From Brazil to Britain: the vicissitudes of participatory budgeting: the importance of context

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FROM BRAZIL TO BRITAIN: THE VICISSITUDES OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT.

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Abstract

This project asks: How was it that a participatory practice, originating in the demands of social movements in Brazil, came to fit within the prevailing neoliberal orthodoxy? It explores changes within both neoliberalism and the practice of Participatory Budgeting (PB) itself. It examines PB’s Brazilian origins and the ways in which the process, initially emerging from protest movements, became a formal institutional process and a feature of Brazil’s new democracy, post authoritarian rule. It then explores developments in the process itself within Brazil, before examining its translation to the UK. PB in the UK is explored through an examination of the political climate into which it came to be deployed (i.e. Blair’s New Labour) and two concrete examples of the process (in Manton, Nottinghamshire and Tower Hamlets, London). It focuses on the way in which the discursive environment of operation (the context) impacts upon PB in terms of both its form and its potential. These explorations raise important questions about the roles and relationships of, and between, the state and the citizen in contemporary representative democracy. Arguing that context matters, it demonstrates ways in which an increase in participation may have a positive democratic impact, but this is not a given; an increase in participation may serve to either enhance or diminish democracy. This work makes use of policy analysis and field word. It uses the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe as a theoretical guide and asks what can be
learnt about PB’s journey, state/citizen roles and relationships, and the relationship between participation and democracy by using this particular theoretical lens.

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<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Church Action on Poverty</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLG</td>
<td>Communities and Local Government</td>
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<td>CPT</td>
<td>Community Pride Initiative</td>
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<td>CUT</td>
<td>Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers' Central)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCLG</td>
<td>Department for Communities and Local Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>DWP</td>
<td>Department for Work and Pensions</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPG</td>
<td>Empowered Participatory Governance</td>
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<td>FNPP</td>
<td>Fórum Nacional de Participação Popular</td>
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<td>GSR</td>
<td>Government Social Research profession</td>
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<td>HDR</td>
<td>Human Development Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institutions</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPI</td>
<td>Key Performance Indicator</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAA</td>
<td>Local Area Agreements</td>
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<td>LAP</td>
<td>Local Area Partnership</td>
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<td>LSP</td>
<td>Local Strategic Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Manton Community Alliance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDI</td>
<td>Multiple Deprivation Index</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>New Deal for Communities</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>National Indicators</td>
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<td>NMP</td>
<td>Neighborhood Management Pathfinders</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>Neighborhood Renewal Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>Orçamento Participativo (Participatory Budget)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODP</td>
<td>Office of Deputy Prime Minister</td>
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<td>PB</td>
<td>Participatory Budgeting</td>
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<td>PBU</td>
<td>Participatory Budgeting Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC doB</td>
<td>Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCT</td>
<td>Primary Care Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSTU</td>
<td>Partido Socialista dos Trabalhadores Unificado (Unified Socialist Workers’ Party)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party)</td>
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<td>SM</td>
<td>Social Movements</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN-Habitat</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDR</td>
<td>União Democrática Ruralista (Rural Democratic Union)</td>
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<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WC</td>
<td>Washington Consensus</td>
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For my father, for passing me the baton and
for Nick, for helping me keep hold of that baton.
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Declaration

I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work.
Introduction

The Landscape

There was a noticeable surge in the number of democracies towards the end of the twentieth century. Democracy spread from some 60 countries in 1985 to more than 140 in 2003, mostly in developing countries (UNDP, 2002). Increasingly, at the turn of the century, the challenge facing many countries was to develop institutions and processes that were more responsive to the needs of their citizens, especially the poor (ibid). For some there was an attitude of triumphalism regarding the spread of democracy, while for others there was, a feeling of fear and dismay (Gaventa, 2006), and a caution of hubris from those who did not accept the superiority of democracy in its current manifestations (e.g. Mouffe, 2000; 2005; 2009).

More recently, there has been mounting concern at the deficits of democracy in its current dominant liberal representative form, and an increasing sense that democracy is in crisis. Despite varying contemporary theories and models of democracy, common to almost all is the idea that participation can act as a panacea to the deficits of democracy as experienced by modern pluralist societies.
There are many different types of democracy. The current phase, the ‘third wave’\(^1\) of democracy and democratization, is characterised by a particular brand of democracy: liberal or neoliberal democracy (Huntington, 1991). It is this form that has become dominant and, in some quarters, has achieved a status of unquestionable common sense. Some of the most common and prominent ways of addressing the deficits of democracy, and thereby ‘deepen democracy’, have involved the implementation of a governance agenda and an increase in participation. Participation is seen by many as a central feature of good governance; a good in and of itself in terms of deepening democracy, and as a way to realise other goods associated with good governance, including greater transparency of government, greater accountability and responsiveness to the electorate, and improved efficiency with regard to policy formulation, implementation and realisation.

The ‘deepening democracy’ debate has evolved from discussing whether and how citizens should engage in the political process, to analysing how to ensure inclusiveness of participation and deepen citizen engagement in decision-making processes. Some theorists emphasise inclusion through participation in the democratic process, while others focus more on the quality of the dialogue that occurs between citizens and public actors. (GSRDRC, n.d.)

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\(^1\) Events such as the Arab Spring and the growing influence of digital media have lead some to start speculating about a fourth wave of democracy, N. Howard and M. Hussain (2013) for example. The existence and nature of a fourth wave remain debatable and its possible occurrence was/is after the main time period of concern to this project.
This project will argue that we need a clearer understanding of the various types and kinds of participation in order to understand the ways in which it may enhance democracy. The result of empirical analysis, this project draws out three distinct types of participation: transformation, inclusion and insertion. Ultimately it argues that what is often considered inclusion would actually be better understood as a form of insertion. In illustrating the way in which participation may either enhance or diminish democracy, the project reveals the need for more attention and work around the kinds and types of participation available in order to understand which will have the potential to make a positive impact on democracy.

The Question
This project attempts to answer one central question: How was it that a participatory practice originating in radical left-wing social movements came to fit within a Third Way neoliberal orthodoxy? The simple answer is that it was due to changes in both the practice and the prevailing orthodoxy. What is interesting, however, is why and how these changes occurred and what this story can tell us about both participation itself and its relationship with representative democracy.

The Hypothesis
This project takes a relatively uncontroversial hypothesis: participatory practices are predicated upon the discursive environment of their operation. In short, context matters. This is not to say that there are no other determining factors; participatory practices are overdetermined. This project tests the above hypothesis and looks to
explore the ways in which the discursive environment, in which participatory practices operate, affects them. This exploration, particularly in terms of ‘how’ and ‘why’ context matters, provides important insights into the different forms participation may take. It illustrates the way in which the same participatory practice may be used to increase very different forms of participation. This leads to more general reflection on different kinds and types of participation in both theory and practice. Exploring the consequences of the impact that context has on participatory practice raises important questions regarding the relationship between participation and representative democracy. There are now a diverse range of participatory practices; this project makes use of Participatory Budgeting (PB) as an example of such practices in order to test the hypothesis that context matters.

**Why Participatory Budgeting?**

The story of Participatory Budgeting is well known (Baiocchi and Gana 2014). Emerging out of the demands of the social movements of the 1970s and 1980s; today it has spread across the globe and become part of mainstream policy and practice; advocated by local governments, national governments and assorted international organisations (including the World Bank). Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a political process, made famous by Lula and the Workers Party (PT) in Brazil, which involves citizens in decisions regarding public budgets. It has spread across Brazil to Europe, and is now practiced in China and the US, with mounting interest in Africa and India. Many grand claims have been made on behalf of PB, these
include its description as a radical new political practice of the left, the greatest and most powerful form of participation currently being practiced, and the most effective way to address deficits in democracy i.e. the way to deepen democracy.

Today, the focus tends to be on PB as a policy innovation rather than as part of a democratic movement. The bulk of this literature focuses on issues of institutional design and policy diffusion. A return to the environment from which PB emerged suggests that what made PB appear so empowering, emancipatory and radical has as much, if not more, to do with the context from which PB emerged than it does with the formal institution of PB based on the Porto Alegre model, which most of the literature (policy and academic) takes to be the exemplar of PB.

Which Contexts?

This project is concerned with two specific contexts:

1. The context from which Participatory Budgeting emerged in Brazil and
2. The context in which it was introduced into the UK.

There is a rich and detailed literature on transitions to democracy (often from authoritarian rule). The majority of this literature comes from Development Studies and tends to be country specific (e.g. Weber, 2014). There is also a rich and in-depth literature on the specifics of Brazil’s transition (e. g. Stepan, 1989; Keck, 1992; Kingston and Power, 2008; Love and Baer, 2009). PB emerged at a moment

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2 Important exceptions include: Baiocchi, 2005; Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2012; 2014; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Cornwall, 2002; Cornwall, Romano and Shankland, 2008; Gaventa, 2006.
of great change in Brazilian history; Brazil was moving from an authoritarian dictatorship to a democracy. This project is specifically concerned with the Social Movements (SMs) that were operating within Brazil at this time.

The importance of context with regard to the import and export of policies and practices is well acknowledged. Even when problems are common, solutions are often different and context dependent; the problems associated with implementing ‘one size fits all’ policies have been well documented by the Development Studies literature. Generally, this has focused on the export of policies and practices from the North to the South. PB saw a reversal in this trend, namely, this time it was the North importing a practice which originated in the South.

The second context investigated in this project is the context into which PB was introduced in the UK. PB was first implemented in the UK at the time of the New Labour government. Discussion of this context illustrates the ways in which the mature, politically neutral, PB fitted well with government ideology and policy at the time. In contrast to Brazil, PB in the UK was introduced into a mature democracy with a pre-existing culture of civic engagement. The focus here is on neoliberal representative democracy and the approach to deepening democracy that stemmed from it in the UK.

As part of the demands of Brazilian Social Movements, PB challenged the orthodoxy of the time. Yet in the UK, PB did not present a challenge to mainstream
thinking and policy, but rather complemented it. Empirical evidence, predominantly in the form of government policy and vignettes (both academic and practitioner authored), suggests that PB's assimilation into mainstream government policy in the UK was primarily dependent on two factors: 1) a particular understanding of PB and 2) changes to political and economic orthodoxy. From this perspective, early Brazilian PB practices appear more innovative and display greater democratic potential than those in the UK.

**Methodology**

This research was conducted using a particular theoretical lens, namely the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe as articulated in their seminal work *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (2001) and its development in subsequent works, particularly those of Mouffe. This is not a work of high theory and does not attempt to unpick the intricacies of theory; rather it uses this theoretical orientation as a lens through which to view and to understand processes at work in the world. This work asks, “What can be gained by using this particular lens in terms of our understanding of contemporary political processes and practices?” In addition to the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, this research has significant empirical elements and makes use of policy analysis and fieldwork. In an attempt to avoid unnecessary bias, namely making practice fit theory, this research began with empirical investigations and analysis and then reflected back using the lens of discourse theory. The use of discourse theory becomes more apparent and explicit as this work moves from Chapter One through to Chapter Five and the conclusion.
Fieldwork

The decision to use vignettes for this project was predominantly informed by practical considerations. The lack of data available necessitated fieldwork. The context-sensitive nature of processes and the time and resources available required that one or two cases be chosen to study; resources would not allow for more and generalisations would be inappropriate. There have now been over two hundred and fifty processes in the UK; at the time this research began it is likely that the figure was closer to one hundred and fifty. The selection of Manton and Tower Hamlets as case studies for this project was based on practical considerations, as well as “special” and “specific” features these examples displayed. Full details on the selection process can be found in Chapter Four.

Initial discussions were held with members of staff at the PB Unit in the spring of 2010. Preliminary correspondence and conversations with those working on the design and implementation and evaluation of live PB projects in the UK were also initiated at this time. These discussions and correspondences raised several areas of practical concern including: the demands of fieldwork on the researcher, the availability of data, and the availability and amenity of potential interviewees.

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3 There are several notable exceptions. Blakey (2007), Blake (2008), and Rocke (2014) have all written academic papers on PB in the UK. SQW Consulting wrote a piece commissioned by the government which sought to evaluate PB in the UK. Practitioners developed their own materials for the running of individual processes. However with the exception of Tower Hamlets there is no substantive evaluative literature by practitioners on any of the individual processes. The literature on Tower Hamlets is extremely limited.

4 The exact figure remains unknown. Two hundred and fifty is a best guess of the UK PB Network and PB Partners. Matters are further complicated by ambiguity of definitions and criteria of and for PB. These problems of ambiguity are discussed in Chapters Two and Four.
Following these discussions and reading of the limited literature available on PB in the UK, a shortlist of six processes were drawn up. From the shortlist, Manton and Tower Hamlets were chosen as the vignettes for this project. These cases were chosen for a number of reasons, including points of similarity and contrast with each other and other UK PB projects (discussed in Chapter Four). There was an intensive period of fieldwork between the spring of 2010 and the beginning of 2011. This involved numerous conversations with those working at the PB Unit, formal and informal conversations and interviews\(^5\), and the attendance of meetings and workshops organised by the PB Unit. Fieldwork, however, continued in a far less intensive way throughout the duration of this project; relationships were developed with various academics and practitioners; conversations and attendance at meetings and workshops continued. I became a member of both the PB Network in the UK and a member of the steering group for the PB Network. The Network has close ties and links to the PB Partners, who are the leading practitioners of, and advisors for, PB practices in the UK.

The vignettes’ ability to speak to several questions was considered in the choosing of specific PB processes to research. These included:

i. What was/is the motivation behind the implementation of PB in the UK?

ii. What form has PB taken?

iii. What form of participation is aimed for and what form actually takes place in UK PB processes?

\(^5\) Full transcripts and/or recordings of formal interviews are available upon request.
iv. Do PBs illustrate a continuation or a break with traditional relations between the state and the citizen?

The vignettes’ ability to address these questions is discussed in Chapter Four; Chapter Three deals with question 1; Chapter Four deals with questions 2 and 3; Chapter Three begins to explore question 4, which is further explored by way of the vignettes themselves in Chapter Four.

Discourse Theory

The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe (2001) evidences the constitutive nature of discourse and the way in which it constructs what are the permitted, viable, livable, valid and legitimate identities and subject positions. These positions and subjectivities both legitimate and dictate certain behaviours. This project looks to reveal the way in which certain forms of citizenship are legitimated. This contingent legitimation dictates the permissible purview of the citizen. The post-foundational basis of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory views power, not as something that can be tamed or brought under control by citizens, but as pervasive of all relations whereby every order is necessarily hegemonic. On this account, democracy entails not so much the sharing or transferring of power but rather the revealing of the mechanisms of power. From a discourse theory perspective,
affect their lives. It is about their exercise of citizenship and political agency. (Cornwall, Romano and Shankland 2008, p.41)

Laclau and Mouffe’s work around the construction of a social reality, which appears as the reality (in that it appears as both necessary and the only possible one) but is in fact contingent and one of innumerable possible constructions, is crucial to this project. The political rhetoric of neoliberalism has come close to proclaiming the necessity of particular social realities, which is exactly what is precluded by the discourse theory advanced by Laclau and Mouffe. Margaret Thatcher’s ‘There is no alternative’ and Tony Blair’s assertion that the Third Way was the ‘only common sense way forward’ essentially appealed to an objective universal without contingency. From a discourse theory perspective, Third Way social democratic forms of neoliberalism have potentially deleterious consequences for democracy.

Today many politicians and their ideologies have removed the politics from ‘politics’. There are no longer ‘left’ or ‘right’ policies but only ‘good’ and ‘bad’ policies implemented by technocratic administrations. ‘The unchallenged hegemony of neoliberalism represents a threat for democratic institutions. (Mouffe 2000, p.6)

This challenges the assumptions that 1) participation can act as a panacea, and 2) participation will always enhance democracy. A discourse theory approach highlights the way in which contrasting interpretations of participation, which are predicated on specificity of particular discursive environments, may act so as to variously strengthen or weaken democracy.
Despite a growing interest in and an increased popularity of discourse theory generally it remains poorly understood by many. This is understandable given the complex, specific and discrete nature of this school of thought. The deep philosophical reflections and claims accompanied by highly abstract theory heavily influenced by psychoanalysis which characterise discourse theory renders it very different to much traditional and contemporary political theory and political science. The seminal work for this school, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Laclau and Mouffe 1989) was a deliberate attempt to make a break with a number of traditions which included a break with traditional Marxism and the creation a new understanding which incorporated Lacanian analysis. Although many of the terms central to discourse theory have been common parlance, for example hegemony and discourse, more often than not they are used in a way that divorces them from the philosophical and ontological claims. Discourse theory is as much metaphysics as it is political theory. However, in addition to being a philosophical work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy also contains within it a political project - a project for radical democracy; the two may be linked but the philosophical claims can and do stand independently of the political project. It is the ontological claims which form the theoretical framework of this piece not the political project.

Although there is often some conflation in the literature discourse theory when used as a tool is not so much discourse theory as discourse analysis. The distinction between discourse theory as a tool i.e. discourse analysis and discourse theory as
an approach is an important one. Discourse theory cannot be used as a tool or as an instrument. This work makes use of discourse theory as an approach and its analysis is in keeping with the ontological commitments of discourse theory. This is not to say that there is no analysis of specific discourses. Discourse theory draws our attention to specific occurrences like language games and articulations. Various discourses are discussed but they are discussed through a discourse theory lens. Using this lens enables us to reveal the contingent nature of these discourses despite their appearance of necessity and or universality; it also reveals their constitutive nature. Discourse theory is concerned with the way in which identities are constructed and interpreted, the way in which they are shaped and conditioned by discursive contexts through processes or articulation and re-articulation (Howarth &)

There is a common misunderstanding surrounding discourse theory namely that it is totalising. In fact discourse theory as initially conceived of by Laclau and Mouffe and subsequently developed by them and others, most notably Chouliaraki and Fairclough, Glynos, Howarth, Norval, Stavrakakis and Torfing, has always emphasised the undecidability of the social and the contingency of any given reality. No discourse is capable of completely hegemonising a field of discursivity (cf Laclau, Mouffe, Howarth, Norval, Stavrakakis, Torfing and Glynos). Discourse theory with ‘the theory of hegemony as the central axis of political analysis’ is primarily concerned with the construction of naturalising and universalising myths and imaginaries. It is this appearance of universalisation and discourse theories
insistence that any universal is a myth which is at its very core; it attempts to unveil what appears to be universal but what is in fact contingent. It looks to reveal the construction of relationships, systems and structures rather than taking them as given. Crucially ‘no discourse then is capable of completely hegemonising a field of discursivity’ (Howarth, Norval, and Stavrakakis, 2000, p. 15)

There are many well rehearsed debates about the value of discourse theory. Any ontology is necessarily hypothetical and debates around the merits of all and any ontological claims are rich and complex. This work is situated within this tradition but it is not a philosophical investigation into the merits of this tradition. This work does not engage with these philosophical debates in depth; it is not a philosophical work. It is however, worth briefly sketching some of the most often cited criticisms. These include it leading to idealism and/or relativist gloom, it cannot explain it can only describe and that it falls into the liars paradox i.e. its claim to be anti essentialist is in fact itself an essentialist claim (Stavrakakis 2013). These criticisms and the rebuttals are well covered in the literature (cf Geras, Glynos, Howarth, Laclau, Mouffe, Norval, Stavrakakis and Torfing) and although interesting are not of direct relevance to this project. There are, however, features of discourse theory which do present real challenges with regard to empirical work.

Early discourse theory tended to be little concerned with the empirical and attempts to make use of discourse theory to aid the understanding of empirical instances is relatively new. With notable exceptions, most coming from the Essex
School (eg. Chouliaraki and Fairclough, Glynos, Howarth, Norval, Stavrakakis and Torfing), few attempt to use discourse theory for empirical analysis. Many use terms taken from discourse theory but few make use of discourse theory itself. Discourse is not, as was previously noted, an instrument or toll and therefore cannot be used piecemeal.

Discourse theory is not prescriptive and therefore cannot provide insights as to what should be done. It can highlight problems and puzzles but it offers not solutions. Discourse theory does make at least one normative claim though and that is that political theory should not make normative claims. The question from a discourse theory perspective then is not ‘what is the proper role of the citizen’ but ‘what are the myths and imaginaries that a proclaimed proper role for the citizen is predicated upon’?

Discourse theory reveals the historical specificity that takes us to any given present conjuncture and views each conjuncture as specific and discrete. This prevents empirical analysis grounded in this approach from generating generalisation or even general guides and principles. The requirement of historical specificity means that empirical cases require long histories and a great deal of contextual information; empirical cases cannot be analysed in isolation. Historical specificity also dictates that analysis will always be retrospective, reductive and cannot be inductive. However, understanding how we arrived at a particular conjuncture can facilitate the development of strategies for change. The fact that each strategy will
be specific can be viewed as both a strength and a weakness; there can be no
general guidelines but it also appreciates that each conjecture will require specific
strategies and the problems associated with a ‘one size fits all’ solution have been
well documented.

Perhaps the biggest challenge for those wishing to undertake empirical work using
discourse theory is that it has tended to take an anti-epistemological stance
(Howarth and Torfing 2004). ‘Discourse theory adopts and even radicalises the
post-positivist critique of epistemology….There are no extra-discursive facts, rules
of method, or criteria for establishing that can guarantee the production of true
knowledge.’ (ibid p.27). This is not to say that things do not exist independently of
discourse, a common misunderstanding of discourse theory, things quite clearly do
exist independently of discourse but it is only through contingent representation
that they acquire meaning; our experience of reality is always discursively
mediated. The anti epistemological stance of discourse theory is a fair criticism and
does present a conundrum for empirical investigation. However, the fact that our
experience of reality is always discursively mediated is one of the greatest insights
of discourse theory. It is an ontological claim which according to discourse theory
applies to all experience, to all empirical work whether conducted through a
discourse theory lens or not.

It is only by taking an anti essentialist stance than we can even begin to imagine
transformation. Discourse theory does not give insight into transformative potential
of the individual as it does not operate at that level - the extent to which any individual may be empowered by a process is not something discourse theory can shed light on. Discourse theory seeks to understand the construction of subject positions and identities what they legitimate and what they deny. It does so at the societal not the individual level.

**Structure**

Chapter One illustrates the way in which PB originated from the demands and aims of a vibrant and diverse set of social movements in 1970s and 1980s Brazil. Particular attention is paid to the Workers Party (PT), its relationship with other movements, and its transition from a social movement to a political party. This chapter explores the role of the PT with regard to the initiation of PB and the subsequent development of PB within Brazil. It illustrates the way in which the PT, during its social movement phase at least, acted as an umbrella for a variety of disparate, and sometimes conflicting, causes and groups. The discussion of the Brazilian social movements also highlights the importance of 1) a reconfiguration of the political sphere, 2) the construction of a new political subject, and 3) the departure from traditional minimalist understandings of the nature of democracy itself. This chapter draws our attention to the ways in which these social movements were challenging the dominant hegemony; they were demanding an expansion of the political sphere and they were demanding a broader and deeper form of political subjectivity for citizens.
Chapter Two discusses the changes that PB underwent within Brazil before its export to other countries. It discusses the changes in PB itself vis-a-vis its diffusion, dissemination and translation. It touches upon the adaptability of neoliberal hegemony, but that is not the focus of the chapter (this adaptability is explored in more detail in Chapter Four). Chapter Two notes that, in addition to the practices themselves (their design and implementation), the discursive environment of the operation of PB practices is crucial to the ways in which they manifest themselves and the potential that they have. It shows that it was a matured and more neutral practice of PB, no longer associated with social movements and their political demands, that was taken up by other countries. It explores the changes that PB underwent in order to explain what made PB so attractive to others, gaining insight to the appeal and potential of PB processes. The focus is on general trends and changes rather than the specifics of institutional design. This chapter argues that PB underwent significant changes in Brazil itself prior to its export to other countries.

Combined, Chapters One and Two show how PB has been imbued with many false hopes which are based on PB as it was in its nascent form, rather than its later manifestations, which are generally the ones exported to other countries. It shows that PB in 2000 (the model imported to UK) was not the same as it was in the 1980s (its nascent form and the basis for many radical claims and hopes made in relation to PB). PB is seen as far more radical, innovative and disruptive in its initial
presentation. Asking ‘how and why it changed?’ opens the debate as to where its radical potential may lie.

Chapter Three focuses on neoliberal representative democracy and the approach to deepening democracy that stemmed from it in the UK. This chapter explores the new political settlement put forward by the New Labour government. It is particularly concerned with the Third Way social democratic form of neoliberalism and the associated roles of, responsibilities of, and relationships between, the state and the citizen. One of the ways in which the New Labour government was conspicuously different from its predecessor was in its emphasis on civic engagement. This is explored both in terms of ideology and rhetoric as well as concrete policy. Chapter Three looks specifically at the construction of the New Labour citizen, and associated constructions of citizenship and civic engagement. The policy and rhetoric of New Labour spoke to specific behaviours in terms of roles and responsibilities for, and of, the citizenry. These were reinforced by the introduction of material practices to enhance civic engagement. The underlying identities and subject positions which relate to these behaviours were not generally explicitly articulated in any detail and were, as Chapter Four argues, often incoherent and contradictory.

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6 This chapter contributed a lot to a conference paper I co-wrote (Daker and Jamieson, 2012).

7 Large sections of this chapter appear in a book chapter I co-wrote, (Jamieson and Fortis, 2012).
Having explored why the UK would want to import PB processes in Chapter Three, Chapter Four looks at the nature of two processes in the UK: ‘Voice Your Choice’ in Manton and ‘You Decide!’ in Tower Hamlets. Direct comparison of PB processes in different times and locations is not appropriate as the context is radically different. As mentioned above, PB processes are contextually sensitive in terms of the form the process itself takes, and the institutional design of the process. As PB processes are not uniform, it would not be appropriate to make generalisations. The use of vignettes aims to answer the following questions: what, how, by whom and why have PB processes been implemented in the UK. The conclusions drawn are limited by the investigation of two, rather than assessing all, experiences in the UK. There has been much research into PB experiences in Brazil, while there has been very little on the UK to date.

The vignettes highlight the importance of both who instigates and implements participatory practices and the importance of the context in which it operates. They also illustrate some of the many ways in which what is made available to participate in may be delimited.

Chapter Five reflects on the previous chapters and asks what we can learn from them. It looks at the implications of the arguments of the preceding chapters in relation to more general questions concerning the following:
i. The mechanisms of hegemony and the continued dominance of neoliberal hegemony, generally and specifically, in the face of significant criticism of and opposition to neoliberalism.

ii. The nature of participation and the various forms it may take

iii. The relationship between participation and representative democracy.

This chapter argues that an increase in participation has the potential to address deficits in democracy but it will not necessarily or automatically do so. In fact, it may further entrench undemocratic processes and structures. It suggests that we need a much better understanding of how participatory processes interact with traditional institutions of representative democracy.
CHAPTER ONE

The Origin and Development of Participatory Budgeting in Brazil

Introduction

The Workers Party (PT), especially since the election of Lula de Silva as president in 2002, was associated with a ‘Pink Tide’ washing over Latin America. Participatory Budgeting’s (PB) association with the PT and the so called Pink Tide have contributed to a perception of PB as radical. Orçamento Participativo (OP)/Participatory Budget (PB) is a process that emerged out of demands made by social movements in Brazil, and was subsequently taken up as official policy by the Partido dos Trabalhadores/Workers’ Party (PT), with which it became synonymous. PB has been labeled as one of the most radical and empowering participatory initiatives (Fung and Wright, 2001). Although some of the demands emanating from the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s have been met simply by the transition from authoritarian rule to that of democracy which legally enshrined the rights and participation of citizens, the more radical hopes of a New Left have not materialised. By the time Lula was elected president in 2002, Brazil had settled into a Third Way neoliberalism associated with the Blair and Clinton administrations. A misattribution of the political features of SMs and the PT to PB itself can lead to a romanticisation of PB. This is not to dismiss the importance of institutional design, but it is not the main focus of this chapter. Issues pertaining to institutional design are taken up in subsequent chapters.
This chapter traces the origin and development of PB in Brazil from the 1980s through to the turn of the century. PB has been characterised, by a host of authors, practitioners, charities and international organisations, as one of the most radical and empowering participatory initiatives currently being deployed. Yet these adjectives do not seem to chime with the minimal institutional definitions associated with PB today. The literature on both the PT and PB is contradictory. At one extreme both are portrayed as radical and political, challenging political and economic orthodoxy and providing new hope for the Left in the form of a new post-Marxist social democracy. This portrayal is found in earlier writings and commentary and, as time went on, both the PT and PB became associated with a reinforcing of political and economic orthodoxy succumbing to a Third Way form of neoliberalism. This chapter argues claims of PB’s radical and empowering character lie in its origins as part of the demands of social movements in the 1970s and 1980s, and its subsequent championing by the PT; that is to say, in a movement and experiment that once was but is no longer. Ultimately, PB should be viewed as a tool and the use it is put to is determined by who wields the tool, how they do so and why they do so. PB is viewed as inherently political in only a very minimal sense i.e. it demands that citizens have some say in public budgets. Stripped of the political discourses around the nature of citizen and citizenship, of justice and equality, PB is rendered a politically neutral institution with a vague and minimal definition that leaves it vulnerable to many interpretations. The depoliticisation and reassigning of PB is taken up in later chapters discussing its manifestation in the UK, however, as this chapter illustrates this process of depoliticisation began within
Brazil itself. The next chapter outlines the nature of the tool/PB in terms of the basic institutional features which form the basis of PB as it has been imported by other countries. This chapter looks at who wields the tool (PB) and the consequences this has. Although highlighting the beginning of the PT’s adoption of Third Way neoliberal ideology and policy, this chapter stops short of a full analysis of this transformation. The PT became a fully fledged advocate of Third Way neoliberal ideology and policy after Lula’s win at the 2002 election. This chapter looks at PB’s history in Brazil up until that point; further developments in PB, including the impact of a Third Way government, are explored in the later chapter on PB in the UK.

The discussion starts with a very brief introduction to Brazil highlighting the aspects that might make it seem an unlikely paragon of democracy. It then moves to a general overview of some significant features of Brazil’s new federal pact and new constitution. This is followed by a brief overview of the SMs of 1970s and 1980s Brazil from which PB emanated, and where some of the more radical claims and hopes with regard to the democratic potential of PB may have come from. The next section briefly highlights some of the specific features of PB that inspire hope, before a more detailed analysis of the relationship between PB and the PT. The PT itself started life as a SM and, initially, even after its transition to a political party, it maintained close ties with many diverse SMs. The PT was a very early adopter of PB and championed its use. This chapter suggests that we can understand many of the changes in PB within Brazil over this twenty year-plus period as paralleling
those of the PT. This chapter attempts to explain how political claims made regarding PB can be attributed to its handling by and associations with SMs, including the PT, rather than the minimal institutional features of PB itself. Early conceptions of PB, residing in SMs and the PT, reveal PB as both a formal institutional process and the creation of a political forum which expanded the political sphere in Brazil.

1.1 Brazil: an unlikely paragon of democracy

Brazil would seem to be an unlikely paragon for democracy. However, the reasons it would seem unlikely also provide the motivation for many of the social movements’ demands; the overthrowing of the military regime, social justice, equality, new conceptions of the citizen and a battle against the clientelism and corruption that had characterised Brazil for so long. The very transition from authoritarian rule to democracy created a space for debate about the nature of democracy, both in terms of normative claims and institutional arrangements.

Brazil has often been characterised as having the largest income inequality in the world (Hunter, 2003, p.158; Schwartzman, 2003, p.1). Despite decreases in income inequality since 2003 (Leite and Litchfield, 2007, p.1), where the poorest 20% of the population claimed only 2.5% of total income and the richest 20% of the population claiming 64% of total income (UNDP, 2002), Brazil continues to rank highly on the UN Gini index (World Bank, 2011). Extreme poverty affecting huge numbers of people prevents effective participation for many in Brazil. Lack of
education and extreme poverty render individuals and groups more susceptible to patronage (Hunter, 2003, pp. 157-158). This was a source of contention for many of the varied SMs.

Brazil has never undergone any substantial form of land reform: ‘48 million families have no land and 35 million Brazilians live below the poverty line’ (Strong Roots, 2001, np). In 1962 one of the most serious attempts at land reform led to a coup in 1964 and 21 years of military rule (Hammond, 1999; Meszaros, 2000). The land issue is inextricably tied to the concentration of ownership, agricultural productivity and rural poverty, and unemployment (Hammond, 1999). Old systems and inequalities prevent any form of inclusive democracy in Brazil (Hammond, 1999, p. 470). The ability of elites to prevent effective land reform in Brazil dates back to the sixteenth century (Meszaros, 2000). More recently, the UDR formed in 1985 in response to President Jose Sarney's ambitious agrarian reform bill (Hammond, 1999, p. 471). 60% of Brazil's farmland lies idle while 25 million peasants struggle to survive by working in temporary agricultural jobs (Strong Roots 2001). This too was a source of contention for many SMs, most conspicuously the MST, but equality and redistribution were also among the main goals articulated by the early PT; PBs were seen as tools capable of addressing these explicit aims.

Traditionally Brazilian society and politics have been clientelistic, hierarchical and corrupt. These problems did not disappear with liberation. Sarney's administration (1985 – 1989) was undermined by corruption charges and criticised for
strengthening clientelistic politicians (Weyland, 2000, p.54). His successor Collor lasted only two years (1990 –1992) before being impeached (ibid, p.47). Franco’s one-year presidency (1994-1995) was characterized by turmoil which led to talk of a possible coup (Hunter, 2003, p.155). Cardoso’s coalition was plagued by infighting and corruption scandals during its second term (1999 – 2001). ‘In September 2000, a congressional committee probing organised crime and drug trafficking released an explosive report implicating nearly 200 officials in 17 of Brazil’s 27 states’ (Transparency International n.d.). Again, this was a source of common contention among many of the SMs and again PB was seen as a tool capable of addressing these issues.

Following the adoption of the new constitution in 1988, the first direct election since the 1960s taking place in 1989, and the resulting inauguration of Collor in 1990, Brazil could finally be considered a democracy once more (Keck, 1992). Brazil, was a democracy which ‘formally recognised social rights and civic guarantees and citizens prerogatives [however, these coexisted with]… violence and continual human rights violations, in a world that reveals the antithesis of citizenship and basic rules of civility’ (Paoli and Telles, 1998, p. 64).

For all their claims around citizenship and power, the new participatory initiatives, including PB, were unable to tackle some of the most fundamental obstacles to the realisation of meaningful democratic citizenship on the most basic level. Even today the country remains plagued by inequalities, in terms of both money and
education, and both the legal and judiciary systems remain inadequate. While SMs may have won small battles at the local level, these fundamental obstacles required national level action. This is not to dismiss the important advances made in terms of civil rights, civic engagement, the extension of service provision to the majority of the population, as well as the more limited success in addressing issues of corruption. This chapter does not focus on the state of Brazilian democracy, either then or now, but rather examines the development and origin of the much hailed participatory initiative, PB.

The next section deals briefly with some of the biggest institutional changes that occurred as Brazil transitioned from authoritarian rule to democracy. It is these changes which formed the political and administrative apparatus that enabled the introduction of participatory initiatives, including PB, into Brazil’s new democracy. The advent of democracy necessitated the creation of a new federal pact and a new constitution.

1.2 A new federal pact

‘Brazil’s transition to democracy began in 1973 with military President Ernesto Gazel’s decision to initiate a gradual liberalisation of the regime and ended in 1989 with the first direct presidential elections in 3 decades’ (Keck, 1992, p.1). Twenty-one years of military dictatorship in Brazil ended in 1985 when Jose Sarney took the presidential sash (Kingstone and Power 2000, p.3). ‘Brazil’s 1988 constitution decentralised political authority, thereby granting municipal administrations
sufficient resources and political independence to restructure policymaking processes’ (Wampler and Avritzer, 2004, p.291). ‘This signalled a broad shift from national to local state power, reversing the dictatorship-era pattern of centralisation’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p.8).

Brazil’s transition to democracy necessitated a structural transformation of the state. Part of this restructuring involved allowing more decisions and policies to be made at a local rather than national level. Brazil’s federal republic consists of three levels of government, federal, state, and municipal, and over the course of the 1980s more and more responsibilities were transferred from both the federal and state levels to the municipal level (Baiocchi, 2005, p.9). Municipalities became ‘the de facto source for social spending and public investment’ (ibid., p.9).

This transfer of power from the national and state levels to the municipal level was accompanied by a drive towards greater civic engagement in issues that had previously remained the exclusive purview of the state.

The decentralisation of power in Brazil, as part of the federal pact, followed two distinct kinds of rationale. Firstly, decentralisation has consisted in handing over functions and activities of centralised public authorities to municipal governments... [Secondly], the decentralisation of public power has incorporated individual citizens into the process of proposing and monitoring public policy, as well as the implementation of public acts. (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, pp.44-45)
The decentralisation of power saw municipalities and their citizens gain at least some control over issues pertaining to taxes, land use, housing, education and health provision, in terms of planning, policy and provision (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002). Civic engagement and universalist rights were enshrined in law by the new constitution.

Brazil's decentralisation created the institutional openings for actors with ties to civil society and social movements to carry out progressive experiments. By the late 1980s, many large city governments in Brazil began to establish decentralisation programs alongside participatory programs. (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002. pp.8-9)

PB was just one of several experiments in participation, including various community councils and neighbourhood associations, that took place after the 1988 constitution which afforded mechanisms for greater public involvement (Souza, 2001, p.160). PB remains the best known and most praised of the various participatory initiatives. The reorganisation that granted greater power, autonomy and finances to the municipalities between 1988 and 1991 created the legal and administrative environment which enabled the implementation of PB. The new ‘political-administrative system in Brazil is the result of the ‘federative pact’…. The constitutional contract allows for relative political, financial and administrative autonomy for each of the entities (at all the various levels) that are part of the federal pact’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.42). A coalition of actors, which
included modernizers within government, progressive politicians, and activists, formed the coalition behind the change (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002).

By way of the federative pact [the] responsibility for the provision of public services was transferred from the national government to the municipalities (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.44), and municipalities were also granted powers to raise their own revenue. Yet the extent to which municipalities were capable of generating income depended greatly on whether they were rural or urban..

For a large number of these (rural) municipalities the principle source of income for the provision of public services, comes from the Federal government. In this they differ from the big cities, which have the capacity to generate their own income. (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.43)

This allowed big cities like Porto Alegre, with a relatively large capacity for income generation, greater autonomy from national government than other smaller and more rural municipalities. Yet the greater autonomy both financially and politically accorded to the municipal level as a result of the new constitution was still limited and circumscribed by the extent to which both resources and power remained centralised. There was a ‘perversity of public policy of the 1990s, when the responsibility for economic development, was passed on to the municipalities, without in turn providing the necessary power and resources to assume it effectively’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p. 27). In addition to this, the proportion of budget transferred to municipalities remained relatively low.
compared to that in developed countries (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia 2002, p.45). In effect, municipalities remained technically and financially subordinate to central government (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.46).

The ‘broad and diverse social mobilizations prevalent during the first half of the 1980s’ (Paoli and Telles, 1998, p.69) had a significant impact on both the nature of constitutional changes later that decade and the creation and nature of the PT throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998). It is the nature of these SMs which is the focus of the next section.

1.3 Brazilian social movements of the 1970s and 1980s

This section addresses Brazilian social movements (SMs) of the 1970s and 1980s as a general phenomenon. Aside from its discussion of the PT, it does not speak to the variety or particularities of these movements. Even the most cursory glance at the literature reveals these movements to be far from homogenous. This does not mean that there was no commonality; the majority of movements spoke in some way to rights and social justice, but the specificity of “what rights?”, “for who?”, and the interpretation of social justice and how it was to be achieved varied greatly. Some general trends can be identified; the PT was indicative of these general trends and PB itself emerged as a response to the demands and issues to which these general trends spoke. Commonalities included: demands for social justice and equality, a new conception of citizenship and the recognition of new political
subjects, the necessity of developing a critical consciousness or critical pedagogy\(^8\) amongst the masses, and a fight for accountability and transparency against the clientelism, paternalism and corruption that seemed endemic to Brazilian social and political life.

Social movements (SM) experienced a dramatic increase in both their number and strength in Brazil during the 1970s and 1980s. By their very existence and visibility, as well as by the specifics of their claims and demands, these movements questioned the very nature and meaning of citizenship and democracy (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998). Rights and who has them are inextricably linked to issues of power. However, these movements did not only seek to address the balance of power within society but also the way in which power is exercised (Baierle, 1998). The PBs came out of demands made by SMs and were an expression of both a desire to reduce elite power and claims as to a ‘proper’ mode of expression of power (ibid.).

The 1970s and 1980s were [also] characterized, however, by the appearance of new civic associations and new urban social movements making claims at the local level, often backed by ideologies of social transformation and a break with the past. The ‘new unionism’ around Sao Paulo, the grassroots church activism (in the Ecclesiastic Base Communities), and the struggles for urban rights were all part of a diffuse democratic movement that has been well described in the

\(^8\) Although the desirability and necessity of developing critical consciousness/critical pedagogy originated specifically in the Freirean and Liberation Theology movements, it became a general theme of many movements.
literature. These new movements politicized questions of access to services, coalescing around nationally organized movements for urban rights such as the Cost of Living Movement, the Housing Movement, and the Collective Transportation Movement, in the mid-to-late 1970s, which emphasized novel practices and values, including autonomy from manipulative government agencies and patronage schemes, proceduralism and democracy in decision making, and democratic access to urban services. (Baiocchi, 2005, p.10)

Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar (1998) detail the ways in which SMs ‘play a critical role in…[determining] the very boundaries of what is to be defined as the political arena: its participants, its institutions, its processes, its agenda, and its scope’ (ibid., p.1). SMs were able to fulfill this role in Brazil in the 1980s; this was in part due to the sheer number of them and the energy they possessed, but also because this was a moment of transition in Brazil. The transition from military dictatorship to democracy created a space for debate about the nature of democracy, the roles of and relationships between state and citizen. A new social and political contract was being forged and the form it took was, at least in part, determined by demands and claims originating from SMs. In a country where elitism, clientelism and paternalism had reigned, new voices were being heard demanding more than the minimum of suffrage granted by traditional representative democracy; amongst demands for rights pertaining to specific groups within society, there was a general call for greater citizen involvement in the new democracy. Given the complete lack of citizen participation under military rule, even the most minimal changes would have been an improvement. However, the demands of the SMs were actually
relatively radical, calling for participation in decisions and policies that affected them. Greater participation would tackle corruption, clientelism, elitism and paternalism but it was not just about remedying ills: the demands, often couched in a language of rights, were also crucially about power and specifically transferring power from a small elite to the wider population. The SMs were vociferously demanding new understandings of the citizen and citizenship and the rights and powers they should be accorded (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998). Given the glaring inequality across Brazil and its completely inadequate legal and judiciary systems, it is hardly surprising that these demands were bound up in debates about equality and justice. Many of the movements in Brazil demanded a redefinition not only of the political system but also of economic, social and cultural practices that might engender a democratic ordering for society as a whole…. [They] struggled to re-signify the very meanings of received notions of citizenship, political representation, and, as a consequence democracy itself. (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998, p. 2)

They sought to redefine what counted as political. Baierle, Daningo and Paoli and Telles in separate papers in the same volume (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998) all highlight the foundational role played by SMs with regard to the transformation of the existing political order; a transformation which focused on the emergence of new citizens and the introduction of new participatory initiatives. The movement’s new citizens sought ‘[to] radically question the mode in which power is to be

Social movements played an important role in bringing about the end of military rule, the formation of the new social and political pacts and contracts that emerged in Brazil's new democracy, and in the vibrancy of debate around deeply political issues pertaining to democracy. Brazil’s transition to democracy was about the implementation of appropriate administrative, legal and judicial frameworks and political institutions. The deeper political function afforded by these movements was the development of discourse and debate about the very meaning of citizenship, the ‘proper’ role and function of the state, the way in which citizen and state relate to one another and concepts of equality and social justice. These movements ‘generated (and generate) a sense of enlargement of the political sphere via an extended and redefined notion of rights and citizenship’ (Paoli and Telles, 1998, p.65). The variety of movements and the extremely diverse origins of their claims and demands, for example liberation theology, Catholicism, Trotskyism, Leninism and post-Marxism resulted in the development of many different and competing conceptions of citizen, state and the interaction between them, as well as notions of the importance of equality and justice.

[I]t is not that social movements are, in themselves, intrinsically politically virtuous. Rather, social movements are important because they constitute, in the conflictive terrain of social life, public arenas in
which conflicts gain visibility and collective actors become valid spokespersons. (Paoli and Telles, 1998, p.66)

A variety of groups, including poor workers, homeless, women, blacks and [many] other marginalised people, all demanded to be seen and heard as citizens, as political subjects with valid demands around justice which spoke to the very nature of social justice and equality (Paoli and Telles1998, p.66). While the particularity of the demands of individual groups varied, all demanded a new social and political contract. The political ether and normative claims of these various movements varied, as did the methods proposed for the accomplishment of their various political projects. However, they all shared at least some common struggles and adversaries: the old regime, the lack of civil and political rights, the clientelism, corruption and paternalism, and the staggering income inequality and severe poverty that had pervaded Brazil for so long. These movements, visible and audible both within Brazil and internationally, constituted the creation of new political subjects demanding a new political settlement.

The practices of social movements were grounded in the ideologies of movements of the 1970s and 1980s, and while demanding dialogue with the state, they simultaneously challenged the limits of representative democracy by calling for participatory reforms and expanding versions of traditional rights. Evelina Dagnino refers to this as ‘the new citizenship’ that dominated Brazilian social movements in the 1980s and 1990s. Its premise was ‘the right to have rights,’ and it lauded the invention of ‘new rights that emerge from specific struggles and concrete practices.’ In demanding the recognition of new subjects,
it proposed new forms of social relationships mediated by the state, as well as new relationships between civil society and the state. (Baiocchi, 2005, p.11)

The existence of these social movements and the vibrancy of the very political debates they generated can been seen as the source of hope that Brazil once held for many on the Left and the reason for viewing Brazil as part of a ‘pink tide’ washing over Latin America. Globally, the left could be said to be experiencing a crisis at both a theoretical level and in practice, particularly post 1989. In Brazil, the end of military rule necessitated a new form of social and political contract, and the prominence and vitality with which generally left leaning movements and discourses emerged within this space, meant that Brazil seemed pregnant with possibility. Although Brazil did become a democracy which introduced new civil and political rights, and implemented policies, initiatives and laws to tackle clientelism, corruption and paternalism, income inequality and severe poverty, the radical left-leaning projects ultimately did not materialise. Democracy was new to Brazil but it was not a new form of democracy that many had hoped for. Brazil settled into a form of democracy very much in keeping with the political and economic orthodoxy advocated by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and bore more similarities than differences with the UK and the US as they moved towards a more social democratic form of neoliberalism associated with the Third Way politics and the policies of the Blair and Clinton administrations.

1.4 PB: the possibility of hope
Before exploring the changes in the PT and the associated changes in PB, it is worth exploring why PB, at least initially, held so much hope as a new, transformative participatory initiative. PB was seen as an arena where the voices of new political subjects could be heard, an institution that could address issues of social justice, equality and redistribution, and a process that could address issues of clientelism, paternalism and corruption by creating mechanisms for accountability and transparency. PB was a process and an institution, but it was also seen as the creation of a political arena to address the concerns and demands of the SMs from which it emerged.

The Participatory Budget was conceived of in 1989 as an attempt to make the municipal councils popular (Nylen, 2000). Although initiated by the PT, they are now run across Brazil under various political leaderships. The PBs are processes that span a year and annually new ones begin as the old ones end; there is no fixed end point where it is believed that consensus will be achieved among all parties. It is the earlier Budgeting processes that provide the clearest examples of the potential to challenge power structures and processes.

PBs were designed to hand over policies, decisions and resource allocation to those who would be affected by them, initially ‘addressing decisions about community level capital expenditures and eventually gaining decision making power over major capital investments, service and maintenance programs and personnel issues’ (Abers, 1998, p.4). The successes in these areas were significant
achievements for a country where elitism, paternalism and clientelistic relations had traditionally prevailed. While the actual participation figures (15,000 attending the Participatory Budget in Porto Alegre each year by 1995 (Abers 1999) can look impressive, when the population of Porto Alegre (1.3 million) is taken into account, they seem less impressive (a little over 1% participation). While Brazil boasts that PB ‘is today practiced in some 200 cities’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.2), it should be understood that Brazil has over 5,560 cities and, in this context, 200 is a relatively small number. However, progress has been made and public service provision has been extended to the majority of the population in Porto Alegre and the surrounding areas (Hatcher, 2002).

Studies also show that participation is generally from poorer sections of society and is generally on the increase (Hatcher, 2002). Against this, ‘critics of direct democracy say that it is messy, inefficient, and prone to domination by an articulate few’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.2). While there is certainly a danger that the most vocal will become over-represented and may dominate the process there is a substantial volume of literature which shows that, in Brazil at least, PB enables traditional unheard voices and marginalised groups significant space and power. Participatory budgeting asserts the value of their voice (Baiocchi, 2006, p.5).

Here the concern is with the specific nature of PB at the time it originated.

Participatory budgeting was haltingly introduced in Porto Alegre in 1990 by an inexperienced and besieged Workers’ Party administration,
elected just one year earlier and in search of legitimacy. The idea goes back to the 1970s and the social movements that would eventually usher in democracy in the mid-1980s. Radical popular educators and progressive clergy in these movements emphasized the importance of autonomy and participatory democratic procedures; throughout the country citizens formed neighborhood associations and social movements to demand a voice in such local affairs as transportation, health, and housing. (Baiocchi, 2006, p.2)

PB was about genuine power sharing (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.23).

A Participatory Budget in the ultimate analysis amounts to an effort to socialise an instrument of power that has in the past been exclusively in the hands of elite classes with the outcome that social exclusion from the public and political sphere is perpetuated.

PB, then, can be seen as an instrument for and of the expansion of the political sphere when SMs were demanding an expansion and redefinition of the political sphere itself. PB was seen as a forum for political (not just administrative) decisions. The PT sought to

share power with the movements from whence we came. … The PT did so by opening up the finances of the municipality to a transparent process of participatory decision-making through which local people had real power. (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination)

An aspect of citizenship which was associated with PB and originated from the SMs was that of ‘critical consciousness’. ‘[T]he assemblies were a forum to discuss news
in order to foster the 'critical consciousness' prized by liberation theology activists’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p.98), which had a strong influence on many movements. PB was seen as a form of ‘citizenship school’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002) where the critical consciousness of the citizens could be raised:

The Participatory Budget Trial, seen by some as a ‘Citizenship School,’ was the ultimate action by social movements in the 70s and 80s looking forward to achieving social control of the budget and the resulting allocation of public funds. (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.15)

“Citizenship School’ is grounded in the idea of, amongst other things, ‘the right to own social subjects and their objectives’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.64). It was in this context that PB was seen as a forum for discussion of the very meaning of citizenship. It was also a place to discuss the “how” and “why” of social problems (Baiocchi, 2005, p.102).

Looking specifically at PB, Baiocchi (2005) argues that

Community activists in Porto Alegre... are both militants and citizens. They consider themselves part of a broad movement for social justice, engaged in what they believe is a process of social transformation. However, in order to achieve substantive change, they act in civic and cooperative ways. They are engaged in their communities and believe they must both monitor local government and bring more citizens to participate. (ibid. p.4)
This focus on social justice and social transformation adds a distinctly political dimension to ‘citizen’ and ‘citizenship’; where participation is not simply the inclusion of more people within the existing political system and order, but is also about contesting and constructing the political system and order itself. This brings to the fore the inherently political nature of such participation, where social justice, the political system and the political order are not preordained. Baiocchi (2005) argues that the notion of citizenship at play here is one which blurs the distinction between ‘citizen’ and ‘militant’. The notion of citizenship which emerged from the SMs went beyond notions of citizenship, based on rights and duties, found within traditional conceptions of representative democracy.

In this context ‘deep citizenship’ is based on political subjectivity developed out of the realisation of, and in the name of social justice, struggles against the prevailing social, economic and political environment. ‘Thin citizenship’, on the other hand, is based on the inclusion of citizens in discussions about service provision priorities and implementation. In this ‘thin’ version citizens do not debate the origin or validity of the social, economic and political environment but discuss a specific project within a preordained and predetermined environment; discussion centres around issues of implementation based on preordained notions of social justice, social transformation, the political system and citizenship itself. Where ‘deep citizenship’ speaks to personal, social, political and economic transformation, ‘thin citizenship’ speaks to an inclusion in decisions and policies in a given social,
political and economic order and lacks any conception of the critical pedagogy that is embedded within ‘deep citizenship’.

The next section explores the developments in the PT and PB which facilitated its non-partisan implementation by parties and groups across the political spectrum; this ranged from left-wing parties such as the PDT, through the PSDB of former president Fernando-Henrique Cardoso, to conservative parties such as the PFL and the PPB (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.17).

The section below explores this transition in relation to the changes that occurred in the PT, as it moved from a left wing political movement towards a political party advocating Third Way neoliberalism.

1.5 PB and the PT

The Workers Party (PT) was conceived, developed and grew as Brazil was undergoing a transition to democracy; a transition which began in 1973 (Keck, 1992, p.1). In 2002 the PT won Brazil’s second presidential election since the beginning of the transition. There were significant changes in the aims and structure of the party as well as the political and legal environment and the nature of civil society in which it existed during this time. The PT was affected by, but also contributed to, many of the environmental changes as well as the transition to democracy itself. This section explores how and why a party that seemed to offer so much hope to many in Brazil and a wider public, particularly
for those ‘on the left’, came to leave many disillusioned and dismayed. The rise of the PT attracted attention as it was seen as the start of a new era, the start of a new experiment in democracy, ‘presenting an alternative form of democracy, and an alternative form of socialism, a new experiment in Radical Democracy’ (Branford and Kucinski, 2005, p.23). Lula’s victory was seen as paving ‘the way for a new debate on the relationship between socialism and democracy, based on a real experiment in a big country’ (ibid. p.23). The PT articulated the need for an alternative to the global hegemony of neoliberalism. The Lula government broke ‘the bond at the heart of the original PT project - that of achieving social justice by building on the power of the popular movements to do so - … (as he failed) to turn his electoral mandate and huge international support into a democratic counter force to drive a hard bargain with the IMF’ (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination). Lula and his government were not strong enough to counter the political and economic orthodoxy of the IFIs. Over time, the PT settled into the very political and economic orthodoxy of neoliberalism which it originally sought to challenge, to the extent that decentralisation in all its forms including PB became used as a strategy for the deregulation of public services (Torres Ribeiroand Gracia, 2002, p.47). Lula himself became an advocate of the Third Way. This shift was in part due to the PT’s transitions from SM to political party and then from a political party to the ruling political party, and to the alliances it had to form in order to gain electoral success. The drive to build a PT political party, as opposed to a PT SM, and the drive to gain electoral success resulted in the closing down of
‘the mechanisms linking the party to the social movements and therefore acting as a political channel for their expectations and their pressure’ (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination).

The Workers Party was formed in 1980 and in 2002 its candidate, Lula de Silva, was elected to presidential office. ‘With Lula’s victory the PT completed the cycle: all leading Brazilian parties have now been in both the opposition and the government in the period since the country returned to democracy in 1985’ (Hunter, 2008, p.16). The Party had been a beacon of hope for many on the Left, both domestically and internationally, and for a varied and larger audience in Brazil (Wainwright, 2005). It had also been perceived as a dangerous threat, internationally and domestically. Fear spread across the international financial markets in 2002 over the possible election of Lula, causing the currency to drop almost 50% in just a few months (Schwartzman, 2003, p.3); foreign investment fled, interest rates climbed, the Real dropped and long-term debt papers became short-term debt papers as the possibility of default grew (Schwartzman, 2003, p.3). ‘Investment banks including Morgan Stanley Dean Witter and Merrill Lynch began downgrading their ratings of Brazil early in May’ (Burbach, 2002). Whether this is seen as a good or bad thing, a success or failure, depends largely on who is speaking and their particular areas of concern and interest.

The PT has received worldwide attention both from the academic community and the wider public and has been cast as an anomaly. As the Left was experiencing a
crisis theoretically and in practice, particularly post-1989, the PT continued, with occasional and sometimes significant hiccoughs, to grow both in numbers and in strength. It was not alone though: ‘While Socialism declined in the West during the final decades of the twentieth century, the Brazilian left created three new forms of popular organization that took the left by surprise in other countries........ the Workers Party - Partido Trabalhadores (PT)........Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (CUT) and.....Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST)’ (Branford and Kucinski, 2005, p.21). The rise in unemployment in the late 1990s led to loss of influence of CUT and loss of ideological ground to Marxist parties like the PCdoB and the PSTU, the latter later joining the PT and the former remaining ‘the dominant force among left-wing students’ (ibid., 2005, p.26).

The PT stood out in a context where many on the Left displayed an inability to move beyond traditional economic reductionism. A failure to appreciate the antagonism ever present in social relations and the interplay between power, conflict and democracy stymied the overall project of many on the Left. In contrast to this, the early PT can be seen as a form of post-Marxist movement which moved beyond traditional economic reductionism and fully appreciated the multiplicity of struggles, the inherently conflictual nature of social and political relations and the centrality of power. In this vein the PT advocated a form of socialism radically different to traditional conceptions; under this conception, socialism and democracy were not just compatible but necessitated each other. For the PT there was no democracy without socialism and no socialism without democracy. The PT
understood democracy as a process without an end rather than as the end of a process itself.

In contrast with many traditional conceptions of socialism the PT recognised the inability of a movement or party to ‘organically’ reflect the wishes of social movements’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.47). The PT sought to be a party which did not dictate to its members but rather one where the workers had voices that were heard. PB served as an interface for the mediation of demands made by administrators both PT and non PT (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.47). The pioneering trail of PB in Porto Alegre was adopted as official party policy by the Workers’ Party’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002)

[T]he Participatory Budget, with its potential for bringing together long-standing popular demands for change, constitutes a project for transforming relations between government and society, whose strongest political party advocate is the PT....

The Participatory Budget reflects the popular movements’ need for a political platform, especially within the Workers’ Party (PT).... [T]he Participatory Budget stands for the tangible expression, in quite a visible form, of the commitments made by this party to democratic and popular management. It should also be remembered that there have been links between the political culture of this party and the demands of social movements ever since the 1970s and 1980s. (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.61)
The PT was one of the most prominent SMs that became a political party with the ability to bring together many diverse sections of society variously associated with different SMs. It also championed PB. Initially the PT was aligned with the demands of the social movements out of which the PB grew, but over time the aims and ideology of the PT moved further and further away from the demands of the 1970s and 1980s SMs. The PT continued to champion PB after its alignment with the demands of the social movements ceased. As the nature of the PT changed so too did the nature and use of the tool PB.

In its early day the PT took the form of a social movement rather than a political party. It was not alone in its calls for participation and other SMs were also influential in the rise of PB. Although it would become more of a top-down process, initially calls for PB came from outside the mainstream political arena and represented a bottom-up form of participation.

‘In Porto Alegre, activists from neighborhood associations started demanding direct input into the city budget in 1985. Through a process of trial and error, participatory budgeting evolved into a year-long cycle of meetings that allow participants to decide on projects in their own neighborhoods as well as for the city as a whole’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.3).

The SMs of Brazil were plural and diverse in nature. They did not hold the same, or necessarily compatible, demands; nevertheless they shared some common contentions, and most significantly a common adversary, and this served to form a bond between the groups. The military regime was seen as the embodiment of many of the struggles these SMs faced. With the fall of the military regime, this shared adversary disappeared; as a result the bond between the groups and the
focus of their individual struggles weakened. The PT brought together many movements but crucially they all maintained their autonomy. The PT, at least initially, was able to act as an umbrella organisation for the many struggles represented in the SMs. One illustration of the PT’s innovative politics was its relationship, historically, with the MST landless movement - a movement that occupies the large estate lands of the rich and then tries to use it for co-operative agriculture. The PT both critically supported this movement and was supported by it, while at the same time respecting its autonomy.

In addition to the fall of the military regime the PT faced another challenge in terms of its ability to represent either the demands of individual SMs or the collective demands of the SMs. The PT initially acquired power at the mayoral level, it then moved up the various levels of government before becoming the ruling party in 2002. The bond created by common opposition to a powerful regime, linking the PT to other SMs, was fundamentally challenged as the PT acquired more powers and became the regime. The specifics of this and other changes to the position of the PT is explored in more detail below.

Prior to election in 2002, Lula was promising an alternative to neoliberalism and his party had a tradition of close ties to social movements who also positioned themselves against neoliberalism, such as the MST (Petras, 1997; Martins, 2000). The PT was committed to challenging the corrupt, clientelistic and hierarchical culture in Brazil and tackling inequality. PBs were one of the main instruments used
to address these issues. ‘[F]or the PT, participation means empowering the poor to become aware of inequalities and injustices (political consciousness raising), and to reform the political and social systems through collective action’ (Souza, 2001, p. 174). This can be contrasted with ‘the multilateral community (where for many), participation is a way of transforming unorganized people into members of a civil society that can help provision of public services. This latter view also stresses short-term 'results', both in scope and time, rather than long-term changes’ (ibid., p.174) associated with the developing of critical consciousness, claiming political subjectivity and the fostering of a participatory culture. The PT held a vision of participation as a process of transformation as opposed to the inclusion of a greater number of people.

The PT emerged in the wake of a series of major strikes in the late 1970s which mortally wounded the military dictatorship. In 1977 Lula led the ABC metalworkers’ campaign for increased wages and other benefits. Continued discontent led to strikes the following May, Lula’s participation in which led to his brief imprisonment. It was in December 1978 that the first serious discussions about the formation of a workers’ political party were held at a meeting convened by Lula. On January 9th 1979, the Metal Workers’ Congress approved a proposal ‘calling on all Brazilian workers to unite to build a party, the Workers Party’. The proposal for the PT was officially launched at a congress of the Sao Paulo metalworkers in Linz in January 1979. On May Day of the same year, the PT circulated the Workers Party Charter: PTs Charter of Principles 1979 ‘Democracy means organized and conscious
participation by workers' (Agência PT de Notícias n.d.). On February 10th 1980 1200 people met at Sion College in Sao Paulo and took the first steps towards formally creating the PT. 'The formal foundation of the PT took place in Sao Paulo in February 1980 at a meeting of 300 people in an auditorium of the journalists union named after the murdered Vladimir Herzog' (Manifesto, Approved by Motion Pro-PT, on February 10, 1980, in Zion School (SP), and published in the Official Gazette of 21 October 1980).

The PT was somewhat of an anomaly both in terms of its structure, ideology and the international and domestic environment in which it came into being and developed. The PT understood democracy and politics as processes rather than defined trajectories with a specific end point. The context in which the PT was formed, grew and developed make it stand out and are also crucial to gaining a better understanding of the Party as it was then, the changes it underwent and the party it became. Its internal structure, ideology and ability to represent disparate groups without them losing their particularity also contributed to its anomalous status.

It is supported by many Catholic activists, but defends equal rights for homosexuals and is willing to consider the legalisation of abortion. It is a mass party, operating openly, yet it is structured like a Leninist party, with a central committee and strict rules about adherence to party decisions (although in practice these rules are often broken). At the same time, and even more paradoxically, it allowed the existence of organised tendencies within the party. Its supporters were active
members, and often leaders, of the many social movements in Brazil. However, the movements are not affiliated with the party and often clash with elected PT local authorities. (Branford and Kucinski, 2005, p29)

The PT is an example of a particular party with this ideology and the PBs are an example of their way of governing at a practical level; allowing these disparate groups to be brought together in a forum, and allowing the differing demands and claims of the groups to be heard.

Differing, often competing claims, were to be recognised and discussed in the forum created by PB. The forum held ‘the good of the city’ as its overall objective (Baiocchi, 2005) but the nature of ‘the good’ was not preordained by the PT or any other group. This aspect of PB reflects the PT’s understanding of the multiplicity of struggles and the inability of any one group to represent them all. The lack of one concrete view as to what constituted ‘the good’ is what enabled the articulation of differing and competing claims. The PB was, however, also an intensely practical forum where decisions had to be, and indeed were, made with regard to budget allocation for projects seen to be good for the city. Given the diversity of groups and claims within the PB forum, competing claims were not always reconcilable (Y. Cabannes, 2013, pers. comm., May 9th). In order for a decision to be made by so many competing groups some form of consensus had to be reached. However, the nature of the consensus developed in the PB forum was ‘temporary, fragile and pragmatic’(Y. Cabannes, 2013, pers. comm., May 9th). The nature of PB as a
process where at the end of each cycle decisions and priorities can be revisited meant that no consensus on them was final. Groups and individuals whose claims and demands had not been met within one round of PB could re-articulate them in another. As a place for activists and movements to meet and articulate their claims, the PBs were also a place where new relationships and alliances could be forged; marginalised groups could find common ground with one another and thereby strengthen their claims (Baiocchi, 2005).

The PT not only proposed a different structure and ideology from dominant parties in Brazil but was itself organised and committed to this different structure. This was an anomaly in Brazil where parties and politics had been characterised by corruption, clientelism, hierarchy, and exclusion. The PT was unique in Brazil not only in terms of ideology but also in terms of structure.

Democratic vocation of the PT, however, goes beyond political affiliations who defended and advocates. Also the internal organization expresses our commitment to libertarian. She reflects the commitment, always renewed, the directions of military bases to make itself PT a free society and participatory premise that other, bigger, we want institute in the country. Refractory monolithic and verticalism of traditional parties - including many associations of the left - the PT strives to practice democracy at home and precondition for democratic behaviour in society and in the exercise of political power. The same goes for the relationship between the party and its social bases and the society as a whole. Although he was born by the force of movement union and popular and they hold a powerful bond of inspiration, and reference
dialogue, seeking to offer them a political direction, the PT refuses, on principle, the stifle their autonomy and, moreover, to treat them as customers or belt drive.

(Socialism Petista is part of the resolution adopted at the 7th National Meeting, held between May 31 and June 3, 1990 at the Palace of Convention Hall, in Sao Paulo, and reaffirmed the 2nd Congress, held in Belo Horizonte, between 24 and 28 November 1999.)

Some of the support that the PT gained can be attributed as much to the way in which they organised their own party as to their higher ideological aspirations. They promoted and demonstrated honesty, commitment (with parliamentarians contributing up to one-third of their salaries to the party coffers), transparency, and anti clientelistic politics. These characteristics made the PT an anomaly in Brazilian politics at the time. ‘Scholars of the country’s notoriously weak party system regularly noted the PT’s outlier status as virtually the only ideologically driven, internally democratic, and disciplined party’ (Goldfrank and Wampler, 2008, p.246).

This section will focus on the relationship between the PT and the budgets, it also looks at some of the changes that took place as a result of the PTs success. ‘The PT was reelected in 1992, with OP as its ‘central axis’ of government’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p. 40). Once the PT started winning struggles and assuming greater power it became harder for it to fulfill the uniting role that so often took a negative form i.e. anti-neoliberalism or anti-the-past and current regimes. It became the regime and as it did so it also seemed to become less opposed to neoliberalism in its policies if not in its rhetoric.
Lula and the PT faced pressure both internationally and domestically from both the left and the right. Although coming into power has undoubtedly increased these pressures and created new ones, taking office is not the only reason or explanation for changes within the PT and its relationship with others. There is a much longer history which must be taken into account. Only by looking at this history can we begin to understand changes to the PT and avoid the trap of analysing, and putting hope in, a party that no longer exists as it did at its formation. To assume nothing has changed is to misunderstand the party. The PT’s relationship with ‘social movements and their struggle; the internal structure of the party and the compositions of delegates to its Party Congress; and both its programme and its political alliances’ have all undergone significant changes in the last twenty years (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003, p.8). The PT began to display signs of neoliberal orthodoxy in its economic policy since winning the presidency. It is possible, however, to trace the roots of this to the history of the PT; in particular in its policy on alliance formation, its swing from ideological purism to a more tactical and pragmatic line and its move to a more “middle ground”. ‘The PT’s fall from grace is best explained by the political institutional pressures that induced party leaders to change their strategies, by national and international markets that provided a limited range of options, and by intra-party conflicts regarding the strategies that should be utilized to govern effectively’ (Goldfrank and Wampler, 2008, p.246). Acknowledging all of these, the focus here is on the changes in the nature of the party as a result of changes in strategy aimed at party building and electoral
success rather than ideology. This includes reflecting on the associated move towards a middle ground as the PT became increasingly unable to umbrella intra and extra party conflicts, and the fiscal restraints of economic orthodoxy to which the PT ultimately adhered.

The early PT could be labeled a socialist project, however it was also a democratic project and did not follow the traditional authoritarian socialist model. Their manifesto and other early documents talk of socialisation of democracy rather than socialism per se. Their own documents reveal a view of democracy as a process rather than an endpoint where there is no space for ‘the good’ or a model society. An aim of the PT was, and still is, to ‘radicalize democracy’ versus the dominant world hegemonic project to ‘deepen democracy’ (i.e. a transformation of the political order versus a deepening of existing channels, systems and procedures), their aim being an inclusion of the marginalised in an active way, politicising them. This was deemed possible only through a restructuring of power relations. The PBs and their focus on the ownership of resources were part of the PT’s project to radicalize democracy. As a party the early PT had two explicit goals; 1) an inversion of priorities and 2) popular participation. PB was one of the main ways in which these goals were to be achieved.

When the PT first formed over twenty years ago, it did so against a backdrop of military rule, strikes and oil shocks. During this time the PT had close ties with social movements and a deep involvement in social and class struggles (Petras and
Veltmeyer 2004, p.8); this included links with trade unions, Catholic organisations ‘and many other parts of the vibrant Brazilian civil society’ (Teivainen, 2002, p.624), such as Trotskyists, Leninists and Marxists. It aimed to design and implement a democratic socialist alternative (Nylen, 2000, p.126). It sought a new form of socialism, radically different from the Soviet model, which ‘would preserve diversity, civil liberties and tolerance’ (Abers, 1999, p.68). ‘The PT strategy is to mobilise the population through the participatory democracy process, not simply to create a more active citizenship or to achieve a fairer distribution of social goods, but to create a counter-hegemonic force capable of confronting the federal government and the capitalist state’ (Hatcher, 2002, no pagination). The PT provided a home for many activists and intellectuals including ‘Mario Pedrosa ‘Brazil’s best known art critic and the leading Trotskyist theoretician. Antonio Candido a famous literary critic; and Paulo Freire who developed pedagogy of liberation’ (Branford and Kucinski ,2005, p.35). As a ‘new left’ party they faced challenges from the traditional Left in Brazil, e.g. PCB and PCdoB who challenged their claim to speak for the Workers.

In the context of “Partido Trabalhadores’ / ‘Workers Party’ - what does ‘worker’ mean? It is not just Marxist reductionism, limiting it to an economic class, but rather post-Marxist as it incorporates a wide variety of social struggles, and the various struggles do not lose their particularity but rather form a common bond as anti- the current regime. This can be seen at the level of official PT doctrine (which remained loose enough for associated groups to maintain their particular demands and
identities) and in their active attempts to form alliances with student bodies and Amnesty groups, for example. The PT and various other actors, including various leftist activists and social movements, deny economic determinism and class reductionism, recognising the multitude of non economic struggles. ‘So came the proposal of the Workers Party. The PT is born of the decision of the exploited to combat an economic and political system that cannot resolve their problems because it exists only to benefit a privileged few. For a mass party’ (PT Manifesto 1980.) Initially, the PT was certainly looking for an alternative to the existing political and economic regime in Brazil at the time. The successful attempts at getting the disparate groups, their members and followers, to recognise the city as a whole rather than being limited to their particular demands was crucial to the success of the PBs (Baiocchi, 2006). Once in power, though, it could no longer create a support base around being against the regime as it became the regime.

When the PT was founded it was deeply involved with a variety of social movements and their struggles, however as time went on, and it became an electoral party, both its interest and support for these causes decreased. The PT, as the party in power, merely pay lip service to these issues and struggles while they focus on working through institutional channels and forging alliances with the bourgeoisie and elite sections of society, in order to consolidate their position as an electoral party (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003, p.9). The composition of the PT has also changed; by the 1990s the majority of the party was made up of professionals and middle and lower class employees (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003, p.9). 'The right
turn of the PT at the national level was preceded by a similar pattern at the state and municipal level during the decade of the 1990s' (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2003, p.9). There is a history of discussion within the PT about its relationship with social movements. Although it does not endorse its political agenda, it shares similar roots and some ideology with the largest movement in Brazil, the MST. The PT did consider forming stronger links with social movements in order to gain more support and form a bloc capable of challenging neoliberal political hegemony after Lula’s defeat in 1998 but ultimately decided against this and actually distanced itself from social movements (Branford and Kucinski, 2005, pp.53-54), seeking ‘to win over the centre of the political spectrum and to avoid alienating conservatives’ and controversially formed an alliance with the Liberal Party (ibid.). It was not possible for the PT to become more strategic without impacting on its ideology.

‘Recognizing the party’s extreme disadvantage in campaign finance, and thus in elections generally, the dominant faction’s leaders began moderating the PT’s rhetoric and policies in order to attract campaign contributions both on and off the books, first at the local level in select cities, and later at the national level’ (Goldfrank and Wampler, 2008, p.263). This not only diluted the ideological imperatives of the early PT but also by seeking ‘off the books’ finance it betrayed the party’s commitment to address the corrupt nature of Brazilian politics. The party, heralded as both exhibiting and promoting honest, open, transparent politics, devoid of clientelism and corruption, was already falling prey to the traditional modes of Brazilian politics it had once so vociferously denounced. These issues continued and, particularly during the second term, saw the PT besmirched
by scandals of corruption and bribery (Goldfrank and Wampler, 2008). ‘The PT had established Brazil’s first mass political party according to its own ethics of popular democracy, but after the disappointment of 1994 - and even more so of 1998 - it accepted the rules of Brazil’s corrupt political system’ (Wainwright 2005 np). In order to build a broad base of support the Party had to dilute its rhetoric, and in order to run successful election campaigns it required greater financial support. In response to these demands the Party’s ideological purity gave way to pragmatism, and the PT began to operate within the corrupt systems it had previously so vehemently decried.

The PT had to change, develop and adopt a more practical approach, as the failure of the PT orthodoxy in Fortaleza and elsewhere demonstrates9 (Nylen, 1997, p. 425). Radical Leninist sloganeering alone could not be the basis for a political party or for effective reform. The PT can be seen to have two distinctive phases prior to gaining office; the movement-building phase from their conception to 1985 and the party building phase post-1985 (Nylen, 2000). During the party building phase differences in ideology became more prominent (Nylen, 1997, p.436). By the time of the formation of a heterodox PT in 1992/1993 there were already concerns that the party would fall prey to ‘electoralism and bourgeois reformism’ (Nylen, 1997). The PT’s original model of governance was different from both left-wing Leninist styles of governance and right-wing neoliberal styles of governance and ideology. The PT not only aimed for democratic elections but also sought a democratisation

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9 Early in 1988 the party in Fortaleza expelled its more orthodox members but still lost the election later that year (Nylen, 2000)
of the economy and for participation and citizenship to extend beyond decisions to the deliberation process (Nylen, 2000; Abers, 1998). Making the state both participatory and redistributive requires the mobilisation of the poor and unorganised, bureaucracy must become more flexible and responsive and widespread political support must be gained (Abers, 1998). In addition to increased participation, core policy included targeting public policy to favour the poor, taxing higher income groups (Abers, 1998) and opposing neoliberal privatisation policies. ‘Non-Marxist socialism was the essence of PT heterodoxy’ (Nylen, 2000, p.426). However, Lula’s privatisation, decentralisation, and prevention of subsidies and protection, along with free trade policies and commitments to debt repayment (leaving little budget left for either agrarian or social reform), suggest the PT is moving closer and closer to neoliberal ideals.

Lula's government pushed through neoliberal reforms of which Tony Blair would be proud. These included the reform - effectively partial privatisation - of an extremely unequal public pensions system, which nevertheless left the inequalities almost untouched; and amending Brazil’s relatively radical, albeit contradictory, 1988 constitution to facilitate the creation of an independent bank with the freedom to raise interest rates as high as it wants. (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination)

Even the social policies and projects for poverty alleviation that Lula did introduce, for example Fome Zero and Bolsa Familia, struggled with issues of poor implementation, ‘inadequate monitoring, clientelism, weak accountability and alleged political bias’ (Hall, 2006, p.689).
In order to acquire and retain power it seems that a party must appease and appeal to the powerful and elite, nationally and internationally. ‘There have been sharp centrist or rightward turns by the PSDB and PT precisely at the moments at which they took the reins of Government’ (Power, 2008, p.101) ‘Alliance politics is both the cause and the consequence of ideological convergence’ (ibid p.102). Initially, the PT was very reluctant to form alliances, but its attitude to forming alliances changed as the party evolved. Crucially, there was a major shift in the type of organisations and people the PT formed alliances with, and the ideologies that these groups represented. ‘The most that can be said is that Political activists increasingly believe that they must ally with former enemies in order to achieve governability in the Brazilian journalistic sense, that is in order to pass legislation of interest to the executive’ (Power, 2008, p.102). Once in power, unless they initiate an authoritarian style dictatorship, the policies they are able to implement will again be limited to those which appeal to the elite and powerful. In 2002, Lula did not have enough support in either the Chamber or the Senate to pass legislation without acquiring ideological support from sympathetic members of the PSDB and the PMDB (Hunter, 2003, p.153). In order to get into office, the party had to compromise their left wing ideology, once in office they had to continue to do this or be left stranded and unable to pass any legislation or reform due to lack of support. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that in 2002, of the 27 states in Brazil, only 3 of them had PT governors while 12 of them were either PSDB or PMDB (Hunter, 2003, p.154). Without the support of these other two parties, Lula
would find it extremely difficult to implement any reforms. Reforms which alter the structure of power within a society, enabling further social reform, would be almost impossible to implement without force. Many policies are created with a rhetoric that appeals to the masses but which in actuality only furthers the interests of the few.

The PBs had to appeal to the interests of more than ‘just’ the poor in order to gain support and success for their policies, in much the same way as the PT have had to do at both a national and, subsequent to Lula taking office, international level. A combination of forming alliances with other groups possessing differing ideologies and agendas, and a diluting of policy objectives so as to make them more appealing to a broader base, accounts for the increased support shown for both the PT and the PBs. Over time, both the PT and the PB became less associated with socialism and radicalising democracy. Today many see Lula as one of the leading proponents of the Third Way and the PBs as a way to achieve good governance. The good governance agenda\(^\text{10}\) can be seen as having eight fundamental characteristics: it ‘is participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of law’ (ESCAP, 2009, no pagination). Good governance is a system or technique for decision making and policy implementation and focuses primarily on institutions. It displays a strong concern for the efficient running of a political system and efficiency in general. There is a conspicuous absence of analysis or

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\(^{10}\) The term ‘good governance’ has been used by many in various ways but this serves as a basic guide to the concept. ‘Good governance’ is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.
consideration of power, and great concern for stability and management techniques. Participation, seen through the lens of good governance, is devoid of early PT conceptions of participation which entailed the politicising of citizens and the development of a critical consciousness. The good governance agenda speaks to criteria for the development of formal institutions rather than the development of a forum or space for political debate.

After winning the presidential elections, Lula attended conferences in London celebrating the ‘The Third Way’ and gave speeches about taking the middle road. Conspicuously absent from the PT’s 2002 official platform were the words socialism or socialist (Hunter, 2003, p.153). International and domestic pressures had forced the PT to move to the middle if they were to ensure electoral victory. Lula sent messages to the international community signifying fiscal responsibility by promising to reduce inflation and to maintain debt repayments and also made links with Brazil’s right wing Liberal party (PL). Below is an extract from a speech Lula gave that was reported in Reuters December 11th 2006 showing just how much he had moved towards the middle ground and the Third Way.

Today I’m a friend of Delfim Netto (finance minister of the 1964-1985 military regime) I spent 20 odd years criticising Delfim Netto and now he is my friend and I am his friend. Why am I saying this? Because I think this is the evolution of the human species. Those on the right are moving towards the centre. Those on the left are becoming more social democratic leftist. These things blend together according to the amount of grey hair on your head, according to the responsibility that
you have. There is no other way. If you meet an elderly person who is leftist, it’s because he’s got problems. If you happen to meet a very young person who is right wing, he’s got problems too. When we hit 60 years of age, that’s the point of equilibrium because we are neither one nor the other, we transform ourselves by taking the middle road, that's the road that must be followed by society. (Lula, 2006, cited in, Kingstone and Power, 2009, p.82)

This is a long way from the Leninist sloganeering and post-Marxist and Gramsci-informed ideology associated with the early PT. Ultimately ‘Brazil has transformed the PT more than the PT has transformed Brazil’ (Goldfrank and Wampler, 2008, p. 266).

The Party of 1980 was certainly not the one elected to power in 2002. ‘Like Cardoso before him, Lula chose to ally with conservative parties in congress and went on to implement an economic agenda so orthodox that his presidency was dubbed Cardoso’s third term’ (Power, 2008, p.82). Although there has been some significant continuity there has also been much change. ‘In its early years, the PT’s political action resembled that of a radical social movement demanding the end of capitalism and the establishment of socialism. Its slogan in 1980 was ‘The party without bosses.’ But in 2002 the PT chose one of Brazil’s biggest capitalists, textile magnet José Alencar, as Lula’s vice-presidential running mate…….’ (Flynn, 2002, no pagination). Representing a wide variety of groups is not the same as forming alliances. The PT became much more strategic in its aims. ‘[C]oncepts such as ‘social pact’ were an anathema at the birth of the Workers Party in 1980, Lula
explicitly asked for the support of the ruling elites during his campaign.......and he proposed the formation of .....a pact between workers and employers, so that the country's problems could be solved consensually’ (Branford and Kucinski, 2005, p. 22). During the 1980s the PT was more radical, but during the 1990s it became more social democratic in character. The party began a process of normalisation in the second half of the 1990s and Lula's race for the Presidency in 2002 accelerated this trend (Hunter, 2008, p.17). 'The Party broke with the past and publicly acknowledged the benefits of adapting to international market trends. This first occurred with Lula’s third run of the Presidency in 1998, and became even clearer in the 2002 campaign.” (Keck, 1992, p.24). This is in stark contrast to the early anti-capitalist statements of the early PT.

This commitment to root democracy in capitalist also made - so as the option described capitalist unequivocally our democratic struggle. One most powerful stimulus to our organization as a political party having an alternative project of government and power, was the discovery (for most of the PT, before empirical than theoretical) of structural perversity of capitalism. We were, and we being, angry response to the unnecessary suffering of millions, a logical consequence of capitalist barbarity. The concrete historical experience - in other words, the pedagogy negative Brazilian miracle and so many other tragic examples of situations life national and international - has taught us that capitalism whatever its material power, vocationally is inequitable and unjust, by nature averse to that fraternal sharing of social wealth, which is a prerequisite of any genuine democracy. It is the capitalist oppression that results in absolute poverty by more than one-third of humanity. Is that it imposes on the American new forms of enslavement,
which reduced the income per capita at 6.5% in recent years, making many countries regress to levels of twenty years ago. It is the capitalist system is based, ultimately, the exploitation of man and the brutal commodification of human life, responsible for heinous crimes against democracy and human rights, the crematoria of Hitler to the recent genocide in South Africa, through our notorious torture chambers. Is Brazilian capitalism, with its predatory dynamics, responsible for the starvation of millions, by illiteracy, marginalization, violence that spreads by all plans of national life. It is capitalism that maintains and deepens the real basis of inequality office in Brazil. Therefore, the incorporation of PT - Manifesto and Program of the Foundation -- have advocated the overcoming of capitalism as essential to the full democratization of Brazilian life. Even though larger ones do not deepen the internal design of clearly socialist. And the ten years that followed, the painful, but passionate fight democratic, just made our choice to confirm and enlarge the capitalist commitments transformers PT.

(Socialism Petista is part of the resolution adopted at the 7th National Meeting, held between May 31 and June 3, 1990 at the Palace of Convention Hall, in Sao Paulo, and reaffirmed the 2nd Congress, held in Belo Horizonte, between 24 and 28 November 1999.)

As the PT developed so did the purpose to which PB was put. Originally, PB was both an institutional process and a deeply political forum. Over time, the institutional process remained but the associated expansion of the political sphere that the forum of PB engendered became less prominent. The forum of PB was tied to explicitly political claims; the creation of new political subjects, the development and ownership of political subjectivity acquired through the development of critical consciousness, the multiplicity of struggles and the necessity that they be heard. As the PT relinquished these claims, PB as a forum ceased to exist. The institution
remained and with it some of the original goals, namely to tackle corruption and clientelism and to enhance transparency and accountability. These goals were in keeping with the overall projects of the IFIs and Third Way governments like those of Blair and Clinton. The Lula ‘government had moved from a supposedly tactical acceptance of the IMF terms to a wholehearted acceptance of neoliberal orthodoxy’ (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination). The radical democratic, socialist and Freirean-type ‘school of citizenship’ aspirations that would have challenged many of the assumptions of IFIs and Third Way forms of government disappeared from PT rhetoric and policy. PB was one of the PTs most prominent policy initiatives and it too became a less political and more pragmatic tool.

There are a variety of claims and projects which aim to be counter hegemonic. The grander projects and claims tend to be somewhat utopian and include projects to overthrow the neoliberal capitalist order and realise a different form of democracy, more often than not this is some form of socialist democracy. These projects tend to assume a universal project, an anti capitalist project, and false homogeneity of struggles; they fail to acknowledge the multiplicity of struggles highlighted by post Marxist approaches. The lesser projects and claims are not only more practical but are also theoretically more coherent. They display a more nuanced understanding of the nature of the hegemonic struggle. Attempting to endow initiatives like PB with the potential to overthrow neoliberal capitalism is to set them up as straw men. To demand that PB (or any form of formal civic engagement) be capable of directly challenging the dominant hegemony misunderstands the dynamic nature
of the hegemonic struggle. Placing unrealistic expectations on formal civic engagement suggests a utopian formulation which fails to acknowledge that counter hegemonic projects are necessarily multi headed. Misunderstandings pertaining to hegemonic nature arise from the failure to acknowledge its dynamic relation, one of co-construction, that exists between hegemony and counter hegemony; this and an assumed false homogeneity with regard to counter hegemonic claims/projects. Once this dynamic, heterogeneous nature is revealed and made explicit then PB can be variously transformative (counter hegemonic) and reinforcing of the status quo (dominant hegemony). Tarso Genro (a political theorist, leading member of the PT and a past mayor of Porto Alegre), an advocate of initiatives like PB, recognises their potential but also appreciates the limitations of initiatives like PB. His work focuses on the realisation of a socialist democracy. He is quite clear that the task of realising a socialist democracy is gargantuan and on a very different level to the operation of initiatives like PB. It would need to be a national if not international multi-faceted counter hegemonic struggle and necessitate an anti-capitalist strategy.

There are lesser counter hegemonic projects and claims and it is here that initiatives like PB may have some transformative potential. This is not to suggest that PB alone could accomplish any of them simply that PB and initiatives like it may contribute towards them. These projects include attempts to: penetrate the State, democratise the State, create a non-state public sphere and thereby move some power from the State to the citizenry. In these approaches PB would be one
of many non homogeneous molecular struggles. The question then is not whether PB itself reinforces the dominant hegemony or whether it is counter hegemonic but how, when and in which ways can it contribute to counter hegemonic struggles. This approach acknowledges the fluid, mutating, co-contaminating and co-constitutive nature of hegemony and the hegemonic struggle. A PB process could be predominantly counter hegemonic in character and yet still exhibit aspects of hegemonic reinforcement. The co-constitutive nature of PB would hold that equally the reverse is also true, that is a PB process could be predominantly hegemonic in character and yet still exhibit transformative (counter hegemonic) aspects.

During the late 1970s/early 1980s there was a development of a ‘new’ Left across Latin American; this was particularly strong and vibrant in Brazil (Couto, 2013). It rejected traditional Marxism and looked to marry socialism and democracy. It saw democratic reformism as a way of realising ‘real’ i.e. social and economic democracy rather than merely ‘formal’ i.e. political democracy. There were many rich and vigorous debates about types of democracy and the types of institutions and social relations necessary to realise ‘real’ democracy (Couto, 2013). For some (Genro, Baierle, Santos) PB was viewed as an institution aimed at achieving a reconfiguration of state society power relations which could further the project for a real democracy; not that PB alone could achieve this but that it could contribute to a much larger multi faceted project.
The implementation of small local initiatives, like PB, became possible although further extensions were hindered by a lack of national initiatives and a lack of ambition for ‘real’ democracy at the national level (Baierle 2003). This happened for a variety of reasons including pragmatism, ideology and international environment; this limited the transformative potential of these initiatives shifting such potential away from any conflict that may arise between local and national initiatives and the ideologies that drove them (ibid). As such the extent to which PB was able to act so to further a project for ‘real’ democracy restricted to the local level.

PB, and similar initiatives, viewed as an attempt to penetrate state power and thus democratise the state may be seen as partially successful. One strategy that sought to achieve this was the formation of a public policy which occurred in dialogue with the State. PB was viewed as an avenue for this dialogue between state and citizen because of its capacity to render local government budgetary decisions participatory. PB did form new relationships between the state and the citizenry and did foster new forms of civic engagement. Both PB and PT looked to transform these relationships by moving their relative sites of power, forming a new innovatory relationship between citizen and state, thus allowing citizens to act collectively as part of a non state public sphere. This transformation reduced the State from potential enemy to political object, one which could now be realistically democratised. The forming of new relationships between citizen and state required new institutions, both formal and informal. PB, as a formal institution, spoke to
disparate demands from a newly formed non state public sphere and, as a process, it brought them together.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has traced some of the factors that contributed to changes that PB underwent from its conception in the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s to its role as the PT’s ‘main axis of government’ (Baiocchi, 2006) as the political party in power. Acknowledging the importance of the new federal pact and the space created by the end of the authoritarian regime, this chapter’s main argument has been for an understanding of PB as a tool which in and of itself is relatively politically neutral; it makes a minimal political claim, namely that citizens be given some say in public budgets. The handling of PB by various groups reveals that other more potentially political claims associated with PB reside, not in the process itself, but rather in the hands of the implementers. In its more political manifestations, PB was not just an institutional process but was also an explicitly political forum. This political space is not intrinsic to the process of PB, but rather it develops out of specific understandings of citizenship and democracy which prize the development and ownership of political consciousness and the necessity of a forum which allows for the articulation of competing demands. This chapter has argued that both the changes in the PT and the transfer of PB into the hands of others are germane to the manifestation of PB and consequently what can, and cannot, be achieved by the process. PB’s association with SMs and the early manifestation of the PT can lead to a romanticised idea of both PB and its potential. The PT championed PB
and initially the PT was aligned with the demands from the SMs out of which the PB grew. These claims and demands spoke to a new political settlement and the creation of new political subjects which went beyond the minimal conditions necessary for traditional models of representative democracy; they related to forms of citizenship and civic engagement that went far beyond universal suffrage and regular free and fair elections. Over time, the aims and ideology of the PT moved further and further away from the demands of the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s. The PT continued to champion PB after its alignments with the demands of the SMs ceased. The hand of the PT changed and as a consequence so did the use and nature of its tool - PB.

The extent to which any specific PB process was affected by these or other case-specific factors cannot be assessed without an investigation of individual instances. This is due in part to the very context-sensitive nature of PB but also due to peculiarities of the socio-economic landscape of Brazil in general and the many varied areas it is composed of. Where this chapter has charted general developments in the advocacy of PB and the consequent impact this had on PB itself, the chapter on PB in the UK will focus on two specific cases and thereby afford a more specific and detailed analysis of the form of PB undertaken. The next chapter explores some of the changes that the PB process underwent in Brazil prior to its translation to other countries. It is particularly concerned with changes that rendered PB so attractive to a diverse set of actors.
CHAPTER TWO

The Development of PB: Progress or Ossification?

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the environment in which PB emerged. This chapter focuses specifically on the PB process and its development. The problems associated with implementing policy and processes in different contexts have been well documented both generally and specifically with regard to PB. Here the focus is not so much on these factors but rather what made PB so attractive and also what constitutes success with regard to its implementation. Of late it has become more common to speak of policy and practice translation rather than diffusion or transfer or in terms of export and import. Newman and Tonkens (2011) illustrate the usefulness of thinking in terms of translation:

[T]ranslation is emerging as a theoretical approach to understanding the flow of policy ideas across borders. The more usual concepts of policy transfer or diffusion tend to conceptualise policies as rather static objects that can move across boundaries without losing their coherence. The idea of translation, in contrast, focuses on the flows, processes and movements at stake in the process of policy development and learning. Attention shifts to the local settings in which ideas are translated, mediated and adapted (e.g. Czarniawska, and Sevon 2005; Lendvai and Stubbs 2007; Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002). (ibid. pp.19-20)
Given one of the claims of this project is ‘context matters’ translation would seem a more useful concept than transfer or diffusion. This becomes even more apparent in subsequent chapters exploring PB in the UK and the specificity of the UK context.

The translation of PB to different countries with radically different political, social and economic contexts will clearly impact upon the nature and consequences of the process. However, this chapter argues that the most fundamental changes to PB took place within Brazil, and that these changes facilitated its translation into other contexts. The factors affecting the success of PB have been widely researched and analysed and there remains much disagreement around this. However, the focus of this chapter is on the nature of success. What would constitute success for PB? PB grew out of demands for an alternative both to the traditional politics of Brazil and that of the prevailing political and economic orthodoxy of neoliberalism. This chapter asks what happened to PB that rendered it an attractive process for proponents of neoliberalism including the World Bank. By 2012 the biggest champion of PB was not the PT, but was instead the World Bank (Goldfrank, 2012). Unsurprisingly, this was due to a confluence of changes in neoliberalism as well as changes in PB. Neoliberalism took a participatory turn and PB went from a space or forum to a formal institution - a process. Many have addressed the consequences of translation. Here the attention is on what made PB ripe for such widespread translation. PB emanated from overtly political movements and demands which were radical and distinctly different from the
prevailing orthodoxy, and over time it became a politically neutral and politically malleable process. Tracing PB back to its origins in the SMs and contrasting this with later institutionalised and even constitutionalised models reveals that the development of PB maintained only some of the original aims and hopes of the SMs.

This chapter starts by looking at how PB is generally understood today. It then briefly outlines the PB process in Porto Alegre, which came to serve as the exemplar of the process, before contrasting this with the demands, hopes and aims of the SMs detailed in the previous chapter. While the development of PB did realise some of the demands and aims of the SMs, ultimately these were only those in keeping with dominant models of representative democracy and neoliberalism as they shifted towards more participatory and social democratic forms, respectively. The more radical and alternative demands and aims remain unmet, and are generally no longer part of PB processes even in Brazil.

This chapter concludes that the formalisation and translation of PB does represent some achievements in terms of the demands of the SMs. However, these achievements are eclipsed as formalisation and institutionalisation themselves, regardless of what form they take, preclude the realisation of core aspects of the more radical demands of the SMs. Ultimately, the more radical demands around the creation of new political subjects and a new political sphere are revealed to operate on a different logic from that on which formalised PB processes operate.
Formalised PB processes do offer new channels for civic engagement understood as including more people within an already existing sphere which at best broadens the sphere. Moreover, the more radical demands of the SMs were not about inclusion, but transformation; they spoke to a new or at least deeper sphere populated by new political subjects, and called for a new political space/forum/arena populated by new political subjects. This is contrasted with PB as a process.

2.1 PB Today

PB has been widely praised, and is indeed today widely practiced, as one of the most empowering participatory innovations, no longer the preserve of left wing movements, parties and organisations. ‘To speak of Participatory Budgeting today is to speak of a seemingly infinitely malleable set of institutions that... continues to attract attention from actors on all ends of the political spectrum. It is to speak about an institution present in more than 1500 cities spread over five continents’ (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, p.1). It also bears another less noted but no less remarkable feature. PB, birthed by the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s in Brazil, arose from a space of contestation, but went on to become institutionalised and even constitutionalised in Brazil. Few formal institutions develop directly out of protest movements.

Today PB is generally understood as a process, a policy instrument and a mechanism that affords citizen involvement in the allocation of public budgets. It has become a policy instrument able to meet a variety of political aims. As a policy instrument it has become the tool of local and national governments and global
institutions including the World Bank and UN Habitat. This indicates a significant shift from bottom up demands to top down policy implementation. There is no single definition of PB but a brief look at some of the definitions used by these adopters of PB reveals the extent to which PB has become a politically neutral and malleable process.

World Bank, UN Habitat: the biggest advocate of PB today (Goldfrank, 2012)

There is no single definition, because Participatory Budgeting differs greatly from one place to the next. [...] Nevertheless, in general terms, a Participatory Budget is ‘a mechanism (or process) through which the population decides on, or contributes to decisions made on, the destination of all or part of the available public resources.

(UN-Habitat, 2004, no pagination)

PB Unit: the body responsible for importing PB to the UK, and who supported the public sector and community groups in developing participatory budgeting processes in the UK.

Our agreed definition with the Department for Communities and Local Government is:

Participatory budgeting directly involves local people in making decisions on the spending and priorities for a defined public budget. PB processes can be defined by geographical area (whether that’s neighbourhood or larger) or by theme. This means engaging residents and community groups representative of all parts of the community to discuss and vote on spending priorities, make spending proposals, and
vote on them, as well giving local people a role in the scrutiny and monitoring of the process and results to inform subsequent PB decisions on an annual or repeatable basis.

(PB Unit, 2008, p.11)

Participatory Budgeting Project: the main advocate of PB in the US

Participatory budgeting (PB) is a different way to manage public money, and to engage people in government. It is a democratic process in which community members directly decide how to spend part of a public budget. It enables taxpayers to work with government to make the budget decisions that affect their lives.

(Participatory Budgeting Project, n.d., no pagination)

Participation Compass: an example of the plethora of tools, developed to provide practical information for those working to involve people, which appeared alongside the growing emphasis on participation.

Participatory budgeting is an umbrella term which covers a variety of mechanisms that delegate power or influence over local budgets, investment priorities and economic spending to citizens.

(Participation Compass n.d., no pagination)

As previously noted, PB has been characterised as one of the most radical and empowering participatory initiatives currently being deployed (Fung and Wright, 2001). Yet the definitions of PB today do not accord with the idea of PB explored in Chapter One. Chapter One explored the way in which PB became relatively
politically neutral which allowed, as the origins of the definitions above suggest, PB to be used as a policy instrument by a variety of actors.

2.2 Porto Alegre - the Exemplar

While there is no commonly agreed upon definition of PB independent of the various institutions that use it, there is a great deal of literature describing the various processes of PBs (Santos, 1993; Navarro, 1996; Fedozzi, 1997; Baierle, 1998; Abers, 2000; Fischer and Moll, 2000; Souza, 2001; Wampler and Avritzer, 2004, among others). The following discussion will outline the basic ideal features and processes of a PB cycle. This outline is based on literature which typically focuses on Porto Alegre PBs as the exemplar and uses Belo Horizonte and Fortaleza for comparisons. The illustration (Illustration 1) below demonstrates the various stages in the annual cycle of an ideal Brazilian PB process.

Porto Alegre was both the birthplace of PB and also the city whose process, in its later, mature, more developed form, was generally accepted as being the exemplar, both within Brazil and with others from across the globe. The Porto Alegre model’s ‘importance and influence on the global travel of PB is well accepted’ (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, p.2). While enjoying exemplar status, given the minimal and neutral definitions above, and the scope for variation they afford, the Porto Alegre model was often adopted piecemeal and transformed dramatically as it travelled across the globe. The wide variations in PB models within Brazil has also been widely documented (for example, Santos, 1993, Souza,
2001; Wampler, 2002; Wampler and Avritzer, 2004; Baiocchi, 2006, among others). However, looking at the mature Porto Alegre model reveals the development of PB into a formal process within Brazil and begins to show how it became a tool that was attractive to individuals and organisations across the political spectrum. Originally championed by the PT, PB became the tool of choice for a variety of political parties in Brazil. Looking at the process itself reveals that, although not devoid of political content, the decoupling of PB and the demands of SMs, particularly the more radical and alternative political claims, occurred within Brazil. This was not simply a consequence of its adoption by politically and economically orthodox organisations. Rather, the minimal political content of PB as a process and formal institution was both compatible and in sympathy with the prevailing economic and political orthodoxy, and this made it ripe for such widespread translation. The development of PB coincided with the growing emphasis placed on participation within neoliberalism; this confluence rendered the two congruent.

Brazil has been running PBs for close to three decades now and the processes of PB have evolved and developed over this period and '[b]y 2001, an intricate system had been consolidated’ (Koonings, 2001, p.85). The processes involved in PB are continually assessed and developed. ‘Near the year’s end, participants redraw the rules of the process for the following year based on their experience’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.3). The finance available for PB comes from a discretionary spend but a ‘significant portion of [this part of] the annual municipal budget (between 9 and 21 percent of the total)’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.3) is open for PB:
In Porto Alegre, activists from neighborhood associations started demanding direct input into the city budget in 1985. Through a process of trial and error, participatory budgeting evolved into a yearlong cycle of meetings that allow participants to decide on projects in their own neighborhoods as well as for the city as a whole. (Baiocchi, 2006, p.3)

The illustration below details the form that this matured version of PB took and shows the extent to which it had become a formalised institutionalised process.
The PB Cycle - Illustration 1

This illustration above (illustration 1) and the table below (table 1) are both drawn from an interactive versions found at: http://www.ongcidade.org/site/htm/comum/cicloEN.html [Accessed 01.02.12]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part of Cycle</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. March / April - Preparatory Meetings</td>
<td>Agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning and coordinating meetings at the regional and micro-regional, thematic and other levels. Meetings to integrate the Delegates Forum and the Planning Forums.</td>
<td>- Accounts Rendered; Presentation of Investment Plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Presentation of PB regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- General and Technical Criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Discussion of the List of Councillors to be sent to the PB Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Suggestions of priorities and requests submitted through the Internet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. April / May - Regional Thematic Assemblies
Holding of the Regional and Thematic Assemblies

**Agenda**
- Selection of Thematic Priorities
- Election of Councillors
- Establishing of the number of delegates based on level participation in regional
- Accounts rendered

3. May / June / July - Regional Thematic Meetings
Holding of Regional Thematic Meetings

**Agenda**
- Election of Delegates
- Prioritisation of Works and Services
- Deliberation on request made over the internet (in the Forum of Delegates)
- Before Prioritisation: delegate visits the sites targeted by the requests in order to understand the request being made

4. July (First Fortnight)
Municipal Assembly

**Agenda**
- Swearing in of new Councillors
- Submission of the prioritisation of Works and Services
- Selection of a general theme for the current PB cycle

5. July - September
Analysis of Demands and Budget Structure (resources to be allocated to each Department)

**Government**
- Analysis of technical feasibility of requests made
- View of proposed general budget structure

6. August / Sept.
Vote on the Budget Structure

**Agenda**
- Discussion and voting on the general budget structure
- Beginning of resource distribution for the regions and thematic committees of the PB Council

7. October / Dec
Detail added to the Investment and Service plan

**Agenda**
- Finalisation of the distribution of resources for the regions and thematic committees
- Presentation and voting on the Investment Plan Proposals (technical and financial analysis of service and construction requests) in the regional and thematic delegate forums, with the Cabinet of Budget Programming, Municipal Secretary of Political Coordination and Local Government and similar organisations
- Reception of Investment Plans beginning before the proposals are returned to their corresponding forums
After the PT introduced and established PB in Porto Alegre, the process was exported to dozens of other municipalities throughout the country. In 1992, a dozen PT municipalities had participatory budgeting; by 1996 the number had increased to thirty-six. PB grew and became common practice in municipalities run by parties other than the PT. ‘Over 100 municipalities experimented with it between 1997 and 2000, and at least 200 did so between 2001 and 2004, at least half of which were run by other political parties’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.5). It took about ten years before the PB cycle developed into this form. It is worth noting that it also took time for significant numbers of people to become involved.

The table below (Table 2) shows the number of people taking part in the Porto Alegre PBs each year from 1990 to 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3,694</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the possible explanations for why participation increased so dramatically after the first few years is previous participants praise for the process; PB was based on a principle of attraction rather than promotion. ‘Once the process started to show results—three or four years after its introduction—the number of participants grew dramatically. By 2004, some 20,000 were attending the first round of meetings, many of them for the first time. A conservative estimate is that ten percent of adults in the city have at one point participated’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p3).

### 2.3 The growing popularity of participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>7,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>10,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>9,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>11,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>10,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>11,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>13,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>28,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>26,807</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data from this table is taken from the Administration of Porto Alegre cited in Wampler and Avritzer (2004, p.302).
The maturation of PB ran concurrently with a global trend championing the benefits of increased public participation. By the dawn of the twenty-first century, a double movement appeared to characterise debate and thought on democracy at the international level. Firstly, the conviction that liberal democracies should be exported worldwide, and secondly a desire to deepen democracy where it was already entrenched. Two common and interrelated motivations for the latter can be identified: 1) to make governments and institutions more responsive to the needs and concerns of their citizens and 2) to address what had come to be seen as the deficits of modern democracy. Two of the most prominent perceived deficits are 1) a crisis of legitimacy of governments and 2) a general apathy among citizens. The proposed solution was a ‘political project of developing and sustaining more substantive and empowered citizen participation in the political process than what is normally found in liberal representative democracy alone’ (Gaventa, 2005, p.2).

This was accompanied, at the theoretical level, by an increase in attention given to deliberative models of democracy by many prominent theorists including Cohen (1989; 1997), Dryzek (2000; 2010), Fishkin (1993; 2003) and Habermas (1991; 1992). These models and theories are associated with an emphasis on the importance of combining traditional representative mechanisms with the construction of public spaces where citizens are entitled to voice their opinions, desires, and preferences. This so called deliberative turn of the 1990s was characterised by claims that authentic deliberation and collective decision making comprise the nexus of democratic legitimacy (Dryzek, 2002). Participation came to
be seen as a panacea for the perceived deficits of contemporary democracy. The question of the desirability of participation was off the agenda, and attention was focused on how its increase could be realised within contemporary democracies.

By the 1990s there had been a noticeable shift in mainstream thinking from minimalist elitist conceptions of representative democracy - where the masses are deemed incapable of acting in accordance with democratic principles for the greater good of society and where mass mobilisations are seen as a threat to democracy - towards a view where the inclusion of the masses and the democratisation of all aspects of life is not just seen as desirable but necessary in order to address the crisis of representation and legitimacy faced by contemporary existing democracies. Calls for greater participation were now part of the mainstream agenda and no longer the preserve of social movements and left-wing thinkers and activists. Towards the end of the twentieth century there was a general acknowledgment that

\[\text{the traditional institutions of representative democracy, while the ultimate guarantor of accountability, are also viewed as insufficient in complex and differentiated societies. More sophisticated methods are called for to enable decision-making bodies to respond to the multiplicity of views and interests which no longer - if they ever did - follow simple lines of class or party loyalty. (Newman, 2001, pp 130 -131)}\]
By the turn of the century, the limits of consultation as a way of engaging local communities and making good use of their potential to contribute both to the efficient provision of services and to a more vibrant democratic polity had become apparent. It was not producing the desired results and citizens were not interested in being consulted. Traditional partnership models for local government were being replaced by more collaborative models where collaboration is defined by active contribution of resources. Collaborative models view citizens as both being and possessing valuable resources. The development of a host of democratic innovations based on some notion of collaboration signified a change in relationship from government (local and national) working for the people to one of the government working with the people. This move was politically motivated, in terms of civic engagement, and economically motivated, in terms of resource and efficiency maximisation. PB was one such innovation. PB may not have been an easy fit with the traditional neoliberalism associated with Thatcher and Reagan, but it did fit naturally alongside the social democratic forms of neoliberalism associated with the Third Way policies of Clinton and Blair, which grew in prominence around the turn of the century. The previous chapter charted the PT’s move away from its radical and socialist origins and towards the prevailing orthodoxy of neoliberalism. The PT did drop much of its radical rhetoric, ideology and policy but, even as Lula himself became an explicit advocate of Third Way thinking and policy\textsuperscript{11}, he and his party retained PB as official policy (Martell, 2010).

\textsuperscript{11} In July 2003 Lula attended a conference on 'Progressive Governance' essentially Third Way thinking and policy, in London. (Kingstone and Power, 2009)
The Participatory Budgeting that has traveled promises to solve one of the problems of democracy, namely its unruliness and unpredictability, substituting this with rational, more inclusive, and more transparent demand-making. This makes it compatible with both 'good governance' and New Public Management discourses as well as with some social justice projects. (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, p.1)

PB may have developed out of radical and alternative demands but it proved itself capable of also being an instrument for far more orthodox political and economic ends.

PB attracted international attention, becoming a best practice that was taken up by a number of international networks. Now, it traveled as a politically neutral device, one that could improve governance and generate trust in government. (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, p.2)

PB became an attractive tool for anyone seeking to increase the transparency of public management in order to enhance democratic legitimacy, by: 1) improving accountability, which seeks to make executive responsibility more transparent: and 2) increasing the amount and volume of participation in government. (Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012 p.8)

There are a variety of explanations for the growing attention paid to participation by institutions like the World Bank ranging from the relatively benign to the
suspicious and outright deprecating. On the one hand, there appear to be what Goldfrank (2012) calls the ‘true believers’, namely those who advocate the use of PB for its ‘transformative, democratizing, poverty-reducing potential’ (ibid p.14), and on the other, those who advocate PB as a way to maintain and promote a neoliberal agenda (Goldfrank, 2012, p.14). In its more generous interpretation, the emphasis on participation and interest in innovations like PB are viewed as ‘programs seeking to reform how the state functions by increasing citizen oversight’(Ganuza and Baiocchi, 2012, p.7). There are a variety of strategies associated with the latter which again range from the relatively beneficent to the more skeptical and cynical. Neoliberalism’s new emphasis on participation, including its adoption of innovations like PB, can be seen as a reaction to criticisms of the Washington Consensus (WC) but one which still maintains its core principles of ‘privatization, liberalization, deregulation, and generally reducing the role of the central state’ (Goldfrank, 2012, p.1). PB affords a role for the citizen in this strategy to accompany that of the private sector in more traditional neoliberalism. PB is particularly suited to this as ‘the rules associated with PB can be used to maintain the status quo, because they provide government officials with a better understanding of citizens’ demands’ (Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012, p.7). Rather than a response to criticism, the growing emphasis on participation can also be viewed as simply an acknowledgement that civic participation can serve to enhance efficiency as well as legitimacy and thereby both aid the maintenance of the status quo and facilitate a fuller realisation of its explicitly economic ends. This appreciation is

12 Goldfrank (2012) also identifies other factors affecting PB. He also ultimately rejects the more orthodox Marxist interpretations of World Bank motivations.
exhibited by the addition of the good governance agenda to the traditional WC. According to this view participation, and specifically PB, can facilitate ‘good governance and avoid cost overruns and corruption in its projects’ (Goldfrank, 2012, p.6). More sceptical interpretations of the growing popularity of, and emphasis on, participation view ‘the adoption of participatory approaches in general as an attempt to co-opt the ideas and the activists of its civil society opponents in order to neutralize them or to use them to help advance a neoliberal agenda’ (Goldfrank, 2012, p.4). The merit of these interpretations can only really be determined on a case by case, or policy by policy, basis. Here, the issue is that PB had become a process capable of acting as an instrument for any of these agendas. A return to the demands of the SMs reveals that the even more generous and benign interpretations are devoid of the more radical and alternative elements of the SM demands.

2.4 Social Movements Revisited

The previous chapter discussed the general nature of the SMs and their demands. This section discusses the relationship between these demands and various manifestations of PB. To varying extents, PB did continue to be an instrument capable of tackling the corruption and clientelism of Brazilian political life, it did allow greater civic involvement in decisions about public budgets, it did give voice to previously excluded groups, and it did redirect resources. In this way it did contribute to a new political settlement with new roles and responsibilities for the state and citizen within Brazil. However, it did not become part of, nor contribute
to, the realisation of a new political settlement, or a new form of democracy in the sense demanded by the SMs. PB’s relationship to the demands of the SMs from which it was birthed had inspired hope for a new form of democracy. As PBs relationship with more radical and alternative demands diminished so too did its ability to contribute to a new form of democracy. PB became an instrument of Brazil’s new democracy but this was only new to Brazil; it was and remains very much in keeping with the orthodoxy of an adapted form of neoliberalism and associated Third Way policies.

It is worth revisiting why the PB, at least initially, held so much hope in terms of a new transformative participatory initiative. As noted in Chapter One PB was a process and an institution but it was also seen as the creation of a political arena capable of addressing the concerns and demands of the SMs from which it emerged. PB was seen as a part of the fabric of a growing culture of participation in Brazil which began in the development of social movements in the 1970s and which, by the 1980s, included formal organisations and a variety of actors developing concrete participatory innovations in their struggles for democracy and against military rule (Mainwaring, 1989; Baiocchi, 2006). Movements concerned with demanding a greater voice for the population and demands for increased participation pre-dated the introduction of PB.

Given the authoritarian and military rule in Brazil a call for more democracy is easy to understand; Brazil has a history of a glaring lack of democracy: ‘The way that
decisions are made in participatory budget meetings marks a real break from past models of civic engagement. Participants spend a fair amount of time in deliberative discussions. Beyond providing a forum to choose projects and priorities, participatory budget meetings enable other forms of collective action and discussion. Participants regularly carve out these spaces for open-ended discussion (Baiocchi, 2006, p.4). These spaces and the nature of discussions that took place within them were not so much formal institutional components of PB itself but rather the informal institutions of the SMs from which PB originated.

PB ‘emerged as an attempt to transform relations between government and society and set up institutions that promote joint management of public resources’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.59). In this way it was a new system and a new institution. The district level meetings gave citizens direct access to government and an opportunity to demand justifications from government; this ability to demand justification is credited with generating a sense of empowerment amongst citizens (Baiocchi, 2005, p.104). For example, ‘In Porto Alegre, a prefigurative social movement innovation - norms of claim making and collective access to the public good - became institutionalised and extended to a whole city’ (ibid., 2005, p.5). While there were a number of participatory initiatives, it was PB that served as by far the most popular, in terms of both its reputation and the extent to which it was used as a form of institutionalisation: ‘[T]he OP stands out as a system that has not only provided services and improvements for the urban poor but involved large numbers of them in active civic life’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p.2).
The PB process, aside from the much talked of benefits with regard to local governance issues ‘has become a sort of school of democracy’ (Baiocchi, 2006 p.2) and has helped aid a general culture of participation (Baierle, 1998) in Brazil. This pedagogical aspect ‘built into participatory budgeting’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.5) was about much more than learning about budgets or how decisions are made. It was informed by Freirean critical pedagogy and liberation theology; as such it emphasised the necessity of becoming aware of and understanding the prevailing social, economic and political world, so that one could both see but also appreciate the origin of social, political and economic injustice and thereby be in a position to challenge such injustice (Y. Cabannes, 2013, perf. comm., May 9th).

‘[T]he regime of state-civil society relations under OP was different from anything that had been seen before in Porto Alegre’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p. 47), which alone constitutes the ‘novelty’ of PB as a form of participation. However, perhaps the most interesting and novel aspects of PB are not its institutional form, but rather its association with the claims of SMs and activists with regard to notions of participation and citizenship, and the associated understandings of political subjects and the political sphere.

The Participatory Budget trials carried out in various municipalities between 1997 and 2000 lie at the heart of complex changes that are taking place in the relationship between state and society in Brazil. Such trials bring the hope of genuine democracy and active citizenship and reveal ways of reducing social inequality. The trials also point,
broadly speaking, towards new ways of understanding the state, in
which forms of self-management involving full social participation
prevail when issues of public interest are at stake. (Torres Ribeiro and
Gracia, 2002, p.21)

PB became a site of not just administrative debate but one of political
debate; ‘meetings becoming sites for open-ended discussion of
community problems over and above the stated agenda and allocation
of budgeting priorities. (Baiocchi, 2005, p.95)

As noted in the section above the ‘reinventing and reclaiming 'citizenship' was a
dominant theme in social movements in the 1980s and 1990s. PB was influenced
by and associated with various notions of participation and citizenship originating
in the SMs. The heavy involvement of activists in the early development of PB
(Baiocchi 2005) saw the continuation of these ideas. PB was, at least initially,
associated with new conceptions of citizenship, participation, social justice, social
equality and redistribution as well as the more practical issues of dealing with
clientelism, paternalism and corruption.

Looking back over the 1990s, a longtime PT activist recalled, '[T]hat old
militancy of going door to door to confront the government is gone.
Now OP is everything,' while another said that 'the era of the mass
protest [has] ended in Porto Alegre. (Baiocchi, 2005, p.45)

Protest did not entirely disappear but the PB had become a vehicle for the
demands of SMs whose traditional method had been protest: ‘Even a cursory
reading of association newsletters reveals an evolution throughout the 1990s toward a language where the meaning of popular struggles is equated with participating in the OP,’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p.46).

Conversations about deeply political issues, including migration, unemployment, the environment, planning and land tenure were what facilitated the development of ‘political consciousness’ amongst PB participants (Baiocchi, 2005, p.102). This pedagogical aspect was not formally institutionalised within PB but rather it was a way of being derived from the critical pedagogy and liberation theology that had influenced so many of the activists and SMs who took part in PB.

The community activists originating in the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s ‘use the language of citizenship to describe rights and responsibilities, and they describe themselves as citizens’, (Baiocchi, 2005, p.4) but crucially by including debates about social justice, social transformation and the political system they spoke to a ‘deep’ notion of citizenship. As PB was initially heavily influenced by this style of community activism and its conceptions of citizenship it seemed to have the potential to usher in new ‘deeper’ forms of participation and citizenship.

At a time when scholars are pointing to a crisis of the welfare state as a threat to industrial democracies, here we see an instance of an innovation by municipal government that has empowered local citizenry, fostered new activism in civil society, and created a novel form of coordination across the state-civil society divide. (Baiocchi, 2005, p.3)
As Baiocchi (2005) emphasises, community organisers and activists played important roles with regard to the organising, running and popularity of PB. There was a noticeable difference between the community leaders and activists of 1970s and 1980s Brazil and those that began to emerge in the 1990s (ibid., p.127). This change of focus from the traditional conflictual modes of operation of SMs to one of participatory governance by individuals and groups who played a significant role in the running of PB was undoubtedly one of the factors which effected a change in the nature of debate and discussion in these public arenas. While SMs are credited with creating the space for deeply political debates where different visions and projects could be promoted and challenged, the new-style organisers and activists were generally more project orientated. Over time, overtly political discussions were considered to be inappropriate within PB arenas (Baiocchi, 2005, p.166). The PB citizen shifted from one based on a conception of deep citizenship to one based on thin citizenship. The process and the individuals who took part became less political and more pragmatic in orientation.

The discussion of neoliberalism and the increasing importance placed on participation earlier in this chapter suggests an understanding of the citizen in which the conception of citizen originates from a given political and economic project. That is rather than asking ‘what is the role and status of the citizen?’ it starts by asking ‘how can the citizen further the project?’ The role and status of the citizen is developed out of the answers to the latter. The more radical aspects of the SMs demanded a new conception of the citizen which, unlike neoliberal
understanding and constructions, took the citizen and the role of the citizen as prior to economic ends. Given the socialist leanings of the SMs it is possible to identify an economic project in their conception of the citizen, but the conception they developed was not dependent on this. The SMs’ construction of the citizen was first and foremost political. The SMs’ political citizen was one that was capable of recognising and challenging economic orthodoxy, however it was not predicated upon economic project.

There is a burgeoning literature on democratic innovations. Warren (1996) and others rightly identify this literature as focusing on democratic, rather than economic, ends and an associated broadening of the political sphere. Both stand in stark contrast to the conceptions and logic of the SMs. Assessing what travels under the name of PB, Ganuza and Baiocchi (2012) suggest a ‘decoupling of Participatory Budgeting from a broader set of institutional reforms of which it had been part in the 1990s’ (ibid., p.2). This is certainly an insightful and important article which, amongst other things, speaks to the elasticity of PB, and ultimately the form PB takes is revealed as overdetermined. Here I wish to suggest a different decoupling, that of PB from the radical demands from which it originated. There are many aspects of the demands which are absent from alternative manifestations of PB, but here I focus on a few that were prominent in the SMs and conspicuously absent from later PB processes: critical consciousness as a founding principle of citizenship and a logic of contestation and transformation. This logic includes what might be considered a deepening, as opposed to the broadening mentioned
above, of the political sphere. This difference ultimately hinges on a logic of transformation of the existing sphere exhibited by the SMs versus a logic of inclusion into an already existing political sphere. The latter operates on a defined, or at least definable, common good, whereas the former operates on an essentially contested notion of the common good where any consensus reached is merely pragmatic, temporary, fragile and open to disruption at any moment. The latter contains a notion of citizen identity and political subjectivity as claimed whereas the former prescribes identity and subjectivity. To borrow from Gaventa (2006), this is the difference between ‘democracy-building’[as]’ an ongoing process of struggle and contestation rather than the adoption of a standard institutional design’ (ibid., p.3). The radical demands were rooted in a logic of contestation (Dagnino, 1998) and a lack of closure where PB cannot be formalised as it is itself a process in process. ‘Democracy is at once the language of military power, neoliberal market forces, political parties, social movements, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)’ (Gaventa, 2006, p.5). Democracy and accompanying notions of participation and citizen empowerment are the currency of a diverse set of actors. The tightly structured nature of the matured process tends to circumscribe broader discussions. As Baiocchi (2006) himself notes later in his book, as time went on PBs were characterised by discussion about the adoption and implementation of specific projects rather than the more open ended discussions which characterised earlier PBs.
The PB process, aside from the much talked of benefits with regard to local governance issues ‘has become a sort of school of democracy’ (Baiocchi, 2006 p.2) and has helped aid a general culture of participation’ (Bairele, 1998). ‘There is a pedagogical component built into participatory budgeting’ (Baiocchi, 2006, p.5).

Unlike the delegated decision-making of representative democracy, direct participation requires active intervention that in effect trains people for citizenship through problem-solving, communication, and strategizing. But the achievement with the greatest lessons for progressives elsewhere is the transformation of the relationship between the government and the governed. (Baiocchi, 2006, p.2)

The idea of 'citizenship school' is grounded in the idea of, amongst other things, ‘the right to own social subjects and their objectives’ (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.64). This pedagogical aspect was not formally institutionalised within PB but was rather derived from the critical pedagogy and liberation theology that had influenced so many of the activists and SMs who took part in PB.

The understanding of citizenship found within the SMs bears a striking resemblance to that found in the works of authors like Levinson (2011) and Fraser (1992). Both accord pivotal roles to education, identity formation, counter-discourses, counter-publics and alternative political spaces. This is a radically different conception of citizenship from that of ‘citizenship as constraining or 'disciplining’ the subject,’ (Levinson, 2011, p.285) which occurs when citizenship is prescribed and defined rather than claimed and disputed. For Levinson (2011) and the SMs, ‘In a
democratic society, what constitutes legitimate expressions of citizenship itself becomes a matter of debate and disputation’ (Levinson, 2011, p.281). The ‘claiming of identity and subjectivity by citizens as opposed to state-prescribed counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs’ (Fraser, 1992, no pagination, cited in, Levinson, 2011, p.281). Neoliberal discourses predicate the role and function of the citizen on specific understandings of democracy, whereas, for the SMs and the authors above, the ability to debate and to contest the nature of democracy, the role of the citizen, and the prevailing social, political and economic settlement is at the core of what citizenship and democracy are.

If in Latin America the modernizing, developmentalist state of the 1940s to the 1970s wanted ‘productive’ citizens who worked for the good of the country, the neoliberal state wants ‘participatory’ citizens who can learn to solve their own problems and provide for their own needs privately, or at best through civil society. (Levinson, 2011, p. 292)

The SMs called for ‘critically conscious’ citizens capable of demanding alternative social, political and economic settlements. Many have noted the ability of PB to act as a ‘school of citizenship’ including Levinson (2011), Cabannes (2015) the World Bank (n.d.) and the UK PB Unit (2008) to name just a few. The political neutrality and malleability of PB suggests that it is capable of schooling many different forms of citizenship. The SMs sought PB not as a process which contained preordained notions of citizenship but as a space where their vision of citizenship could be
performed and new political subjectivities thereby constituted. There are cases, generally very early manifestations, where this seems to have occurred:

As Silva and Teixeira’s case study of OP in Recife shows, it has given rise to new opportunities for people to constitute themselves as political subjects. In doing so, it has enlarged their sense of their own spheres of agency, bringing them not only into contact with other citizens in the pursuit of rights, but also into the interface with government. (Cornwall, Romano and Shankland, 2008, p.37)

However, this was due to the heavy involvement of SMs rather than a necessary feature of PB as it matured into a formal process. The good governance agenda and neoliberalism’s participatory turn emphasise governing with the state. This contrasts with the contestatory logic of the SMs. The critical consciousness which they advocated was for them necessary so that citizens could recognise the nature and mechanisms of their oppression and thereby be in a position to challenge them.

Details of the changes that the PT underwent as it transitioned from a SM to a political party are explored in detail below. It is, however, worth noting that the PT was not the only SM to undergo significant changes. With the transition to democracy came a noticeable shift in the articulations of many SMs, ‘social movements shifted practices and discourses toward demanding a voice and participation in local governments and toward proposing specific policies’ (Baiocchi, 2005, p.10). Demands generally focused not on overthrowing
the regime or claims about the form a new regime should take (as had been the case while the country remained under military rule), but rather on the roles and functions of citizen and state in Brazil’s new democracy. If not the cause of this shift then at least concomitant with it was an identifiable difference between the community leaders and activists of the 1970s and 1980s and those that began to emerge in the 1990s (Baiocchi 2005). The new style leaders were ‘schooled in participatory governance rather than the conflictual tactics of social movements or the deal making of neighbourhood politics’ (ibid., p.127). Many of the leaders of the SMs became less radical and more pragmatic in their orientation during the 1990s.

D’Oliveira stresses the emergence of a group of trade union leaders, including Lula, whose approach was essentially one of pragmatic negotiations. He argues that in the 1980s, when the independent trade union movement was highly political as its every action, however economic or sectional in intent, came up against the dictatorship, they appeared as radical political leaders. But as the militant trade unions, in the car industry especially, faced rising unemployment and declining influence, the influence of leaders was one of caution and pragmatism. Another group in the post 1994 leadership - for example, ex-guerrilla José Genuino - had reacted to the fall of the Berlin Wall by dropping any belief in radical change and adopting a variant of Tony Blair’s ‘third way’, weak social democracy. (Wainwright, 2005, no pagination)

Old school activists bemoaned the decline of political discussion and the growing preoccupation with issues of politics and policy. Baiocchi (2005) quotes a comment
made by an older community activist which typifies this change in discourse, ‘people these days only talk about projects and not enough about the big questions’ (ibid., p.103). PBs, far from the deeply political arenas of early SMs, came to be seen as a place where it was not appropriate to discuss politics (Baiocchi, 2005, p.116). Once forums for lively political debate, they had become a process for making practical decisions about budget allocation and overtly political debate was seen as an obstacle to the efficiency of the process. PB became a place where competing groups left ideological commitments at the door and entered into practical relationships with one another (Baiocchi, 2005, p.116). PB was a forum for groups who identified with a variety of parties and movements to come together to discuss issues pertaining to the community as whole, i.e. a broader community of which all the groups were part. In this context community activists came to understand ‘there to be 'three' worlds: those of 'the government', 'the community', and 'political parties' (ibid., p.113). While these boundaries did to some extent remain blurred this division significantly impacted PB. PB had initially been a result of deeply political demands, championed as a way to begin the implementation of PT ideology, a space to form bonds and challenge the government and a community of new political citizens. It was becoming a politically neutral place for the community to make practical decisions and an institutional process to discuss the administration of projects rather than an arena for political debate.
For all the novelty, radicality and hope associated with PB outlined above much of it was short lived and/or remained a relation of association. While PB was, at least initially, associated with claims of SMs and activists with regard to notions of participation and citizenship and the associated understandings of political subject and the political sphere, the extent to which it actually embodied these is questionable. Certainly, if it embodied them at all it was only during early manifestations of PB when it was closer to SMs and populated and propagated by old-style activists. ’[O]ver time broader conversations diminished and discussion focused on individual projects (Baiocchi, 2005, p.102). The PT was originally a SM which displayed many of the general trends of the SMs of the 1970s and 1980s and was also PB’s biggest champion. Over time PB became less and less associated with the normative political claims of the SMs and the early PT; it became a more or less neutral political instrument rather than a tool of a political project. PB became part of the mainstream and the norm across Brazilian cities regardless of the party in power in the district.

PB was only possible due to the ‘decentralisation of power and political administrative autonomy brought about by the constitutional federal pact in the 1980s (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p.44) and ‘the participation of citizens in drawing up the municipal public budget is today guaranteed by Federal law’ (ibid., p.56). However, the form that decentralisation took and the triumph of prevailing political and economic orthodoxy meant that the amount of power and resources available for decision making at the local level remained circumscribed. The end of
authoritarian rule did entail the restructuring of the relations between state and society in Brazil. However, the much hoped for emergence of complex social subjects, corresponding to new political roles (Torres Ribeiro and Gracia, 2002, p. 27) did not materialise. They were hampered by the dominance of economic efficacy and technical rationality (Paoli and Telles, 1998) at the expense of the normative political demands of the 1970s and 1980s SMs. This trend away from policies of redistribution and away from an ethic of responsibility towards an ethic of efficiency identified by Paoli and Telles (1998) and Freitas (1995) continued into the 1990s and the start of the twenty-first century.

2.5 PB: A variety of analytical frameworks

The ‘lack of a coherent analytical framework able to guide evaluations of politico-administrative practices leads to extremely divergent evaluative criteria and conclusions on the results and prospects of participatory programs’ (Souza 2001, p. 179). Matters are further complicated by a lack of agreement on the nature and/or aim of participation.

A variety of authors have suggested various criteria for analysing and assessing PBs. Wampler and Avritzer (2006) suggest participatory publics as an analytical framework ‘to explain the changing form of political participation after Brazil’s democratization..... (Linking) the strategies of political renewal and contestation to the new institutions that are now spreading across Brazil’ (ibid., p.309). Posner (2003) ‘argues that popular participation will be strong and effective where
structural reforms expand the resource base and policy-making authority of local leaders, local institutions strengthen accountability and facilitate citizen input in decision-making, and political parties attempt to organize and mobilize groups and constituents at the grass-roots’ (ibid., p.39). For Posner (2003) the accountability of public officials and institutional arrangements to facilitate political participation are the crucial factors (ibid p.42). Kooning (2004) makes use of Diamonds (1999) ‘key parameters for democratic consolidation: performance, institutionalization and deepening’ (Kooning, 2004, p.88) to assess ‘whether the participatory budgeting process contributes to strengthening (or consolidating) democratic governance through the promotion of political and social citizenship rights’ (ibid., p.88). Kooning (2004) also makes the case for the consideration of ‘the resources made subject to participatory decision making, the seriousness of its implementation, and the overall preparedness of both administrators and grass roots and civil society actors. In addition, the prevailing configuration of forces within political society may work in favour of participatory governance (as was the case in Porto Alegre) or against it (as was the case in Fortaleza in the 1980s and Sao Paulo between 1989 and 1994). (2004, p.96). Boaventura de Sousa Santos (1998) analyses PB ‘along the following vectors: redistributive efficiency, accountability and quality of representation in participatory democracy, autonomy of the participatory budgeting vis-a-vis the executive government on the city, from technobureaucracy to technodemocracy, dual power and competing legitimacies and the relations between the participatory budget and the legislative body vested with the formal legal prerogative of budget approval’ (1998, p.462). Souza (2001, p.179) even
draws up a table (copied below) summarising the main strengths and weaknesses of PB.

Summary of PBs main strengths and weakness according to selected literature

Souza (2001) - Table 3

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Table 1: Summary of PB’s main strengths and weaknesses according to selected literature</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Strengths</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Makes representative democracy open to more active participation of segments of civil society</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Reduces clientelism, populism, patrimonialism, authoritarianism, therefore changing political culture and increasing transparency</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Stimulates associativism</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Facilitates a learning process that leads to better and more active citizenship</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Inverts priorities away from the best off to benefit the majority of the population (the poor) together with attempts to open participatory channels to other social classes</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provides a means of balancing ideological concerns for promoting citizen empowerment with pragmatic responses to citizens’ demands</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provides a structure that can carry over beyond a governmental term</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Encourages programme participants to move away from individualistic views towards solidarity and to see city problems in universal rather than personal terms</td>
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Despite the many and varied criteria and frameworks almost all would agree on certain components, for example citizen involvement in financial decisions. More precisely, ‘a broad definition: PB allows the participation of non-elected citizens in the conception and/or allocation of public finances’ (Sintomer et al. 2008, p.168).

However, other criteria are more disputed, for example the thought that PB should be an ongoing cycle and not a one off event. Although much of the academic literature would suggest this latter element is a crucial part of PB, many one off processes have been labeled PB; this is certainly the case in the UK as is explored in Chapter Four.
Sintomer et al (2008) use a hexagon to explore and explain the many different manifestations of PB across Europe. They identify six kinds of processes: private/public negotiation table, consultation on public finances, 'proximity' participation, Porto Alegre in Europe, participation of organised interests and community funds on local and city level (ibid). Sintomer et al (2008) also set out some simple basic requirements for PB:

In Europe, in order to sever it from other participatory instruments, five criteria need to be added:

1. The financial and/or budgetary dimension must be discussed; PB is dealing with the problem of limited resources

2. The city/region level has to be involved, or a (decentralised) district with an elected body and some power over administration (the neighbourhood level is not enough)

3. It has to be a repeated process (one meeting or one referendum on financial issues are not examples of participatory budgeting)

4. The process must include some form of public deliberation within the framework of specific meetings/forums (the opening of administrative meetings or classical representative instances to 'normal' citizens is not PB)

5. Some accountability on the output is required

(Sintomer et al 2008, no pagination)
Although these are simple and basic criteria many processes in the UK which claim to be PB would not meet them. I would like to suggest that a triangle may be used to understand variations in PB processes. The purpose of the triangle is not to outline detailed criteria or give a definition of what may constitute PB but rather show the different directions it may take and how the Porto Alegre exemplar became so ripe for translation. Cabannes and Lipietz (2015) have also developed a triangle as a way of understanding different PB processes. The one presented here is neither a development of, nor a criticism of, their work.

A PB Triangle 1.0 - Illustration 2

The three corners of the triangle are labeled: Radical Politics, Resource Distribution and Neoliberal Governance. The terms ‘radical politics’ and ‘resource distribution’

13 This is discussed in detail in chapter four.

14 Indeed I am grateful to Yves Cabannes for suggesting the triangle shape to me several years ago as we discussed my interpretations of PB. I am also indebted to Graham Smith for discussing this triangle with me and helping me develop my ideas.
more or less speak for themselves. ‘Radical Politics’ represents the beliefs and demands associated with the SMs and the early PT in Brazil, including a reconfiguring of the political sphere and a redefining of the proper roles and responsibilities of the citizen and the State. ‘Resource Distribution’ represents discussions and decisions about the way in which resources are distributed and here specifically refers to resource distribution in terms of social justice which tends, although not necessarily, towards a redirection of resources to marginalised groups and issues; the very early PBs certainly did focus on a redistribution of funds away from the rich elite and towards the poor and services which would be of benefit to them. ‘Neoliberal Governance’ is a more ambiguous term which is much harder to define, not least because there are many varied understandings and interpretations of both ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘governance’. This project is concerned with the more participatory social democratic form of neoliberalism advocated by the New Labour government in the UK; the details of this are explored in detail in the next chapter. Although not the place to fully explore and analyse the notion of ‘governance’ due to the ambiguity of the term, it is worth briefly outlining the general way in which it is used here.

For the purposes of this work the main concern is the particular way in which the shift from government to governance reconfigures the role, function and

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15 Arguably this triangle could be adapted and used in a more general way i.e. ‘Radical Politics’ could mean social movements and/or challenge to the prevailing orthodoxy and ‘Resource Distribution’ need not necessarily be tied to social justice.

16 Again arguably the triangle could be used with a more general interpretation or other particular understandings of ‘neoliberalism’
relationships of both the State and citizen and the host of participatory initiatives which accompanied. While acknowledging possible benefits this project takes a somewhat skeptical view of the shift from government to governance. It also finds affinity with Stoker’s (1998) exploration of governance. ‘The academic literature on governance is eclectic and disjointed (Jessop, 1995, cited in Stoker, 1998, p.18). Stoker (1998) speaks of governance as having many different meanings but generally signifies a shift in thinking and working and one that blurs the line between private and public. Stoker (1998) also lists the variety of understandings of governance, it being associated with: New Public Management, the efficiency of public service provision, better management, an organising framework to understand/investigate public administration, greater civic involvement and a government that steers and enables rather than commands and controls. All of these are in keeping with the way in which ‘governance’ is being used here.

Previously the state “governed”, now with the shift towards governance the state plus the citizenry plus private economic agents and organisations (some of which operate above the level of the nation state) “co govern”.

Governance is about the interaction between various actors (Stoker, 1998, p.17) which not only blurs the lines between public and private but also blurs the lines around accountability and responsibility. Governance signifies a shift from solely State involvement and responsibility, with regard to service provision, towards
shared responsibility and involvement. This generally means some combination of State, citizen and private entities. The State remains involved and is partnered by private entities (e.g. public private partnerships) and/or citizens via some form of participation. These partnerships were seen as a way to enhance efficiency of service provision and empower citizens. However, several authors including Stoker (1998), Newman (2001) and Swyngedouw (2003) have noted the ambivalence of such arrangements.

The socially innovative figures of horizontally organised stakeholder arrangements of governance that appear to empower civil society in the face of an apparently overcrowded and ‘excessive’ state, may, in the end, prove to be the Trojan Horse that diffuses and consolidates the ‘market’ as the principal institutional form. (Swyngedouw, 2005, p.2003)

Marketisation is not the only concern with regard to the shift to governance though. There are concerns that the joining up of the state, the citizenry and private entities creates confusion and complication around accountability and transparency; how can we hold the state accountable for policy it is no longer the sole author and implementer of (Stoker 1998)? Another concern is that the shift towards governance recasts the electorate so they are no longer citizens or political subjects but rather stakeholders (Mouffe, 2005; Stoker, 1998; Swyngedouw, 2003). For Mouffe (2005) the shift towards governance contributes to a post political (and therefore post democratic) landscape which ‘implies a conception of politics as the resolution of technical problems, not active engagement of citizens exercising their democratic rights….’ Unlike government,
governance refers to ‘policies’ rather than ‘politics’ (Mouffe 2005, pp.103-104 in Urbainati 2003).

Despite supposedly diminishing the role and responsibilities of the State, governance arrangements always involve the State. This challenges the idea that governance involves less State, instead it may be more helpful to think of governance involving the State in different ways.

In fact, many of these networked organisations are both set up by, and directly or indirectly controlled by, the state and, regardless of their origins, necessarily articulate with the state... In fact, the state takes centre stage in the formation of the new institutional and regulatory configurations associated with governance (Swyngedouw et al., 2002). This configuration is directly related to the conditions and requirements of neo-liberal governmentality in the context of a greater role of both private economic agents as well as more vocal civil-society-based groups. The result is a complex hybrid form of government/governance. (Bellamy and Warleigh, 2001, no pagination, cited in, Swyngedouw, 2005, p.2002)

Governance is then here understood as a new way of governing which affords the potential for the introduction of a host of participatory initiatives including PB. It is, however, a complex notion and practice which does not necessarily have a positive democratic impact.
2.6 A PB Triangle

In addition to suggesting different types of processes the triangle below attempts to explain the attractiveness, in terms of its fluidity and adaptability, of PB to different actors in different contexts. It looks at different kinds of process in relation to the Porto Alegre exemplar process. The exemplar process being the later more mature processes rather than the earlier processes associated with social movements and their demands.

In the triangle above the Porto Alegre exemplar process sits squarely in the middle. The star on the left hand side represents the earlier PB processes that were closely connected to the SMs and their demands focusing on both radical politics and resource distribution. Chapter One illustrated the changes that PB underwent as
time progressed; it became predominantly associated with the PT rather than the disparate social movements, and as the PT itself transitioned from a social movement to a political party with a closer resemblance to the prevailing neoliberal and Third Way orthodoxy. So too did PB become adapted to this political context. The triangle above suggests that the later processes sit not along the right hand side but towards, if not squarely in, the middle of the triangle. Sitting in the middle the exemplar process can move in any direction. No longer anchored in radical politics, as earlier manifestations were, enables translations of PB to move around the triangle and still bear some resemblance to the Porto Alegre exemplar PB. If PB as advocated by organisations like the world bank, and practiced in American and European examples of the process, were to be compared to those positioned on the right hand side of the triangle the resemblance would be much less; this would call into question the validity of calling these processes PB. As PB moves and is translated in different contexts it can move anywhere within the triangle. The vignettes of Chapter Four illustrate the ways in which UK processes seem to be situated on the right hand side. Stars (both representing early PBs in this chapter and one in Chapter Four representing UK PBs) are placed right on the line rather than within the triangle. This represents the most extreme cases. As PB processes are so flexible and context sensitive each process differs. Individual early Brazilian processes may move along the lines or indeed into the triangle itself as the emphasis and goals change with each process. The way in which PB is translated will depend in great part upon the context in which its translation occurs. Chapter Four will illustrate that the neoliberal context of the UK had a great impact
on the way in which PB was translated in the UK and suggest that UK processes tend to sit along the right hand line. Using the triangle analysis, what constitutes a success for any particular PB process will depend upon its place within the triangle, the definitions of and the relative importance attached to each of the corners (i.e. radical politics, resource distribution and neoliberal governance).

**Conclusion**

PB is notoriously context sensitive and many have assessed and analysed individual cases in order to identify the factors which contribute to a successful process. Many factors have been identified. Here, the focus has been on the way in which PB transformed into a neutral process, an instrument capable of being used for diverse political ends. The focus then is not on what affects success but rather what constitutes a success. Undoubtedly, given the neutral and malleable state of PB its translation and adoption beyond Brazil will have an impact on the nature and consequence of the process and its implementation. This chapter has argued that it was the shifts that PB underwent in Brazil itself that rendered it malleable and neutral and in doing so ripe for such widespread translation. Demands for a political space, a forum populated by new political subjects based on alternative ideas of citizenship, were replaced by the formulation of a process populated by neoliberal citizens. The discussion has also presented a triangle visualisation as a way of understanding these processes. The triangle visualisation helps to illustrate how a multitude of different process can be identified under the name of PB, it also
helps to clarify the way in which the success of any particular process may be assessed using flexible criteria.

Albeit with somewhat mixed results, PB has proved itself as a formal process capable of enhancing transparency and legitimacy, and that has been able to tackle some of the negative informal institutions of corruption, clientelism, elitism and paternalism that pervaded Brazilian political life. However, the more radical positive informal institutions regarding contestation over meanings, new political spaces and new political subjectivities, are all far less in keeping with economic and political orthodoxy than transparency and accountability, are no longer a necessary corollary of PB as it has developed into a formal process.

Key aspects of the SMs which continued to influence very early PBs disappeared from PB as it matured into a formal process. While PB as a formal process tended towards concrete demands with regard to specific projects and budget allocations earlier manifestations recognised that ‘negotiation cannot be reduced to the materiality of what is demanded’… As PB developed debate was restricted to the material level and the symbolic debates disappeared. There ceased to be debates about the construction of a decentred and plural conception of the public interest which characterized the SMs’ (Paoli and Telles 1998, pp. 74-75). The anti neoliberal character of the SMs was also lost. Embryonic manifestations of PB pointed to ‘the emergence of a new type of citizen, a new relationship between the public and the private, constructed as a countercurrent to the capitalist modernisation of
Brazil’ (Baierle, 1998, p.135). PB as a politically neutral process was devoid of any such ethical-political principles. PB exhibited ‘a dual significance of citizenship [which] includes both the exercise of rights from the state and the self -governance and autonomy of society’ (Baierle, 1998, p.136). While the former remains uncontroversial and a more or less standard feature of contemporary formulations of democracy the latter is open to subversion. For the SMs this ‘self -governance and autonomy of society’ referred to the development of a critical consciousness and a challenging of dominant social, economic and political settlements. However, the ‘self-governance and autonomy of society’ could also be understood in a more orthodox neoliberal way as a replacing of the state by civil society; that is, extending the project of shrinking the state to include not just the private sector but also civil society. Relatedly the competencies that citizens achieve via PB may be diverse and range from a political awareness and agency to deliberation and budget literacy.

This chapter has introduced several themes that will be explored further in subsequent chapters. Despite participation having acquired the status of an unquestionable good, important questions remain regarding the nature and form participation takes. A number of factors affect this: who, in this chapter what kind of citizen takes part in what, in this chapter a process or a political forum, how, in this chapter by contesting orthodoxy and associated meanings of citizenship and democracy versus the implementation of projects and why, in this chapter to
include greater numbers in existing structures against the possibility of transforming those structures.

Just because the desirability question was off the agenda it is not clear that an underlying desire for stability had disappeared and many tensions and conflicts seem to pass unacknowledged and or unresolved. Underlying tensions include: whether the primary incentive for an increase in participation is the maintenance of stability of the political system or whether there is an explicit political goal where participation makes a contribution to democracy rather than just stabilising. The nature of incentives and motivations for an increase in participation will obviously have an impact on the form participation takes. This chapter has also begun to touch upon the various ways in which the prevailing orthodoxy, in this chapter neoliberalism, may respond to critique. Forms and types of participation and the relationship between neoliberalism and critique are explored in subsequent chapters culminating in an explicit discussion of both in Chapter Five.
CHAPTER THREE

New Labour and Civic Engagement

Introduction

Having previously argued that participatory practices are predicated on the ideological and discursive environment of their operation, this chapter explores the nature of this environment, which, for the purposes of this project, is that of the New Labour government in the UK (1997–2010). In the UK, PB was first implemented during the New Labour government. The focus of this chapter is the policy and discourse of New Labour, specifically with regard to civic engagement and the participatory possibilities it afforded. This situates the two vignettes within the discursive and ideological environment of their operation and compliments the previous chapters’ discussion of the Brazilian context from which PB emerged. This chapter explores the nature and place of civic engagement within New Labour ideology and policy; it does so via an exploration of “the who”, in terms of constructs of the citizen, including the citizen as a member of a community; and “the how”, in terms of decentralisation, of civic engagement within New Labour policy and discourse. Ultimately, New Labour is understood as an adaptation and mutation of neoliberal hegemony. While the main focus of this chapter is on the policy and ideology of New Labour, consideration is also given to the mechanisms and processes that resulted in the manifestation of New Labour’s variant of neoliberalism, in terms of its relation to the previous incarnation of neoliberalism in
the UK and the immediate history of decentralisation in the UK. As Lister (2001) notes, there was a ‘deep ambivalence’ (ibid., p.426) within New Labour policy and rhetoric, and the proper role of social policy is to explore ‘the contradictions and tensions and the uneven and unfinished character of social-political projects’ (Lister 2001, p.426). In keeping with this and the work of others, most notably Driver and Martell, New Labour is understood to have been both shaped by Thatcherism and also a reaction to it. The project espoused by New Labour is revealed to be one that combined various, and at times contradictory, discourses (Newman, 2001) which fundamentally restrained ‘the transformation that, according to Tony Blair (2000), is the raison d’être of a Labour Government’ (Lister 2001, p.442).

Clearly, the below is not a wholesale analysis of New Labour ideology and policy. There is a wealth of literature exploring New Labour ideology and policy, and the analysis here draws heavily on the work of Driver and Martell, Hall, Mouffe and Newman all of whom, in one way or another, give an account of the depoliticising effect of the various economic and or moral discourses at play in New Labour and its Third Way.

The change in government after the 1997 General Election has been viewed by many on the British Left as a moment of immense political potential which remained unfulfilled. For Stuart Hall (2003), the move from Thatcherite Conservatism to Blair’s Labour government was a missed opportunity to offer radical alternatives to Thatcherism, rather than adapting to the prevailing neoliberal
conditions. In his famous article ‘New Labour’s *Double Shuffle*’ (2003), he goes on to address various areas - health, public sector reform, economic policy - in which the post-political conceit of ‘New Managerialism’ enabled Blair's government to embrace neoliberal values while maintaining a rhetoric of reinvention. The disquisition of diversity remained at the heart of this rhetoric throughout the New Labour years. Drawing on Chantal Mouffe's assertion that the denial of antagonism in favour of consensus and collective identity is what prevents much of liberal thought from comprehending democratic practice, this chapter seeks to understand the way in which aspects of this manifested under New Labour in the UK. The apparent contradictions in New Labour oratory and policy have been well documented (for example, Lister, 2001; Driver and Martell, 2002; Hall, 2003; Newman, 2001). Of particular interest here are: the notions of citizens; the roles and relationships ascribed to the State and the citizen; a preoccupation with the notion of community, the accompanying emphasis on ‘community building’ while concomitantly promoting a form of heightened individualism; and the specifics of New Labour decentralisation as exhibited by New Labour rhetoric and policy and the consequence and implications this has for civic engagement.

In keeping with the overarching theoretical orientation of this project, identities and meaning - specifically those of the State and citizen - are viewed as socially constructed. This chapter attempts to excavate some of the constructions of New Labour. The who and the how are revealed as a set of dynamic relations of co-constitution, where each is constitutive of and constituted by the other.
Furthermore, they stand (both jointly and severally) in a dynamic relation of co-
constitution with the political settlement propounded by New Labour; this in turn is
dynamically co-constituted by New Labour ideology, which is dynamically co-
constituted by the hegemonic environment of its operation. These relations are
dynamic in that the continual flow between constitutive elements creates a never-
ending feedback loop, where the extent to which the one impacts on the other,
and vice versa, varies. In other words, they are all mutually dependent and
contingent upon one another and can only be understood within the context of
their operation, where this context itself is situated in a wider context and so on ad
infinitum.

3.1 New Labour in Context

3.12 New Labour and Public Participation

Along with the already noted shift away from traditional minimalist and elitist
democracy, there was also a move away from consultation. As was noted in
Chapter Two the limits of consultation had become apparent and it was being
replaced with more collaborative models; collaborative models view citizens as
both being and possessing valuable resources. Resources includes financial
resources, especially when collaboration was between the public and private
sector. Resources were not, however, exclusively financial and, when collaboration
was with the citizenry, most often the resources were those of knowledge and a
capacity to monitor and to evaluate. This was part of the shift from government
Along with these general global motivations for an increase in public participation, New Labour articulated its own specific motivations for it. For New Labour, an increase in public participation was the medicine for many existing ills and one which would also afford many additional betterments. It could lend greater legitimacy to existing forms of representative government, it could render governments more accountable to, and more responsive to, the needs and desires of citizens, it could elicit valuable information from citizens making for more efficient, effective and responsive service provision. New Labour branded itself as an enabling State on a course of democratic renewal and invigoration. Civic engagement was both constitutive of, and constituted by, the new political settlement advocated by New Labour. It afforded greater roles for both citizens and local government than either the previous government or traditional manifestations of representative democracy in the UK, and was at the core of New Labour’s strategy for democratic renewal. As the roles of local government and the citizen changed so did the role of central government. The proper role for the State was deemed to be one of enabling rather than providing. The State should enable local government and citizens to provide for themselves and their communities. For citizens this meant taking opportunities for work, education and training created by the State, principally via the Welfare to Work (1997 onwards) initiative and the various New Deal (1998 onwards) initiatives. In addition to this, citizens were to
take a greater role in decision making and service provision within their geographical communities, principally via decentralisation and the accompanying participatory initiatives. For local government, this meant a transfer of accountability and decision making capacity from central to local government. Under New Labour, participation was conceived as part of a ‘joined-up’ government in which the responsibility for choosing policies was not a sole prerogative of political leaders, but rather a partnership between central government, local government and the citizen. The dissemination of consultative fora and participatory initiatives (including PB\(^{17}\)) promoted the construction of institutional spaces for collaborative partnerships facilitating a form of co-government. These fora were also sites for greater accountability and enhanced service provision; providing accountability from local government to the citizen and this then feeding back to greater accountability from local government to central government. A focus on performance and results identified the citizen as a privileged site of accountability for service delivery. New Labour promised to modernise government, to promote modernisation of bureaucratic agencies by replacing anachronistic institutions, and to ensure that efficiency-driven, customer-oriented apparatus would be responsive to the needs and demands of their clients/citizens (Cabinet Office, 1999). ‘In consultation and partnership with the people, we will design a modern welfare state based on rights and duties going together, fit for the modern world’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997).

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\(^{17}\) Other examples include citizens’ juries and locally elected mayors.
This form of co-government resonates with another more general trend - that of a shift from government to governance and a move towards governance beyond the State. Greater inclusion of the citizenry in decisions and democracy, beyond mere suffrage, has been associated with a move from traditional vertical forms of power, from government to the people, to more horizontal and networked forms of power. Third Way discourse shifted the sphere of politics away from the State and towards the social. Transformation traditionally achieved through the transformation of the State and the claiming of State power by political subjects was now to be achieved by the empowering of citizens.²⁸

New Labour did show a renewed interest in civic engagement but was not singular in the renewed emphasis it gave to public participation; as detailed in Chapter Two there was a global trend championing the benefits of increased public participation. Third Way is here understood as variously both author and product (generative and derivative) of discursive and normative shifts pertaining to the relationship between the State and the citizen; it did not appear deus ex machina and, despite explicit claims, it is revealed to be far from politically neutral.

3.13 New(?) Labour

As well as these general trends New Labour was also shaped by policy and discourse of the outgoing government. The political settlement propounded by New Labour was different from any other existing in the UK prior to 1997. It was

²⁸ PB is here seen as an example of governance beyond the state.
borne out of an acknowledgement of contemporary global systems and a response to previous policy and ideology. ‘The reason for having created new Labour is to meet the challenges of a different world’ (Labour Party Manifesto 1997, no pagination) and ‘Some things the Conservatives got right. We will not change them. It is where they got things wrong that we will make change’ (ibid., no pagination). It was driven both politically, most explicitly with regard to equality and the role of the citizen, and economically, most explicitly in terms of efficiency and competition. In addition, the political and the economic motivations and discourses were overlaid with a moral discourse around duties and responsibilities, and a further more pragmatic type of discourse, that of a Third Way. Claiming to supersede the traditional left/right binary of politics, the Third Way was couched in a language of pragmatism which held it as the only common sense way forward.

‘[T]he broad notion of a unified society with a strong sense of purpose and direction, can be achieved in different ways for different cultures and nations. And it is really a matter of common sense. Working as a team is an effective way of working; or playing a sport or running an organisation. My point is that a successful country must be run the same way.

That cannot work unless everyone feels part of the team, trusts it and has a stake in its success and future

This is where a new economics of the centre and left of centre must go, an open economy working with the grain of global change; disciplined in macroeconomic and fiscal policy yet distinguished from the laissez
faire passive approach of the right by a willingness to act to prepare the
country for this change, and a commitment to ensure that its benefits
are fairly distributed and all our citizens are part of one nation and get
the chance to succeed. That this is the real way to combine efficiency
and equity in a modern age.’ (Blair, 1996, pp.4-5)

‘Third Way’ is a term loosely used to describe ‘the emergence of new social
democratic governments throughout the world’ (Arestis and Sawyer, 2001, p.1)
and here refers specifically to the New Labour government in the UK and the
policies and practices they advocated. The Third Way places an emphasis on
decentralisation, the importance of "the local" and greater citizen involvement.
What emerges from this thinking is a technical managerial interpretation of
participatory practices aimed at increasing efficiency.

The shift from the neoliberal hegemony of the 1980s to the more social democratic
form of neoliberalism displayed by the Blair government is understood, here by
Stuart Hall in his famous article 'New Labour's Double Shuffle', (2003), not as a
fundamental ideological shift away from neoliberalism or any fundamental changes
in principles (particularly the supremacy of the market) but rather as neoliberalism
adapting to oppositional demands to ensure its continued dominance. The
adaptive nature of neoliberalism enabled it to maintain its dominance in the face of
significant challenges and criticisms. The way in which it adapted was determined
by the challenges and criticisms it faced in such a way as to defuse them. Ultimately
this was neither a significant shift away from neoliberalism nor a simple
continuation of neoliberalism rather what developed was a hybrid form of
neoliberalism riddled with contradictions. These contradictions were due in great part to the overlaying of various discourses.

As Leitner et al (2007) and Barfuss (2008) have illustrated in their discussions of the birth of British neoliberalism following the crises of the 1970s, it did not appear *deus ex machina* but was itself formed out of contestation. Following a boom period after the post war settlement, the UK suffered an economic crisis with extremely high inflation and unemployment which saw economic growth decline considerably. These economic conditions created a political crisis where strikes become more and more common and disruptive, class conflict continued unresolved and the idea of a United Kingdom (i.e. England, Ireland and Scotland) was increasingly under threat (Devine, 2007). The country came to be seen as ungovernable (ibid.) and by the early 1980s local government in the UK was considered to be in crisis (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). The 1970s saw both Labour and Conservative governments elected on manifestos they were unable to meet once in power. The country seemed increasingly deeply divided by the Left/Right binary, with both sides promoting very different solutions. Finally with the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and her continued occupancy of office with her becoming the longest serving prime minister of the twentieth century the ideological battle between left and right seemed to be over. While discontent remained, the Conservative party, with economic policies characterized by deregulation and privatisation and their brand of neoliberalism, brought significant growth to the UK, particularly during the 1980s, and remained in power until 1997.
With the election of John Major in 1991 there was some minor revision to the previous Thatcher dominated government, most significantly for this discussion with regard to local government. However, these changes are generally seen as relatively minor and, despite Thatcher no longer being prime minister, the Conservatives continued to be heavily influenced by the rhetoric and policy of her previous governments.

Drawing on this, the loss of the 1997 UK election by the Conservatives is seen as having created the potential for a change in direction which was not realised. The Thaterite form of neoliberalism which existed prior to New Labour taking office could be characterised as being ‘dedicated to the extension of the market (and market-life) forms of governance, rule, and control - tendentially at least - all spheres of social life.’ (Leitner et al, 2007, p.28). Rather than entirely abandoning this general trajectory, the incoming Blair Government chose to follow a path of continuation, albeit adapted in order to address the dissatisfaction that had arisen as a consequence of decades of neoliberalism in the UK.

Blair’s government implemented a more social democratic form of neoliberalism which allowed a role for the state, albeit a limited one, in mitigating the harshest consequences of neoliberalism which had heaped the burden on the poorest sections of society. In its adapted social democratic form, the informing ideals and principles of neoclassical theories of economics - efficiency maximisation and the superiority of the market with regard to both economic and social policy –
remained: ‘The aim is no longer to restrict capital but to seek it as a friend’ (Martell, 1999, p.2). This and the related accompanied focus on competition, citizens as consumers, a fetish for targets and the promotion of entrepreneurs and a general entrepreneurial spirit helped foster a form of individualism. ‘Individuals compete. There are winners and losers. Having won in fair competition, the winners are entitled to their gains; indeed, they occupy the most honoured places in the social pantheon. As for the losers, their duty is to lick their wounds and return as soon as possible to the fray …’ (Marquand, 1998, p.69).

The adaptations and changes in British neoliberalism during the Blair government are here understood to have been pursued not because of significant shifts in ideological considerations but rather to minimise and or neutralise threats to its dominance. The specific area of concern here is with the creation and extension of consensus-based democracy, facilitated by a hijacking of terminology associated with the left, which contributed to the creation of a post-political landscape precluding alternative ideas, policies and, most vitally identities. To quote Martell (1999), ‘The 'Third Way' is, in part, about the reunification, in the centre ground, of old false divisions. It is very much aimed at overcoming conflict and building consensus’ (ibid., p.3). The dominance of Third Way ideology was further concretised by this consensus-driven view of democracy which eroded choice. Change was presented as logical and even moral. If choice is limited then so are the decisions which can be made, and so, given that meaningful political
participation is about exercising decision-making powers, is the potential for participation

New Labour’s neoliberalism combined market-friendly policies with those of social inclusion and as such was able to appeal to a variety of disparate groups, thus enabling the neutralisation of potential threats to its dominance. Despite the proliferation of rhetoric on participation, diversity and inclusivity, the vignettes of the next chapter suggest there was limited increase of political control or engagement among British citizens. This is discussed later with reference to the different forms participation may take.

The policy and practice of New Labour was informed by both its underlying principles and by oppositional claims which, while remaining subordinate to those underlying principles, were embraced and became part of New Labour rhetoric. Much of the way in which New Labour behaved was reactionary (in the literal sense of reacting after-the-fact to contestations from outside), and in this way their behaviour can be seen more as revisionism than co-optation.

As Leitner (2005) puts it:

Much contestation has emerged as a direct response to neoliberalism, objecting to its imaginaries and practices and its deleterious impacts, particularly on disadvantaged groups and locations … First, contestations might be directed to specific negative outcomes of neoliberal policies, seen as barriers to realising a particular imaginary, rather than the working of neoliberalism in toto. (ibid., p.5).
This is where New Labour placed itself: in opposition to specific negative outcomes of neoliberal policies rather than to neoliberalism in toto. In addition, groups and individuals who engage in vocal contestation of neoliberalism in toto appear to remain in the minority, and have become associated in both the discourses of the government and the mainstream media with anarchism and violent direct action; contestation within the mainstream centred around specific issues and concerns rather than overarching ideologies. The Third Way displayed a commitment to maintaining the position of the market, and concessions were made in the form of state intervention. These concessions, ones which importantly did not significantly disrupt the overall ideology or goals of neoliberalism, included:

A minimum wage, tax and benefits changes to make work more worthwhile for the unemployed, and training and work programmes to encourage individuals out of welfare dependency and social exclusion and into the labour market. (Martell, 1999, p.1)

Rather than addressing inequalities created by the existing economic and social systems and relations, the Blair government looked to create easier access to those structures. Exclusion, poverty and inequality were not seen as a result of the economic or societal hierarchies inherent in neoliberalism but as due to the inability of marginalised individuals to take part in these hierarchies. ‘Social democratic communitarianism has become more moral and oriented to obligations required of the individual and less socio-economic and geared to corporate obligations to the
community’ (Martell, 1999, p.6). Welfare dependency, for example, was to be eradicated without any consideration given to how it was being produced by systems and relations, placing the responsibility on the individual’s lack of social capital - skills, education and opportunity. People were to be helped and encouraged to take part in systems that had been, at least in part, responsible for that very lack of social capital, and not to participate in their own governance but to be complicit in their own exclusion.

The shift from the British neoliberalism which characterised the 1970s and 80s to the more social democratic form was achieved through both state intervention and the inclusion of new social groups. Several tactics can be identified, including concession and co-optation, via a hijacking of any potentially contentious language, demands and ideals, in such a way that they came to bolster and support the dominant ideology rather than threaten it. While seemingly moving away from it, the Blair government in fact fostered support for the wider neoliberal project by implementing a form of neoliberalism that cushioned the majority from its harshest excesses.

This was accompanied by the use of a universalising rhetoric which placed New Labour ‘in the middle’ of the political spectrum. This enabled it to absorb and assimilate disparate groups and their competing demands more easily than it could by claiming allegiance to the Left or Right, as it was able to justify concessions to contestations on both sides. New Labour maintained the primacy of the market
while allowing a role for the state to address some of the most glaring inequalities created by market mechanisms: ‘[W]hile free-market intellectuals criticize the Blair government on many grounds, they appear to acknowledge that the underlying commitment to a broadly liberalized economic management is a genuine one’ (Leitner et al., 2007, p.45). Policies and practices designed to appease more traditionally left-wing concerns were also put into place. While policies bore the language of these concerns, their focus was on using them to effect efficiency and quiet contestations, rather than to address the concerns themselves. In this way ideals and contestations traditionally associated with the Left, which were ostensibly about political demands regarding equality and justice, came to be used as tools to meet economic goals. The whole of society was reorganised and reshaped by the Third Way in order to further market efficiency. Inequality was addressed by tackling pre-, rather than post-, market inequalities. Policy making tended towards the creation of equality of opportunity to compete in a market-driven society and to this end created initiatives to develop social capital, to enhance skills and to increase training opportunities, rather than embracing the ideology traditionally associated with the welfare state (Driver and Martell, 1999).

New Labour ‘was not just about creating an alternative to the state and the market, but addressed issues of civil society and cultural values’ (Newman, 2001, p.2). The Third Way presented a new ideology and by implication new subjectivities and identities; it presented a new moral psychology and a new reality and by implication a new conception of our place and role within society.
The third way is positioned as the route out of a proclaimed failure of traditionally antagonistic ideological programmes to offer up genuine answers to social problems. …. Given the presence of crisis, third ways have projected themselves as more than merely a technical fix; their task is a wholesale cultural and moral renewal. (Barstow and Martin, 2002, no pagination)

New Labour’s Third Way perspective and accompanying political settlement was no exception. As governments change, citizens are presented with new representations of the world, their position in it, and what constitutes a viable or liveable identity. The next section explores “the who?” of civic engagement by exploring New Labour’s construction of the citizen.

The enabling state of New Labour ascribed specific roles for the state, the citizen and the community. In stark contrast to Thatcher’s famous dictum ‘there is no such thing as society’, New Labour ascribed significant roles and responsibilities to society by way of the communities of which it is composed. However, looking at the context in which Thatcher made this remark, in an interview for Women’s Own magazine on October 31 1987, there appear to be some similarities between her perspective and that of the later Blair government. Thatcher said:

I think we’ve been through a period where too many people have been given to understand that if they have a problem, it’s the government’s job to cope with it. ‘I have a problem, I’ll get a grant.’ ‘I’m homeless, the government must house me.’ They’re casting their problem on
society. And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first. It's our duty to look after ourselves and then, also to look after our neighbour. People have got the entitlements too much in mind, without the obligations. There's no such thing as entitlement, unless someone has first met an obligation. (Thatcher 1987, cited in, Briandeer, n.d., no pagination)

There were significant differences between the approaches of the Thatcher and Blair governments but as the discussion below highlights they both shared an emphasis on individual responsibility. For Blair this was articulated in a language of duty and responsibility, where for Thatcher it was articulated in a language of obligation. Both emphasised the need to reduce dependency on the State and a need for individuals to take greater responsibility for their circumstances. Both argued for greater emphasis on the individual rather than economic and social structures and systems as the primary cause of any individual's circumstances. This, as well as other aspects of New Labour thinking and policy, goes some way to explaining the claim, made in various blogs and press articles (some attributing the statement to Thatcher herself), that New Labour was Thatcher's greatest success. The belief was that the Thatcher government made history by removing the possibility of a return to more traditionally socialist ideas centred on the welfare state and the primacy of structural causes for individual circumstances.
Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) argue that local government is about much more than just service delivery - it is also about community. For New Labour it was very much about both, although it was based on a particular understanding of community. Community enjoyed pride of place within New Labour rhetoric and it played a lead role in its proposed new political settlement. It was both a reaction to Thatcherism’s dictum that ‘there is no society’, and also independently important to New Labour as the site and the means of achieving their new political settlement. The local as opposed to the national was better placed to deal with local issues. The development of strong local communities was integral to New Labour’s decentralisation initiatives and the thinking that motivated them. As well as much rhetoric and policy around the role of the citizen, New Labour also spoke to the citizenry collectively as members of communities. The notion and construction of communities, generally although not exclusively constructed around locality in terms of geography, was pivotal to both the economic and the political projects of New Labour.

New Labour’s appeal to a politics beyond left and right did not go beyond this traditional antagonist binary to a politics where there is an appreciation of multiple sites of conflict; for New Labour there was no place for conflict within politics. They constructed a social world without conflict or antagonism, where community was harmonious rather than riven with tension and conflict as it is understood by Mouffe (2001; 2013), for example. The rational and moral impetus of the Third Way towards the goals of consensus, cohesion and stability precludes dissent and
discord either within communities or between a minority community and the mainstream; such antagonism would be cast as immoral or irrational, rather than progressive or radical. This drives to the heart of the form of participation realised under New Labour as it precludes the possibility of participating in anything outside the realms of the prevailing common-sense pragmatism espoused by New Labour. As the subsequent vignettes illustrate, this tends to restrict participation to the inclusion of citizens in issues of implementation rather than policy, as overarching policy ideas were constructed as indisputable common sense. Although there may be space to influence policy and practice at the very micro level, this operates within a larger ideological apparatus which, according to New Labour's construction of the Third Way, is the only sensible way forward and, therefore, not up for debate of any kind. An attempt to force discursive closure may have been a specific manoeuvre of New Labour, but it is not necessarily exclusive to New Labour. Despite explicit claims from New Labour concerning the renewing of democracy, the sharing of power, joint responsibility and joint decision making, decentralisation and the importance of the local, and greater citizen involvement, the political was more often than not eclipsed by the economic and the moral. Mouffe (2005) argues that this shift from the political to the economic and the moral, combined with the pragmatism of the Third Way, effected a form of depoliticisation.

19 Ultimately this renders participation superficial. In effect it manifests as little more than inclusion as is borne out by the vignettes in the chapter following this.
3.14 New Labour Community and Communitarianism

New Labour advocated a form of communitarianism which amongst other things emphasised the importance of community and the relationship between the individual citizen and the community with regard to political life. The word 'community', one with an interesting history in British politics, has been said to have held a unique and important position in Blairite rhetoric. In a speech to the Womens' Institute in 2000, Blair used the word no fewer than eighteen times, emphasising that his use of the term went beyond the purely geographical and had wider ideological implications:

At the heart of my beliefs is the idea of community. I don't just mean the local villages, towns and cities in which we live. I mean that our fulfilment as individuals lies in a decent society of others. My argument ... is that the renewal of community is the answer to the challenges of a changing world. (Blair, 2000, no pagination, cited in, Milligan and Conradson, 2006, p.16)

The speech went on to stress the importance of 'community' in what in Mouffe and Laclau's thought would be seen as depoliticised terms, surrounding it with the language of morality. A subsequent section of this speech refers to 'the helping hand of an active community, not the cold shoulder, the cruelty, of those who say 'you're on your own'’. New Labour’s use of 'community' went beyond 'the common-sense of the day' arguments, it posits a universalist doxa that dismisses

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20 I am indebted to Rebecca Daker for many hours of conversation about Blair’s communitarianism.
ideological opposition as irrational and pushes it into the territory of moralising. ‘Community’ crosses over from the rational to the ethical, from ‘common sense’ to an equally unassailable moral necessity.

Various authors have already rehearsed the argument that New Labour’s particular brand of communitarianism worked both as an antidote to the individualism and self-interest of Thatcherism and as a rebuff to ‘Old Labour’ and the heavy-handed, interventionist state. Both Levitas (2000) and Driver and Martell (2006) have identified points of specificity in New Labour’s communitarianism which distance it from previous incarnations. Levitas (2000) contrasts it with the communitarian thought of utopian socialists such as Fourier and Owen by highlighting the links of opportunity and responsibility that New Labour ‘community’ forges between individual and state, quoting Blair’s election campaign sound bite ‘opportunity plus responsibility equals community’. Driver and Martell (2006) explore the sociological and ethical underpinnings of New Labour communitarianism, and demonstrate its usefulness in shoring up neoliberalism by binding social cohesion to economic efficiency. Levitas calls it ‘the central collective abstraction for New Labour’ (2000, p.191), a way of expressing geographical, vocational, ethnic or any other kind of commonality without resorting to terms redolent of Old Labour and the strong state, and while maintaining links with the lexis of civic responsibility.

21 Congruent with Mouffe’s universal consensus based on reason that lies at the heart of liberalism.
Labour appealed to ‘community’ to address the heightened individualism of Conservative-led economic growth of the 1980s and to combat the danger of a Big State creating an irresponsible citizenry, dependent on the care of the state and unable to take on social responsibility (Driver and Martell, 2006). ‘Community will restore the moral balance to society by setting out duties and obligations as well as rights. And where Old Labour looked to the state for action, New Labour talks of reinventing government through collective action in the community’ (ibid, p.28).

As set out in the preceding pages, the social inequalities created by the unrestrained individualism and unfettered free market policies of the Thatcher era had to be moderated. Communitarianism was a useful tool in this process, as it could be used across any number of policy areas: housing, welfare, education, justice, the arts. Levitas (2000) shares Driver and Martell’s (2006) view that Blair’s repeated references to ‘community’ are a deliberate strike against Thatcher’s ‘There is no such thing as society’.

Driver and Martell (2006) highlight the way in which New Labour's communitarianism uses moral rather than political arguments to maintain distance from the Left. On the ethical and the ‘meta-ethical' level, Driver and Martell observe, New Labour communitarianism pulls away from both the New Right of neoliberalism and neoconservatism (signalled in Blair’s rhetoric by terms like 'selfishness' and 'cruelty') and from the ‘Old Left’ and ‘a rights-based culture which has ignored duties and responsibilities and led to dependency on the welfare state'
(ibid., p.33). The imagined ‘community’ invoked by New Labour provides support and social cohesion while also requiring that the individuals within it shoulder their civic responsibilities and contribute to the social and economic well-being of the group. In this way, economic efficiency enters moral territory, as a virtue upheld by the responsible, communitarian citizens of Blair’s ‘decent society’.

Driver and Martell’s (2006) observations may be taken a step further, as contended above, by a move towards Mouffe’s formulations on the displacement of the political by the moral in models of deliberative democracy:

Morality has been promoted to the position of a master narrative; as such, it replaces discredited political and social discourses as a framework for collective action. Morality is rapidly becoming the only legitimate vocabulary: we are now urged to think not in terms of right and left, but of right and wrong. (Mouffe, 2002, p.1)

New Labour communitarianism, then, steers a moral as well as a pragmatic course between Left and Right, which, following Mouffe’s line of argument, weakens the political dimension of public life. If the ‘communities’ of New Labour policy are to be constructed in response to moral necessity, then the political becomes increasingly irrelevant to the formation of collective identities. As well as being a response to economic demands and civic responsibility, as demonstrated by Driver and Martell (2006), the creation of any New Labour ‘community’ comes about through moral rationalism, a consensus as to what constitutes Blair’s ‘decent society’. This community cannot, then, be a political one, in Mouffe’s sense of the
word, as its very existence is predicated on the elimination of antagonism and dissent. Blair’s communitarianism failed to fulfil the radical potential of the post-Thatcher moment (Hall, 2003).

The normative dimension of communitarianism, posited as inevitable by Driver and Martell (2006), is unavoidably problematised by New Labour’s alleged commitment to a diverse and pluralistic Britain. On the one hand, the ‘strong community’ of One Nation discourse requires common norms and values which foster cohesion and national identity, while on the other, the demand that difference and diversity be recognised necessitates a decentralised, less homogenous approach. The latter, Driver and Martell (2006) argue, is not motivated solely by a left-wing agenda of multiculturalism but also by the magnetic pull of neoliberal hegemony towards the free market:

New Labour’s interest in a pluralist civil society is part of its attempt to break with postwar forms of socialism and social democracy - in particular with state intervention in the economy... Labour’s interest in ‘reinventing government’ along more communitarian lines marks a shift in politics which, in ambition at least, would leave more to voluntary endeavour, whether by individuals, families or other non-state institutions. This means, of course, a positive commitment to private enterprise and the market economy. (ibid., p.118)

The marketisation of more and more aspects of life privileges choice and the individual (Driver and Martell 1999). Individuals, as consumers, make choices about
their consumption of private and public goods and individuals, as private people, make choices about lifestyle, culture and beliefs (ibid). Greater individual choice appears to be favoured in New Labour communitarianism with regard to health, education and welfare, in line with the development of entrepreneurial governance, although the collective rather than the individual is ‘favoured for treatment of neighbours, responsibilities of parents for children and expected preferred family form’ (Driver and Martell 1996, p.6).

As the above and many others (notably Newman, 2001) have demonstrated, New Labour’s social policy is riddled with inconsistencies, although Driver and Martell (2006) make some attempt to lend it coherence by casting it as a move towards a form of 'liberal conservatism' that draws together communitarian and liberal thinking, and ‘which celebrates the dynamic market economy and is socially conservative’ (ibid., p.27). Even without unpicking the many threads of what constitutes the communitarian and the liberal, it has already proved instructive to note that the different strains of communitarianism identified by Driver and Martell within New Labour lead inexorably to the depoliticisation of the community; and, inevitably, this problematises the construction of both individual and group identities.

New Labour defined itself as ‘other’ in being opposed to Thatcherism and Old Labour, but more important in this discussion is New Labour’s appropriation of names and terms associated with that which they claimed to oppose. As language
responds to the dominant ideology, so terms such as 'community' and
'participation' became more fluid as they were used to represent and tie together
(rather than genuinely unite) disparate groups – for example, Black British people
claiming ancestry from places as different as Nigeria, Somalia and Jamaica being
referred to as 'the black community'. While some individuals within these groups
have resisted, on the whole it enabled New Labour to quieten a number of
oppositional claims and groups, offering them the rhetoric of diversity while
simultaneously engaging in naming that promoted homogeneity.

The rereading of Marx on which the radical democratic project of Laclau and
Mouffe (2001) depends, one that no longer prioritises a relatively simplistic class
struggle but which recognises a growing multiplicity of social actors working in
common as political subjects. The formation of any collective political identity that
would be able to resist both New Labour’s and social democratic neoliberalism’s
ability simultaneously to assimilate and to fragment resistance would require the
creation of precisely the kind of chain of equivalence (as defined by Mouffe and
Laclau, 2001) that is impeded by the moralising rhetoric and contradictions
discussed above. Mouffe (1992), writing on political identity five years before the
advent of the New Labour government, defines it thus:

The creation of political identities as radical democratic citizens, for
instance, depends on a collective form of identification among the
democratic demands found in a variety of movements: those of
women, workers, blacks, gays, the ecological, as well as against other
forms of subordination. This is a conception of citizenship that, through a common identification with a radical democratic interpretation of the principles of liberty and equality, aims at constructing a 'we', a chain of equivalence among their demands so as to articulate them through the principle of democratic equivalence. (Mouffe, 1992, cited in, Martin, 2013, p.112)

In this kind of commonality, plurality is not crushed or erased because difference remains constitutive of the 'we', something that New Labour communitarianism is unable to comprehend.

Still, though, we are confronted by the question of who has, or should have, the power to name and thereby be able to contribute to definitions of citizen and citizenship. This implies that the only way to achieve radical political subjectivity is for oppressed citizens to reject the rhetoric and critique that comes from a position of transcendence and to take control of language. New Labour not only hijacked terminology but also renamed groups, for example, refugees and asylum seekers became 'migrants'. While renaming may not be as powerful as the hijacking of names accompanied by a subversion of meaning, it still threatens the ability of individuals to group and to form bonds capable of challenging government rhetoric. The extent of this challenge is well documented by a variety of authors from different perspectives from Bourdieu to Foucault.

In addition to the imposition of a false homogeneity, in terms of a harmonious community working for the 'common good' (see for example New Labour's
frequent use of ‘One Nation’), New Labour also ascribed several roles to the citizen as an individual. These often contradictory articulations attempted to define the proper role of the citizen as a political subject.

As governments change, citizens are presented with new representations of the world, of their position in it, and of what constitutes a viable or liveable identity. As New Labour constructed its citizens simultaneously as free market consumers and competitors, as members of a communitarian society who were told should be both morally united and culturally pluralistic, as potential beneficiaries of the welfare state but also as the economic and social actors responsible for the health of that state, they were, overburdened by contradictions, precluded from claiming political identities and only able to partake of political narrative through the heightened individualism of a Giddens-style ‘life politics’. Once Left and Right had been proclaimed dead, politics had given way to morality in government.

3.2 Who - The New Labour Citizen

Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) argue that the notion and construction of citizenship is of fundamental importance with regard to the democratic potential of decentralisation. They draw a number of stark contrasts in order to highlight this, for example Gyford (1991) states:

the citizen debating public issues in the agora of ancient Greece could be seen as the historical symbol of political democracy. The consumer making judgements on price and quality in the shopping centre would
be the contemporary symbol of economic democracy. (Gyford, 1991, p. 18).

The discussion below looks at the particularities of citizenship promoted by New Labour and ultimately reaches a similar conclusions to that of Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) with regard to the centrality of the notions and constructions of citizen and community at play, and democratic potential.

Janet Newman (2001) addresses many of the ideological inconsistencies in New Labour policy; she stresses the way in which the government shaped discourse to remake the identities of its citizens through welfare reform and policies claiming to combat social exclusion. In a move away from Old Labour, the citizen of New Labour rhetoric is constructed in terms of duty and responsibility rather than dependency; the relationship between citizen and state is, as Newman (2001) puts it, 'quasi-contractual' (ibid., p.150), with the opportunities and rights offered by the state being matched by the responsibilities of the citizen.

The 'modernisation' of welfare was structured around a norm of the active, working citizen, availing him or herself of the opportunities to become part of the new information-based economy and equipped with the skills and capacities to do so [...] The norm of active, working citizen differed from previous Labourist conceptions of work in the women as well as men, and those previously marginalised through disability, single parenthood or long-term unemployment, were expected to become fully integrated members of the working population. (Newman, 2001, p.150)
Newman (2001) argues that not only was the New Labour vision of welfare and social inclusion normative it was also moral. The rhetoric of rights and responsibilities, in demanding that everyone be a breadwinner and contribute to the economy, enabled what she calls a ‘disciplinary’ approach to social welfare; anyone resisting (for whatever reason) the training or ‘welfare to work’ schemes intended to reduce their reliance on benefits and back into work would be guilty of a moral failing, that of refusing to recognise their civic responsibilities, which in turn justifies punitive measures such as the withdrawal of benefits. The duties of citizenship are defined here in terms of active economic responsibility, rather than simply (and more traditionally) obeying laws and paying taxes.

As noted above, New Labour did promote an agenda of greater civic engagement. The nature of civic engagement under New Labour was in part determined by a specific conception of the citizen. At the same time, the New Labour citizen was in part determined by a particular conception of civic engagement. Correspondingly the proper place and function of civic engagement was derived from specific goals and aims to be achieved by it. These goals included developing greater accountability, legitimacy, efficiency and responsivity.

The next section explores some of the conflicting political, economic and moral subject positions ascribed to the New Labour citizen. ‘These discourses provided new, legitimate subject positions and identities for social actors’ (Newman, 2001, p.
The overlaying of, often incongruous, moral, political and economic discourse by New Labour created complex, contradictory notions of the citizen. The citizen became overburdened and according to the various discourses at play was expected to fulfil a variety of conflicting subject positions simultaneously. The interplay of these discourses resulted in various incongruous subject positions becoming fused together under the position of citizen. Citizens were cast as rational, responsible politically and morally bound efficiency maximisers. As Newman (2001) points out in her examination of New Labour, the issues and problems that Labour sought to address, such as inequality and social exclusion, were not new; rather, it was the discourses created around these issues that were novel. New Labour explicitly called for responsible active citizens. The below examines this responsible and active citizen first with a focus on ‘responsible’ and then with more focus on the ‘active’ aspect. The two are viewed as related and so no hard and fast distinction actually holds.

3.21 The Responsible Citizen

In a speech to the Singapore business community in 1996 Tony Blair spoke of the development of a ‘new’ stakeholder society for the UK. The stakeholder concept was reframed in terms of, state rather than firm, and citizen (variously understood in connection with society, community and the individual) rather than employee. Blair articulated a series of characteristics, derived from but also deviating from US stakeholder relations between firms and employees, that he envisioned as the way forward for the UK. The term ‘stakeholder society’ quickly disappeared from New
Labour rhetoric and policy. However, many of the issues and relationships Blair spoke about with reference to it in the 1996 Singapore speech, albeit rebranded in various ways, did remain a prominent part of New Labour policy and ideology. This very early speech illustrates some of the thinking which continued to influence New Labour’s idea of society and the state/citizen relations implicated with it.

Given the intended audience for this speech, a business community, a certain emphasis on commerce and the economic is to be expected and indeed the speech centres around Blair’s desire and strategy for ‘Britain to be one of the really dynamic economies of the 21st century’ (Blair 1996, p.2). However, in this speech, Blair explicitly connects economic success with new state/citizen relations, viewing them as intertwined where each is both dependent on and determined by the other. In this speech, Blair states that the development of a stakeholder society is ‘the real way to combine efficiency and equity in a modern age’ (ibid., p.6). The notion of a stakeholder community articulated is explicitly pragmatic, with its emphasis on practicalities, political, in terms of steering a course between Left and Right, moral, in that we all have duties and responsibilities, and economic, as the whole thrust of the speech is around the UK again becoming one the top global economies. The intertwining and conjoining of the economic, the moral and the political is indicative of the way in which New Labour superimposed various, and often apparently contradictory, discourses on one another (Newman 2001). Of particular interest here are Blair’s articulations around trust, in terms of addressing the lack of legitimacy and accountability of British government: private and public.
sector partnerships, in terms of the continued role of the private sector; the economic justification for social cohesion, in terms of the interplay of economic, moral and pragmatic discourses; One Nation, in terms of a homogenous and harmonious community and responsible citizens and active citizens, in terms of the contradictions explored in below. All of these terms and phrases speak to the role and place of the citizen and community within the New Labour project, all feature in the 1997 Labour Manifesto, and all continued to play significant roles in New Labour rhetoric and policy in all its three terms in government. ‘Our mission in politics is to rebuild this bond of trust between government and the people. That is the only way democracy can flourish’ (Labour Party Manifesto 1997). For Blair, trust means ‘the recognition of a mutual purpose for which we work together and in which we all benefit’ (ibid p. 2) and the idea of One Nation centres around ‘a country in which we acknowledge an obligation collectively to ensure each citizen gets a stake in it….an active politics, the bringing of a country together, a sharing of the possibility of power, wealth and opportunity’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997, p.2). These were the foundations upon which the New Labour project was built.

A stakeholder citizen is an active and responsible citizen: ‘If people feel they have no stake in a society, they feel little responsibility towards it and little inclination to work for its success’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997, p.3). While New Labour often did, and Blair here specifically does refer to responsible citizens, the discourse was one which effectively both endowed citizens with certain responsibilities and also served to create responsible citizens. While their explicit call for ‘responsible
citizens’ is a normative stance appealing to a certain morality, the ‘responsibilisation’ of the citizen attests to a particular causal understanding, and superimposed on both were particular economic and political discourses.

The ‘responsible citizen’ is one who performs the proper roles and duties assigned to the citizen under the new political settlement of New Labour. Citizens were endowed with an array of rights, duties and responsibilities. As noted above, these included both taking opportunities for work, education and training created by the state, and taking a greater role in decision making and service provision within their geographical communities. State-created opportunities for work, education and training were designed to reduce the number of people dependent on benefits and to boost the economy; it would reduce the financial burden of providing benefits and citizens would become economically active. The state as enabler rather than provider would ‘refashion the welfare state on the basis of rights and responsibilities, with people helped to help themselves, not just given handouts’ (Labour Party Manifesto 2001). Taken from the 2001 manifesto, this shows the continued emphasis on rights and responsibilities into New Labour’s second term. The engagement of citizens in the provision of services would render these services more efficient. Here, then, is the economic discourse implicated within the ‘responsible citizen.’ Citizens also had an important role to play within New Labour’s mission to renew democracy in the UK. The new forms of co-governance advocated by New Labour necessitated greater involvement from the citizen. It impressed a moral discourse, exhibited by the frequent use of ‘duty’ and
‘responsibility’ with regard to the citizen, and, in the quote above, the use of ‘handouts’, a term associated with such derogatory labels as ‘scrounger’. There is also a political discourse at play here, as any designation of roles to state and citizen and the relationship between the two is necessarily political.

New Labour’s One Nation, based on ‘equal life opportunities for all’ and implemented most prominently by the ‘Welfare to Work’ scheme (a package including benefits reforms, training schemes, education programs, contribution of the third sector, and wage subsidies), sought to include the excluded (DWP, 2006). The state, as enabler rather than provider, was to be refashioned, not to provide benefits to those who needed them, but rather to eradicate what was seen to be an unnecessary and immoral dependency on benefits by the majority of, if not all, recipients. Ultimately, the causal foundation of anyone’s exclusion and or dependency on benefits was to be found within the individual themselves. The state as enabler created opportunities which would enable citizens; citizens themselves could and, based on rational choice theory, would seize these opportunities. The creating of opportunities by the state and the taking of these opportunities by citizens would render society more equal. The only external factor with a causal relation for inequality was lack of opportunity; all other causal factors were deemed to reside within the individual and their choices, and in this way the citizen was ‘responsibilised’. As noted above, the form of communitarianism put forward by New Labour repositioned the causes of exclusion, poverty and inequality. The primary causes did not reside in economic or societal structures but
rather in individuals. On this understanding, tackling issues of exclusion, poverty and inequality became the responsibility, not of the state, but of the citizen. The enabling state would help citizens to meet these responsibilities.

There is an obvious tension between this ‘responsibilisation’ of citizens and the Empowerment Agenda\textsuperscript{22} advocated by Hazel Blears during her time Secretary for State for Communities and Local Government (2007-2009). The creation of the self-responsible citizen with equal opportunities, which renders the citizen responsible for their position within society, implicitly blames the citizen and this, necessarily, actively disempowers them. There was an unresolved tension within New Labour’s parallel drives for ‘community engagement’ and ‘community empowerment’. The ‘responsibilised’ citizen, despite a political discourse around partnership and decentralisation, and a lack of power being transferred to the citizenry, tended to eclipse the empowered citizen. The vignettes used in this project demonstrate this.

3.22 The Active Citizen

Encouraging citizens to engage in policy–making processes via an assortment of consultative fora, New Labour promoted an active notion of the citizen and yet, concurrently, the citizen was designated as a client and consumer of services, which is suggestive of something very different. The former relates to moral and political discourses around ‘joined-up government’ and citizen engagement, while the latter

\textsuperscript{22}The empowerment agenda was comprised of a variety of White papers and statutory requirements including the White Paper ‘\textit{Strong and Prosperous Communities}’ (2006) and the new statutory ‘\textit{Duty to Involve}’ (2009)
relates more to economic discourses around customer or taxpayer satisfaction and efficiency maximisation.

Civic engagement was to be promoted so as to combat the democratic malaise manifested in civic apathy of citizens and their disillusions with traditional models of representative government (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997; 2001). New Labour identified a variety of causes for this malaise, locating it variously within society and the social, traditional representative political settlements, a lack of accountability of government, and corruption of government officials. Their solution, addressing all of the above, was the new roles and relationships of and between the state and the citizen, outlined above, and the introduction of new forms of political activity which went beyond suffrage and consultation. These new forms included greater decentralisation and the accompanying focus on the local and the citizenry, discussed below, and a variety of participatory initiatives including elected mayors, citizens’ juries and PB. While the discourse around the state-citizen relationships and the necessity for new forms of political activity was ostensibly political, it was overlaid with a moral discourse which attributed duties and responsibilities to the citizen, and an economic discourse where the inclusion of resources residing in the citizenry would enhance the efficiency of service delivery. According to Third Way pragmatism, this was the only sensible option.

According to the moral and political discourses, citizens were encouraged to take part in the construction of public policies, and were seen to play an important role
in the formulation and implementation of a wide range of policy issues and initiatives. This reflects an appreciation of the citizen’s capacity to help the government on two levels: first, by identifying the needs, preferences and choices of the citizenry, and second, by shaping policy. This is consistent with, and also offered as a justification for, a form of collaborative government, as is illustrated by New Labour’s recurrent appeal to ‘joined–up government’ based on a partnership between government and civil society, the public sector and the private sector. It also suggests that when policy–making is conceived as a shared process, the power of the state is no longer monopolised by politicians and administrative bureaucracies. Instead, an inclusive deliberative approach allows for information gathering from various arenas that generates relevant input for public policy formulation. There was a significant emphasis on both ‘consultation’ and ‘partnership’ throughout the New Labour governments, indicative of the shift toward more collaborative models. The notion of an active citizen, where citizens are no longer regarded as simply voters but also as policy–makers, is part of a particular political discourse associated with deliberative models of democracy which emphasises the importance of citizen participation for the restoration (or introduction) of democratic vitality in our societies. Citizen engagement is seen as a way of revitalising the public sphere and generating political solutions that better reflect a collective will and a common good. This was indicative of the ‘new phase in the development of democracy... a new phase of experimentation within participatory governance, involving a variety of ways of directly engaging citizens with government’ (Warren, 2012, p.ix). The expansion of the public sphere,
acknowledging the capacity of and affording greater roles for citizens and the citizenry, was deemed a necessary condition for the development of democracy (ibid).

The citizen was also identified as a consumer and a client. These identifications driven predominantly by an economic discourse focused on efficiency maximisation; an assumption that citizens want maximum efficiency lending it some additional validity. Here, the state does have a role in providing services. However, the concept of an enabling state remains; central government was to enable a more effective provision of services at the local level via a series of decentralisation initiatives discussed below. Central government was tasked with ensuring taxpayers satisfaction with public services and, to this end, New Labour sought to improve the efficiency of services by both engaging citizens and by a process of decentralisation down to the level of the local. This civic engagement, however, was predominantly economically driven and focused on the efficiency of service provision as a way to ensure the citizen as customer and client was satisfied. This is the idea behind, for example, the ubiquitous value–for–money jargon widely employed during New Labour's administration. This suggests that the main task of government is essentially an organisational one, that is, finding the most efficient solutions to maximise the quality of services at minimum cost. If the satisfaction of the consumers is the priority, then individuals are not regarded as citizens, but rather as consumers. This was not a new identification, the conflation of citizen,
client and consumer was common to all governments in the UK from at least the early 1980s (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994).

This consumer-focused approach is grounded in a wider managerial orientation. If the right choice is a matter of discovering the appropriate technique or organisational solution, then the managers are those best equipped to lead and to coordinate the policy process. In contrast to the active model of citizenship, here the power lies not in the knowledge of the masses but rather in the specialised knowledge of the experts. Managers are rational agents that possess proper training and skills that enable them to identify problems, to devise solutions, to implement policies and to review their results. Recognising the inefficiency of an overly bureaucratised system of local government, New Labour recruited many of these ‘managers’ from the private sector. This was at once both the motivation and the justification for the creation of a wealth of new public private partnerships (PPPs)\(^{23}\) under New Labour. The privatisation or partial privatisation of many services generally eliminates political considerations from their organisation. For the most part, private companies follow economic not political imperatives. This necessarily depoliticises service provision and, following this economic discourse, the primary function of the citizen is that of an information provider. This is reminiscent of traditional forms of consultation as the citizen, rather than partner, assumes the role of information provider.

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\(^{23}\) Under New Labour additional PPPs were introduced across sectors including health, education and transport
The active citizen, grounded in a moral and political discourse, stands at odds with the consumer/client citizen grounded in an economic discourse. In the former, civic engagement in decision making processes is prized, while an acknowledgment of the economic benefits of expertise in the latter restricts decision making to a few experts. Enlightened experts gain legitimacy by virtue of their specific skills over collective wisdom dispersed in the masses. Although accountability mechanisms are generally set up, it is difficult to see how a managerial rationality can be consistent with the political and moral drivers of a responsible and active citizen.

New Labour’s ‘society’ cannot, as has been argued above, be a political one, in Mouffe’s sense of the word, as its very existence is predicated on the elimination of antagonism and dissent. This unavoidably problematises New Labour’s alleged commitment to a diverse and pluralistic Britain. If the citizen of New Labour policy is to be constructed in response to moral necessity, then the political becomes increasingly irrelevant to the identity of the citizen. New Labour invoked an economic discourse around efficiency maximisation, a political discourse around civic engagement, and a moral discourse of civic responsibility.

This array of often conflicting interpretations of the citizen necessarily significantly impacted on citizen engagement as it designates who engages, in what, how, and to what end they do so. PB as it manifested in the UK spoke to several of these varying subject positions. This is drawn out by way of the vignettes. What follows here is an explanation of the new policy initiatives for citizen engagement which
afforded the new formal institutional arrangements which in turn afforded PBs assimilation into the formal political infrastructure within the UK.

3.3 How - Decentralisation in the UK

Decentralisation was not new to the UK. The notion of decentralisation has a long history in the UK and it was the focus of much attention in the decades leading up to New Labour's electoral victory. Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, (1994) provide an excellent account of changes in thinking and policy with regard to decentralisation and the reorganisation of local government from the 1950s through to the early 1990s. Decentralisation can provide both economic and democratic goods (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.xiv); it can enhance the quality and efficiency of service provision, and it can also strengthen ‘citizen involvement in the governing process’ (ibid., p.xiv). Both economic and democratic reform were explicit aims for the New Labour government, making decentralisation a natural strategy for them to pursue. There are many forms of decentralisation including: neighbourhood based decentralisation, devolution of power to voluntary groups, involving the public in council decision making, and decentralising to the individual service user via market mechanisms (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, pp.5-6). Regarding UK policy, a very oversimplified distinction can be made between decentralisation from central to local government and from local government to smaller groups including citizens, voluntary groups and/or the private sector.(Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). Clearly within these two very general forms there are many variants of decentralisation.
Debates about the form, role and nature of local government had all but fallen into obscurity in Britain until the changes of the 1980s and 1990s brought discussions of this nature back to centre stage (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.3). Blair may have implemented new policies and strategies regarding decentralisation but discussion preceded their electoral victory and, by the mid-1990s, parties from across the political spectrum agreed that decentralisation was desirable, if for different reasons and to be implemented in different ways. By the 1990s, interest in the ability of decentralisation to enhance service provision and accountability spanned across all parties; decentralisation was no longer considered as a radical form of reorganisation but rather as the way forward for politics in Britain (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, pp.3-4). By 1991, even the Conservative government, who under Thatcher had done much to reduce the role and power of local government as part of an ideological attack on the provision of public services and the institutions of local democracy, began to espouse a positive agenda for public services (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.5). Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) identify three major strategies pursued in order to tackle the crisis of local government in the UK in the late 1980s and early 1990s: the extension of markets, new managerialism and the extension of democracy.

These debates were forced back onto the agenda by economic and political concerns at both the domestic and international level. The consequences of the oil crisis of 1973 and the declining profitability of Fordism, due in great part to
growing international competition, and a backlash against the Thatcherite policies of privatisation, forced a rethink of the economic structures and strategies of the UK; the latter included a rethink regarding the roles and relationships of central and local government. (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.8). The Thatcher government of 1979 was seen by many to have launched an ideological but also very practical attack, especially in terms funding, on both local government and the institutions of local democracy (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). The 1990s saw various attempts to reinvigorate both.

As debate around the relationship between central and local government grew in prominence so too did debate around public participation. ‘[I]n the 1970s, we can note that there was a surge of innovation with public participation and community development in the period from 1968’ (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p. 15). However, ‘[t]he participatory democracy which some believed to be just around the corner did not materialise’ (ibid., pp.15-16). By the early 1990s, issues of public participation and democratic innovation were back on central stage. New Labour revived the community development ideas of the 1970s. This may well have been in part due to the fact that the 1970s advocates of community development were now leaders within the Labour party. In addition, given the pride of place afforded to community in New Labour rhetoric, albeit rather muddled, an emphasis on the potential and development of community is not surprising.
Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) outline the three major strategies for public service reform occurring during the 1980s and 1990s. All were based on the idea that the public service bureaucracies of the 1970s were unresponsive. One strategy was to extend markets, focusing on people as consumers who could and would be empowered by the removal of government, both local and national. Another strategy was that of New Managerialism, which viewed people as customers who would be empowered by way of self improvement. The third strategy Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) identify is a project to extend democracy, where people are viewed as citizens and empowered by being given voice. We can see aspects of all three of these within New Labour’s decentralisation initiatives.

The decentralisation of political power throughout the United Kingdom was one of New Labour’s ten key commitments in their Manifesto of 1997. Decentralisation was a pivotal aspect of the new political settlement propounded by New Labour which significantly impacted upon the form public participation took during this period. New Labour’s enabling state did seek to enable the citizen, but it also explicitly sought to enable local government, so that the two could work together in a form of joined-up government. This included a commitment to the introduction of democratic innovations and as such begins to situate PB within policies and institutions, details of which are taken up by way of the vignettes. Where the focus of the previous section was on the creation of roles and relationships, this section focuses on concrete policies and the formal institutional arrangements associated with them.
New Labour continued with the already acknowledged necessity to rethink and to reorganise the relationship between central and local government and the form and function of local government itself.

In 1997:

‘Over-centralisation of government and lack of accountability was a problem in governments of both left and right. Labour is committed to the democratic renewal of our country through decentralisation and the elimination of excessive government secrecy….

Local decision-making should be less constrained by central government, and also more accountable to local people. We will place on councils a new duty to promote the economic, social and environmental well-being of their area. They should work in partnership with local people, local business and local voluntary organisations. They will have the powers necessary to develop these partnerships. To ensure greater accountability, a proportion of councillors in each locality will be elected annually. We will encourage democratic innovations in local government, including pilots of the idea of elected mayors with executive powers in cities.’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997, no pagination)

And in 2001:

‘We will decentralise power within a clear framework of national standards to increase the quality and diversity of public services and meet the challenge of rising expectations.’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 2001, no pagination)
‘In all our public services, the key is to devolve and decentralise power to give freedom to frontline staff who perform well, and to change things where there are problems. Services need to be highly responsive to the demands of users.’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 2001, no pagination)

This commitment was kept, as a variety of decentralisation initiatives and policies were implemented throughout both of their first two terms, although this began to tail off as it entered its third term. After winning the general election, New Labour published a White Paper in 1998 ‘Modern Government: In Touch With the People’, which displayed a concern for both ‘improving’ democracy and greater efficiency. This White Paper was implemented in 2000 by way of The Local Government Act, however, by 2002, there was recognition that the strategy was not working, and this is in turn saw the advent of new localism. By 2004, David Miliband was calling for ‘Power to the People’ and talking of double devolution, 2006 saw the publication of both the Lyons Inquiry into local government and another White Paper entitled ‘Strong and Prosperous Communities’. The aim of this White Paper was ‘to give local people and local communities more influence and power to improve their lives. It is about creating strong, prosperous communities and delivering better public services through a rebalancing of the relationship between central government, local government and local people’ (DCLG, 2006, p.22). It explicitly supported the use of PB as a way of promoting democracy through participation and empowerment, and saw this as key to devolving power to communities. In 2007, Hazel Blears became Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, formerly the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and she
championed Participatory Budgeting until she resigned in 2009. She went as far as to call for their implementation in every local authority by 2012. Concomitant with Blears’ role as Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government was the 2007 Sustainable Communities Act, originally a Conservative bill adopted by Labour, which required authorities to inform citizens of how public money was being spent in their area. Additionally in 2007, there was the spending review which made mention of area-based budgets, the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act, and the publication of the government’s Review of Sub-National Economic Development and Regeneration. These endowed councils with greater powers explicitly in order to develop local prosperity and economic growth. Gordon Brown pledged that his government would continue devolution to local government and in 2010 the Decentralisation and Localism Bill was introduced.

Decentralisation can take many forms and New Labour introduced a variety of them; decentralisation was one of the biggest policy initiatives pursued by New Labour. The various justifications New Labour gave for the need for decentralisation, understood as handing more power to local authorities and their communities included: central government was not very good at making decisions about local service provision, it would deepen democracy, it would increase efficiency and that those at the local level are best placed to understand the needs of the local population. Under New Labour’s decentralisation, knowledge was the oil that kept the machine running. This information was understood to reside at the
local level, within local authorities and the populations which they served, and was expected to support the running and provision of services.

The new relationship between the state and civil society was couched in the language of decentralisation and participation. However, there was another member of this partnership - the private sector. Driven by an explicit desire to improve services and to render them more efficient and more responsive to the people they serve, New Labour sought to rearrange their delivery using both citizens, predominantly to provide valuable information, and the private sector as a more efficient and competitive alternative to the market. Here, then, the political aspect of civic engagement was, more often than not, eclipsed by an economic discourse. In addition to this, a moral discourse around duties and responsibilities was used as an additional justification for the economic drivers; citizens had a responsibility and a duty to help create a ‘better Britain’.

The push for decentralisation was centrally driven; there was a whole host of initiatives, policies and White Papers (as evidenced above) which forced roles and responsibilities on local bodies. New Labour’s decentralisation drive displays a complex relation of both delegation to, and control of, local authorities. Policy initiatives ran alongside a host of performance management indicators (including star ratings and financial incentives) and the creation of an Audit Commission which
made use of a plethora of Key Performance Indicators (KPI) to inspect councils and other public bodies. Under New Labour there were in fact 198 KPIs.\(^\text{24}\)

New Labour did seek to have services more locally driven. However, it also insisted on greater accountability of and efficiency from local authorities and service providers. New Labour introduced just under 200 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)\(^\text{25}\) in or to monitor local government performance which in effect administered greater central control over local government. Local authorities were to carry out new roles and their ability to do so was closely monitored by central government. There was constant surveillance from central government in order to ensure that best practice, as outlined in their own documents, was being realised. Citizens also featured in this complex, controlling, centrally-driven form of decentralisation. Blair used what was seen as a universal democratic malaise, citizens’ dissatisfaction with governments both local and national, as a justification for decentralising to local bodies. This ‘justification’ took the form of a thinly veiled threat; people and communities are dissatisfied with the local bodies, therefore they must change. If they did not change, and so increase the electorate’s trust and satisfaction, then MPs were in danger of losing at the local elections. They must change and become more efficient, more accountable, and more responsive to local communities. Here ‘accountable’ was meant as accountable to the local

\(^{24}\text{198 was the initial number of KPIs proposed; this number did go down slightly as there was a realisation that not all of them were viable. All 198 are set out in a 488 page document put together by the Local Government (DCLG) entitled ‘National Indicator for Local Authorities and Local Authority Partnerships’ (2008))}\n
\(^{25}\text{The performance framework principles on which these were based was set out in the 2006 Government White Paper ‘Strong and Prosperous Communities’}\)
communities, and was a crucial part of New Labour’s citizen/state relationship where the two were to work together for a better Britain. However, the mechanism of surveillance measuring the performance of local government meant that the accountability was ultimately local government accountability to central government. In effect this overrode the stated commitment of greater accountability to citizens.

New Labour did provide large amounts of money for the implementation of their centrally-driven decentralisation initiatives. As the local was given money by central government to carry out specific policy and initiatives, it was accountable to central government and, as noted above, New Labour created several schemes to monitor local bodies’ activities and to ensure this accountability. Not only did the initial funding for the initiatives come from central government, but also there were actual financial incentives available; if local bodies were seen to be displaying best practice and realising the goals set out for them by central government, then they would be rewarded with additional funding. If local bodies were seen to be underperforming, using the monitoring and evaluating methods noted above, then funding would be reduced or cut. Under New Labour, then, power was divided, if not so much decentralised; it was divided between the economic, in terms of a commitment to the market; central government, via its particular variety of decentralisation; and society, predominantly by the way in which it cast the state/citizen relation, and the role of the citizen. Glasman (2010) succinctly states the impact of this on the public sphere:
If the state becomes the ultimate source of collective power and the market that of money, then it is not surprising that society – the third sphere, and source of reciprocity and association – finds itself impoverished and powerless.’ (Glasman, 2010, p.59, cited in, Corbett and Walker, 2013, p.466)

The three biggest decentralisation initiatives under New Labour were the New Deal for Communities implemented in 1998/1999 (NDC), the Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders announced in 2001 (NMP) and the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund also announced in 2001 (NRF). Each of these initiatives related to the development of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Local Area Partnerships (LAP). All of these were developed within New Labour’s conception of an enabling state where the state was no longer to provide so much as it was to enable. It would enable individuals and communities to be and to do better. Ultimately, the NDC, NMPs and NRF all stemmed from New Labour’s Neighborhood Renewal initiative, which was a long term strategy to reduce geographical inequality in the UK. Noting existing inequality in the UK, New Labour sought to equalise the playing field and, as enabler, it would facilitate the creation of equal opportunity for all. Having acknowledged that there was inequality in the UK, New Labour focused on spatial and geographical inequality i.e. geographical areas of relative deprivation as measured by the newly developed\textsuperscript{26} Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD). The NDC, NMPs and the NRF all bore this out and were all characterised, to

\textsuperscript{26} In 1998 the Department of the Environment, Transport and Regions (DETR) was tasked with developing a new Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) to replace the existing Index of Local Deprivation (ILD)
varying extents, by a desire to ‘bend the spend’. The thinking was that these deprived areas were being underserved and that the relationship between the need for services and the provision of services was not balancing in these areas. Money was pumped into these areas\(^{27}\) of deprivation via the NDC, NMPs and NDC so that equality of opportunity could be realised. It is no coincidence that almost all PBs in the UK under New Labour took place in areas designated as some of the most deprived in England, as additional funds were available for new initiatives in these areas. Despite the drive and push for decentralisation under New Labour, there was little to no fiscal decentralisation; New Labour decentralisation centred around service provision and shifting this down to local bodies and the communities they served. Local initiatives still had to adhere to national policy, set by central government. Although significant, this is not what most hampered PB in the UK. Given that PB focussed on handing over financial decision making power to citizens the lack of fiscal decentralisation under New Labour meant that any PB process in the UK at this time would necessarily be limited.

At one point it almost looked like the UK would enshrine some sort of participatory democracy into LSPs. They were meant to have a governance structure behind them which was more than just the existing informal partnerships between service heads. LSPs had a very explicit agenda and individually they had their own agendas. Community Relations Councils played an important role in setting up PBs

\(^{27}\) In the 2001 Manifesto Blair pledged £900 million for areas of deprivation and between 2001 and 2003 that was the amount spent on 88 of the most deprived boroughs via the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund which was part of the New Deal for Communities (Johnstone and Whitehead, 2004, p.9).
in Porto Alegre and LSPs were hoped to be similar sorts of bodies - a strategic partnership with a governance agenda and explicit role for the voluntary sector. However, in actuality LSPs were cut off just as they were starting to be instituted. LSPs were about partnership budgets in the same way as the current Our Place schemes; they were the infrastructure built to deal with the following questions: - how to target resources and work within a pooled budget? How to reach down to front line level and get various agencies involved in front line work and provision? How to make collective decisions and ensure the public has a voice in this? While all these have explicitly political content, the overlaying of multiple discourses by New Labour ultimately circumscribed any political potential.

Participation was generally a consultation of consumers by the government, rather than any meaningful transition of power or decision making capacities to citizens. The continued existence of quangos and outsourcing of public service provision to private companies prevented any democratisation of large areas of public policy and service finance. There was more decentralisation but little or no devolution of power to the local level, not least because of the continued exercise of ring fencing and capping of local authority spending. The New Localism, introduced in the second half (2001 onwards) of the New Labour government, did mark a shift from the previous centralism. There was more decentralisation but little or no devolution of power. While the rhetoric changed, the government still pursued privatisation policies and decentralisation as a management technique rather than a democratic tool.
Two motivating factors can be identified with regard to New Labour’s drive for decentralisation: a desire to create ‘democratic renewal’ and a desire to improve service delivery. Decentralisation would affect democratic renewal by way of civic engagement and greater accountability of government and public officials. Giving local government greater power and autonomy with regard to service provision, combined with greater input from citizens, renders service delivery both more responsive to the citizenry and more efficient. Greater accountability, in addition to contributing to democratic renewal would also motivate service providers to be more efficient. The two motivating factors for decentralisation are then revealed to be connected. Furthermore, in line with New Labour’s insistence on equal opportunity for all, there was a desire to reduce the geographical inequality in Britain; this was apparent in the many of New Labour’s decentralisation policies and initiatives. The impetus for all of the above was variously moral, political and economic. Accountability was construed as political in that it would strengthen democracy by improving trust between citizens and the government, the latter being understood as one of the causes of a perceived apathy amongst the general population. At the same time, accountability was economic, in that inefficiencies would have to be accounted for, thus creating a motivation to improve efficiency. Both the focus on geographical inequality and civic engagement were constructed as moral, political and economic. Couched in a language of equality for all, this spoke of a political ideal at the core of democracy. However, as noted above this was a particular form of equality - equality of opportunity. This equal opportunity
was, in addition to its aforementioned political construction, a moral and an economic construct; a lack of opportunity prevented individuals from contributing to the British economy and, concomitantly, individuals had a moral duty and responsibility to seize these created opportunities and contribute to the society in which they lived, and to societies economic and political renewal. Efficiency, in addition to its obvious economic construction was constructed as moral. Understood as the moral duty and political responsibility of elected officials to serve their electorate to the best of their ability, where service is understood as being as efficient and responsive to the electorate’s needs as possible, efficiency was likewise embedded within a moral discourse.

Participation and participatory practices did enjoy a surge of popularity from the early to mid-1990s, but discussion of the relationship between participation and democracy is as old as political thought itself. There had been much attention paid to participation and participatory practices in the thirty or so years before New Labour came to power. However, quoting from a study of the participatory initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s, Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) reveal the absence of power shifts accompanying these initiatives.

though there have been great moves towards public involvement in local service provision in recent years, little has been achieved by way of a fundamental shift in power, a shift which implicitly underlay the radical proponents of participation in the late 1960s. In the end, elite perspectives have won out, and participation has served the purposes of building up a consensus for the proposals of those in power, thereby
By the early 1990s there was an acknowledged crisis of local government in the UK and all parties were looking at strategies for reform (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994). While John Major undertook several reviews and began to instigate a moderate reform program when he took over from Margaret Thatcher as prime minister in 1991, it was under New Labour, winning the 1997 general election, that a more significant overhaul was attempted. This combined elements of thinking drawn from both the 1970s, in terms of community development, and the 1980s, in terms of decentralisation.

Reforming Local Government - Ambivalence and Countervalence

The New Labour attempts to reform local government displayed the same ambivalences and contradictions apparent in so much of the New Labour oratory and policy. Stated attempts to decentralise and grant greater autonomy to local government more often than not resulted in a more centralised form of government and as a consequence of increased surveillance and monitoring an actually loss of autonomy for local government. This loss of control at the local level may go some way towards explaining why local authorities would be reluctant to cede power and control to citizens.

The promise of change
The New Labour victory brought with it a promise of change for local government and local/central government relations. The notion of decentralisation has a long history in the UK and it was the focus of much attention in the decades leading up to New Labour’s electoral victory (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). Debates about the form, role and nature of local government had all but fallen into obscurity in Britain until the changes of the 1980s and 1990s brought discussions of this nature back to centre stage (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.3). These debates were forced back onto the agenda by economic and political concerns at both the domestic and international level, notably. The consequences of the oil crisis of 1973 and the declining profitability of Fordism, itself due in great part to growing international competition, and a backlash against the Thatcherite policies of privatisation. These forced a rethink of the economic structures and strategies of the UK; the latter included a rethink regarding roles and relationships of central and local government. (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.8).

The Thatcher government was infamous for both its ideological and also very practical, especially in terms of funding, attack on local government and the institutions of local democracy (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994; Sullivan et al., 2004, p.245; Travers, 2004, p.90). ‘The absence of a codification of the relationship between central and local government means the latter is a creature of statute subject to the vagaries and predilections of central political administrations.’ (Sullivan et al., 2004, p.245). Blair may have implemented new policies and strategies regarding decentralisation but discussion preceded their
electoral victory. By the early 1990s there was an acknowledged crisis of local government in the UK and all parties were looking at strategies for reform with various attempts to reinvigorate both local government and the institutions of local democracy (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). Interest in the ability of decentralisation to enhance service provision and accountability spanned across all parties and was no longer considered as a radical form of reorganisation but rather as the way forward for politics in Britain (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, pp. 3-4).

There were three major strategies pursued in order to tackle the crisis of local government in the UK in the late 1980s and early 1990s: the extension of markets, new managerialism and the extension of democracy. All were based on the idea that the public service bureaucracies of the 1970s were unresponsive (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994). The extension of markets focused on people as consumers who could and would be empowered by the removal of government, both local and national. New Managerialism viewed people as customers who would be empowered by way of self improvement and the project to extend democracy viewed people as citizens empowered by being given voice (ibid).

Although local government had survived the Thatcherite reforms it had suffered and by the time New Labour took office in 1997 it was ‘battered and bruised’ (Coulson 2004, p.467). The Major government did attempt to restore central-local government relationships and undertook several reviews to begin to
instigate a moderate reform program when it took over from Margaret Thatcher in 1991 Implementation (Burns, Hamilton and Hoggart 1994; Travers 2004). However, at that time, there was still much to be done to restore local political power and many hoped that the election of a Labour government would return power to local government through its implementation of significant reforms (Travers 2004, p.90).

The responsiveness and efficiency of local government which concerned the Thatcher government (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994) were also amongst the issues raised in the New Labour Manifestos of 1997 and 2001. New Labour continued with the already acknowledged necessity to rethink and to reorganise the relationship between central and local government and the form and function of local government itself (Newman 2001; Newman et al. 2004; Travers 2004). A big part of this reform process, sold as modernisation, was a commitment to decentralisation. The decentralisation of political power throughout the United Kingdom was one of New Labour’s ten key commitments in their Manifesto of 1997. Decentralisation was a pivotal aspect of the new political settlement propounded by New Labour and significantly impacted upon the form and potential of civic engagement during this period. New Labour’s enabling state did seek to enable the citizen, but also explicitly sought to change the role and function of local government. Decentralisation was deemed a necessary strategy for remedying the unresponsiveness of local government, enhancing the quality and efficiency of service provision and strengthening citizen involvement as can be seen from the extracts from the 1997 and 2001 Manifestos below. Although the
strategies and emphasis changed over time (this is discussed in more detail below) a general commitment to decentralisation remained as the exerts from the 1997 and the 2001 manifesto, quoted earlier and repeated here, illustrate.

In 1997:
‘Over-centralisation of government and lack of accountability was a problem in governments of both left and right. Labour is committed to the democratic renewal of our country through decentralisation and the elimination of excessive government secrecy....

Local decision-making should be less constrained by central government, and also more accountable to local people. We will place on councils a new duty to promote the economic, social and environmental well-being of their area. They should work in partnership with local people, local business and local voluntary organisations. They will have the powers necessary to develop these partnerships. To ensure greater accountability, a proportion of councillors in each locality will be elected annually. We will encourage democratic innovations in local government, including pilots of the idea of elected mayors with executive powers in cities.’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 1997, no pagination)

In 2001:
‘We will decentralise power within a clear framework of national standards to increase the quality and diversity of public services and meet the challenge of rising expectations.’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 2001, no pagination)

‘In all our public services, the key is to devolve and decentralise power to give freedom to frontline staff who perform well, and to change things where there are problems. Services need to be highly responsive to the demands of users.’ (Labour Party Manifesto, 2001, no pagination)

The reforms they went on to implement were significant in terms of the sheer number of policies and initiatives launched (Coulson 2004; Sullivan et al. 2004; Travers 2004; Watson & Game 2011) and those working in local government certainly felt their impact (Newman et al. 2004). However the extent to which power was returned to local government is questionable as is the extent to which there was a significant change in direction in terms of reform to local government under Thatcher and Blair. Although their oratorios clearly differed, the Conservatives favouring a lexicon of ‘competition’ and New Labour one of ‘modernisation’, (Watson 2003, p.467). There were, at least some similarities between the two. Notably in terms of the involvement of the private sector, both as a model for the public sector to emulate and as an actual provider of ‘public’ services (Travers 2004; Watson 2003; Wilks-Heeg 2009), illustrating the extent to which central government exerted its control over local government (Lowndes, 1999; Newman 2001, Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 2002; Pratchett and Leach...
2004; Sullivan et. al; Travers, 2004; Watson and Game 2011; Wilks-Heeg, 2009) and showing how both governments used remarkably similar instruments to both gain and retain power over local government,’ (Watson, 2003, p. 471).

New Powers?

This is not to say that New Labour simply adopted and continued the Conservatives approach and policies with regard to local government. There were differences and notable structural reforms (Watson 2003; Wilks-Heeg, 2009) some of which included new frameworks and new powers for local government (Sullivan et al. 2004; Travers 2004; Wilks-Heeg 2011).

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The three biggest decentralisation initiatives under New Labour were the New Deal for Communities implemented in 1998/1999 (NDC), the Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders announced in 2001 (NMP) and the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund also announced in 2001 (NRF) (Interviewee I). Each of these initiatives related to the development of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Local Area Partnerships (LAP) (ibid). All of these were developed within New Labour’s conception of an enabling state where the role of the state focussed more on facilitation and less on provision, thus enabling individuals and communities to be and to do better. Ultimately, the NDC, NMPs and NRF all stemmed from New Labour’s Neighbourhood Renewal initiative, which itself was a long term strategy to reduce geographical inequality in the UK (Interview, Richard Edwards). Noting
these existing inequalities, New Labour sought to equalise the playing field and, as enabler, it would facilitate the creation of equal opportunity for all (ibid). Having acknowledged such inequalities, New Labour focused on its spatial and geographical aspects, i.e., geographical areas of relative deprivation as measured by the newly developed Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) (Interviewee J). The NDC, NMPs and the NRF all bore this out and were all characterised, to varying extents, by a desire to ‘bend the spend’ (Interview Richard Edwards). The thinking was that these deprived areas were being underserved and that the relationship between the need for services and the provision of services was not balanced (ibid). Money was pumped into these areas of deprivation via the NDC, NMPs and NDC so that in effect an equality of opportunity could be realised. It is no coincidence that almost all PBs in the UK under New Labour took place in areas designated as some of the most deprived in England, these being the specific target areas for additional funding and propagation of new initiatives (Interviewee J).

The push for decentralisation was itself centrally driven in that there was a whole host of initiatives, policies and White Papers, which forced roles and responsibilities on local bodies. After winning the general election, New Labour published a White Paper in 1998 ‘Modern Government: In Touch With the People’. This displayed a concern for both ‘improving’ democracy and for greater efficiency and was eventually implemented in 2000 by way of The Local Government Act. This afforded Local government new powers and new roles (Sullivan et al., 2004, p.
246); and granted it both greater discretionary powers ‘enabling a council to do almost anything that would enhance the ‘economic, social or environmental wellbeing’ of its area.’ (Watson, 2003, p. 470) and also it was accorded a new community leadership role (Sullivan et al 2004, p.246). Local government also potentially had greater financial freedoms too with the liberalisation of capital finance (Travers, 2004; Wilson & Game, 2011), the removal of capping (Travers 2004; Wilson & Game, 2011, p.176) and an increase in ‘real terms’ funding for local services (Wilson & Game, 2011, p.176). However, none of these went unchecked; some initiatives like the removal of capping were simply reversed (Travers 2004; Watson & Game 2011) while others were checked by additional responsibilities and accountabilities and/or other policies and initiatives.

By 2002 however there was recognition that these initiatives were not working, and this is in turn saw the advent of new localism (Interviewee I). By 2004, David Miliband was calling for ‘Power to the People’ and talking of double devolution. 2006 saw the publication of both the Lyons Inquiry into local government and another White Paper entitled ‘Strong and Prosperous Communities’. The aim of this White Paper was ‘to give local people and local communities more influence and power to improve their lives. It is about creating strong, prosperous communities and delivering better public services through a rebalancing of the relationship between central government, local government and local people.’ (DCLG, 2006, p. 22). It explicitly supported the use of PB as a way of promoting democracy through participation and empowerment, and saw this as key to devolving power to
communities. In 2007, Hazel Blears became Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, formerly the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, and she championed Participatory Budgeting until she resigned in 2009. She went as far as to call for their implementation in every local authority by 2012. Concomitant with Blears’ role as Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government was the 2007 Sustainable Communities Act, originally a Conservative bill adopted by Labour (Interviewee I), which required authorities to inform citizens of how public money was being spent in their area. Additionally in 2007, there was the spending review which made mention of area-based budgets, the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act, and the publication of the government’s Review of Sub-national Economic Development and Regeneration. These endowed councils with greater powers explicitly in order to develop local prosperity and economic growth (Sullivan et al. 2004) Gordon Brown pledged that his government would continue devolution to local government and in 2010 the Decentralisation and Localism Bill was introduced.

In addition to some of the additional powers noted above New Labour made extensive use of targets, regulators and inspectors (Coulson 2004; Travers 2004; Watson 2003; Wilks-Heeg 2009; Wilson & Game 2011). The use of both positive and negative reinforcement performance related incentives (Stewart 2003; Stoker 2003). There was emphasis, on the one hand, for a need for democratic renewal and, on the other, one for enhanced efficiency (the latter specifically with regard to

Ambivalence

Although the emphasis varied there were common themes that ran through New Labour’s approach to local government in terms of ideology, oratory, policy and implementation. However, many of these did not sit comfortably with one another and generated significant tensions in both policy and practice, these themes being riddled with incongruities and contradictions; the one common denominator being a lack of coherence (Travers 2004).

As previously noted much of New Labour’s oratory and policies involved the overlaying of multiple, often contradictory, discourses and this is also true of New Labour’s relationship with local government, whose reform program displayed
numerous ambivalences. There is a rich literature assessing the extent to which
New Labour marked a continuation and/or rupture with previous government
policy regarding local government and the extent to which New Labour variously
2004; Pratchett 2002; Pratchett and Leach 2004; Sullivan et. 2004 al; Travers, 2004;
Watson & Game, 2011; Wilks-Heeg, 2009). However, the general consensus is that
the result was a form of hybrid which generated significant tensions in terms of
agenda (Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 2002; Travers 2004), policies and initiatives
(Stoker 2003; Travers 2004; Watson & Game 2011) and also central/local
government working relations (Travers, 2004; Watson & Game 2011). In practice all
three of these areas implicated one another in a variety of ways. The
aforementioned tensions filtering their way down into specific policies and
initiatives in a variety ways.

Control and Constraint

Some changes, often faltering, were implemented. However, despite commitments
made by Labour to reduce particular constraints on local government action,
(Travers 2004, p.91) the extent to which these changes involved greater power and
autonomy for local government is questionable (Atkinson & Wilk-Heeg 2000;
Needham 2002; Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 2002; Smith 2009a; Stewart 2003;
Stoker 2003; Sullivan et al. 2004; Travers 2004). ‘In characterising the nature of the
Labour government’s agenda, the prevalent view is one of ‘constraint’ or even
‘control’.’ (Pratchett and Leach 2004, p. 366). It could even be argued that in some
ways local government was even more constrained by New Labour than had been
by the Conservatives (Pratchett & Leach 2004; Stewart 2003; Watson 2003; Wilks-
Heeg 2009; Wilson & Game 2011). While new governance arrangements ‘may have
helped to loosen the taut central–local relationship in England by providing
opportunities for localities to operate beyond the central state…. [It] does not,
however, mean that the state’s influence is ebbing away.’ (Sullivan et al., 2004, p.
263).

The extent to which there was an increase in freedom and flexibility varies from
author to author but the fact is that there was a marked increase in control and that
this control more often than not trumped any possible increase in choice
predominates (Pratchett and Leach 2004) as does an appreciation of the conflicting
motivations (i.e. effecting efficiency and renewing democracy) behind the
modernisation agenda (Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 2002; Travers 2004; Wilks-
Heeg, 2009). Below explores some of the many countervalents /counterbalances to
these small increases in power and freedom and illustrates ways in which local
government was constrained and controlled under New Labour.

Capital finance was liberalised, allowing greater autonomy and sovereignty for local
government, but at the same time the power and jurisdiction of local government
was restricted by greater reliance on the private sector, significant ring-fencing of
local government expenditure and the transfer of services from local to central
government (Travers 2004; Watson & Game 2011). Planning procedures demanded
by the reforms were cumbersome and often incongruent with themselves, coming down from various central government departments and potentially did so with other policies surrounding community strategies (Stewart, 2003, p. 218). There were also tensions between other congruent policies and initiatives, for example between enhancing efficiency and the additional bureaucracy many initiatives brought with them. Compulsory Competitive Tendering was another case in point, itself abolished to be replaced by a Best Value regime which was considered to be even more bureaucratic and interventionist (Wilson & Game, 2011, p.176).

Concerns around the effectiveness and efficiency of local government were used as justifications for central governments involvement as the previous examples show. New Labours aim was, ‘to convey an image of fiscal and administrative responsibility’ (Travers 2004, p.92). Stewart (2003) argues WC that the modernisation program was an attempt to reconcile New Labours commitment ‘to strong local government with a deep suspicion of many actual local authorities,’ (ibid., p. 4).

‘The requirement to use public money wisely became the justification for a cascade of initiatives designed to ensure efficiency and effectiveness within Whitehall departments, appointed bodies and local government. ... [Performance] targets were then imposed on most central and local service deliverers.’ (Travers 2004, p. 92).
Many in central government not only saw local government as generally problematic, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness (Travers 2004) and specifically with regard to the services it provided (Stewart 2003; Travers 2004), but also held those working in local government in low esteem (Travers 2004; Wilson & Game 2011). The introduction of a variety of accountability, efficiency measures and targets and the introduction of new regulators (Travers 2004 REF) acted as a form of central government surveillance of local government (REF). Not only was local government under constant watch there were also very real rewards and punishments attached to their performance (Stewart 2003) REF. Central government confirmed that it would strengthen local authorities but only when and if they modernised (Stewart, 2003, p. 4). This ‘carrot and stick’ style governance was dangled over local authorities, the implicit being that modernisation would be rewarded with greater powers and a lack of it punished by their withdrawal. (Stewart, 2003, p. 5). In addition to this economic justification there was also apolitical argument was introduced around areas of equality. There existed a strong line of thought that central involvement was necessary in order to guarantee public service quality and uniformity (Travers 2004, p.93). The argument was ‘that social democracy requires central government to take an activist role in redistributing resources and securing equal service provision from place to place (Walker 2002). … [Meaning] there is an important role for the centre in laying down detailed standards. (Travers 2004, p.93).
As such The New Labour government ‘took new powers to intervene in the workings of individual authorities.’ (Stewart, 2003, p. 206). Central government, by way of the Secretary of State, was afforded general powers of intervention in local government for the first time under New Labour with the passing of the Local Government Act (Stewart, 2003, p. 206). The powers that this Act afforded were extensive and in effect gave the Secretary of State complete control over local authorities in that the Secretary of State, or his nominee, could take over specified functions of any authority perceived to be ‘failing’ (Stewart, 2003, p. 207). Although this control was not often exercised the potential threat it existed had much the same effect; it forced acceptance of government proposals. (Stewart, 2003, p. 207).

‘The Labour government took more interest in the performance of local councils in the delivery of their core services than any previous government.’ (Watson, 2003, p. 468). New freedoms and flexibilities were granted to authorities based on positive assessment of their performance (Stewart, 2003, p. 207). ‘Performance indicators can provide incentives to improve performance but they are ‘staff intensive, and draining, and subject to diminishing returns. … [Additionally] any system of performance measures will bring forth a range of dysfunctional behaviour,’ (Watson, 2003, p. 469). This is because resources are directed towards improving scores which target specific areas rather than overall performance. (ibid., p.469). There was ‘an explosion of new national performance measures’ (Watson, 2003, p.34) and by
‘2004, even the Treasury itself agreed that the ‘target culture’ had got out of control (HM Treasury 2004).’ (Travers 2004, p.92).

In addition to ‘top down’ control, constraint, measurement and inspection, local government was mandated to work more closely with the communities they served and be both more accountable and more responsive to ‘bottom up’ demands from the citizenry. The tensions between New Labours ‘top down’ prescriptions and apparent support for ‘bottom up’ consultation (Needham, 2002, p.704) meant that local government was being simultaneously pulled in different directions both in terms of accountability and responsiveness. In addition to the obvious ideological tensions there were also feasibility issues; local government was placed somewhat between a rock and a hard place in that it was increasingly accountable to central government via a series of initiatives which increased its workload (Stewart 2003; Travers 2004; Wilson & Game 2011) while at the same time it was mandated to spend more time and energy working with the citizenry (Needham 2002; Newman 2001; Newman et al. 2004; Pratchett 2002; Travers 2004; Watson 2003; Wilks-Heeg 2009; Wilson & Game 2011). It is hard to see how this could be achieved without additional resources which for the most part were not forthcoming (Travers 2004; Watson 2003; Wilks-Heeg 2009; Wilson & Game 2011). ‘Although New Labour appeared genuinely to support localism, a number of countervailing influences obstructed the path to local freedom. … [There was a] conflict between efforts to achieve greater local autonomy while at the same time guaranteeing public service quality and equity from the centre’ (Travers, 2004, pp.92-93). This squeezing of local
government, between central government on one side and the citizenry on the other has even been construed ‘as part of the same process of stripping control away from local politicians.’ (Needham, 2002, p.704).

The hope that the election of a Labour government would return power to local government (Travers 2004) was dashed by the introduction of the variously controlling, centralist and interventionist strategies noted above. In fact ‘new public management auditing systems introduced under Conservative governments were developed into a fully comprehensive system of targets, inspection and audit, arguably more centralising than anything that went before it.’ (Wilks-Heeg, 2009, p. 37). Behind New Labours modernisation program lay significant ‘centralising (and hence authoritarian) tendencies: it gave them the excuse to tell local authorities what to do, and to mould them in its image.’ (Watson, 2003, p. 472). It seems as though there was far more stick than carrot; the balance was clearly tipped towards controlling and constraining local authorities with little reward, in terms of the promised greater flexibility and freedom, for even top performing authorities (Pratchett and Leach, 2004, p.367).

In New Labours attempts ‘to be seen as a party of high quality public services’ (Travers 2004, p.92) they put so many demands upon local government, via a host of new targets and regulators, that the ‘demands of the centre which, of course, provided three-quarters of council revenue income, over-rode conventional local democratic claims.’ (Travers, 2004, p.92). Here again is an example of the
overlying of multiple discourses, in this instance the economic in terms of efficiency and the political in terms of democracy. The next chapter takes up the issues of both community development and the centrality of power regarding different types and forms of participation.

Conclusion

Drawing on Heater (1990), Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) remind us that ‘[t]he theory and practice of citizenship are continually changing in response to particular economic, social and political circumstances (ibid., p.46). Where Chapter One looked at the context out of which PB grew in Brazil, this chapter explores the context in the UK which made for such a comfortable fit with initiatives like PB. Clearly ‘[d]ifferent countries, regions and cities have different regimes of governance reflecting the different histories and cultures’ (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994, p.11). The changes occurring in the UK in the decades leading up to the time when PB was introduced were clearly not on the scale of those occurring in Brazil (i.e. from authoritarian rule to new democracy) but they were significant all the same.

Ultimately, New Labour is here viewed as a communitarianism-inspired, social democratic form of neoliberalism. The ‘who’ was explored via the new political settlement New Labour propounded and the way in which this constructed the identity(ies) and role(s) of the citizen and community. This was explored via an examination of New Labour’s articulation of the state/citizen relationship and the...
roles afforded to each, focusing on New Labour’s articulation of an active and responsible citizen and citizenry. This was revealed as a complex relation where overarching ideology both constitutes a specific construction of the citizen and is also constituted by this construction. The ‘how’ detailed the policy and process of decentralisation under New Labour. This begins to explain how PB came to be such an easy fit with New Labour policy; the impact that this had on the processes themselves is brought out in the UK vignettes. Decentralisation under New Labour was shown to be a highly centralised form of decentralisation. While New Labour did actively pursue strategies to decentralise, specifically from both central to local government and from government to the communities they serve, concomitantly there was a centralising of power where ultimately more power resided with the central state than with local government. This in turn impacted upon the amount of power devolved to the citizen and community. New Labour implemented a form of decentralisation which called for greater involvement from citizens and where central government both supported local government, by way of initiatives and in some cases funding, but also held local government accountable through the implementation of numerous performance indicators. The concentrating of power is significant given this project’s argument that the form participation takes ultimately depends on the nature and amount of power participants have. The practical import of this is revealed in Chapter Four by way of two vignettes.

New Labour policy and discourse involved the overlaying of many discourses which did not easily fit with one another (Newman 2001) and, in consequence, was
characterised by contradiction and paradox. After briefly exploring some of the ways in which New Labour both did and did not represent a fundamental shift in thinking and policy, this chapter, following Newman (2001) and Lister (2001), resists viewing New Labour in terms of it exhibiting or not exhibiting a fundamental shift and instead explores some of the processes and discourses of New Labour and the consequences this had for civic engagement.

The various moral, political and economic discourses at play within New Labour ideology and policy are revealed, not as part of one coherent ideology, but rather as concomitant aspects which variously supported and subjugated one another. Despite an identifiable political discourse, the co-existence of an overarching commitment to a Third Way more often than not effectively sounded the death knell for the political aspects of New Labour ideology. New Labour, then, far from being devoid of ideology, is revealed as overburdened by a variety of competing discourses. The way in which New Labour constructed decentralisation and greater citizen involvement did have a political dimension. However, the overlaying of political with moral and economic discourses weakened the political aspect and, as Mouffe (2005) has argued, the preclusion of alternatives served to depoliticise whatever political there was.

Material practices are embedded in symbolic structures that impart meaning to social action. Under New Labour, civic engagement was overburdened by the interplay of numerous conflicting discourses, and the political nature of civic
engagement was diminished due to an allegiance to non-political and depoliticising discourses. This promoted a weak interpretation of civic engagement as inclusion with permitted restricted power shifts rather than transformation. As Rocke (2014) notes ‘the introduction of new ideas in public administrations is often a very difficult undertaking potentially provoking a wave of protest from civil servants who consider these new ideas as acts of aggression against their way of doing things.’ (ibid. p24). This accompanied by the loss of control at the local level may go some way towards explaining why local authorities would be reluctant to cede power and control to citizens generally and specifically vis-a-vis PB processes. This is explored in the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR
PB in the UK

Introduction
This chapter begins to look at the way in which PB was affected by the discursive environment in operation in the UK. Chapters One and Two noted that as PB moved away from its social movement origins and became a formalised institution the political and normative claims it makes appear to have been minimised. Without strong claims of this sort being contained within PB itself there is a danger of it becoming a politically neutral management tool. Certainly, the relatively neutral and adaptable form PB has come to take has facilitated its translation to the UK. The previous chapter discussed various notions of civic engagement and citizenship at play in UK policy and rhetoric. This chapter details two PB processes in the UK and begins to assess the way in which PB manifested in the UK and the way in which PB was effected by overarching policy and discourse on civic engagement and citizenship. The previous chapter explored New Labour policy and rhetoric around civic engagement. This chapter explores the way in which PB fitted into this context, and details two concrete PB processes that were induced within this context.

4.1 Beyond Brazil
Brazil's Participatory Budgets are a much admired and replicated way of rendering representative democracy more participatory. Since their inception in 1989, they
have spread across Brazil, South America, North America and Europe. Today PB is in operation on every continent except Antarctica. It has been implemented by local communities and authorities and been backed by community groups, local government, national governments and the World Bank. Participatory budgeting processes and those involved and affected by them are not uniform either across time or across Brazil, and these differences are likely to be magnified as the processes are taken up by different groups with different agendas in different parts of the world.

Even when problems are common, solutions are often different and context dependent; the problems associated with implementing ‘one size fits all’ policies have been well documented by the Development Studies literature and more recently by those looking at PB (see for example Wampler (2007)). Historically, it is the North that exported ideas and policies to the South in the name of development. The global spread of participatory budgeting processes has effected a change in direction: the North is importing from the South. While Brazil and Britain share some concerns with regard to democracy and representation, accountability, transparency and legitimacy, they also have very specific issues to tackle and discrete political, economic and social situations. In addition, the infancy of processes in Britain and the lack of uniformity of PB across Brazil forecloses the possibility of comparisons between participatory budgeting processes in the two countries. Despite the issues in direct comparison, considering the similarities and differences can help frame questions and shed light on both common and specific
obstacles. As Chapters One and Two showed, initially the PBs in Brazil were overtly political and part of a left-wing political project. The discussion below shows how PB in the UK slotted into an already existing political project and one based on a very different ideology from that of the early PT. PBs in Brazil came out of bottom-up social movement thinking and action. Although PB may have arrived in the UK through community activists and charities, it very quickly became part of top down government initiatives. The type of participation promoted by the early Brazilian PBs and UK PBs is radically different. Crudely put, it is the difference between participation as transformation and participation as inclusion. Where the social movements in Brazil demanded a reconfiguration of the public sphere, with new forms of citizenship and new state/citizen relationships, PB in the UK functioned within a project to include more people into already existing political arrangements. By the time PB came to the UK it had become a formal institutional process.

There have now been in excess of two hundred and fifty\(^{28}\) PB processes in the UK. However, the individual processes often bear little resemblance to one another. The organising and instigating bodies vary, as do the number of people involved, the amount of funds involved, the types of budgets available, the way in which decisions are made, and the type of decisions that are made open to PB processes and which aspects of the Porto Alegre model (outlined in Chapter Two) are used.

\(^{28}\) The exact figure is not known. Two hundred and fifty plus is the figure used by members of the PB Network Steering Group and PB Partners. In addition to a lack of available data matters are further complicated by issues of definition which are discussed below.
After briefly discussing the way in which PB came to the UK, and some general features of PB in the UK, this chapter focuses on two concrete PB practices in the UK: You Decide! in Tower Hamlets and Voice Your Choice in Manton. There are important institutional design differences between PB in Brazil and PB as it manifests in the UK which warrant discussion. However, the primary concern here is not with the way in which UK processes do or do not measure up to the Porto Alegre exemplar; the disparity is so evident and so great that this type of comparative analysis is neither appropriate nor particularly illuminating. The processes detailed below are then analysed on their own terms and are considered in relation to their aim to enhance civic engagement. By the time PB came to the UK, it had become a formal institutional process. This process of formalisation and institutionalization itself, as distinct from the actual form the processes themselves take, has a bearing on the form of civic engagement it is capable of promoting. Ultimately, the two vignettes discussed below reveal the way in which PB can function as a neoliberal technology of governance whose implementation can serve to further an existing political project.

4.2 Import to the UK

It was a confluence of individuals, organisations and their associated interests that facilitated the initial import and early advocacy of PB in the UK (Hall, 2011; 2014, pers. comm.,). Relationships between Oxfam, Church Action on Poverty (CAP) and Community Pride Initiative (CPI) and individuals from these organisations subsequently moving to positions within UK government were instrumental to PBs...
transition to the national agenda. All of these organisations had shared concerns: poverty, inequality and social justice. CAP, a national ecumenical Christian social justice charity, was heavily influenced by liberation theology, Freirean critical pedagogy and Saul Alinsky-type community organising; all were concerns shared by CPI (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.). This confluence brought together individuals and organisations with different political and ideological backgrounds:

that of a local community activism based on ideas of capacity building and social capital, of a faith-based activism against poverty rooted in Liberation theology, and of radical leftist activities aiming at a greater amount of bottom-up participation of ordinary citizens and the transformation of power relations. (Rocke, 2008, p.10)

PBs started life in Britain with an interest from a Manchester-based NGO, Community Pride Initiative (CPI), supported by the charity Church Action on Poverty, working on issues of community empowerment. Members of this NGO, together with Oxfam's UK Poverty Programme, set up a learning exchange between Manchester and Porto Alegre in 2000 and, as a result of this exchange, the first initiatives to set up PB processes in the UK came into being (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.). Initially, this took the form of a feasibility study supported by Salford City Council in 2003. Subsequently, both CAP and CPI applied for government funds (ibid.). The government amalgamated the two bids and in 2005 what was then the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (it went on to become Department for Community and Local Government, DCLG) funded the creation of the PB Unit (Interviewee B, 2011, pers. comm.). Until this point, support for PB in the UK
had relied heavily on individuals and church networks (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.). Much has been made of the importance of mayors with regard to the development of PB both in Brazil (Wampler, 2010) and subsequently in Portugal and Italy (Rocke, 2014). In the UK, it was relationships between individuals within church networks, including advisors to government ministers, rather than political networks, that facilitated the promotion and implementation of PB. Church networks were instrumental in the development of PB in Bradford and also subsequently in the further promotion of PB by Hazel Blears as part of a national agenda²⁹ (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.). However, the PB Unit, formed as it was using government funding, was very conscious of the fact that it was paid by the government to deliver a government-based agenda. Distinct from CPI’s and CAP’s origins as community activists and movements for greater social justice, the PB Unit presented themselves as consultant experts aiding the promotion and development of PB in the UK. The PB Unit consciously tried to reflect policy in an attempt to appear relevant to current debates, not least in order to maintain continued support and funding from government (ibid.).

‘The Values Principles and Standards of PB’ (PB Unit, 2009) set out by the PB Unit centred around eight values: Transparency, Accessibility, Deliberation, Empowerment, Local Ownership, Mainstream Involvement, Representative Democracy and Shared Responsibility. This document was explicitly set within a framework of community development and empowerment which was easily

²⁹ It was Ed Cox, advisor to Hazel Blears, advocate of PB and church minister who was responsible for introducing PB to Hazel Blears (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.).
assimilated into existing government rhetoric. This document promotes PB as a way of meeting the requirements of the Comprehensive Area Assessment (DCLG, 2009) and the Duty to Involve (2009, DCLG) (ibid., 2009, p.3).

There has been a greater recognition of the value of PB in meeting the requirements of the Comprehensive Area Assessment and the Duty to Involve. PB is beginning to be seen as a way of engaging with communities at a time when resources are tight and as a way of renewing local democracy and giving a greater role to local councillors and community leaders and champions. There has been greater media interest in PB as an answer to the dramatic decrease in trust in representative democracy following the MPs expenses scandal (PB Unit, 2009).

This, coupled with the fact that the appendix to this document ‘Community Development Values and Standards’ was taken from the ‘Community Development Challenge’ (CLG, 2006) is evidence of the way in which PB was promoted as a natural ally of current government policy and rhetoric.

The creation of the PB Unit was crucial to the development of PB in the UK. Prior to its creation, advocacy of PB in the UK was essentially reliant on the work of a handful of committed individuals (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.). Government funding of the PB Unit enabled the development of the first five PB pilots in the UK (Interviewee B, 2011, pers. comm.). The first larger scale PB process in the UK was set up in Bradford in 2005, followed by Sunderland (2005), London-Harrow (2005), Newcastle (2006), and Coedpoeth (2006) (ibid). Unlike in Brazil, in the UK there was
no major civil society movement for greater civic engagement. PB had political support in both Brazil and the UK. However, while PB was seen, at least for a time, as the main axis of government for the PT, in the UK PB was deliberately constructed around existing government policy and discourse. In order to get initial funding, PB has to appeal to current government initiatives, and, once funded, it was charged with delivering a government-based agenda (Hall, 2011; 2013, pers. comm.). Rather than a form of public sovereignty, PB was cast as a tool for public sector agencies wishing ‘to engage more often, more meaningfully and effectively with the public than traditional approaches allow’ (SQW, 2010, p.4). In the UK, PB was seen as

a mechanism through which communities and citizens can play a greater role in local decision-making processes and aims to improve the quality of this participation. Participatory Budgeting will enhance community empowerment and engagement by encouraging residents to have more of a say in what happens in relation to budgets and the prioritisation of services. (SQW, 2010, p. 14)

This collection of literature illustrated the Government’s growing support of Participatory Budgeting as a mechanism for empowering communities to help set local priorities for spending and thereby create the opportunity for them to influence council budgets and policies. (SQW, 2010, p.25)

Indeed in 2007, the then Communities Secretary, Hazel Blears, announced that within five years every local authority in England should have set up PB processes (DCLG 2009). Although this never materialised, and was always a wildly ambitious plan, along with the other various papers noted above, this confirms that there was some government support for PB in the UK. It was supported, however, for its ability to further existing government policy, rather than for any intrinsic value it may have had.

Hazel Blears championed the use of PB in the UK. However, she promoted it as an aid to existing New Labour drives towards decentralisation and community empowerment, rather than as pertaining to a fundamental reorganisation of state/citizen relationships. Blears commonly referred to PBs as ‘Community Kitties’. ‘A ‘kitty’ usually relates to a small amount of money and implies a one-off fund to spend, and thus no transformation at all of the existing institutional framework of representative democracy. Blears vision of PB was not the grand Porto Alegre vision; it was about small community self-action. It was hoped that a small amount of seed money would instigate capacity building within communities and further the development of social capital (Rocke 2008, p.12,). Indeed, PB in the UK has generally used ‘small amounts of money taken from national policy programs (like
neighbourhood renewal money\(^{30}\) rather than municipal budgets; participation was confined to a very local level (often one or several city areas) and processes did not imply a more general discussion about city-wide priorities or general planning issues’ (ibid. p.12). This has led some to question whether any of the UK processes actually constitute PB at all.

4.3 PB(?) in the UK: Definitions and models

Despite the UK being one of the early adopters and there now having been hundreds of instances of PB in the UK relatively little has been written about PB in the UK. There is only one report, the DCLG-commissioned SQW report, that covers multiple cases. This report, referenced above, is essentially a form of government-funded cost-benefit analysis and, as such, rather myopic in its approach. However, being commissioned by the DCLG, it does offer an insight into the motivators for the government’s support and interest in PB. Academic articles are few and tend to focus on one or two processes. One possible reason for the lack of articles on PB in the UK, despite the number of instances, is that many would question the extent to which these instances are really PB at all. It is difficult to speak of ‘PB in the UK’ as, despite the number of instances, the individual processes often bear little resemblance to one another. The amount of funds available varies from £500 as a one off (Hampton Bishop in Hereford) to £5.6k over two years in (Tower Hamlets in

\(^{30}\)In June 2003, the UK Government launched *Neighbourhood Renewal - People and Place. Neighbourhoods* (DCLG, 2003) in which the most deprived 10% of wards across Northern Ireland were identified using the Noble Multiple Deprivation Measure. Following extensive consultation, this resulted in a total of 36 areas, and a population of approximately 280,000 (one person in six in Northern Ireland), being targeted for intervention. In essence this was a programme to provide additional funds to particularly deprived areas in order to create more opportunities for the people living in those areas. (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. comm.,)
London). Organising bodies and the related budgets vary between Home Office funds, parish councils, city councils, borough councils, police forces and voluntary organisations. In some places, PB has run for a number of years (for example, Durham and Newcastle) whereas in many others it was simply a one off event (for example, York and Gateshead) (Interviewee A, 2013, pers. comm.). These variables also suggest another reason why it is difficult to speak of PB in the UK; the models and practices deployed, collectively and individually, diverge significantly from the Porto Alegre model which is generally taken to be the exemplar, and was in fact the inspiration, for the initial import of PB to the UK. Additionally the Porto Alegre model, held up as an exemplar, was itself divorced from its social movement origins.

4.3.1 Definitions

By the time PB was implemented in the UK it had already been analysed and promoted by the World Bank, UNESCO and various other international agencies; it was already becoming instituted as a tool rather than as a set of values or an open space or forum. Although PB does demand the creation of some sort of space, PB had by this time become associated with formalised spaces with rigorously defined agendas, even within Brazil (Baiocchi, 2006). Rather than the open spaces where anything, including issues of social justice, the nature and role of citizenship, and current structures of power and oppression, could be discussed, PB had become a tool to improve decision making processes. By the turn of the century, international understandings of PB had little in common with its Brazilian social movement
origins. This is reflected in the three definitions most commonly used as guides for the design and implementation of UK practices.

World Bank (Shah, 2007) describes PB as:

It (PB) is a tool for educating, engaging and empowering citizens and strengthening demand for good governance. The enhanced transparency and accountability that participatory budgeting creates can help reduce government inefficiency and curb clientelism (sic), patronage and corruption.

The Local Government Information Unit (UK) defined PB as:

A process for bringing together local communities to the decision-making process around public budgets that makes new connections between residents, political representatives and local government official. (Cox, cited in, SQW, 2010, p.12)

As noted in Chapter Two The PB Unit in the UK gives the following definition of PB which shows the ideally common features of UK experiences of PB:

Our agreed definition with the Department for Communities and Local Government\textsuperscript{31} is:

Participatory budgeting directly involves local people in making decisions on the spending and priorities for a defined public budget. PB processes can be defined by geographical area (whether that's

\textsuperscript{31} The inclusion of ‘Our agreed definition with the Department for Communities and Local Government’ was because the wording originated from civil servants in Hazel Blears department. Members of the PB Unit did not feel completely comfortable with this definition, they wanted it to have a closer connection to issues of empowerment and bringing the government closer to the citizenry (Hall, 2016, pers. comm.,). This supports the argument that PB in the UK was being shaped to fit with current government policy.
neighbourhood or larger) or by theme. This means engaging residents and community groups representative of all parts of the community to discuss and vote on spending priorities, make spending proposals, and vote on them, as well giving local people a role in the scrutiny and monitoring of the process and results to inform subsequent PB decisions. (PB Unit, 2008, p.11)

These vague and minimal definitions leave PB open to multiple interpretations. Devoid of strong normative and political claims, PB was being promoted as a managerial tool for the efficient administration of government, rather than as a political project or process aimed at popular sovereignty. Despite this, PB, even in the form of managerial tool, was still credited with the ability to empower citizens and to revitalise democracy in the UK. This is indicative of a more general conflation of ‘effecting efficiency’ and ‘deepening democracy’ which pervaded UK government policy and rhetoric at the time.

All two hundred and fifty plus PB processes in the UK would, by the vague and minimal definitions above, count as instances of PB. Conversely, according to the bulk of academic literature on PB, which focuses on issues of institutional design, none of the UK processes would qualify as PB.

4.34 Models

Although transformed by implementation, the basic aims, goals, and format of participatory budgeting processes in Brazil do share commonalities. Generally, it is PB in Porto Alegre that is taken as ‘the exemplar’ of participatory budgeting and
the exemplar of common values, principles and standard for PB processes. These
commonalities or modified replications of the Porto Alegre experiences are what
have been taken up by other countries and organisations which are then in turn
transformed by the agenda of those implementing them. Although almost all of
them take inspiration from it, none of the processes in the UK follow the standard
Porto Alegre model.

There are typically three different models of PB in the UK, the Community Grants
model, the Pooled Budgets model and the 1% Budget/Top Slicing model. Below is
an abbreviated version of how the PB Unit defines each of these models.

Community Grants
This is the most common model of PB in the UK at present, and the
model originally adopted by the pilots in 2005. It usually involves small
pots of money that may have already been identified for community
grants, and involving residents in voting for which community projects
should receive the funding.

Pooled Budgets
This approach involves citizens in allocating pooled budgets from a
range of providers on a particular theme or neighbourhood. Typically,
the budgets will be reallocated to the organisations or services involved
in the original pooled budgets, rather than to community groups. The
aim is to encourage individual citizens to address an issue or a
neighbourhood’s needs from the perspective of the community as a
whole, and provide more coherent and tailored suite of services to
meet the those needs. These approaches are more closely aligned with
the original Brazilian model [than the Community Grants approach] and may involve other techniques such as community-led commissioning, community planning and the budget matrix.

**The 1% Budget/Top Slicing**
This is an approach which advocates top slicing a percentage of a public body's investment budget to be allocated by citizens across a range of services and the local organisation's catchment area. The budget may be then devolved to wards or area committees or may be kept at the broader level. A budget matrix or cycle linked to the main budget cycle may also be adopted. Usually the budget is used for reinvestment in services that the public organisation provides or commissions. This model most closely resembles the type of PB developed in Brazil, where a percentage of the overall budget for an area is identified for PB. In Porto Alegre, this percentage rose to as much as 18% (PB Unit, 2008, no pagination).

The most commonly used model in the UK is the Community Grants model (Hall, 2011; 2015, pers. comm.). Some would cite this as the reason for there being so little literature on UK PB, i.e. rather than a lack of uniformity of PB across the UK as noted above, the problem is rather that too many UK PBs follow one very limited model. In effect, PB in the UK has not attracted as much attention as it has elsewhere because of the scale at which they operate (i.e. in very small neighbourhoods, for a limited time and with small amounts of money). Some UK processes have moved beyond the Community Grants model, and there have been various instances of Pooled Budgets PB processes in the UK (PB Partners, 2013, no pagination). Some have made use of Pooled Budgets at the neighbourhood level,
for example, Voice Your Choice in Manton and Voice Your Choice in Scarborough. Others have focused on services based on a particular theme or issue. These have included Children and Young People (e.g. The Children’s Fund, Newcastle and It’s UP2U, Tameside), Police (e.g. Acorn’s Your Voice, Your Choice Ballot, Scunthorpe and currently Manchester Police Force), Housing (Your Call PB, North Lincolnshire), Health and Wellbeing (e.g. ‘Your Health, Your Community, Your Vote’, Thornhill, Southampton) (PB Unit, n.d., no pagination). To date only You Decide! in Tower Hamlets has used the 1% Budget/Top Slicing model\(^\text{32}\), and Voice Your Choice in Leicestershire. The majority of PB cases, regardless of the model used, have focused almost exclusively on the part of PB in which citizens decide on which projects get what funds, and pay very little attention to other parts of the PB cycle like the selecting of priorities, the development of a Budget Council, or a Budget matrix or any stage that would occur pre- or post-voting on which projects and services get funding. Without these and other aspects of the Porto Alegre model, PB in the UK ultimately boils down to citizen involvement in the ‘decision day’. The ‘decision day’, which may occur over a period of weeks or months, is that part of the process which occurs after groups and individuals have applied for funds, and is when citizens vote on which projects receive funds. This voting part of the process would, in the Porto Alegre model, be preceded by deliberation amongst citizens about which projects and services should receive funding. This deliberative aspect is considered by many to be a distinguishing and essential feature of PB.

\(^{32}\) There may have been other places that have used a 1% model on a very small scale. For example, 1% of a parish budget but nowhere else has used anything approaching this model on an authority wide scale (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.,).
For the most part, deliberation is afforded minimal importance in UK PBs and more often than not it does not occur at all. The PB Unit went to great efforts to advocate and support the implementation of Porto Alegre-style PB processes in the UK, developing a whole suite of documents detailing the various stages and their importance as well as information on how to design and implement them (PB Unit, 2010). These documents include information on some of the features that have been highlighted as distinct and distinguishing features of PB processes, including the annual cycle of PB, the way a PB matrix works, or the development of a Budget Council. Despite the advocacy and support of the PB Unit, there has yet to be a PB process which uses the annual cycle or a PB matrix to target investments into areas with greater populations or with higher deprivation, or a Budget Council (a deliberative body of elected representatives from the local community which is distinct from but works with the local council), in the way in which they are used in Porto Alegre, let alone all three. A number of places have run PB numerous times. Southampton, for example, has now been running PB for seven years. However, the form PB takes in Southampton, and in other areas which have repeatedly run PB, is one of distinct events run in consecutive years, rather than a continuous and rolling process as is the case in a Porto Alegre-style annual cycle. While some PB processes have attempted to form types of proto-Budget Councils to help facilitate PB grant processes, none has implemented a fully articulated and formal Budget

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33 This issue also impacts upon the question of how many PB processes have taken place in the UK. PB has taken place in over 130 distinct locations but with numerous locations running several processes the number of processes can be said to be in excess of two hundred and fifty. Given the lack of continuity between processes in the same geographical area, to the extent that even the budgets opened to PB derive from different bodies from year to year, this project views them as distinct processes hence stating over two hundred and fifty PB processes having taken place in the UK.
Council along the lines of the Porto Alegre model. Furthermore, no UK PB has made use of a budget matrix. This had led some to question whether any of the processes in the UK actually constitute PB at all.

Despite the concerns over these practices, those designing, implementing, running and taking part in UK processes would strongly contest this view, and are adamant that what they have done or are doing is definitely PB and, based on the vague and minimal definitions of PB noted above, almost all UK processes, be they Community Grants models, Pooled Budgets models, or 1% Budget/Top Slicing models, would qualify as PB. This speaks to the elasticity of PB which has undoubtedly facilitated its now global translation. While the Porto Alegre model still holds its place as the exemplar of PB, it is evoked as inspiration rather than for imitation, at least in the UK. Clearly the nature of processes affect what they can achieve and there is a wealth of literature exploring the various institutional design issues that affect PB. Here, the concern is not with the way in which UK process do or do not measure up institutionally to the Porto Alegre exemplar. The PB Triangle proposed in Chapter Two can be of use here too.

A PB Triangle 1.3 - Illustration 4
The three corners remain the same and the Porto Alegre Model remains squarely in the centre of the triangle. However, the star appears, not on the left hand side as it did in Chapter Two (where it represented the earlier Brazilian PB) but rather on the right hand side. This suggests that there is no longer any association with radical politics and that PBs in the UK focus on neoliberal governance and resource distribution. The fact that PB in the UK was supported and in many cases implemented by government, and that it fitted within the existing policy framework rather than altering the narrative, explains its focus on neoliberal governance. The fact that PB was often implemented in more deprived areas and focused on engaging deprived and marginalised communities would suggest at least some focus on resource distribution. Each individual UK process will sit in a slightly different place, some focusing more on neoliberal governance and moving towards the right hand corner, others focusing more on resource distribution and so moving more towards the top corner, and others still, which more closely resemble the
Porto Alegre model, would move towards the centre. This triangle allows for some analysis and categorisation of processes which call themselves PB but which would not generally meet the criteria set out in most of the academic literature, even the simple and basic five requirements outlined by Sintomer (2008) listed in Chapter Two and repeated below.

1. The financial and/or budgetary dimension must be discussed; PB is dealing with the problem of limited resources

2. The city/region level has to be involved, or a (decentralised) district with an elected body and some power over administration (the neighbourhood level is not enough)

3. It has to be a repeated process (one meeting or one referendum on financial issues are not examples of participatory budgeting)

4. The process must include some form of public deliberation within the framework of specific meetings/forums (the opening of administrative meetings or classical representative instances to 'normal' citizens is not PB)

5. Some accountability on the output is required

(Sintomer, 2008, no pagination)

Sintomers (2008) list is far less stringent than the criteria suggested by other authors noted in Chapter Two but even by these standards most UK PB processes would not count as PB. The processes below arguably meet 1. and 4. to some
extent, although the funds available in Manton were limited and the space for and
good quality of deliberation in both processes was relatively minimal. They do not meet
the other three criteria at all. The processes above, and again most UK PB
processes, certainly do not resemble the more mature and complex processes in
Porto Alegre as outlined by Sintomer (2008). They do not span the executive,
legislative and civil society. They are not both territorial and thematic nor do they
cover the three levels of the neighbourhood, district and city.

The next section explores two specific UK processes. They are assessed in terms of
the way in which they do or do not impact upon civic engagement, the nature of
citizenship and the role of the citizen and also explore where they may sit within the
triangle above.

4.4 Two Vignettes

Given the number of and disparity between PB processes in the UK, no attempt at
a comprehensive overview is made here. The choice to focus on these two
processes was driven by a desire to find counter hegemonic processes that might
contain a meaningful democratic potential. The search initially began with
extensive conversations with various members of the PB unit; I took their advice on
which were the most interesting processes and specifically which showed the
greatest potential for meaningful civic engagement and showed the greatest
democratic potential. Ideally I would have observed and investigated live
processes which would allow for participant and process observation. However, at
the time of the fieldwork I was advised, by the PB Unit, that there were no live processes which exhibited significant potential in terms of increased civic engagement and displayed something different to previous non PB initiatives. Newcastle, Bradford and Salford would all have been of interest to this project. However, these processes had already been well researched and documented by Blakey (2015) and Rocke (2014). There were one or two very intreating processes like the one in Scarborough. However, these processes were extremely small in scale and the design of them was very far removed from what is generally understood to be PB. They may have used the name PB but upon investigation it was clear that they were PB in name alone. Later the research shifted its focus to what was limiting its potential in the UK. The Porto Alegre myth revealed itself more explicitly as understanding grew into what it was that limited the potential of PB and this data began to reshape the research questions toward what limits the potential of PB. PB in the UK faces a plethora of contextual obstacles. These include policy frameworks, discursive environments and institutional design.

Given the scarcity of literature on individual PB cases, almost nothing having been written about the majority of processes, any overview of PB in the UK would require much more extensive fieldwork. Two processes, You Decide! in Tower Hamlets and Voice Your Choice in Manton are discussed in detail below. Despite numerous differences between them, almost all PB processes in the UK have been

34 The obvious exceptions being Blakey 2008; SQW 201; Rocke 2014
implemented and run by a local government body or initiative\textsuperscript{35} (e.g. Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), Councils, Borough Councils, Pathfinders and Unitary Authorities). Tower Hamlets was run by an LSP and Manton was run by a Pathfinder. As noted above, the vast majority of UK PB processes have made use of Community Grants models. Tower Hamlets use of mainstream funding took it closer to the 1% Budget/Top Slicing model than other UK processes. It did not, however, make use of a Budget Matrix or a Budget Council. Manton made use of a combination of the Community Grants and Pooled Budgets models. The fact that both Manton and Tower Hamlets moved beyond the minimal Community Grants model would suggest that they, more than other places, had the potential to make a larger impact.

4.41 Background

The two processes outlined below vary in many ways and most notably in terms of: aim, geography, amount of money involved, number of people involved, issues brought and decisions made, where funding comes from, the diversity and background of those involved. The process in Manton was run by Manton Community Alliance (MCA) a Government Neighborhood Management Pathfinder (Pathfinder/NMP) and in Tower Hamlets it was run borough-wide and implemented by The Tower Hamlets Partnership, a Local Strategic Partnership (LSP). The purpose of choosing these two is not to compare them, but rather to illustrate the way in which the policy environment in the UK impacted on two very different processes.

\textsuperscript{35} There is evidence suggesting that one or two voluntary organisations have made use of PB type processes. These are, however, very much the exception rather than the norm.
both labeled as PB. While the extent to which PB processes are top down may vary, PB in the UK has become an almost universally top down process, run by various arms and bodies of local government, and as such the general policy context has not only an indirect impact upon the processes but also a very direct one as the vignettes below illustrate.

Manton is a large estate in the south east ward of Worksop in Nottinghamshire. It has a population of over 6500 residents, predominantly of White British origin. The estate is an ex-pit village, built around a mine that itself closed in 1994 (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. comm.). Tower Hamlets is a Borough in the East End of London. Despite being only about 5 miles across it contains nearly 220,000 people speaking 110 different languages, which gives some indication of the diversity and complex issues of pluralism faced by this borough. Both exhibit high levels of deprivation (SQW, 2011). In the 2004 National Index of Deprivation (DCLG, 2004), Tower Hamlets ranked 4 out of 347, where 1 displays the highest levels of deprivation.

Bassetlaw was ranked 82 in the same index and, while this is much higher than Tower Hamlets, Manton and overall Bassetlaw has a moderate level of deprivation, there are pockets of significant deprivation (DCLG 2004). Manton is considered to be the most deprived area across the Bassetlaw district (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. comm.) and the Indices of Multiple Deprivation 2004 identified Manton as one of the most deprived areas in the country. While no PB in the UK has yet used the matrix system of Brazil’s PBs, one function of which is to focus attention on areas of significant deprivation, many UK PBs have been set up in areas of increased
deprivation in order to promote engagement with more deprived and marginalised sections of the population within an area (SQW, 2011). While Tower Hamlets has a history of activism and community networks, Manton has a history of very little engagement with politics on both the local and the national level. In general elections, Manton has traditionally had one of the lowest levels of voter turnout in the country. In 2005 the average turnout across the UK was 61% (UK Political Info, 2005), but in Manton it was only 22% (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. comm.,).

In order to help assess the impact of PB processes in the UK, the SQW reports (2010; 2011) detail the way in which funding decisions were made prior to the introduction of PB. Both reports illustrate the way in which PB was considered as an additional tool in ongoing policy and practice rather than as a radically different approach. PB was understood as a natural progression for both the LSP in Tower Hamlets and the Manton Community Alliance. Both show a history of involving citizens in decision making processes; the steering groups referred to in the paragraph below about Tower Hamlets were actually public steering groups.

Tower Hamlets:

Prior to the introduction of Participatory Budgeting in 2008-09, budgetary decision making processes were largely undertaken by the relevant members and officers of the council, which included members of the Cabinet and the directors of services based on professional assessments of need and performance. Residents were not involved in high-level budget setting exercises. Additions or supplements to the central process include a range of annual consultation and engagement
processes run by the Tower Hamlets Partnership, through either the Neighbourhood Management team or the Participation and Engagement team. In addition to the above large-scale consultation processes, Tower Hamlets also previously devolved funding from the council to the Local Area Partnership Steering Groups. Funding was rarely spent on council services and instead focused on supporting local community groups to facilitate activities that sought to address local prevailing issues. This process was the pre-cursor to Participatory Budgeting in Tower Hamlets. (SQW, 2011, p.126)

Manton:
Previously Manton Community Alliance's Board would have set the priorities for service delivery in the area and allocated resources in order to help bring about enhanced mainstream service delivery for Manton. The Manton Community Alliance Board comprises local residents, Councillors and officers from mainstream service providers. The decision to introduce Participatory Budgeting into Manton was taken as part of Manton Community Alliance’s broader approach to building social capital and Participatory Budgeting was seen as another tool for engaging and empowering the local community to improve the relationship between residents as consumers of services and service providers. Again, however, as with the previous two examples, the resources involved were relatively small. (SQW, 2011, p.115)

Existing local structures and policies facilitated the adoption of PB in both these cases (SQW, 2010; 2011). The initial promotion and implementation in the UK (from 2005-2012) relied on central government funding in the form of the PB Unit (Interviewee A, 2011, pers. comm.). Having been employed by the government to work within their agenda, the framing of PB in the UK was one of a practice which
would complement existing policy and initiatives. Those working for the PB Unit hoped that PB, while complementing the government agenda around civic engagement and improved service delivery, would also facilitate greater citizen empowerment than was allowed for by existing government policy (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.). While promoting PB as in keeping with central government directives, it was hoped that it could also usher in conversations around the nature of civic engagement and state/citizen relationships (ibid.). This, as the vignettes below illustrate, did not come to fruition in either Tower Hamlets or Manton, and there is no evidence that it did elsewhere either. In addition, although the use of PB, in both Manton and Tower Hamlets, certainly involved more citizens than the prior processes noted above, the extent to which it gave citizens greater control over decisions remains questionable as is illustrated below.

4.42 How PB came to Tower Hamlets and Manton?

Despite central government funding for the PB Unit and Blears announcement that every local authority should be running PB by 2012 the uptake and spread of PB in the UK relied for the most part on the church, community activism and social justice networks that first brought the idea to the UK, personal relationships and almost chance encounters (Hall, 2011, pers. comm.).

Shazia Hussain, Director of Tower Hamlets Partnership, first came across the idea of PB while attending an Institute of Development Studies ‘Champions of Participation’ event in 2000 (Hussain, 2011, pers. comm.). The event was centred
around ideas and practices for engaging citizens in local governance, something local government was increasingly being tasked with in the UK, and PB was highlighted as one of the most empowering initiatives. Shazia Hussain took the idea of PB back with her to Tower Hamlets and, over the next two years, the Partnership developed a way in which they felt they could usefully implement PB in the borough (ibid.). By the time Tower Hamlets introduced PB they already had several years of Neighbourhood Renewal Scheme (NRS) initiatives running, which had localised some funding to residents through local forums (Hussain, 2011, pers. comm.). The NRS funding was conditioned upon the involvement of local communities (ibid). LSPs were set up in 2000 in some of the most deprived areas of the country. They brought parts of the public, private, voluntary and community sectors together, to work at a local level to improve the quality of life in an area and deliver public services more effectively. Tower Hamlets designed PB as a way to go beyond the traditional methods of grant giving and commissioning to local communities and local priorities of NRSs (Hussain, 2011, pers. comm.). Tower Hamlets wanted to use PB to start involving local people in mainstream funding decisions. PB was seen as a way to build on a ‘strong history of participation... and engagement’ (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.) within the borough and take this ‘up a notch’ (ibid.). Tower Hamlets PB is so far the only PB in the UK to use mainstream funds, making the actual amounts of money open to the PB process much greater than in any other process in the country to date.
In 2004/2005 MCA was attempting to instigate forms of community engagement in the area. Historically a very passive community, there was a lot of energy being put into reinvigorating community engagement. Richard Edwards, MCA Pathfinder Manager, read an article about PB and saw it as a possible tool for making engagement more meaningful; he viewed PB as a way of ‘giving people power by handing over one of the leaders of power - money’ (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.). At this point, PB was not on the CLG agenda, but the purpose and remit of Pathfinders was very clearly spelt out by central government. Pathfinders were set up in areas of particular deprivation to trial approaches, aimed at improving services by bringing the local community and service providers together, before they became general practice (SQW, 2008). This afforded them greater freedom than the LSPs or Local Area Agreements (LAA), which were also introduced at this time as part of a general strategy to develop a relationship between service providers and the communities they served (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.).

4.43 Models and Processes

The only large scale evaluation of PB in the UK to date are the DCLG commissioned SQW reports (2008;2010;2011). In line with New Labour’s fetish for targets and an almost universal predilection for the scientific method, they are essentially a cost-benefit analysis of PB in the UK. This in itself displays a concern for PB as a management and efficiency technique as opposed to a democratic process or tool. Cost-benefit analysis may be a wholly inadequate way to assess democratic processes; however, the details of the number of people involved in PB
processes, and the amount of money, its origin and what it is available for, are pertinent. This is not least because many of the claims to innovation with regard to PB rest on the fact that it gives real financial control to citizens and that this engenders a more empowering form of participation.

The table below provides a brief overview of the PB processes in Manton and Tower Hamlets. The information in the table was collected from Tower Hamlets and Manton’s own promotional materials, SQW reports (2010; 2011) and interviews with several individuals: Richard Edwards, Shazia Hussain, Interviewee E and Interviewee F.

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Voice Your Choice</th>
<th>You Decide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Where</strong></td>
<td>Manton - Large estate in the south east ward of Worksop in Nottinghamshire within Bassetlaw District Council</td>
<td>Tower Hamlets - East London Borough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Control</strong></td>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year(s)</strong></td>
<td>2007, 2008</td>
<td>2009, 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organisation</strong></td>
<td>Manton Community Alliance (MCA) - A round two Government Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder (Pathfinder) independent from but part of Bassetlaw District Council. - Voice Your Choice was run by MCA</td>
<td>Tower Hamlets Partnership - A Local Strategic Partnership (LSP). Members include: the council, police, the Primary Care Trust, public services, voluntary and community groups, faith communities, local businesses and residents. - You Decide was run by the Neighbourhood Management teams within the Local Area Partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of operation</strong></td>
<td>Pathfinder - across the area i.e. The estate of Manton</td>
<td>Local Area Partnership - across the area i.e. Borough wide Covering 8 LAP areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Aims

1. Enhance the development of social capital
2. Increase community engagement and empowerment
3. Build trust within the community
   - Over the longer term:
     1. Reduce levels of deprivation
     2. Increase local democratic activity so that residents exercise meaningful influence and are an integral part of local decision making
     3. Achievement of NI 4 [1]

### Amount of Funding available to be decided by PB

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Voice Your Choice</strong></th>
<th><strong>You Decide</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Aims**             | 1. Improve perceptions and performance of local services
                      | 2. Develop proper participation within the Tower Hamlets community
                      | 3. Generate social capital |
| **Amount of Funding available to be decided by PB** | £50,000 per annum. Year 1: £50,000 from MCA budget Year 2: £40,000 from MCA budget + £10,000 Bassetlaw PCT | £5.6 million over 2 years Year 1: The cabinet allocated £2.38 million of the council budget. Year 2: The cabinet allocated £2.38 million of the council budget + £300,000 from Tower Hamlets PCT |
| **Source of Funding** | Revenue               | Revenue         |
| **Primary source was the Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder supplemented by PCT, Nottinghamshire County Council, Community Safety Partnerships funding** | **Primary source was Council budget - from the council’s General Fund. Money was set aside for PB by the Cabinet before it had been allocated to a specific department.** |

### Type of Funding (Revenue or Capital)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Voice Your Choice</strong></th>
<th><strong>You Decide</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of Funding</strong></td>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>Revenue</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Source of Funding

- **Voice Your Choice**: Primary source was the Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder supplemented by PCT, Nottinghamshire County Council, Community Safety Partnerships funding
- **You Decide**: Primary source was Council budget - from the council’s General Fund. Money was set aside for PB by the Cabinet before it had been allocated to a specific department.

### Population of area

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th><strong>Voice Your Choice</strong></th>
<th><strong>You Decide</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population of area</strong></td>
<td>7,900</td>
<td>215,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Participants

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Voice Your Choice</strong></th>
<th><strong>You Decide</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participants</strong></td>
<td>Year 1: 498 Year 2: 1056</td>
<td>Year 1: 815 Year 2: &lt;=800 (Exact number not known)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Percentage of population that took part

<table>
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<tr>
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<th><strong>Voice Your Choice</strong></th>
<th><strong>You Decide</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year 1: 6.30</strong> Year 2: 13.37</td>
<td>Year 1: 0.38 Year 2:&lt;=0.37 (Exact number of participants not known)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Amount of Money per person

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<tr>
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<th><strong>Voice Your Choice</strong></th>
<th><strong>You Decide</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Year 1: £100.40</strong> Year 2: £47.35</td>
<td>Year 1: £2920.25 Year 2: £3012.5 (Exact number not known)</td>
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</table>

### Decisions - Processes used

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Voice Your Choice</strong></th>
<th><strong>You Decide</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information provision</strong> followed by voting</td>
<td>Year 1: Information was presented competing projects at a live event Year 2: Information was presented by competing projects on a DVD</td>
<td><strong>Deliberation</strong> followed by voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisions - Residents involvement in menu setting</td>
<td>Voice Your Choice</td>
<td>You Decide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES Residents were involved in issue groups which identified a list of 42 issues, residents were also on the scrutiny panel. Unlike the voting events these were not open events as such. Residents self selected to become involved in the issue groups and the scrutiny panel.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO No resident input on the menu in year one MINIMAL Residents were invited to a menu review session. 20 residents took part in this. The menu was drawn up according to the 6 priorities of the LSP. A menu of services was presented at decision-making events. The menu shaped by the Cabinet’s priorities. Although developed by the LSP it was the Cabinet and not the LSP or the residents had final say over the content of the menu.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages involved</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Menu Setting</td>
<td>1. Menu Setting</td>
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<tr>
<td>- MCA used knowledge collected from issue groups to develop a sheet of 42</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Citizens were asked to number their top 5 priorities from the sheet of 42 leading to a list of 10 priorities. The format for this was ‘Budget Bingo’ (see appendix for example of Manton’s Budget Bingo Sheet)- Budget Bingo forms were promoted at local events and activities, local schools, shops and community centres, in the Manton Newsletter and online on the website of Manton Community Alliance. About four weeks was allowed for this stage.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Council developed menus of services that met the priorities produced by the LAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The wider menu of services then had to be approved by the cabinet</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Identifying Projects</td>
<td>2. Voting Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Local organisations, groups and services were invited to bid for the money by offering projects that would address the priorities. - A scrutiny panel reviewed the bids and shortlisted projects for the project voting stage.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A scrutiny panel reviewed the bids and shortlisted projects for the project voting stage.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Year 1 included presentations by approved projects followed by voting. Voting events took place in various locations over a period of several weeks. - Year 2 the live presentations were replaced by DVDs. Again voting events took place in various locations over a period of several weeks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Eight public ‘You Decide!’ events were held by the council. Each event lasted half a day and contained 3 elements: Service presentations, deliberation and voting.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Project Delivery</td>
<td>4. Services Delivery</td>
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</table>
In Manton, citizens were in involved in three distinct stages of the process (1) the setting of priorities for Manton, (2) voting on how much money should be spent on these priorities, and (3) deciding who delivers the projects designed to tackle these priorities (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. comm.). In Tower Hamlets, the involvement of citizens was more restricted. In addition to the limited input of citizens in the menu setting stage, in Tower Hamlets, the way in which priorities and the subsequent menu was designed meant that ultimately citizens could only influence the way in which services were provided, rather than decide which service would be provided and how (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.). Decisions about which services would be provided were made by the LAPs in accordance with priorities stipulated by the


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examples of Projects and Services selected/ influenced via PB</th>
<th>Voice Your Choice</th>
<th>You Decide</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Play Area, Athletic Club Changing Rooms and PCSO Cameras</td>
<td>Placement of mobile speed reduction signs, street lighting, languages offered for the Early GCSE in Mother Tongue</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| Publicity Tools | PB was promoted in a variety of ways including: marketing in local employer’s canteens, pubs and bookmakers, MCA newsletters and events, the MCA website, leaflets in schools and shops and word of mouth. | PB was promoted in a variety of ways including: posters, banners, press adverts, articles in the council newspaper (which is circulated to all homes across the authority), radio adverts, TV adverts (on Bengali TV stations) and leaflets, as well as through word of mouth, councillor contacts in their wards, local social networks and community groups, mosques, churches etc. |
Cabinet and, in addition, the Cabinet held the power to override any decisions made by either the LAPs or citizens; the Cabinet made explicit use of this power on at least one occasion (ibid.). In effect citizens had no influence on priorities in Tower Hamlets.

To an extent the numbers speak for themselves in terms of how much money was available for allocation via PB and how many people were involved in the process. Manton had much less money available for PB than Tower Hamlets, partly because the Tower Hamlets PBs was run by the LSP, which has more control over mainstream service provision and was able to open up this much larger area, both in terms of projects and finances, to PB. MCA does not provide or have jurisdiction over provision of mainstream services and so could not, even if it wished to, open up such large projects or sums of money for PB (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. comm.). Its partnership with the PCT did, however, allow it to make inroads into more mainstream service provision. Participants in Manton very clearly had strong views about the way in which issues which fall under the purview of mainstream budgets should be prioritised; as part of the 2008 process, for example, it was actually voted to allocate part of the budget to pay for extra policing (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. comm.). This was somewhat controversial, as policing should have been paid for out of mainstream Council budgets. However, the participants in Manton felt so strongly about the issues they decided to provide additional funding to this mainstream service so that the police could carry out additional drug raids (ibid.).
Given that the arguments for PBs innovation and ability to render participation empowering rely heavily on the fact it hands over financial control to citizens superficially, one could assume that the greater the amount of money involved, the greater the power given to citizens. However, there are arguments for PB to start with smaller projects. One of the initial reasons why people became so involved with PBs in Brazil was their ability to physically see the outcomes of decisions made by the PB process (Abers, 1995, p.200). So, while some of the projects in Manton may have been relatively small, the placing of a new bin for example, they were visible and had a direct effect on the physical environment of those who took place in the PB process (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.).

Voting and the general process of PB is very simple. This removes many of the barriers to entry present in traditional grant giving schemes. Applying for grants can be time consuming, intimidating, and a difficult process which requires certain skills and capabilities; this is not the case with PB, which is a very easy process to understand and in which to take part. While the actual voting processes may be easy for residents to understand, in both areas under consideration the history of deprivation would likely result in low levels of political knowledge and expertise within the community. This would render some of the more complex power issues and processes at play difficult for participants to navigate and to understand. As projects become larger, the physical impact on a geographical area becomes less visible. Additionally, experiences in Brazil show how starting small enables people
to gain knowledge and experience (Abers, 1995; 2000). They do not feel overwhelmed when considering larger projects where issues of funding and implementation become more complex and also have a less visibly direct impact on individuals’ day to day lives (ibid.). In effect, having control over smaller projects, involving smaller sums of money, at least initially, may result in greater feelings of power and empowerment for citizens. Acquiring a small amount of power may result in a disproportionate increase in feelings of empowerment, particularly where little or no power has been held before.

Although the sums of money involved in the Tower Hamlets processes were much larger than those in Manton, the situation was reversed in terms of the control over what happened with those sums. In Manton, participants were given fairly extensive control over the development of a menu from which to choose. Although attached to the council, MCA was self-governed by a combination of local people and public sector officials; it was not directly controlled by either the council or central government (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.,) in the same manner as Tower Hamlets LSP. In Tower Hamlets, there was no citizen involvement in the menu-setting stage for the first PB; superficially this was because of a lack of time allowed for the lead (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.). They only allowed five months from the decision to implement PB to the running of the actual voting process (ibid.); this in itself shows a lack of concern for citizen involvement in the menu-setting stage of PB. Citizens were minimally involved in the menu-setting process for the second PB; twenty people attended a form of menu-reviewing session
In both PBs in Tower Hamlets, the menu was restricted to the six priorities of the LSP and ultimate control of the menu lay with the Cabinet (ibid.). The menu was first and foremost based on the Cabinet’s priorities for the upcoming year, council members and service providers were then asked to make contributions to the menu in line with the Cabinet’s priorities, and finally the menu was sent to the Cabinet to be signed off. In at least one case the Cabinet made alterations to the menu before sign off36 (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.). So, based on the sums of money and scale of projects involved, it may appear superficially that the participants of the Tower Hamlets PB had more power, a closer inspection of the actual processes involved suggests otherwise. The Tower Hamlets process, then, appears to be little more than a legitimation of Cabinet priorities. While the participants were unaware of the behind-the-scenes menu-setting process in Tower Hamlets, the lack of involvement in menu setting and the restriction of choice over projects would have been apparent (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.) and arguably would have had a negative effect on feelings of empowerment. In fact, people did complain about the lack of involvement in the menu-setting stage of the first PB in Tower Hamlets, and this is why they were invited to a menu-reviewing session in the second PB (ibid.). However, they were only asked to review the menu not help construct it (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.,) and given the other processes outlined above their ability to control the menu remained practically non-existent.

36 One of the original menu had included some funding for a healthy living project which would have been run with the Primary Care Trust (PCT). This item was in all the drafts of the menu until it went to the Cabinet. The project leads were later told that the Cabinet had removed the provision because they did not want any council money going from this process outside of the council (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.,)
Manton actually developed a tool, budget bingo, specifically to involve local residents in the construction of a menu (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.). In Manton’s first PB, citizens were asked to number their top five priorities from a bingo sheet of forty-two that MCA had identified using knowledge collected from issue groups (ibid.). Although the format of this stage altered slightly, predominantly to include the service providers from the public sector as a way to seduce them into becoming involved in PB, and to allow it to impact more mainstream services beyond the remit of MCA, in subsequent PBs the contribution of citizens in this stage remained significant (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.)\(^{37}\). Involving service providers at this stage gave the agencies a vested interested in being involved, and MCA also hoped it would give them a sense of legitimacy and credibility (ibid.). This change to stage two represents the concrete introduction of co-production practices which had been developing as ideas to complement the original social capital model used by MCA (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.). MCA understood coproduction as ‘tools and methods that create opportunities for people and agencies to learn and work together in designing services which become subsequently more effective and efficient’ (ibid.).

\(^{37}\) Manton’s third PB saw a greater concern for including the public sector. They wanted to ensure that the public sector was ‘seduced’ into being involved. In year three there were five themes in Stage One including a health theme, an employment theme and a young person’s theme. Within that at the voting for priorities stage there were ten choices to make and voters had to pick the top. Five of those ten in each theme were what the agencies wanted to do and five of those ten were what the residents had identified as being important. In Stage Two MCA contacted all the agencies involved with the selected priorities and asked all the agencies and say here are the priorities and what they wanted to do in response to them. (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.)
As noted above, only twenty people attended the menu-reviewing session in Tower Hamlets. The council expected around sixty people to turn up (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.). Sixty is still a very small percentage of the number of people who took part in the voting events, and an extremely small percentage of those eligible to take part in PB overall. This suggests that it was not considered to be a major part of the PB process and, as such, not much time and energy was devoted to developing it; despite a £100,000 publicity budget, Tower Hamlets relied upon word of mouth to promote their menu-reviewing sessions (ibid.).

There is another issue around how much people actually want to be involved. ‘[E]mpirical evidence produced by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister found that most citizens did not want to participate more than they did (ODPM 2005, p. 73), and Meadowcroft’s (2001) study into participatory mechanisms employed by UK local governments recorded a similar lack of desire for increased participation (Meadowcroft, 2001, p. 40, cited in, Davidson and Elstub, 2014, p. 379). This suggests that people want to know they can influence the way in which services are provided and run, but are less interested in actually exerting that influence, let alone in co-designing and running a scheme of this kind. There are also the issues of complexity and time with regard to this form of participation. This is especially true when people have had no experience of being directly involved in decision making about service provision by their council. Service provision can be complex and becoming informed about all aspects in order to make meaningful decisions can be time consuming. It is not obvious that citizens have the time or inclination to
take on such burdens. Davidson and Elstub (2014) themselves note that the studies they cite with regard to a lack of appetite for increased participation in the UK ‘do not take into account the fact that much of this participation has little or no influence on decisions’ (ibid. p.379). They also suggest that ‘if UK citizens did have the opportunity to participate meaningfully in deliberating over and making important decisions that affect their lives, they may well desire more opportunities to participate’ (Davidson and Elstub, 2014, p.379). In Manton, citizens did have far more control over the menu but the issues and projects were smaller, not as complex, and had visible impacts on their day-to-day lives. PB proved far more popular with citizens in Manton than it did with citizens in Tower Hamlets, as is evidenced by the dramatic increase (113%) in the number of people attending the 2008 PB process compared to that organised in 2007. In contrast, Tower Hamlets saw roughly the same number of people attending in 2009 and 2010 with, if anything, a slight decrease in 2010.

Manton included a far greater percentage of the population able to take part in PB in each process than did Tower Hamlets. As Manton’s process potentially involved far fewer people than that in Tower Hamlets, it was easier to contact potential participants directly and to encourage them to become involved, and MCA was actively involved in canvassing. The fact that Manton could extend their voting period (up to two months in the third round) beyond one-day events, and that the total population covered by the Manton PB allowed for door-to-door canvassing (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.), while this was not appropriate for Tower Hamlets
given the far greater population goes some way to explaining the much higher percentage of the population taking part in Manton. However, the continued increase in numbers of people taking part in Manton, compared to the actual decrease in Tower Hamlets, also reveals how attractive and meaningful PB was seen to be in each location. Publicity and advertising obviously play their part in attracting people to take part, and Tower Hamlets had a much wider area to cover, but Tower Hamlets did have significantly greater reserves to draw upon for this than Manton. In addition, the existence of community networks and organisations and a history of activism within the borough of Tower Hamlets (SQW, 2010) would suggest a more fertile ground for participation and engagement initiatives than the traditionally passive population of Manton (SQW, 2010).

The funds available for PB in both Manton and Tower Hamlets were revenue spend rather than capital spend as is generally the case in Brazil’s PBs. Crucially, capital spend enables PB to be a rolling process with cycles but no definite end, each cycle feeding into another and creating ongoing participation in all areas and projects. Secure funding enables PB in Brazil to be an ongoing process which promotes knowledge acquisition and capacity building in participants through simply repeating the process and allowing them to become more familiar with the issues raised. As revenue spend is exhausted at the end of each year there is no guarantee that the process will continue beyond a one-off event. Tower Hamlets had funding for two years but there was a big question mark over whether it would happen for a third time (Interviewee A, 2011, pers. comm.). Despite having moved
beyond the small grants model of PB, both Manton and Tower Hamlets were ultimately reliant on grants from central government. Reliance on grants depoliticises the processes and makes it harder for residents to argue against a process or the way in which it is constructed; citizens are put in an obliged and dependent position with regard to the council. Although the money in theory belongs to the residents, it is still held by the council who rely upon central government to give it to them.

Much has been made of the deliberative aspects of the Porto Alegre model with regard to its innovatory status and the type of participation it affords. Many would consider deliberation as a distinguishing feature of PB. The Porto Alegre model has deliberation built in to various aspects of the process; the Budget Councils create a space for discussions about issues of social justice and local priorities, there is also space for discussing spending priorities in wider forums and finally deliberation about funding. ‘In the transfer of Participatory Budgeting to the Northern Hemisphere, deliberation seems to have lost out to an emphasis for reaching set targets for community cohesion and urban renewal’ (Ryan, 2009, p.8 cited, in Davidson and Elstub, 2014, p.378). Community cohesion was an important consideration for both Manton and Tower Hamlets. Like almost all UK PB processes, the main emphasis in terms of citizen engagement was on the voting rather than the deliberation stages of PB. Community cohesion was an aim, explicitly stated as such in Tower Hamlets and it was also cited in MCAs own literature on PB, of their PB processes. PB voting days in Tower Hamlets were seen
as events that would bring people from across the community together and create interaction between groups and thereby promote cohesion (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.). Cohesion was a goal in both areas both due to underlying community issues and because greater cohesion enhances social capital. In Tower Hamlets sectionalism is a problem (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.) and in Manton there are still rifts in the community that date back to the miners’ strikes concerning who did and did not cross the picket line (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.). The emphasis on community cohesion meant neither MCA nor Tower Hamlets LSP wanted to highlight the differences within their community for fear this would actually damage community cohesion. In addition, radical or dissenting views are unlikely to get expressed when you have got a set menu of projects that people are deciding between.

While the Manton process made no specific provisions for deliberation at all, Tower Hamlets felt that deliberation was an important part of the process and that it was not possible to get good decisions without good deliberation (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.). Arguably, this could facilitate a better understanding of different views within the community. Deliberation was very much built into the Tower Hamlets processes. The PB event to decide where the money went was designed to last three hours, with only the last twenty-five minutes allocated for voting, while the first two and a half hours were for information sharing, deliberation and discussion (ibid.). In addition to the generous time allotted for discussion, the event was heavily staffed; there was one member of staff per ten residents sitting on a
table facilitating deliberation and then other staff to explain the technical aspects of the projects (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.). Despite these relatively large efforts made by Tower Hamlets, there were several obstacles to achieving meaningful deliberation. Like-minded people with similar concerns and needs tended to sit together and would object to sitting elsewhere (ibid.). In addition, there were cultural obstacles; there existed groups where one person decided for everyone, as traditionally the group looked to this person for guidance (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.). Despite big efforts, the Tower Hamlets events were unable to create or facilitate much substantial deliberation and there was almost no space for dissent because the process was so structured (ibid.). There was an element of conflict in the first PB between the youths and the adults who attended. It was felt that the youths ‘just voted for what they wanted’ (Interviewee F, 2011, pers. comm.). Rather than being seen as a vibrant expression of views, and as a challenge to navigate disparate and competing views, the presence of the youths was deemed disruptive and undesirable. In order to avoid any further disruption, the second PB ran a separate youth event and anyone under eighteen was prevented from attending the adult PB (ibid.).

After the first PB process in Manton, there was a concern that voting decisions were being influenced by the quality and nature of presentations on the day (Interviewee E, 2011, pers. comm.). In order to help ensure votes were being cast on issues rather than personalities, there were no presentations and not even any communal final voting events in Manton’s second PB (ibid.). Instead, people read about
projects and proposals and made a decision based on this (Interviewee E 2011, pers. comm.). While arguably this facilitates more objective issue-based voting, it also precludes the possibility of deliberation in the process. This is likely to result in a lessening of the opportunity to understand competing and conflicting views. The literature needed, time required and sophistication of readers needed for this is very high. The pamphlets developed in Manton were deliberately kept short and simple so that people would not be put off by a large and lengthy document (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.). This could help tackle the issue of reader sophistication but hinders the development of detailed knowledge of projects. Given the lack of a Budget Council in either Manton or Tower Hamlets, coupled with limited options between which to choose, especially in Tower Hamlets, and the general structure of PB in both places, the possibility of deliberation about issues of social justice was eclipsed.

The motivation for implementing PB obviously shaped the way in which the processes were designed and run. Both Manton and Tower Hamlets had very clear and specific reasons for implementing PB. Both the general aims of the bodies implementing PB, and the specific aims they had in mind for the processes themselves, had agency in this respect.

4.44 PB: Specific Aims

The table below (reproduced from the table above) lists the aims of each PB process as outlined in their own promotional material.
Table 5: Specific aims

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aims</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Enhance the development of social capital</td>
<td>1. Generate social capital</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Increase community engagement and empowerment</td>
<td>2. Develop proper participation within the Tower Hamlets community</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Build trust within the community</td>
<td>3. Improve perceptions and performance of local services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Over the longer term:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. Reduce levels of deprivation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Increase local democratic activity so that residents exercise meaningful influence and are an integral part of local decision making</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. Achievement of NI 4 [1]</td>
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[1] NI 4 -National Indicator 4: The percentage of people who feel they can influence decisions in their locality

The first three in each case are very similar and very much in keeping with central government policy at the time. The longer term aims of the Manton project make it distinct not just from Tower Hamlets but also from almost all other PB processes in the UK; Manton’s concern with democratic activity makes it distinctive among UK processes. Unfortunately, it is simply not possible to assess Manton PB’s impact with regard to its longer term aims; there is not enough data about the consequences of the PB processes themselves and there are innumerable other

38Mansfield is another example where one of the aims of PB was to enhance the democratic process. Where there have been explicit concerns with democracy in UK PB processes these have generally been directed at meeting requirements of The Duty to Involve Statute 1 and/or (NI) 4
variables which could impact upon these aims. The long term aims\textsuperscript{39} were a consideration in the establishment and design of, and the decision to implement PB, however, it was the initial three shorter term aims that had the most influence on the form PB took.

Both projects, Manton and Tower Hamlets, wanted to use PB to build trust within the community, and both saw PB as a tool to increase participation and community cohesion. In addition, Tower Hamlets saw PB as a way to promote the Partnership, its profile, its priorities, and its activities. Both were focused on building models of co-production and developing social capital, but, while Manton had an eye on democratic issues, Tower Hamlets PB was very explicitly about efficiency and service provision, ‘their concern with democracy was merely that decisions be made by a voting process’ (PB Officer in Tower Hamlets). PB was seen by both as a tool to further co-production. The thinking was that if you can empower people to make decisions in their locality, then they might take more responsibility. PB was used as a mechanism to involve citizens in the design of services. It was primarily implemented as a way to address existing issues and to further policy initiatives, rather than because of its potential with regard to participation or democracy. There was an interest in issues of empowerment; empowering individuals to make decisions for themselves and their locality. The ideological ground from which these concerns grew, however, was economic, they revolved around co-production and social capital, rather than political. Both projects also hoped to raise the profile

\textsuperscript{39} As MCA ceased to exist in 2011 they themselves did not have the time or resources to follow up on this.
of the Pathfinder or LSP involved generally, as a form of PR, and specifically to further local resident understanding of their role and activities.

4.45 LSPs and Pathfinders

Manton Community Alliance is the local brand name for the government's department of Communities and Local Government (CLG) Neighborhood Management Pathfinder initiative (Pathfinders). Pathfinders came about from what used to be called the Social Exclusion Unit, a part of the cabinet, as a way to improve public services. They specifically wanted to test the idea that managing public services at a more local level would bring substantial benefits. There were two rounds of the Pathfinder approach; MCA was part of the second round of Pathfinders. The key difference between the thirty round one and the fifteen round two Pathfinders is that the round two Pathfinders were deliberately given less money to see if Pathfinders could influence public services without money (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.). Like all round two Pathfinders, MCA was given seven years to prove its worth, and the object was to test new ways of working as part of the reform of the public sector (ibid.). There was, however, a general aim: ‘To enable deprived communities and local services to improve local outcomes, by improving and joining up local services, and making them more responsive to local needs’ (SQW, 2008, p.6). Pathfinders were given relatively free rein as to how they would achieve these goals, so each one of the thirty-five total pathfinders in the country was acting independently (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.). The vast majority of them adopted a traditional neighbourhood renewal approach i.e. pump priming
MCA rejected that approach viewing it expensive, inefficient and ineffective. Instead, they set up their own social capital model of renewal which focused on changing people's behaviours as a means of sustaining growth in the community (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.).

Both LSPs and Pathfinders came into being in 2000 and 2001 respectively. They appeared against a backdrop of broader aims to change the relationship between citizens and the state, the central tenet being that citizens are part of the solution and not just passive consumers of public services. Citizens are viewed as a valuable resource for the development of more responsive and more efficient services. The drivers behind this are economic and the hope was that input from citizens can replace some capital input; a rise in social capital can offset a fall in traditional capital (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.). Although relevant to their particular geographical areas, the aims were shaped by the specific purpose of Pathfinders and LSPs as put forward by central government, as well as by central government policy and initiatives more generally (for example the Localism Agenda). PB fitted very neatly into and complemented many existing policies and initiatives in the UK. LSPs and Pathfinder initiatives had similar goals in that they were both developed to bring communities and service providers together, to combat a culture of silo working and improve local services (Edwards, 2010, pers. comm.). The main differences, which affected their operation and processes, were that LSPs dealt with larger areas (both in terms of geography and service provision) and larger sums of money, and were general practice across the UK, while Pathfinders dealt with smaller amounts of money over geographically smaller areas, and were selectively
implemented in areas of particular deprivation (ibid.). Both LSPs and Pathfinders were initiatives developed in a general policy framework to improve services and their delivery. The underlying assumption was that this could and would be achieved by greater community involvement and a drive towards localism. This was accompanied by a rhetoric of bringing the government and citizens closer together and giving local people ‘more say’ in the way in which local services were run. Although never clearly defined, the development of social capital and co-production models underlined much of the policy and rhetoric around empowerment and localism. This reveals the sense in which the fundamental concerns of the projects were economic rather than political. The driver for this approach is an attempt to provide more effective services with less money (Boyle, Coote, Sherwood and Slay, 2010). Social capital, however it is defined, is generally deemed to be at least desirable, if not necessary, predominantly due to its economic value. The relationship between economic development and democracy may be mutually beneficial particularly with regard to minimalist conceptions of democracy. The subversive aspect is to use political and democratic language and ideals to pursue economic ends and thereby diffuse actual political issues and demands. As the previous chapter illustrated this is exactly what happened as a consequence of the overlaying of multiple discourses by New Labour.

The Blair government’s language expressed a renewed interest in community, neighbourhood, citizenship, exclusion, and empowerment, and saw the introduction of The New Deal for Communities, introduced in 1998 and the
Neighbourhood Renewal Schemes introduced in 1997, to name just two. However, the continued existence of quangos and the outsourcing of public service provision to private companies prevented any democratisation of large areas of public policy and service finance. Participation was generally a consultation of consumers by the government, rather than any meaningful transition of power or decision-making capacities to citizens. In short, there was more decentralisation but little or no devolution of power to the local level, not least due to the continued exercise of ring fencing and capping of local authority spending. The New Localism of which Hazel Blears was a strong advocate, introduced in the second half of the New Labour government, did mark a shift from the previous centralist policies to more direct participation. PBs held at least the potential to genuinely shift power, if only minimally initially, into the hands of the people affected by policies, and they were very much in line with the rhetoric of the New Labour government. While the rhetoric changed the government still pursued privatisation policies and decentralisation as a management technique rather than a democratic process. Underlying all of this was a construction of a new relationship between the state and civil society that, while couched in the language of decentralisation and participation, fundamentally rested on co-production rather than power sharing. As national policy began to scale down the amount of power to be devolved to local government and communities, the amount of power possible to open up via PB also shrunk.
Traditional partnership models for local government were being replaced with collaborative action models (Interviewee, E, 2010, pers. comm.). Collaborative action models illustrate a form of co-production where citizens are seen to be valuable resources (ibid.). While resident engagement may lead to better public services, as it affords more information on the needs and wants of the communities to which they deliver, and a quicker sense of where things are working and where they are not working. However, the addition of responsibility for citizens to co-produce these services, or to ensure that they are responsive to need in the community, does not automatically follow. Citizen engagement does not require that this responsibility rest on the residents involved. The responsibility shift from the government and service providers to citizens is part of the way in which the new state/citizen relationship was conceptualised.

PB fitted very neatly into and complemented many existing policies and initiatives in the UK. Rather than ushering in a radical and/or new form of citizen engagement, PB was reconfigured so as to become the natural development of existing policy initiatives. PB also sits very well with Neighbourhood Charters (later to become Neighbourhood Agreements) an initiative in the Strong and Prosperous Communities - The Local Government White Paper (DCLG 2006). These Charters/Agreements were aimed at getting local people to sit down with the public sector and decide together what level of service is to be delivered. MCA were part of the national pilot scheme for the Neighbourhood Agreements and used PB as a tool to enact them. As part of PB in Manton is about local people setting their priorities,
the Neighbourhood Agreement should actually mirror what people expect to get;
MCA married the two together and made them into one entity, so everything that
is decided through PB goes into a written agreement/contract (Interviewee E,
2011, pers. comm.,). While this is not general practice for PB in the UK it does
illustrate the way in which PB can and was used as a tool to enable central
government policy, rather than as an initiative in and of itself.

The Porto Alegre exemplar of PB and the two vignettes discussed here are clearly
very different in many ways. PB in Porto Alegre, and now across Brazil, has become
a formal institution. This institutionalisation can be seen as a double edged sword;
it may lead to ossification but it can also serve to strengthen PB and its potential.
Earlier chapters, particularly chapter two, highlighted some of the potential
limitations that formalisation and institutionalisation can impose upon PB
processes. Smith (2009) very clearly illustrates the various ways in which the details
of institutional can design influence the democratic potential of participatory
practices. The vignettes above illustrate just how influential institutional design and
institutionalisation can be. The absence of both, not just in the case of the
vignettes but with regard to PB across the UK, is one of the factors that has
contributed to the lack of development of PB processes in the UK and significantly
weakened their potential when they have taken place.

Smith (2009) asks ‘[t]o what extent can different designs express theorists’
democratic hopes and expectations?’ (ibid p.6). PB is an example of what Smith
(2009) terms democratic innovations; these are ‘institutions that have been specifically designed to increase and deepen citizen participation in the political decision making process.’ (ibid, p.1). He reminds us that institutional design of such processes is itself an object of investigation.

‘All of them [including PB] are representative of a growing and widespread interest in finding new ways of engaging citizens in the political decision-making process, and it is the aim of this book to offer an evaluation of the democratic potential of these different institutional designs.’ (Smith, G. 2009, p.2)

Smith (2009) bases his analysis on four democratic goods: inclusiveness, popular control, considered judgement and transparency; these are accompanied by two institutional goods – efficiency and transferability. There are numerous design elements of mature Brazilian PBs that are absent from the vignettes above. The inclusion of some of these elements would almost certainly strengthen the potential of these processes. This sentiment has also often been expressed by a number of UK PB practitioners and members of the PB Unit including Jez Hall, arguably the leading expert on and practitioner of PB in the UK. The features of the mature Brazilian PBs that would likely have made the biggest difference to the vignettes include: regional budget forums, the COP, delegates and councillors associated with the regional assemblies and the COP, a budget matrix and an annual cycle repeated year upon year. Each of these features infix particular institutional characteristics that facilitated the realisation of various democratic
goods in different ways in Porto Alegre. (Smith 2009). The incorporation of these
design features into the vignettes would arguably have enhanced their ability to
more fully realise all six of Smith's goods and made for much stronger participatory
initiatives.

The Possibility of Transformation?

It is worth noting that, in contrast to the vignettes detailed here, there are
eamples of where agency played a role in turning an essentially non-
transformative policy into a practice that had unintended transformational
consequences. Wainwright (2003) details the Marsh Farm New Deal for Community
project. Wainwright cites this as an example of how even when the government
policy and institutional design is not intentionally transformational - indeed maybe
even intended to diffuse transformational impulses under the guise of
commitments to change - well-organised, consciously transformational, citizen's
organisations have potentially the capacity to 'occupy the rhetoric'. This led to
unintended, transformational consequences (unintended by New Labour at least).
The New Deal for Communities involved the devolution of 50 million pounds to be
spent over 10 years through a 'community led' process of decision-making. The
Marsh Farm alliance of tenants, community groups, the Exodus collective and
sundry vicars struggled more or less successfully to realise this promise of money
for community led processes (Wainwright 2003). The Marsh Farm project was part
of the New Deal for Communities; as previously noted PB (or at least the promise
of it) featured in the New Deal for Communities. The vignettes illustrate a variety of
the obstacles and limits some of these community led processes faced; Marsh Farm illustrates that, despite all of these, transformational processes are sometimes possible (Wainwright 2003). A wider study of various participatory initiatives (Newman et al. 2004) also acknowledged that while central government policy and control often generated institutional constraints and limited the capacity of participation initiatives to shape policy and practice from below there did exist some spaces for change (ibid).

‘[C]entral government policies on participation, while not necessarily bringing citizen and user voices closer to the centres of decision-making power, were producing a culture of change as some strategic actors seized policy opportunities in order to introduce new ways of working and used the enhanced legitimacy afforded to the participation agenda to bring about change.’ (Newman et al., 2004, p.210).

The vignettes detailed here highlight some of the difficulties that participatory initiatives faced. Alone they may suggest that change was almost impossible. However, as shown above, there were cases where at least some form of change was realised.

There are also studies of other UK PB processes which suggest PB has greater potential than the two vignettes here suggest. As noted above the two main academic authors who have written about PB in the UK are Blakey and Rocke. The various studies conducted by both suggest PB does have at least some transformational potential. The reasons for this are various and include: case selection, conceptual framework, methodology and the questions posed by their
research. Their work is conceptually very different, to one another and to this work, but there are at least some non-conceptual similarities worth noting. Both conducted a significant number of participant interviews, undertook diverse participant observations and both observed the PB processes they investigated (Blakey 2015, Rocke 2014). This enabled them to observe change and transformation in individuals during PB processes; something this work was not able to do. However neither researcher was able to follow up with individuals to ascertain whether the change was enduring, that it lasted beyond the buoyancy of the often very buoyant PB processes. Additionally both researchers investigated early adopters of PB and both researchers were dependent on, if not heavily involved with, PB activists for their non-participant based information. The point about studying early adopters (Salford, Bradford and Newcastle) is that these processes occurred before the PB Unit became government funded and as such were less bound by government policy and therefore possibly closer to the activist and social justice orientation of CAP and CPI. The early UK PBs were set up and run by self proclaimed community activists and advocates of PB; relying on such individuals for information is bound to produce a certain bias. Blakey (2015) is explicit about the fact that her research is advocacy-driven and very frank about her normative commitments and about her activist identity and motivations which inevitably invoke a certain cognitive bias. This is not to say that the processes investigated by Blakey and Rocke did not display greater potential than the vignettes above but it does go some way towards explaining how and why they
were able to find more evidence of change than was found during the investigation of the vignettes.

**Conclusion**

The investigation of actual UK PB processes reveals that the only concrete import to the UK processes analysed here was the idea that citizens be given a say in how budgets are allocated. This vague and general abstraction leaves PB open to a profusion of disparate interpretations and implementations. The way in which PB manifests is then dependent on innumerable variables including both the design of practical processes and the context in which these processes operate. Discussion of context and its impact illustrates how, in the UK, PB did not influence or change the narrative around participation but rather was incorporated into it. This is made explicit by an account of who implemented PB and why. The introduction of PB into the UK is then seen not as a radical and innovative participatory practice, an idealism created by the myth of PB, but rather as an additional tool to further a particular political project and as such displays minimal shifts in power and superficial forms of participation. New Labour deployed a consensus-driven and technical managerial interpretation of participation based on business models which were only rhetorically concerned with citizen empowerment.

The exploration of the two vignettes above does suggest that they would sit along the right hand side of the triangle. Arguably, Manton did place slightly more emphasis on politics, if only in terms of a desire to increase voter turnout in
elections. However, his emphasis on politics did not develop in any other respect throughout the project. Again arguably it could be said that Tower Hamlets was slightly closer to the Porto Alegre model in terms of the budget that was available for PB. That said, given that many aspects of the Porto Alegre cycle were missing, it was not actually an ongoing cycle at all, and the limited control participants had over how the funds would be spent, means that it remains very far from the Porto Alegre model.

Given the number of citizens involved in the PB processes outlined above, even the far weaker claim that participation was improved by including greater numbers of people is somewhat questionable. In neither case did PB dramatically impact upon popular sovereignty even at the very micro level; in Manton, PB was not used for mainstream services and, in Tower Hamlets, authority over both the initial priorities and the final decisions lay not in the hands of citizens but those of local and central government. Although the processes did include more people than previous engagement initiatives did, citizen involvement, albeit that of a select few, in the types of issues addressed by PB in both Tower Hamlets and Manton was not novel. There is little evidence that these PB processes did usher in conversations around the nature of civic engagement and state/citizen relationships.

PB, with its focus on citizen control over public budgets and social justice, does have the potential to address issues of sovereignty and equality; these were taken
up to an extent in the UK, for example, the areas which got funding to carry out PB were some of the most deprived in the country.

The New Labour citizen is rational, active and responsible, while for the Brazilian social movements the achievement of citizenship is dependent on the formation of a critical consciousness. The types of participation befitting each will necessarily be radically different. One mode of participation appropriate to the New Labour citizen is co-production. The vignettes presented here reveal PB as a management tool capable of creating opportunities for people and agencies to learn and work together in designing services which subsequently become more effective and efficient. There may well be a lack of appetite among citizens in the UK for this type of participation, but that does not mean there is no appetite at all. Apathy is often cited as one of the causes of the current crisis of representative democracy. It is highly unlikely that the UK population has suddenly become apolitical - indeed five minutes talking to anyone on the street would challenge this assumption. What is more likely is that they are disillusioned with the current state of representative democracy. Maybe they are also disillusioned with the types and forms of participation being put forward by government. Despite the lack of potential displayed by the vignettes here it is important to note that there are other instances, Marsh Farm and the PB processes explored by Blakely and Rocke, where some form of change and/or transformation may be possible. The next chapter will explore different types and kinds of participation including a contrasting of what was demanded by the social movements in the UK and what has been put forward
by government, this leads to a discussion of the relationship between the prevailing hegemony and critique. Finally the last chapter will explore the relationship between participation and representative democracy: can participation remedy the ills of contemporary representative democracy?
CHAPTER FIVE

Participation and Representation

Introduction

This chapter reflects on some of the questions that arise out of previous chapters. It attempts to make sense of a recent trend in politics, namely the emphasis on participation. It asks what accounts for this trend? Is it a development and mutation of neoliberalism? Is it a response to criticisms, contentions and challenges to neoliberal hegemony? Does it illustrate a triumph or a defeat of political struggles and social movements? What is the relationship between participation, specifically civic engagement and representative democracy? The turn towards participation reconfigures the traditional relationship between state and citizen in classical theories of representative democracy. This impacts on the role and function of both the citizen and the state. There are many different understandings of participation, what it is, what it should be, and to what ends it should be implemented. Part One of this chapter problematises of the concept of participation. Then Part Two looks to the recent turn towards participation asking what accounts for this trend. Drawing on Chapter Three, it explores the ways in which neoliberalism’s turn towards participation can be understood as a reaction to counter-hegemonic demands (in both theory and practice) for greater citizen participation in political decisions. It explores the ways in which neoliberalism has co-opted participation and incorporated it, so that it functions to reinforce the hegemony of neoliberalism rather than, as its radical roots would have it, question the hegemony itself.
Finally, it reflects on the consequences of understanding hegemony and counter-hegemonies as standing in a relation of co-constitution. It explores what significance the difference between participation-as-insertion and participation-as-transformation has for our understanding of the relationship between participation and representative democracy and reflects on the understandings of participation that are more likely to have a positive democratic impact.

PART ONE: Problematising Participation

5. 1 Participation

Understandings of participation are extremely varied. At one end of the spectrum are understandings based on process and Freirean pedagogy which emphasise empowerment and critical consciousness raising; this literature focuses on the participants. At the other end, there are those who focus on the state and the ways in which participation may aid the function of the state. Clearly there are a profusion of authors and disciplines which could be drawn upon to explore the concept and as such no attempt at a comprehensive exploration is made here. Authors and disciplines have been chosen and drawn upon to illustrate the variety, complexity, and antithetical nature of meanings signified by the one word ‘participation’. The briefest investigation of the multifarious meanings of participation highlights the multiplicity of aims, and the subsequent consequences, embedded in the concomitant meanings. After briefly evidencing the longevity of the debates around participation and democracy, this chapter quickly turns its attention to more contemporary debates.
There may be a renewed interest in participation in contemporary politics and political theory, for a variety of reasons, some of which are explored below, but an acknowledgement of the relevance and importance of participation in relation to democracy is not as new as much of the literature on participation (both academic papers and policy documents) seems to suggest. Academic work on the relationship between participation and democracy can be traced back at least as far as Aristotle (Gaventa, 2006). It was also an area of reflection and contestation within modern philosophy. Carole Pateman (1975) highlights the differences in thought on participation with regard to democratic theory by drawing upon the works of classical theorists including Mill (father and son), Bentham, and Rousseau. Although ‘participation’ may currently be almost universally seen as an unquestionable good, Pateman (1975) reminds us that this was not always the case. Her work, and that of the authors she draws upon, helps to draw out some of the fundamental tensions between democracy and participation which appear to be somewhat glossed over by more contemporary thought. Such thought often starts from the assumption that participation is necessarily good for democracy in one way or another, and immediately jumps to questions pertaining to the form participation may take to further certain multiple and divergent aims, from gaining information for the state (so that it may attempt to be more responsive to the needs of the citizenry and/or enhance the efficiency of its policies, for example) to the empowerment of citizens. A return to the work of classical theorists illustrates the underlying tensions which often go unacknowledged or unexplored within
contemporary work on the subject (Pateman, 1975, pp.1-2). Whether the primary
e incentive is the maintenance of stability of the political system, as in the work of
Mill senior and Bentham, or whether it has an explicit political goal and makes a
contribution to democracy rather than just stabilising it, as displayed in the work of
Rousseau (Pateman, 1975, p.24), will have an impact on the form participation
takes.\footnote{Pateman, unlike other classical theorist, also expressed an interest in the psychological
impacts and educative potential of participation (Griffith 1998).}

Pateman (1975) dispels what she calls ‘the myth’ of there being one classical theory
of democracy by showing the differences in thought on democracy and
participation in the work of James Mill and Bentham on the one hand and J. S. Mill
and Rousseau on the other. She illustrates how Bentham and Mill senior share a
focus on institutional arrangements necessary for democracy, and participation is
accorded a solely protective role. It protects the interests of individuals and is there
to keep the government in check, used as an accountability tool; its primary threat
is the removal of officials from office via the electoral system. Each person\footnote{Depending on the extent of suffrage.} can
participate in the choice and the removal of elected officials by means of their vote.
A surfeit of participation, i.e. anything beyond participating in the choice of
representatives via election, was seen as potentially detrimental to the smooth and
effective running of the political system, and as a threat to stability where stability
of a political system was prized above all else (Pateman, 1975, pp.18-19). She
classes theorists of this ilk as proponents of representative democracy. By contrast,
due to the wider function afforded to participation in their works, she labels J. S. Mill and Rousseau as proponents of participatory democracy (Pateman, 1975, pp. 24-39). Arguably, this would more accurately be termed a more participatory form of representative democracy. Today, few are suggesting a full participatory democracy that does not heavily rely upon representation. In the work of Rousseau and J. S. Mill on democracy, participation is ‘central to the establishment and maintenance of a democratic polity’ (ibid., p.20) which extends beyond institutional arrangements to a ‘participatory society’ (ibid Pateman, 1975, p.20). Rousseau recognised and valued the psychological and educative aspects and consequences of participation.

Referring to Berelson (1954) and his comments on classical theory, Pateman (1975, pp.6-7) notes the assumed necessity of homogeneity in many classical theories of democracy and the accompanying desirability of minimal participation. While Berelson, whose work Pateman classes with Dhal as an example of the contemporary theory of democracy, acknowledges the existence and necessity of heterogeneity, he still maintains that consensus is the goal and places the stability of the system at the hierarchical apex such that ‘limited participation and apathy have a positive function for the whole system (of democracy) by cushioning the shock of disagreement, adjustment and change’ (Pateman, 1975, p.7). Participation then is seen as a possible arena of conflict and, given the primacy afforded to stability and consensus in contemporary theories of democracy, it is to be

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42 Pateman notes that Berelson does not name the theorists he refers to as ‘classical’
minimised, ‘the amount of participation that actually obtains is just about the amount that is required for a stable system of democracy’ (ibid., p.7).

Referring to Dahl’s classic text on democracy, Pateman (1975, pp.8-10) highlights the narrow interpretations and limited roles assigned to equality and participation which continued to dominate what she calls contemporary theories of democracy. In contemporary theories, equality refers primarily to suffrage and an equal right to vote, and participation is limited to the use of this right to vote to participate in the choice of representatives. There is also an unacknowledged normative aspect to contemporary theories, specifically with regard to Western democracy as the ideal, and the desirability of consensus and stability which as Pateman (1975, p.16) notes is not argued for.

‘Contemporary’ theories of democracy with their emphasis on suffrage and limited participation continued to dominate. The 1960s saw a well acknowledged and much written about surge in interest in participation, which saw people questioning the traditional elitist models of mainstream contemporary democratic thought and practice. The theories developed during this period still have import today. There was a new energy to political debates regarding people’s ability to affect decisions which impacted on their lives. There was a call to be able to participate in much more than the election of representatives. The debates were accompanied by protest groups and social movements led predominantly by students. Public dissatisfaction with the lack of influence they had over issues and decisions affecting their lives forced participation back onto the political agenda. The text of
Arnstein (1969), explored below, and that of Pateman (1975), noted above, were written in the 1960s and 1970s when these movements were at their most vocal. Despite recent developments in our understanding of participation, these texts explore the origins of the contemporary debates. In addition, Arnstein is still used by many in British local government and national government when it comes to implementing participatory practices and policies, and as such still has influence on policy formation.

The Port Huron Statement (Students for a Democratic Society, 1962) is a good example of the more radical ideas developing around participation at this time. Although arguably more radical than most of the population, the student movements of the 1960s did raise the issue of participation into the consciousness of the general population. The movements were conspicuous and impacted upon the feelings and views of everyday people, which obviously had an impact on political parties competing for their votes, during the 1960s and in the decades that followed. The Port Huron Statement speaks of democratic ideals and specifically mentions the need for greater active participation in democratic institutions. It displays a belief that participation, and not just suffrage as put forward by traditional (referred to as “contemporary” in Pateman 1975) minimalist elitist conceptions of democracy, is not only desirable but necessary for the existence of democracy. It called for a participatory democracy in which citizens were more active in political processes, and criticised the then current dominant political and economic structures and institutions for being managerial and
technocratic and (as they saw it) creating or reinforcing what they saw as problems within society. Not everyone agreed with the issues and the claims and statements made in the Port Huron Statement, and those that agreed did not necessarily feel strongly about them, but they nevertheless brought issues up for debate both among theorists, politicians and the general populations of countries. Obviously, the debates around participation were not brought about solely by the Port Huron Statement or the student movements, but they do serve to highlight the way in which traditional conceptions of democracy and participation were being challenged at this time. These debates continued and developed over the next few decades; demands for greater choice and greater voice persisted.

By the 1990s, there had been a noticeable shift in mainstream thinking from minimalist-elitist conceptions of representative democracy, where the masses are deemed incapable of acting in accordance with democratic principles for the greater good of society, and where mass mobilisations are seen as a threat to democracy, towards a view where the inclusion of the masses and the democratisation of all aspects of life is not just seen as desirable but necessary in order to address the crisis of representation and legitimacy faced by contemporary existing democracies. Calls for greater participation were now part of the mainstream agenda and no longer the preserve of social movements and left-wing thinkers and activists. There had been a recognition that elites are just as likely to act out of self interest as ‘the masses’. Elite democracy assumes that governing

43 It was particularly critical of inequality specifically with regard to the apartheid of the Southern States and for the use of the Cold War to promote apathy for politics at home.
bodies will adhere to democratic principles, but experience demonstrates they are just as likely to act out of self-interest as anyone else, thus undermining the argument that the masses cannot manage resources because they act out of self-interest. As it is possible that both elites and the masses act in this way, it becomes a common problem, and not one which is solved by handing over management to elite elected individuals or bodies. Acting out of self interest, and therefore contrary to democratic principles, cannot be eradicated by transferring governing to elites rather than the masses. An appreciation of the knowledge and abilities of the masses came from all directions, including a variety of political theorists, politicians and practitioners from across the theoretical spectrum. Hilary Wainwright (2003) 44 talks of mass sense, and Elinor Ostrom’s 2009 Nobel Prize-winning work 45 can be seen as an answer the tragedy of the commons, showing how mass management of resources is not only possible but also has many potential political and economic benefits. If old elitist notions are retained, then it makes sense to implement consultative forms of participation which act to validate and legitimise elite decisions, whereas if elitist conceptions are relinquished and the potential of the masses is admitted then more devolutionary forms of participation which actually hand over decision-making become appealing. Theories of representation, It was this book, along with connections forged through liberation theology, that were the inspiration for the very first PB process in the UK, which took place in Bradford in 2005. Bradford was done independently of the UK PB Unit; there was a correlation but not a connection (J. Hall, 2011, pers. comm., March 14th).

44 ‘Elinor Ostrom has challenged the conventional wisdom that common property is poorly managed and should be either regulated by central authorities or privatized. Based on numerous studies of user-managed fish stocks, pastures, woods, lakes, and groundwater basins, Ostrom concludes that the outcomes are, more often than not, better than predicted by standard theories. She observes that resource users frequently develop sophisticated mechanisms for decision-making and rule enforcement to handle conflicts of interest, and she characterizes the rules that promote successful outcomes’ (nobelprize.org).
and the necessity (or not) of elite representation, inform the forms which participation takes. Elitist conceptions of democracy reduce sovereignty to the choosing of governing bodies. Elitist arguments on democracy can be found in the work of academics like Schumpeter who argue that, once individuals have been elected, the involvement of the population in political action ceases. These Elitist notions are no longer dominant and are contested by more recent work on democracy and participation. Minimalist conceptions of representative democracy are being replaced by more participatory and deliberative ones.

In the 1960s, concern and interest around participation came mainly from citizens, but by the 1990s mainstream institutions were paying much more attention to participation and its potential. During the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, the UK and US, along with the big international development agencies, began to focus not just on the spread of democracy, as had been their previous focus, but also to the ‘deepening of democracy’. The titles of the Human Development Reports during the 1990s, and culminating in the 2002 report entitled ‘Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World’ (UNDP), clearly display the global interest in this area. The long-fought crusade to spread democracy across the world was accompanied at the turn of the century by a renewed surge to ‘deepen’ already existing democracies. Increasingly, the challenge now facing many countries is to develop institutions and processes that are more responsive to the needs of their citizens, especially the poor (UNDP, 2002). Deepening democracy, the buzzwords of the late 1990s and early twenty-first century, have become inextricably linked
with the notion of participation in one guise or another. Participation was a key element of the ‘good governance agenda’ developed in the 1990s by the major international development agencies.

By the turn of the century, the question of whether or not an increase in participation was desirable was off the agenda, and attention was on the differing forms of participation and their implementation. However, just because the desirability question was off the agenda, it is not clear that an underlying desire for stability had disappeared, and many tensions and conflicts seem to pass unacknowledged and or unresolved. Despite this, participation did come to be seen as a panacea able to address the deficits of democracy (particularly in terms of legitimacy, representation and apathy which may lead to the development of a ‘quiet authoritarianism’), as experienced by modern pluralist societies.

The term participation has been so overused that its meaning has been completely obscured and obfuscated. Additionally, in much of the literature, terms like participation and empowerment are used to explain, rather than themselves being explained or adequately analysed (Nederveen Pieterse, 1992, p.10). ‘The various

46 Many aspects of the good governance agenda became central to UK government policy and rhetoric as illustrated earlier in this project.

47 The term ‘quiet authoritarianism’ is used by Graham Smith, (2006) to illustrate the dangers of the deficits in democracy experienced in the UK. ‘The risk of quiet authoritarianism: The increasing failure of large sections of the population to engage with the political process may lead to a situation where governments are no longer effectively held to account. Over a period of time, this could encourage a gradual growth of ‘quiet authoritarianism’ in Britain where policy and law is made in consultation with a small coterie of supporters and with little reference to wider views and interests. Under such circumstances, the processes of democracy, including general elections, become empty rituals. The more critical commentators argue that this has already happened’ (Smith, 2006, p.35).
definitions of emancipation, liberation, participation and empowerment show a tendency towards circularity, one being defined in terms of the other’ (ibid., p.11). A more rigorous analysis of these terms, and an appreciation that in use they are far from politically or theoretically neutral, is necessary in order to assess the ways in which they may or may not deepen democracy.

The simplest possible definition of the verb participate could be ‘to share in something’ so participation would be ‘the sharing in of something’. This immediately raises questions: the sharing of what, by who, and how? More complicated definitions seem only to raise more questions. Work and debate on participation now generally adds an adjective to participation, as it has become clear that there are so many variants. This does not entirely clarify the issue because, as Nederveen Pieterse (1992), quoted above, argues, the accompanying adjectives, e.g. empowered or emancipatory, raise just as many questions as the term they attempt to qualify. Empowerment, for example, may be examined through several different levels:

increasing one’s authority and control over the resources and decisions that affect one’s life. As people exercise real choice, they gain increased control over their lives. Other writers explore empowerment at the personal level, involving a sense of self-confidence and capacity; relational, implying ability to negotiate and influence relationships and decisions; and collective. (Sidorenko, 2006, p.2)
Despite the above noted complications with the qualification of participation, a typology is the simplest way to begin exploring the various meanings, even if a further exploration of the additional terms is also latterly required.

Around the same time as the student movements and protests, and their accompanying debates, Arnstein developed the first widely acknowledged typology of participation: Arnstein’s ladder. Arnstein’s simple typology has been much elaborated on, and much more complex typologies have been developed, but it remains a useful heuristic. The ladder differentiates between eight forms of participation and then classes them as nonparticipation, tokenism or citizen power.

A Ladder of Citizen Participation (Arnstein 1969) - Illustration 5
Arnstein drove straight to the heart of the matter: power. ‘[P]articipation is a categorical term for citizen power’ (Arnstein, 1969, p.216). Practices or theories centred around illustrating the way in which people’s opinions or desires are taken into account without providing people with the power to ensure their opinions and desires affect policies or processes are enabling techniques to ensure the maintenance of the status quo (ibid.). They function as tools of legitimation. The last two rungs of the ladder ‘have been contrived by some to substitute for genuine participation. Their real objective is not to enable to participate’ (Arnstein,
Participation proper only occurs when there is a transfer of power; the top three rungs of the ladder classed as displaying varying amounts of ‘citizen power’.

Despite neither analysing or suggesting solutions, Arnstein (1969) does note the main obstacles to achieving a shift in power both from those with more power and those with less or none. She identifies the main resistance from those with power coming from ‘racism, paternalism and resistance to power distribution’ (ibid., p. 217) and from those with less or no power as being ‘inadequacies of the poor community’s political socioeconomic infrastructure and knowledge base, plus difficulties of organizing a representative and accountable citizens group in the face of futility, alienation and distrust’ (Arnstein, 1969, p.217). While some, specifically racism, may have been more conspicuous issues in 1960s America, the problems she lists are still pertinent today. Alienation and distrust, often translated into apathy, are some of the deficits in democracy identified in the mainstream literature which a deepening of democracy, via assorted practices, seeks to address.

Forms of, and what legitimately constitutes, participation in politics or political participation are many and varied, from flash mobs to general elections; for example, Blaug (2002) has a much broader view of what may count as political participation than does Smith (2006). Some of what Blaug (2002) would classify as participation others would name as activism. There are differences between demanded and invited participation; for example, PB in Brazil was demanded by
social movements and activists, but has since become part of the formal political system and would now be considered invited. There is also a difference between declarative forms of participation, like marches, petitions, and die-ins, and participation as engagement with the state, whether it takes the form of consultation or joint policy formation. The concern here is with the formal participation of citizens in policy formulation and decisions within representative democracy and considering what the relationship is between participation and representative democracy. Despite the surge in interest around participation, its forms, roles, and potentials, for the most part people are not advocating that we relinquish representative democracy in favour of participatory democracy. Rather than attempting to render representative democracy more democratic, we should be looking to some hybrid form of participatory and representative democracy. There are some, for example Laclau (2002) for whom representative democracy is not simply the best but actually the only possible form of democracy. Others advocate hybrids, which are more often than not based on practical concerns around the possibility of participatory democracy on a large scale incorporating millions of citizens in national decisions. Representative democracy is and always has been predicated on the existence of the nation state. Despite changing and possible weakening, the nation state persists; it is, in fact, the nation state which often sets up and maintains many of these multinational arrangements. These changes and potential weakenings do, however, bring into question the authority of our representatives at both the local and national scale. This may be one of the factors motivating representatives’ drives towards greater participation i.e. a re-
legitimisation of their position and authority in new times. The nation state has
clearly undergone significant changes, however, despite these changes, it is still the
basis on which our representative democracies work and it does not look set to
disappear in the near future. The place of representative democracy based on
notions of the nation state is clearly debatable in the current globalised systems of
power. This is not, however, the focus of this chapter, save noting it as a possible
motivating factor for national representatives it is not explored; there is a wealth of
literature which does this. It is important to note it as a possible motivating factor,
as this suggests a particular goal which increasing participation may hope to
achieve. However, given it will not address root causes associated with shifts in
power, it will not be able to resolve the problem which is about the state and place
of the nation state in the contemporary world. Acknowledging it may have an
impact vis-a-vis the ability of participatory initiatives to meet particular goals, this
chapter focuses on the relationship between representative democracy and
participation within the nation state.

The aims and goals of an increase in participation are many and varied, they
include: the promotion of inclusivity, social cohesion, the legitimation of policy, the
gaining of information in order to enhance the efficiency of policies, the state’s
ability to be more responsive to the demands of the citizenry, and a desire to
deepen democracy and to reduce the responsibility of the state. In addition to
questions surrounding the role and function of participation, there are also
questions regarding who participates and why. Swyngedouw(2005) makes use of
Schmitter (2000) to highlight some of the issues surrounding who participates and why by distinguishing between:

Right-holders [who] participate because they are members of a national political community. Space-holders [who] participate because they live somewhere affected by the policy. Knowledge-holders [who] participate because they have particular knowledge about the matter concerned. Share-holders [who] participate because they own part of the assets that are going to be affected. Stake-holders [who] participate because, regardless of their location or nationality, they might be affected by change. Interest-holders [who] participate on behalf of other people because they understand the issues and [S]tatus-holders [who] participate on behalf of other people because they are given a specific representative role by the authorities. (Smitter 2000, no pagination, cited in, Swyngedouw, 2005, p.199)

The surge in participatory practices facilitates the examination of both stated objectives and also the way in which practices manifest and the actual effects they have. Smith (2005) identified 57 different democratic innovations around the world. He classified them as variously electoral innovations, consultation innovations, deliberative innovations, co-governance innovations, direct democracy innovations, and e-democracy innovations. Smith focuses on the importance and effect of institutional design. Technical and or institutional analysis more often than not focuses on outcomes, and has been associated with a desire for harmonious relationships between state and civil society. At the other end of the spectrum, there are those who focus on process rather than outcome. Much of the
development studies literature on participation focuses on issues of pedagogy, psychological development, and the capacities of citizens, rather than the design of practices. Participation is frequently associated with a relationship of resistance to and an antagonism towards the state, rather than cooperation with the state; it looks to the reform of society, often via a process of critical consciousness raising, rather than reform of institutional spaces and practice.

What perhaps sets the ascendancy of participation apart from other co-opted development concepts are its radical roots. Arising from the emancipatory pedagogy of Paulo Freire, the Marxist-oriented school of Participatory Action Research (PAR), the principal objective of the participatory paradigm was not development – or ‘poverty alleviation’ – but the transformation of the cultural, political, and economic structures which reproduce poverty and marginalisation. ‘The basic ideology of PAR’, according to Mohammed Anisur Rahman (1993:13), ‘is that a self-conscious people, those who are currently poor and oppressed, will progressively transform their environment by their own praxis’. Or, in more Freirean terms, development can only be achieved when humans are ‘beings for themselves’, when they possess their own decision-making powers, free of oppressive and dehumanising circumstances; it is the ‘struggle to be more fully human. (Freire, 1970, p.29, cited in Leal, 2010, pp. 540-541)

Fung and Wright (2003) make their own contribution by elucidating on both their concept of Empowered Participatory Governance (EPG) and the conditions necessary for its realisation. EPG is, in their view, the model for meaningful participation. Fung and Wright’s (2003) ‘EPG, is a model of governance ...... that
seeks to connect a set of normative commitments for strengthening democracy with a set of institutional design prescriptions intended to meet that objective' (Shane, 2005, p.4). The authors identify ‘seven elements that characterize this kind of democratic process; the first six concern aspects of the internal design of empowered participatory governance institutions; the seventh concerns the importance the socio-political environment of such institutions which contributes to their robustness and stability’ (Fung and Wright, 2003, p.113). Before going on to explore these characteristics, it is worth noting that here we are already dealing with participation as inextricably linked with governance and, more importantly, democratic processes. This assumes participation is itself a political concept and can be used to realise a variety of political goals. This is not always the case as has been shown above.

The characteristics Fung and Wright (2003) give for EPG are: bottom-up empowered participation, pragmatic orientation, deliberation, devolution and decentralization, recombinant decentralization, state centered institutionalization and countervailing power. Although they stipulate that participation should be ‘bottom up’, they do not insist that it be ‘demanded’ (i.e. from those wishing to have more power) rather than ‘invited’ (i.e. institutions, in the case of this project local government, inviting those not participating to participate), a distinction that this project deems crucial. Fung and Wright’s (2003) pragmatic orientation characteristic insists the focus be on concrete problem-solving, where all involved have a common interest in solving the problem, but where there may also be
differences in desires about how it is solved, and many other areas not directly related to the common problem. Amongst others, arguments will be made for the necessity of difference in order for there to be real choice and therefore radical participation. This also relates to the issue of ‘demanded’ versus ‘invited’ mentioned above, vis-a-vis participants being invited to enter into already existing power structures versus their ability to challenge the very nature of existing structures and institutions; whether participation is about the insertion of the citizen into already existing systems and structures, or whether participation is about the ability and power of citizens to transform the systems and structures.

Recombinant decentralization, where central authorities both support and hold the local institutions accountable, begins to touch upon the complicated relationship between the central state and local government. This was elaborated on in this project with reference to the decentralisation policies implemented in the UK over the last few decades which also relates to Fung and Wright’s (2003) next characteristic, state centered institutionalization. This last form comes close to the idea of participation as insertion, an idea explored more fully in the second part of this chapter.

Although their focus is mostly on participation, Fung and Wright are amongst those who explore participation in terms of its relationship with democracy. The exploration of this relationship has led to a host of new terms including: empowered participatory governance (Fung and Wright, 2003) incumbent and
critical democracy (Blaug, 2002), expansive democracy (Gaventa, 2006), deeper democracy (most often found in policy documents), agonistic democracy (most often developments of an idea put forward by Mouffe), and deliberative democracy (most often developments of the idea put forward by Habermas). The projects for deepening democracy derived from these different theories are extremely different. Some claim that the way to deepen democracy is via the building and development of civil society, others through participation and participatory governance, others through the creation and development of deliberative fora (Gaventa, 2006). The radical democracy project of Mouffe (2000; 2005; 2013), developed out of her theory of hegemony, would suggest that the ability to form counter-hegemonies is crucial for participation if it is to function so as to deepen democracy. The next section will deal specifically with the relationship between participation and neoliberal representative democracy as the dominant hegemony of the day. The merits of Mouffe’s approach are made clear through the examination of this specific relationship. It brings to light the importance of hegemonic struggle, where the dominant hegemony may be contested and challenged by others, for the existence of a vibrant and meaningful form of democracy. This chapter attempts to make a distinction between participation-as-insertion and participation-as-transformation. Participation-as-insertion takes place within, and is run by, the dominant hegemony and does not afford space to question or challenge its ideology. Participation-as-transformation necessitates that there at least be the possibility to challenge and question ideology, systems and structures not just the policies conceived within them. The focus on Mouffe and
hegemony does not dismiss the other approaches but rather suggests that, whatever approach is taken, the importance and influence of hegemony should not be overlooked. Indeed, deliberative democracy, initially developed as an attempt to question and to revitalise dominant thought on democracy, may itself have suffered at the hand of the dominant hegemony; although in practice seems to have been co-opted into the mainstream.

Both the social movements of the 1960s and early 1970s and the so-called deliberative turn attempted to challenge traditional views of liberal representative democracy; they both questioned the minimalist suffrage-based concepts of participation. The deliberative turn also attempted to set out theoretical developments regarding the way in which we view the relationship between participation and democracy; it was also supplemented by a burgeoning literature on the institutional requirements for meaningful citizen participation in political decision-making processes. This literature, at least initially, tended to focus on the decision making process and the importance of deliberation within this process.

For a time, agonistic theorists were critical of deliberative theories for their inability to deal with conflicting views. Agonist theories criticised deliberative ones for an overbearing focus on, and desire for, consensus. However, as deliberative theories developed and looked to deal with these criticisms, Mansbridge et al. (2010) for example, the debate moved on. There is now far less dialogue between the two as, rather than criticising deliberative understandings for their lack of appreciation
regarding the plurality and inherently conflictual nature of the social, agonistic theorists turned their attention to other issues, including the nature of citizenship, for example, Tambakaki (2010) and Tully (2014). These new areas of interest for agonistic theorists tend to focus not on the institutional arrangements (and the ways they may or may not allow for dissensus) but broader issues concerning the context in which contexts determine the role and function of the citizen; the way in which the citizen is constructed, and the impact this has on democracy. The nature and shape of participatory practices are crucially, although not exclusively, informed by the form which the practice takes, institutional design, subjectivities of participants, and the environment in which all these take place; in short, it is overdetermined.

Conclusion

The place, role, aim and form of participation within democracy, then, are not new debates. At one extreme, participation is to be used as minimally as possible, that is, just enough to ensure the stability of the system. At the other extreme, it has an educative, psychological, emancipatory and democratic role and impact. Participation can be used to realise a variety of other goods too, for example, the provision of information for the more efficient and effective running of services, or the reduction (or at least change) in the role of the state. Despite the longevity of the debates, they seem to have recently gained a greater prominence than ever before, in that these debates are no longer the preserve of a few, but rather pervade all policy and debate and include a variety of actors from academics and
politicians to citizens and charities. Also, despite the almost universal agreement that participation is beneficial, many of the underlying tensions, not least the type and form of participation, remain unresolved.

PART TWO: Neoliberalism and Participation

5.21 Introduction

This section takes a more detailed look at the already noted recent trend in politics, namely the emphasis on participation. It asks what accounts for this trend? This chapter explores the changes in neoliberalism, what they are, what prompted them and the consequences they had in more detail. Was the emphasis on participation a development and mutation of neoliberalism? Drawing on the work of Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) it asks: is it a response to criticisms, contentions and challenges to neoliberal hegemony? Does it illustrate a triumph or a defeat of political struggles and social movements? What is the relationship between participation and representation and the consequences this has for understandings of the relationship between civic engagement and representative democracy? In addition, drawing on Part One of this chapter, it argues that there are important distinctions between participation as transformation, participation as inclusion and participation as insertion.
Drawing on and developing the arguments of Chapter Three, Part Two argues that the emphasis on participation reconfigures the traditional relationship between state and citizen in classical theories of representative democracy. This impacts on the role and function of both the citizen and the state. The emphasis on participation restructures state/citizen relations and the roles and responsibilities both accorded to and ascribed to each. Many have illustrated the way in which participation can be used as a rubber-stamping exercise to legitimate policy. Ultimately neoliberalism’s emphasis on participation does not just legitimise policy, it legitimises a particular type of citizen and a particular form of the state.

Where Chapter Three explored the advent of a more social democratic form of neoliberalism in the UK, here the focus is on the development of a more participatory form of neoliberalism. This development is, following the advances made by Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), understood as a reaction to criticism. Here the focus is on the criticisms and demands of the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s around greater civic engagement in politics, and demands for a greater voice (for the voices of repressed, marginalised and disenfranchised to be heard) and choice (freedom and autonomy) for citizens. It explores the extent to which these social movements were successful in terms of reforming the dominant order of neoliberalism and some of the ways in which neoliberalism delegitimised these demands by variously co-opting, subverting or neutralising them. It will be argued that, although the recent emphasis on participation can be seen as a partial success for some of these movements, for the most part it has functioned so as to
reinforce the hegemony of neoliberalism. The discussion below shows the way in which, in the past, participation was frequently associated with progressive politics, an association which does not hold with regard to the relationship between neoliberalism and participation. Neoliberalism has subverted the more progressive aspects of the demands of and criticisms made against it by new social movements in such a way as to divorce them from their progressive aspects. Neoliberalism’s emphasis on participation began in the 1990s and signified a shift in neoliberalism which re-articulated the role and function of both the state and the citizen and the relationships between the two. In order to be effective in their challenges, critique must respond to this new form, rather than remaining critical of a form that no longer exists.

5. 22 An appeal to Boltanski and Chiapello

Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) describe the way in which capitalism, the dominant order and prevailing common sense, has maintained its dominance and responded to criticisms lodged against it. Without using Gramscian terms, they describe the relationship between the dominant hegemony (for them capitalism) and counter-hegemonic demands and challenges (for them the artistic critique and the social critique).

To be sure Boltanski and Chiapello never use this vocabulary but their analysis is a clear example of what Gramsci called ‘hegemony through neutralization’ or ‘passive revolution’ to refer to a situation where demands which challenge the hegemonic order are recuperated by the
existing system by satisfying them in a way that neutralizes their subversive potential. (Mouffe, 2008, no pagination)

Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) outline the various ways in which the dominant hegemony may respond to criticisms lodged against it. The dominant order may variously and partially satisfy, subvert, displace or neutralise critique and the dominant order may be affirmed or disrupted by its opposition (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). Critique may function so as variously to challenge, to refashion or even to bolster the dominant order (ibid.). Following Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), delegitimation serves to strip old forms of their effectiveness, reform involves a positive improvement by incorporating some of the values in whose name it was criticised and displacement eludes the requirement of strengthening demanded by critique whereby ‘the old world at which critique was aimed disappears and a new world is created which is hard to decipher and therefore hard to critique at least in the first instance. (ibid., pp.28-29)

Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) detailed exploration and explanation of these mechanisms with regard to the relationship between capitalism and critique in France makes advances on Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. These advances may be used to further our understanding of the relationships between hegemony and counter-hegemony in different contexts; they provide a rich explanation for the

48 Both Mouffe and Boltanski acknowledge similarities in their approach vis-a-vis hegemony and counter hegemony; Boltanski focuses on the economic and Mouffe on the political (Boltanski 2015; Mouffe 2015).
continued dominance of hegemony in the face of significant criticisms. Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) illustrate the ways in which capitalism has been able to capture critique and make it work so as to reinforce it.

In their book, *The New Spirit of Capitalism* (2007) they bring to light the way in which capitalists managed to use the demands for autonomy made by the new movements that developed in the ‘60s, harnessing them in the development of a post-Fordist networked economy and transforming them into new forms of control (Mouffe 2013, p.72).

Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) highlight the necessity of opposition, not least in order to provide justification via constraint and the adaptability of hegemonic orders. They illustrate the importance of change and provide an account of domination via change. The mechanisms and concepts developed by Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) are here used to explore the continued dominance of neoliberalism (the dominant) hegemony and its interaction with criticisms (counter hegemonic movements) lodged against it, arguing that adaptations to neoliberal representative democracy are borne out of contestations and criticisms to it.

‘[H]egemony has come to be conceived as a ‘dimension’ of power of particular use to the analysis of contemporary societies where consent rather than force is the
normal mode of governance’ (Martin, 1998, p.166). Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) move from a notion of power maintained by force, à la Gramsci, to a theory where the reinforcement of power and ideas is a reciprocal relationship, and domination is secured by change which occurs as a consequence of the unending relationship between hegemony and counter-hegemony. Hegemony and counter-hegemony stand in a relationship of dynamic co-constitution. It is ‘spirit’ which they argue is the organising principle of the capitalist state. ‘This study of changes in the spirit of capitalism has revealed a major re-organisation in dominant value systems’ (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p.162). It is change that has enabled capitalism to maintain its supremacy. Chapter Three detailed the new political settlement put forward by New Labour which reconfigured state/citizen roles and relationships. This new settlement was shown to be a mutation and adaptation of the hegemony of neoliberalism; the changes which transformed neoliberalism into a more social democratic form of neoliberalism enabled neoliberalism to maintain its hegemonic dominance. Neoliberalism, like capitalism, underwent significant changes and it was as a consequence of these changes that it was able to secure and maintain its position as the dominant order. This is not domination by force or coercion so much as domination by change. Viewing domination as secured by change provides a rich account of the interactions between hegemony and counter-hegemony and also helps to explain the difficulties of forming an effective counter-hegemony. The road to salvation for capitalism is found in the criticisms it

49 Martin (1998) draws heavily on, and is faithful to, a Mouffian understanding of hegemony. This is important as the term has been/is used by a variety of authors who attribute a diverse set of properties and meanings to it.
faces (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2007, p.163). Here it will be illustrated that this is also the road to salvation for neoliberalism understood as the political counterpart to late capitalism. Not only are the demands of counter-hegemonic groups and movements absorbed or diffused as change occurs, but also the ‘new’ hegemony presents a new reality; a constructed contingent reality which masquerades as the (and therefore unassailable) reality. This means that successful movements first need to appreciate this contingency and then unpack and understand the nature of the new reality before they can effectively contest it. Not only does hegemony capture counter-hegemony, it also shifts the ground on which we live.

Echoing Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2007) description of capitalism, as the dominant order, neoliberal hegemony, is here seen as amorphous, adaptive, contingent, contested and defined/constructed by ‘other’ as well as defined/constructed by criticisms. The changing face of neoliberalism, here specifically referring to the birth and development of its more participatory manifestation, is seen to have enacted a passive revolution inasmuch as it was a revolution from above which was actually reform rather than revolution (Showstack Sassoon, 1987): ‘The process is therefore not literally ‘passive’ but refers to the attempt at ‘revolution’ through state intervention, or the inclusion of new social groups within the hegemony of a political order’ (ibid., p.210). Revolution tends to be associated with a radical break or rupture rather than reform. However, reformism may be considered a form of passive revolution (Showstack Sassoon, 1987, p.211). Of specific concern is Gramsci’s concept of transformismo ‘as one of the historical forms of ... passive
revolution’ (Gramsci, cited in, Hoare and Smith, 2005, p.295) which speaks directly to acts of cooptation and absorption, and relates to processes which exhibit a less radical break than is often associated with revolution. As noted by Mouffe (2008), it is these specific aspects and understandings of Gramsci which are echoed in the work of Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) and Boltanski (2011). The New Spirit of Capitalism (2007) also echoes the advances made by Laclau and Mouffe (2001) with regard to hegemony, and specifically the way in which ‘the hegemonic link transforms the identity of hegemonic subjects’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.xii) and that what is perceived as ‘the only natural or possible societal order, is the expression of a certain configuration of power relations’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.xvi). All societal orders are constructions, they are not given; they are contingent constructions, not necessary expressions, and these contingent constructions are always hegemonic. Exploring the work of Mouffe, Martin (2013) explains that ‘Dispensing with class as the essential agent of radical change, she [Mouffe] argues, Gramsci conceived hegemony as the generation of new subjective identity - a ‘collective will’ - and not simply the imposition of a class ideology’ (Martin, 2013, p.7). Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) explore capitalism as a form of common sense in a Gramscian sense (i.e. the Gramscian notion of ‘common sense’ is always the result of a given hegemony; ‘Common sense’ both literally, in that it is common and pervasive, and colloquially, in that we unthinkingly accept it as the way to be, the way to do something and/or our place within the world). However, this ‘common sense’ is contingent and constructed. The common sense of the day, capitalism for Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), and here neoliberalism (the political
counterpart to capitalism), is dictated by the dominant hegemony; it articulates a particular subjective stance which comes to be perceived as legitimate, objective and universal.

5.23 Participation: Its radical roots

As noted in Part One of this chapter, the 1960s saw a well acknowledged and much written about surge in interest in participation, which saw people questioning the traditional elitist models of mainstream contemporary democratic thought. In the 1960s, various social movements questioned the representative orientations of democratic theory, arguing that participation went beyond universal franchise and the equal right to vote. Vibrant political debates emphasised people's ability and legitimacy to effect decisions which impacted on their lives. They claimed that representation was elitist and minimalist and failed to acknowledge the role of the citizenry. There were demands that people be able to participate in much more than the election of representatives. Public dissatisfaction with the lack of influence they had over issues and decisions impacting their lives forced participation back onto the political agenda.

The idea that greater civic engagement would render democracy more legitimate, responsive and accountable inspired a new focus on political practices whose main orientation was the ‘deepening of democracy’ (UNDP, 2002). Elitist conceptions were being relinquished and the potential of the masses admitted, and more devolutionary forms of participation which actually hand over decision-making power become appealing. Deeply political and hotly contested, civic engagement
now enjoys widespread support from across the political spectrum. The question is, as Newman and Tonkens (2011) put it

whether new government policies on inclusion and participation, choice and responsibility, might be considered the crowning achievement of the social movements of the second half of the twentieth century or whether such policies ‘devoured’ the political energies and potential of such movements. (Newman and Tonkens 2011 p.198).

Various political struggles and social movements with a variety of differing claims can be identified in the UK. Newman and Tonkens (2011) separates the UK struggles into two broad categories: expansive and transformative struggles.

‘Newman and Clarke (2009) suggest that citizenship struggles can be understood as expansive or transformational. Expansive struggles focus on questions of access and inclusion to a more or less public realm of citizenship rights and entitlements. Transformative struggles seek to remake the relationship between the public realm and the ‘private’ realm of personal and domestic life, and to challenge structured forms of domination and subordination. Many social movements had a significant role in transforming the meanings and practices of citizenship, changing the public domain itself rather than simply demanding access to it and a voice within it, and in the process changing the boundaries between what are deemed to be public, private and personal matters.’ (Newman and Tonkens, 2011, p.15)

This echoes the distinction made in earlier chapters between ‘inclusion in’ and ‘transformation of’ the political sphere. Participation-as-insertion is concerned with specific issues whereas participation-as-transformation is concerned with the
conditions and relations which engender the issues in the first place. Insertion starts from assertions about the way the world is, globalised, complex and plural for example, and then sets out ways in which to navigate issues based on these assertions. Transformation operates on a different level where ‘the way the world is’ is not given, but contingent, and can always be otherwise. Insertion issues prescriptions based on the way the world is whereas transformation is concerned with the way the world should be. Participation-as-insertion can offer new channels for civic engagement understood as inserting more people into an already existing sphere, which at best broadens the sphere. Participation-as-transformation relates to a new or at least deeper sphere populated by new political subjects. However, as explored in Chapter Three, the way in which civic engagement was constructed by New Labour meant that citizens were incorporated into state discourse and included as citizens according to the specific understanding of citizen and citizenship (i.e., active and responsible) put forward by the state, rather than as political subjects on their own terms. This incorporation more closely resembles a form of insertion than inclusion. Inclusion suggests including more people, and possibly other actors like economic agents, in the democratic process. Insertion, on the other hand, is about the construction of a particular citizen, its nature and its roles and functions with regard to its relationship with the state, so that their insertion may reinforce the dominant hegemony project, in this case that of neoliberalism. Inclusion is not problematic per se; rather it is the manner of inclusion that is potentially problematic. Where inclusion tends towards insertion, rather than inclusion as expansion, it will likely simply reinforce the dominant
hegemony. Participation-as-transformation entails reconfiguration of the political sphere, the construction of a new political subject for, and a departure from, traditional minimalist understandings of the nature of democracy itself. The social movements of the 1960s and 1970s were challenging the dominant hegemony, they were demanding an expansion of the political sphere, and they were demanding a broader and deeper form of political subjectivity for citizens.

Neoliberalism’s appropriation of participation strips it of its normative content (Leal, 2010). It has come to function as a politically minimal management tool, that inserts participants into existing structures, rather than a part of political struggles aimed at challenging the status quo.

For participation to become part of dominant development practice, it first had to be modified, sanitised, and depoliticised. Once purged of all the threatening elements, participation could be re-engineered as an instrument that could play a role within the status quo, rather than one that defied it. Co-optation of the concept depended, in large measure, on the omission of class and larger social contradictions....

‘liberated’ from their transformative elements, are still, in fact, political, since they inevitably serve to justify, legitimise, and perpetuate current neo-liberal hegemony. As such, by having been detached from its radical nature, participatory action was consequently re-politicised in the service of the conservative neo-liberal agenda... (Leal, 2010, p.95)
The quote above begs the question: What exactly do we wish to participate in? Can we continue to accept a form of participation that is simply added on to any social project, i.e. neo-liberal modernisation and development... Or should participation be re-located in the radical politics of social transformation by reaffirming its counter-hegemonic roots? (Leal, 2007, pp. 543-546).

Issues and decisions are the objects of participation as insertion. Socioeconomic conditions and relations are both the subject and object of participation as transformation. Participation-as-insertion can be applied as a technique or tool for decision making about specific issues and or policies. As insertion, participation is concerned with the finding of answers to problems; participation-as-transformation is concerned with transforming the political sphere and its relationship with the state. Insertion is concerned with problems that arise out of the system, transformation is concerned with the nature of the system which creates the problems. Rather than addressing inequalities created by the existing economic and social systems and relations, neoliberalism emphasis on participation looked to create easier access to those structures. For example, as Chapter Three detailed, exclusion, poverty and inequality were not seen as a result of the economic or societal hierarchies inherent in neoliberalism, but as due to the inability of marginalised individuals to take part in these hierarchies. People were to be helped and encouraged to take part in systems that had been, at least in part, responsible for that very lack of social capital, and not to participate in their own governance but to be complicit in their own exclusion.
Citizens may be the objects and or subjects of policy. As objects, they are ascribed specific roles in the formation of policy. They are objects inasmuch as they are essential elements of policy formulation. They are to be included as essential to the function of participation as insertion. Citizens as subjects of policy are the authors of policy rather than instruments of its formulation. Where citizens are the subjects of policy formulation, i.e. they are not inserted into existing structures and systems, but rather have at least the possibility (exercised or not) of challenging the current systems and structures. The reformulation of the state/citizen relationships and their roles explored in Chapter Three suggests that citizens may have become subjects of policy but only partially.

They become (at best) subjects of policy, but not subjects of social determination. The policies that they are allowed to influence are located within an unquestioned and unquestionable context of capitalism, of private property and profit and all that flows from that. (Holloway, 2011, no pagination)

Political struggles may have been successful in their demands for greater inclusion but less so in terms of demands to transform the political sphere. They may have won the right to play the game but they did not succeed in changing the rules of the game itself.

Newman and Tonkens (2011) neatly illustrate the ambivalence vis-a-vis the struggles of social movements’ demands for greater participation and changing conceptions of citizenship. They outline the ways in which the emphasis on
participation contained within it new constructions of the notions of ‘citizen’ and ‘citizenship’, and how this can be seen as both a success and a subversion leading to neutralisation of these movements and their demands.

There are valid reasons to argue that active citizenship can be considered a response to such claims, and as such represents the crowning achievement of the work of new social movements. Many issues that a few decades ago were considered private and thus hardly issues of public deliberation have been brought into the public domain. Governments have come to recognise the importance of citizen participation and choice, ... ‘Choice’ and ‘empowerment’ have often become seamlessly coupled, ... New issues as well as new topics have been included as issues of public importance, and citizenship itself – its inclusions and exclusions as well as its rights and duties – has become the focus of extended political attention (Newman and Tonkens, 2011, p.10).

From a different perspective [W]e might suggest that active citizenship is not the triumph but rather the ultimate disowning or even devouring of social movements. The term active citizenship itself is an invention of policymakers, and the ideals of social movements, it can be argued, have been appropriated and adapted for policy purposes, leading to new strategies of responsibilisation or incorporation. That is, the idea of active citizenship is used to discipline rather than liberate and empower citizens. (Cruickshank, 1990, no pagination, cited in, Newman and Tonkens, 2011, p.10)
Neoliberalism has been able to minimise or to neutralise threats to its dominance through both state intervention and the inclusion of new social groups. Other tactics included making concessions, which importantly did not disrupt the overall ideology or goals of neoliberal ideology, to aggrieved and dissatisfied groups. In addition, it co-opted demands and ideals potentially harmful to it in such a way that they came to bolster and support the dominant ideology rather than threaten it. Neoliberalism is revealed as elusive, and sometimes contradictory and/or paradoxical. It defies definition as it is not static and cannot be pinned down; it is inherently dynamic, changing, adapting and reacting. There may be common aspects among many forms of neoliberalism. Whatever similarities and differences the different forms may have, all of them continually mutate. The policy and practice of neoliberal governments are informed not just by underlying principles but by oppositional claims. These oppositional claims are variously subverted by neoliberalism or manage to reform it in some way.

Chapter Three sought to illustrate the development of a new construction of the relationship between the state and the electorate, where the electorate are not simply passive recipients of state policy and rhetoric and, if not active, then are at least complicit in the reproduction of dominant ideology and power structures. In fact, the emphasis on greater civic engagement encouraged citizens to become involved in material practices that would reinforce ideology and policy.

The active citizen is invited, cajoled and sometimes coerced to take on a range of responsibilities for the self, for the care of others and for the
well-being of communities. S/he is offered a range of opportunities to participate in a devolved and plural polity as well as to exercise choice in the expanding marketplace of care and welfare services. (Newman and Tonkens, 2011, p.9)

Neoliberalism’s emphasis on participation did promote and open new avenues to facilitate greater civic engagement. However, the recognition and inclusion of previously excluded or marginalised groups and voices were legitimised only when expressed as a particular citizen - the responsible and active citizen. Rather than the claims and identities gaining legitimacy in their own register, they are assimilated into new constructions of the citizen, and it is via their rearticulation in a discourse of the responsible and active citizen that their legitimacy and inclusion is secured. Newman and Tonkens (2011) illustrate the way in which the focus on ‘active citizenship’ entails ‘a focus that transforms older meanings of citizenship and that seeks to incorporate (or at least rework) older struggles’ (ibid., p.9).

Gramsci famously articulated the way in which dominant ideology can and will adapt to threats and demands made to and of it. However, the goal is not to meet these demands so much as to neutralize them, which may include granting certain concessions, in order to secure its continued dominance. ‘Political projects such as the ‘Third Way’ or the ‘radical center’ clearly express this ideal of creating a state apparatus sensitive to some extent to social demands, but which operates as an instrument of demobilization’ (Laclau, 2001, p.3). The shift from the neoliberal hegemony of the 1980s to a Blairite form, a more participatory social democratic
form of neoliberalism, is here understood not as a fundamental ideological shift away from neoliberalism, or any fundamental changes in principles, but rather as neoliberalism adapting to demands to ensure its continued dominance. This, again, is not domination by force or coercion so much as domination by change.

While enabling new forms of participation and articulating the state–civil society relationships in potentially democratising ways, there is also a flip side to the process. To the extent that new governance arrangements rearticulate the state-civil society relationship, they also redefine and reposition the meaning of (political) citizenship and, consequently, the nature of democracy itself’ (Swyngedouw, 2005, p.1991).

The recent emphasis on participation has shifted the sphere of politics away from the state and towards the social. Noting the shift in focus from the proper role and function of the state to the proper role and function of the citizenry, we should be wary of theories and policies based on and justified by ‘sociological claims about the novel condition of contemporary society...[rather than] moral claim[s] about the nature of society and the distribution of resources’ (Finlayson, 1999, p.271). The former being characteristic of governance-beyond-the-state and tend towards the depoliticisation of essential political issues. It warns against a trend that displays a lack of attention paid to the state, its role, its function, and as the site of political struggle. Mouffe (2005) connects the move to a politics ‘beyond left and right’, the explicit aim of Third Way politics, with the shift from government to governance and the associated shift from political and normative debates about the way things
should be to discussions of technical solutions to specific problems based on claims about the way the world is, claims which are put forward as beyond dispute.

Today many politicians and their ideologies have removed the politics from ‘politics’. There are no longer ‘left’ or ‘right’ policies but only ‘good’ and ‘bad’ policies implemented by technocratic administrations; ‘the unchallenged hegemony of neoliberalism represents a threat for democratic institutions’ (Mouffe, 2000, p.6).

Her concern is that we now live in a post political (and therefore post democratic) climate. The argument here is that while participation may have the ability to have positive democratic impact it will not necessarily do so. The stronger claim being that the recent emphasis on participation within contemporary neoliberalism may have realised some goods but far from enhancing democracy it has, in many ways, actually served to diminish democracy in that it serves to reinforce a hegemony which prohibits the possibility of alternatives.

Noting the progressive and radical roots of demands for greater participation, whether in deliberative theory or in the demands and practices of social movements, neoliberalism’s emphasis on participation is understood as a reaction of the dominant hegemony (i.e. neoliberalism) to criticism (i.e. counter-hegemonic movements in both theory and practice). Neoliberalism’s incorporation of participation stripped it of its more progressive and radical elements; participation
came to be about inserting citizens into systems and structures rather than a vehicle for citizens to challenge the systems and structures themselves. This section has explored the journey of participation from being part of radical critique to becoming a mainstay of orthodox policy. The growing emphasis on participation is revealed as a process of discursive re-articulation of existing discourses and practice. The question of hegemony is always about articulation and disarticulation of existing symbolic material (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001; Mouffe, 1979; 1988). This process may be progressive but is not necessarily so (Mouffe, 2011).

5.24 The social construction of reality

For Gramsci, ‘hegemony was conceived as an ongoing struggle to define the world in accordance with dominant groups and classes’ (Martin, 1998, p.166). For Boltanski (2015), there is a continual struggle over symbolic domination in order to define the world where we willingly commit acts of symbolic violence in order to secure semantic safety in a chaotic and messy social life which is fragile and contradictory. Based on the contingency of reality, Boltanski (2011) explores the way in which we are presented with a necessity that is not a necessity, i.e. created and maintained by institutions and society which are in fact contingent. He explores the way in which this presented necessity appears not to be constructed and maintained by institutions, but appears to be given (Boltanski, 2011). This reflects Laclau and Mouffe's (2001) discourse theory reading of Gramsci where the construction of hegemony is a form of non-necessary necessity which appears as the reality rather than one contingent reality amongst many. For Boltanski (2015),
everyday actors are not brutalised but appeased by a too real reality and critique struggles to get a grip on reality, because reality appears as not institutionally created.

Chapter Three illustrated the way in which state discourse created a new political settlement which contained new roles and responsibilities for the state and the citizenry. The Third Way, perhaps the most dominant form of social democratic participatory neoliberalism, explicitly presents us with a new reality. It constructs the proper role and function of the State and citizen/citizenry. It presents us with a contingent construction of ‘the common good’ and ‘the people’ which masquerades as a necessity. The nature and form of participation asserts roles and responsibilities, for the state and the citizen/citizenry and is thereby constitutive of the relationship between them. In doing so, the articulation of participation contains within it a claim on the position and the meaning of citizenship and thereby the very nature of democracy. Various conceptions of participation are then not only a description of various ways in which citizens may (or may not) be involved but are also determiners of and/or determined by specific ontologies and normative claims.

For the anti-essentialists, the mediation of representation is inescapable; we cannot escape representation, and representative democracy is not second or even the best but rather the only possible form of democracy, for example, Laclau (2000). ‘The people’ and ‘the will of the people’ are constructed out of a process of
representation (Laclau, 2000). Participants are constituted through a process of representation; it is through a process of representation that identities and groups are formed on behalf of which claims and interests can be expressed (ibid). ‘[P]olitico-hegemonic articulations retroactively create the interests they claim to represent’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001, p.xi). It is through this process that the represented is brought into existence. This undermines the idea that participation is superior to representation. Participation cannot enable a more direct and immediate way of expressing the will of the people than representation as participation is itself a form of representation. ‘The elimination of all representation is the illusion accompanying the notion of a total emancipation’ (Laclau, 2000, p. 143). Dismissing appeals to immediacy, the anti-essentialist argument reveals the constitutive nature of representation, that is, it denies that identities and demands are out there somewhere to be revealed, but rather they are constituted by a process of representation.

The function of the representative cannot be purely passive, transmitting a will constituted elsewhere, but that it has to play an active role in the constitution of that will. And so the name representing that collective will is never the passive expression of any previously achieved unity. On the contrary, the name retroactively constitutes the very will that it claims to represent....

That is why representative democracy is not a second best, as Rousseau thought, but it is the only possible democracy. Its insufficiencies are actually its virtues, as it is only through those insufficiencies that the visibility of the gap between universality and particularity — without
which democracy is unthinkable — can be recreated. (Laclau, 2000, pp. 144-145)

One consequence of this is that, in order to have greater meaningful participation, we actually need more representation. If we could express our will directly, that is through participation, then we would no longer need representatives but rather administrators and managers. Politicians have abdicated their responsibility to represent ideology, principles and crucially ‘the people’ and ‘the common will’.

The question is not ‘more or less participation?’ nor is it ‘participation or no participation?’ but rather ‘what form of participation will have a positive democratic impact?’ Democratic politics is about groups, group claims, and group interests; it is about the formation of ‘the people’ and ‘the collective will’. Democracy cannot function on the basis of individual claims and preferences; it is predicated on some idea of a community. In democratic politics, these groups are represented by representatives. The plurality and diversity of contemporary societies are not adequately represented either in terms of quality or quantity. The quality of our existing political representatives is lacking, at least in part due to them remodeling themselves as managers of individual preferences, preferences which are revealed to them via the introduction of a host of participatory practices to facilitate greater civic engagement. If we could express our will directly, that is through participation, then we would no longer need representatives, but rather administrators and managers. Politicians have abdicated their responsibility to represent ideology, principles and, crucially, ‘the people’ and ‘the common will’. They now present
themselves as managers capable of, and ethically responsible for, implementing the policy choices of the individual. Not only is this not possible, but it also makes a mockery of representative democracy. We are left with a representative democracy in name but without representatives. In terms of quantity, what is represented is limited and does not adequately reflect the ideas, aims, claims and views associated with contemporary plural and diverse societies; this limitation is due in great part to the prevailing common sense of neoliberalism, which delegitimises, neutralises and/or co opts alternatives. Third Ways are particularly well placed to do this as, having placed itself in the middle of the political spectrum, it can more easily appease demands from both Left and Right than others towards either end of the spectrum. Neoliberalism's emphasis on participation is revealed as a process of discursive re-articulation of existing discourses and practice. The introduction of participatory practices means that citizens are not simply complicit in the hegemonic project but actively reinforcing it via material practices.

5.25 The crisis of representative democracy

More than desirable or justifiable, participation was regarded as a political antidote to address the crisis of representation and legitimacy faced by contemporary democracies. Representative democracy may be in crisis, but is this a crisis of representative democracy itself or a crisis of the current institutions of representative democracy? If it is the former, then the answer would seem to lie with theorists like Hardt and Negri (2004) and social movements like the
Indignados, who advocate a withdrawal from, rather than engagement with, representative democracy. However, if we accept the above argument that representative democracy is in fact the only possible form of democracy then the solution would seem to lie in a reconfiguration of the current systems of representative democracy. Many have suggested that the introduction of greater civic engagement will have a positive democratic impact and that this is the way to reconfigure representative democracy, address the crisis and render representative democracy more democratic. However, the above illustrates that representation is a prerequisite for participation which undermines the idea that we can express our will and preferences directly which is one of the biggest arguments for participations ability to enhance representative democracy. Mouffe (2000; 2015) has argued that as a consequence of a post-political landscape ushered in by Third Way thinking and politics, many groups no longer feel represented.

If the crisis of representative democracy is understood as a crisis of representation (i.e. citizens no longer feel represented by their so called representatives) then this would suggest that the solution to the crisis is to increase representation in terms of both quality and quantity. For the most part social movements, theory and policy now all believe that giving greater voice to citizens will have a positive democratic impact. However, questions remain about the best way for these voices to be heard, i.e. directly or via representatives. The above discussion suggests that simply adding more participation to representative democracy is unlikely to have a deep democratic impact. Rather we need to be thinking about the system of
representative democracy as a whole and the relationships between representation and participation.

**Conclusion**

Various authors have explored the way in which ‘the intellectual projects and political struggles of the Left in the second half of the twentieth century... have become complicit to the agenda of neoliberal capitalism’ (Azmanova, 2012, p.1). The second part of this chapter argued that participation has suffered a similar fate. In order for participation to maintain its critical edge and political potency, both in theory and in practice, the term must be reclaimed and its relationship with representation be acknowledged and explored in more detail.

Neoliberalism’s turn towards participation is understood as a reaction of the dominant hegemony (i.e. neoliberalism) to counter-hegemonic movements in both theory and practice. Neoliberalism’s incorporation of participation stripped it of its more progressive and radical elements; participation came to be about inserting citizens into systems and structures, rather than a vehicle for citizens to challenge the systems and structures themselves. Neoliberalism’s emphasis on participation addressed a set of more traditionally left-wing contestations around citizen power and ability to make decisions. Participation was claimed as a tool to deepen democracy but the way in which it manifested tended to prohibit this. It subverted claims for participation and transformation by inserting more people in existing systems and structures.
If, as many argue, participation can help strengthen and deepen democracy, as it allows more groups to have more voice, it must be accompanied by an increase in representation. Participation is not superior to representation, nor should we be thinking of the two in terms of ‘either/or’. Representation is constitutive and inescapable. If we want more groups to have more voice we need to be thinking about ways in which these groups are constituted and represented.

Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) is a very detailed study of France but they suspect that what they uncovered is part of a more general trend (Boltanski, 2002). This project has focused on the UK but again it is likely that UK is an example of a general trend, geographical differences will impact on specifics but the trend remains the same. Clearly this could only be confirmed by an in depth study of other countries. The theory aspect of the importance of hegemony and its relationship with counter hegemony is obviously not France or UK exclusive.

**Conclusion**

This project has told the story of the inception of PB in Brazil and its subsequent translation to the UK. Emerging from the demands of a diverse set of social movements in 1970s and 1980s Brazil, PB became a formal process. It was part of a new way of governing, emerging in Brazil as the country transitioned from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. Taken up and championed by the PT, the
development of PB within Brazil was inextricably linked to the ways in which the PT evolved and especially the party's transition from social movement to a political party. PB in Brazil developed and matured into a process that was attractive to a broad range of diverse actors. This matured process, no longer rooted in the political demands of left-wing social movements, was a relatively neutral process. It made only the minimal demand that citizens be given some say in budgetary decisions. This is minimal compared to PB's radical roots. The idea that citizens should be more involved in what was previously the exclusive domain of the state had become commonplace, but that citizens should have a say in financial decisions was a specific form of citizen involvement which went far beyond traditional methods of consultation, and was also a step beyond even the more progressive ideas around citizen involvement at the time. The development and maturing of PB within Brazil coincided with more general trends in thinking. The two were inextricably linked. There was a growing appreciation and acknowledgement, in theory, policy and practice, of ‘the knowledge of the masses’ and there was increasing recognition of potential goods, both political and economic, that could be achieved through greater citizen involvement; by the start of the twenty-first century, these had acquired the status of common sense. This lead to the development of more social democratic forms of representative democracy. The economic orthodoxy of neoliberalism was accompanied by a political orthodoxy of social democratic representative democracy which emphasised the importance of greater citizen involvement. It was into this climate that PB was translated into the UK. In Britain, PB and other participatory initiatives
do illustrate an alternative form of governance and do go some way to creating a new form of relationship between the governed and the governors. However, unlike PB in Brazil, PB in the UK did not influence or change the narrative around participation but rather was incorporated into it.

In the telling of this story several arguments were tested and developed: 1) participatory practices are overdetermined; context is an important determining factor 2) participation can take many forms and attention needs to be paid to acute differences in kind in both theory and practice, 3) a triangle can help illustrate the attractiveness of PB and aid general categorisation of the myriad processes which go under the name of PB and 4) greater attention needs to be paid to the relationship between participation and representative democracy; it may be true that it is greater representation that is required, and that participation is not a panacea.

1. Participatory practices are overdetermined

There are many factors, not least institutional design, that determine the shape and form practices take and the associated potential they hold. The discursive environment of their operation also affects their potential and will have an impact on the design process itself. This project explored two particular contexts in Brazil and the UK. It looked at the specifics of these contexts. The discursive environment of the UK was particular, but it was also emblematic of more general trends. While the specifics will differ, it is likely that similar observations could be made in
different countries, particularly in Europe and the US, which bear more general resemblance to the UK than either China or Africa. Whatever the particularities, context matters, and it will have a determining impact on participatory practices. While here only PB was investigated, the same arguments could be made for any participatory practice. The concrete impact of context on any given practice will be case specific. Indeed the analysis here was restricted to just two, rather than all, UK processes. The difference in particularities vis-a-vis concrete practices is only likely to be magnified when the practices take place in different geographies and at different times.

2. Participation: Important differences in kind

There are many different types and forms of participation. Despite the relatively recent emphasis on it, there is a long history of thought and debate around aims and types of participation. It is not clear that the recent popularity of participation exhibits a resolution of old tensions. The types of participation put forward in theory and practice display important differences in kind. The main three forms explored here were transformation, inclusion and insertion. The emphasis placed on participation by the New Labour government tended towards insertion. Accordingly, PB in Manton and Tower Hamlets possibly exhibited some extension of inclusion, but ultimately they were forms of insertion and as such held minimal democratic potential. The recognition that participation may take the form of insertion is important because it illustrates and explains how, contrary to popular belief, participation can actually diminish democracy. Transformation, inclusions
and insertion certainly do not exhaust the types and forms of participation. There is a need for greater work on and understanding of the concept of participation itself.

3. A Triangle

In addition to arguing that we need to think more about participation, it was suggested that a triangle could help situate PB processes in relation to the Porto Alegre exemplar process. The triangle put forward is in no way meant to replace the more detailed and specific criteria for PB put forward by a variety of academics and practitioners. The triangle was borne out of a recognition and acceptance that many processes that call themselves PB simply do not meet even the most basic criteria. The triangle is simple and flexible. It helps us to understand not just the different forms a process may take but also why PB became so attractive to such a diverse range of actors. In order for the triangle to be of use, the meaning of the three corners, radical politics, resource distribution and neoliberalism must be made clear. The corners were understood in one way here, however, the definitions of all terms may be changed and used in other ways.

4. Participation and Representative Democracy

Having told the story of PB's translation to the UK, this project took a more reflective turn and looked at what the story could tell us about the relationship between participation and representative democracy. Despite the current
popularity of participation and concerns that representative democracy is in crisis, it
does not seem likely that representative democracy is going to disappear
completely any time soon. The relationship between representative democracy and
participation is complex; there is not, as some would seem to suggest, a simple
equation where ‘representative democracy + participation = deeper representative
democracy’. Nor is it a simple binary, i.e less representation and more participation
will make for deeper democracy. Indeed, Chapter Five illustrated the way in which
we cannot escape representation and that participation itself cannot occur without
prior representation. The so-called crisis is understood to be a crisis of the current
institutions of representative democracy, rather than a crisis of representative
democracy itself. As the diagnosis dictates the treatment, this suggests that we
need to look at, to understand, and to change the current institutions rather than
abandon representative democracy altogether. In order to render representative
democracy more democratic, we need to explore different forms of participation
and their relationship with the aims and goals of increased civic engagement.
These aims will have a determining impact on the design and implementation of
practices, which itself impacts on the democratic potential any given concrete
practice will have. There is a rich literature on representative democracy, and also
on participation, but the relationships between the two are still in need of much
more attention. Contestation itself is not a necessary requirement, but the
possibility of contestation is. As Mouffe (2005, 2013) cautions, without this
possibility we are at the end of politics and the end of democracy. We may now
have both vote and choice but effectively we still have no voice.
Currently political representation lacks both quality but more importantly it lacks diversity. Many no longer feel represented by our representatives, this is why we do not engage, and this makes the term representative a misnomer. It makes a mockery of representative democracy, as we no longer have representatives, but only managers of choices and preferences; these choices and preferences in turn are limited by the prevailing hegemony.
List of Interviewees

Full transcripts and/or recordings of formal interviews are available upon request.

Names are given when the interviewee gave permission and when the interviewee wished to remain anonymous letters are used.

Yves Cabannes  Emeritus Professor in Development Planning, University College London. He is an urban Planner and activist specializing in urban and municipal governance. He was senior advisor to the International Centre for Urban Management, CIGU, Ecuador, and the Municipality of Porto Alegre, Brazil (International Network on Participatory Budgeting and Municipal Finance).

Jez Hall  Member of PB Unit, Member of PB Partners and Member of CPI. Leading UK PB Practitioner

Shazia Hussain Service Head Culture, Learning and Leisure, Communities Localities & Culture, Tower Hamlets Partnership. Lead on the introduction, implementation and evaluation of PB in Tower Hamlets

Richard Edwards  Head of Mantons Pathfinder, Director of Manton Community Alliance, a Neighbourhood Management Pathfinder and lead in the planning, implementing and evaluating of PB processes in Manton. He is a founder
board member and trustee of the National Association for Neighbourhood Management.

Interviewee A  PB Partner
Interviewee B  Senior member of PB Unit
Interviewee C  Senior member of PB Unit
Interviewee D  Member of PB Unit
Interviewee E  Member of MCA. Involved in the planning, implementing and evaluating of PB processes in Manton
Interviewee F  Senior member 1 of Tower Hamlets Partnership Department of Communities Localities and Culture. Involved in the planning, implementing and evaluating of PB processes in Tower Hamlets
Interviewee G  Junior member Tower Hamlets Partnership Department of Communities Localities and Culture. Involved in the planning, implementing and evaluating of PB processes in Tower Hamlets
Interviewee H  Senior Member 2 of Tower Hamlets Partnership Department of Communities Localities and Culture. Involved in the planning, implementing and evaluating of PB processes in Tower Hamlets
Interviewee I  Senior Adviser at the Department for Communities and Local Government 2000 – 2006
Interviewee J  Senior Civil Servant. Senior member of The

Government Social Research profession (GSR)
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