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The Limits of Limits: Schmitt, Aureli, and the Geopolitical Ontology of the Island

Douglas Spencer
Models of fluidity, process, self-organization, and complexity today enjoy near-hegemonic status in the fields of architectural, landscape, and urban design. As against the putatively top-down practices of planning and the authoritative mastery of modernist design, we are led to believe that a progressive turn to more bottom-up, networked, ecologically sensitive, and “new-materialist” principles is underway. The advocates of this turn are, however, in thrall to the same models as are to be found in the history of neoliberal thought and as are frequently employed in the achievement of its political and economic agendas.

The writings of the architect and teacher Pier Vittorio Aureli appear to offer a clear and decisive critique of this development. Perhaps most appealingly, Aureli’s account of the architectural archipelago offers a way for architects and architecture to counter the purely economic logic of neoliberal processes of urbanization—particularly where the urban comes to stand, as with Landscape Urbanism, for the purely processual—through the assumption of a political project. The field conditions of urbanism as connective landscape are countered, by the Italian architectural theorist, with the self-sufficient autonomy and formal limits of architecture as island.

Aureli’s politics of architectural form are, though, questionable in their claim to effectively contest the prevalence of models of the fluid, connective, and self-organizing in design, as well as the broader neoliberal conditions in which they operate. The inadequacies of Aureli’s archipelago model, in these terms, are rooted in its indebtedness to the thought of the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt, with its characteristically agonistic polarizations of land–sea, political–economic, friend–enemy, limited–unlimited, and, especially, in its mythic and fascistic origins.

Landscape Urbanism: From Object to Field
That the urban has, in recent years, been transformed from a form composed of static architectural objects into a “field” of processes, networks, mobility, and infrastructural connectivity constitutes something like a founding principle for Landscape Urbanism. In his 1999 essay “Field Conditions,” Stan Allen—a significant figure in the formulation and promotion of Landscape Urbanism—located the emergence of what he identifies as a generalized shift from “object to field” amidst the science, technology, and culture of the post-World War II period. Allen defined this “field condition” as one of “loosely bound aggregates characterized by porosity and local interconnectivity . . . bottom-up phenomena, defined not by overarching geometrical schemas but by intricate local connections.” Employing these insights, Allen recommended, would at last place design “in contact with the real.”

Contemporary to Allen’s essay, Alex Wall’s “Programming the Urban Surface” has been equally significant to the theoretical development of Landscape Urbanism. Here, Wall writes that in contemporary urbanization, “infrastructures and flows of material have become more significant than static political and spatial boundaries . . . The emphasis shifts here from forms of urban space to processes of urbanization.” Consequently, he continues, we are now experiencing “a fundamental paradigm shift from viewing cities in formal terms to looking at them in dynamic ways. Hence, familiar urban typologies of square, park, district, and so on are of less use or significance than are the infrastructures, network flows, ambiguous spaces, and other polymorphous conditions that constitute the contemporary metropolis.”

The paradigms of fluidity, interconnectivity, and process promoted by Allen and Wall are echoed in the conception of “weak urbanism” formulated by Andrea Branzi. This putatively new condition of urbanism, argues Branzi in the essay “A Strong Century,” proceeds according to a hermeneutics that is “more ductile and therefore able to absorb the new and confront the surprises and complexities that this produces.” The ductile and fluid qualities of Branzi’s model of urbanism are further elaborated through his adoption of the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman’s concept of a “liquid modernity,” of which he writes, “For Bauman, the term ‘liquid’ positively indicates the idea of a state of material that does not possess its own form (rather, that of its container) and tends to follow a temporal flow of transformations. These conditions converge to describe ‘the nature of the current, and in many respects, new phase of the history of modernism.”

For Charles Waldheim, landscape is the medium through which urbanism achieves the kind of connective and fluidly interactive performance appropriate to contemporary realities. Landscape, as a “performative medium,” writes Waldheim in his recent Landscape as Urbanism: A General Theory, services the post-Fordist city “through a unique combination of ecological performance and design culture.” “Rather than offering an exception to the structure of the city,” he continues, landscape “aligns with the return to the project of city-making associated with contemporary service, creative and culture economies.” In this fashion, Waldheim argues, landscape succeeds as the discipline of urban design, replacing the now hopelessly retrograde and leaden one of architecture. The turn to landscape is one in which urbanism is “unburdened of all that architectural baggage.”

It would be difficult to conceive of anything more diametrically opposed to the position of Aureli than this, invested as it is in the politics of architectural form as the delimited, posed against the connective economies of a landscaped urbanism. Rather than pursuing the economic
zeitgeist, or drawing upon ontologies of complexity, he has proposed to redeem what he regards as a foundational politics of architectural form through the geopolitical ontology of Carl Schmitt.13

Leviathan and Behemoth
In *The Nomos of the Earth* (1950) and *Land and Sea* (1954), Carl Schmitt argues that a new spatial order has emerged in the aftermath of World War II.14 The great sea powers—England and the United States—have finally established their ascension over the land-based powers of the European continent. For Schmitt, as he posits in *Land and Sea*, “world history” is a struggle between maritime and land or continental powers that he casts, in mythological terms, as the battle between Leviathan and Behemoth, between sea creature and land animal:

Behemoth tries to tear Leviathan to pieces with its horns and teeth, while in turn, Leviathan tries hard to stop the land animal’s mouth and nostrils with its flaps and fins in order to deprive it of food and air. This is a graphic illustration . . . of the blockade to which a sea power subjects a land power by cutting its supplies in order to starve it to death.15

The defeat of Germany is made to stand more broadly for the defeat of the behemoth of Europe by the levithians of England and America. Noting that in some sense, given the all-encompassing nature of the oceans, all land for Schmitt is effectively an island, this final victory of sea over land brings to a conclusion the “spatial revolution” initiated when England “turned her collective existence seawards and centred it on the sea element.”16 Setting out on this course, transforming itself from “a nation of sheep herders” into one of “pirates” in the Elizabthern period, England went on to “win the first round of the planetary, spatial revolution.”17 This revolution brings about, for the first time in world history, a truly global order, with the British Empire at its center. Earlier empires, says Schmitt in *The Nomos of the Earth*, were in some ways interconnected, but these “lacked a global character”: “Each considered itself to be the world, the cosmos, the house.”18 Prior to the spatial revolution of modernity there is, then, an effective archipelago of more or less isolated worlds, each surrounded by the uncharted and “malevolent chaos” of the sea.19 With the coming to hegemony of the new maritime powers, the plurality of worlds becomes the singular world, a truly global condition.

The ascension of the maritime powers brings to a close a centuries-long struggle between land and sea. Over this period, from the 16th to the 19th century, the lines of the first planetary order are clearly drawn. They run between the dry land of the European continent—itself clearly divided between sovereign national states—and the sea, ostensibly belonging to no one but ruled in reality by England: “The dry-land order implies the subdivision into state territories. The high seas, in turn, are free: they know no state and are not subjected to any state or territorial sovereignty.”20 The turn to the sea, then, marks a rupture in the existing nomos of the earth, its literal deterritorialization. The conquest of the sea opens up a new spatial condition in which the old practices of land-based sovereignty—the making of clearly bounded worlds—are undermined. The sovereign order of limits is challenged by new powers that operate through the medium of the unlimited.

In plotting out this dichotomy between the limited and the unlimited, played out between land and sea, Schmitt associates the judicial territory of the land with an established order and the unlimited space of the sea with the practice of commercial trade. He notes, in *Land and Sea*, the popularity among the English for maxims such as those of Sir Walter Raleigh: “Whoever controls the seas controls the world trade; whoever controls world trade holds all the treasures of the world in his possession, and in fact, the whole world.”21 Slogans about freedom, such as ‘All world trade is free exchange,’” he writes, “express the zenith of England’s maritime and global power.”22 In constructing these polarities and associations—of land and island as the “properly” juridical and political space of man, as opposed to the sea as the chaotic, desacralized, and unlimited realm of trade and commerce—Schmitt is rehearsing themes first established in the same ancient world into which he projects the origins of the struggles between land and sea powers.

Anaximander and the Apeiron
The profound significance of monetization for the world of ancient Greece, Richard Seaford has argued in his *Money and the Early Greek Mind: Homer, Philosophy, Tragedy* (2004), is registered in the cosmology of Anaximander (610–546 BCE).23 Seaford suggests that Anaximander’s conception of the apeiron—the “unlimited,” the primordial, infinite, and unendingly productive source from which all things are constituted—is inseparable from the development of monetization in the ancient Greek world of the pre-Socratic philosopher, particularly that of the commercial city of Miletus in which he lived.24 Just as money serves as a substrate of trade, the apeiron serves as the substrate from which all other things come into being. Seaford further pursues this analogy between “money and everything that we know” in Anaximander’s conception of the apeiron, noting, for instance, that the apeiron and money are each said to “contain all things,” to “steer” and regulate all things, to be in constant movement and circulation, and to be “undifferentiated, homogeneous.”
“The apeiron,” writes Seaford, “is abstract in the sense that (although it surrounds all things and is their source) it is imperceptible. So too money is both concrete and abstract, visible and invisible.” Given the extent of these analogies, Seaford is lead to posit that the relationship between the apeiron and money is more than simply analogous: we are “forced to accept [that] Anaximander’s cosmos is in some respect a projection of social relations.” His hypothesis is that “one factor in the genesis of the notion of the apeiron, and of philosophical cosmology in general, was money.”

Following Seaford’s reading of Agamemnon, we can add to this series land–sea—a polarization between the self-sufficient and self-contained limit of the settled territory—the island—and the unsettling commercial space of the unlimited sea that surrounds and threatens its order.

The Discreet Charms of Carl Schmitt

The polarities through which Schmitt’s geopolitical ontology are performed are then as much ancient as they are reflections on his contemporary situation. His arguments, in fact, rehearse an archaic tragedy dressed up as the truth of global modernity. Following Schmitt, Aureli, in turn, is consistent that only clearly bounded, physically and juridically delimited spatial orders, such as those of the archipelago, can properly sustain the properly political. In adopting Schmitt’s geopolitical ontology in this fashion, Aureli revives a definition of the political originally confected to underwrite the appropriation of land and the juridical “rights” of this appropriation. As the philosopher Bruno Bosteels writes of this ontologizing work, “Schmitt first of all presupposes an immediate connection between being and spatiality . . . All being is oriented in accord with an immanent principle of justice and right: ‘Right is the rightfulness of being that is given at the origin.’”

The earth itself, of course, is the primal site for this suturing of being, space, and law as right. It is this essentializing and archaic foundation of a juridical politics of land appropriation, and its defense, that Aureli takes up as appropriate to the question of contemporary processes of urbanization. The outside, the unlimited “sea” of urbanism or landscape, is abjured as inescapably economic. “One can argue,” writes Aureli in The Possibility of an Absolute Architecture (2011), “that the notion of urbanization presupposes the fundamental substitution of politics with economics as a mode of city governance to the point that today it is reasonable—almost banal—to ask not what kind of political power is governing us, but whether we are governed by politics at all.”

Aureli’s allegiance to and admiration for what he terms Schmitt’s “political realism” determines his definition of the political and the strictness with which it is to be understood as separate and distinct from the economic. Schmitt’s account of the political, as taken up by Aureli, is heavily reliant on the former’s infamous friend–enemy distinction, as propounded in The Concept of the Political, published in 1932. Here Schmitt proclaims that “the specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.”
For Schmitt the political just is, ontologically, the ineluctable struggle between friend and enemy. This struggle marks the perpetual agonism that must exist between sovereign nation states in order that the political exists as such. The necessary and defining expression of this agonism is war: “A world in which the possibility of war is utterly eliminated,” writes Schmitt, “a completely pacified globe, would be a world without the distinction of friend and enemy and hence a world without politics.” As opposed to liberal notions of competition that might derive from matters of trade, the properly political is dependent on the possibility of armed conflict between sovereign spatial orders. “The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing,” Schmitt makes plain in The Concept of the Political. As is well known, Schmitt’s theories of sovereignty and the political were instrumental to the juridical formulations of National Socialism, particularly during the period of his membership in the Nazi Party. As international relations scholar Benno Gerhard Teschke notes, Schmitt’s theory of the political “inscribed Hitler’s ‘spatial revolution’ into a full-scale reinterpretation of Europe’s geopolitical history, grounded in land appropriations, which legitimized Nazi Germany’s wars of conquest.”

Aureli’s reading of Schmitt attempts to abstract this agonistic formulation of what is essentially political from its historically specific political context. Indeed, there appears no reference to Schmitt’s fascism, anti-Semitism, or membership in the Nazi party in Aureli’s The Possibility of an Absolute Architecture. Schmitt is described here simply as a “German jurist.” For Aureli, it seems, the fascism of Schmitt’s politics can be disregarded while its agonism, and its fixation on the appropriation of land, can be repurposed as a universal truth in order to pursue a properly political architectural project.

This project is founded on the formalization of the friend–enemy distinction through an architecture with the function to clearly inscribe limits and boundaries upon appropriated land. Aureli argues that the formal “essentially involves an act of spatial determination, of (de)limitation.” Architecture, as a practice of delimitation, generates the inside–outside binary through which the friend can be distinguished from the enemy. Unlike in Schmitt, however, the purpose of this friend–enemy polarization is not to sanction war but to allow us to know and identify ourselves, as such, through an encounter with what we are not: “What counters us inevitably constitutes the knowledge of our own limit, our
own form.”41 “The enemy,” argues Aureli in a quasi-Brechtian formulation, “estranges us from our familiar self-perception, and gives us back the sharp contour of our own figure.”42 Since form requires delimitation, architecture, as a formal practice of inscribing limits, achieves a political condition only when it is a “composition of parts” and never when it integrates us into the whole of the limitless “sea.” In the “composition of parts,” writes Aureli, “the concept of the formal and the concept of the political coincide and can be posited against notions such as urban space, urban landscape, and network.”43 Integration with the apeiron of urbanism would result in the dissolution of the political and the architectural alike, within a purely economic logic.44 This dissolution can only be resisted through what Aureli names as the “metaform of the archipelago.”45

In The Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, Aureli affirms the architectural archipelago as an essentially political form through an account of its periodic historical appearances. This account ranges across the works of figures such as Andrea Palladio, Giovanni Battista Piranesi, Étienne-Louis Boullée, Ludwig Hilberseimer, Oswald Mathias Ungers, and Rem Koolhaas. He praises Koolhaas and Elia Zenghelis’s project (as OMA) Exodus, or the Voluntary Prisoners of Architecture, for instance, for its projection of “an exacerbated version of communitarian citizenship based on self-imposed closure.”46 In the work of Ungers, Aureli finds a fully developed “theory of the city as an archipelago.”47 Ungers, especially in the 1977 project for the shrinking city of Berlin, The City within the City—Berlin as Green Archipelago, produces what Aureli understands to be a politically radical project in its refusal of the megastructural form of architecture prevalent in this period. The megastructure is held to integrate architecture with processes of urbanization, dissolving the possibility of the truly political architecture of the limited enclosure; Ungers’s project, in contrast, is “composed of islands, each of which was conceived as a formally distinct micro-city.”

Aureli also notes the significance of Ungers’s earlier research, undertaken with his wife Liselotte, on the history of communitarian (typically Shaker or Anabaptist) settlements in America:

Religious communities such as the Shakers were characterized by a principle of communal life in which there was no private property; all facilities were for collective use. This resulted in settlements whose form was organized for communal life, with an abundance of common spaces, and in clear contrast to cities, which are shaped by land ownership. Ungers observed that radical communality was possible only within limited settlements.48

It is this same possibility for a radically autonomous form of life in common that Aureli also locates in the case of “Red Vienna” and the “Hof” superblocks built there in the mid-1930s to accommodate the city’s workers. These superblocks collectively constitute a further historical instance of the archipelago. They are situated “within the city as self-sufficient islands in pronounced contrast to their surroundings . . . an archipelago of places for communitarian life.”49

The Agonies of the Archipelago

As a politics of architecture, Aureli’s archipelago is pitched against the economics of urbanism; the island against the sea, the limited against the apeiron. The decisiveness with which the political is opposed to the economic derives from the equally decisive function of architecture as, essentially and fundamentally, a practice of formal delimitation. This notion of what is essential and fundamental to architecture derives, in turn, from the Schmittian conception of the nomos, a word that comes, states Schmitt, from nemein, “a [Greek] word that means both ‘to divide’ and ‘to pasture.’ Thus, nomos is the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people becomes spatially visible.” Elaborating on the meaning of the nomos he continues that it can be “described as a wall, because, like a wall, it, too, is based on sacred orientations.”50 The decisive presence of the nomos as wall constitutes the foundational act of spatial ordering. It divides inside from outside, friend from enemy.

It is this decisiveness that no doubt endows what Aureli refers to as his “project” with its significant appeal for
those seeking to challenge the hegemony of the various ecoarchitectures and parametricisms, all the relational, infrastructural, and landscape urbanisms, and their relentless reassertions of the fluid, flexible, and self-organizing. To these, “the project” offers a clear and concise set of formulations that appear readily translatable into design thinking and practice. Less often reflected upon, however, are the implications of the politics of agonism on which the archipelago model is premised.

It is seldom noted, for instance, that the political agonism adopted by Aureli is essentially opposed to the possibility of any radical transformation of the social in its totality. The politics of agonism is, by definition, opposed to any form of universalism or internationalism on which any such transformation would depend. It cannot countenance the termination of the friend-enemy distinction, or any movement toward this possibility as a political goal. There must be an ineluctable and untranscendable condition of conflict. For Aureli this is essential to our identity, but it forecloses the possibility of identities that are formed not through the appropriation, settlement, and delimitation of land but on relations of solidarity despite of, and across, boundaries, borders, and walls. As the philosopher Mark Neocleous writes, “For Schmitt the vision of a world without the state, without the political friend-enemy distinction and without war is an absurd and impossible dream. It is also of course a communist, but not a fascist one.”

While for Aureli the promise of agonism is clearly reoriented to an entirely different agenda from that of Schmitt, the impossibility of even moving toward the overcoming of conflict is, for him, unviable: the overcoming of conflict would annul the political dimension itself (as it is understood here). There can be no dialectical movement of synthesis. But if this is supposed, somehow, to forestall the universalizing managerialism of life, it serves equally to delegitimize any equally universalizing opposition to this prospect. There can only be parts—separate, distinct, and opposed to one another.

In its essentializing tendencies, the formalism through which the identities between the political, the architectural, and the communal are forged is equally problematic. There are no guarantees that small-scale, architecturally delimited settlements will produce or sustain forms of commonality with any even vaguely radical or progressive orientation. As the cultural historian Fred Turner, amongst others, has made plain, the communes of America’s West Coast counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s, for instance, were largely organized and populated by affluent white men. The organization of these communes tended to exacerbate patriarchal prejudices, sustain class distinctions, and produce friend–enemy distinctions of the most racist sort between the communalists and the marginalized ethnic groups they encountered.

It might also be noted that gated communities and securitized apartment blocks, with facilities shared in common, are very much the preferred form of dwelling for the urban rich and super-rich wanting to insulate themselves from the chaos of their immediate surroundings. An archipelago of secured enclaves increasingly defines patterns of urban development. The occupants of these are, precisely, enabled through the decisiveness of walls and boundaries to establish their identities in contradistinction to those of the urban masses that surround them. The formal identity between the archipelago and the political agonism of the friend–enemy distinction appears to work then, but to what end?

Aureli’s project appears to challenge the essentially neoliberal turn of contemporary urbanization, as well as the models and practices with which architectural, landscape, and urban design have tended to serve it of late. This challenge is, however, in its very definition of the political, absolutely compromised by its Schmittian origins—mythopoetical, archaic, and formalist—at its core. In discounting the possibility that the unlimited—the urban—might itself be a space simultaneously and complexly economic and political, this project effectively concedes the greater part of the territory to the putative enemy. It offers only the possibility of secession from the networks of globalized urbanization that are already deemed nonpolitical. In doing so, Aureli’s politics of form misses what is effectively political in the making fluid, connective, and productive of the urban, especially under the contemporary imperatives of neoliberalism.

Marx and Engels, of course, already understood the process of urbanization and its economic modes of production in explicitly political terms. This process is understood, dialectically, as the ground of any future universal struggle—antagonistic rather than agonistic—against capital, in their Communist Manifesto. Many figures within Western Marxism, perhaps most notably Henri Lefebvre, have since taken up and developed their analysis in attempting to understand the politics of urbanization in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. From a different perspective, but equally concerned with the political, Foucault’s concept of the “biopolitical” understands the production of subjectivity, especially that occurring within neoliberalism, as a political operation achieved through economic means.

In addition to the politics of urbanization, there is also a politics of design that is effectively obscured by Aureli’s position. By the logic of Schmitt’s definition of the political, design that is not concerned with the decisive production of limits and boundaries is not political. The production and articulation of networks, the channeling of subjects according to preferred patterns of movement and association, in fact the very act of dismantling limits and boundaries is, though,
a political practice. It is the politics of this practice—and its framing as progressive, natural, and ecological, as in the case of Landscape Urbanism—that needs to be contested, rather than discounted tout court as a manifestation of the unlimited. The alternative is a politics of regression to an archaically conceived pre-economic condition of autonomy, a monastic politics of retreat that—while now perhaps desirable to some—is evidently attainable only by the most economically privileged. A more ambitious politics would be ready to engage in the no doubt more fraught struggle to understand, and act upon, the spaces of the unlimited as a radically universalizing and collective project.

03. Ibid., 92.
04. Ibid.
06. Ibid., 234.
07. Ibid.
09. Ibid., 20.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid., 6.
17. Schmitt, Land and Sea, 49.
21. Schmitt, Land and Sea, 47.
22. Schmitt, Land and Sea, 47.
24. Miletus was unique, notes Seaford, in being at the center of a “commercial network stretching in all directions over much of the known world united . . . by that common currency of precious metals (uncoined or coined) that increasingly provided a measure of value and means of exchange, a substrate of all commercial activity.” In ibid., 208.
25. Ibid., 205–08.
26. Ibid., 166. Emphasis in the original.
27. Ibid., 169.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., 166. Emphasis in the original.
30. Ibid., 168.
33. Ibid., 235.
35. Ibid., 35.
36. Ibid., 33.
38. Aureli, Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, 235.
39. Aureli is, of course, by no means unique in assuming the broad proposition that the politics of Schmitt—despite and not because of his fascism—might offer useful lessons for the political left. For a discussion and critique of this, see Mark Neocleous, “Friend or Enemy? Reading Schmitt Politically,” Radical Philosophy 79 (September/October, 1996), 13–23.
41. Aureli, Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, 29.
42. Aureli, Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, 29.
43. Aureli, Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, 31.
44. Aureli, Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, x.
45. Aureli, Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, xii.
47. Aureli, Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, 178.
48. Aureli, Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, 199.
49. Aureli, Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, 201.
50. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth, 70.
52. Aureli makes clear his rejection of the Hegelian dialectic, arguing that “the political realizes the solution of conflict not by a synthesis of the confronting parts, but by recognizing the opposition as a composition of parts.” Possibility of an Absolute Architecture, 29. Emphasis in the original.
55. This retreat to the monastic, affirmed as an autonomous form of life that might be recovered as an alternative to the current conditions of urbanization, is presented in Pier Vittorio Aureli’s Less is Enough: On Architecture and Asceticism (Moscow: Strelka Press, 2013). For a critique of this proposition see Douglas Spencer, “Less than Enough: A Critique of Aureli’s Project,” in This Thing Called Theory, ed. Teresa Stoppiani, Giorgio Ponzo, and George Theomistokleous (London: Routledge, 2016).

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