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Gillies, V. and Edwards, R.

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Family Policy and the Data Revolution

Val Gillies and Ros Edwards

The 2016 Brexit referendum and the tumultuous events that followed have dominated subsequent policy centred debates and governing rationales. Constitutional crises, internecine feuds and the ongoing fallout from the Covid pandemic have seen off three successive Conservative Prime Ministers in six years and directed attention away from concerns that occupied administrations of the past. In particular, family as a prominent cause shaping the Cameron era has appeared to recede into virtual invisibility. Most notably, when Theresa May took power she substituted the previous administrations promise of a 'better future for hard working families' for the assertion that she was 'working hard for hard working people'. Her successor, Boris Johnson's own 'complex' family relationships turned family policy into a minefield for his government and foreclosed entirely any Cameron style moralising on the subject.

However, it would be a mistake to view the post Brexit years as a vacuum for developments in family policy. While more recent Conservative administrations have moved away from a family centric agenda, a lack of rhetoric and debate masks substantial developments in operational governance techniques, the effect of which have led to a significant reshaping of family state relationships. Details of these changes are more likely to be found buried deep in digital strategy documents rather than in political speeches and government papers. To be more specific, we are referring to what Denick et al (2019) have described as data driven governance and the use of digital surveillance and automated scoring to categorise, target and regulate family life. The last decade has seen a marked techno-administrative turn, with family state relationships increasingly mediated through online portals and dashboards. Over the last few years this data centric approach has accelerated towards an algorithmic approach to governance through the incorporation of big data surveillance and predictive analytics to regulate and manage populations.

In this chapter we show how this new mode of digital governance came to dominate Conservative visions for a stable future and how this was pursued through a privatised style of social investment. The 'troubled families' targeted by the Cameron administration were translated into digital data points and monetized, monitored and nudged as part of a quiet 'data led revolution'. We begin by drawing out the phased development of this techno-social imaginary across the Cameron, May and Johnson administrations, and show how a vocal commitment to tackle ingrained social ills through 'gripping' and 'turning around' dysfunctional families morphed into a more surreptitious data led decisions and interventions. We reflect on how this quiet revolution marked an ideological and pragmatic shift in conservative politics melding, neoliberal authoritarianism with a brand of populist conservatism. We conclude, the chapter with a brief consideration the likely future direction of the Truss administration.

Troubled families and the turn to data

When the Conservative Coalition Government came to power in 2010 they inherited a social investment centred policy infrastructure from the previous New Labour administration. Blair's 'third way' philosophy had positioned children and families as holding the key to the future success and prosperity of late capitalism and had operationalised this conviction through a front loading of state spending on 'human capital development', investing in nursery entitlement, Sure Start, tax credits and substantial network of child welfare and parenting support organisations. A similar policy framework was embedded across much of the European Union, reflecting a widespread faith that early social investment in human capital would promote future economic growth and social stability. After winning the 2010 election the incoming Conservative led coalition retained the optimistic and progressive sounding narrative of investment in children, but crucially they withdrew most of the financial framework sustaining it.

The extent to which the Conservative party ever really bought into the principle of a family centred investment state is debateable, but in the early years of the Coalition, Family policy appeared to represent an unambiguous point of convergence between Liberal democratic and conservative agendas. David Cameron and his liberal democrat deputy, Nick Clegg were apparently united in their concern to increase intergenerational social mobility. But significantly, this agenda was pursued alongside a ruthless program of austerity cuts. New Labour's social investment spending was branded ineffective, profligate and unaffordable in the wake of an economic crisis. A commitment to responsibilizing and upskilling parents remained in place, but services and provisions were replaced by attempts to more precisely target the most 'dysfunctional' and or needy families.

At the same time an extensive reform of the social security system was begun with the aim of rolling all benefit payments into one means tested 'Universal Credit' with added conditionality and sanctions which worked to inculcate the values and behaviour traditional family unit (Anderson 2021; Bennett 2020). A 'two child benefit cap' was introduced to discourage parents from having more children than they can support and households were required to make a joint claim and receive the allowance each month in one bank account, as they would if they were in work. Furthermore, couples had to nominate one parent, most likely to be female according to equality impact assessments (DWP 2011) to be a 'lead carer', vulnerable to being pulled into employment related conditionalities if the household income were to fall below a fixed threshold.

This disciplining of poor families was pursued more aggressively through the introduction of the Troubled Families Program (TFP), one of the coalition's most prominent and expensive policy agendas. Launched in 2012 after a period of rioting and disorder in England, the TFP was officially tasked with 'mending our broken society' and 'tackling 'a culture of disruption and irresponsibility that cascades down through generations' (Cameron 2011). Heavy on moral rhetoric and recycled tropes of the underclass and 'problem families', the program far outlived Cameron's two term premiership, even though it fell well short of its stated objectives. Despite the

scathing results of an independent evaluation suggesting the program made no meaningful difference to the lives of the families it targeted it (Day et al), the Cameron Government expanded the remit and funding for the TFP to encompass families with health care problems or in need of help. The Program remains a key source of Government expenditure having since changed its name to 'Supporting Families' under the Johnson administration.

From its inception the structure of the TFP was inchoate and difficult to distinguish from the family support work that was already in place. The gap between the inflated political rhetoric justifying the program's administration and its practical implementation was vast (Crossley). In practice the TFP operated more as a local authority funding stream than a discrete family intervention program, but its impact on the structure and delivery of family services, and on family state relationships more generally has been significant. More specifically, the TFP has operated to accelerate an administrative 'datafication' of households with family practices being translated into digital data points in order to analyse, monitor, predict and pre-empt their behaviour (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier 2013). Lying beneath the TFPs somewhat derivative pledge to tackle 'problem families' was a novel payment by results system that allocated funding to local authorities, on the basis of an audit trail. Overseen by the Department for Communities and Local Government, the TFP offered participating councils an 'introductory' fee for identifying families meeting the 3 of 4 'troubled' criteria (worklessness, high service use, involvement with criminal justice services and poor school attendance). A final payment was designated to follow on evidence of successful behaviour change.

This funding did not compensate for the swinging austerity cuts that had by that point been administered to children's services, but it represented a significant resource for cash strapped local authorities. Eligible regions chasing the TFP funds, were forced into an unprecedented collection, linking and processing of data on local families to produce the digital trails demanded by central government. The funding structure underpinning the TFP and the digital surveillance mechanisms it generated constituted more than an administrative technicality. As we will outline, the Cameron administration paved the way for a new data led governance of families operating through the financialization of intervention projects and routine involvement of private industry and investors. This has since evolved into a distinctly techno solutionist approach to family policy characterised by a shift away from the responsabilization of parenting to increase social mobility and a lurch instead towards attempts to maintain of social order and manage criminogenic populations. In the following sections we demonstrate how family policy was unobtrusively digitized under the May administration and subsequently tied to a broader logic of algorithmic governance under Johnson's succession.

Theresa May: the digital transformation

The twists and turns of Brexit defined Theresa May's short premiership, deflecting attention away from her rather uninspiring policy agenda. Her social reform commitments were vague and unmemorable, but her administration oversaw highly significant changes to frameworks of governance and service provision. In 2017,

May's Government set out a plan to 'transform the relationship between citizen and state' by drawing on the tools, techniques, technology and approaches of the internet age'. The Government Transformation Strategy (GTS) styled itself as the most ambitious programme of change of any government anywhere in the world', promising the digitisation of the state and the use of data as an enabler of services. Built on previous plans to make transactional public services 'digital by default' by the GTS heralded an extensive reorganisation of government infrastructure, including a re-engineering of welfare state delivery. The first Government service to become internet only was the newly introduced Universal Credit structure, the social security system supporting the poorest families in the country. Access to benefits became contingent on a claimant's ability to navigate complex automated online systems further marginalising the most disadvantaged (Alston 2018). Moreover, electronic applications left an easily trackable digital trail integrating the data centric focus of the Troubled Families Program by supporting the measurement and meeting of behavioural targets. By this point plans had also been drawn up to digitize to link children and families data across health, care and education sectors (NHS England 2016).

This digital turn in governance was justified largely on the basis of efficiency. It was argued that state services would be streamlined and costs cut (ref). In practice though the digital by default rollout racked up public expenditure by making the state heavily reliant on private sector provided IT resources and expertise, (Dunleavy et al 2018). Corporate involvement in digital governance extended beyond support and maintenance of systems to shape the integral content and delivery of services, as exemplified by the Troubled Families Program. The implementation of the program required a whole new data infrastructure. The administrative data caches required to identify and track 'troubled families' were originally held within hundreds of separate and or incompatible central and local government repositories as well as by independent services and charities. Each database enforced their own storage protocols to ensure compliance with the Data Protection Act and few had the requisite inhouse technological abilities or resources to effectively manage the new data demands being placed on them.

The introduction of the TFP, forced local authorities to 'innovate' at speed, supported by a wide range of government funding streams and quangos (Gillies et al). Most councils, participating in the TFP turned to private companies specialising in 'data solutions'. They were guided by the government's 'digital marketplace', a procurement hub set up to promote access to around 3000 data analytics companies, many offering products and services specially tailored towards family intervention (Edwards et al). Many companies designed bespoke dashboards allowing local authorities to manage the TFP requirements, bringing together the family data necessary to maximise Payment By Results funds while promising to pinpoint which families are likely to meet or fail particular criteria. Pioneering councils found they were able to access proliferation of organisation were set up supporting councils to adopt data analytics. The Innovation Fund, the London Office of Technology and Innovation (LOTI), the Digital Information Fund, the London

Challenge Programme, Social Finance, and the Local Digital Accelerator Fund are all enabling councils to adopt and develop data analytics in children's services.

And having been incentivised and coerced by central government to invest in digital infrastructure to access TFP revenue, many local authorities upgraded and extended the range of tools and services to wider populations. Digital dashboards and surveillance products offering 'holistic' profiles of individual household members are now commonly used and often have the capacity to categorise and flag characteristics, behaviours or social associations as 'risky' to support decision making by social workers and other professionals. The data analytics company Sentinel Partners, for example offers local authorities a 'Single View' dashboard offering a 'true' account of an individual and 'a fully joined-up view of all that is known and all that has gone before' (<https://www.sentinelpartners.co.uk/single-view>). Pioneering councils found they were able to access a proliferation of funds to help them develop and extend their technical capacity in their work with children and families.

As such, the Troubled Families Program helped pave the way for a radically altered family / state relationships characterised by real time 'dataveillance' and an actuarial focus on risk management. While the governing of poor families has always revolved around the recording, categorisation and coding of their lives and relationships, digital technology and the real time surveillance systems have transformed the way that families can be understood and targeted. As Emily Keddell (2014) has pointed out troublesome behaviour and parenting are reified as objectively knowable through data about sets of characteristics and aspects of behaviour, turning difficulties into estimable risks. In the process, families struggles are interpreted through an individualistic and moralistic lens, with the behaviour of parents and their children abstracted from their social and structural context, often with the aim of meeting datafied targets.

Moreover, the TFP also acted as a gateway for greater involvement of private industry and investors in children's services (Redden et al 2020). As Hintz (2019) notes data driven governance is built upon the processes, logics and technologies of the private sector. The datatification of families in policy has worked to further embed and accelerate the financialization of public policy by streamlining social impact bonds (SIBs) as a transactional model of welfare. SIBs are designed to generate a surplus for an upfront capital investment in a public intervention or service on the basis that a set of pre-determined goals are met. Initially launched as part of Cameron's Big Society agenda, they were further embedded and celebrated by May as part of her vision for a 'shared society' (May 2017). They operate as a Conservative reworking of social investment models, commodifying family services that had previously received direct government funds. For example, the Life Chances Fund, launched in 2016 by the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) allocated £80 million to financing SIBs in priority areas including children's services, the early years and young people.

Extensive government subsidy and datification of families have swollen the market value of SIBs, but evidence of their effectiveness has so far been elusive (Huckman 2020; Sinclair et al 2021). They are complex and costly projects to administer and require a sophisticated market infrastructure, including extensive data metrics to calculate financial risk and evidence impact. They also impose a significant burden on welfare providers while reducing their flexibility to meet family's needs (Edminston and Nicholls 2018). They do, however, further a broader conservative mission to privatise public and social services while resonating with the emerging techno-solutionist logic that came to propel much of the subsequent government's approach to policy making.

Boris Johnson: Levelling up from 'seeing rooms'

As the Brexit drama saw off Theresa May's Government and framed the early months of Johnson's administration, Dominic Cummings, Johnson's controversial chief advisor pushed forward a technocratic imaginary of 'smart governance'. His proposal was for a centralised, data driven policy model, harnessing the power of big data and technology to improve decision making, and thereby solve a wide range of engrained social problems. Having called an early general election, Johnson reclaimed rhetoric around 'working families' for his manifesto, but after a resounding victory the practicalities of leaving the EU, a global pandemic and Cummings controversial reforms to state structures dominated his policy agenda. Cummings vision was of 'hub and spoke' governance with decision making managed at the centre by data scientists, mathematicians, physicists and other 'talented weirdos' from panoptic 'seeing rooms' equipped with live data streams (Cummings 2019; 2020). The Covid health crisis quickly exposed the major flaws in this mechanistic policy model and led to the swift demise of its architect. Shortly after, Johnson was to follow, in ignominy.

While Cummings position at the centre of power was short lived and destined to end in acrimony, the accelerationist philosophy he championed retained considerable momentum. Belief in the capacity of datification and automation to depoliticise policy decisions and deliver efficiencies had already gained considerable ground under May's administration. The Johnson Government focused attention on the achieving greater integration of artificial intelligence into policy frameworks and public delivery. The public sector was positioned a 'buyer' with the government helping services 'to evaluate suppliers, then confidently and responsibly procuring AI technologies for the benefit of citizens' (DCMS 2021). This was followed with plans to accelerate the use of transformative technologies, including in the delivery of new family support services. The COVID-19 pandemic provided an additional justification for innovation, with the government releasing an updated National Data Strategy stating:

Our experience responding to the coronavirus pandemic ... has underlined the need for the public sector to move away from a culture of risk aversion towards a joined-up approach, where the presumption is that, with appropriate safeguards, data should be shared to drive better outcomes.

As the initial shock of the Covid pandemic receded public concern focused on the impact of extended lockdowns and school closures on children. In response the then

Chancellor, Rishi Sunack introduced a 'start for life' offer in his 2021 spending review and promised to direct £300 million to fund family support projects. Start for Life was positioned predominantly as a health initiative, with responsibility for family support shifting away from a social investment centred emphasis on education to a more explicit focus on 'growing up well'. Parenting programs were to be targeted at improving perinatal mental health and breastfeeding support, while a new 'family hub' system was introduced to 'transform' the way universal services are delivered.

This proposal was at the time widely misread as an attempt to revive the Sure Start network of children's centres introduced by New Labour in the late 1990s. This comparison was tacitly encouraged by the Government, with the then Children's minister, Will Quince describing family hubs as 'Sure Start ++'(Hill 2021). Rachel Reeves, the shadow Chancellor dismissed them as pale imitation of Sure Start, but even this unfavourable contrast hugely overstated the similarities. Unlike the wide-ranging provision introduced as part of the Sure Start roll out the Family Hubs project delivered relatively modest changes to service delivery models, bringing together already established resources to create centralised access points for services and support. Most Family Hubs operate from the few underfunded children centres spared from austerity cutbacks, while many exist only as virtual online spaces signposting parents towards services. Crucially, this focus on meeting the needs of families was tied to the digitisation and sharing of personal child health records (commonly known as the red book) as well as a specific 'information sharing strand' requiring selected local authorities to develop, test, and embed digital and data products into family services (DHSC and DfE 2022).

The introduction of the family hubs was linked to a further extension and development of the Troubled Families Program which received another £165 million in funding to extend its scope and ambition. This involved a name change to 'Supporting Families' and a yoking of its aims to Johnson's vaguely articulated pledge to 'level up' society. Criteria for inclusion in Supporting Families was widened out substantially to encompass almost any family relying on non-statutory state services, while the objectives became about building 'strong multi-agency local partnerships in every area, and mature local and national data systems, which enable partners to identify families in need of extra help, target services more effectively and track family level outcomes over the long term' (HCLG 2021). Supporting Families also received its own innovation strand with £7.9 million allocated to fund a 'Children and Families Data Accelerator Fund'. The purpose of this was to improve the efficiency of data linkage and to develop more sophisticated data practices to identify, target and address family problems.

Beneath the policy jargon, grandiose claims and euphemisms the practical implications of this data centric policy trend are remarkably difficult to ascertain. Local authorities in England and Wales are now evidently deploying highly sophisticated digital tools to shape and inform their engagement with families, but there is a striking lack of transparency about these practices. Intensive and persistent investigations using freedom of information requests have revealed a widespread collection and 'warehousing' of households' data by councils and increasing use of artificial intelligence to automatically classify, flag, and target families. Many councils have been supported to build, operate or rent unstructured

'data lakes' merging together information formats (administrative data, images, credit records, phone calls, social media posts and other information scraped from the internet). Data lakes support a move beyond panoptic style data surveillance to embrace new techniques of prediction and prevention using data mining and machine learning. These allow vast quantities of accumulated population data to be searched ('mined') for identifiable patterns or correlations with the intention of generating predictive algorithms to guide decision making and practices (generally known as predictive analytics).

Precise details of these tools and their applications are hidden behind commercial confidentiality clauses and Freedom of Information exemptions. It took tenacious research by the civil liberties campaigning group, Big Brother Watch to uncover the widespread implementation of 'digital solutions' by local governments, including Low Income Family Trackers (LIFTs.) Developed by the company Policy in Practice, these are used to identify disadvantaged households in order to target them for interventions (e.g. advice on debt or invitation to a weight loss clinic). The trackers process large amounts of linked data to categorise families as: in crisis, struggling, at risk or coping. More powerful products developed by data analytics specialists Xantura are also widely used to predict and risk model debt and financial vulnerability, child protection, homelessness, fraud and even risks associated with Covid. Xantura's OneView package processes both structured and unstructured data scraped from the internet and claims to identify all sorts of issues including individuals' anger issues, dangerous dogs and a history of unsafe sex (EY and Xantura Covid-19 Analysis, Project Briefing cited in Big Brother Watch 2021).

Automated justice

While presented as apolitical administrative reform, this trajectory towards dataveillance, automation and techno- social management of families marked a substantial shift in policy. The vocal commitment to early years intervention and social mobility of the Cameron era faded as rationales for data innovation began to focus almost exclusively on the pre-emption of problems rather than on the maximisation of children's future potential. References to 'early intervention' remain but are used to emphasise the importance of cost savings and harm prevention rather than childhood investment. Data led family intervention projects stress the importance of 'acting early' but the age of children targeted has moved significantly upwards and away from the previous policy preoccupation with under-fives. Instead, predictive analytics projects tend to profile and risk score over 10 year olds marking a further convergence of family policy with crime reduction agendas. The predictive analytic models currently in use are predominantly designed to prevent gang activity, county lines, sex trafficking, antisocial behaviour, domestic violence, homelessness and fraud. In many cases the data warehouses/lakes are run by, or in collaboration with local police forces.

A typical example is Bristol County Council's 'Insight Bristol', project, created in partnership with the Behavioural Insights Team (originally set up by the Cabinet Office). Insight Bristol operates as an interagency data warehouse and analytics hub centred around a 'Think Family' database and run by Avon and Somerset Police.

Insight Bristol draws in data from over 35 sources including undisclosed privately operated databases. Predictions are made to target the families of children who are calculated to be at risk of 'criminal exploitation', 'sexual exploitation', becoming violent and or 'NEET' (not in education, employment or training). Similar projects, either directly or indirectly funded by central government are running in wide variety of English local authorities including London Borough's, Essex, Kent and Dorset. There is little evidence that targeted individuals receive any substantial extra services or support. In many cases they are merely 'flagged' as high risk to inform and shape the practices of any professionals they come into contact with.

Child protection services are another area targeted for digital innovation, with the aim being to automatically risk profile families and identify children at risk from abuse or neglect. Algorithmically driven social care scoring systems have been trialled in a number of local authorities and continue to be deployed despite their poor track record in overlooking the majority of at-risk children and young people (ref). This underwhelming performance has done little to dent government ambition and is instead assumed to highlight the need for more data and better modelling. Meanwhile concerns are growing about the impact on targeted families and the potential for such technologies to amplify inaccurate and discriminatory categorisations. While evidence supporting the benefits of AI in this context is thin, profiling and risk scoring have been found to amplify inaccurate and discriminatory categorisations, and to punish the most vulnerable families in societies (Eubanks 2017;

A constant then across the various Conservative administrations has been the positioning of poor families as dysfunctional and potentially criminogenic. However, efforts to responsablize 'troubled' household have significantly receded. Rather than attempting to reform and re-educate disadvantaged parents' entitlements, sanctions and interventions are increasingly enforced via automated portals. Contemporary datified modes of family regulation move beyond attempts to discipline and subjectivise through shame, stigma and threats, towards an actuarial management applied at scale and commonly without the knowledge or understanding of the targeted individuals. Families can not easily see the digital categorisations that identify them and so cannot engage or challenge them.

This bypassing of individual knowledge and autonomy sharply distinguishes current data centric approaches from previous family policy directions. Longstanding efforts to harness the family as a cipher for individual responsibility, social order and cohesion are being replaced by a technocratic concern with calculation, prediction and control of populations, undermining ideals of the foundational self-determining liberal subject in the process. This public policy data revolution has been pursued as part of a Conservative drift to the political right, linked to a broader global ascendancy of right-wing populism in the context of growing political, economic and social crises. Political theorists have described how these forces constitute new operational logics of neoliberalism, characterised by authoritarian conservatism welded to market-based rationales and riding roughshod over established liberal structures and values (refs). Nationalistic rhetoric and promises of protection and crime prevention take precedence with policy practices increasingly depoliticised as

neutral, pragmatic technical 'solutions'. The effect has been to redraw boundaries between families and the state largely without the knowledge and consent of those impacted, cutting across long held expectations of privacy and democracy.

Concluding thoughts

In this chapter we have shown how a lack of clearly articulated family policy from the May administration onwards has belied a very substantial change in family state relationships. We've detailed how quietly enacted turn to digital innovation has resulted in widespread 'datification' of families and mathematical management via unprecedented levels of surveillance. This emerging data regime marks a substantial change from previous efforts to safeguard the 'normal' development of children and works instead to identify and manage broad, geolocational indicators of risk. Family relationships remain a key site for state intervention, but the aim and focus has shifted away from engagement with individual subjects, towards attenuation and control at the level of broad, stratified populations, largely through the policing and punishing of poor families. This data centric approach has been characterised by deeper and faster privatisation, with public private partnerships driving and capitalising on digital innovation in family services. Key corporate players like Sentinel Partners and Xantura are operating largely outside of public knowledge and scrutiny and well beyond traditional expectations of transparency and accountability.

As Liz Truss takes office as the fourth Conservative prime minister in a row, there is no indication of any immediate change in direction for family policy. As former secretary of state for the Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Truss promised to turn Britain into a 'global tech powerhouse' and proposed major reform to privacy and data protection laws to 'help the UK realise the benefits of greater personal data use' (DDCMS 2022). But while efforts may remain focused on the datafication, surveillance and control of poor families in the short term, this technological approach is expensive and lacking in public trust, while its utility remains dubious. The widespread introduction of risk scoring and predictive analytics have not offset the social impacts of austerity and have instead coincided with mounting social ills in violent crime, child poverty and neglect, family and youth homelessness and poor mental health. It remains to be seen how long this techno social imaginary will sustain in the current context of an energy crisis, soaring inflation, economic stagnation and industrial unrest.

provide a single access point – a universal ‘front door’ – to services for families with children of all ages. Family Hubs involve co-location of services and professionals to make it easier for families to access the services they need, and this can include both physical locations and virtual offers.

Advanced Research and Invention Agency (800 million funding and exempt from Fols)

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legal restrictions were increasingly recast as semi-porous boundaries to be routed or reconstituted for the public good.

<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jun/27/britain-welfare-state-shadowy-tech-consultants-universal-credit>

Privatisation

marks a substantial change from previous family intervention frameworks in its broad scope and ambition of identifying and managing broad, geolocal indicators of risk. It also builds

While the governing of poor families has always revolved around the recording, categorisation and coding of their lives and relationships, digital technology and capacity has transformed the way that families are known and regulated (Edwards et al).

operating to incentivise local governing authorities to adopt to data analytics and behavioural targeting through a payment by results system that would . Administered by central government (the

Broad liberal democratic approach with some more conservative nods Equal marriage rights and removing couples tax penalty

rhetoric stressing the need for more initiatives

targeted at the very poor and the very young are an effective driver

for the narrowing of universal provision in the context of austerity. It

page 69

In whose best interests?70

Challenging the politics of early intervention

also proves a useful vehicle to demonstrate their tough stance on crime

and welfare, lending credence to wider attempts to blame and place

responsibility on the poo

Conservative doctrine

Peck Neoliberalism as a authoritarian moral project (quotes Thatcher saying that economic problems have their roots in immoral human behaviour)

technological rationale back to

reflecting on the continuities and differences

Family state privacy boundaries

Privitistion

We show how this quiet revolution marks a

In this chapter we will trace the foundations of this techno-administrative turn to the Cameron era and more specifically to his flagship intervention project, the 'troubled families program'.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254136/bis-13-1250-strategy-for-uk-data-capability-v4.pdf

predictive analysis and the application behavioural

AI

Automation

Predictive analytics

three successive

Family a footnote to the nationalist project of Brexit

Decorative function

Through the vacuum

Cameron By supporting the family, we can increase opportunity and ensure everyone has the best possible start in life. Our ambition is to make Britain the most family-friendly country in the world.

Johnson – Pledge to lower childcare costs and cost of living and a few decorative references to family.

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