	Local officials did not consider the wellbeing of farmers, and sold land for profit	A more suitable way to govern rural areas; stricter measures to crack down village on riots	Disapproval; sceptical; condemning
	Al Jazeera: How to maintain the Party's methods of ruling	The rise of 'Western' democracy in the village	Punishment and solutions from the provincial or central government	Dangerous; mysterious

<i>villagers</i>	CNN: How to get lands back and return to normal	The government fails people	Continue to protest	Sympathetic;
	BBC: How to get lands back and return to normal	The lack of communication between protesters and authorities	Continue to protest	Sympathetic
	Al Jazeera: The village committee has breached the country's policies	Corruption in the local committee and lower-level government	Justice from the central government	Neutral

Table 4.1. Reasoning Devices (CNN, the BBC and Al Jazeera)

	Actors	Lexical choices	Rhetorical choices	Moral&Emotional basis
Pro-protest	Active villagers/ protest leaders (officials)	<p>CNN: Mourning for the death (2011/12/21)</p> <p>Continue to assert their political rights (2011/12/21)</p> <p>Held an election against the odds (2011/12/12);</p> <p>Finally suppressed by the police (2016/9/13)</p> <p>BBC: “down with corrupt officials” “return the land” (2011/12/15)</p> <p>“long live the Communist Party” (2011/12/15;2016/7/25)</p> <p>Fury against corrupt local officials, but not the central government (2011/12/15)</p>	<p>CNN: Thousands of residents took part in protests; drove out government officials; set up obstacles to deter police (2011/12/14;12/21)</p> <p>Leading hundreds to protest (2011/12/14)</p> <p>BBC: the villagers' fury reached a new pitch (2011/12/15)</p> <p>Amid a heavy police presence, thousands marched around the village calling for him (Lin Zuluana) to be freed. (2016/7/21)</p>	<p>CNN & the BBC:</p> <p>Villagers: oppressed; cry for democracy; failed in the end</p>

Anti-protest	Police/authorities/CP C	<p>CNN: Was suspected of beating the villager to death; attacking villagers; arrested 13 according to the law (2011/12/21)</p> <p>Block the access to food; Agreed to release the detained villagers; launched investigations (2012/2/1)</p> <p>The Communist Party usually reigns supreme (2011/12/21)</p> <p>BBC: police with batons beating villagers; they had also fired tear gas and used water cannon (2011/12/15)</p> <p>The authorities had agreed to release three other village leaders detained (2011/12/21)</p> <p>The leader of protests, Lin Zuluan has been appointed the village chief (2012/1/16)</p>	<p>CNN: With wider attention from international media, Chinese government trod carefully to defuse the standoff (2/1/2012)</p> <p>Communist Party still keeps a tight grip on dissent nationwide, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring (2012/3/5)</p> <p>BBC: China's determination to maintain social stability by cracking down on anyone who could undermine it. (2011/12/15)</p>	<p>Authorities: suppressing; undemocratic;</p> <p>Police: violent</p> <p>CPC: dictatorship</p>
Neutral parties	Normal villagers/Wukan/China	<p>CNN: Were locked in a standoff with authorities (12/14/2011);“we hope the government can help us”(12/14/2011);</p> <p>Food is running very short (12/14/2011)</p> <p>(China) is one-party controlled (9/14/2016)</p> <p>BBC: China's determination to maintain social stability by cracking down on anyone who</p>	<p>CNN:Wukan remains heavily militarised (2016/9/14)</p> <p>BBC: The Wukan model of village democracy</p>	<p>Wukan/China:</p> <p>Suppressed by one party (the CPC)</p>

		could undermine it. (2011/12/15)	is dead. (2016/9/13)	
media	Chinese (state-controlled media)	CNN: denied the cause of death of the villager; justified the actions of authorities (2011/12/21)	CNN: Dozens of foreign reporters - used to government interference in the field -- savoured a rare moment to roam freely , filming the event and interviewing voters, as several officials watched from a second-floor balcony. (2016/9/14)	Chinese media: propaganda; unreliable
	International media	Information is limited due to restrictions and censorship (2016/9/13)		International media: doing justice; reliable; information provider
		BBC: Chinese authorities often release videos on state television of suspects admitting to crimes, in what rights activists say are forced confessions. (2012/3/5)		

Table 4.2. Frame Matrix (CNN and the BBC)

Data interpretation: common themes and discrepancies among the frames of the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera

(1) Discrepancies in relation to ‘problem source’ and ‘policy solution’

There are interesting discrepancies in relation to the reasons for the protests, which are shown under ‘Problem Source’ in Table 4.1. The reasons for the riots, according to CNN, are more politically involved, while they are more financially and legally based in the BBC’s reports. Although both organisations have pointed out that the lack of democracy was one of the major problems leading to the riots and suppression, CNN focuses more on the villagers’ cry for democracy, such as **‘asserting their (villagers/protesters) right to participate in the local decisions’ (2012/2/1); ‘continue to protest after the negotiation with the City government (2012/12/21)’**. On the other hand, CNN included some background to the Chinese political environment, such as **‘the Communist Party usually reigns supreme (2012/3/5)’** and **‘Communist Party still keeps a tight grip on dissent nationwide, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring (2012/3/5)’**. Both CNN and the BBC expanded on the topic over politics that discussed ‘whether the Wukan election could be a “model” as an experiment for a democratic system’, since Wukan held an election for its village committee.

In comparison, Al Jazeera’s reports did not mention ‘the Communist Party’. Instead, they used a vague and collective concept: ‘authorities’— ‘The odds appeared insurmountable - the authorities are not known for tolerating dissent.’ (Al Jazeera, 2017/7/14). Al Jazeera also entitled reports: ‘Wukan, China’s democracy experiment’ to make an analogy between the election and an experiment.

Apart from the similar background to the one-party political system in the BBC’s reports, such as **‘China’s determination to maintain social stability by cracking down on anyone who**

could undermine it. (2011/12/15)'; **'The Communist Party believes this (crack-down) is an essential tool for maintaining power (2012/1/16)'**, The BBC contributed the financial and legal reasons for the protests. As shown in 'problem source' and 'policy solution', the BBC reported that the deprivation of their land ownership from farmers gives the authorities the right to sell lands without necessarily breaking any law. Some quotations from the state news agency gives some relevant information to reflect upon. For example, **"The lack of legal proof of rural land ownership has left farmers' interests poorly protected,"** (Xinhua News Agency) (2011/12/15). The quotation does not function as an 'awkward fact', or as the 'voice of dissent', as it did in CNN's report, but as an information source that explained one of the major reasons for the protests.

Huge discourse discrepancies are shown, in "problem solution", between the two Western media outlets and Al Jazeera. When describing pro-protest activists, CNN's reports are the same: ideological and political—a democratic political system will solve problems. Villages **"continue to assert their political rights (2011/12/12)"** and **"held an election against all odds (2011/12/12)"**, but protesters were still suppressed because "the Communist Party usually reigns supreme" (2012/3/5). As for the BBC, apart from the condemnation of the CPC, the media outlet points out that the land law should include farmers' rights to own their farmlands. The BBC also points out a significant difference that CNN seldom reports— "(Villagers') **Fury about corrupt local officials, but not the central government (2011/12/15)**". Meanwhile, the BBC's reports include the questions that arise from the seemingly paradoxical banner language.

Example 1: *The rally on Thursday saw hundreds of villagers chanting slogans such as "Down with Corrupt Officials", but also "Long Live the Communist Party", as they hope China's central government will intervene on their behalf... (2011/12/15)*

Example 2: *"Return Our Land!"*

And, it's always followed by: "Long Live the Communist Party!"

Where else could you see virtually the entire population of town or a village filling the streets in support of their Communist Party Secretary? (2016/6/25)

The examples above show that the protesters are not directly against the Chinese regime or political system, but against the local authorities, who sold the communal lands illegally. Meanwhile, the central government might be one of the solutions to the problem of the land issue.

However, voices from the Al Jazeera's documentary reveal a very different picture. For both pro- and anti-protest parties, the problem solution is the same, which is to rely on the central government to tackle the land issue. These voices come originally from interviews with the villagers and protesters from Wukan. A large proportion of the overall voice is from the newly-elected committee members, who were protesters before being elected by villagers. Among those direct quotes, what villagers and protesters thought deviates largely from the narratives of CNN and the BBC. Here are some excerpts from the documentary.

Example 3: *“Wukan is not a ‘model’. We are only concerned about doing our work, not being a ‘model’.*

We now have a new democratic structure. “(Episode 1)

4: *“The land problems depend on whether people ‘above’ will do their work” (Episode 6)*

5: *“The ordinary farmers have had their lands swallowed and sold by (the old village committee and the Women’s Affairs chief)” (Episode 6)*

6: *“What the previous committee has done is a betrayal of our country’s policies” (Episode 6)*

7: *“The old and newly elected village committee did not do anything to solve the land issue” (Episode 7)*

In example 3, Wukan’s new leaders seemed not to care about the symbolic and political meaning of being elected, but were more focused on “doing our work”, which is to tackle the land issue. Examples 4-6 show that corruption comes from the old village committee and the Women’s Affairs Chief, and more cases of corruption may be related to the higher-level government. In Example 6, the audience could detect that the villagers still, overall, supported China’s political system and policies, thus it is probably one of the reasons that the protesters chanted those slogans that went along with the central government, and had them on their banners. In Example 7, attitudes towards the newly elected committee changed from being positive to being negative, which would be further analysed via critical discourse analysis of the documentary.

Compared to the anti-protest roles of the police and the government on CNN and the BBC, the documentary includes some unexpected voices that reinforce the communist ideology.

Example 8

“They value that counter-revolutionary Lin Zuluan (the newly elected leader) because he’s a Wukan villager. It’s impossible. They are backing the wrong person. His ideas are from the West. We need to maintain the Communist Party’s method of ruling. If you’re going to ruin the village and undermine the Communist Party, I will not allow it...” (Episode 2, 5:40- 6:14).

The above example comes from an anonymous recording from the documentary, which shows that there was strong resistance against Western ideology, even at the grass-root level of government. The ideology battle between the CPC and the West is a deeper layer of the conflicts shown in the documentary.

(2) Discrepancies on a “moral and emotional basis”

The study has found that the news on the BBC and CNN describe the scale of protests as being massive. Meanwhile, descriptions of their actions are quite active, and hence they show the power of the protesters.

Thousands of residents took part in protests; drove out government officials; set up obstacles to deter police (CNN, 2011/12/14;12/21)

(The illegal selling of the land) Leading hundreds to protest (CNN, 2011/12/14)

The villagers’ fury reached a new pitch (BBC, 2011/12/15)

*Amid a heavy police presence, **thousands** marched around the village calling for him (Lin Zuluán) to be freed. (BBC, 2016/7/21)*

Meanwhile, condemnations of the police and the regime can quite frequently be seen in texts.

*The police were suspected of **beating the villager to death** (CNN, 2011/12/14)*

*The police **attacked** villagers and **arrested** 13, according to the law. (CNN, 2011/12/14)*

*Wukan remains **heavily militarized** (CNN, 2016/9/14)*

*Police with batons **beat** villagers; they had also **fired** tear gas and used water cannon. (BBC, 2011/12/15)*

However, the documentary from Al Jazeera tends to have a more neutral angle in recording what was happening. According to Episode 4 (14:36-20:55), traffic police did not show any violence towards those protesters who blocked the road. Efforts from both the village committee members and the traffic police to negotiate with the protesters were shown on camera. The documentary also included actions from the government—it showed a violent crackdown in the end, after a series of riots, and how foreign journalists were wanted by the police. Some journalists had to hide around the village. All in all, the documentary did not hide the violence from either the protesters or the military force, nor did it exaggerate either of them. Besides, apart from the ideological conflicts mentioned in Example 8, interviews and footage reveal more layers of the Chinese government, from the grass-root to the provincial level, amongst which are individual politicians who had different interests, and who would battle against each other in the name of ideology. All of the above manifests a more complicated and nuanced Chinese politics, which would be inaccurate if simplified as being only ‘authoritarianism’.

4.6 CDA on reports

Considering there is no systematic way of conducting CDA on any discourse, the framework consists of several relevant and useful theories and methodologies, which are carefully selected and compared. It includes the functional grammar (logical conjunctions, sequence of clauses, vocabulary usage, coherence, intertextuality, passivisation and nominalisation (Halliday, 1985; Wodak, 2019; Fairclough, 1992, 1995); presences and absences in a text (or presuppositions) (Fairclough, 1995: p.107; 1989, chapter 4) and intertextuality (Fairclough, 1992: p.101) which are mentioned in Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.

The death of Xue Jinbo

Conjunction and presupposition

Although the death of Xue is still a myth, since there is no clear evidence of how he died, both news outlets used some reporting techniques to show, or indicate, the ‘truth’. According to CNN and the BBC, there are two contradictory discourses of explanations: one is from the villagers, and the other is from the State media (Xin Hua News Agency) and the Chinese authorities in general. When it comes to the villagers, **‘Xue Jinbo died in police custody. Some villagers suspected that he was beaten to death. Villagers were mourning for his death and were also angered that Xue’s body had not been returned’**, is the most common discourse that appeared in the reports on December 14th, 2011; December 21st, 2011; March 5th, 2012, from CNN and the BBC, while **‘Xue was suspected of leading hundreds of villagers in protests over issues of land use, money and local elections in September that led to two days of rioting. His death was caused by cardiac failure and no apparent signs of assault were found on his body’**, is the most common explanation from the Chinese State

media and authorities. Both descriptions are different in terms of their semantics (meanings), rhetorical devices, and their moral and emotional basis. The two discourses were not linked by any conjunctions until reports on December, 15th, 2011, from the BBC, and March 5th, 2012, from CNN. Here are a few examples:

Line 1: *Rumours spread that he had been beaten to death by police, **but** reports in the **state media** dismissed those claims (BBC, 2011/12/15)*

Line 2: ***State news agency** Xinhua said local authorities denied rumours that the sudden death of 42-year-old Xue Jinbo on Sunday was the result of his being beaten in custody. (CNN, 2011/12/21)*

Line 3: *Police say he died of a 'sudden illness', **but** his family say he was beaten to death (BBC, 2011/12/21; 2012/1/16).*

Line 4: *-- Xue Jinbo -- soon died in jail. Authorities blamed sudden illness, **but** his family and most villagers believed he had been beaten to death (CNN, 2012/3/5).*

In Lines 1, 3 and 4, the two contradictory discourses are linked by the conjunction—'but'. According to Halliday (2004), the cohesive system of conjunction has evolved as a complementary resource for creating and interpreting text. It provides the resources for making logico-semantic relationships that obtain between text spans with a varying extent. According to his category, 'but' belongs to the group of adversative conjunctions, which have extending functions. 'But', in the text here, is an addition to the former information, and it leaves room for readers to decide which adversary information is closer to the 'truth'. However, the 'truth' has been indicated by providing additional information. For example, in Lines 1 and 2, the nature of the news agency is defined as being 'state media' and as a 'state news agency', thus the text indicates that news from the state media, or from any media run by the state, is untrustworthy, considering that there might be censorship. It is therefore more likely that Xue Jinbo was beaten to death in custody, and the state media covered it up. Similar examples can be found in relation to the arrest of Lin Zuluan, the village committee leader who was elected by the villagers.

*13: Lin Zuluan was arrested on Saturday, later appearing on **state television** saying that he had accepted bribes.*

***But** locals in Wukan, in Guangdong province, marched to express support, saying the confession was forced. (BBC, 2016/7/21)*

The two adverse facts are: 'Lin Zuluan was arrested because he accepted bribes' and 'Lin was forced to confess he had accepted bribes'. Certain amounts of background and information in the reports indicate that there are many cases of 'forced national television confession', and quotations from villagers saying, "there wasn't a single villager who believed it", **every** voice said.' (BBC, 2016/7/21). The reports therefore lead readers to the fact that Lin was likely to have been forced to confess. The title 'state media' is not only representing the state media as being an unreliable news source, but also as a public place in which authorities can force dissidents to confess the crimes they did not commit.

The presupposition of text is involved here. Although there is no quantitative data, nor evidence from the reports, i.e., what's the percentage of villagers who believed that Lin was framed, the text presupposed that it was a very widely acknowledged fact that the confession was forced.

In order to achieve credibility without solid evidence, there would be a relatively 'common sense' background, or presupposition, that existed long before the reports. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, any text is a combination of explicit meanings— what is actually 'said'— and implicit meanings—what is left 'unsaid' but taken as given, as presupposed (Fairclough, 1995: p107), and:

...it is important to be sensitive to absences from the text, to things which might have been "there", but aren't—or, and this really comes down to the same thing, to things which are present in some texts appertaining to a given area of social practice, but not in others. (Fairclough, 1995: p.106).

In this case, 'Chinese state media' or 'state-run media', the 'police' and the 'authorities' are related to the political realm, in which the circulation of the pertaining discourse, i.e., intertextuality, helps to anticipate the implicit or explicit meaning of the text.

Horizontal and vertical intertextuality

As mentioned in Section 2.6, Critical Discourse Analysis, 'horizontal intertextuality' includes texts that proceed and follow each other in the chain of texts, while 'vertical intertextuality' contains texts that are historically linked with various time-scales, and along various parameters, including texts which are more or less contemporary with it (Kristeva, 1986a; Fairclough, 1992: p.103).

Firstly, the horizontal intertextuality of 'Chinese media', 'police' and 'authorities' can be found throughout the reports.

Chinese media:

Line 1: *China's internet censors have blocked searches relating to an ongoing protest in the village of Wukan, web users say. (BBC,2011/12/15)*

Line 2: *The Global Times newspaper, which is seen as the mouthpiece of the ruling Communist Party, said on Tuesday that some of the seized land had been returned, but that some remained in dispute. (BBC, 2016/9/13)*

Police:

3: *Roads into the village have been closed and are being guarded by heavily armed security personnel on one side, and villagers on the other (BBC, 2011/12/15).*

4: *Police have launched an operation in the Chinese village of Wukan, to end protests over the jailing of the elected village chief (BBC, 2016/9/13).*

5: *Heavily armed riot police fired tear gas as locals threw rocks and other projectiles amid ongoing unrest in Wukan, a village in China's Guangdong province (CNN, 2016/9/13).*

Authorities:

6: *The Communist Party believes this (crack down) is an essential tool in maintaining power (BBC, 2011/12/15).*

7: *Whatever the figures, the fact that the government is coy about releasing them (figures of protests) suggests they are embarrassingly high. (BBC, 2011/12/15)*

8: *There has also been a series of strikes and labour walk-outs in southern China in recent months. On Tuesday, a separate protest erupted in Haimen, also in Guangdong province, over local government plans to build a power plant (BBC, 2011/12/21).*

9: *Even after Wukan, the authorities continued to use heavy-handed tactics to end other village disputes (BBC, 2012/4/24).*

10: *It was seen as a visionary move, offering hope to other Chinese villages that they too could choose their governments. But the mood in China, under President Xi Jinping, is now very different (BBC, 2016/9/13).*

11: *The local government has so far not responded to a request for comment from CNN. (CNN, 2011/12/14)*

12: *the Communist Party still keeps a tight grip on dissent nationwide, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring. (CNN, 2012/3/5)*

In these descriptions, none of the parties could be trusted. The Chinese media does not have professionalism but are only ‘the mouthpiece of the government and the Party’ and under censorship. The police are not the upholders of social order, but the tool of suppression. The authorities are dictators, who maintain power by using ‘heavy-handed’ tactics, and who refuse to comment on foreign media. Meanwhile, other texts are intertwined in Lines 8 and 10. Examples like Line 8, in which descriptions of other protests and suppressions can be found at the end of the articles as background, and in Lines 9 and 10, other villages ‘who revolt or hope to choose their government’ are at odds with the Chinese authorities, and the Chinese President is mentioned as a major figure, showing a vivid image of the potentially-uprising villages versus the suppressing regime.

The horizontal intertextuality provides background that helps the readers to presuppose the roles of different parties whenever they appear, while vertical intertextuality enhances readers’ common sense, gained from historical texts. The use of ‘common sense’ is, here, not consistent among scholars (Fairclough, 1995; Hall, 1992a). Fairclough (1995) refers to ‘common sense’ as one of the necessities for readers to be able to understand the news, while Hall (1992a) points out that the circulation of certain texts will contribute to the establishment of common sense.

Although vertical intertextuality is not the focus of the case, the trace of it cannot be overlooked. Historical discourse about the Communist Party can be traced back to the period of the Cold War.

We might say that the period of the Cold War was characterized by a dominant paradigm or meta-schema that organized “normal” elite thinking, media coverage, and public response to foreign and defence policy. The problem was communist aggression and intention to conquer the world; the cause was an ideology melding atheism with ruthless totalitarian dictatorship; the remedy was constant vigilance and struggle on ideological, diplomatic, economic, and military fronts; and the evaluation tended toward moral condemnation of the communist side and idealization of “free world” allies. Virtually any problematic situation that arose in the world could be, and was, assimilated to the Cold War paradigm. (McNair, 1988, p.3)

Propaganda in international broadcasts in the leading Western media was significantly observed in the Second World War (Thussu, 2006). The Subsequent Cold War, arising from the fallout from the Allies’ victory—the communist Soviet Union and the capitalist West—gave rise to ‘communist propaganda’ and ‘capitalist persuasion’ (ibid). In fact, during the Cold War, the leading Western world perceived the Soviet Union to be their enemies. so that, even if there were ‘.. few opportunities to meet Soviet citizens here... in fiction, cinema, and television entertainment the Soviet threat has become a staple theme... and the red menace are regularly and lucratively pitted against freedom and democracy’ (McNair, 1988: p.4.)

McNair (1988) also found that the descriptions of the Chinese regime are similar to the Cold War narratives in some contexts, and he claims that China is a replacement for the Soviet Union, since it is portrayed as ‘a potential enemy to democracy’ (ibid., p5).

As for police, the notorious footage of the ‘Tian’an Men Man’, in 1969, are still mentioned in recent protests in China. A youth standing in front of a tank has become the symbol of ‘the price for democracy’. The ‘Tian’an Men Square’ event has circulated for long enough to establish the ‘common sense’ that whenever Chinese police, with the five-pointed Red Star on their hats and badges, are seen at the site of protests, they are ready to maintain the Party’s power at the expense of civilians’ lives.

Meanwhile, other discourses around the police, especially in the Western media, are part of vertical intertextuality, too. According to Fairclough (1995), work in critical linguistics, for instance (Fowler et al., 1979; Hodge and Kress, 1979), has suggested that some newspapers systematically background the involvement of the police in violence and other forms of undesirable social behaviour.

With both horizontal and vertical intertextuality, therefore, ideologies in reports of Wukan’s protests can be anticipated, even if the information is implicit. Since there are two adversarial explanations of Xue Jinbo’s death, and one of them is from an authoritarian regime, no matter if it is the media, the police, or the authorities, the sources, statements or opinions from any of them would be assumed to be means of maintaining the Party’s power. By contrast, the villagers’ suspicion, or claim, that ‘Xue was beaten to death’ fits more into contemporary and historical discourse, or ‘common sense’.

However, another interesting point is that the media can also avoid indications of intertextuality by simply not mentioning some words that would trigger it. When the BBC uses the Xin Hua News Agency as one of its news sources, there is no 'state media' or 'state-run media' added throughout the report, and there are no adversarial conjunctions used to add contradictory information—"In an article late on Monday, Xinhua News Agency said that Wukan's former party chief, Xue Chang, and the former head of the village committee, Chen Shunyi, had been expelled from the Party for corruption (BBC, 2012/4/24)', while some descriptions still have the title when opinions are quoted—"The lack of legal proof on rural land ownership has left farmers' interests poorly protected," said an article on this issue that was published by China's **state-run** news agency Xinhua (BBC, 2011/12/15).' Meanwhile, when it was the Chinese media that contained some negative words about the regime, 'state-owned media' was not used, either. Here are more examples.

13: *"The initial error of the local government in the Wukan incident was its failure to head the reasonable demands of the villagers, which escalated reasoned petitioning into excessive actions," the People's Daily editorial said.*

The Global Times called for better regulation, saying: "China should speed up the process of setting up a judicial authority to deal with interest disputes such as land disputes. Laws and regulations should be improved and implemented decisively."

In this example, both *the People's Daily* and *the Global Times* are state-owned, but there is no mention of such when the quote directly pointed out that the local government handled the reasonable demands wrong, and China's judicial system was flawed.

How the information is presented seems to depend on how journalists report it, which leads to another important topic—the boundaries between the reporting and the reported. This study will look into the representation of news and the presuppositions in texts so as to evaluate boundaries in reports.

Representation of news—is news the truth, or the representation of a one-sided voice?

The representation of news is another major aspect of analysing the news discourse in this study. An important variable in the representation of discourse is the degree to which boundaries are maintained between the representing discourse and the represented discourse—between the voices of the reporters and those of the persons reported (Fairclough, 1995: p.81).

Fairclough points out that reports are rarely even-handed, with all the various voices being reported equally. Some are given prominence, and some are marginalised. Some are used to frame others. Some are legitimised by being taken up in the newsreader's or the reporter's voice (Ibid.). Moreover, other grammatical and lexical usage can also indicate which voices are most dominant throughout the report.

The importance of analysing the representations of news is explained quite well by words from Fairclough.

The focus, then, is upon how events, situations, relationships, people, and so forth are represented in texts. A basic assumption is that media texts do not merely 'mirror realities' as is sometimes naïvely assumed; they constitute versions of reality in ways which depend on the social positions and interests and objectives of those who produce them. They do so through choices which are made at various levels in the process of producing texts. The analysis of representational processes in a text, therefore, comes down to an account of what choices are made - what is included and what is excluded, what is made explicit or left implicit, what is

foregrounded and what is backgrounded, what is thematized and what is unthematized, what process types and categories are drawn upon to represent events, and so on. (Fairclough, 1995: p.104)

As this quotation shows, the representations of news reflect the choices in texts which are easily overlooked. The purpose of conducting the analysis is to examine the ideology of the reports by looking closely at texts by using a more linguistically analytical method, but, firstly, although Fairclough (1995) points out that representations in news do not entirely depend on word counts, two graphs will be drawn to give a rough idea of the proportion of voices in texts from CNN and the BBC, respectively, and the percentages of voices in Al Jazeera’s documentary. Words are counted article (episode) by article (episode), and the percentages of voices are the average percentages of the same voice. Variables are the voices of journalists (here, these only refer to CNN and the BBC’s), villagers, protesters, Chinese media, Chinese authorities, police, and other voices (including Chinese web users and international researchers, etc.). Extra explanations have to be made when it comes to the ‘voices’ of any party, as they are either direct or indirect quotations. For example, the descriptions of the police from the direct or indirect quotations of villagers are counted as being the voices of villagers.




Figure 4.1. Percentages of voices in CNN and BBC




Figure 4.2. Percentages of Voices in Al Jazeera's Documentary

As Figure 4.1. shows, reports from the BBC and CNN contain a large proportion of journalists' voices. Although there are large amounts of description of the police's actions on both news outlets, direct or indirect quotations from the police are very few, and the words of the police are similar to those of the Chinese authorities', in terms of their content. Meanwhile, quotations from the Chinese media are mostly not used as news sources, but as adversarial information counteracting that from the villagers and journalists. Meanwhile, when it comes to 'other voices' in CNN and the BBC, they are mostly from researchers in international organisations for Chinese Studies in the West or in Hong Kong.

By contrast, there is almost no voice from the Al Jazeera journalists in the documentary, according to Figure 4.2. The voiceover is largely absent, while the voices of new village committee members account for 41.42%, and these are totally absent in the BBC and CNN's reports. Major discourse differences are expected to be found in the documentary, which will be analysed in detail later on.

All in all, the large percentages of journalists' voices from the BBC and CNN indicate that the boundary between the reporting and the reported is blurred. Presupposition could be hidden in texts, and this needs further analysis.

Indications in presupposition: blurred boundary between the reporting and the reported

According to Fairclough, representations of news involve several factors, including the boundary between the reporting and the reported parties (presupposition); representations in clauses (vocabulary choices, rhetorical devices; genre); and the grammatical functions of clauses. These three are not necessarily excluded, and therefore this study will sometimes consider more than one aspect when analysing the data.

According to Fairclough (1995), the analysis of voices can be conducted in news reports, broadcasts and documentaries. Voices in news are important markers of the boundaries between

the represented discourse and the representing discourse. However, in most cases, the boundaries are not strongly maintained (Fairclough, 1995: p.81). Voices are not treated even-handedly, and considering the coherence of the article, indirect speech may transform or translate to fit more into the reporters' speech (ibid).

In this case, the voices in the data articles from the BBC and CNN are not even because the majority of the texts are given to journalists. It gives journalists enough space to report on the incident in detail. However, large amounts of description from individual journalists will sometimes blur the boundary between the reporting and the reported parties, by creating coherent presuppositions in the texts. Presupposition, as mentioned before, are what is implicit in texts. They help to fudge the boundary by suggesting the 'common sense' in the texts.

To further explain this, we might think in terms of the scale of presence, running from 'absent' to 'foregrounded': absent—presupposed—backgrounded—foregrounded. If something is presupposed, it is, in a sense, present in the text, but as part of its implicit meaning (Fairclough, 1995: p.107). The presuppositions of a text are part of its intertextuality: presupposing something is tantamount to assuming that there are other texts (which may or may not actually exist) that are common ground for oneself and one's readers, and in which what is now presupposed is explicitly present, part of the 'said' (Fairclough 1992a). A text's presuppositions are important in the way in which they position the readers or viewers or listeners: how a text positions you is very much a matter of the common-sense assumptions it attributes to you (Fairclough, 1995: p.107).

The presuppositions are present throughout the texts, but there are obvious and important ones that implicate the current political vibe in China, the 'presupposed' nature of the Wukan protests and their impacts on other villagers.

Line 13: *This has been a place which - unlike anywhere else in China - had a genuinely elected government but many here are wondering if the so-called "Wukan experiment" is about to die.* (BBC, 2016/6/26)

The presupposition here is that there is no place in China that genuinely elects their government, nor any governmental institution. It is unclear to what 'genuinely' refers, but the presupposition is that elections are genuine in the Western democratic system, in which citizens have the right to vote. Meanwhile, the choice of the word 'genuinely' is also rhetorical. It uses a more colloquial word to describe the election, which may bring the discourse closer to the populace. However, the 'populace', here, are mainly the Western readers, considering that the BBC is circulated more in the West and its main revenue comes from Western audiences. Normally, in the Western political context, there is no need to question whether an election is 'genuine', or not, but the marked word in the text suggests there are other forms of election that exist in China, ones which are not honest, or ones which are not conducted properly. The second part of the sentence, following the 'but', contains another presuppositional rhetorical device. The election has been compared to an 'experiment'. Experiment refers to a scientific procedure that is undertaken in order to make a discovery, test a hypothesis, or demonstrate a known fact (definitions from Oxford Languages). Here, the 'experiment' is already a practice in the West and in other parts of the world, and this practice is known as 'democracy', a concept which is defined largely by the West, but which is still an impossible or 'forbidden' practice in China, according to background provided by the reports. It presupposes that the overall political situation in China is essentially different to that of the rest of the world, and it needs changing.

Furthermore, the presupposition of an overall authoritarian political environment, and the Chinese people's pro-democracy attitudes, can be found not only in the BBC and on CNN, but also in one of the reports from Al Jazeera.

*In late 2011, Wukan, a small fishing village in southern China, captured international attention when it rose up against **decades of corrupt leadership**. The odds appeared insurmountable - the authorities **are not known for tolerating dissent**. Still, despite a crackdown and the death of a leading activist, **the unthinkable** happened: the Village Committee fell and democratic elections were announced (Al Jazeera, 2017/4/3).*

Firstly, the contrast between the 'villagers rose up against decades of corrupt leadership' and 'the odds appeared insurmountable' indicate that long-term corruption has been deemed to be a normality in China, and the 'insurmountable' problem is nearly impossible to tackle due to the government's intolerance of dissent. Democratic elections, which are regarded as political rights in the West, are 'the unthinkable' in China. The authoritarianism of the regime has been set up as a tune at the beginning of the article, showing that the protests are going to be about the uprising as a rebellion against authoritarianism.

Similar examples can be found below.

Line 14: *Wukan **became a symbol of democracy** after villagers banded together in 2011 to protest against what they said were corrupt officials selling their land to developers and failing to compensate them properly (BBC, 2016/7/21).*

A symbol of democracy' is also a term that is rhetorical and presupposed. The presupposition, here, is that 'Wukan became a **symbol of democracy in China**', which means the rest of the country lacks such a precious opportunity to be democratic, and the rest of the country is therefore looking up at Wukan, as it is trying to achieve a noble goal. It also presupposes that the rest of the country supports Wukan's protests and the subsequent election, and highly approves of the idea and practice of democracy.

Line 15: *The election of Wukan's government **had given people in villages right around the country great hope** for what might be possible under the Chinese system as it stands today (CNN, 2016/7/20)*

This is another similar example of presupposition. 'The election had given people great hope' presupposes that people were living in a state where the situation is bad enough that they could not have a traditional election under the current Chinese system, and they had to 'hope' for something better and different. It also presupposes that the Chinese system nowadays is fundamentally flawed, that elections are seen as a glimpse of hope for democracy, or for a better life.

In conclusion, presuppositions are used frequently in the reports when it comes to the overall Chinese political vibe and the impacts of the Wukan protests, and the 'common sense' in the texts actually indicates the emotional and moral basis of the Wukan protests, which are just and brave, while the Chinese system suppresses and needs changing. Here, the journalists are on the side of protesters, even though there are not large numbers of direct or indirect quotations from the protesters, as shown in Figure 4.1.

Representation in clauses: relations between protesters and the State—who are the patients and actors?

Representation in clauses involves some simple rules of linguistics. Fairclough (1995) points out that representation in clauses involves single clauses, and even single words within them. There are often systematic patterns and tendencies in particular types of text, and in particular discourse types (Ibid.).

The grammar of English clauses differentiates the following process types: Action, Event, State, Mental Process, Verbal Process (Fairclough, 1992a; Halliday, 1985). This study will analyse the descriptions of the Chinese authorities, the villagers and the protesters based only on the types of action, event and state.

Norman Fairclough explains these types as follows:

An Action involves both the participant-types Actor and Patient (person or thing affected by action): the Actor does something to the Patient. A typical Action clause has a transitive structure (Subject + Verb + Object) (e.g., *police kill 15, child breaks window*). An Event involves just one participant, which may either be affected by what happens and hence be a Patient (e.g., *15 die, window breaks*), or be in an active, causal relationship to what happens, and hence an Actor (e.g., *victims screamed*). Events have an intransitive structure (Subject + Verb). A State is 'being' (e.g., *15 are dead*) or 'having' (*many have serious wounds*), and has an 'equative' structure (Subject + Verb + Complement). (Fairclough, 1995: p.110)

In this study, the types of action, event and state are only used to define the types of statements. Other grammatical analysis (generalisation and the omission of actors and patients, passivisation, and nominalisation) will further explain how these types of statements are constructed, and what ideologies may be indicated by such a sentence structure.

Generalisation and omission of actors and patients: descriptions of Chinese authorities

The generalisation of the Chinese government can be seen throughout the reports. In some situations, the actor is omitted from the text. Here, the study will list some excerpts to illustrate this.

Excerpt 1:

16: *His name is Xue Jingbo. He was actually negotiating on behalf of the village with **the authorities** to resolve this dispute.*

17: *At a funeral tent, his 21-year-old daughter was choked with emotion.*

18: *She said **the authorities** had yet to release her father's body and needed to explain his death.*

19: *"We know his wish was to get his land back and punish **corrupt officials**," she said. "He sacrificed himself - and now we'll make a sacrifice to fight for his cause."*

20: ***The local authorities** say they will halt the land project at the heart of this dispute.*

21: ***But in Wukan all trust has been lost**, and many people say they will continue to make a stand.*

22: *One villager told me that they wanted **to be allowed** to elect their own chiefs.*

23: *In **Beijing**, there will be deep concern if what's happened in a small village becomes part of a wider trend.*

(BBC, 2011/12/15)

In examples 16, 18, 19, 20 and 23, the Chinese government, at different levels, is generalised as 'the authorities', 'officials' and 'Beijing'. Readers would have difficulties in identifying which levels of the government are directly responsible for the land corruption, which could easily lead them to come up with the presupposition that 'the overall Chinese government is corrupt'. However, the generalisation of different levels of the Chinese government shows inconsistency in the interview with Xue's daughter. Xue's first attempt to solve the dispute was through negotiating with 'the authorities', while, according to his daughter, what he wished for was to punish 'corrupt officials'. One cannot negotiate with another party while wanting it to be punished, and we can therefore assume the 'authorities' with which Xue negotiated are not 'corrupt officials'. Then 'the local authorities' say they will halt the land project amid the dispute, which is still ambiguous. Did 'the local authorities' act because of Xue's negotiation, or because they are 'corrupt officials' who were afraid of being punished. Such ambiguities and inconsistencies stem from unclear reports about the government, which has different levels, and which could possibly have different responsibilities in relation to the Wukan land issue.

Meanwhile, the passivisation, omission and nominalisation may contribute to the construction of a collective image of the Chinese government. For example, the report says 'in Wukan all trust has been lost'. The passivisation of the act, 'lost', makes it an event (subject+verb), but if we look at the original action, it is that 'Wukan lost trust in (...)'. The passivisation of the verb avoids the mention of the patient, which is 'the institution/person that Wukan did not trust'. The report does not point out which party lost the trust from Wukan. Is it 'the authorities', 'the local authorities', the 'corrupt officials', or 'Beijing'? The similar absence of the actor is shown in Line 22. The actor who would allow villagers to vote is omitted. A missing by-phrase in the English passive construction might be seen as being an ideological means for concealing or 'mystifying' the reference to an agent (Chilton, 2008). This helps to consolidate the 'common sense': that no matter on which level of Chinese administration, voting is not allowed. Then, the report points out that: 'in Beijing, there will be deep concern of a wider impact.' Here, the state (**Subject + Verb + Complement**) involves the nominalisation of an action—'(...) concerns deeply of a wider impact.' The nominalisation: that is, the processes that have been turned into noun-like terms (nominals) (Fairclough, 1995: p.113) makes it very abstract and distant from the concrete events and situations (Hodge and Kress, 1979). Furthermore, a similar CDA, conducted by Fairclough in his analysis of *The Daily Mirror* and *The Guardian's* reports on disputes on the Maastricht treaty, also highlights that the mention of the location, instead of specific people or institutions, projects a more complicated game being played out over time, one largely involving collective agents amongst whom distinctions of function and status are

important (Fairclough, 1995: p.117). The collective agent here (Beijing) omits the specific actors, thus probably indicating that the inner structure or system of the central government is opaque, but the action on Wukan may be a direct one, even if it's just a 'small' village, as described.

However, one of the excerpts from the Al Jazeera documentary specifies that there are conflicts among the different levels of government.

Wukan might have held democratic elections, but China remains a largely undemocratic country. The new village committee had to take orders from officials from local and provincial governments, who had no interest in rocking the boat. Contentious land issues - the very reason why Wukan rose up in 2011 - remained unresolved (Al Jazeera, 2017/6/10).

The excerpt is not as vague as are others. It specifies that there is a more complete Chinese government system involved. The readers will have more knowledge about how grassroots-level government—the new village committee, comes into conflict with the higher levels of government. Meanwhile, they have different ideological and political focuses. The new village committee puts more effort into solving the land issue, while local and provincial governments care more about the stability of the regime. Due to the different stances among the three levels of government, the land issue thus cannot be solved easily. However, the attitude of the central government on the matter is absent from the excerpt.

In conclusion, the generalisations and omissions of actors appear quite often in the reports when it comes to the descriptions of the Chinese authorities. Such finding is in line with Hess's research (2015). 'In some of the early reporting on the emerging situation at Wukan such understandings of the Chinese Communist Party monolith were evident, as foreign media reported, 'Beijing [was] set to strike hard at [the] revolt' (emphasis added). Also, 'In many popular understandings of the People's Republic of China and authoritarian regimes in general, the state is treated as a unitary, monolithic entity.' (ibid., p180)

Meanwhile, passivisation and nominalisation are found in the texts, too. These representations in clauses are very nuanced and are easily overlooked. Firstly, the generalisations and omissions of specific Chinese authorities help to create a collective image, and the nominalisation of their actions makes the event or action more distant and abstract, which indicates a mysterious and dangerous image of the central government and a direct top-to-bottom process if the central government decides to deal with the village riots.

Narratives of the actor: how villagers and protesters respond

It is quite coincidental that both the BBC and CNN describe Wukan's villagers and protesters in a very active role at the dawn of the protests, but occasionally with hints of passivity. Here are some examples.

24: *Villagers had planned a march through police barriers on Wednesday.* (BBC, 2011/12/11)

25: *Thousands of villagers have been taking to the streets every day in a brazen challenge to the authorities.* (BBC, 2016/6/26)

26: *Villagers last week drove out government officials and set up obstacles to prevent the police from entering the village. (CNN 2011/12/21)*

27: *The man, who gave only his surname, Huang, for fear of being identified, said thousands of residents of Wukan village in Guangdong Province had taken part in protests this week and driven out local officials. (CNN,2011/12/14)*

28: *Instead of meekly accepting the decision, the villagers chose to fight.*

But defiance has come at a cost. (BBC/2011/12/15)

29: *Residents of a Chinese village locked in a stand-off over land seizures appear to be nearing a compromise with local authorities. (BBC, 2011/12/21)*

In these reports, descriptions are either an action (subject + verb + object) or an event (subject + verb). For example, Line 24 is an action (the villagers had planned a march), Line 25 is an event (thousands of villagers have been taking to the street), Line 26 contains two actions (villagers drove out the government officials and set up obstacles to prevent the police from entering the village), while Line 27 contains both an event (thousands of residents had taken part in protests) and an action (thousands of residents had driven out local officials). In general, Lines 24, 25, 26 and 27 describe the rather active roles of the residents, and certain word choices enhance the effect (“brazen challenge to the authorities”). Furthermore, the boundary between the residents and the protesters is rather blurred. It seems that large quantity of villagers took part in the protests, and it is hard to tell if they themselves could be defined as protesters.

As mentioned above, although there are certain degrees of initiative from the villagers in the protests, hints of passivity are also found in the texts. In Line 27, amid the ‘brave’ actions of the thousands of other residents who had taken part in the protests and driven out the officials, Huang was in fear of being identified. There is again a passivisation and omission of the subject. If we turn the sentence to an action, it is ‘Huang feared that (...) would identify him’. The person or organisation who would identify him and impose danger on him is omitted from the text. The similar example is in Line 28—‘the villagers chose to fight against (...)’. The object is missing, and therefore ‘the enemy’ of the villagers is not made clear, but there is an enemy or enemies out there, in this language context, an enemy which is reinforced by the next interpretation, that defiance against certain authorities or enemies has certain consequences. In Line 29, the passiveness of the villagers is shown more obviously. The initiative has vanished, since the residents were locked in, and the interpretation in the text indicates that they are on the edge of compromising with the local authorities. Here, the ‘enemy’ is clear, it is the local authorities, but the discourse here does not deprive the villagers of all initiative, because they only ‘appear to be nearing a compromise’, but remain resilient.

All in all, the descriptions of the protesters are supportive and sympathetic, which ignores the other voices that are potentially different or opposite to them. The one-sided voice in the reports

indicates that a certain ideology and hegemony exists in the texts, which will be discussed in the following section.

4.7 Ideology and hegemony in the reports

According to the graph and analysis, the voices of the ‘pro-protest’ that are supportive of, and sympathetic to, the protesters and villagers, are dominant throughout the reports in the BBC and CNN. Meanwhile, the upholding of democracy seems to be a major solution to not only the Wukan protests, but also to a series of protests around the country. What are marginalised or ignored are those who might have opposite opinions and behaviours. For example, apart from the authorities and the police, there may be some villagers who did not approve of the protests or the election, considering that there are banners like ‘Long Live the Party’ shown among the protesters, but their voices are absent in the reports. Neither the BBC nor CNN ever interviewed these villagers, who seemed ‘not [to be] angry with the central government but [with] local authorities’ (BBC, 2011/12/15). The predominance of one voice and the absence of another has produced hegemony in the reports. The hegemonies are shown in the framing of the news, and could be dissected as techniques of reporting, including vocabulary choices, rhetorical devices, representations of clauses, and other grammatical functions in the language, such as nominalisation and passivisation, as analysed. There are, of course, other methodologies of CDA with which to analyse texts, such as van Dijk’s schematic structures of news and Ruth Wodak’s genre, historical, and socio-cognitive analysis, but considering Halliday’s Functional grammar is the inspiration of the later CDA theorists, and Normal Fairclough has developed a rather intricate and systematic way to develop language analysis in order that it can be more ideologically related, so this study has majorly applied Halliday and Fairclough’s theories and has found the hegemony in the covering of the Wukan protest, as follows.

Throughout the series of protests, the image of the Chinese government, no matter on which level, is described as an authoritarian regime that does not tolerate dissent. The Chinese police force is not the upholder of justice, but a tool of the Communist Party, in these protests, while the Chinese media is the mouthpiece of the regime. The election held in Wukan was only a compromise, since the regime feared further riots, but the procedure was deemed to be a symbol of democracy and hope around the country. Chinese protesters were brave enough to challenge the authorities, but, inevitably, they ended up being violently suppressed.

To further illustrate, the way the Wukan protests were reported is shown in the presupposition of a unanimous approval of Western democracy and a disapproval of communism in China. This presupposition may stem from the journalists themselves, or from the West in general, considering that both CNN and the BBC’s main targeted audience and readers are from the West, and presupposition requires readers to participate, otherwise the texts cannot be interpreted as the broadcaster wishes them to be (Hall, 1992a). However, the reports did not consider the potential differences when it comes to the political environment in China, i.e., the relations between the normal Chinese residents, protesters and the Chinese government and the CPC. What are the approvals and disapprovals in Chinese people’s opinions of their government, and what is the relationship between protesters and the government? Why did some protesters hold banners saying ‘Long Live the Party’ and ‘Topple Down Corruption’ side by side? These questions are not fully answered, nor are they considered in the reports, but they are worth further exploration, as this may indicate that the reality of the protests is not as presupposed, as being simply ‘people in a Chinese village were fighting against the authoritarian regime’. The following section will review those relations from the Chinese political and cultural aspects.

4.8 How do Chinese perceive ‘democracy’—is it really a symbol of hope?

According to the reports, Chinese people are keen to have a democratic political system. A Chinese researcher, Zhengxu Wang, claims in an article that ‘Public opinion surveys show that more than 90% of Chinese citizens believe that having a democracy is good.’ (Wang, 2007), but if we look at the details of these poll results, opinions that are either unexpected or incongruent to the general ‘common sense’ would emerge.

In 1990, Nathan and Shi conducted a survey on what they claimed was the first ever national representative sample from China. They first examined the political efficacy, political knowledge, and political tolerance in a 1993 article. A second article then reported findings that were more directly related to Chinese citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. For example, while 54.8% of the people surveyed in 1990 agreed that ‘China needs more democracy now’, more than 76% agreed that China’s democracy depended on the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Meanwhile, a sizable proportion of those surveyed also feared the negative aspects of democracy. For example, 35.7% agreed that the existence of too many parties would ‘cause political chaos’ (Nathan and Shi, 1996). They also show that CCP party members and state employees (government as well as SOE employees) are also more pro-democratic. That is, contrary to one’s intuition, the survey found that people within the establishment of the party-state were more likely to support democracy (Wang, 2007).

We can’t ignore the fact that the political environment has changed since 1993, and the Chinese people have the possibility of growing more resentful towards the government, but polls in more recent times show a different picture. The research will quote results from two polls—one is the World Values Survey (WVS), a poll which was conducted in 2001; the other is the East Asia Barometer (EAB), conducted in 2002. Both polls conducted surveys that were mostly interested in individuals’ social attitudes and behaviours (Zhang, 2007). The surveys used stratified multi-stage random sampling to achieve a national representative sample, representing the adult population over 18 years of age who were residing in family households at the time of the survey, excluding those living in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The WVS survey generated a sample size of 1,000, while the EAB 2002 China survey had a sample size of 3,183 (Wang, 2007).

	Percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing		
	1993	2001	2002
Our country should expand democracy now	94 (8)		
Democracy is completely suitable for our country			96*
Having a democracy political system is good		96 (21)	
Democracy is better than other forms of government		90 (9)	
Democracy is always preferable			74

Notes: The figure in each cell combines the percentage of those who agreed *and* those who strongly agreed, while the figure in parentheses is the percentage of those who strongly agreed.

*This is the percentage of those who rate the suitability of democracy for China as ‘6’ or above in a 1–10 scale (see also Figure 1).

Sources: Social Change and Social Attitudes Survey, 1993; WVS China, 2001; and EAB China, 2002.

Table 4.3. Explicit support for democracy, 1991-2001 (2007)

The WVS China 2001 was the first survey supervised by Western researchers that directly asked about people's attitudes in regard to democracy. In this survey there were two questions asking how Chinese people see democracy. One question was: 'Do you think having a democratic political system is very good, fairly good, bad, or very bad?' Three-quarters (75%) of the respondents said it was 'fairly good', and another one-fifth (21%) said that it was 'very good'. Combined, 96% of those surveyed agreed that having a democratic system is either fairly good or very good. Regarding the statement, 'democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government', 81% of the respondents said they agreed, and another 9% said they strongly agreed. Combined, therefore, 90% agreed, or strongly agreed, that democracy is the best form of government. The EAB 2002 China survey also asked two questions gauging citizens' explicit support for democracy. When asked to compare whether authoritarianism or democracy is preferable, 74% said democracy is preferable to other forms of government, with only about 5% saying that 'sometimes' authoritarian government may be preferable (the remaining 20% or so said that it 'does not matter') (2007).

However, how Chinese people perceive 'democracy' may be different from the perception in the West. The word 'democracy' (民主 *minzhu*) has appeared in the Chinese Communist Party's official files and the Chinese media quite frequently, as a propaganda slogan, and the democracy, as it appears in these files and contexts, is always referred to as 'a concentrated top-down democracy (自上而下的民主集中制).' It is thus highly possible that the understanding of democracy in China is very different from the understanding in the West, and thus it is not surprising that Chinese people feel uncomfortable about, or even fearful of Western democracy, and this has been shown in those polls. The 1993 survey finds that 45% were afraid that introducing more democracy might cause instability or a loss of social order. Furthermore, more than 60% agreed that, if there were too many political parties, it would bring chaos to national politics. Similarly, about 40% thought that too many interest groups involved in national or local politics would harm the interests of everyone. Concerning the free flow of information, a striking 74% believed that the government should decide whether a certain school or trend of thought should be allowed to circulate. Similar findings are presented in the 2002 EAB survey. As shown in Table 4.4, in 2002, there were still 63% of respondents who believed that the government ought to decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed, and 76% believed that too many interest groups would disrupt the harmony of the community (2007).

Negative attitudes toward democracy	Percentage agreeing or strongly agreeing (number in parentheses is percentage of strongly agreeing)	
<i>a. Democracy = Chaos/ No Order</i>	1993 SCSA	2002 EAB
Too many parties bring chaos	65	
Government decides trends of thought	74	63
Too many interest groups will harm everyone	60	76
More democracy will affect stability	45	
<i>b. Weakness of Democracy</i>	2001 WVS	2002 EAB
Democracies aren't good at maintaining order	18	
Democracies are indecisive and have too much quibbling	35	
In democracy, the economic system runs badly	26	
Democracy can not solve our society's problems		12*

Note: *12%: agreed, 61%: opposed, 24%, don't know.

Sources: 1993 China Social Change and Social Attitudes Survey (SCSA), 2002 EAB Survey, and 2001 WVS China.

Table 4.4. Negative Attitudes Towards Democracy (2007)

Surveys found that in recently democratized Taiwan and South Korea, people demonstrated some resentment towards democratic practices, and some even felt that authoritarian rule might be better under certain circumstances. This may help to explain the similar fear of social chaos that many Chinese citizens feel democratization may cause (see, Y.-H. Chu, L. J. Diamond and D. C. Shin, (2001).

Within this context of the Chinese people's opinions of political systems, this study will discuss the banner language, as previously mentioned.

4.9 Protest banners— why 'Long Live the Party'?

The incongruent evidence: protesters' banners

Despite the descriptions of an authoritarian regime and an overall supportive attitude towards democracy in the reports, there are language signs on the protesters' banners that are incongruent with the news stories. Pro-Party slogans like 'Long Live the Party'; 'the Central Government Has Justice'; 'Save Us, CPC', are seen throughout the protests and until the final severe crackdown. Journalists seem not to understand the unexpected evidence properly, and there are insufficient explanations or descriptions in the reports. The lack of a deeper understanding of the incongruence may not lead the journalists and the readers to a more complete view of the Chinese protests and political opportunities. Negative authoritarian vocabularies and expressions are used to describe the Chinese regime, while positive and sympathetic ones are used with regard to the villagers and protesters. The intertextuality and presupposition of the Cold War narrative are found in the description of the regime, in terms of a one-Party government, heavily censored media, and the brutal police. This hegemonic report of 'protesters/villagers' versus 'the authoritarian regime' cannot explain why there is unexpected and incongruent evidence in the pictures from the protest sites. Language on the banners, unlike the anti-Party attitudes indicated by CNN and the BBC, is predominantly pro-Party, but the news does not translate it all, nor does it fully explain the incongruence. This study will review some contemporary and historical reasons for this way of protesting.

Political opportunities in China—how protesters write their messages?

Collective gathering and protests are deemed to be illegal, in most cases, in China and, therefore, ways of protesting are essential in enabling protesters to reach their goals, so that they can utilise their political opportunities as much as possible. The political opportunities structure in non-democracies has been discussed by Osa and Schock (2007, p128-9). They state that 'in non-democracies, opportunities for mobilization arise from some combination of the following: divided elites, influential allies, increasing/decreasing repression, media access/information flows, and social networks. Such variables, they claim, may be highly interdependent.

The fact that political opportunities lie within the elite divides is essential in large-scale protests. The paradoxes and ambiguities of the Chinese State-Party had already started to emerge at the beginning of the 1980s, when the country – after 30 years of authoritarian rule – embarked on a process of accelerated institutional, economic and legal reforms. Drastic changes in various areas of social life and governance exposed both the flaws and the intrinsic vulnerabilities of a

fairly closed political system. In the aftermath of the Tian'anmen massacre, Western scholars started to warn the international community against any simplistic understanding of Chinese political power as being monolithic and unified (Calhoun, 1994; Zhao, 2001)

Elite divides have largely stemmed from China's government structure. Brien and Li (2006) point out that the action of human rights activists, and of other forms of protest within China, have been directly affected by the multi-layered structure of the state. Their rights assertions have been facilitated by vertical divisions within the State-Party institutions operating at different levels of authority, as well as by horizontal fissures among various agencies at the same level. Lee (2006) also explains that the State-Party's decentralised legal authoritarianism may generate popular activism 'by furnishing the aggrieved groups with both the vocabulary and an institutional mechanism to express their demands and to seek redress' (ibid., p15). According to Chen (2016), the decentralisation of the Chinese government has increased since the Reform and Opening Up during Deng's era. In recent Chinese politics, the decentralisation also posed threats to the central government. For example, Bo Xilai, the Party Secretary of Chongqing between 2007 and 2012, created a populist Chongqing Model and directly challenged the Chinese central authorities (ibid., p16).

In Wukan's case, protests are related to elite divisions and the decentralisation of the government. Divisions among the old village committee members enabled villagers to seek demands and opportunities from those officials who stood with them and fought against those who suppressed them. According to Al Jazeera's documentary, due to the loose-structured governance, the government at a higher level could not suppress the protests immediately, since they had happened in a relatively remote village, rather than in a major city, and this gave more time to the protesters to aggregate and grow, but their demands cannot be satisfied for years. Illegal land selling must be traced to corruption in the higher-level government, but the village committee failed to meet, or to sue, officials in the county government, or on a higher level, and therefore the land issue would be almost impossible to solve unless the scale of protests drew attention from the central government, or even from the international community. Taking full advantage of international connections, media attention, and cyberspace contention to publicize their cause, protesters have, in time, wrung some significant concessions out of the state (Yang, 2008). It is not very likely, therefore, that protesters would use anti-Party slogans, because they have to show the state that they are 'in-group' people, who have no affiliation with foreign powers. The leaders will give in-group members more support and opportunities, whereas others must work harder to achieve their work and career goals (Cheng, 1995), or even put themselves in danger before their demands are met.

Histories of Chinese protest slogans

Another reason for 'top-down' protest slogans is related to how Chinese slogans have developed through time. Hartig (2018) points out that Chinese slogans should be researched separately from Western ones, due to their different political agendas and purposes. Unlike those in most Western countries, where slogans stem from the grassroots, Chinese political slogans often come from the top.

Mao Zedong essentially 'ruled the country by campaign slogans' (Li 1995: xxv) and from the 1950s to the 1980s thousands of political slogans that introduced communist ideology and class warfare were posted and broadcast through the mass media, billboards, or even as home decorations (Lu 1999). Various slogans were formulated by the leadership in the form of instructions, in order to illustrate to the people that their leaders cared. For example, a timeless slogan in this regard is 'Serve the People' (wei renmin fuwu), which was first used in the 1940s,

and is still in use today. Another famous slogan is ‘Seek Truth from Facts; (shishi qiushi), which essentially means that facts, rather than ideology, should be the criterion for the correctness of a policy, and that policy has to work in practice (Hartig, 2018). As time goes by, slogans in Chinese politics not only refer to the abstract ideas and concepts of ideology, but also target the problems of everyday life. A prime example here are slogans promoting family planning, which have, as Xiang shows, undergone a transformation from being ‘intimidating and forceful’, during the Mao era, to being much ‘more humanistic’ nowadays (Xiang 2010b: 95).

Today, protest slogans more or less echo the slogans promoted by the top-level government, as their communication instruments. Many China scholars, who are long accustomed to viewing collective action in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a product of top-down state mobilization, rather than as an expression of bottom-up societal interests, have heralded the recent protest activity as a definitive break with the Maoist past that indicates a “rising rights consciousness”, which is propelled by a newfound appreciation of “citizenship” (Cai, 2008). To be sure, the protests that disturb the contemporary Chinese landscape present significant challenges to the central leadership. Although most of the protests are directed, in the first instance, against grassroots officials, protesters often take their petitions to higher levels—including all the way to Beijing—if a local resolution is not forthcoming (Ibid.). Taking full advantage of international connections, media attention, and cyberspace contention to publicise their cause, protesters have, in time, wrung out some significant concessions from the state; for example, the historic abolition of the agricultural tax in 2006, the property rights law the following year, and the current move to privatise collective land ownership (Yang, 2008).

Yet, however visible and vocal (and sometimes violent) these protests may be, participants usually go to great lengths to demonstrate their loyalty to central policies and leaders (Perry, 2010). Perry (Ibid.) makes an analogy between the pre-Mao and post-Mao protests, and points out there is no fundamental difference between the two.

In these respects, today’s protests perpetuate certain core features of both Mao-era and pre-Mao- era protests. Among these features is a pronounced penchant on the part of protesters to advance their claims within the “legitimate” boundaries authorized by the central state. To be sure, these boundaries have shifted in significant ways over time—as a result of state initiatives as well as societal innovation. But whether we are talking about the pre- or post-1989 reform-era period or for that matter about the Maoist era (or even the Republican or imperial periods) that preceded them, Chinese protesters have shown a consistent tendency to “play by the rules.” Although the language of “revolution” articulated by “comrades” in Mao’s day has been supplanted by a language of “rights” proclaimed by “citizens” today, it is not readily apparent that most protesters in the two periods differ fundamentally in either their mentality or their relationship to the authoritarian state. Rather than interpret protest in contemporary China as emblematic of a seditious “rights consciousness,” in which a new generation of citizens assert their autonomous interests against the state, I see these protests as reflecting a seasoned “rules consciousness” that expressly acknowledges, and thereby serves to undergird more than to undermine, the authority of the state. (Perry, 2010)

In conclusion, the banner language reflects a political reality in China. Chinese protesters focus on delivering the messages more effectively by ‘playing by the rules’, instead of trying to topple the government. The symbiotic relation between protesters and the government showcases another discourse, but this has not been reported. This study will look into Al Jazeera’s documentary to reveal more of this relationship between the protesters and the government.

4.10 Voices of the documentary

The Al Jazeera documentary on the Wukan protests has 6 episodes. Each episode is 25 minutes long, apart from episode 6 (24:51). In order to analyse the voices of the documentary, the study categorises voices into: (new) village committee officials; civil journalist (Zhang Jianxing); anti-election voices; protesters; random villagers, and other scenes. All voices, apart from other scenes, which are mainly about shots of village landscapes and activities, are presented as half-interview and half-monologue. The study calculates the time length of each voice in the 6 episodes, as shown below.




Figure 4.3. Percentages of Voices in the Al Jazeera Documentary

Data explanation

According to Figure 4.3, the voices of the newly elected village committee officials make up the largest percentage (41.92%). Apart from the other scenes, which do not contain any party’s voice, the second most heard voice is that of the protesters (17.44%), and the third is a civil journalist’s (8%). There is a slight proportion (0.93%) of anti-election voice in the documentary, and that is rare in news, as already mentioned.

Anti-election voice: ‘They value that counter-revolutionary Lin Zuluan because he was elected from the Wukan villagers. It’s impossible. They are backing the wrong person.

His idea was from the West. We need to maintain the Communist Party's method of ruling. (Dpisode 2, 5:42-6:14)

The large proportion of voice that is given over to the new village committee members indicates that the main angle of the whole incident is from those who rose up against the old village committee, and who were then elected by the villagers as a new governmental body. This particular angle represents the voices of rebels and the grassroots-level government.

Political factions are shown in the quotation. Parties had conflicts with each other and the study will analyse them as the 'positive us' and the 'negative them'. The categories of 'us' and 'them' stem from van Dijk's framework for a racial discrimination analysis. Normally, the dichotomy is applied in relation to discrimination against minorities and foreigners in certain host countries (see Wodak and Pelinka, 2002; Rydgren, 2005), but the method can also be applied to the inclusion and exclusion of groups due to different criteria relating to how insiders and outsiders are defined in each instance. In this way, various topologies, or group memberships, are constructed, which sometimes include a certain group, and sometimes do not, depending on socio-political and situational contexts and interactions (Wodak 2007; 2008a; 2008b).

However, as mentioned previously, dominance sometimes cannot be simply categorised as relating to villains and victims, and therefore the study will give examples of 'us' and 'them' from the angles of the villagers and the newly elected village committee, with fluid identifications of 'us' and 'them'.

	<i>us</i>	<i>Them</i>
<i>villagers</i>	<p>New village committee: We hope the new village committee will help us get our land back, then we'll be satisfied (Episode 1, 4:07-4:10)</p> <p>The Central Government: We beg the Central Government to save Wukan (Episode 6, 10:46-10:50)</p> <p>If we did away with the county government and formed a Wukan government, communicating directly with the Central Government, all our problems would be solved. (Episode 4, 9:01-9:13)</p>	<p>Old village committee: They sold our land, and the villagers didn't get a single cent in compensation (Episode 1)</p> <p>If we choose corrupt officials who don't serve the people, then Wukan will rise again. That's for sure (Episode 1, 6:24-6:35)</p> <p>New village committee: Xue Jinbo lost his life like that. Have they (the new village committee) done anything for us? Nothing at all. The officials are just holding on to their jobs for their dear life. (Episode 2, 15:33-15:42)</p> <p>Anyway, they (the new village committee) are not talking to us. It's a disgrace. What's the point of electing them? (Episode 3, 15:45-15:50)</p> <p>Higher-level government: Return our land! Return our Chief (Lin Zuluán)! (Episode 6, 6:15-6:17)</p>

The new village committee

	<p>Lin Zuluang is innocent! The county government is so corrupt! (Episode 6, 6:40-6:42)</p> <p>If they find out our identities, we'll be put in jail. (Episode 6, 16:48-16:51)</p>
<p>Villagers/Farmers Zhang Jiancheng: The ordinary farmers have had their land swallowed and sold by these people (episode 1, 2:09-2:12)</p> <p>I hope he (Xue Jinbo, the former activist) will look down from heaven as I work for the people (Episode 1, 24:14-24:20)</p>	<p>Old village committee: Zhang Jiancheng: The way they conducted 'elections', from the voting to the supervising of the event to the selection of the Committee, was all behind 'closed doors' (Episode 1, 1:28-1:38).</p> <p>Villagers: Lin Zuluang: Those who help the weak often come to a sorry end (Episode 2, 24:21-24:30).</p> <p>Now, as a grassroots worker serving the public, I have a deeper understanding about how public opinion is sometimes illogical (Episode 2, 14:32-14:45)</p> <p>CPC: My phone is tapped. (journalists: who's monitoring it?) Who else can it be? There's no 'who', only 'them'. (Episode 3, 7:36-7:50).</p> <p>Some villagers were shouting 'Long Live the Communist Party', they hoped to show the government that they were not conspiring with foreign forces, that they believed in the Party. They did it out of helplessness. We know the corruption is top-down (Episode 6, 21:32-21:40).</p>

Table 4.5. Fluid identification of 'us' and 'them'

The identification of 'us' and 'them' had been changing throughout the protests. Before the election, the old village committee and the county government were 'villains', whose corruption was the main cause of the land issue. Villagers and the newly elected committee

members were ‘victims’, who had decided to rise up. However, the roles of ‘us’ and ‘them’ changed as the land issue wasn’t entirely solved. Conflicts were exacerbated between villagers and the new village committee. On the one hand, villagers condemned the newly elected committee as ‘a disgrace’ (Episode 3, 15:45) since they thought the officials had achieved nothing. On the other hand, Zhang Jiancheng, a prominent committee member, reflected on whether democracy was suitable for the governance of the village.

‘Lately, I have been wondering if we really want democracy. Every ideology, every organisation has its own flaws. Now, as a grassroots worker serving the public, I have a deeper understanding about how public opinion is sometimes illogical.’ (Episode 2, 14:32-14:45).

Although resentments between villagers and the new village committee became aggravated, the role of ‘them’ changed when Chief Lin, the new committee leader, was arrested two years after the election. Both villagers and the committee claimed the innocence of Chief Lin and they blamed the county government, as ‘them’.

Although the image of ‘the governments above’ remains the image of the enemy throughout the entire time of the protests, they were depicted differently according to their different levels. As for villagers, the central government was always given a positive image, it is they who can help to solve the land issue and can tackle corruption. The reasons are, to some extent, relevant to the political opportunities that are mentioned in the literature review. Protesters in mainland China have to choose their messages carefully, since collective gathering is usually illegal. The careful usage of protesting messages might promise greater possibilities for applying the potential political opportunities needed to achieve their own goals. Secondly, it may be that the villagers trust the central government more than the county government, so they wanted to attract the central government’s attention to the issue. Thirdly, it is also likely that they used pro-Party slogans to indicate that the protests were not related to foreign anti-Party forces and, therefore, they wouldn’t have to go against the regime. However, when the crackdown began, the villagers were vague about whom they blamed. They used the preposition ‘they’ to indicate those people who suppressed them, instead of being clear about the actors. (*If they discover our identities, we’ll be put in jail* (Episode 6, 16:48-16:51)). As for the new village committee members, apart from Zhuang Liehong, who fled to the U.S.A., none of them explicitly commented on the central government. However, Zhuang Liehong’s discourse wasn’t anti-Party until he was in America. He said the corruption is top-down from the central government to the government levels below (Episode 6, 21:32-21:40), and he publicly condemned the Party.

The research will analyse how every party constructs the images of the ‘negative them’ and the ‘positive us’ via various techniques in their discourse.

Negative them:

Grammatical role of the discourse: the use of pronouns

Scholars (Fairclough, 1993; van Dijk, 1998; Weiss & Wodak, 2003) have found that ideologies can be shown in grammar. For example, in *Media Discourse*, Fairclough analyses the use of pronouns ‘we’ to illustrate how news or interviewees try to identify their social representations with the audiences. However, in the case of the Chinese political context, the use of prepositions may be the opposite. Different levels of government are referred to as ‘them’ by villagers and village committee members in multiple quotations, as shown below.

Villager: *They* sold our land, and the villagers didn't get a single cent of compensation (Episode 1)

You say you're getting our land back. Where is it? Make them give it back! (Episode 2, 17:27-17:30)

If they discover our identities, we'll be put in jail. (Episode 6, 16:48-16:51)

Zhang Jiancheng: *The way they conducted 'elections', from the voting to the supervising of the event to the selection of the Committee, was all behind 'closed doors'* (Episode 1, 1:28-1:38).

Zhuang Liehong: *the problem (the land issue) is whether or not the people above do their work, whether they are doing their work fairly and with integrity. This is the most important.* (Episode 3, 5:58-6:10)

My phone is tapped. (Journalists: who's monitoring it?) *Who else can it be? There's no 'who', only them.* (Episode 3, 7:36-7:50).

People's clear intention to avoid mentioning 'the government' or 'the regime' directly is largely due to the fear of getting themselves into trouble. As the documentary shows, the government paid those who offered information about dissenters to the police (Episode 6), so, any word about a specific department or official in the interview might cause them to be arrested. Secondly, it is also likely that the villagers or the committee members do not have sources that inform them about who is doing what from above. The concept of the central government, or the Party, remains a collective and mysterious image that villagers and committee officials have faith in, but also have a fear of, while Zhuang Liehong remains the only person who publicly rebuked the Party, but after he fled to America.

Zhuang Liehong: *Some villagers were shouting 'Long Live the Communist Party', they hoped to show the government that they were not conspiring with foreign forces, that they believed in the Party. They did it out of helplessness. **We** know the corruption is top-down* (Episode 6, 21:32-21:40).

The transition of 'they' to 'we' is marked as a preposition shift. On the one hand, Zhuang Liehong takes refuge in a referentially ambiguous 'we', rather than 'I', which helps to evade the exclusive referential. On the other hand, it can be understood as the 'party-we', which is intended to demonstrate the closed, unanimous, fixed position of the whole party on the issue in question (Weiss & Wodak, 2003), which indicates that some villagers have the same political opinions and stance as Zhuang Liehong.

Argumentation: justification of negative attributions

Another more straight-forward way to construct 'them' is through argumentation. Although it was the villagers who elected the new village committee, negative argumentation in relation to the new committee was recorded, in Episodes 2-5, about how villagers thought the new committee had failed them.

They (the new village committee) say they've returned our land, but nothing's been returned at all. All the villagers in China should ask the Central Government to be fair to us. (Episode 2, 10:20-10:26)

Xue Jinbo lost his life like that. Have they (the new village committee) done anything for us? Nothing at all. The officials are just holding on to their jobs for dear life. (Episode 2, 15:33-15:42)

Anyway, they (the new village committee) are not talking to us. It's a disgrace. What's the point of electing them? (Episode 3, 15:45-15:50)

You (Lin Zuluang) are powerless. Absolutely powerless. (Episode 4, 16:54-16:56)

In return, the village committee members also made some negative argumentations about the villagers, too.

Zhang Jiancheng: Lately I have been wondering if we really want democracy. Every ideology, every organisation has its own flaws. Now, as a grassroots worker serving the public, I have a deeper understanding about how public opinion is sometimes illogical. (Episode 2, 14:32-14:45)

The committee was selected by villagers, but there are also many villagers who oppose us. (22:04-22:14)

Lin Zuluang: Those who help the weak often come to a sorry end. (Episode 2, 24:21-24:30)

There's a division between villagers and the village committee about the understanding of the (land) issue. (Episode 3, 8:44-8:52)

The provincial government has been working hard, but nobody knows how we can meet the demands the villagers are making. (Episode 3, 9:00-9:18)

From the extracts, we can conclude that it is arbitrary to call the election of the new village committee 'a democratic victory', since the amount of resentment between the elected village committee and villagers was increasing, as the land issue was not fully solved. The dynamic relations between the villagers and the committee demonstrate that there is no ideal political system or governance that can guarantee a perfect solution. However, their negative argumentations in relation to each other do not make the committee and villagers enemies, since their interests were the same, which was to tackle the land issue as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, their political stance did not contradict that of the other, either. Villagers held one of their largest protests against the arrest of Lin Zuluang, and claimed his innocence, while the village committee did not crack down on any protest from the beginning to the end, and some committee members also supported those protests.

This study will analyse how the roles of the 'positive us' are constructed in the documentary.

Positive us:

Nominations of social actors

Although the voices of the new committee members lead the story, they are not presented as being formal bureaucratic images. First of all, village officials' names are nominated. When individuals are nominated, they are personalized and their unique identity and human characteristics are highlighted (van Leeuwen, 1996). A case in point is proper names, which vary in terms of formality, from very formal (last name only), to semi-formal (first and last), to informal (first name only), to the least formal (a nick name). Formal nominations, which can be titled (such as Doctor X, or Professor of Neurology at X University) can empower the referent and, by extension, the assertion of the speaker, whereas informal nominations without titles may be selected in order to serve just the opposite function, that is, to de-authorize and de-legitimize the power and status of an actor (Hart, 2014).

In the documentary, the full names of the village committee officials are introduced, but most of them, apart from Lin Zuluan, call each other by their first names, as do their family members and interviewers. The voices of the Al Jazeera journalists' are occasionally audible in episodes. The informality, as such, is not common, considering that the Chinese are used to calling officials by their titles in order to demonstrate hierarchies or respect. Calling each other, especially governmental members by their first names only de-authorises the bureaucracy to a great extent. It only happens when participants are close and in an equal position. Since the majority of the committee officials are called by their first names, the intimacy and equality among them and the other parties (or the audience) effectively construct positive images of the new village committee members, which are also the main voices in the documentary. By contrast, Lin Zuluan, as the Chief of the committee, is never called by his first name only. He was called 'Chief Lin' by the other committee officials and interviewers, which means he is nominated according to his position. The authorisation of Lin, and the de-authorisation of the other committee officials, are ideological in the documentary— committee officials are shown as normal people who struggled to serve the Wukan villagers, while hierarchies are inevitable in the governmental structure, even at the grassroots level.

Argumentation: justification of positive (innocent) attributions

Despite a few negative attributions, positive or innocent ones appear in prominent places in the documentary when it comes to the new committee officials. When Lin Zuluan was arrested and made his confession of bribery on National television, journalists interviewed Lin's grandson.

'I have only two words: false accusation. It's only because he (Lin Zuluan) wanted to fulfil his promise to the villagers and himself, so he organised a village meeting and a petition (to request the higher-level government to solve the land issue). I was taking a bus home, and they arrested me. The person who nabbed me was really gleeful. He kept saying on his phone: "I have the brat! Of course, I personally saw to the mission." As if he'd struck the lottery. I've done nothing wrong, only because I'm Lin Zuluan's grandson. He loves me a lot, and they managed to threaten him (to confess)'. (Episode 6, 11:30-12:30)

The interview is directly quoted so as to illustrate the positive, or innocent, image of Lin. Since it is a direct quotation from the victim, it is highly original and authentic, if compared to descriptions in the BBC and on CNN. Details of how Chinese authorities deal with domestic issues are revealed. It is deviated from the overall framing of the BBC and CNN, considering Lin was also a CPC member and he was neither a dissenter against the Party nor the central government. The political battles within the Party could therefore be one of the reasons why

Lin was arrested, which is more complicated than the simplification demonstrated by ‘the authoritarian regime arrested the activist leader’ as the BBC and CNN portrayed.

Meanwhile, there are also other villagers’ remarks about how the higher-level government threatened Lin Zuluan so as to make him confess to bribery.

‘County government forced him to say those things.’ (Episode 6, 13:18-13:20)

‘Why did they wait until we said we would petition before arresting him in the middle of the night? If he’s really corrupt, they should have arrested him in broad daylight, instead of the middle of the night. They snatched him away.’ (Episode 6, 13:20-13:34)

‘Return our land! Return our Chief (Lin Zuluan)!’ (Episode 6, 6:15-6:17)

‘Lin Zuluan is innocent! The county government is so corrupt!’ (Episode 6, 6:40-6:42)

In the documentary, there were more young people and protesters from other cities grouping together and protesting on the streets after Lin had been arrested. The slogans and attitudes showed their support for the village committee, despite the previous conflicts. The attributions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ become more obvious when the higher-level government sent armed police to crack down on the protests, until almost all of the village committee members were arrested, and the whole village was silenced.

4.11 Conclusion

According to international polls (Tables 4.3 and 4.4) and academic research, it is arbitrary to assume that most Chinese people would prefer the practice of Western democracy domestically. Presupposition in the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera’s reports, such as **‘Wukan became a symbol of democracy and had given people in villages right around the country great hope’** (BBC, 2016/7/21; CNN, 2016/7/20; Al Jazeera, 2016/9/14) obviously lacks strong evidence to support the rhetoric. Hegemonies found in texts via CDA in relation to the authoritarian regime are not compatible with the Chinese political reality, which has had a more decentralised government since the late ‘70s, and the presupposition of ‘suppression of freedom of speech’ is invalid, considering that 63% of Chinese (in 2002) think that the government should decide about which discourse and thoughts to circulate. Although the passiveness and powerlessness of the protesters are depicted in reports, the nuanced pro-Party protest language, which indicates a symbiotic relationship between the protesters and the central government, are ignored, or even distorted as being a hostile one in those reports. In those reports, the dominant voices are from Western journalists and sources, while Chinese protesters and the Chinese authorities’ voices are peripheral (as shown in Graph 1). The reports use the frame of ‘the suppressed fight against the suppressing’ in Chinese protests, from the reporting angle, while the local political and cultural elements are filtered out.

However, unlike the reports mentioned above, the discourse of the Al Jazeera documentary is significantly different from the news reports about the protests. The documentary gives a large proportion of its time and its shots to the newly elected village committee officials, who can represent both the Chinese grassroots-level government and protesters. The deliberate informal nominations of village committee officials, which involves addressing them by their first names, demonstrates a rather casual and down-to-earth image of Chinese grassroots-level officials. Meanwhile, images of protesters are not always the heralds of democracy, but also

lack an understanding of the complicated Chinese politics, which directly lead to the shifting images of 'us' and 'them' in relation to the whole event. Protesters and villagers deemed the newly elected committee officials to be 'us', until the land issue could not be solved, due to the loose-structured government and the flawed law systems. They blamed the committee officials for their incompetence and had direct confrontations with them. However, when the chief of the committee was arrested and 'forced' to confess, protesters and villagers regarded the committee as 'us' again and continued to petition and protest against the higher-level government.

Images of the higher-level government are different, based on their levels. The county government remains the enemy, since it ignores villagers' petitions and the requirements to solve the land issue. The provincial and central government have more positive images, which are shown in protesters' slogans and interviews. However, when considering the nature of the regime, the obedient slogans may be the political instruments that protesters have to use to maximise their political opportunities under pressure and, therefore, the image of high-level government in the documentary, or the protesters' messages, cannot be arbitrarily interpreted without considering the long-lasting culture of top-down mobilisation, and the ever more complicated Chinese politics.

Chapter 5: Case Study 2: Hong Kong Protests

5.1 Introduction

This study deals with the ways in which leading international broadcasters, namely, the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera, report news relating to a particular and recent period of protest against the Extradition Bill 2019-2020. Firstly, the study will review the Bill briefly to provide some background. As will be seen below, the findings corroborate the overall view that the coverage by the three organisations was partisan and hegemonic.

The Extradition Bill

To grasp the mediation of the protest, it is important to examine the socio-political background, especially the legal changes that triggered it. In the final months of British rule, Hong Kong passed laws barring extradition to mainland China due to concerns around the freedoms promised under the one-country, two-systems formula (Lague, Pomfret & Torode, 2019). However, Beijing has been trying to change the extradition law since the handover (ibid.). An incident accidentally pushed such changes. In early 2018, 19-year-old Hong Kong resident Chan Tong-kai murdered his pregnant girlfriend, Poon Hiu-wing, in Taiwan, then returned to Hong Kong. Chan admitted to Hong Kong police that he had killed Poon, but the police were unable to charge him for murder or to extradite him to Taiwan because no agreement is in place (*Hong Kong Free Press*, 2019). Immediately afterwards, the pro-Beijing flagship party, the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong's (DAB) chairwoman, Starry Lee, and the legislator, Holden Chow, pushed for a change to the extradition law in 2019, using the murder case as the rationale for this action (Lague, Pomfret and Torode, 2019).

The Bill led to well-founded concerns that Hong Kong residents and visitors might be detained in mainland China, and could then be subjected to its jurisdiction and legal system, thereby inhibiting Hong Kong's autonomy and civil liberties (Ku, 2020). The scale of these protests was unprecedented in Hong Kong's history, and forced the Chief Executive, Carrie Lam, to concede legislative defeat, first by suspending the Bill, on 15th June, and then by declaring it 'dead' on 9th July (ibid). The research agenda not only dealt with the legal changes but also asked specific questions about the role of the news in coverage of the protests.

5.2 Research Questions and Assumptions

The research questions are closely related to the topic of the study, therefore there are two major research questions, below:

- R1. Is the news of HK protests domesticated in the three media outlets?
- R2. Does the news showcase demonstrate different geopolitical interests?

As for the first question, the researcher's assumption is that the news is domesticated according to the home country's audience.

Considering the literature review regarding the domestication of news in the BBC and CNN, and a better reputation in regard to international reporting from Al Jazeera, the research assumes that (1) CNN news is more relevant to the U.S.; (2) the BBC to the U.K.; (3) Al Jazeera remains more neutral.

5.3 data

The study used two key phrases together— ‘the Extradition Bill, Hong Kong protests’ to search news on the official websites of BBC World, CNN news and Al Jazeera English. The first 12 pages of word-based news (exclusive of editorials, comments or opinions) are selected. The studies collected 83 articles from the BBC news, 81 from CNN news, and 72 from Al Jazeera English.

5.4 Sources and Discourses

Firstly, from a journalistic point of view, the use of authoritative and official sources enhances the validity of the news item and adds prestige to the story (Xu, 2013). Several studies have demonstrated that mass media rather often rely on official sources, mainly in order to delegitimise protests and reinforce the status quo norms (Jha, 2007; McFarlane & Hay, 2003), or they legitimise and criticise the *status quo* norms (see Veneti et al, 2016). Meanwhile, official sources that are quoted during an international affair would indicate a different geopolitical agenda. Furthermore, according to Van Dijk (1991), quotations allow the insertion of subjective interpretations, explanations, or opinions about current news events, without breaking the ideological rule that requires the separation of facts from opinions. For example, quotations from non-Western officials and institutions provide another perspective on the protests (even if they may be propaganda), which may oppose the US and the UK sources, but may also serve to offer a balance in the news’s voices. By looking at the official sources from the BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera, the researcher therefore hopes to find similar, but more detailed, differences that would reflect the domestication (of news) and geopolitical interests of the different countries, and can also examine the balance of voices in the news. All the direct and indirect quotations from every party are counted. Those parties are not counted as official sources.

Secondly, discourse about horizontal and vertical intertextuality, according to Fairclough (1992 ;1995), are also worth researching. Embarking on Foucault’s theory, scholars (see Bakhtin (1981); Kristeva (1986a)) have created the concept of ‘intertextuality’. The term ‘intertextuality’ was coined by Kristeva in the late 1960s, in the context of her influential accounts for Western audiences of the work of Bakhtin (see Kristeva 1986a). Fairclough then further defines intertextuality as ‘horizontal intertextuality’, which includes texts that proceed and follow each other in the chain of texts; and ‘vertical intertextuality’, which includes texts that are historically linked on various time-scales and within various parameters (Fairclough, 1992, p103). In other words, horizontal intertextuality is more contemporary, while vertical intertextuality is more historical. According to Foucault (1984) and Hall (1994a), underlying ideology may be found in intertextuality in discourse. Regarding reports about China, contemporary and historical references are frequently mentioned, which could possibly also be ideological. The study will therefore firstly conduct a quantitative analysis by using NVivo to code those topics that fit into either horizontal or vertical intertextuality and then list the subcategories that are relevant to the two types of intertextuality. Finally, some textual examples will be given in relation to every topic so as to examine them more closely. Unlike official sources, each topic includes direct and indirect quotations and descriptions of specific persons or subjects.

5.5 Results

Media outlets/official sources	BBC	CNN	Al Jazeera
The UK (British)	111	66	112
The US (American)	66	103	60
China	43	52	56
Other Western countries	6	3	9
Non-Western countries (Taiwan)	0	1	2
	4	2	3

Table 1.1 (All the direct and indirect quotations from every party are counted. Descriptions of those parties are not counted as official sources.)

According to Table 1.1, CNN has significantly more direct and indirect American official sources, if compared to the BBC and Al Jazeera, and Al Jazeera and the BBC have similar numbers of British official sources. Al Jazeera has the most quotations from China. When it comes to Chinese official sources, Al Jazeera has the most (2860/66206 (4.3%)), while the BBC has the least (1243/54168 (2.3%)), and CNN falls in between the two (2788/76788 (3.6%)).

Furthermore, official sources from other Western countries are few, if compared to those from the U.S. and the U.K.. The protests in HK seem like a geopolitical battle, one that is being fought mostly among Britain, America and China, with other Western countries jointly condemning China.

Meanwhile, all the three media outlets had very few official sources from non-Western countries. CNN had one from the UAE, while Al Jazeera had two from Malaysia, whereas both governments did not comment on the protests— the UAE issued warnings to tourists in HK, while Malaysian officials expressed the potential possibility of replacing HK as one of the most popular tourist destinations. As for the BBC, there is no quotation from any non-Western country. The significant absence of official sources from the Second and Third Worlds indicate that, when it comes to HK news concerning battles among superpowers, voices from other parts of the world are not heard.

In conclusion, the data only roughly showcased that CNN has the greatest number of American official sources, while Al Jazeera has the most Chinese ones, which is not detailed enough to demonstrate the extent to which the news has been domesticated or tailored in relation to geopolitical interests. The study examines the coded topics of horizontal and vertical references.

	BBC	CNN	Al Jazeera
Horizontal(contemporary)	58	199	65
Vertical (historical)	51	30	44

Table 2.1

Horizontal(contemporary)	BBC	CNN	Al Jazeera
Xi Jinping	26 (0.04)	97 (0.08)	28 (0.03)
Trump	8 (0.01)	46 (0.06)	10 (0.01)
UK and US flags	2 (0.01)	5 (0.01)	2 (0.01)
Hongkonger (identity issue)	9 (0.01)	2 (0.01)	1 (0.01)
China's economy	2(0.01)	8(0.01)	4(0.01)
Hong Kong's economy	11(0.01)	41(0.07)	20(0.02)
Vertical(historical)			
Tiananmen massacre	1 (0.01)	12 (0.03)	15 (0.04)
Cultural Revolution	2 (0.01)	0	0
Former British colony	46 (0.10)	16 (0.02)	29 (0.05)
Chris Patten	2 (0.01)	2 (0.01)	0

Table 3.1 intertextuality

(Each topic includes direct, indirect quotations and descriptions of specific people or subjects.)

According to Table 2.1, CNN has significantly more horizontal references than the other two, whereas the BBC has slightly more vertical references among the three.

To further examine the details of intertextuality, the study categorises intertextuality into subtopics, as Table 3.1.. Firstly, as for contemporary references, CNN has significantly more references to 'Trump' (97), if compared to the BBC (23) and Al Jazeera (28); another topic that CNN mentioned the most is 'Xi Jinping'; as for the BBC, it mentioned both the Tiananmen massacre and Xi Jinping the least, if compared to the other two media outlets, whereas 'Cultural Revolution' and 'Hongkonger's identity issue' have been written about the most. Secondly, when it comes to historical references, the BBC has a much higher proportion of 'former British colony' (46) than CNN (16) and Al Jazeera (29). Both CNN and BBC mentioned the last British governor to HK— Chris Patten-- twice, while Al Jazeera did not write about him.

The results explain further the domestication and geopolitics of news. CNN has the most American official sources and the most references to Trump, showing that the news presents a high relevance to American politics, whereas, for the BBC, the highest proportion of ' (HK being a) former British colony' directly links Hong Kong news with the history of Great

Britain. Interestingly, CNN has the least references to HK being a former British colony, while the BBC has the least references to Trump.

Furthermore, CNN has the most descriptions of China and Hong Kong's economy, if compared to the other two. This result may be related to America's geopolitical interests, because it was having a trade war with China in 2019.

Another indication from the data is that CNN's news contains a higher proportion of elite personnel. Apart from the most references to Trump, it also has the most references to the Chinese President, Xi Jinping. It fits into one of the news values that stories concerning powerful individuals would be more likely to be selected as news (Harcup and O'Neill 2001). Meanwhile, even if the news is about Xi, CNN has a few examples that mention Trump at the same time.

Excerpt 1: In June, as the protests kicked off, Trump promised Chinese President Xi Jinping, in a phone call, that the US would remain quiet on the protests while trade talks continued, according to sources familiar with the call (2019/11/19).

Excerpt 2: In a series of tweets late Wednesday, Trump praised Chinese President Xi Jinping as a "good man" and suggested the two leaders hold a personal meeting to sort out the political crisis in Hong Kong and the escalating trade war between the US and China (2019/8/15).

Excerpt 3: Trump, who has faced criticism for not taking a tough enough stance on China over Hong Kong, said that he believes Xi can solve the situation "quickly and humanely."

"I know President Xi of China very well. He is a great leader who very much has the respect of his people. He is also a good man in a "tough business,"" Trump said.

"I have ZERO doubt that if President Xi wants to quickly and humanely solve the Hong Kong problem, he can do it. Personal meeting?" (2019/8/15)

The positive interaction between Trump and Xi, to some extent, categorised Trump as one of the 'out-group' people who would describe Xi as a 'good person', compared to the rest of the tones in news about Xi, which were quite negative (authoritarian; tight grip; stability-obsessed Communist Party, etc.). It fitted more into the overall tone of 'anti-Trump' in CNN, therefore, in this case, more frequent references to Xi helped to portray the partisan politics in CNN, since Trump seemed to have a tolerant, or even friendly, attitude towards Xi.

Although Al Jazeera had 3 references and the BBC had 1 to the interaction between Trump and Xi, they were all partially quoted, compared to the fully quoted words in CNN.

BBC : Mr Trump said he signed it "out of respect for President Xi [Jinping], China, and the people of Hong Kong". He had previously been non-committal, saying he was "with" Hong Kong but also that Mr Xi was "an incredible guy" (2019/11/28).

AJ: In Washington, US President Donald Trump said he believed Chinese President Xi Jinping has acted “very responsibly” with the protests, which have been the Chinese leader’s greatest popular challenge since he came to power in 2012 (2019/7/23)

China has likened the protests to terrorism and warned it could use force to quell them, as US President Donald Trump urged Xi to meet protesters to defuse the tension (2019/8/16)

US President Donald Trump said Beijing must deal with the protesters “humanely”, while also suggesting that if Chinese President Xi Jinping met the demonstrators, “there would be a happy and enlightened ending to the Hong Kong problem.” (2019/8/16).

Apart from the differences shown by the partial and full quotations, Al Jazeera presented a shift in Trump’s attitude towards Xi (from describing Xi as behaving ‘very responsibly’ to suggesting that he should: ‘urge Xi to defuse the tension’), which is absent in CNN’s coverage, even after Trump signed an Act to support protesters.

Seeing that there could be other differences in the discourse over one topic, the study will go into more detail about the texts of each of them.

	BBC	CNN	Al Jazeera
Trump	<p>Before Monday's protests erupted into violence, US President Donald Trump expressed his support for the protesters, saying they were "looking for democracy" and "unfortunately, some governments don't want democracy".</p> <p>Mr Trump is currently seeking a deal with China, in order to end a trade war between the two countries.</p>	<p>“I have ZERO doubt that if President Xi wants to quickly and humanely solve the Hong Kong problem, he can do it. Personal meeting?”</p> <p>While Trump has remained largely silent on the Hong Kong protests amid trade talks with the Chinese government, he has previously expressed a willingness to make deals on supposedly separate issues</p>	<p>But President Donald Trump appeared to take a cautious line when he was asked about the protests.</p> <p>“That was as big a demonstration as I’ve ever seen,” he said. “I hope that it all works out for China and Hong Kong.”</p>

Protesters (regarding Trump)	For the second week running, some marchers carried the US Stars and Stripes flag and called for President Donald Trump to "liberate" Hong Kong.	In an interview with CNN, the paper's (<i>Apple Daily</i>) publisher, Jimmy Lai, said that Trump "is the only one who can save us." "We share the same US values of liberty and democracy," 30-year-old banker David Wong said. "USA is a country of democracy. Donald Trump is elected by his people. We want this."	Spray-painted slogans and printed signs that read "[US] President [Donald] Trump, liberate us!" were spotted in the business district after million-strong marches in June and early July.
US and UK flags	Hong Kong activists have waved US and UK flags at protests The British colonial flag was draped inside the government's legislative council building.	Earlier in the day, tens of thousands of protesters waving US flags marched on Hong Kong's US Consulate to call for help from the Trump administration Protesters hold a banner and wave US national flags as they march to the US Consulate in Hong Kong on September 8.	Calling for politicians in the United States to support their cause, thousands of people gathered in central Hong Kong and marched towards the consulate waving US flags As protesters flooded the highway and roads on Sunday leading to the rail station, participants waved British colonial flags , distributed leaflets, and used AirDrop to share electronic graphics with the public.
Tiananmen massacre	"It's hard for us to accept that Carrie Lam, the leader of Hong Kong, copy the model of the Tiananmen Square massacre to such a modern global financial centre," he added, referring to China's bloody crackdown on pro-democracy protests in 1989 .	Fears that Chinese forces could enter the city and quash the protests have been rife in Hong Kong, where memories of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre – where Peoples' Liberation Army troops brutally put down pro-democracy protests – is still fresh in residents' minds.	And the army's brutal crackdown on students in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago is memorialised every year in Hong Kong . Even for those with no living memory of the event or who were not yet born at the time, it is the one history lesson about China most Hong Kong parents take pains to pass on .
Hongkonger (identity issue)	Instead, it is about her "Hongkonger" identity. It's personal and should not be amended by others. Though Hong Kong is legally Chinese territory, Hong Kong citizens have diverse self-identities .	As a semi-autonomous city, Hong Kong itself has a splintered identity – it is both China, and not .	while most of the population is ethnically Chinese, they are fiercely proud of their Cantonese identity , with its own dialect and traditions
	According to a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Programme of The		

University of Hong Kong in December 2018, in the 18 to 29 age group, merely 4.1% Hong Kong people identified themselves as Chinese, while 59.2% of them said they are Hongkonger, Hui included.

Hong Kong's economy

Its economy shrank 3.2% in the July-to-September period compared with the prior quarter, figures showed, confirming earlier preliminary data. It means the economy has contracted for two quarters in a row, which is the usual definition of a recession.

Tourists are staying away and shops are suffering amid battles between anti-government protesters and police.

In September, Lam announced the withdrawal of an extradition bill after three months of increasingly violent protests, which have roiled the city and damaged its economy.

The economy shrank 0.4 percent in April-June from the previous quarter, revised government data showed on Friday, and conditions have sharply deteriorated since then as demonstrations spread, closing the airport and paralysing prime shopping areas.

If passed, the Bill would hurt Hong Kong's economy by subjecting businesses to tariffs and import restrictions.

However, he (Asia Pacific market strategist) stressed that the extradition bill is just one of the many issues dragging Hong Kong's economy, and by extension its stocks, lower.

China's economy

If Hong Kong continues to challenge Beijing's authority, the government could further redirect investment and trade towards the mainland, **squeezing** Hong Kong's economy and making it far more reliant on Beijing's goodwill.

The Chinese government maintains it is not afraid of a trade war, but higher tariffs are an extra burden on an economy that's already showing signs of slowing.

As Beijing works out what to do with Hong Kong, it is fighting a bitter trade war with the US, **a slowing economy** and its standoff with the United States.

Facing **a weakening economy**, and with trade tensions with the United States at an all-time high, experts say Xi is under pressure to deliver on the enormous power he's

Hong Kong's protests pose a major challenge to Chinese President Xi Jinping, who **is grappling with a trade war** with the US and **a slowing economy**

		amassed since coming to power in late 2012.	
Cultural Revolution	<p>From the Cultural Revolution to the British Miners' strike, historical precedent has been one tool to influence the narrative on Hong Kong in China's favour.</p> <p>Media began labelling four veteran Hong Kong pro-democracy figures as a new "Gang of Four",- drawing on the dreaded language of the Cultural Revolution, it was a term that referred to the political faction blamed for the worst excesses of that time in China's history.</p>		
Xi Jinping	<p>Under Xi Jinping, critics say, Beijing is seeking to increase influence over Hong Kong Under the so-called "one country, two systems" principle</p> <p>Chinese president Xi Jinping has warned against separatism, saying any attempt to divide China would end in "bodies smashed and bones ground to powder"</p>	<p><u>Hong Kong</u> has once again <u>burnished its reputation</u> as a thorn in the side of the Chinese Communist Party and its leader, President Xi Jinping, after protesters swarmed the city's streets for the third time in one week.</p> <p>Xi's Message to Hong Kong: You're Stuck With Carrie Lam (title)</p> <p>These freedoms stand in stark contrast to China's strict censorship and Chinese President Xi Jinping's tight grip on power</p>	<p>Xi is also grappling with an escalating strategic rivalry with the US and a slowing economy.</p> <p>The Hong Kong protests mark the biggest popular challenge to the rule of Chinese President Xi Jinping since he took power in 2012.</p>
Former British colony	A former British colony, Hong Kong is semi-autonomous under the principle of "one country, two systems" after it returned to Chinese rule in 1997.	The former British colony was returned to China in 1997, when Beijing agreed to guarantee its semiautonomous legal system for the next 50 years.	Hong Kong, a British colony until 1997, was handed over to China under the concept of 'one country, two systems,' which accorded political and legal autonomy to the city.

Table 3.1 discourse details

Discourse of CNN

Apart from the references to Trump that were previously mentioned, descriptions of protesters seeking for Trump's help have some distinctions in CNN, if compared to the other two broadcasters. For example, "We share the same US values of liberty and democracy," 30-year-old banker David Wong said. "USA is a country of democracy. Donald Trump is elected by his people. We want this." (CNN, 2019/9/8). The discourse conforms to the previous analysis, which showed that CNN tends to quote discourse that links HK news with American politics and to make it more relevant to its domestic audience, whereas the BBC and Al Jazeera have few direct comparisons or quotations of this type. Furthermore, in CNN, of 8 descriptions about China's economy, 5 explicitly said that China's economy is 'weakening' and 'slowing', which may fit into America's agenda of a trade war with China in 2019, while Al Jazeera only mentioned this twice out of 4 uses under the topic.

Discourse of the BBC

As for the BBC, apart from mentioning most that HK was a former British colony, it provides more discourse on topics, such as the Cultural Revolution and Hongkongers' identity issue (see Table 2.1 and 3.1). For example, it gave a very detailed explanation of the 'Gang of Four' that is specifically related to the context of the Cultural Revolution, while the other two media outlets did not have any reference to it. When it comes to the discussion of Hongkongers' identity, one of the reports had substantial discussion on it and quoted a study from the University of Hong Kong, making it more academic and convincing. However, the reports did not mention that China's economy is weak or slowing down. It pointed out that the Chinese government could 'squeeze HK 's economy and make it far more reliant on Beijing's goodwill.' (BBC, 2019/8/14), which indicated that China still has a strong economy.

Discourse of AJE

According to Table 3.1, AJE did not relate HK politics directly to American politics. In fact, the language in AJE tries to stay neutral and not to name any politician. For example, in one of the quotes from the 'UK and US flags' topic, Al Jazeera says 'Calling for politicians in the United States to support their cause, thousands of people gathered in central Hong Kong...' (AJE, 2019/9/8) in which it says 'politicians in the US', instead of mentioning Trump or the Trump administration. When it comes to the topic of the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, it also has a slightly different tone from the other two. Compared to 'Xi warned any attempt to divide China would end in "bodies smashed and bones ground to powder"' (BBC, 2019/11/28) and 'Xi Jinping's tight grip on power' (CNN, 2012/12/20), Al Jazeera pointed out the general dilemma of the relationship between China and America, and it uses 'the rule of Xi Jinping' (AJE, 2019/9/3) instead of other descriptions or metaphors.

Another discourse difference from the other two is the discussion of Hongkongers' identity. Al Jazeera says 'the population is proud of their Cantonese identity' (AJE, 2019/6/25), in which 'the Cantonese identity' could be geopolitically and culturally broader than the 'Hongkonger identity' that was mentioned in the BBC's coverage, considering that Guangdong province in mainland China shares the same Cantonese language and culture.

Another different perspective given by Al Jazeera is that it mentioned the Tiananmen Square massacre the most amongst the three media outlets, and the example in Table 3.1 is more

sentimental than the other two. The BBC uses words like ‘China’s **bloody crackdown**’ (BBC, 2019/7/17), and the CNN ‘Peoples’ Liberation Army troops **brutally put down** pro-democracy protests’ (CNN, 2019/8/15), whereas Al Jazeera says ‘the brutal crackdown ... **is passed on with pain** (AJE, 2019/7/11)’. Furthermore, compared to the descriptions from BBC and CNN about the massacre, Al Jazeera focuses more on the possible resemblance between the massacre and the crackdown on HK protests, as shown in further examples, below:

Excerpt 4: ... there is always the looming question of Chinese intervention, and observers often draw quick parallels to the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.

“A very specific, also very worrying, historical parallel is that People’s Daily has been using terms to denigrate the Hong Kong protests that are very similar to those the same paper used to denigrate the Beijing protests of 1989 – before declaring a state of martial law,” says history professor Jeffrey Wasserstrom of the University of California, Irvine, citing several historical echoes in protest and repression in 20th century China, his area of expertise.

(Al Jazeera, 2019/7/22)

Excerpt 5: Tianmen 2.0?

“Military action [is] unlikely, at least at present, but the situation on the ground is quite fluid,” he added.

Referring to Tiananmen Square in 1989 when troops forcibly cleared the area of pro-democracy protesters leaving hundreds dead, Ni pointed out that while that might have seemed an irrational response to a political problem, China’s Communist Party still chose that path.

The party has “its own internal dynamics and rationales.

“I’d caution thinking that the party wouldn’t, but I think the likelihood is low at this point”.

(ibid., 2019/7/31)

Excerpt 6: “It’s always a possibility. During June 4, 1989, people didn’t expect that the army would crack down and they did, so you never know,” he said, referring to the iconic Tiananmen Square incident in Beijing.

(ibid., 2019/8/17)

Excerpt 7: World leaders have been closely watching whether China would send in the military to quell the protests, as it did a generation ago in Beijing, in the bloody Tiananmen crackdown.

(ibid., 2019/9/3)

Instead of merely describing the cruelty of the Tiananmen massacre, therefore, Al Jazeera questions the possibility of a crackdown on HK protests turning into another Tiananmen massacre more, which showcases a general concern for the humanitarian issue. Furthermore, it provides a more multi-faceted image of Chinese authorities by quoting Li, an academic from Lingnan University, saying ‘the situation is fluid; The Party has “its own internal dynamics and rationales... but it still chose the path (of the violence)’.

Another discourse difference found in Al Jazeera is in relation to the Hong Kong economy. Both CNN and the BBC directly blamed the proposal of the extradition bill and the ongoing protests for damaging the HK economy, whereas Al Jazeera provided different opinions from an Asia Pacific market strategist, who stressed that ‘the extradition bill is just one of the many issues dragging Hong Kong’s economy.’ (Al Jazeera, 2019/9/4).

5.5 discussion

The case study showcased that there are traces of domestication and geopolitics of news regarding HK protests in CNN and the BBC in several of the topics, whereas Al Jazeera has a slightly different approach to reporting on the protests.

The study started with the discussion of the numbers of official sources in the three media outlets. CNN has a significantly higher proportion of American official sources. Both Al Jazeera and BBC have similar numbers of British official sources. When it comes to Chinese official sources, Al Jazeera has the most, while the BBC has the least.

The official sources only gave a rough idea of the differences in the reports. When the data was broken down into more details of the different topics, there are some distinctions among the three outlets.

Both the domestication and the geopolitics of the news have been shown in CNN’s reports. It shows two different attitudes to Trump, which might serve different purposes for the outlet. Firstly, quotations and descriptions of Trump showed that he was friendly with one of the opponent figures, Xi Jinping, which indicated that Trump might be one of the ‘out-group’ people. This way of reporting fitted into CNN’s agenda of being anti-Trump during his tenure (see Tari & Emamzadeh, 2018). However, the discourse underwent a change when quoting from protesters regarding Trump. It is quite American-centred— it compares HK claims to American politics. The study concludes that, by quoting the most American official sources, while being American- centred on some other topics, CNN firstly made the news more relevant to its domestic audience, and to serving its domestic political agenda (anti-Trump) but, at the same time, it was also trying to convey a message that compared it to the British colony and Chinese authoritarianism, HK protesters preferred American democracy, regardless of the image of Trump. In addition, CNN had the most descriptions of China’s economy slowing down, or weakening, which also fitted into its agenda in regard to the trade war with China in 2019.

As for the BBC, the highest proportion of mentions of HK being a former British colony also makes it more relevant to the British audience. The discussion of the Hongkongers' identity issue was more detailed, with statistical evidence from the poll conducted by the University of Hongkong. However, the relation between the identity of Hongkongers with the British colonial legacy has to be examined further. The close connection between the two cannot be ignored (see Flowerdew, 2012). According to Flowerdew (2012), Chris Patten, the last Hong Kong Governor from Great Britain, did have some significant influence on the general public via public speeches, weekly radio talks, and media discourse, in order to build Hongkongers' identity upon the British Empire's ideological legacy. The stress on maintaining Hongkongers' distinctive identity (from mainlanders) can be seen as an effort to maintain the British colonial legacy in Hong Kong.

However, the BBC introduced some historical background, such as the Cultural Revolution in China, when the other two media did not, which could be regarded as a contradiction to the domestication of news, because it makes more sense to the local and mainland people than to the British audience.

As for Al Jazeera, firstly, it had more direct quotations from Chinese official sources, which indicates that it provided more opposing voices/discourse for the reports. When such discourse is examined more closely, it presented a few different moral attitudes towards the Chinese government (see Excerpt 5) and, therefore, it provided more than one perspective on the regime. When it comes to reporting on the protesters, the discourse balanced those reports between pro-America and pro-Britain viewpoints. Another major difference in Al Jazeera's reportage is that the highest number of references, in relation to vertical intertextuality, about Tiananmen massacre, which it gave, indicated a general humanitarian concern about the conflict between the Hong Kong police and the protesters.

Last, but not least, few official sources from other countries indicate that, firstly, it was a geopolitical battle, mainly among Britain, America and China, while other Western countries were mostly with the first two; Secondly, sources from the Second and Third Worlds were not seen, which indicates an imbalance of voices in HK news in the three media outlets.

The globalisation of news, to some extent, is largely led by the West. This can be seen in the ways in which the three news outlets deal with the concept of the 'international community'. In their reports, the 'international community' only includes major Western countries and their allies. Leaders from the Second and Third World are absent from the texts.

All in all, reports about the Hong Kong protesters, including those of Al Jazeera English, can be seen as being the site of an ideology battle between the West and China. When the battle becomes the theme of those reports, there are still some questions that remain unanswered. To which identity are people in Hong Kong more related? Are core values from the West more important than Chinese ethnicity, as the BBC and Al Jazeera have briefly mentioned? Is there any disagreement among the protesters themselves? Apart from the Western core values that are mentioned in these reports, what are their personal opinions of Chinese politics and culture? These questions will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 6 Discussion

6.1 introduction

China's protests have continually drawn international attention. This study has reviewed the relevant theories that relate to how the international media report on Chinese news.

The domestication and stereotyping of foreign news are commonly found in reports of Wukan and Hong Kong protests. Both can be regarded as being an adaptation of international news for their home markets.

These two reporting techniques will result in hegemony in such texts. Overt deployment of domestication and cultural stereotypes is one indication that the news reports fail to transcend a national outlook, as this signifies a reliance on the national lens to make sense of the other. Stereotyping is looking to oneself—one's own cultural logic—for a clue and an understanding of different peoples (Desmarais and Bruce, 2010), rather than seeking to directly and candidly engage with, and to understand, other cultures (Tanikawa, 2018).

Meanwhile, the geopolitics of news is also embedded in the texts. National news outlets have different focuses on content, focuses which put emphasis on home countries' political ideologies and agendas. This has been shown quite clearly in the case analysis of how CNN, the BBC and Al Jazeera report on the Wukan protests over the illegal selling of the land, and the Hong Kong protests during the proposal for the extradition bill.

This study will discuss results of the Wukan case from this section to 6.6, and the rest will discuss the Hong Kong case.

This study has found that, when it comes to news reports on China's mainland protests, the BBC and CNN's descriptions of certain parties have vocabularies that indicate a fixed moral and emotional basis. The depiction of the Chinese regime comes from three aspects: the Chinese authorities (the government and the Communist Party), the police and the Chinese media.

(1) When it comes to the Chinese government, expressions such as 'keeps a tight grip on' (CNN, 2012/3/5); 'China's determination to maintain stability by cracking down' (BBC, 2011/12/15) have depicted an authoritarian regime, and the emotional and moral basis of the regime is condemned. The intertextuality of the historical references to the Chinese government is also found in the texts. Horizontal intertextuality, which is deemed as being a more modern and recent reference, according to Norman Fairclough (1991;1993), has been found in the news. The BBC quotes President Xi Jinping, to indicate that there is a political environment with more suppression in China today (BBC, 2016/9/13), while CNN says that 'the Communist Party still keeps a tight grip on dissent nationwide, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring (CNN, 2012/3/5)'.

(2) As for the police, the Chinese police in the news are the tool that is used to maintain the regime's power. Police 'were suspected to have beaten one of the activists to death' (CNN, 2011/12/15); to have 'attacked villagers and arrested 13 people according to the law' (CNN, 2016/9/13); 'hundreds of police officers are storming the village' (BBC, 2011/12/15). CNN shows footage of police going backwards when they confront a villagers' attack, while the subtitle of the video is 'China cracks down on village protesters'⁴ (CNN/2016/9/13).

⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fU6FZ9BaoZI>

(3) The description of the Chinese media fits in with the image of such an authoritarian regime. 'Information is limited due to restrictions and censorship' (CNN, 2016/9/13), while foreign reporters only have limited access to the village. Both news outlets define the nature of the Chinese media as being 'State media' (BBC, 2011/12/15); the 'State news agency' (CNN, 2011/12/21); 'State television' (BBC, 2016/7/21), in order to presuppose that news on those 'State-owned' media is propaganda.

The descriptions above successfully picture China as an authoritarian country, in which the Party keeps a tight rein on its people, the police obey the orders from the authorities in order to maintain their power, and information is controlled by strict censorship. This description is logical, due to some 'hidden common sense' in the circulation of such news. There is a certain presupposition, which is largely ignored by the audiences, but which indicates an ideology that has been regarded as 'common sense' since the Cold War.

The news stories pass down the more remote historical references, which are categorised as vertical intertextuality, according to Fairclough's definition (Fairclough, 1991;1993). However, vertical intertextuality does not have to be as explicit as the horizontal since the texts provide presupposition and background to those stories that expect the audience to understand what's not there in the texts. There is empirical and academic evidence that shows that the circulation of 'communism versus capitalism' has continued since the Cold War. The descriptions of the Chinese regime, according to McNair (1988) and Thussu (2006), fit into international, especially Western, media's news frame of 'communist propaganda' and 'capitalist persuasion' (Thussu, 2006: pp.16-17). Descriptions of the Soviet Union have largely influenced how the international media describe its ally, China, nowadays.

Apart from intertextuality and the functional use of the conjunction, the boundary between the reporting and the reported is therefore quite blurred. A large proportion of the texts are given to journalists. The descriptions from journalists insert presuppositions so as to provide the 'hidden common sense' of the Chinese regime. Presupposition helps to produce a communist political vibe in the texts which resembles the portrayal of 'an enemy to democracy'.

Excerpt: This has been a place which - **unlike anywhere else** in China - had a **genuinely elected** government **but** many here are wondering if the so-called "**Wukan experiment**" is about to die (BBC, 2016/6/26).

This report explicitly marks the election in Wukan as being 'genuine', indicating that leaders being elected through voting is an uncommon phenomenon in China, and it is therefore worth marking. The preposition 'unlike' confirms this assumption, that other parts of China conduct 'ungenuine' elections. The analogy that compares the election to 'an experiment' also indicates that such elections have existed in other parts of the world as a political normality, while still being at an experimental stage in China. The ongoing 'experiment' cannot be guaranteed, due to the tight grip of the regime. It showcases the fact that Chinese politics is fundamentally different from that of others, and it needs changing via experiment.

A presupposition about how Chinese people think of such a regime can also be found in the texts.

Excerpt: Wukan **became a symbol of democracy** after villagers banded together in 2011 to protest against what they said were corrupt officials selling their land to developers and failing to compensate them properly (BBC, 2016/7/21).

The election of Wukan's government **had given people in villages right around the country great hope** for what might be possible under the Chinese system as it stands today (CNN, 2016/7/20)

Both 'A symbol of democracy' and 'the election had given people great hope' presuppose that the whole country supports a fundamental political change, using the Wukan experiment as a model. It also indicates a judgment that the current Chinese political system is flawed and that it is not beneficial to its people, and thus Chinese people have to hope for a democratic system. Such a presupposition is contradictory to the poll results that have been mentioned in the Wukan case. To quote a few results from the East Asia Barometer (EAB), in 2002, there were still 63% of respondents who believed that the government ought to decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed, and 76% who believed that too many interest groups would disrupt the harmony of the community (Wang, 2007).

This study has also found that, when it comes to the descriptions of the Chinese authorities in the BBC and CNN, the actors and patients are generalised or omitted.

In the generalisation of the Chinese authorities, all levels of Chinese government are mentioned as collective concepts, rather than as individual departments, while the omission of the government as actors can also be found in the texts.

The generalisation and omission of the Chinese government have a certain ideology behind them. According to Fairclough (1995), the generalisation and omission of actors poses a mystery to the institutions, since they avoid mentioning actors, and the direct actors remain both anonymous and mysterious.

On the other hand, the depictions of villagers have a supportive and sympathetic moral and emotional basis. They 'mourned for the death' (CNN, BBC 2011/12/15), while they 'actively took part in protests, drove out local officials and set up obstacles to deter police' (CNN, 2011/12/14, 12/21). The description of protesters and villagers at the beginning of the riot is more positive, considering that they are the actors in a series of incidents, for example, 'Thousands of residents took part in protests (CNN, 2011/12/11)'; 'the villagers' fury reached a new pitch (BBC, 2011/12/15), but the description towards the end becomes passive. Groups of armed police were sent to the village and 'villagers were finally suppressed by the police' (CNN, 2016/9/16).

However, the study found that the banner language is inconsistent with the overall moods of the protesters in the reports.

The incongruous evidence: protesters' banners

Despite the descriptions of the authoritarian regime, together with an overall supportive attitude towards democracy, there is language on the protesters' banners that is inconsistent with the news stories. Pro-Party slogans like 'Long Live the Party'; 'the Central Government has Justice'; 'Save us CPC', are seen throughout the protests, until the final severe crackdown. Journalists seem not to understand this unexpected evidence properly and there are insufficient explanations or descriptions in the reports. The lack of a deeper understanding of this incongruity may not lead the journalists and the readers to a more complete view of the Chinese protests and political opportunities. Negative authoritarian vocabularies and expressions are used to describe the Chinese regime, while positive and sympathetic ones are used to describe

the villagers and protesters. Intertextuality and the presupposition of the Cold War narrative are found in the description of the regime, in terms of a one-Party government, heavily censored media and the brutal police. This hegemonic report of ‘protesters/villagers’ versus ‘the authoritarian regime’ cannot explain why there is unexpected and incongruous evidence in the pictures from the protesting sites. Language on the banners, unlike the anti-Party attitudes depicted by CNN and BBC, is predominantly pro-Party, but the news does not explain this incongruity fully.

6.2 Confucian politics and political opportunities in China: a unique way of protesting

As mentioned above, the domestication of news does not fully explain the incongruity between the ‘common sense’ of the Western protest news and the Chinese reality shown in the pictures. This study has already discussed how Chinese protesters utilise their banner language to remain in-group, so as to maximise their political opportunities (see, 3.9). This section will try to understand the unique political situation in China culturally, so it is going to discuss the influence of Confucianism on Chinese political culture and political opportunities.

As the literature review mentioned, Confucianism plays an influential role in Asian politics and culture. Hofstede (1980) points out that many differences in leadership style, employee motivation, and organizational structure can be explained through different cultural lenses. Culture also affects the use of power and the tactics for influencing followers, and it can affect the relationship between leadership and employee outcomes. The leadership construct and style, in other words, depends on cultural factors.

Applying Western leadership theory to non-Western societies must be done carefully (e.g., Bass 1990; Hofstede 1980). Scholars (Cheng, 1995; Hu, Hsu, and Cheng, 2004; Jiang and Chang, 2010) have tried to identify Chinese leadership based on a comparison with Western leadership theories.

A comparative literature study finds that Chinese public leadership is based on moral concepts, authoritarian relationships, and an approach that favours some subordinates over others - characteristics that are all related to Chinese culture and Confucian values (Xiao and Wu, 2014). The most salient difference in a comparison of the Chinese and Western implicit leadership theories is that the Chinese value personal morality much more than other attributes. This result suggests that the Chinese consider moral behaviour, or “virtue,” the most important feature of leadership (Ling et al., 2000).

Contextualised research thus suggests that Chinese leadership behaviour and style, whether in the public or the private sector, differs from the Western approach. In particular, more weight is given to leaders being moral and ethical. Subordinates expect leaders

...to be willing to be a public servant, to have integrity and honesty, to be consistent in thought and word, to be willing to search for truth, to be fair, to serve as a model, and to be willing to accept criticism from others and from him or herself (Ling et al. 2000).

This is consistent with traditional values, as the Chinese culture has a “long history of valuing leadership and preparing leaders on moral grounds” (Wong 2001).

The interactions between the leaders and their followers are more like those of a ‘parent-children’ or ‘teacher-students’ hierarchical model. The leadership styles of supervisors or principals, as perceived by mid-level supervisors, employees, and teachers, across various types of businesses and schools, were found to comprise three subtypes: benevolent, moral, and authoritarian (Xiao and Wu, 2014). Benevolent leadership contained *shi'en* behaviours, e.g., “individualised care” and “understanding and forgiving.” Moral leadership entailed *shude* behaviours, e.g., “integrity and fulfilling one’s obligations,” “never taking advantage of others,” and being a “selfless paragon.” Authoritarian leadership comprised five types of *liwei* behaviors: “powerfully subduing,” “authority and control,” “intention hiding,” “rigor,” and “doctrine.” (Chen and Kao, 2009; Cheng et al., 2004; Farh and Cheng, 2000). Moreover, in a relationship-oriented society, leaders categorise subordinates as belonging either to an in- or an out-group, treating members of the two groups differently (Cheng, 1995). The leader will favour those in the in-group, because of their mutual relationship, as well as their loyalty and competence. The leaders will give in-group members more support and opportunities, whereas others must work harder to achieve their work and career goals (Cheng, 1995).

This ‘moral leadership’ suggests some unique characteristics in the interaction between Chinese leaders and their followers and indicates that subordinates will respond differently to the different leadership styles (Cheng et al., 2004). Chinese public leaders exhibit leadership by making themselves moral models for their followers. Leadership power derives from character, as well as from their position in the organisational hierarchy. If a leader models moral behaviour, followers will obey out of respect and trust (Xiao and Wu, 2014). Acceptance of high power-distance means that subordinates tend to depend heavily on, and comply with, their leaders. Subordinates tend not to exercise discretion or make their own decisions but, instead, focus on carrying out the leader’s decisions and the letter of the orders given to them. Like a parent, the leader is expected to take a close interest in the subordinates’ personal or family affairs, seeking information about their health and welfare and offering assistance. In turn, subordinates will show their gratitude and work harder, in order to repay the leader (Xiao and Wu, 2014).

Such a leadership model requires a strong mutual trust between leaders and followers, and protests and conflicts often happen when the ideal model does not work. If leaders are corrupt and ignore the basic needs of their followers, petitions will be put forward and protests will break out. However, the doctrine of the ‘parent-children’ leadership model decides that Chinese protesters have to utilise unique political opportunities in order to achieve their political goals.

Firstly, protesters’ slogans have to showcase the fact that those protesters remain within the ‘in-group’. Slogans like ‘Long Live the Party’ and ‘Central Government has Justice’ mean that their carriers identify themselves as being followers of the Party, and thus the government may consider an effective solution to the land issue. Slogans that directly go against the Party will lead to a more severe crackdown before protesters achieve their goals. Secondly, as mentioned in the case study, protest slogans nowadays more or less echo those slogans that have been promoted by the top-level government as their communication instruments, since Mao’s era. Unlike the bottom-up protest models in the West, Chinese protesters’ slogans are largely influenced by propaganda and by slogans which were originally formulated by the top-level government. Apart from supporting the regime with their protest language, there is a ‘rising rights consciousness’ that is propelled by a newfound appreciation of “citizenship.” Protesters have begun to reiterate their demands in slogans, too. In the Wukan case, language such as ‘Punish the Corrupt Officials’ and ‘Return our Land’ are protesters’ demands that are made after the claims that ‘Central Government has Justice’ and ‘CPC Save Us’. To be sure, the

protests that disturb the contemporary Chinese landscape present significant challenges to the central leadership. Although most of the protests are directed, in the first instance, against grassroots officials, protesters often take their petitions to higher levels—including all the way to Beijing—if a local resolution is not forthcoming (Cai, 2008).

6.3 Another reality of the Wukan protests: What Al Jazeera's documentary shows to the audience

Representations of news in Al Jazeera's documentary are different to those in the BBC and CNN's output from the following aspects: the main voice of the incidents; the moral and emotional basis of feelings towards protesters and villagers; the descriptions of the local grassroots government.

The main voice of the narration in the documentary is the newly elected village committee. As mentioned in the case study, it provides a unique angle from both protesters and the local grassroots government. According to the documentary, the relationships among the protesters and the new village committee and the central government are not fixed relationships of 'us' and 'them'. At the dawn of the protests, protesters chanted pro-Party slogans and hoped the central government could tackle the corruption and the land issue, while they also had much hope that the new village committee could solve the problem.

However, protesters and villagers' attitudes towards the central government changed towards the end of the protests. When they were threatened by armed police, and with being put in jail, they were vague about whom they blamed. All the actors were mentioned as being 'they', when they tried to refer to the government.

Excerpt: *If they discover our identities, we'll be put in jail.* (Episode 6, 16:48-16:51)

The vocabularies that the protesters and villagers used to describe the new village committee are also not confined to certain sets of emotional and moral bases. A very distinct difference in the documentary is that the villagers did not attach any political importance to the election. There was no 'it is a symbol of democracy', or other similar ideological expressions. In fact, villagers were more concerned about which government might tackle the land issue as soon as possible, while they seemed not to be very passionate about politics itself.

Excerpt: *We hope the new village committee will help us to get our land back, then we'll be satisfied.* (Episode 1, 4:07-4:10)

If we choose corrupt officials who don't serve the people, then Wukan will rise again. That's for sure. (Episode 1, 6:24-6:35)

The neutral emotional and moral basis changed into a condemnatory one when the villagers found the Committee could not meet their demands. They blamed the Committee for failing the Wukan people, and for the death of their activist leader, Xue Jinbo.

Excerpt: *Xue Jinbo lost his life like that. Have they (the new village committee) done anything for us? Nothing at all. The officials are just holding onto their jobs for dear life.* (Episode 2, 15:33-15:42)

On the other hand, the Committee members' emotional and moral basis in relation to the villagers experienced a transition, too. When the Committee had just been elected, the officials were keen on giving justice to the Wukan people.

Zhang: *I hope he (Xue Jinbo) will look down from heaven as I work for the people.* (Episode 1, 24:14-24:20)

However, when the land issue was more complicated than the Committee expected, and they could not solve it in a short period of time, the villagers started riots against the committee. Zhang Jiancheng and Lin Zuluang's discourse in relation to the villagers changed significantly.

Zhang: *Lately, I have been wondering if we really want democracy. Every ideology, every organisation has its own flaws. Now, as a grassroots worker serving the public, I have a deeper understanding about how public opinion is sometimes illogical.* (Episode 2, 14:32-14:45).

Lin Zuluang: *Those who help the weak often come to a sorry end.* (Episode 2, 24:21-24:30)

There's a division between villagers and the village committee on the understanding of the (land) issue. (Episode 3, 8:44-8:52)

The provincial government has been working hard, but nobody knows how we can meet the demands the villagers are making. (Episode 3, 9:00-9:18)

In their discourse, villagers were depicted as being illogical, rude, stubborn, but also vulnerable to a crackdown by the government.

As for the committee members' attitudes towards the central government, before the final crackdown, some members hoped that the higher-level government would punish the corruption and handle the land issue.

Excerpt: *The land problems depend on whether the people 'above' will do their work. Whether they are doing their work fairly, and with integrity. This is the most important....* (Episode 3, 5:58-6:10)

However, the committee members were silenced after the final crackdown. Some were arrested due to bribery and, according to protesters and villagers, the allegations were false. Some of their family members were arrested. The only committee member, Zhuang Liehong, who offered another discourse which contained an emotional and moral basis in relation to the central government and the CPC, fled to America.

Excerpt: *Some villagers were shouting 'Long live the Communist Party', they hoped to show the government that they were not conspiring with foreign forces, that they believed in the Party. They did it out of helplessness. We know the corruption is top-down.* (Episode 6, 21:32-21:40)

This discourse challenges the loyalty of the villagers and committee members to the central government and the CPC, but it also fits into the analysis of political opportunities in China. Protesters and dissidents cannot state their own demands without chanting along with the central government and the Party, otherwise they cannot fulfil their goals and are risking their lives.

The study will put the Wukan case against a broader background of international news reporting, which will echo the political economy of the media and hegemony in news that are shown in the literature review.

6.4 Indications of the Wukan case in the globalisation of news

News stories on the BBC and CNN have certain patterns of reporting.

Representations of news indicate that there is a Cold War narration in the reporting of Chinese protests. To be more specific, news stories contain intertextuality, presuppositions and rhetorical and lexical devices to complete an image of ‘the red communist menace’, which is composed of the authoritarianism of the regime, the brutality of the police, the heavily censored mouthpiece of the State-owned media, and the oppressed people who yearn for freedom. Such discourse has been circulated in news stories so that it has become ‘common sense’, that China, or any other communist country, fits into such descriptions, especially in events that include riots and violence.

Such representations of news ignore the political and cultural nuances that have always existed in China’s politics. First of all, in the Wukan case, Chinese protesters are mostly politically neutral, in that they do not attach too much importance to China’s political ideology. The discourse of protests as a ‘Symbol of freedom/democracy’, in the Western news stories, is absent in the protesters’ discourse and slogans. Protesters are more concerned with the practical issues which caused the riot, rather than with the regime itself.

Secondly, the Chinese government is not a monolithic entity, as some of the news has depicted it. Governments on different levels are loosely-structured, which allows different political factions and thoughts within the Party itself, resulting in elite divides that may provide political opportunities for Chinese protesters.

Thirdly, the relations between the Chinese protesters and the regime are far more complicated than a simple definition of ‘us’ and ‘them’. There are three relations included in the case. The first is the relation between protesters/villagers and the village committee; the second is between protesters/villagers and higher-level government (the county, provincial and central government); the third is between the village committee and the higher-level government. In those relationships, as the discussion of the results showed, the emotional and moral basis is dynamic, rather than static, and it is therefore too arbitrary to conclude that this dynamic can be described as ‘the regime’ vs. ‘the people’.

Reasons for the framing of Chinese protests may stem from the different ideologies and cultures in the West and the East. As the literature review discussed, the huge difference between Western democracy and Asian Confucianism has put the Western media in a dilemma in which the domestication of news was necessary for its national audience to understand what was happening in China, but the news’s authenticity is compromised in such a process. It is easier to fit Chinese riots and crackdown into the frame of a ‘communist authoritarian regime suppresses its people’ rather than to dig deeper. Furthermore, the intertextuality resulting from the long-term circulation of the Cold War narrative also presents the news more credibly, since readers tend to believe in circulated common sense rather than in random and sudden explanations that do not fit in with their common knowledge. Meanwhile, the limited time and word count that are necessary when writing news also result in another reason for creating simple but arbitrary frames in international news.

Such framing of news, in this case, will result in hegemony in news language. Scholars have discussed hegemony in news language from different angles, which have shown a dominant language in the news. According to Gramsci (1971), hegemony is a necessary method of State control and of maintaining stability. Whether it is implicit or explicit, in post- Gramscian writings, the term *hegemony* has come to mean the taken-for-granted, almost invisible, discourse practices of symbolic domination (Blackledge, 2000). Some critical linguists (Fairclough, 1995; van Dijk, 1999) link hegemony with relations of power. It is about the process of a dominant group exerting power over society as a whole, but it is also about making alliances, and achieving consent from subordinated groups (Fairclough, 1995).

6.5 How does ideology work in the international news system? The possibility of the establishment of political belief systems

As mentioned previously, the publication of *The End of Ideology* triggered the revival of ideology, which had exactly the opposite effect to that which the book had intended. Thompson (1984) argued that the thesis that ideology has come to an end was very much a product of the Western liberal democracies in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when politics was a matter of pragmatism, and even radicals had seemingly reconciled themselves to moderation. However, Marxist scholars (Hall, 1984; Seliger, 1976) argued that, despite those (see Aron, 1959; Shils, Lipset, 1960; Bell, 1969 and others) who claimed the end of ideology, they used the term 'ideology' inconsistently, and instead of arguing the end of the concept, they more or less pointed out the character of a belief system, whether it was a conservative, moderate or radical one.

Martin Seliger's theory of ideology being a belief system was discovered against the backdrop of 'the end of ideology'. He came up with 'inclusive conception', which applies the term to all political belief systems, irrespective of whether the beliefs guide action that is oriented towards preserving, destroying or rebuilding the social order (Thompson, 1984).

Seliger further defines an inclusive conception. Ideology, according to Seliger, is made up of action-oriented sets of beliefs which are organised into coherent systems. These systems are composed of a number of elements, which may be formally distinguished and represented as shown in Figure 6.1.




Figure 6.1. Seliger's theory of ideology (Thompson, 1984)

As the figure makes clear, all ideologies mix together factual description and the analysis of situations with moral prescriptions about what is right and good, and technical considerations of prudence and efficiency. It is this peculiar mixture of factual content and moral commitment that gives ideology its appeal and enables it to guide political action. (Thompson, 1984; Seliger, 1976).

Among those elements, those described as 'rejections' may be relevant to this study. This calls attention to the fact that ideologies are always defined in opposition to others, and they thus incorporate the denial or rejection of certain principles and beliefs; the separation of powers in constitutional democracy, for example, is premised upon the rejection of the divine right of kings. (Thompson, 1984).

Seliger offers a full definition of his inclusive conception:

An ideology is a group of beliefs and disbeliefs (rejections) expressed in value sentences, appeal sentences and explanatory statements.... (It is) designed to serve on a relatively permanent basis, a group of people to justify in reliance on moral norms and a modicum of factual evidence and self-consciously rational coherence the legitimacy of the implements and technical prescriptions which are to ensure concerted action for the preservation, reform, destruction or reconstruction of a given order. (Seliger, 1976, p256)

Seliger's idea of the construction of an inclusive concept of a belief system is constrained within a national border, and then falls back onto the discussion of whether to maintain the class domination in original Marxism (Thompson, 1984), but does not consider broadening its scope to an international political belief system.

The study has found that language in the international news, which is mostly produced by the Western media, has rejections and moral prescriptions in the content so as to sustain hegemony and to maintain the dominant ideology. As mentioned previously, the odds of the news being read by local Chinese people are quite small, considering the language barrier and the

ensorship in China. The main group of the news audience is from the West, and, thus, it is highly likely that the way the Chinese protests are reported is one of the ideological methods used in order to maintain hegemony, which is claimed as being in the interests of all in the West.

The CDA analysis of the Wukan case indicates such hegemony, but we have to look into a more detailed relationship between media, language and ideology.

According to Gouldner (1976) and Thompson (1984), ideology does not float in some ethereal realm of ideas, but is tied very closely to the medium of linguistic communication (Thompson, 1984). While grounded in ordinary language, ideology restructures it and constructs itself 'as a sociolect of an "elaborated" sociolinguistic variant' (Habermas, 1970, p.43). Writing was, and still is, ideology's principal medium (Gouldner, 1976).

Meanwhile, ideologies are not rooted directly in the experiential flux of everyday life, but are *mediated* by the news and the interpretation of that news. Ideologies are second-order accounts, 'palimpsestic texts on texts', which interpret and integrate the information provided by the news-producing system. (Thompson, 1984).

Findings from the CDA analysis present the possibility of constructing a belief system via presuppositions, which are expressed by conjunctions and other grammatical usages, and moral descriptions, which also indicate a dominant ideology in the texts.

Media: *Chinese authorities often release videos on State television of suspects admitting to crimes, in what rights activists say are **forced** confessions.* (BBC, 2012/3/5)

Government: *Communist Party still **keeps a tight grip on** dissent nationwide, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring.* (CNN, 2012/3/5)

*The Communist Party believes this(crack-down) is an essential tool in **maintaining power.*** (BBC, 2012/1/16)

Police: ***Hundreds of** police officers **storming** the village.* (BBC, 2011/12/15)

More detailed CDA analysis was presented in the case study and at the beginning of the chapter, but here we can find more information about the dominant ideology behind the texts.

Rejections of the Chinese regime, and negative descriptions of it, are quite common throughout the reports. The construction of an authoritarian regime involves the descriptions of a censored (State-owned) media system as a mouthpiece of the government, a government under which people do not have the right to vote, and a police force which serves to maintain the power of the regime. Descriptions of those three are presented in texts produced by CNN and the BBC. Here are just a few from the sample excerpts.

Such descriptions, with expressions like 'keep a tight grip on' and 'police storm in', have a strong moral and emotional inclination, within which rejections of the regime are hinted at. Meanwhile, expressions like 'a symbol of democracy' and 'had given people great hope' are moral descriptions that promote democracy.

Excerpt: *Wukan became a symbol of democracy after villagers banded together in 2011 to protest against what they said were corrupt officials selling their land to developers and failing to compensate them properly.* (BBC, 2016/7/21)

The election of Wukan's government had given people in villages right around the country great hope for what might be possible under the Chinese system as it stands today. (CNN, 2016/7/20)

This has been a place which - unlike anywhere else in China - had a genuinely elected government but many here are wondering if the so-called "Wukan experiment" is about to die. (BBC, 2016/6/26)

Besides, there is an opposite but marginalised voice which contrasts with the main voice. "Ungenuine" elections, or the Chinese government, or descriptions of an authoritarian image, in this context, is the antagonistic side of the 'unstable equilibrium'. What Seliger did not analyse and explain in more depth is that rejections of other ideologies in news are sometimes not directly shown in texts. For example, in the Wukan case, rejections of the regime are reflected in descriptions.

In conclusion, the moral descriptions and rejections of the Chinese regime can be regarded as representing the solidarity of Western democracy, and this is done through the gathering, production, dissemination and circulation of news. The gathering of the Chinese news largely comes from Western media sources, while the Chinese language and culture are not considered to be decisive elements that can affect the liability and originality of protests in the Far East. The incongruent language on the banners is the direct evidence of such neglects. Secondly, the production, dissemination and circulation of news cannot be seen separately. They impact upon each other as a chain of reaction. The production is carried out in international media organisations, amongst which the Western ones take up a larger share than the others do, as previously mentioned. Although there is no direct evidence that journalists from the West choose to report incidents in certain ways, it is possible that certain frames, the 'Cold War narrative' in this case, is an achieving of consent, instead of the sign of any coercion. Historical texts have, since the Cold War, sown the seed of the 'red menace' of Soviet Union and China, and it has become 'common sense' that the Chinese government is a threat to democracy, or a threat to the interests of all. The dissemination of such frames has been circulated for long enough in the domestic market that both the audience and the journalists take it for granted, and the Chinese government has become quite a rigid image of an authoritarian regime. This image would have been described repeatedly in other events, right back to the production, and will then be disseminated and circulated again.

It is hard to tell whether rejections and moral descriptions of the regime come from the people who have the power, or from the populace. As the Glasgow Media Group's work shows, the dominant voice or ideology serves to maintain a capitalist order under which behaviours like a labour strike would be deemed to be a further weakening of Britain's economic position and as a harming of the national interests (Glasgow Media Group, 1980; Hall, 1984). For the populace, a thriving Communist country has every reason to be a destructive element of democracy itself. This consensus has to be arrived at jointly by the less powerful people, which requires the shaping, the education and the tutoring of consent. If the consensus of the majority can be so shaped that it squares with the will of the powerful, then particular (class) interests

can be represented as being identical with the consensus among the will of the people (Hall, 1984). For example, if the owners of conglomerates, MPs and cleaners all agree that democracy is the interests of all in England, then the promotion of democracy is legitimated by all walks of life, and so are the rejections of other alternative ideological or political systems.

6.6 A counter-power to the existing international news flow—Al Jazeera: see Asia from Asians

However, data analysis of the documentary from Al Jazeera reveals a different picture of the protests. First of all, the majority of the voices come from local people, who represent both grass-roots-level government, and some protesters. Interviewees speak the Wukan dialect, Cantonese and Mandarin, and the documentary has English subtitles. This unique angle grants the audiences a more local and authentic view of what was happening inside Wukan.

In fact, Al Jazeera's main goal is to reverse the international information flow in order to give a greater share of the voices to the global South. The Network has tried to counter the meta-narrative of the international information flow through the gathering, production and dissemination of news. In the Wukan documentary, the Network did not use news sources from Western media outlets. The crew went directly to Wukan and interviewed local officials, villagers and protesters there. The diversity of Al Jazeera's crew also guarantees that journalists can speak and understand local languages. The Network has a very global recruitment of staff. It has intentionally hired a diverse staff—over 50 nationalities are represented—and it operates 69 news bureaux around the world (this total includes both the Arabic and English language bureaux). AJE's mission, which is driven into everyone who works there, is to give a voice to the voiceless and to represent the "South" in global media discourse (Powers, 2009).

Meanwhile, Al Jazeera's way of reporting goes deeper into the roots of problems.

The AJE way of journalism is a bit different from the West, because we tend to go faster to the story and to go deeper into communities to understand the stories, rather than getting the [news] services to give us the information...We try to do our best to set the agenda by searching for stories others cannot reach, or don't think of.

(Helal, 2008, interview with author).

According to Parsons (2008), this diversity and the decentralised nature of AJE's reporting team and its method are the essential components with which to counter the flow.

'The philosophy is very much about decentralising the news gathering process. We kind of reinvented the news gathering process. It's to allow people to see events from the eyes of the people of that region, rather than through foreign eyes, which has tended to be the case in the past. And that's a benefit to both, the viewer inside of the region and the viewer outside of the region. People are tired of seeing themselves through foreign eyes. We want Africans to tell us about Africa. We want Arabs to tell us about the Middle East and Asians to tell us about Asia.'

(Parsons, 2008, interview with the author)

Results from the documentary are thus essentially different from those of other international news outlets. Firstly, villagers and protesters seldom care about the political system, whether it is authoritarian or democratic. They were only concerned about whether the land issue could be solved, and whether the issue was in good hands.

Random villager: *If we choose corrupt officials who don't serve the people, then Wukan will rise again. That's for sure.* (Episode 1, 6:24-6:35)

According to villagers, they put more attention onto whether the elected officials have good qualities and the abilities to serve the people, rather than on whether the system is democratic, which echoes the notion mentioned before: that Chinese people rely more on the morality of their leaders. This psychological notion can be traced in the ways in which interviewees perceived the Central Government.

Random villager: *We beg the Central Government to save Wukan.* (Episode 6, 10:46-10:50)

If we did away with the county government and formed a Wukan government, communicating directly with the Central Government, all our problems would be solved. (Episode 4, 9:01-9:13)

Meanwhile, slogans like 'Central Government Give us Justice' also indicate that villagers hoped that the highest-level government would notice what is happening in Wukan and would punish the corrupt officials and solve the land issue. The central government is somehow omnipotent at the dawn of the incident. However, when the final crackdown happened, villagers were not sure which level of the government issued the order, so they spoke discreetly.

Random villager: *If they discover our identities, we'll be put in jail.* (Episode 6, 16:48-16:51)

Furthermore, the documentary also reveals that Chinese governments are loosely-structured and that the relations among the protesters/villagers, newly elected committee officials and the Chinese government cannot be definitively demarcated. Protesters' attitudes towards the committee and the government were constantly shifting between the friendly and the hostile, based on how land issues were being handled. However, the final crackdown silenced all protests, and the journalists could not discover who it was who had ordered it, since their own safety was in jeopardy.

In conclusion, Al Jazeera's different way of gathering news produced a more local and diverse discourse around the protests. The documentary reveals a more complicated and nuanced picture of Chinese politics. This discourse is a powerful counter-discourse to that around news that has been framed, and which largely ignores the cultural and political nuances of China, and how Chinese people and protesters cope with them through the various twists and turns. The media outlet also gives inspiration as to how to report foreign news from a more authentic and diverse angle, including using journalists who are familiar with the local languages and cultures, interviewing people who become involved directly, and giving them more opportunities to have their voices narrate stories. This way of reporting would counter the ideologies that are hidden in the previous articles from the BBC and CNN, which have, to some extent, deviated from the incidents

themselves, but that are more focused on the ideological and geopolitical battles between China and the West.

6.7 Hong Kong case: An unbalanced international news flow—a postcolonial case

As mentioned in 6.1, the domestication and geopolitics of news have been presented in HK news on BBC News Online and CNN news. To sum it up, the BBC emphasised the former colonial legacy in Hong Kong, while CNN stressed that Hong Kong protesters preferred the American democracy. AJE toned down the pro-Britain and -America feelings among the protesters and had more humanitarian concerns about the crackdown on protests.

The study also found that, unlike the discrepancy between protest slogans and the texts in the Wukan case, HK protesters did wave both British and American flags on the street. The researcher thus found it necessary to discuss the HK case against the background of postcolonialism, since Hong Kong was a British colony. However, there are connections between these two cases upon which this study will later elaborate.

Postcolonial theory is highly relevant in Hong Kong's case considering that Hong Kong has been influenced both by Britain and China in different periods of its history. Hong Kong was colonised by Britain from 1841 until the handover to China in 1997. Scholars (see, Anthony Fung, 2007; Chan Chi Kit, 2014; Gordon Mathews, et al., 2007). have looked into the hybridisation of the identity of Hongkongers, both before and after the handover.

Hongkongers' hybrid identity: overlapping between the West and China

According to previous studies, scholars have found (see, Wong, 1996; Lau, 1997) that before the political transition there was a local-national polarisation of the Hong Kong-Chinese identity, and the Hong Kong people, in general, showed a dual self-claimed identity as being both a 'Hong Konger' and 'Chinese', with a larger percentage focusing on the former. Although Hongkongers' identity has been fluid since the political transition, this finding has remained as the main argument about how Hong Kong people perceive themselves, with different proportions of them identifying as either 'Hong Kongers' and/or 'Chinese'.

In the first decade of the postcolonial era, Anthony Fung (2007) conducted research on Hong Kongers' perceptions of their identity, with respect to cultural, national, military and transitional icons (Fung, 2007). According to Fung, from 1997-1999, the proportion of self-claimed 'Chinese' increased, until 1998, while the proportion of self-claimed 'Hong Kongers' decreased in the same period of time. However, in 1998, the proportion claiming 'Chinese' identity decreased, while those claiming to be 'Hong Kongers' increased. In 1999, the hybridisation of identity was more obvious. The identification with 'Hong Kong people, but also Chinese' and 'Chinese, but also Hong Kong people' significantly expanded. The hybridisation of the national and the local, as manifested in the identification by category, reached 53 per cent — much higher than the figures in 1996, 1997 and 1998 (47 per cent, 43 per cent and 46 per cent, respectively) (Fung, 2007).

Another perspective of the research shows that Hong Kong people identify themselves strongly with some Chinese cultural symbols. Between 1996 and 1999, nearly 80 per cent of the respondents said that they had a 'strong sense of pride' or a 'sense of pride' in relation to the Great Wall. At the same time, there was consistency in the sense of affection towards the Great Wall throughout these years, with an average of over 50 per cent.

However, in relation to military icons, such as the Public Security of China and the People's Liberation Army, people's feelings towards them underwent changes. Before the handover, the fear of military images was a legacy of people's impressions of the brutal military act of the 4th June, 1989, incident in the Hong Kong media, as well as the uncivilised and corrupt image of the security guards, as reported in the news and portrayed in the popular media (Fung, 2007), but after the smooth handover and the gradual and peaceful entry of the soldiers, Hong Kong people's perception of the Public Security of China and the People's Liberation Army became more and more positive, with less uneasiness towards the icons.

As for transitional icons, including the Chinese national flag and the emblem of the Special Administrative Region, the sense of pride and affection increased from 1997 to 1998, decreased in 1998, and significantly increased in 1999. These figures show the decolonisation and renationalisation of Hong Kong which, to some extent, assimilated the nation into the Hong Kong identity (Fung, 2007)

Fung concluded that the changes in people's feelings with regard to these icons are largely related to the local media. The apex of crystallisation might be the political transition and media events around July, 1997. These events precipitated the transformation of local culture and widened its boundaries to include some elements of 'Chineseness'. In 1998, people's support for the various national icons significantly reduced, as the media events pulled out. However, the cultural effect regained its momentum in 1999, when the political arrangements were settled (Fung, 2007).

During the second decade of the postcolonial era, the tendency to identify themselves as locals, rather than as nationals, has increased in Hong Kong. Chan Chi Kit (2014) conducted similar research on Hong Kong people's claims about their identity in 2006, 2008 and 2010. Hong Kong continues to wrestle with the reconfiguration between national identity and local distinctiveness, even though its handover from Britain to China was settled long ago (Chan, 2014). Polls indicated that, in December, 2013, 21.8% of Hong Kong locals called themselves "Chinese" (中國人), compared to 23% in 1999, while 34.8% of respondents identified with the appellation of being a "Hongkonger" (香港人), compared to 22% in 1999.⁵ The hybridisation of a mixed identity also changed, if compared to that in 1999. The hybridisation proportion was 53 % in 1999 while, in 2013, 42.6% of people claimed a mixed identity (27.6% opted for "Hongkonger in China" 中國的香港人, and 15% chose "Chinese in Hong Kong" 香港的中國人). This trend contradicts the hypothesis in Fung's previous research, in which he claims that 'There would no longer be any local uniqueness and they will only exist as a marginal and diasporic local identity' (Fung, 2007). Chan's research (2014) shows that Hong Kong people's local identity draws more of a sense of belonging than does the national one. While China remains an ethnic and racial identity that is available to Hong Kongers, survey findings indicate that adherence to the local label of "Hong Kong people", and its distinctiveness, continue to prevail (Fung, 2005).

⁵ Public opinion polls conducted by Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong, <http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/poll/datatables.html> (accessed on 25th January, 2014).

	1. Hong Kongers	2. Chinese	3. Hong Kongers but also Chinese	4. Chinese but also Hong Kongers	5. hybridisation (3+4)
1996	25	26	33	15	47
1997	23	32			43
1998	29	25			46
1999	22	23			53
2013	34.8	21.8	27.6	15	42.6

Table 6.1. HK people’s identity (Fung, 2004; Chan, 2014)

The conclusion to be drawn from the data is that the proportion of people who identify themselves as ‘Hong Kongers’ was decreasing, but then started rising, while the identity ‘Chinese’ has been decreasing, since its peak in 1997. The hybridisation of identities has fluctuated a bit, and settles at its lowest percentage in 2013. The overall trend, in terms of the identity claim, is that more people in Hong Kong define themselves distinctively as ‘Hong Kongers’, instead of taking on some other identification, while identification as Chinese seems to grow weaker and weaker after 1997. In Chan’s research (2014), there is a new argument discussing the boundary between Hong Kong’s localness and the national identity.

Hong Kong’s identity is hybridising for historical reasons, formed by its special position as a manufacturing and financial hub, as a colony, between the 1960s-70s, while China was going through political turbulence, e.g., the Cultural Revolution. Substantial improvement in the standard of living, and a significant change in the urban landscape in Hong Kong, marked an interesting contrast with the economic backwardness that was found in the mainland (Chan Chi Kit, 2014). This perception of mainland China being plagued by political campaigns and ruthless power struggles among the different factions in the political leadership (as was evident in both the devastating Cultural Revolution and, 20 years later, during the Tian’anmen Incident of 1989), remained in the minds of a significant proportion of Hong Kong people (Chan Chi Kit, 2014). All these elements together helped to construct China as an alien, backward, and chaotic “other,” whereas the image of Hong Kong was one of a modernising and increasingly international city.

However, it would be imprudent to conclude that there was an outright dichotomy between the formation of the Hong Kong identity and the perception of “Chineseness.” (Chan Chi Kit, 2014). According to Ma (2007) and Chan (2014), Hongkongers had an ethnic and racial identification with China, even when Hongkongers were under colonial law. While a sense of local communal consciousness could be found among social movements in the pre-handover days, nationalist passion was also displayed, through long-lasting protests against the Japanese “occupation” of the Diaoyu Islands (disputed territory between China and Japan) and urging the colonial government to recognise Chinese as an official language in the 1970s, were typical examples.

Furthermore, something that is contrary to Anthony Fung’s argument in regard to the ‘local vs. national’ is that ‘Pan-Chineseness’ has played a significant role in Hong Kong identity, in which Chinese folklore and an ethno-cultural ethos have been widely attributed by Hong Kong inhabitants, and it is therefore hard to distinguish Hong Kong’s local culture from some of the traditional Chinese culture.

Such overlapping nexuses could be conceptualised from three perspectives: official political discourse, national education, and the cultural perception of mainland people by Hong Kong locals.

1. Official political discourse (an official will to identify more with mainland China, a notion which is built upon an ethnic Chinese nationhood and the opportunities brought by China's modernisation)
2. National education (the increase in the reinforcing of a Chinese identity, but it is hard for the HK government to lose any of the Hongkongers' widely respected cultural elements, including the core values of the rule of law, civic rights and duties, from the informal and formal curricula). The promotion of national education is carried out with some restraint.

Growing national pride may be attributed to the rise of China as a world power, a flourishing flow of population and capital between Hong Kong and the mainland, and an expanding cultural horizon that is being espoused by Hong Kong people, due to transborder living experiences and business opportunities. On the other hand, an antagonistic sentiment, that treats mainlanders as a cultural "other", remains in the public discourse.

(Chan, 2014)

However, there are other, different results which show that Chinese culture and values were not the major influences in Hong Kong's distinctiveness either before or after the handover. In fact, there is a possibility that Hong Kong's distinctiveness has been largely shaped by the West, namely, the UK and the USA.

Firstly, the analysis will be more convincing if HK people's identity types are systematically categorised.

Brewer (1999) assumes that Hong Kong people have three different forms of dual identity, comprising their regional identification with Hong Kong and their ethnic identification with China. Distinctiveness in identities depend on a personal need for assimilation with, and distinction from, a certain social group.




Figure 6.2. Types of HK people's identities

Figure 6.2. a) represents a situation in which the two identities are experienced as separate aspects of the self. The individual may be aware of having these separate identities, but does not engage with them both simultaneously, These are identities that thus switch with the context. One form of dual identity, b) is a compound group identity, defined by joint membership in both group A and group B; Another form of dual identity is represented by the nested identities that are depicted in Figure c), where one identity, A, is superordinate. and the other, B, is a differentiated sub-part or sub-group identity (Brewer, 1999).

Brewer speculates that the 'Hong Konger' label falls into Fig. b), that of a compound identity which is defined by both a regional and an ethnic identity. For those who identify themselves with the label "Hong Kong-Chinese", however, the corresponding social identity is a nested dual identity of the type represented in Fig. c). Before the handover, "Hongkongness was the superordinate social category, while a Chinese ethnic identity was the subordinate identity within that category, which serves the need for distinctiveness from the Westernized Hong Kong culture (Ibid.).

Brewer's arguments showcase the culturally-diverse side of Hong Kong, where the importance of superordinate and subordinate identities depends on the differentiation and assimilation needs of individuals in a society. In fact, other studies (Bond, 1987; Bond & King 1985) indicate that traditional Chinese culture was not an assimilation motive before the handover. The inclusive Chinese identity "encompassing both mainland and Hong Kong ethnic Chinese" was not a meaningful in-group for a majority of Hong Kong citizens (Brewer, 1999). As Bond (1987) suggests, the Chinese identity is cultural rather than political, and represents a selective sampling of Chinese cultural traditions that provides a spiritual grounding that is distinct from that represented by Western culture (Bond & King, 1985).

From the studies of Bond (1993) and Lam et al. (1996), it is apparent that the "Hong Konger" identity represents a distinct cluster of traits and values that is similar to those associated with Americans and Britons, whereas the "Hong Kong-Chinese" identity is more differentiated from that of the American/Briton and is somewhat closer to the Singaporean and Japanese ethnic clusters, but is still very distant from the Mainlander Chinese cluster. In either case, Chinese ethnic identity appears to serve as a basis for differentiation from the Western identity, but not as an assimilation with traditional Chinese culture as a whole (Brewer, 1999).

However, Brewer speculated that the nested dual identity model would reverse after 1997. He argues that this is because something more than a simple shift between independent identities is involved, in that the transition requires, for many Hong Kong residents, a reversal in the role played by regional and cultural identity in serving their needs for assimilation and differentiation. A successful reversal requires that a superordinate Chinese identity will provide a basis for secure status and acceptance (Hong & Chui, 1996), while Hong Kong identity serves their needs for distinctiveness (Brewer, 1999).

These were the speculations back in 1999. When we go back to the data, the numbers of those who claim to be 'Hong Kongers', as in the compound model that is found in Figure b), have experienced a fluctuation in percentages which reached its peak in 2013, at 34.8%, while those who claim to believe that they have a hybridisation of identities (nested dual identity model, seen in Fig c)) account for the largest percentage among the other categories, but this then gradually reduces to 42.6% in 2013 (see Graph 1.1). As more Hong Kong people identify themselves distinctively as 'Hong Kongers', while fewer identify as being both Hong Kongers and Chinese, the gap between the compound (Figure b) and nested model (Figure c) is gradually narrowing. If the trends continue, there will be more people in Hong Kong who identify themselves distinctly as 'Hong Kongers', rather than identifying as 'both Hong Kongers and Chinese'.

There is no data that can support Brewer's arguments about the cultural reversal in the nested dual identity model—in which China replaces Hong Kong as a superordinate identity, while Hong Kong becomes the subgroup, but the numbers in Graph 1.1 have shown a trend towards the pursuit of a distinctiveness in Hong Kong after the second decade of the postcolonial era. However, the cultural influences from the West would not easily go along with the colonisation. They have also made up a relatively large proportion of Hong Kong distinctiveness, both before and after the handover, and this will be discussed in a later chapter.

In conclusion, Hong Kong's identity depends on the social resistance and acceptance of certain cultures. Before the handover, Hong Kong people's awareness of China remained at praising Chinese landmarks, such as the Great Wall, but according to other studies (see, Bond, 1993; Lam et al., 1996), when it came to Asian culture, the Hong Kong people leaned more to the

Singaporean and Japanese ethnicity, and they had some distance from the Chinese mainlanders. The resistance to Chinese mainland culture stemmed from the economic and educational gap between Hong Kong and China before the handover, as previously mentioned. Besides, the mass media framing in some of Hong Kong's anti-Beijing media outlets did not help to establish a more positive image of China. Hong Kong's newly-found identity was thus largely a mediated construction, foregrounding the cultural differences between 'Hong Kongers' and the mainland Chinese. In the mass media, 'mainlanders were stigmatised as being 'uncivilised' and 'uneducated' outsiders and intruders, and this was a ready-made cultural contrast against which modern, cosmopolitan Hong Kongers could define themselves' (Fung, 2014).

Meanwhile, Western and Chinese culture and values have reversed their roles in the nested dual identity model (Figure c)), both before and after the handover. Before 1997, Western culture and values played a significant role in Hong Kong, and Chinese culture, rather than being a basis for the assimilation of its traditional culture, which served as a differentiation from Western identity (Brewer, 1999), thus, as Brewer suggests, before the handover, in the nested model, Hong Kong is superordinate, while China is a subgroup. However, since the handover, the role of Western and Chinese identity influences has switched, and the change fits into Brewer's theory on identity—social groups' identities depend on the motives for resistance and acceptance into certain cultures. Western identity is no longer Hong Kong people's identity resistance. Western culture and values remain in Hong Kong's distinctiveness, in that it differentiates itself from mainland China from the political, legal, and educational perspectives. Core values that have stemmed from the West, such as freedom of speech, the rule of law, civic rights, etc., function as a cultural and political resistance to mainland China.

Results in Chan's research in 2013 prove the accuracy of Brewer's postulation that social identity is derived from the opposing forces of two universal human motives—the need for inclusion and assimilation, on the one hand, and the need for differentiation from others, on the other (Brewer 1999). Before the handover, in 1996, the proportion of the hybridised identity was the largest (47%), while that of the 'Hong Konger' identity was the lowest (25%), and, according to Brewer's theory, this is due to the resistance to a dominant Western influence, as Hong Kong people wanted to make a differentiation from the West by claiming a dual identity. 1998 witnessed a polarisation of identity. Both 'Hongkongers' and those claiming a hybridised identity rose in numbers, compared to 1997, while, in 1999, the dual identity of being both Hongkongers and Chinese reached its peak at 53 %, while the number of 'Hongkongers' dropped to the lowest percentage, 22%. However, in 2013, data showed a significant rise in the number of those claiming a 'Hongkonger' identity (34.8%), while the dual identity proportion reduced to 42.6%, compared to 53% in 1999. China has been replaced by the West for resistance and differentiation motives, in recent years. The need for differentiation from mainland China has resulted in an increase in the percentage of people who identify themselves as 'Hong Kongers' who, according to scholars' observations (Bond, 1993; Lam et al., 1996, Chan, 2014), share more traits and values with the West, or with the UK and the US, more specifically. However, a polarisation has been shown in more recent years. According to Chan (2014), while their resistance to icons standing for the Communist regime (national flag, national emblem, PLA, Chinese police, Great Hall of the People) increased from 2006 to 2008, people's pride for the same cluster of cultural icons also increased from 2006 to 2010. Likewise, the increment in people's affinity to icons representing the ethnic roots and economic power of China was associated with simultaneously increasing resistance (Chan, 2014).

Hong Kong people's identity is therefore more polarised on the spectrum than ever. The desire for assimilation and acceptance in mainland China, firstly, according to Brewer (1999), is a secure and cultural basis for status. Secondly, according to Fung (2007) and Chan (2014), this is an economical decision, because some Hong Kong people want to take the economic opportunities that China can offer. On the other side of the spectrum, some Hong Kong people remain more distant from the mainland. Unlike the predictions of Brewer (1999) and Fung (2007), most Hong Kong people are not assimilated into mainland China's mainstream cultural and political values. On the contrary, Western core values appear to have been more prominent in the clashes between Hong Kong and China recently, in that Hong Kong people went onto the streets protesting against the proposal for the extradition bill and the enactment of the national security law and waving American and British flags. In education, parents protested about the changes in any of the core values of Hong Kong, which are mostly Western based, and thus China has always failed to make a fundamental change in Hong Kong's educational materials.

Chan's research (2014) suggests that the increase in the number of interactions between Hong Kong and mainland China has resulted in a different transborder experience that might lead to polarised opinions and identification with mainland China. A varied media environment may also be another reason for such polarisation (which may not be the case recently, since China has started cracking down on media dissenters, such as *Apple Daily*). With Chinese, local and international media covering stories with different ideologies, different audiences may form opposite opinions and feelings about the same event. The decolonisation and renationalisation of Hong Kong have put the region into a very special position, in which an integration into mainland China seems politically and legally inevitable, while there is a desire to maintain the local distinctiveness in Hong Kong, which mostly includes Western values.

However, it is true that Hongkongers have an ethnic and racial identification with China, even though Hongkongers were under colonial law (Ma, 2007; Chan, 2014). A sharp increase (in February 1997) in the percentage of respondents choosing a preference for Hong Kong joining China, rather than becoming independent or remaining under British control (Brewer, 1999) has been seen. In more recent years, patriotism and sympathy have been shown during the Diao'yu Island conflict and the Si'chuan earthquake, which are one of China's diplomatic struggles and a natural disaster, and most Hong Kong people were proud of Beijing holding the 2008 Olympics (Fung, 2007). From these perspectives, Hong Kong people are no different to the mainlanders, who are concerned about China's ups and downs.

With all the discussion about Hong Kong people's identities and attitudes toward China, the international news seems to be arbitrary in presenting one niche point in relation to Hongkongers as a representation of the whole. This study will review some of the texts again.

6.8 International reports: Have they reported the whole picture of Hong Kong people's struggles?

According to the case study, news from the BBC and CNN draws a picture of deeply conflicted relations between Hong Kong and China politically, while the cultural and ethnic bonds between the two are toned down. Instead, Hong Kong seems to have more

political and cultural connections with the West, which are not compatible with the previous studies on Hongkongers' identity. It is possible that news from CNN and the BBC has only echoed with one niche group of Hong Kong people, who are on one side of the spectrum, while others are silenced in the texts. Such hegemonic discourse in Hong Kong's reports also reveals the unanimous stance of the media. The reports give different perspectives from America, Britain and other Western countries, who condemn the Chinese government, while offering different forms of help to Hong Kong. According to the news, Hong Kong people showed a great welcome for that help. The picture depicted is still one-sided, and does not reveal the more fundamental reasons why Hong Kong people cannot feel a sense of belonging to China, and thus they protest differently from those in Wukan. Protesters in Hong Kong do not consider whether their slogans or remarks belong to any of the 'in-groups' in China. They care more about connecting themselves with the West, in terms of the core values of a society, such as freedom of speech and civic rights.

Furthermore, according to the previous studies, Hong Kong's core values, which have been previously mentioned, are regarded as Hong Kong's distinctiveness (Fung, 2007; Chan, 2014), rather than as representing a cultural, political or sentimental attachment to Britain, or to other Western countries. Although those values were largely influenced or shaped by the UK in the colonial era, Hong Kong tries to maintain a distinctiveness that only identifies with Hong Kong.

The discussion of Hong Kong people's distinctive identity is an ongoing topic in academia. Unlike other colonies in Africa and India, where indigenous culture had prevailed and been dominant before their colonisations, Hong Kong faces another challenge in maintaining the local culture that mostly came from the West, so as to resist the dominant political power from mainland China. The special situation poses conflicts between Hong Kong and China due to the fundamental differences in Western and Chinese cultural values. Some traditional Chinese values conflict with Western ones, at their core. For example, as mentioned before, Asian culture appreciates a strong and competent leader to lead the nation, compared to Western culture, which requires public opinion as a political must. Although traditional Chinese culture was influencing Hong Kong both before and after the handover, during the British colonisation, the values of freedom of speech, civic rights and the rule of law had also taken root in the Hong Kong people's way of thinking through education, and legal and social reconstruction. The privilege of 'East meeting West' has therefore become a conundrum since the handover. The decolonisation would pose the danger that Hong Kong might give up its mature political and legal system to a government that they don't quite approve of, while the cultural similarity and ethnic similarity to China makes total independence a last, or even an impossible, choice. However, the Western media only focus on the former struggle and the pains that Hong Kong has had to endure, but they fail to understand the cultural bond and the struggle between Hong Kong and China, and the identity conundrum that Hong Kong has gone through in the postcolonial era. Some news reports go so far as to pull Hong Kong closer to the West in political and cultural terms, as the results showed, while the China-HK relationship is described more like a coloniser-colonised situation. Meanwhile, reports from the Western media do not showcase a polarised trend in Hong Kong people's opinions of the mainland. According to the content, the unanimous attitude of opposing the Chinese government fits in with the category of people who have similar traits and values to those of the West, while those voices which are on the other side of the spectrum have been absent from the texts.

6.9 Hong Kong's identification and social stratification in the post-colonial era

Other studies (*The Burney Report*, 1935; Lin 1997a; Lin, 1997b; Poon, 2000a, 2000b) demonstrate that Hong Kong people's socio-economic positions and potentials are largely dependent on their mastery of English. The resistance and acceptance of Western and Chinese values cannot therefore be analysed without considering the cultural and social elements in Hong Kong society, where English has been dominant in both education and the labour market.

According to Poon (2000a, 2000b), the educational and social stratifications stem from the Hong Kong government's implementation of a dual-stream, pure-medium policy in September 1994 – the Medium of Instruction Grouping Assessment (MIGA) Policy (Education Department, 1994).

'The MIGA policy is a precursor of the later linguistic streaming policy enforced in all public-funded secondary schools starting from September 1998. Under the MIGA policy, Secondary 1 entrants (aged around 12) are classified into three groups according to their test scores in English and Chinese. Those within the top 40% in both languages are classified as Group I students and labelled as able to learn effectively in either English or Chinese (approximately 33% of all Secondary 1 entrants). Those who are either not within the top 40% in both languages, or are within the top 40% in one language but not within the top 50% in the other language, are classified as Group II students and labelled as able to learn more effectively in Chinese (approximately 60%). The borderline approximately 7% of all Secondary 1 entrants are classified as Group III students and are labelled as able to learn better in Chinese, but probably also able to learn effectively in English. Secondary schools are advised to adopt one clear medium of instruction based on the MIGA status of their student intakes.'

(Lin, 2005)

According to Poon, most of the school participants shared the common social values found among the public in Hong Kong: i.e., (a) seeing English-medium (EMI) schools and students as superior to their Chinese-medium (CMI) counterparts, and (b) wanting to have access, eventually, to some form of English-medium (EMI) education (e.g., the students would like to have the option of a gradual shift from Chinese medium to English medium, while the school personnel favoured the option of streaming by subjects).

The social and cultural preference for learning and using English is largely related to the English-based elite labour force in Hong Kong. The status of the English language in Hong Kong has remained as important, if not more so, as in the pre-1997 years. A 1998 survey (*Sing Tao Jih Pao*, 1998) found that the majority of business corporations in Hong Kong preferred employees with a good command of English to employees with a good command of Chinese. The ruling elite is the English-educated, Hong Kong Chinese elite, in both the business and the political arenas. The English-dominant education system seems to have produced an elite bilingual social group whose cultural identities are constructed through their successful investments in an English-medium education, a mastery of the English language, and their familiarity with, and membership of, English-based modern professional institutions (e.g., the various English-based professional associations of accountants, lawyers, doctors and engineers, and English-mediated professional accreditation mechanisms) (Lin, 2005).

However, students from the working-class who do not have the socio- and cultural-economic conditions to master English tend to be marginalised in the society. For a majority of working-class Cantonese-speaking children in Hong Kong, English remains something beyond their reach. Unlike their middle-class counterparts, they typically live in a lifeworld where few will (and can) speak or use English for any authentic communicative or sociocultural purposes (Lin, 2005). Although they want to mobilise themselves up the social ladder, the lack of English proficiency tends to send them back to where they come from.

With the continuing dominance of English, the cultural and social core values are therefore hard to change, due to this capitalist production chain from education to the labour force, which eventually entrenches the social stratification. An even lower degree of acceptance of the Chinese language (Mandarin) and traditional Chinese culture cannot provide Hong Kong people with an alternative or, in other words, a truly local social and cultural system. In fact, the teaching of the Chinese conservative culture in schools in the colonial era, according to Pennycook (2002), was the Orientalist colonial discourse that had actually shaped language education policies towards vernacular education in Hong Kong. Pennycook (2002) pointed out that the colonial government was promoting vernacular education because of its conservative ideals (e.g., Confucian ethics of filial piety, respect for the aged and for authority, and emphasis on social hierarchy) in order to enhance its political and cultural governance of its colonial subjects:

...Often far more important, therefore, than the civilizing zeal of English teaching was the conservative use of vernacular education, developed and implemented by colonial administrators and Orientalist scholars. These were the crucial tools of governmentality through language-in- education policies. Conservative Chinese education was the colonial route to the making of docile bodies. (Pennycook, 2002: 108)

The critical analysis of contemporary, naturalising and ‘technicalising’, capitalist discourses (see, Lin, 1997b) shows us how English has been discursively constructed as being the indispensable, natural, neutral and technical vehicle and medium mainly, if not merely, for accessing advanced science and technology, world civilisation and both personal and global socio-economic success (Lin, 2005), while it is even harder to explore what the true distinctiveness that Hong Kong possesses is. Perhaps it is Cantonese, the language, and the cultural products that have been extended from it, that constitute parts of Hong Kong’s distinctiveness, despite the failure of students to bring their ‘street-corner’ Cantonese identities into the classroom and the future labour force market (McLaren, 1998; Lin, 2005).

6.10 Orientalism: the colonial remnants from the West

However, we cannot blame the language for the profound influences of the colonies on the colonised. Language, after all, is only the embodiment of a historical colonial phenomenon. According to what has been reviewed, the Hong Kong situation has been highly relevant to the colonial remnants that have prevailed, even after the end of the British colony. As Fung’s research (2007) shows, Hong Kong people have a tendency to view mainlanders as coming from a backward civilisation and as ill-educated crowds, reasons that form part of the reasons why they are not able to have a sense of belonging long after the handover. The economic

disadvantages of mainland China cannot be a simple explanation of such views, considering that China has gone through major financial and economic growth in recent years. Another hidden ideological reason is rooted in the history of Hong Kong's colony, which has spread a certain discourse that cannot easily be erased. This discourse, or system of thoughts, was there before and after the British and French colonisation of Asia, which is Orientalism, based on the original concept of how the West has portrayed the Near and Far East. It is important to review Orientalism, because the colonisation of Hong Kong was largely influenced by Orientalists, who were responsible not only for Hong Kong, but also for the imperialism of the Middle East, India, Africa, and China in the 19th century.

Orientalism is the ideological cornerstone of the imperialism of the British empire. According to one of the British colonisers, Curzon's speech at a Mansion House conference, '(Oriental) studies were a great Imperial obligation.' Orientalism stands for a systematic generalisation of the Orient, which lay the foundation for imperialism in the 19th and 20th century.

However, Orientalism has been a fictional reality since the heyday of the Ottoman Empire (Said, 1978). Edward Said reviewed the history of Orientalism and pointed out that Orientalism not only existed in the political agenda and in its discourse, but had been widely spread in travel books and Western literature as early as the 14th century. This research has no ambition to review the whole history and progress of Orientalism, but a quite interesting example in the 14th century will give a hint of what we are going to discuss.

'Earlier in the *Inferno*, a small group of Muslims turns up. Avicenna, Averroes, and Saladin are among those virtuous heathens who, along with Hector, Aeneas, Abraham, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, are confined to the first circle of Inferno, there to suffer a minimal (and even honourable) punishment for not having had the benefit of Christian revelation. Dante, of course, admires their great virtues and accomplishments, but, because they were not Christians, he must condemn them, however lightly, to Hell. Eternity is a great leveller of distinctions, it is true, but the special anachronisms and anomalies of putting pre-Christian luminaries in the same category of 'heathen' damnation with post-Christian Muslims does not trouble Dante.'

(Said, 1978, p.69)

This excerpt shows that Westerners, from a rather early time, tried to measure the Near East culture and religions based on Western ones. According to Said, one of the aspects of Orientalism is to represent Islam as a false image of Christianity. According to Orientalists, Mohammed was a false image of Jesus, since his descriptions in *The Koran* were very close to those of Jesus, but this was still a heresy. The Christian concept of Islam was integral and self-sufficient. Islam became an image— whose function was not so much to represent Islam in itself, as to represent it for the medieval Christian (Ibid., p.58).

Apart from the generalisation of Islam, Orientalism had done a great job in stereotyping and generalising the Orient. The key to understanding Orientalism is that it is a systematic Western projection on the East (Ibid., p.95). Here are the key points of Orientalism, taken from Edward Said and other scholars, which may be relevant to the colonisation of Hong Kong.

(1) Oriental mentality

The Orient was deemed to be a geographical and ethnic group of people who lacked logic. Unlike the systematic achievements of Western science—Darwin's theory and any theory that was accurate and logical, the Orient did not have the capability to have substantial success or

to make contributions to modern science and society. According to British and French colonisers (Napoleon, de Lesseps, Cromer, etc.), the Oriental had had a long and rich history, but its religions and languages can no longer take a lead in the modern world, which was very Eurocentric at its core. Since the Orient was unable to develop Darwinism and other social and scientific theories and methods, ‘the Oriental is irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, “different”’; thus the European is rational, virtuous, mature, “normal”’ (ibid., p.40). According to Said, Orientalism constructed a ‘fictional reality’ which was not based on the local culture and knowledge, but on a one-sided hermeneutical relation with the far East.

(2) 'Us' and 'Them'

About the problem of categorising other cultures as ‘them’, Said asked a very important question, although he gave the answer in his theory: ‘Can one divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided, into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the consequences humanly?’ (Ibid., p.45). The answer is no. An absolute distinction between different civilisations has resulted in political, and even racial, disputes. In this case, the generalisation of the Oriental caused the division of ‘us’—the Occidental, and ‘them’—the Oriental. The division, first of all, is cultural. It is the geographical distance and language barriers that keep the Occidental outside of native Oriental culture. However, the Occidental always had a quite condescending view of the Oriental.

‘This country (Egypt), which has transmitted its knowledge to so many nations, is today plunged into barbarism.’ (Fourier, 1846)

The degradation of Egypt is only one part of the barbarism of the whole Orient. ‘The perfidious Chinese, half-naked Indians, and passive Muslims are described as vultures for "our" largesse and are damned when "we lose them" to communism, or to their unregenerate Oriental instincts’ (Ibid., p.108).

The European explorer had thus been deemed to be the only hero to ‘save’ the backward and obsolete Oriental civilisation.

(3) Eurocentrism—the powerless East

According to Said, it is quite ironically true that the knowledge of learning the Oriental is basically Eurocentric. In the Orientalists’ mindset, the Orientals need saving from their out-of-date civilisation, but the standard of evaluating whether it needs revitalising was from the West. The relation between the Occident and the Orient was essentially hermeneutical (Ibid., p.222), and the texts had been developing into a pattern of discourse that the Orient had no power to change. As Said pointed out, ‘such an Orient was silent, available to Europe for the realization of projects that involved, but were never directly responsible to the native inhabitants, and unable to resist the projects, images or mere descriptions devised for it’ (Ibid., p.94). Orientalism had become a systematic discourse and knowledge of it had been circulating long enough in Western societies, including universities, literature, governments, institutions, or had even become a part of Western culture. Such discourse was so powerful that no Oriental could ever counter it. Said quoted the Fool in *King Lear* to illustrate this sense of powerlessness that the Oriental was unable to feel, but would feel in the later imperial times.

‘They’ll have me whipp’d for speaking true, thou’ it have me whipp’d for lying; and sometimes I am whipp’d for holding my peace’.

(4) Intertextuality became knowledge

As mentioned in the literature review, the circulation of a discourse may make it 'common sense' and it will be disseminated via different mediation. Orientalism, as one of the studied fields, has spread the discourse of the Near and Far East. Texts that have stemmed from a historical context can be defined as intertextuality (Fairclough, 1992a, 1992b). The reason for such circulations and intertextuality, according to Said, is in a case

'... when a human being confronts at close quarters something relatively unknown and threatening and previously distant. In such a case one has recourse not only to what in one's previous experience the novelty resembles but also to what one has read about it...precisely because of this human tendency to fall back on a text when the uncertainty of travel in strange parts seem to threaten one's equanimity' (Ibid., pp.93-94).

The repetition of the old discourse about a novel culture would make it more familiar to the Occidental, especially when such discourse was judged by the Western culture, politics, and religion.

It is not hard to establish a certain common sense though intertextuality.

'...the Orient, like the fierce lion, was something to be encountered and dealt with to a certain extent *because* the texts made that Orient possible. If one reads a book claiming that lions are fierce and then encounters a fierce lion (I simplify, of course), the chances are that one will be encouraged to read more books by that same author, and believe them.' (Ibid., p.94)

The Oriental was silent because of the geographical distant and military disadvantages. The lion cannot talk back, and thus the descriptions of the Oriental developed into a scholarly discourse that had been taught in universities and other institutions for several centuries.

The effect of such an establishment of knowledge through intertextuality is rather complex, according to both Said and Stuart Hall. The repetition and reinforcement of the discourse by which the experience of readers is, in reality, determined by what they have read, and this, in turn, influences writers to take up subjects that are defined in advance by readers' experience (Ibid., p.94). Although such a view has been criticised as being 'ahistorical and inconsistent', by Dennis Porter and others, **the accumulation of the stereotyping knowledge of Orientalism from scholarly studies to imperial obligations.**

(5) Orientalism proceeds to imperialism (political)

When the other cultures and societies, or even races, are dehumanised by systematic descriptions or objects, the consequences are normally not human. The backward Oriental who cannot have any understanding of modern science, and who has never understood the meaning of self-government the way 'we' do (Ibid., p.107), had an urgent requirement for 'our' help. That was why Curzon made a speech in 1909:

'...a great Imperial obligation. In my view the creation of a school [of Oriental studies—later to become the London University School of Oriental and African Studies] like this in London is part of the necessary furniture of Empire. Those of

us who, in one way or another, have spent a number of years in the East, who regard that as the happiest portion of our lives, and who think that the work that we did there, be it great or small, was the highest responsibility that can be placed upon the shoulders of Englishmen, feel that there is a gap in our national equipment which ought emphatically to be filled, and that those in the City of London who, by financial support or by any other form of active and practical assistance, take their part in filling that gap, will be rendering a patriotic duty to the Empire and promoting the cause and goodwill among mankind. (cited in Phillips, 1967)

The nature of 'the hegemonism of possessing minorities and anthropocentrism allied with Eurocentrism' (Said, 1978: p.100) in Orientalism legitimised imperialism on the East. Orientalists had been appointed to positions in government to make policies about the imperial activities and strategies. It was deemed as being the British empire's duty to save the Oriental from their backwardness and anything that did not go along with the modern society, culturally and politically, and, according to Anwar Abdel Malek, the Orient and Orientals (are considered by Orientalism) as an:

'... object' of study, stamped with an otherness... On the level of the *thematic*, [the Orientalists] adopt an essential concept of the countries, nations and peoples of the Orient under study, a conception which expresses itself through a characterised ethnic typology...and will soon proceed with it towards racism.' (ibid. P.97)

(6) Orientalism in Hong Kong: the root of identity issues

All of the above are strongly related to Hong Kong people's perceptions of the West (their coloniser), and to mainland China. What Said did not discuss is how the Orient would respond to the transformative changes of their native culture by the colonial one, which is beyond his topic, but his theory lays the foundation for postcolonialism, which examines the lasting effects of colonialism upon the ex-colonies (Lee, 2010). As mentioned previously, Hong Kong was colonised by Britain in 1840, and this colonisation continued until the handover to China in 1997. The decolonisation of Hong Kong did not start with the handover of the sovereignty right. Instead, cultural and political clashes between Hong Kong and mainland China have never ceased to pop up whenever China wanted to make any amendment to laws, educational policies, or any other examples of the *status quo* that had been constructed by Britain, particularly by the last British governor, Chris Patten. 'Patten can be considered to be a charismatic figure. On his arrival in Hong Kong, he created tremendous impact on the local population and enjoyed high popularity ratings.' (Flowerdew, 2012, p45). According to Flowerdew (2012), Patten created a new form of interaction with Hong Kong people, including monthly question time sessions, public meetings, a monthly radio broadcast and the opening up of Government House for public entertainment, to address the British legacy to the locals (ibid., p48). A major finding in Flowerdew's research (ibid.) is that Patten used manipulative presupposition in his public speech to create a determined interrelation among a market economy, rule of law, freedom of individual, and democratic participation, while neglecting the fact that other East Asian countries could have strong economic growth without some of the other attributes of the developed Western democracies (ibid., p.59). Certain orientalist discourse could be traced in Patten's speech, in which he claimed that the (Western) democracy is the universal truth, or 'bedrock principles' that could not be replaced or argued (ibid., pp.61-63).

Considering the popularity of Chris Patten when he was the governor, despite the return of the territories to the indigenous population after decolonisation, as postcolonial scholars (Fanon, 2004; Bhabha, 1994; Spivak, 1998) have argued, genuine independence, if possible, was far from being achieved. The influences of colonialism and the related issues of how colonialism is internalised by the colonised, never fade away (Lee & Chan, 2010).

Every colonized people—in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality—finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country. The colonized is elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his adoption of the mother country's cultural standards. He becomes whiter as he renounces his blackness, his jungle. (Frantz Fanon, 1986: p.9)

The 'fictional reality' that had been fabricated by the Orientalists, both before and after the 19th century, has finally become the reality, due to imperialism. Western military dominance over the East convinces not only the colonisers, but also the colonised, to think that the white race is actually more powerful and superior. 'In the colonial situation of Hong Kong, "To be or not to be" is not an answer, because it is tantamount to "to be or to be nothing"' (Lee & Chan, 2010). During the colonial period, Hong Kong was subject to draconian laws restricting the freedom of the individual. One of the most glaring iniquities, in fact, was the racial discrimination which was built into the system (Flowerdew, 2012, p.62). Firstly, the assimilation of the colonised elites into the colonisers' culture started in the early 1900s (Lee & Chan, 2010). In 1901, the colonised Hong Kong elites petitioned the colonisers for 'a suitable English School for the education of the children- both boys and girls- of the upper classes of the Chinese residents' (Carroll, 2007, p.520). They argued that the majority of the Chinese elites had 'failed to assimilate to any extent English sympathies and ideas, and are ever backward in responding to the call of public duties' (ibid., p521). They further argued that the new school would 'not only endow our young men and women with more open minds and greater public spirit', but would also 'result in the more cordial co-operation of the British and Chinese nations and closer intercourse between them' (ibid., .521-2).

As Said defined, and Fanon observed, the discourse on Orientalism had also seeped into the bones of the colonised. The previously one-sided discourse completed itself as a matter-of-fact when the other side, the Oriental, but also the colonised, finally took it with a welcoming gesture. The original culture was regarded as something 'backward', which failed in responding to the public duties ordered by the British. The colonisers' culture was seen as being 'more open-minded', which was decent for the Chinese upper classes. 'In addition to learning English and mimicking British lifestyles, the colonised elites actively participated in activities (like contributing to imperial war funds, organising ceremonies for visiting British royalty and attending imperial trade exhibitions), and helped to construct the Hong Kong economic success story, so as to legitimise colonial rule' (Carroll, 2004, p.124). In a way, the Hong Kong Chinese elites became Orientalised: accepting the racial stereotype, admitting their own inferiority and admiring British's superiority (Lee & Chan, 2010).

The issue of identity is raised once the colonised think that they might be equally valued with their colonisers in terms of economic wealth and educational levels. This raised a serious identity problem for the Hong Kong Chinese. Due to the political and economic divide between capitalist Hong Kong and communist China, reverting to the traditional Chinese identity was quite unthinkable (Lee & Chan, 2010). Orientalism has been passed on from the colonisers to

the colonised. Oriental discourse could be found in the ways in which Hong Kong people think about mainlanders:

‘China is an alien, backward, and chaotic “other,” whereas the image of Hong Kong was one of a modernising and increasingly international city’ (Fung, 2014, p.3).

Orientalist discourse had also been found in the Hong Kong mass media before the handover. The previous results in Fung’s (2014) research show that words like ‘uncivilised’ and ‘uneducated’ were always linked with mainlanders, against which modern, cosmopolitan Hong Kongers were seen as being more superior and more advanced.

Evidence demonstrates that the colonised, in this case, Hong Kongers, have internalised the colonisers’ representations and values. According to Lee & Chan (2010), there is a hierarchy in Hong Kong society, and at the top of the hierarchy is the white. The white represents civilised, advanced, elegant, intelligent and rational, while people of colour (and mainland Chinese) signified savage, backward, vulgar, stupid, and irrational. What is beyond the scope of Said’s definition of Orientalism is that the objects have come to believe in what has been described about them, since they were bullied and slaughtered by those people who defined and generalised then, and while they cannot change their skin colour, they accepted and mimicked the colonisers’ lifestyles and values. Once they made sure that they were more advanced before the colonisation, they started a hierarchy on which they are the second best, and other groups, apart from the white, are inferior (Lee, 2010; Fung, 2014). Similarly, in Law’s (2016) study, a chapter attempts to illustrate how the notion of Hong Kong Chinese Orientalism emerged from the racial hierarchy of white-yellow-black by reviewing the racial and ethnic discourses in China and Hong Kong. It claims that the Hong Kong Chinese inherited the colonial legacy and gradually constructed their own form of Orientalism, namely, Hong Kong Chinese Orientalism, in which they assume the inferiority of the Hong Kong ethnic minorities in order to define their own superiority (Law, 2016).

6.11 China in international news

News about China, in recent years, shows facets that are distinct from news during the colonial era, but still with the old rhetoric of Orientalism. Hong Kong is now in the hands of a totalitarian regime that does not value or understand Western self-governance, that ‘sweeps new power over the semi-autonomous city’ (CNN, 2020/7/1), and that ‘has power to shape life in Hong Kong it has never had before’ (BBC, 2020/7/30). A similar discourse has appeared in non-Western media, e.g., Al Jazeera, with quotations from the descriptions of the Chinese regime as ‘China's "determination to **stamp out**" Hong Kong's pro-democracy movement’ (Al Jazeera, 2020/7/1), while China is depicted by a quite barbaric, if not backward, image, who does not accept or understand the core value of democracy. It is quite ironic that democracy, self-determination, civil society, state, equality, the individual, free thought, and democratic justice...betrayed their own logic in the moment of colonialism (Shome and Hedge, 2002), and a double standard, or a paradox, has been shown in reports that the nature of governing the colonised should be condemned if the West were not the governor. Any other alternative would be deemed a threat to Western civilisation and democracy. The discourse of Orientalism has not changed fundamentally through time. Shome and Hedge (2002), in their essay, point out that Orientalism is ahistorical and acontextual, which is partially right, considering that Said

judged a whole system of discourse based on excerpts from literature from different times, but it is exactly the evidence of how persistently a discourse has survived through space and time in scholars, poets, novelists, and, most importantly, normal people's minds, and has been reproduced and circulated regardless of time. Globalisation is not the solution to Orientalism, or to other colonial discourses. It provides multiple media platforms internationally, with the West at the centre, to spread the discourse that more or less resembled the old rhetoric that had been passed down from its origin. The scope of reporting has been expanded, because of the unprecedented resolution of geographical boundaries between the West and the East. However, globalisation gives more power to the West, and the mainstream voices are with the West, and they keep producing discourse that has been imprinted with colonial marks, and such discourse, as shown in this study, has been reinforced by an ever-developing communication technology.

There is also a certain overlapping discourse that is marked with a new kind of orientalism—'Sinological orientalism', as Vukovich (2015) named it. '(the requirement of converging Chinese politics and Western democracy) reflects the rise of capitalist globalisation and "modernisation thinking" in China itself, as well as within the China field or discipline. It is still worth calling it orientalist, since it still reflects the positional superiority of the expert or observer and remains a hierarchy, just as it still draws on colonial and imperial era 'facts' about China's past.' (Vukovich, 2015, p.32). The point is well-shown in the reports on Chinese protests. As this study has shown, the descriptions of the Chinese government focus on how illogical, arbitrary, and brutal the regime is, and Chinese people, especially those who protest, are living under such suppressive and passive conditions. They need the West, or Western democracy, to save them. The uprising in Wukan, or in any other part of the nation, 'sparks hopes on democracy' (CNN, 2011/12/21) and 'becomes a model for the rest of the country' (BBC, 2016/6/26). These voices speak for the West, but not for the Chinese. The method of stereotyping and generalising the 'other' has never changed. The lion has barely talked back. This study has thus found it to be highly relevant to talk about decolonised Orientalism.

6.12 Decolonised Orientalism: the importance of decolonisation and the pluriverse

There are good reasons why the research findings can also be analysed in terms of decolonising Orientalism. Although Said (1978) claimed he had no intention or ambition to point out solutions to Orientalism, he suggested one of them at the beginning of *Orientalism*.

'...the way of enlivening the relationship was everywhere to stress the fact that the Oriental lived in a different but thoroughly organised world of his own, a world with its own national, cultural, and epistemological boundaries and principles of internal coherence.' (p.40).

To understand that other cultures have their own systems of working firstly requires us to decolonise. Decoloniality has meant different things to different people in different geopolitical contexts. For us, it is a theory and method of analysis that emerges from the underside, to counter and de-link ourselves from the Western imperial modernity which valorises the provincial foundations of Western concepts and the accumulation of knowledge as being universal (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2018; Escobar, 2008; Torres, 2016). Orientalism is one of the

legacies that has been left by the imperial era, and building a new understanding of Far Eastern culture and politics is also one of the important calls for decoloniality.

Decoloniality contains ideas for balancing the unbalanced voices, particularly in global media. as the literature review mentioned, the global South (developing countries) has far fewer voices than the North, in terms of news production, dissemination and circulation. Apart from developing countries in Asia and South Asia, those in Africa, and other parts of the Second and Third Worlds have not totally rid themselves of colonial discourse. These other worlds are treated less as sources of refined knowledge than as reservoirs of raw facts: of the minutiae from which Euro-modernity may fashion testable theories and transcendent truths. Just as it has long capitalised on non-Western “raw materials”, by ostensibly adding value and refining them. In some measure, this continues to be the case (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012, p.114). The essence of creating oriental discourse, just like any other colonial discourse, has not changed, that is, the global South has value ‘only because of their grounding cultural and historical conditions of the West’ (Rao and Wasserman, 2007: 31).

Decoloniality encompasses a definite break from Western modernity and a search for alternative modernities (Mignolo, 2011). Notions like the pluriverse, universalism, post-modernism, etc., are raised by scholars from both the North and the South to counter the Anglo-European centred global values and ideologies. Scholars (Shome and Hedge, 2002) have found a vision and a conviction that postcolonial and communication studies had something to offer to each other. To put it in a straight-forward way, Postcolonial studies, broadly described, is an interdisciplinary field of inquiry that is committed to theorising the problematics of colonisation and decolonisation. The related problems of colonisation were discussed in this study, and the study will now focus on the decolonisation of international media.

Some scholars (Blaney and Tickner, 2017; Hutchings, 2019; Dunford, 2017) suggest that taking the idea of the “pluriverse” seriously could be the best way to decolonise international theory, in general, and global ethics, in particular. The research finds the concept to be highly relevant to constructing an inclusive and plural media environment.

In discussing the history of Western philosophy, William James used the idea of the pluriverse, or, more commonly, the “multiverse,” to express what it meant to start one’s thinking about the world (universe) from a pluralist perspective (Hutchings, 2017). James argued that:

‘Pragmatically interpreted, pluralism or the doctrine that it is many, means only that the sundry parts of reality may be externally related. Everything you can think of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic view a genuinely “external” environment of some sort or amount. Things are “with” one another in many ways, but nothing includes everything or dominates over everything.’ (James & Skrupskelis, 1977, p.102)

Unlike Orientalism and Imperialism, the principle of the pluriverse is that it has no ambition to categorise any culture or to judge them. The pluriverse is inspired, in particular, by indigenous movements in Latin America and elsewhere that have resisted the encroachments of modernity in the form of industrialisation, urbanisation, and ecological devastation (Hutchings, 2017). These movements understand themselves as being located in worlds that are radically different to modern ways of being, and that provide an alternative place and time from which to mobilise resistance to modernity (Conway & Singh, 2011).

Hutchings lists four major aspects of the pluriverse: coexistence, collaboration, dissolution, and negotiation.

(1) Coexistence and collaboration

As the definition of the concept indicates, the pluriverse acknowledges that there are multiple worlds that coexist. Values may have different moral and cultural meanings in different contexts. To quote Hutchings (2017: p.124), ‘A pluriversal ethics is not about finding new ways of sorting out the meaning of justice but rather about finding new ways of relating to ourselves and to each other in our pursuit of whatever we may think of as justice.’

The notion of justice is very flexible in pluriversal ethics. It requires contexts to decide what values and ideologies suit in the particular time and space. As a stark contrast to Orientalism, which was born out of one-sided fictional reality, Robin Dunford (2017) argues that the pluriverse is not something that can be done theoretically; rather, it requires practical engagement and dialogue between different worlds. In his account, a genuinely pluriversal ethics must take seriously the claims of non-Western, non-modern actors to be producers of ethical knowledge and values (Hutchings, 2017).

Although there are visions of coexistence and collaboration among different worlds, Dunford (2017) also acknowledges the difficulty. Reducing pluriversal ethics to procedure runs the risk that the worlds that win particular arguments may then close down pluriversal possibilities in the future. Or, even worse, that the parochial world of Western colonial modernity may win out, if considered as one option amongst others, and therefore return ethical debate to the hegemonic frameworks of cosmopolitanism (Hutchings, 2017). This argument shows its point in the Hong Kong case. When other alternative values are available, the majority of Hong Kongers still resort to Western modernity, and they identify it as Hong Kong parochialism, to the extent that they no longer separate certain Western core values from the local culture but, instead, regard them as being the distinctiveness of Hong Kong, if compared to values in mainland China. Other cases, in Africa, also show that upper-class people in some of the former colonies still reserve or pursue a French lifestyle, while indigenous cultures only belong to lower-class people.

The difficulty in realising coexistence and collaboration among different worlds is thus rooted in centuries of the categorising and stereotyping of the colonised while, in some cases, the colonised accept the inferiority of their original culture and decide to lean on Western modernity for a better civilisation. Such problems cannot be solved overnight, considering that there have been centuries of colonial activity, textual circulation, and educational training. However, it is important to recognise that there are other worlds that share different cultures and values and which are distinct from the West and its legacies. Decoloniality forces, in alternative readings, new readings that could open other possibilities.

(2) Dissolution and negotiation

As mentioned previously, context is the key to guiding, if not deciding, what people should value and their behaviour in different worlds, so it requires the dissolution of boundaries to certain values in order that they can negotiate with each other. This always comes at the cost of sacrificing ideas that one group, or all of the participating groups, temporarily hold dear. Hutchings (2017) quotes an example of Martha Chaves (2020) and her colleagues’ experience as environmental activists on a mountain in Colombia. They were refused access to complete

a march to the mountain, which was under threat from developers, because women were restricted from entering this sacred site. Instead, they entered into an alternative engagement with indigenous women that did not challenge established indigenous practice (Chaves et al., 2020). Hutching argues that the temporary dissolution of gender equality only happened when Martha and her colleagues made a detour from the site, but this does not mean that they gave up on the value of gender equality. Meanwhile, they did not try to verbally or physically persuade those local developers that women should cross the site, just as men do, regardless of the indigenous traditions. They did not change their views about the meaning of, or priority for gender justice, but, instead, accepted the limitations of their own rectitude, in the light of their commitment to work with others towards a particular goal. In this respect, dissonance can become a catalyst for work on the self that then enables constructive work with others (Hutching, 2017).

Martha Chaves (2016) and her colleagues argue that:

...rather than romanticizing a “pluriverse” where everybody gets along, engaging with such ‘ontological politics’ forces us to not only acknowledge the existence of different realities but also the power plays within and between them.’ (p5)

If such ethics could be applied to news reporting of the Wukan protests, it would give a more complete picture of what has been going on inside China. In Wukan’s case, different powers had conflicts because of the land issue but, fundamentally speaking, a complicated picture of Chinese politics, which contains power fights at different levels of government, while protesters have layers of conscious and unconscious thoughts that are waiting to be decoded in the contexts of Chinese culture, rather than in a Western one which categorises and simplifies the incident. In the Hong Kong case, if journalists hold a pluriversal view of the history of HK, they would have distinguished the ideology of people in HK and mainland China against different historical and contemporary backgrounds, and thus the content of the protests should be significantly different rather than fitting them into the same frame.

6.13 Conclusion

To conclude, what has been discussed in regard to the Wukan and Hong Kong cases, the fundamental problem of the coercion of a certain ideology in news, and a universal discourse, or hegemony, about how the world should be modernised, is the rejection of an acknowledgement that there are multiple worlds and realities that exist outside of a monistic point of view that reality is united as one, and is run by the same sets of rules. The hierarchy exists in modern politics and cultures. Western standards have been at the top since imperial times, and the West has never failed to inform people from other worlds about the legitimacy and advances they offer. Evidence has been shown in regard to how they report on countries who have different sets of standards. In the Wukan case, rejections, descriptions and moral prescriptions against the Chinese government, indicate a strong political hostility to those who do not share Western political values, while a rhetoric claiming that the West is ideologically, and even territorially, responsible for Hong Kong also appears in the news texts. In a postcolonial time, the call for a ‘new’ discourse is urgent, so that people can accept that they are living in only one set of values, while multiple others live in their own. We cannot judge or categorise others, since the standard of judging can never be fixed when contexts are different. We cannot use the same standard in different contexts, or worlds, to persuade others

to take it on, while ignoring those values and standards that have been passed down, which attract the same amount of importance, but are different from those that we have. Pluriverse ethics can be applied to international media, and even international political relations, which may open our eyes to more worlds and realities, without arbitrary judgements.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This chapter will offer a conclusion to the main findings and the implications that are drawn from both the case studies and the discussion. It will also explicitly summarise the answers to the research questions. Those findings and implications will lead to a brief discussion of the main contributions of the study. Meanwhile, the limitations of the study will also be discussed. Lastly, recommendations for future research will be included at the end of the chapter.

7.2 Main Findings and Implications

Apart from the hegemony found in reports on the Wukan protests from international (Western) media outlets, in this case, CNN and the BBC, the study has further analysed how such hegemony might be achieved by the practice of ideological descriptions—rejections, analysis, and moral prescriptions, that serve to counter the Chinese regime, while offering legitimacy to Western democracy, by comparison. Such hegemony would not benefit the Western audience from two major perspectives. Firstly, they will not garner a more precise and authentic version of Chinese politics and of the Second/Third World political systems and values at large, and thus their visions of the rest of the world may be very much limited by the domestication and stereotyping of international news; Secondly, consistently delegitimising rogue states and the legitimisation of their own political systems does not help people in the West to understand Chinese politics. The frame of ‘us’ and ‘them’ limits the whole discussion to ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘democracy’, which is too arbitrary, as analysed in previous chapters—since the loose structure of the Chinese government, and a symbiotic relationship between the Chinese people and the government, cannot be simplified as being merely an ‘authoritarian regime’.

As Chapters 4 and 5 have shown, the BBC and CNN tend to use negative vocabularies to describe the Chinese government and positive ones to report on protesters/dissenters. The dichotomy of ‘us’ and ‘them’ is constructed by levels of words, sentences and discourse. However, in the Wukan case, according to the inconsistency shown by the protesters’ banner language (Long Live the Party), and the documentary from Al Jazeera, the reports from the BBC and CNN did not reflect the authentic reality of the Wukan protests. A more nuanced, and even more dangerous and contradictory political environment, is only the tip of the iceberg that has been revealed by Al Jazeera’s documentary, due to its sensitivity and confidentiality. As for the description: ‘Wukan serves as a symbol/hope of democracy in China’, poll results from the East Asia Barometer (EAB) in 2002, and Wang’s research in 2007, have all explicitly shown that, as time goes by, a higher percentage of Chinese people think that too many political interest groups would disrupt the harmony of the community (increasing from 45% in 1993, to 76% in 2007).

As for the Hong Kong reports, apart from domestication of the news, the BBC Online News and CNN news had different emphases on the same issue, which indicated that international news sometimes serves the home countries’ geopolitical interests. However, the background of the colonial mentality of the Hong Kong protesters is largely ignored in these reports. Geopolitical interests are manifested in the different emphases in their patterns of reporting, e.g., CNN related the HK protesters to American politics (Democrats and Donald Trump), while the BBC wrote more about the historical bond with HK.

As for AJE, it had a more neutral tone and more concerns about humanitarian issues, rather than the geopolitical battles among the countries involved.

Caught between the continuous sense of inferiority to its former coloniser, and the superiority to its present territorial claimer, Hong Kong people's cultural and political mentalities are tangled. Al Jazeera has pointed out the incongruity between Hong Kong identity and Chinese nationality (*That is because the post-colonial generations see Hong Kong as their homeland, where they are a people bound by the values of freedoms, fair play and the rule of law, rather than Chinese ethnicity.* (Al Jazeera, 2020/7/5), but it did not dig deeper into the issues, as mentioned. Compared to the complications and nuances shown in the Wukan case, which are mostly about the relationships between the Chinese government and its people, the HK case involves more international political ideologies and forces, and this means that the simplification of the problems as representing 'authoritarianism vs. democracy' is insufficient to explain the protests.

This study will consider its contributions to academia.

7.3 Contributions

The first contribution is that the study links cultural studies, in this case international news content about China, with the political economy of the international media in the West. Similar studies (Jansen, 2013) have tried to undertake an interdisciplinary review of cultural studies and the (critical) political economy of international media organisations, such as AP and Reuters, but Jansen (2013) does not go into detail about how Reuters' operational model influences the content of news in South Africa, let alone discussing whether Reuters's construction of news content has continuously had impacts on how the local companies report their news at the discourse and ideology levels. However, this study has reviewed the concentration of the major international media organisations on a macro-level and has then looked closely at how hegemonies are produced in the texts on a micro-level, which combines both a review of the political economy of the international media and of cultural studies—the meanings and ideology in the texts.

The second contribution of the study is its methodology. The study has built a systematic framework (presupposition from lexical to discourse level) by choosing relevant theories and methods from Halliday (1985), Fairclough (1991; 1995) and van Dijk (1991; 2013). Although the findings are not unprecedented, which are that the discourse in reports about China has not changed much since the Cold War, the study has gone into detail about how the texts construct images of 'us' - the West, and 'them' - the Chinese government, at the word, sentence and discourse levels.

The third contribution is that the study has analysed the Hong Kong protest reports in three international media outlets, which has not been seen in previous studies (see 2.7). The results, unlike other studies that have focused on different ideologies in the Chinese and the Western media, which indicated that different discourses exist among international media outlets themselves.

The fourth contribution is that the study linked postcolonialism with the discourse of Chinese protest reports. By analysing discourse of HK news, questions about HK people's colonial mentality has again been raised. When the post-colonial era is covered in the name of globalisation, many sensible but tangled issues remain unresolved, as colonial legacies. As for the Wukan case, the discourse of Orientalism still existed in texts on the BBC and in CNN. The Chinese government was depicted as brutal and backward, and the Chinese legal system

was opaque and flawed. The denial of the overall Chinese political and legal system indicates that the leading Western media has not treated the Chinese system as equal, but as something barbaric and backward, which conforms to the Orientalist discourse that has historically been circulated.

The fifth contribution is that the research links CDA and ideology more closely by connecting CDA with the operations of ideology, i.e., how discourse operates ideology in order to reject one idea while promoting another. This attempt may benefit both theoretical frameworks in the future.

Some of the limitations to, and recommendations for, future research, are listed below.

7.4 Limitations and recommendations

One of the limitations of the study arises from the theories upon which it dwells. According to Golding and Murdock (2000: pp.70–71), ‘political economy and cultural studies share important similarities, despite there being differences between them. Both approaches broadly operate using a neo-Marxist and critical framework, both are centrally concerned with the constitution and concept of power, and both are critical of, and take their distance from, the liberal pluralist tradition, with its compliance with modern (19th C. and beyond) capitalism’. This means that this study chooses one of the branches of media studies, just as James Curran writes in the foreword to *Critical Political Economy of the Media, An Introduction*, by Jonathan Hardy (2014, p.1), ‘The point that is being emphasised here is that media political economy has two wings. The book that you are about to read concentrates, for understandable reasons, on one of these’. The other ‘wing’, or direction, is the liberal view of the media market, which is equally important in media studies. Likewise, the limitation of this research is that it only represents one stance of the discussion to review international media discourse, and to point out the downsides of the concentration and hegemony of media markets.

Another limitation of the study happens to be one of its contributions, the methodology. Critical Discourse Analysis is not a popular method amongst scholars, for a good reason. It is criticised as being too interpretative, and too dependent on the interpreters (the researchers). For example, interpreters must be able to de-code the texts, while the precision of it has no quantifiable standard with which to evaluate it, i.e., to what extent have they de-coded the texts? Besides, CDA is more complicated, and thus messier, than some counterpart qualitative methodologies, for example, content analysis. It is challenging for researchers, on the one hand, to choose the relevant parts of CDA with which to analyse specific texts and, on the other, for the readers to understand the different elements of CDA.

As for the recommendations, the study would be more complete, and perhaps more interesting, had interviews or surveys been handed out to readers in order to conduct media behavioural effects research on what readers in the West think about the Chinese protests. Due to the time limit and COVID, the study did not consider such interviews. The researcher believes that such a study would provide empirical evidence for the interdisciplinary framework, which fall between cultural studies and the political economy of the media, and how ideologies influence readers in real life.

7.5 Implications for further studies

Apart from the potential interviews and surveys on the audience/readers' side, interviews with news workers, including reporters, journalists and editors, could provide further insights into how they report on Chinese protests. The hierarchy of the newsroom may, or may not, largely influence the content, in this particular case. Such interviews may contribute to the demonstration of further links between the sociology of news and the globalisation of news.

As for the ideology in news, the researcher looks forward to seeing further studies that extend the concept of ideology to a global range, with the conflict between the 'peripheral' and 'dominant' power/groups at their core. According to Downey (2008), the work of John Thompson (particularly, 1990), although not without its problems, offers a way forward in its detailed identification of the multiple modes of the operation of ideology. Although this study has tried to reflect CDA's results using Thompson's conceptualisation of ideology (see, Chapter 5), further studies should develop a framework of theoretical exploration and empirical engagement (Corner, 2016).

Another implication for further studies is the Hong Kong identity issue. As mentioned in Chapter 5, orientalism and colonialism have had huge impacts on how HK people perceive their relationships with the West and mainland China. Such relations have shifted from being pro-Kuomintang/CPC to being pro-West, for multiple reasons, and it would be another major contribution if empirical evidence were to be presented, such as conducting interviews/surveys among different generations of Hong Kong residents from different backgrounds, which might ultimately contribute to more theories relating to the colonial mentality, not only in Hong Kong, but also in other former-colonies in the global South.

Bibliography

ABC, China News. (2016). 'Wukan: What a police crackdown in the so-called 'democracy village' says about Xi Jinping's China'. ABC, 14 September. [online] Available from <<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-09-15/wukan-what-a-police-crackdown-says-about-xi-jinpings-china/7845752>> [Accessed 2 November, 2018].

Al Jazeera, (2017). Wukan: China's democracy Experiment, episode 1-6. *YouTube*. Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mglQckQGwbg&t=83s> [Accessed 9 April, 2020].

Adams, W. C. (Ed.). (1982). *Television coverage of international affairs*. Greenwood.

Akhavan-Majid, R., & J. Ramaprasad, (1998). ;Framing and ideology: A comparative analysis of U.S. and Chinese newspaper coverage of the fourth United Nations conference on women and the NGO forum'. *Mass Communication & Society*, 1, 131–152.

Akhavan-Majid, R., & Ramaprasad, J. (2000). Framing Beijing: Dominant ideological influences on the American press coverage of the fourth UN conference on women and the NGO forum. *Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands)*, 62(1), 45-59.

Alasuutari, Pertti, Ali Qadir, and Karin Creutz. (2013). 'The Domestication of Foreign News: News Stories Related to the 2011 Egyptian Revolution in British, Finnish and Pakistani Newspapers'. *Media, Culture & Society* 35 (6): 692–707. doi:10.1177/0163443713491299.

Allan, S. (1998). *Approaches to Media Discourse*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Al-Najjar, A. I. (2009). How Arab is Al-Jazeera English? Comparative Study of Al-Jazeera Arabic and Al-Jazeera English News Channels. *Global Media Journal*, 8(14), N_A.

Allan, S., & Thorsen, E. (2010). Journalism, public service and BBC News Online.

Allam, H. (2014). Showdown over Ukraine sparks cold war-style propaganda. *Stars and Stripes*, 3.

Alexandra Polyzou (2015) Presupposition in Discourse, *Critical Discourse Studies*, 12:2, 123-138, DOI: 10.1080/17405904.2014.991796

Altheide. D.L. (1984). 'Media Hegemony: A Failure of Perspective'. *Public Opinion Quarterly* Vol. 48:476-490

Althusser, L. (1971) *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. London: New Left Books.

Alvear, F. J., & Lugo-Ocando, J. (2018). When Geopolitics becomes Moral Panic: El Mercurio and the use of international news as propaganda against Salvador Allende's Chile (1970–1973). *Media History*, 24(3-4), 528-546.

Anthonissen, C. (2001) *On the effectiveness of media censorship: linguistic, paralinguistic and other communicative devices of media regulation*. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Vienna.

Bakhtin, M. (1986). *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Bakhtin, M. (1981). *The Dialogical Imagination*. M. Holquist (Ed.) trans. C. Emerson and M. Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Bashri, M., Netzley, S., & Greiner, A. (2012). Facebook revolutions: Transitions in the Arab world, transitions in media coverage? A comparative analysis of CNN and Al Jazeera English's online coverage of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research*, 5(1), 19-29.

Bass, Bernard M. (1990). *Bass and Stogdill's Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research and Managerial Applications*, 3rd ed. New York: Free Press.

Bayoumi, M. (2022). They are 'civilised' and 'look like us': The racist coverage of Ukraine. *The Guardian*, 2.

BBC, China Blog. (2016). 'China's Protest Village Crushed'. BBC, 13 September. [online] Available from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/blogs-china-blog-37351737> [Accessed 2 November 2018]

Bekalu, M. A. (2007). 'Presupposition in News Discourse'. *Discourse & Society*, 17(2), 147–172.

Bell, A. (1991). *The Language of News Media*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Bell, D. (1960). *The End of Ideology: on the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties*. Free Press: New York.

Beltrán, P. (1976) 'Alien premises: objects and methods in Latin American communication research', *Communications Research*, 3 (2): 107-34

Bennett, W.L. (1996). 'An Introduction to journalism norms and representations of politics'. *Political Communication* 13: 373-384.

Bernard, H. R., Pelto, P. J., Werner, O., Boster, J., Romney, A. K., Johnson, A., ... & Kasakoff, A. (1986). The construction of primary data in cultural anthropology. *Current Anthropology*, 27(4), 382-396.

Bennett, W.L., & R.G. Lawrence. (1995). 'News Icons and the mainstreaming of social change'. *Journal of Communication* 45: 20-39.

Bernard, H.R. (2002). *Research Methods in Anthropology: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods*. 3rd ed. AltaMira Press:Walnut Creek, California.

Bernard, H.R., P.J. Pelto, O. Werner, J. Boster, A.K. Romney, A. Johnson, C.R. Ember, A. I. Bertrand, and P. Hughes. (2017). *Media Research Methods: Audiences, Institutions, Texts*. Palgrave MacMillan: New York.

Bhatia, A. (2016). Discursive construction of the 'key'moment in the Umbrella Movement. *Journal of Language and Politics*, 15(5), 551-568.

Biltereyst, Daniel. (2001). "Global News Research and Complex Citizenship. Towards an Agenda for Research on Foreign/International News and Audiences." In *News in a Globalized Society*, Stig Hjarvard (Ed.), pp.41–62. Goteborg: Nordicom, Goteborg University.

Blackledge, A. (2000). 'Monolingual ideologies in multilingual states: Language, hegemony and social justice in Western liberal democracies'. *Sociolinguistic Studies*,1(2), 25–45. <https://doi.org/10.1558/sols.v1i2.25>

Blaikie, Norman (1993). *Approaches to Social Enquiry*. Cambridge, MA: Polity.

Blaney, D. L., & A.B. Tickner. (2017). 'Worlding, ontological politics and the possibility of a decolonial'. *Millennium*, 45(3), 293-311.

Bo, Zhiyue and Gang Chen. (2009). 'Bo Xilai and the Chongqing Model', *East Asia Policy*, 1(3 :42-49.

Bond, M. H. (1988). 'Between the Yin and the Yan: The Identity of the Hong Kong Chinese'. Address to the Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Bond, M. H., & A. Y. King. (1985). 'Coping with the threat of westernization in Hong Kong'. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 9(4), 351-364.

Bond, M. H. (1987). Intergroup relations in Hong Kong: the Tao of stability. *Ethnic conflict: International perspectives*, 55, 78.

Boni, F. (2002). 'Framing media masculinities: Men's lifestyle magazines and the biopolitics of the male body'. *European Journal of Communication*, 17, 465–478.

Boyd-Barrett, O. Terhi Rantanen, (1998), *The Globalisation of News*, Thousand Oaks, CA./ London: Sage.

Bosio, D. (2013). How Al Jazeera reported the Arab Spring: A preliminary comparative analysis. *Media Asia*, 40(4), 333-343.

Breed, W. (1995). 'Social Control in the Newsroom'. In O. Boyd-Barret & C. Newbold (Eds.) *Approaches in Media. A Reader*. (pp. 277-283). London: Arnold.

Brewer, M. B. (1999). 'Multiple identities and identity transition: Implications for Hong Kong'. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 23(2), 187-197.

Buck-Morss, S. (2002). *Dreamworld and catastrophe: the passing of mass utopia in East and West*. MIT press.

Brunner, E. (2017). Wild public networks and affective movements in China: Environmental activism, social media, and protest in Maoming. *Journal of Communication*, 67(5), 665-677.

Brunner, E. (2019). *Environmental activism, social media, and protest in China: Becoming activists over wild public networks*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Bryman, A., (2004). *Social Research Methods*. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

Buci-Glucksmann, C. (1980). *Gramsci and the State*, D. Fernbach (Trans.). London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Buck-Morss, S., & Wernick, A. (2001). Dreamworld & catastrophe: the passing of mass utopia in east & west. *Labour*, (48), 336.

Bullock, R., Little, M., & Millham, S. (2017). The relationships between quantitative and qualitative approaches in social policy research. In *Mixing methods: qualitative and quantitative research* (pp. 81-99). Routledge.

Burney, E. (1935) *Report on Education in Hong Kong*. Hong Kong: Government Printer.

Cable, J. (2016). *Protest Campaigns, Media and Political Opportunities*. London/New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.

Caixin. (2011). *4,000 Villagers Protest Land Grabs, Elections*, <http://english.caixin.com/2011-11-22/100330330.html>, [accessed 28 May 2014].

Calhoun, Craig J. (c1992). *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Callahan, S. (2003). 'New challenges of globalisation for journalism'. *Journal of Mass Media Ethics*, 18(1), 3-15.

Callinicos, A., (2003). *The New Mandarins of American Power: The Bush Administration's Plans for the World*. Cambridge: Polity Press

Camaj, Lindita. (2010). 'Media Framing Through Stages of a Political Discourse: International News Agencies' Coverage of Kosovo's Status Negotiations'. *International Communication Gazette* 72 (7): 635–653. doi:10.1177/1748048510378147.

Cammaerts, B. (2012). Protest logics and the mediation opportunity structure. *European journal of communication*, 27(2), 117-134.

Campbell, H. (2008). China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony. *Third World Quarterly*, 29(1), 89-105.

Carroll, J. M. (2007). *A Concise history of Hong Kong*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Chan, C.-K., and Ngai, P. (2009) 'The making of a new working class? A study of collective actions of migrant workers in South China'. *The China Quarterly* 198: 287–303.

Chaves, M., T. Macintyre, G. Verschoor & A. E. Wals, A. E. (2016). 'Towards transgressive learning through ontological politics: Answering the "call of the mountain" in a Colombian network of sustainability'. *Sustainability*, 9(1), 21.

Chen, F. (2006) 'Privatisation and its discontents in Chinese factories'. *The China Quarterly* 185: 42–60.

Chen, Hao-Yi, and Henry Shang-Ren Kao. (2009). 'Chinese Paternalistic Leadership and Non-Chinese Subordinates' Psychological Health'. *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 20, no. 12: 2533–2546.

Cheng, Bor-Shiuan, Li-Fang Chou, Tsung-Yu Wu, Min-Ping Huang & Jiing-Lih Farh. (2004). 'Paternalistic Leadership and Subordinate Responses: Establishing a Leadership Model in Chinese Organizations'. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 7, no. 1: 89–117.

Cheng, Bor-Shiuan, Li-Fang Chou, Tsung-Yu Wu, Min-Ping Huang, and Jiing-Lih Farh. (2004). 'Paternalistic Leadership and Subordinate Responses: Establishing a Leadership Model in Chinese Organizations'. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 7, no. 1: 89–117.

Cheng, Bor-Shiuan. (1995). 'The Pattern of Difference Sequence and Chinese Organizational Behaviors'. *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies* 3: 142–219. (In Chinese.)

Cheng, Bor-Shiuan. (1995). 'The Pattern of Difference Sequence and Chinese Organizational Behaviors'. *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies* 3: 142–219. (In Chinese.)

Chilton, P. (1988) *Orwellian Language and the Media*, London: Pluto Press.

Chilton, P. (2008). 'Critical Discourse Analysis' in: *Cambridge Encyclopaedia of the Language Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ching, Kwan Lee. (2007). *Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt*. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Chomsky, N. (2009). Syntactic structures. In *Syntactic Structures*. De Gruyter Mouton.

Chomsky, N., & D. Barsamian. (c2001). *Propaganda and the Public Mind: Conversations with Noam Chomsky*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.

Chomsky, N., & Barsamian, D. (2007). *What we say goes: Conversations on US power in a changing world*. Macmillan.

Christians, C., & K. Nordenstreng. (2004). 'Social responsibility worldwide'. *Journal of Mass Media Ethics*, 19(1), 3-28.

David, Clarissa C., Jenna Mae Atun, Erika Fille & Christopher Monterola (2011) 'Finding Frames: Comparing Two Methods of Frame Analysis', *Communication Methods and Measures*, 5:4, 329-351, DOI: 10.1080/19312458.2011.624873

Cohen, R. (2008). *Global Diasporas: An Introduction*. (2nd edn.). London: Routledge.

Cohen, J. (2002). Television viewing preferences of Israelis: Programs, schedules, and the structure of viewing choices. *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media*, 46, 204–221.

Cohen, S.; J. Young. (1981). *The Manufacture of News: Social Problems, Deviance and the Mass Media*. London: Constable.

Çoban, S. (2018). *Media, ideology and hegemony*. Brill.

Coleman, C. -L., & E.V. Dysart. (2005). 'Framing of Kennewick man against the backdrop of a scientific and cultural controversy'. *Science Communication*, 27, 3–26.

Comaroff, J., & Comaroff, J. (2012). Theory from the South: A rejoinder. *ultural Anthropology Online*.

Connell, R. (2007) *Southern Theory*. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.

Connell, I. (1980). 'Television news and the social contract'. In Stuart Hall, Dorothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe and Paul Willis (Eds), *Culture, Media, Language*. London: Hutchinson, pp.139-56.

Conway, J., & J. Singh. (2011). 'Radical Democracy in Global Perspective: Notes from the pluriverse'. *Third World Quarterly*, 32(4), 689-706.

Corbett, E.P.J. (1971) *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Corner, J. (2016). 'Ideology'and media research'. *Media, Culture & Society*, 38(2), 265-273.

Couldry, N. (2008) 'Mediatization or mediation? Alternative understandings of the emergent space of digital storytelling', *New Media & Society*, 10, no. 3, pp. 373–391.

Cox, L. (2018). *Why Social Movements Matter: An Introduction*. Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd.

Calhoun, Craig. (1994). *Neither Gods Nor Emperors. Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China*. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Crook, S.; J. Pakulski.; M. Waters. (1992). *Postmodernization: Change in Advanced Society. Culture and Power: A 'Media, Culture and Society' Reader*. London: Sage

Croft, W., & D.A. Cruse. (2004). *Cognitive Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Curran, J. (2012). *Media and power*. Routledge.

Curran J and Park MJ. (2000). *De-Westernizing Media Studies*. London: Psychology Press

Dahlgren, Peter. (1982) "The third world on TV news: western ways of seeing the other." Pp. 45-66 in et al. (eds.), *Mass Communication and Society*. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Damanhoury, K. E., & Saleh, F. (2017). Is it the same fight? Comparative analysis of CNN and Al Jazeera America's online coverage of the 2014 Gaza War. *Journal of Arab & Muslim Media Research*, 10(1), 85-103.

De Burgh, Hugo. (2017). *China's Media in the Emerging World Order*. Buckingham: University of Buckingham Press.

Dencik, Lina. (2013). 'What Global Citizens and Whose Global Moral Order? Defining the Global at BBC World News'. *Global Media and Communication*, 9 (2): 119–134. doi:10.1177/1742766513479716.

Denham, B. (review author). (1995). A History of Communication Study: A Biographical Approach. In *Journalism & Mass Communication Educator*, July, Vol.50(2), pp.82-83;

Desmarais, Fabrice, and Toni Bruce. (2010). 'The Power of Stereotypes: Anchoring Images Through Language in Live Sports Broadcasts'. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 29 (3): 338–362. doi:10.1177/0261927X10368836.

Downey J (2008) 'Recognition and renewal of ideology critique'. In: Hesmondhalgh, D. and J. Toynbee. (Eds.) *The Media and Social Theory*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 59–74.

Dunford, R. (2017). 'Toward a decolonial global ethics'. *Journal of Global Ethics*, 13(3), 380-397.

Dimitrova, D. (2006). Analysis of the BBC News online coverage of the Iraq War.

Education Department (1994) An outline of the medium of instruction grouping assessment. Hong Kong: Government Printer.

Eisinger, P.K. (1973). The conditions of protest behavior in American cities. *American Political Science Review*, 67(1), 11-28.

Elizabeth Brunner & Hui Li. (2018). Fragmented arguments and forces majeure: the 2007 protests in Xiamen, China, *Argumentation and Advocacy*, 54:4, 287-304, DOI: 10.1080/10511431.2018.1509596

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication*, 43(4), 51–58.

Escobar, A. (2008). *Territories of Difference. Place, Movements, Life, Redes*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Fairclough, N. (1989). *Language and Power*, Longman.

Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and Social Change*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Fairclough, N. (1995) *Media Discourse*. Edward Arnold: London.

Fairclough, N. (2003), *Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*. Routledge: London.

Fairclough, N. (2007). *Discourse and Contemporary Social Change*. (Vol. 54). Peter Lang.

Fairbrother, G. P. (2008). Rethinking hegemony and resistance to political education in Mainland China and Hong Kong. *Comparative Education Review*, 52(3), 381-412.

Feng, W. D. (2017). Ideological dissonances among Chinese-language newspapers in Hong Kong: A corpus-based analysis of reports on the Occupy Central Movement. *Discourse & Communication*, 11(6), 549-566.

Farh, Jiing-Lih, and Bor-Shiuan Cheng. (2000). 'A Cultural Analysis of Paternalistic Leadership in Chinese Organizations.' In *Management and Organizations in the Chinese Context*, Anne S. Tsui and J. T. Li (Eds.), pp. 84–127. London: Macmillan.

Faure, D. (2003). *Colonialism and the Hong Kong Mentality* (No. 150). Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong.

Ferguson, M. (1990). *Public Communication: The New Imperatives: Future Directions for Media Research*. London: Sage.

Flick, Uwe. (1988). *An Introduction to Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks. CA: Sage.

- Flint, C. (2021). *Introduction to Geopolitics*. Abingdon/New York: Routledge.
- Foucault, M. (1984). 'The order of discourse', in M. Shapiro (Ed.) *The Language of Politics*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Foucault, M. (1972). *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. London: Tavistock Publications.
- Fourier, C. (1846). *Théorie des quatre mouvements et des destinées générales*. (Vol. 1). Lib. Sociétaire.
- Fowler, R., et al. (Eds.). (1979): *Language and Control*, Routledge.
- Fowler, R., B. Hodge, G. Kress, and T. Trew. (1979). *Language and Control*. Routledge: London.
- Fowler, Roger. (2013). *Language in the News: Discourse and Ideology in the Press*. London: Routledge.
- Fung, A. (2001). What makes the local? A brief consideration of the rejuvenation of Hong Kong identity. *Cultural Studies*, 15(3-4), 591-601.
- Flowerdew, J. (2012). Critical discourse analysis in historiography. *Critical Discourse Analysis in Historiography*. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230336841>.
- Foot, R. (2006). Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging. *International Affairs*, 82(1), 77-94.
- Foucault, M. (1984). 'the order of discourse', in M. Shapiro (ed) *the Language of Politics*, Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gamson, W. A., & A. Modigliani. (1987). 'The changing culture of affirmative action'. In R. G. Braungart & M. M. Braungart (Eds.).(2000).*Research in Political Sociology*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. (pp. 137–177).
- Gamson, William A. and Kathryn E. Lash. (1983). 'The Political Culture of Social Welfare Policy', in S.E. Spiro and E. Yuchtman-Yaar (Eds.) *Evaluating the Welfare State: Social and Political Perspectives*. New York: Academic Press. pp. 397–415.
- Gamson, W. A. (1990). *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Gamson, W. A. (1989). 'News as framing', *American Behavioral Scientist* 33: 157-161.
- Gans, Herbert J. (1979). *Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek, and Time*. New York, NY: Pantheon.

Garnham, N. (1990) *Capitalism and Communication: Global Culture and the Economics of Information*, London: Sage.

Garnham, N. (1992) 'The media and the public sphere' in C. Calhoun (ed) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp.361-2.

Geis, Michael L. (1987). *The Language of Politics*, New York: Springer.

Giddens, Anthony, and Philip W. Sutton. (2009). *Sociology*. (6th ed.). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, Anthony. (2004). *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity.

Ginneken, Jaap Van., (1998). *Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction*. London: Sage.

Gitlin, T. (1980). *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making and Unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Gitlin, T. (1998) 'Public sphere or public sphericules?' in T. Liebes & J. Curran (Eds.) *Media, Ritual and Identity*. London: Routledge, pp. 175-202.

Gitlin, Todd. (c2003). *The Whole World is Watching: Mass Media in the Making & Unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley, CA : University of California Press.

Glasgow Media Group. (1976). *Bad News*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Glasgow Media Group. (1980). *More Bad News*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Glasgow Media Group. (1982). *Really Bad News*. London: Writers and Readers Co-operative.

Goldsmith, Jill and Adman Dawtrey. (2000). 'Murdoch: Sky's the Limit'; , *Variety*, 28 August-3 September. pp. 1,130.

Goffman, E. (1974). *Frame Analysis: An Essay On the Organisation of Experience*. Northeastern University Press: Boston.

Gramsci, A. (1971). *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, Q. Hoare & G. Nowell Smith (Trans.). London. Lawrence & Wishart.

Groseclose, T. & J. Milyo. (2005) 'A measure of media bias', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120, pp.1191-1237.

Groves, Don. (2000). "Star connects dot-coms", *Variety*, 29 May-4 June 2000, p. 63.

Gubrium, Jaber F., and James A. Holstein. (Eds.) (2002a) *Handbook of Interview Research: Context and Method*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Gumpert, G. (1988) 'Linguistic character and a theory of mediation', in *Communication Yearbook 11*. J. A. Anderson (Ed.), Sage: Newbury Park, CA, pp. 230–236.

Gunter, M. (2015). The Dalian chemical plant protest, environmental activism, and China's developing civil society. *Nimby Is Beautiful: Cases of Local Activism and Environmental Innovation Around the World*, 138-160.

Gurevitch, Michael, Mark R. Levy, and Itzhak Roeh. (1991). "The Global Newsroom: Convergences and Diversities in the Globalisation of Television News." In *Communications and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Sphere in the New Media Age*, Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks (Eds.), pp.195–216. London: Routledge.

Gurevitch, M. (1991). The globalization of electronic journalism. *Mass media and society*, 178-193.

Grano, S. (2016). The role of social media in environmental protest in China. In *Urban mobilizations and new media in contemporary China* (pp. 101-118). Routledge.

Habermas, J. (1989). *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (translated by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1992). Further reflections on the public sphere. *Habermas and the public sphere*, 428.

Hafez, Kai. (2007). *The Myth of Media Globalisation*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hall, S. (1980a) 'Encoding and decoding' (revised extract), in Hall, S. *et al.* (Eds.) *Culture, Media, Language*, London, Hutchinson.

Hall, S. (1982). The Rediscovery of 'Ideology': Return of the Press in Media Studies, in *Culture, Society and the Media*, P61-95. London: Routledge.

Hall, S. (1992, c1980). *Culture, Media , Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-1979*. University of Birmingham. Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. London: Routledge in association with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham.

Hall, S., Connell, I., & Curti. (1976). The 'unity' of current affairs television. Working Papers in Cultural Studies. Birmingham: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (Spring).

- Hall, Stuart. (1979) 'Culture, the media and the 'ideological' effect.' in James Curran, et al. (Eds.), *Mass Communication and Society*. Beverly Hills: Sage. Pp. 315-45
- Hall, Stuart. (1980). 'Cultural studies and the centre: some problematics and problems.' in Stuart Hall, et al., *Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-79*. London: Hutchinson, pp.15-47.
- Haller, B., & Ralph, S. (2001). 'Not worth keeping alive? News framing of physician-assisted suicide in the United States and Great Britain'. *Journalism Studies*, 2, 407–421.
- Halliday M. & C. Matthiessen. (2004). *An Introduction to Functional Grammar*. Arnold, London.
- Halliday, M. A. K. (1973). *Explorations in the Functions of Language*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Halliday, M.A.K. and R. Hasan. (1976) *Cohesion in English*. London: Longman.
- Halliday, M.A.K. and R. Hasan. (1985) *Language, Context and Text*. Geelong: Deakin University Press.
- Halliday, M.A.K. (1978). *Language as Social Semiotic*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Halliday, M.A.K. (1985). *Introduction to Functional Grammar*. London: Edward Arnold
- Hallin, D. (1994) *We Keep America on Top of the World: Television Journalism and the Public Sphere*. London/New York: Routledge.
- Hallin, Daniel C. (1986). *The "Uncensored War": the Media and Vietnam*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hallin, Daniel C., and Paolo Mancini. (2004). *Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hanson, E. C. (1995). Framing the World News: The Times of India in Changing Times. *Political Communication*, 12, 371–393.
- Habermas, Jurgen. (1970) 'Towards a theory of communicative competence. *Inquiry*,13:1-4, 360-375,p 131. DOI: [10.1080/00201747008601597](https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747008601597)
- Hardy, J. (2014). *Critical Political Economy of the Media: An Introduction*. Routledge.
- Haroche, C., P. Henry and M. Pêcheux. (1971) 'La sémantique et la coupure saussurienne: langue, langage, discours'. *Languages*, 24.
- Hart, C. (2014). *Discourse, Grammar and Ideology: Functional and Cognitive Perspectives*. London: Bloomsbury.

Hartig, F. (2018). Political slogans as instruments of international government communication—the case of China. *The Journal of International Communication*, 24(1), 115-137.

Harcup, T., & O'Neill, D. (2001). What is news? Galtung and Ruge revisited. *Journalism studies*, 2(2), 261-280.

Hauf, A. (2015). Affluent Activists and New Tactics: The Changing Face of the Chinese Environmental Movement. *Wittenberg University East Asian Studies Journal*, 40.

Hanson, E. C. (1995). 'Framing the world news: The times of India in changing times'. *Political Communication*, 12, 371–393.

Helal, Ibrahim. (2008) Interview with the author. March 2008. Doha, Qatar.

Held, D. (1995) *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance*. Stanford CA.: Stanford University Press

Hepp, Andreas. (c2013). *Cultures of Mediatization*. Cambridge: Polity.

Herbert, John. (2001). *Practising Global Journalism: Exploring Reporting Issues Worldwide*. Oxford- shire: Taylor & Francis.

Herman, Edward S. & Noam Chomsky. (1994, c1988). *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media*. London: Vintage. Also published (2010) New York: Pantheon Books.

Hodge, R. and G. Kress. (1979). *Language as Ideology*. Routledge.

Held, D., (1995). *A Globalizing World?: Culture, Economics, Politics*. London: Routledge.

Hess, S. (2015). Foreign media coverage and protest outcomes in China: The case of the 2011 Wukan rebellion. *Modern Asian Studies*, 49(1), 177-203.

Hess, S. (2015). Foreign media coverage and protest outcomes in China: The case of the 2011 Wukan rebellion. *Modern Asian Studies*, 49(1), 177-203.

Hofstede, Geert. (1980). 'Culture and Organizations;', in *International Studies of Management & Organizations*. Volume 10, Issue 4, <https://doi.org/10.1080/00208825.1980.11656300>

Hiemstra, N. L. (1993). Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc.: A Material Alteration. *U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev.*, 10, 283.

Hofstede, Geert. (1980). 'Motivation, Leadership, and Organization: Do American Theories Apply Abroad?'; *Organization Dynamics* 9, no. 1: 42–63.

Hook, D. (2007). Discourse, knowledge, materiality, history: Foucault and discourse analysis. In *Foucault, psychology and the analytics of power* (pp. 100-137). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Ho, J. (2019). “‘Sensible Protesters Began Leaving the Protests’: A Comparative Study of Opposing Voices in the Hong Kong Political Movement.” *Language and Communication* 64: 12–24.

Hong Kong Free Press (March 31, 2020). Taiwan won't ask for murder suspect if Hong Kong passes 'politically motivated' extradition law. Available from <https://hongkongfp.com/2019/05/10/taiwan-wont-ask-murder-suspect-hong-kong-passes-politically-motivated-extradition-law/> [Accessed 1 December 2022].

Hu, Hsiu-Hua, Wei-Ling Hsu, and Bor-Shiuan Cheng. (2004). ‘The Reward Allocation Decision of the Chinese Manager: Influences of Employee Categorization and Allocation Situation.’ *Asian Journal of Social Psychology* 7, no. 2: 221–232.

Hunt, Richard A.; Robert W. Chandler; Ron D. McLaurin. (1984). ‘War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam’. *Military Affairs*, 04/1984, Vol.48(2), p.90.

Hutchings, K. (2019). ‘Decolonizing Global Ethics: Thinking with the Pluriverse’. *Ethics & International Affairs*, 33(2), 115-125. doi:10.1017/S0892679419000169

Hua, R., Hou, Y., & Deng, G. (2016). Instrumental civil rights and institutionalized participation in China: A Case Study of Protest in Wukan Village. *VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations*, 27(5), 2131-2149.

Hymes, D. (1972). Models of interaction of language and Social life. *J. Gumperz & D. Hymes (Eds.)*.

Jackson, R., (2005). *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism*.

James, W., & Skrupskelis, I. K. (1977). *A pluralistic universe*. Harvard University Press.

James, W., & I.K. Skrupskelis. (1977). *A Pluralistic Universe*. Harvard University Press.

Javon, Rahul. (2000). ‘Star is shooting towards interactive TV’, *Financial Times*, 10-11 June, p.11.

Jiang, Ding-Yu, and Wan-Chen Chang. (2010). ‘Differential Leadership and Subordinate Effectiveness in Chinese Context’. *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies* 33: 109–177. (In Chinese.)

Jin, L. (2002). *Newspaper coverage of agricultural biotechnology in mainland China: the hegemony theory reexamined* (Doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University).

Jing Chen. (2016). *Useful Complaints: How Petitions Assist Decentralized Authoritarianism in China*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

Jha, S. (2007). Exploring Internet influence on the coverage of social protest: Content analysis comparing coverage in 1967 and 1999. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly*, 84, 40–57.

Johnson, R.B. & A.J. Onquegbuzie., 2004. 'Mixed methods research: a paradigm whose time has come'. *Educational Researcher*, 33 (7), 14–26.

Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. (2005). *News Narratives and News Framing: Constructing Political Reality*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Kahane, H. (1971) *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric*, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Katz, P.A and D. A. Taylor (Eds.) (1988) *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*, New York: Plenum Press.

Kaul, V. (2011). 'Globalisation and Media;. *Journal of Mass Communication and Journalism* 1:105. doi:[10.4172/2165-7912.1000105](https://doi.org/10.4172/2165-7912.1000105).

Kiernan, V. G. (1969). *The Lords of Human Kind: Black Man, Yellow Man, and White Man in an Age of Empire*. Boston: Little, Brown.

Kraidy, M. M. (2008). Al Jazeera and al Jazeera English: A comparative institutional analysis.

Kintsch & van Dijk, (1978). toward a model of text comprehension and production, in *Psychological Review*, 85, p363-394.

Kishan Thussu, D. (2000). Media wars and public diplomacy. *Javnost-The Public*, 7(3), 5-17.

Kristeva, J. (1986a): Word, dialogue and novel. In T. Moi (ed.), *the Kristeva Reader*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p34-p61.

Knox, P. L., Marston, S. A., & Imort, M. (2016). *Human geography: Places and regions in global context* (p. 74). New York: Pearson.

Kress, G. (1985) 'Ideological structures in discourse', in T.A van Dijk (ed.), *Handbook of Discourse Analysis, vol. 4, Discourse analysis in society*, London: Academic Press, 27- 42.

Kress, G. and Hodge, B. (1979) *Language and Ideology*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Kristeva, J. (1986a). Word, dialogue and novel. In T. Moi (ed.), *the Kristeva Reader*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p34-p61.

Kuhn, Raymond. (c1985), *the Politics of Broadcasting*, London : Croom Helm.

Labov, W. (1972). *Language in the Inner City*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Laclau, Ernesto, Mouffe and Chantal. (2014). *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics*. Verso: London and New York.

Laclau, G. and Mouffe, C. (1985). *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*. London: Verso.

Lagerkvist, J. (2012). The Wukan uprising and Chinese state-society relations: Toward shadow civil society. *International Journal of China Studies*, 3(3), 345-361.

Lague, D at al. (2019). How murder, kidnappings and miscalculation set off Hong Kong's revolt – A REUTERS SPECIAL REPORT. Reuters. Available from <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/hongkong-protests-extradition-narrative/> [Accessed 26 October 2022].

Lam, S., Chiu, C., Lau, I., + Hong, Y. (1996) *Social Identity of Hong Kong Adolescents before 1997*. Unpublished manuscript. The university of Hong Kong.

Lang, K., & Lang, G. E. (2004). Response to Herman and Chomsky. *Political Communication*, 21(1), 109-111.

Langerbucher, Wolfgang. R. (1998). 'Efuhrung: Zu Person und Werk.' In Otto Groth (ed Wolfgang Langerbucher). *Vermittelte Mitteilung: Ein Journalistisches Modell der Massenkommunikation*. Munich: Fischer. P151-86

Larrain, J. (1979). *The Concept of Ideology*. London: Hutchinson.

Latham, K. (2000). Nothing but the truth: News media, power and hegemony in South China. *The China Quarterly*, 163, 633-654.

Lievrouw, L. A. (2009). New media, mediation, and communication study. *Information, Communication & Society*, 12(3), 303-325.

Lee, F. L., & Chan, J. M. (2005). Political attitudes, political participation, and Hong Kong identities after 1997. *Issues & Studies*, 41(2), 1-35.

Lee, CC. (2005). The conception of Chinese journalists. In: De Burgh H (ed.) *Making Journalists: Diverse Models, Global Issues*. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 107–124.

Lee, F. L., & Chan, J. M. (2010). *Media, social mobilisation and mass protests in post-colonial Hong Kong: The power of a critical event*. Routledge.

Lee, K.-m., & Law, K.-y. (2016). Hong Kong Chinese "orientalism": Discourse reflections on studying ethnic minorities in Hong Kong. In A. Pratt (Ed.), *Ethnic minorities: Perceptions, cultural barriers and health inequalities* (pp. 81-116). New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Lee, C. C., Chan, J. M., & Pan, Z. (2012). *Global media spectacle: News war over Hong Kong*. State University of New York Press.

Levinson, S. (1983) *Pragmatics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Li, G. (1995). *A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China*. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.

Li, M., Zhang, Q., Xiang, W. N., Fu, Q. L., & Achal, V. (2013). Recent protests against paraxylene in Kunming: Re-alarming situation for Chinese government. *Ecological engineering*, 60, 140-141.

Li, Y., Liu, Y., & Koppenjan, J. (2022). Government strategies in addressing three protests against PX plants in urban China: comparing cases using a most-similar-system design. *Policy Studies*, 43(3), 464-482.

Liu, J. (2018). Digital media, cycle of contention, and sustainability of environmental activism: the case of anti-PX protests in China. In *Climate and Sustainability Communication* (pp. 62-83). Routledge.

Linnéll, J. (2014). Ukraine crisis proves cyber conflict is a reality of modern warfare. *The Telegraph*, 19.

Lin, A.M.Y. (1997a) Bilingual education in Hong Kong. In J. Cummins and D. Corson (eds) *Encyclopedia of Language and Education* (Vol. 5, pp. 281–89). The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Lin, A. M. (2005). Critical, transdisciplinary perspectives on language-in-education policy and practice in postcolonial contexts: The case of Hong Kong. *Decolonization, globalization: Language-in-education policy and practice*, 38-54.

Lin, A.M.Y. (1997b) Analyzing the 'language problem' discourses in Hong Kong: How official, academic, and media discourses construct and perpetuate dominant models of language, learning, and education. *Journal of Pragmatics* 28, 427–40.

Ling, Wen-Quan, Rosina C. Chia, and Liluo Fang. (2000). "Chinese Implicit Leadership Theory." *Journal of Social Psychology* 140, no. 6: 729–739.

Lippmann, W. (2004). *Public Opinion*. New York, NY: Dover Publications. (Originally published by Hartcourt, Brace and Company, New York, in 1922).

Lipsky, M. (1968). Protest as a Political Resource. *American political science review*, Dec Vol.62(4), pp.1144-1158. London : Sage

Lu, X. (1999). "An Ideological/Cultural Analysis of Political Slogans in Communist China." *Discourse & Society* 10 (4): 487–508.

Lu, Y., Zheng, W., & Wang, W. (2017). Migration and popular resistance in rural China: Wukan and beyond. *The China Quarterly*, 229, 1-22.

Ma, E. K., & Fung, A. Y. (1967). Re-sinicization, nationalism and the Hong Kong identity. *Press and politics in Hong Kong: Case studies from*, 497-528.

Ma, E. K., & Fung, A. Y. (2007). Negotiating local and national identifications: Hong Kong identity surveys 1996–2006. *Asian Journal of Communication*, 17(2), 172-185.

Ma, N. (2007). *Political development in Hong Kong: State, political society, and civil society* (Vol. 1). Hong Kong University Press.

MacBride, S.; Abel, E.; (1984). *Many Voices, One World: Communication and Society, Today and Tomorrow: (the MacBride Report)*. International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems. Paris : Unesco ; Abridged ed

Maldonado-Torres, N. (2016). "Outline of Ten Theses on Coloniality and Decoloniality". Franz Fanon Foundation. Accessed 20 July 2017. <http://frantzfanonfoundationfondationfrantzfanon.com/article2360.html>.

Malek, A. A. (1963). Orientalism in crisis. *Diogenes*, 44(1963), 107-8.

Malik,R. (1992) 'the global news agenda', *Intermedia*, 20 (1).Manchester : Manchester University Press.

Mansbach, R. W., Taylor, K. L. (2012). *Introduction to Global Politics*. 2nd ed. London ; New York : Routledge.

Marcin W. S. (2012). North–South, Commemorating the First Brandt Report: searching for the contemporary spatial picture of the global rift, *Third World Quarterly*, 33:3, 559-569, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2012.657493

Martin Seliger, (1976). *Ideology and Politics*. Routledge: London.

Martin-Barbero, J. (1993) *Communication, Culture and Hegemony*. London: Sage.

Marx, Karl, and Fredrick Engels, (1960). *The German Ideology*. New York: International Publishers.

Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1975). *Marx & Engels Collected Works Vol 01: Marx: 1835-1843*.

Mathews, G., Ma, E., & Lui, T. L. (2007). *Hong Kong, China: Learning to belong to a nation*. Routledge.

Matthes, J. (2009). What's in a frame? A content analysis of media framing studies in the world's leading communication journals, 1990-2005. *Journalism & mass communication quarterly*, 86(2), 349-367.

McAdam, D.; Y. Su. (2002). 'The War at Home: Antiwar Protests and Congressional Voting, 1965 to 1973'. *American Sociological Review*, Oct 2002, Vol.67(5), pp.696-721.

McAdam, D.; McCarthy, John D.), Zald, Mayer N. (1996). *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. Cambridge England ; New York : Cambridge University Press

McChesney, R. W., & Schiller, D. (2003). *The political economy of international communications: Foundations for the emerging global debate about media ownership and regulation* (pp. 1-43). Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.

McLenna, G. (1995). *Pluralism*. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis.

McLaren, P. (1998) *Life in Schools: An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education*. New York: Longman.

McLuhan, M., Powers, Bruce R. (1989). *The Global Village: Transformations in World Life and Media in the 21st Century*. New York ; Oxford : Oxford University Press

McFarlane, T., & Hay, I. (2003). The battle for Seattle: Protest and popular geopolitics in The Australian newspaper. *Political Geography*, 22, 211–232.

McNair, B. (1988). *Images of the enemy: Reporting of the new Cold War*. London : Routledge

MDC Tangvo, (2007). Purposive sampling as a tool for informant selection, *Ethnobotany Research and Applications*.

Meyer, D. S. (1995). Framing national security: Elite public discourse on nuclear weapons during the Cold War. *Political Communication*, 12, 173–192.

Meyer, D. S., & Minkoff, D. C. (2004). Conceptualizing political opportunity. *Social forces*, 82(4), 1457-1492.

Mignolo, W. D. (2011). Geopolitics of sensing and knowing: on (de) coloniality, border thinking and epistemic disobedience. *Postcolonial studies*, 14(3), 273-283.

Miki Tanikawa.(2018). Is “Global Journalism” Truly Global?, *Journalism*

Milles,M.B., and Huberman, A.M. (1994). *Qualitative Data Analysis*. 2nd ed. Thousand Oaks. CA: Sage.

Mirrlees, T. (2013). *Global Entertainment Media Between Cultural Imperialism and Cultural Globalisation*. New York : Routledge

Modelski, G.; Thompson, William R. (c1996). *Leading Sectors and World Powers: the Coevolution of Global Politics and Economics*Columbia, S.C : University of South Carolina Press.

Moore, Malcom.(2011). "[Rebel Chinese village of Wukan 'has food for ten days'](#)". *The Daily Telegraph*. UK. [Archived](#) from the original on 14 December 2011.

Morgan, D.L. (2007). Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained: methodological implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research* 1 (1), 48–76.

Morley, D. (1992). *Television, Audiences and Cultural Studies*. London : Routledge

Mouffe, C. (2014). Hegemony and ideology in Gramsci. In *Gramsci and Marxist theory* (pp. 168-204). Routledge.

Mueller, Claus. (1973) *The Political Context of Communication*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Murdock, G., & Golding, P. (2005). Culture, communications and political economy. *Mass media and society*, 4, 60-83.

Nathan, A.J. and T. Shi. (1993). ‘Cultural requisites for democracy in China: some findings from a survey’, *Daedalus* 122(2), pp. 95–123.

Nathan, A.J. and T. Shi. (1996).‘Left and right with Chinese characteristics: issues and alignments in Deng Xiaoping’s China’, *World Politics* 48(4), pp. 522–550.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2018). *Epistemic freedom in Africa: Deprovincialization and decolonization*. Routledge.

Nelson, T.E., R.A. Clawson, and Z.M.Oxley. (1997). Media Framing of a Civil Liberties conflict and its effect on tolerance. *American Political Science Review* 91: 567-583.

Nerone, J., & Barnhurst, K. G. (1995). Visual mapping and cultural authority: design changes in US newspapers, 1920–1940. *Journal of Communication*, 45(2), 9-43.

Neuman, William Lawrence. (2014), *Social Research methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods*. Harlow, Essex : Pearson; Seventh edition, Pearson new international edition.

Next Sunday on cable TV, the BBC launches News 24, its open-all-hours service of rolling reports.

Ngok Ma. (2007). Political Development in Hong Kong: State, Political Society, and Civil Society, Hong Kong, Hong Kong University Press, 2007, pp. 200-204.

O'Brien KJ and Li L. (2006). *Rightful Resistance in Rural China*. West Nyack, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Onwuegbuzie, A.J., Leech, N.L., (2005). On becoming a pragmatic researcher: the importance of combining quantitative and qualitative methodologies. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology* 8 (5), 375–387.

Orlik, T. (2011). Unrest grows as economy booms. *The Wall Street Journal*, 26 September. Available at: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903703604576587070600504108>.

Osa, Maryjane and Kurt Schock. (2007). “A Long Hard Slog: Political Opportunities, Social Networks and the Mobilization of Dissent in Non-Democracies.” In *Conflicts and Change* 27: 123-153.

Pan, Z., & Kosicki, G. (1993). Framing analysis: An approach to news discourse. *Political Communication*.

Parry, R. (2014). ‘Ukraine, through the U.S. looking glass—anti-Russian propaganda in the mainstream media’, Global Research, Montreal, Canada, 18 April, viewed 22 January 2017, <<http://www.globalresearch.ca/ukraine-through-the-us-looking-glass-anti-russian-propaganda-in-the-mainstream-media/5378303>>.

Parsons, Nigel. (2008) Interview with the author. Doha, Qatar.

Pasquali, A. (1963) *Comunicación y cultura de masas*. Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela.

Paterson, C., Global Battlefields, in Boyd-Barrett, Rantanen, (1998), *the Globalisation of News*, Thousand Oaks, Califo.; London: Sage.

Patterson, Thomas. (2000). Doing Well and Doing Good: How Soft News and Critical Journalism Are- shrinking the News Audience and Weakening Democracy – and What News Outlets Can Do About It. Cambridge, MA: Unpublished manuscript.

Page, J. and Spegele, B. (2011), *Beijing Set to 'Strike Hard' at Revolt*, Wall Street Journal: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204026804577100132882903066.html>, [accessed 28 May 2014].

Parsons, Nigel. Interview with Powers in *The geopolitics of the news: The case of the Al Jazeera network* (Doctoral dissertation. Doha, Qatar. March 2008).

Pêcheux, M. (1982). *Language, Semantics and Ideology*. London: Macmillan.

Pennycook, A. (2002). Language policy and docile bodies: Hong Kong and governmentality. In J.W. Tollefson (ed.) *Language Policies in Education: Critical Issues* (pp. 91–110). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Perry, Elizabeth J. (2010). Popular Protest in China: Playing by the Rules. In *China Today, China Tomorrow: Domestic Politics, Economy and Society*, ed. Joseph Fewsmith. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield

Perry, E. J. (2015). *Challenging the mandate of heaven: Social protest and state power in China: Social protest and state power in China*. Routledge.

Peter, D., Collin, S. (1991). *Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Sphere*. London: Routledge.

Peters, J.D. (1986). 'Institutional sources of intellectual property in communication research'. *Communication Research*, vol. 13, No. 4, p527-559.

Poon, A.Y.K. (2000a) *Medium of Instruction in Hong Kong: Policies and Practices*. Lanham: University Press of America.

Poon, A.Y.K. (2000b) Implementing the medium of instruction policy in Hong Kong schools. In D.C.S. Li, A.M.Y. Lin, and W.K. Tsang (eds) *Language and Education in Postcolonial Hong Kong* (pp. 148–78). Hong Kong: Linguistic Society of Hong Kong.

Powers, S. (2009). *The geopolitics of the news: The case of the Al Jazeera network* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California).

Powers and Gilboa. (2016). The Public Diplomacy of Al Jazeera, in *Al Jazeera English: Global news in a changing world*. Seib, P. (2016). Springer.

Public opinion polls conducted by Public Opinion Programme, The University of Hong Kong, <http://hkupop.hku.hk/chinese/popexpress/ethnic/eidentity/poll/datatables.html> (accessed on 25 January 2014).

Qi X.Y. (2012). A case study of globalized knowledge flows: *Guanxi* in social science and management theory. *International Sociology* 27(6): 707–723.

Qi X.Y. (2014). *Globalized Knowledge Flows and Chinese Social Theory*. New York and London: Routledge.

Qi, X. Y. (2017). Social Movements in China: Augmenting Mainstream Theory with *Guanxi*. *Sociology*, Vol. 51(1) 111–126. DOI: 10.1177/0038038516656993.

- Rabinow, P. (ed.), (1984). *The Foucault Reader*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Ramesh, J., Talbott, S., (2005). *Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India*. India Research Press.
- Rantanen, T.; *the Media and Globalisation*. (2005). London : SAGE.
- Rao, S., & Wasserman, H. (2007). Global media ethics revisited: A postcolonial critique. *Global media and Communication*, 3(1), 29-50.
- Reese, Stephen D. (2010). "Journalism and Globalisation." *Sociology Compass* 4 (6): 344–353.
- Reese, S. D. (2016). The new geography of journalism research: Levels and spaces. *Digital journalism*, 4(7), 816-826.
- Renkema, J., & Schubert, C. (2018). *Introduction to discourse studies: New edition*. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Reyes Matta, F. (1977) *La información en el nuevo orden internacional*. Mexico: Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales.
- Richardson, John, E., (c2004). *(Mis)representing the Islam Racism and Rhetoric of British Broadsheet Newspaper*, Amsterdam : John Benjamins.
- Roach, C. (1997). Cultural Imperialism and Resistance in Media Theory and Literary Theory. In *Media, Culture & Society*, 10 (1): p47-66.
- Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2001). *Discourse and discrimination*. London: Routledge.
- Robertson, Alexa. (2010). Mediated Cosmopolitanism: The World of Television News. Cambridge: Polity. Russian review, Vol.60(4), pp.631-634.
- Roberts, Carl W. (1997): *Text Analysis for the Social Sciences: Methods for Drawing Inferences from Texts and Transcripts*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Rogers, Everett M. (c1986). *Communication Technology: the New Media in Society*. New York : Free Press ; London : Collier Macmillan.
- Royal Geographical Society,
<https://www.rgs.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?nodeguid=9c1ce781-9117-4741-af0a-a6a8b75f32b4&lang=en-GB>
- Rothrock, K. (2014). The US is being routed by Russia in the Information War over Ukraine. *The New Republic [Site]*, 16.
- Rydgren, J. (ed.).(2005). *Moments of Exclusion*. New York: Nova.

- S. Ku, A. (2020). New forms of youth activism—Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill movement in the local-national-global nexus. *Space and Polity*, 24(1), 111-117.
- Sarah Van Leuven & Peter Berglez.(2016).Global Journalism between Dream and Reality, *Journalism Studies*, 17:6, 667-683, DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2015.1017596
- Samuel Mochona Gabore. (2020). Western and Chinese media representation of Africa in COVID-19 news coverage, *Asian Journal of Communication*, 30:5, 299-316, DOI: 10.1080/01292986.2020.1801781
- Scheulfele, D. (1999). Framing as a Theory of Media Effects, in *Journal of Communication*, March 1999, Vol.49(1), pp.103-122.
- Schiller, Dan. (1981). *Objectivity and the News: The Public and the Rise of Commercial Journalism*, University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia.
- Schifferes, S., & Coulter, S. (2013). Downloading disaster: BBC news online coverage of the global financial crisis. *Journalism*, 14(2), 228-252.
- Schiller, Dan.. (1996). *Theorizing Communication: A History*, Oxford University Press: New York.
- Schiller, Herbert I. (Herbert Irving), (1976). *Communication and Cultural Domination*. White Plains, N.Y. : Sharpe ; New York : Distributed by Pantheon Books
- Schudson, M. (1992) 'Was there ever a public sphere? If so, when? Reflections on the American case' in C. Calhoun (ed) *Habermas and the Public Sphere*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 143- 63.
- Schudson, M. (c2011). *The Sociology of News*, New York ; London : W.W. Norton & Co.; 2nd ed.
- Schulz, Winfried (2004) ‘Reconstructing Mediatization as an Analytical Concept’, in *European Journal of Communication*, 19 (1), pp. 87–101.
- Seliger, M. (2019). *Ideology and Politics* (1st ed. Published 1976). London: Routledge. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429284779>
- Segvic, I. (2005). The framing of politics: A content analysis of three Croatian newspapers. *Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands)*, 67(5), 469-488.
- Seidel, G. (1987) ‘The white discursive order: the British New Right’s discourse on cultural racism, with particular reference to the *Salisbury Review*’, in I. Zavala, T.A. van Dijk and M. Diaz-Diocaretz (eds) *Approaches to Discourse, Poetics and Psychiatry*, Amsterdam: Benjamins.

Shannon, C. E; Weaver, W. (1972). *The Mathematical Theory of Communication*. Urbana ; London : University of Illinois Press.

Shaw, Ibrahim Seaga. (2012). "Stereotypical Representations of Muslims and Islam Following the 7/ 7 London Terror Attacks: Implications for Intercultural Communication and Terrorism Pre-vention." *International Communication Gazette* 74 (6): 509–524. doi:10.1177/1748048512454816.

Shih, Chih-yu. (1995). *State and Society in China's Political Economy: the Cultural Dynamics of Socialists Reform*. Boulder, CO..London: Lynne Rienner.

Shoemaker, Pamela J., and Stephen D. Reese. (1996). *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*. White Plains: Longman.

Shome, R. & Hedge, R. (2002). Postcolonial approaches to communication: Charting the terrain, engaging the intersections. *Communication Theory*, 12, 249-270

Siebert, Fred S. (Fred Seaton),; Peterson, T.; Schramm, W. (1973). *Four Theories of the Press: the Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist Concepts of What the Press Should Be and Do*. Freeport, N.Y : Books for Libraries Press

Sigal, L. (1976). Reporters and Officials, *the Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer 1976. Vol. 40(2), p267.

Silverstone, Roger. (1999). *Why Study the Media?* London : SAGE.

Silverstone, Roger. (2007). *Media and Morality: On the Rise of the Mediapolis*. Cambridge: Polity.

Simon, A. F. (2001). A unified method for analyzing media framing. *Communication in US elections: New agendas*, 75-89.

Simon, A., & Xenos, M. (2000). Media framing and effective public deliberation. *Political communication*, 17(4), 363-376.

Sing Tao Jih Pao. (1998). English important for job promotion: Blow to mother-tongue education [in Chinese]. May 21.

Sireau, N. (2009). *Make Poverty History: Political Communication in Action*. Basingstoke England ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan

Smith, A. (1980). *The Geopolitics of Information: How Western Culture Dominates the World*. London : Faber.

Sparks, C. (1998). *Communism, Capitalism, and the Mass Media*. London: Sage

Sparks, C. (2006). Stuart Hall, cultural studies and marxism. In *Stuart Hall* (pp. 82-113). Routledge.

Steinhardt H. C. (2015) 'From Blind Spot to Media Spotlight: Propaganda Policy, Media Activism and the Emergence of Protest Events in the Chinese Public Sphere', in *Asian Studies Review*, 39:1, 119-137, DOI: 10.1080/10357823.2014.993920

Stillwell, Cinnamon. (Nov 22, 2006). "Al-Jazeera Comes to America." *Accuracy in Media*.

Stone, G. C., & Xiao, Z. (2007). Anointing a new enemy: The rise of anti-China coverage after the USSR's demise. *International Communication Gazette*, 69(1), 91-108.

Sun, X., Huang, R., & Yip, N. M. (2017). Dynamic political opportunities and environmental forces linking up: A case study of anti-PX contention in Kunming. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 26(106), 536-548.

Snyder, T. (2014). Ukraine: the haze of propaganda. *The New York Review of Books*, 1.

Stern, D. (2014). The Twitter war: Social media's role in Ukraine unrest. See <http://www.webcitation.org/70Slyb7p7> (accessed 26 June 2018).

Stephen, D. Reese, Ballinger, J. (2001). The Roots of Sociology of News: Remembering Mr. Gates and Social Control in the Newsroom. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, Vol.78(4), pp.641-658.

Straubhaar, J. D. (2007). *World television: From global to local*. SAGE publications.

Samuel-Azran, T. (2009). Counterflows and counterpublics: The Al-Jazeera effect on western discourse. *Journal of International Communication*, 15(1), 56-73.

Sun, W. (2015). Configuring the foreign correspondent: New questions about China's public diplomacy. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 11, 125-138.

Tari, Z. G., & Emamzadeh, Z. (2018). An Analysis of the Media Messages during the 2016 US Presidential Election: A Thematic Comparison between CNN News and Donald Trump's Tweets. *J. Pol. & L.*, 11, 78.

The Guardian (November 3, 1997). Round the clock, round the bend?;

Thussu, D. K. (2006). *International Communication: Continuity and Change*. 2nd ed. London : Hodder Arnold.

- Tanikawa, M. (2017). Seeking cultural relevance: Use of “culture peg” and “culture link” in international news reporting. *Journalism Practice*, 11(1), 115-133.
- Tanikawa, Miki. (2018). Bane or a Device? Use of Stereotypic Content as a Method to Increase the Power of Mediated Communication. *International Journal of Communication* 12: 1–20.
- Tankard, J. W. (2001). An empirical approach to the study of media framing. In S. D. Reese, O. H. Gandy, & A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing public life: Perspectives of media and our understanding of the social world* (pp. 95–106). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Tankard, J., L. Hendrikson, J. Silberman, K. Bliss, and S. Ghanem. (1991), August. Media Frames: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement. *Journalism and Mass Communication*. Boston.
- Taylor A. (2012) Rising protests in China. *The Atlantic*, 17 February. Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2012/02/rising-protests-in-china/100247/>.
- Taylor, P.; Rawnsley, G.; Taylor, P. (author of reviewed work) ; Rawnsley, G. (review author). (1998). Global Communications, International Affairs and the Media Since 1945. *The American Political Science Review* (1927), Mar 1, 1973, Vol.67(1), p.11
- Therborn, G. (2008). *What does the ruling class do when it rules: state apparatuses and state power under feudalism, capitalism and socialism*. Verso: London.
- Thompson, John B. (1984). *Studies of the Theory of Ideology*. Polity Press: Cambridge.
- Thussu, D. K. (2006). *International Communication: Continuity and Change*. 2nd ed. London : Hodder Arnold.
- Thussu, D. K. (2009). *Internationalizing Media Studies*. London : New York : Routledge.
- Thussu, Daya. (2010). Mapping Global Media Flow and Contra-flow. *International Communication. A Reader*, edited by D. K. Thussu, 221–238. London: Routledge.
- Thussu, Daya. (2005). From MacBride to Murdoch: The Marketisation of Global Communication. *Javnost—The Public* 12 (3): 47–60.
- Thussu, D. K., de Burgh, H., & Shi, A. (Eds.). (2018). *China’s media go global*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Tomlinson, J. (1999). *Globalisation and Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press and Cambridge: Polity Press.

Tomlinson, J. (2002). *Cultural Imperialism: A Critical Introduction*. London ; New York : Continuum.

Tony Harcup & Deirdre O'Neill. (2017). What is News? *Journalism Studies*, 18:12, 1470-1488, DOI: 10.1080/1461670X.2016.1150193

Trew, T. (1979a). Theory and ideology at work. In Fowler, R., *et al.* (eds), *Language and Control*, Routledge.

Tse, T. (2011). Xue zuo zhong guo ren: hou zhi min shi dai xiang gang guo min jiao yu de wen hua zheng zhi (Learn to be a Chinese: cultural politics of post-colonial national education in Hong Kong). *Xiang gang, sheng huo, wen hua (Hong Kong, Living and Culture)*, 21-52.

Tumber, H., Prentoulis, M. (2005). Journalism and the Making of a Profession. In Burgh, H. (eds) *Making Journalists: Diverse Models, Global Issues*. P58-73. Abingdon : Routledge.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCTAD) World Investment Report 2000, (2000). United Nations, New York.

University of London (London).-School of Oriental Studies, & Phillips, C. H. (1967). *The School of Oriental & African Studies, University of London: 1917-1967. An Introduction*.

Van Dijk, (1988). *News as Discourse*, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc: New Jersey.

Van Dijk, T. A. (2009). News, discourse, and ideology. *The handbook of journalism studies*, 191-204.

Veneti, A., Karadimitriou, A., & Poulakidakos, S. (2016). Media ecology and the politics of dissent: Representations of the Hong Kong protests in the Guardian and China Daily. *Social Media+ Society*, 2(3), 2056305116662175.

Vukovich, D. (2015). Illiberal China and global convergence: thinking through Wukan and Hong Kong. *Third World Quarterly*, 36(11), 2130-2147.

U.S. Government. (2020). Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project. Government Printing Office (GPO).

----- (1979b) 'What the papers say': linguistic variation and ideological difference. In Fowler, R., *et al.* (eds), *Language and Control*. Routledge & Kegan Paul.

van Dijk, T.A. (1988c). 'How "They" hit the headlines: ethnic minorities in the Press', in G. Smitherman-Donaldson and T.A van Dijk (eds), *Discourse and discrimination*, Detroit, IL: Wayne State University Press, 221-62.

van Dijk, T.A. (1988b) *News Analysis: Case studies of international and national news in the press*, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

van Dijk, T.A. (1991). *Racism and the Press*. London and New York: Routledge.

van Dijk, T.A. (1993). *Elite discourse and racism*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

van Dijk, T.A. (1995). Discourse semantics and ideology. *Discourse & Society*, 6(2), 243–289.

Van Dijk, T. A. (2013). CDA is NOT a method of critical discourse analysis. *Asociacion de Estudios Sobre Discurso y Sociedad*.

van Leeuwen, T. (1996). The representation of social actors. In C. R. Caldas-Coulthard & M. Coulthard (Eds.). *Texts and practices: Readings in critical discourse analysis* (pp. 32–70). London: Routledge.

Vickers, Edward and Flora Kan. (2003). The Reeducation of Hong Kong: Identity, Politics and Education in Postcolonial Hong Kong. *American Asian Review*, 21, No. 4, (2003), 179-228.

Wagner, H. (1998). ‘Das Fachstichwort Massenkommunikation’, In Otto Groth, Wolfgang Langerbucher (Ed.). *Vermittelte Mitteilung: Ein Journalistisches Modell der Massenkommunikation*. Munich: Fischer. Pp.187-240.

Waisbord, Silvio R. (Silvio Ricardo). (2013). *Reinventing Professionalism: Journalism and News in Global Perspective*. Cambridge : Polity.

Wang, (2007). Public Support for Democracy in China. *Journal of Contemporary China*. Taylor & Francis: London.

Wang, G., & Ma, X. (2021). Were They Illegal Rioters or Pro-democracy Protestors? Examining the 2019–20 Hong Kong Protests in China Daily and The New York Times. *Critical Arts*, 35(2), 85-99.

Wang, M. L. (1991). Who is dominating whose ideology? New York Times reporting on China. *Asian Journal of Communication*, 2(1), 51-69.

Ward, Stephen J. (2011). Ethical Flourishing as aim of Global Media Ethics. *Journalism Studies* 12 (6): 738–746. doi:10.1080/1461670X.2011.614810.

Walker, S. (2014). Russia and US take their Petty War of Words over Ukraine on to Twitter. *The Guardian*, 9, 2014.

Waters, M. (1995). *Globalisation*. London : Routledge.

Weaver, David H. & Lars Willnat (2016) ‘Changes in U.S. Journalism’, *Journalism Practice*, 10:7, 844-855, DOI: 10.1080/17512786.2016.1171162

Weaver, David H., Randolph A. Beam, Bonnie J. Brownlee, Paul S. Voakes, and G. Cleve Wilhoit. (2007). *The American Journalist in the 21st Century: U.S. News People at the Dawn of a New Millennium*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Weiss, G., & Wodak, R. (2003). Introduction: Theory, interdisciplinarity and critical discourse analysis. *Critical discourse analysis* (pp. 1-32). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Wodak, R. (2000c). What CDA is about— A Summary of Its History, Important Concepts and Its Development 1. *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. SAGE Research Methods. SAGE Publications, Ltd.

Wodak, R., and A. Pelinka (eds). (2002). *The Haider Phenomenon in Austria*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press.

Wodak, R. (2004) Discourses of Silence. *Discourse and Silencing*, ed. L. Thiesmeyer.

Wodak, R. (2007) Discourses in European Union Organizations: Aspects of Access, Participation and Exclusion. *Text and Talk* 27(5–6): 655–80.

Wodak, R. (2008a). Prejudice and Discourse. *Handbook of Prejudice and Racism*, ed. A. Pelinka and K. Stögnner. Vienna: Braumüller (in press).

Wodak, R. (2008b). Controversial Issues in Feminist Gender Studies. *Methodologies in Gender Studies*, ed. J. Sunderland *et al.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (in press).

Wodak, R. (2019). What CDA is about— A Summary of Its History, Important Concepts and Its Development. *SAGE Research Methods*. SAGE Publications, Ltd.

Wong, Kam-Cheung. (2001). Chinese Culture and Leadership. *International Journal of Leadership in Education* 4, no. 4: 309–319.

World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages. (2001). United Nations, New York.

Wu,X. (2009) Between public and professional: Chinese sociology and the construction of a harmonious society. *ASA Footnotes* 37(5). Available at: http://www.asanet.org/footnotes/mayjun09/intl_0509.html.

Xiang, D. (2010b). Transition of Chinese Family Planning Slogans and Posters. *The Poster* 1 (1): 95–119.

Xiao Mingzheng & Wu Xinhui. (2014). Chinese Leadership, *Public Integrity*, 16:2, 165-172, DOI: 10.2753/PIN1099-9922160204

Xinhua, “Wukan Village Deputy Head Detained.”

Xu, K. (2013). Framing occupy Wall Street: a content analysis of the New York Times and USA today. *International Journal of Communication*, 7, 21.

Yang, G. (2008). Contention in Cyberspace. *Popular Protest in China*, 126-143.

Yang, Y. (2022). *Environmental Activism, Social Media, and Protest in China: Becoming Activists Over Wild Public Networks*. Elizabeth Brunner. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019, 200 pp., ISBN No. 978-1-7936-0612-9 (hardcover).

Y.-H. Chu, L. J. Diamond and D. C. Shin, (2001). Halting progress in Korea and Taiwan. *Journal of Democracy* 12(1), (2001), pp. 122–136.

Yongshun Cai. (2008). Disruptive Collective Action in the Reform Era. in Kevin J. O'Brien, ed., *Popular Protest in China*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, chap. 8.

Young, R. (Ed.). (1981). *Untying the Text: A post-structural anthology*. Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Zanetta L. Jansen (2013) International Media and Cultural Flows: A Critical Political Economy of Media Organisations in the 21st Century, A case of the Reuters News Agency, *South African Review of Sociology*, 44:1, 87-110, DOI: 10.1080/21528586.2013.784450

Zhao, D. (2001). *The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement*. The University of Chicago Press.

Zhao, Y. (1998). *Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.

Zhao, Y. (2012). Understanding China's media system in a world historical context. In: Hallin DC and Mancini P (eds) *Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 143–177.

Zhang, X. (2011). From totalitarianism to hegemony: The reconfiguration of the party-state and the transformation of Chinese communication. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 20(68), 103-115.

Zhang, X. (2011). *The transformation of political communication in China: From propaganda to hegemony* (Vol. 29). World Scientific.

Zeng, Y. (2018). Detached disseminator, populist watchdog and facilitative change agent: The professional role perception of foreign correspondents in China. *Journalism*, 19(9-10), 1397-1416.

Appendices

Appendix A: CNN texts

Wukan:

- the Communist Party usually reigns supreme (2012/3/5) and 'Communist Party still keeps a tight grip on dissent nationwide, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring (2012/3/5)
- Villages continue to assert their political rights (2011/12/12); held an election against all odds (2011/12/12)
- Villagers' Fury on corrupt local officials but not the central government (2011/12/15)
- Thousands of residents took part in protests; drove out government officials; set up obstacles to deter police (2011/12/14;12/21)
- (the illegal selling of the land) Leading hundreds to protest (2011/12/14)
- The police were suspected to have beaten the villager to death (2011/12/14)
- The police attacked villagers and arrested 13, according to the law. (2011/12/14)
- Wukan remains heavily militarised (2016/9/14)
- State news agency, Xinhua, said local authorities denied rumours that the sudden death of 42-year-old Xue Jinbo Sunday was the result of his being beaten in custody. (2011/12/21)
- Xue Jinbo -- soon died in jail. Authorities blamed sudden illness, but his family and most villagers believed he had been beaten to death (2012/3/5).
- Heavily armed riot police fired tear gas as locals threw rocks and other projectiles amid ongoing unrest in Wukan, a village in China's Guangdong province (2016/9/13).
- The local government has so far not responded to a request for comment from CNN (2011/12/14).
-
- 12: the Communist Party still keeps a tight grip on dissent nationwide, especially in the wake of the Arab Spring (2012/3/5).
- The election of Wukan's government had given people in villages right around the country great hope for what might be possible under the Chinese system as it stands today (2016/7/20)
- Villagers last week drove out government officials and set up obstacles to prevent the police from entering the village (2011/12/21).
-
- The man, who gave only his surname, Huang, for fear of being identified, said thousands of residents of Wukan village in Guangdong Province had taken part in protests this week and driven out local officials (2011/12/14).

Hong Kong

- Four Hong Kong student activists arrested for 'secession' (by...) over social media posts (2020/7/29)
- Hong Kong protest leader Nathan Law pledges to fight for democracy in exile (by...) after fleeing city (2020/7/3)
-
- Hong Kong media tycoon says 'the fight has to go on' after 'symbolic' arrest under new law (2020/8/14)

- For example, an NBA team general manager tweeted in support of the protests... Meanwhile, the television show "South Park" satirized Hollywood's sensitivity to Chinese government censors. (2019/11/15)
- China gifted propaganda win as Trump's protest response undermines US efforts to protect Hong Kong. (2020/6/1)
- Their support has been gladly accepted in Hong Kong, where some protesters last year took to flying the US flag and calling for Trump himself to intervene as they lobbied for the passage of a bill in support of the city's political freedoms. (2020/6/1)
- Protesters in Hong Kong will hold a celebratory, pro-US rally Thursday after President Donald Trump gave them what one prominent activist termed a "timely Thanksgiving present." (2019/11/28)
- The Hong Kong Autonomy Act would impose sanctions on businesses and individuals that help China restrict Hong Kong's autonomy. It will now go to US President Donald Trump for his signature before being enacted. (2020/6/3)
- The leaders of the European Union (EU) expressed "grave concerns" about the potential threat to fundamental rights and freedoms. (2020/7/1)
- This strong anti-China sentiment is why protesters have targeted Chinese-owned businesses -- for instance, they smashed the ATMs at Bank of China locations. They have also boycotted restaurants that expressed pro-China stances. (2019/11/15)
- Black-clad, masked protesters manned the walls, while the roads leading to the technical college were barricaded with makeshift brick walls clumsily cemented in place. (2019/9/16)
- The Hong Kong Basic Law, which guarantees the freedoms of the people, including the right to protest, the right to a free press and freedom of speech -- liberties unavailable to others in communist mainland China. (2019/7/28)
- Though a part of China, Hong Kong has its own legal and political system, with limited democracy and greater personal freedoms than on the mainland. (2020/11/11)
- "I want to protect the young people," she said, so they can "emigrate to other countries." (2020/11/2)
- Her flag (British flag) was an incendiary taunt implying to many that the city was governed better under British colonial rule than Chinese. (2020/11/2)
- On a more abstract level, some people have framed the unrest as a tug-of-war between Chinese authoritarianism and the Western ideals of freedom and democracy. (2019/11/19)
- "Among conservatives, one joke is 'what's the difference between Hong Kong protesters and Democrats? Hong Kong protesters love America'," Mahoney said. But he was critical of those who saw the movement in such simplistic terms, saying that the values they were fighting for were universal, not inspired by Washington (2020/6/1).
- Beijing has taken a firm rhetorical stance, saying the protests "showed signs of terrorism." Xi has demanded an end to the violence, saying the "radical" protests had trampled the city's rule of law and that "stopping the violence and restoring order" was Hong Kong's most "urgent task." (2019/11/15)
- In a statement, Pompeo denounced the law as a "disastrous decision" and "the latest in a series of actions that fundamentally undermine Hong Kong's autonomy and freedoms." (2020/5/28)

Appendix B: BBC texts

Wukan

- China's determination to maintain social stability by cracking down on anyone who could undermine it (2011/12/15).
- 'The Communist Party believes this (crackdown) is an essential tool in maintaining power (2012/1/16).
- The rally on Thursday saw hundreds of villagers chanting slogans such as "Down with Corrupt Officials" but also "Long Live the Communist Party", as they hope China's central government will intervene on their behalf... (2011/12/15)
- "Return our Land!"
And, it's always followed by: "Long live the Communist Party!"
Where else could you see virtually the entire population of town or a village filling the streets in support of their Communist Party Secretary? (2016/6/25)
- The villagers' fury reached a new pitch (2011/12/15).
- Amid a heavy police presence, thousands marched around the village calling for him (Lin Zuluan) to be freed (2016/7/21).
- Police with batons beat villagers; they had also fired tear gas and used water cannon. (2011/12/15)
- Rumours spread that he had been beaten to death by police, but reports in state media dismissed those claims (2011/12/15)
- Police say he died of a 'sudden illness', but his family say he was beaten to death (2011/12/21; 2012/1/16).
- Lin Zuluan was arrested on Saturday, later appearing on state television saying he had accepted bribes.
- But locals in Wukan, in Guangdong province, marched to express support, saying the confession was forced (2016/7/21).
- China's internet censors have blocked searches relating to an ongoing protest in the village of Wukan, web users say (2011/12/15).
- The *Global Times* newspaper, seen as the mouthpiece of the ruling Communist Party, said on Tuesday that some of the seized land had been returned, but that some remained in dispute (2016/9/13).
- Roads into the village have been closed and are being guarded by heavily armed security personnel on one side, and villagers on the other (2011/12/15).
- Police have launched an operation in the Chinese village of Wukan, to end protests over the jailing of the elected village chief (2016/9/13).
- The Communist Party believes this (crackdown) is an essential tool in maintaining power (2011/12/15).
- 7: Whatever the figures, the fact that the government is coy about releasing them (figures of protests) suggests they are embarrassingly high (2011/12/15).
- 8: There has also been a series of strikes and labour walk-outs in southern China in recent months. On Tuesday, a separate protest erupted in Haimen, also in Guangdong Province, over local government plans to build a power plant (2011/12/21).
- 9: Even after Wukan, the authorities continued to use heavy-handed tactics to end other village disputes (2012/4/24).
- 10: It was seen as a visionary move, offering hope to other Chinese villages that they too could choose their governments. But the mood in China, under President Xi Jinping, is now very different (2016/9/13).

- This has been a place which - unlike anywhere else in China - had a genuinely elected government, but many here are wondering if the so-called "Wukan experiment" is about to die (2016/6/26).
- Wukan became a symbol of democracy after villagers banded together in 2011 to protest against what they said were corrupt officials selling their land to developers and failing to compensate them properly (2016/7/21).
- His name is Xue Jingbo. He was actually negotiating on behalf of the village, with the authorities, to resolve this dispute.
- At a funeral tent, his 21-year-old daughter was choked with emotion. She said the authorities had yet to release her father's body and needed to explain his death.
"We know his wish was to get his land back and punish corrupt officials," she said. "He sacrificed himself - and now we'll make a sacrifice to fight for his cause."
The local authorities say they will halt the land project at the heart of this dispute. But in Wukan all trust has been lost, and many people say they will continue to make a stand.
One villager told me that they wanted to be allowed to elect their own chiefs. In Beijing, there will be deep concern if what's happened in a small village becomes part of a wider trend.
(2011/12/15)
- Villagers had planned a march through police barriers on Wednesday (BBC, 2011/12/11).
- 25: Thousands of villagers have been taking to the streets every day in a brazen challenge to the authorities (2016/6/26).
- Instead of meekly accepting the decision, the villagers chose to fight. But defiance has come at a cost (BBC/2011/12/15).
- Residents of a Chinese village locked in a stand-off over land seizures appear to be nearing a compromise with local authorities (BBC, 2011/12/21).

Hong Kong

- Hong Kong security law: Four students arrested for 'inciting secession' (2020/7/30)
- Hong Kong security law: UN experts voice deep concerns (2020/9/4)
- The UK was "keeping our promise" to Hong Kong residents "to uphold their freedoms" (BBC, 2020/7/22)
- the BNO visa route reflected the "UK's historic and moral commitment to those people of Hong Kong who chose to retain their ties to the UK by taking up BNO status (BBC, 2021/7/1)
- "(BNO is) our deep connection with Hong Kong". (2020/7/1)
- "It is Orwellian stuff," Patten told the BBC. "It does go wider and further than anybody had feared." (2020/7/2)
- Australia has suspended its extradition treaty with Hong Kong in response to fears over a new national security law imposed by China. (2020/7/9)
- New Zealand's government also said on Thursday it would review the country's relationship with Hong Kong. Foreign Minister Winston Peters said New Zealand was "deeply concerned" about the national security law. (2020/7/9)
- An 18-year-old was shot in the chest with a live bullet as protesters fought officers with poles, petrol bombs and other projectiles.
In November, a pro-Beijing lawmaker was stabbed in the street by a man pretending to be a supporter.

One week later, a policeman shot one protester at close range when activists were trying to set up a roadblock. Later that day another man was set on fire by anti-government protesters. (2019/11/28)

- They are supposed to protect certain freedoms for Hong Kong: freedom of assembly and speech, an independent judiciary and some democratic rights - freedoms that no other part of mainland China has (2020/7/30).
- "It (BNO visa) is an unprecedented and generous offer reflecting our deep connection with Hong Kong," he (a Home Office spokesman) said. He added that the UK has a "proud record of providing protection for those who need it, where there is a well-founded fear of persecution" (2021/7/1).
- China's foreign ministry has refuted such views, calling them attempts to "politicise" the Hong Kong government proposal, and interference in China's internal affairs. (2019/12/13)

Appendix C: Al Jazeera (text and documentary)

Wukan

- “Wukan is not a ‘model’. We are only concerned about doing our work, not being a ‘model’.
- We now have a new democratic structure. “(Episode 1)
-
- “The land problems depend on whether people ‘above’ will do their work” (Episode 6)
-
- “The ordinary farmers have had their lands swallowed up and sold by (the old village committee and the Women’s Affairs Chief)” (Episode 6)
-
- “What the previous committee has done is a betrayal of our country’s policies” (Episode 6)
- “The old and the newly elected village committee did not do anything to solve the land issue” (Episode 7)
- “They value that counter-revolutionary, Lin Zuluang (the newly elected leader), because he’s a Wukan villager. It’s impossible. They are backing the wrong person. His ideas are from the West. We need to maintain the Communist Party’s method of ruling. If you’re going to ruin the village and undermine the Communist Party, I will not allow it...” (Episode 2).
- In late 2011, Wukan, a small fishing village in southern China, captured international attention when it rose up against decades of corrupt leadership. The odds appeared insurmountable - the authorities are not known for tolerating dissent. Still, despite a crackdown and the death of a leading activist, the unthinkable happened: the Village Committee fell and democratic elections were announced (2017/4/3).
- Wukan might have held democratic elections, but China remains a largely undemocratic country. The new village committee had to take orders from officials from the local and provincial governments, who had no interest in rocking the boat. Contentious land issues - the very reason why Wukan rose up in 2011 - remained unresolved (2017/6/10).

Hong Kong

- Hong Kong marks handover anniversary under shadow of security law (2020/7/1)
- Hong Kong students held in first arrests under new security law (2020/6/30)
- Hong Kong: For those who stay, the fight is on, as threats lurk (2020/7/5)
- Hong Kong man accused of 'terrorism' under new Chinese law (2020/7/4)
- US says China's HK national security law could lead to sanctions (2020/5/25)
- China cautions citizens on Canada travel amid rift over HK law (2020/7/6)
- Defying police ban, HK protesters return to gang-attack scene (2019/7/28)
- In a statement on Wednesday morning, Australia’s Foreign Minister Marise Payne expressed “deep concern” over the legislation (2020/7/1)
- The mini-constitution that was agreed – known as the Basic Law – afforded Hong Kong considerable autonomy, and its people rights and freedoms unknown on the mainland (2020/5/28).
- Pro-democracy demonstrators renewed pressure on the government by marching in three separate rallies across the city, with one of them showing “gratitude” for US support of the anti-government movement that has roiled the financial hub for nearly six months (2019/12/1).

- That is because the post-colonial generations see Hong Kong as their homeland, where they are a people bound by the values of freedoms, fair play and the rule of law, rather than Chinese ethnicity. (2020/7/5)
- China considers Hong Kong to be an "inalienable" part of the country, and calls for independence are anathema to its Communist Party leaders (2020/7/30).
- Authorities in Beijing and Hong Kong say the law will be used to target only a minority of "troublemakers" (2020/7/30).

Appendix D: Xinhua news agency

- "The lack of legal proof on rural land ownership has left farmers' interests poorly protected" (2011/12/15).