Internal divisions and security cultures: the impact of Turkish membership on the European Union's foreign and security policies

Paula Sandrin
School of Social Sciences, Humanities and Languages

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INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND SECURITY CULTURES: THE IMPACT OF TURKISH MEMBERSHIP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES

PAULA SANDRIN

PhD 2013
INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND SECURITY CULTURES: THE IMPACT OF TURKISH MEMBERSHIP ON THE EUROPEAN UNION’S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICIES

PAULA SANDRIN

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

February 2013
Abstract

This thesis aims to assess, with the help of the concept of security culture, the impact that Turkish membership will have on the European Union’s foreign and security policies. It argues that any analysis of the impact of Turkey on the EU’s role as an international actor needs to take into account existing divisions within Europe and within Turkey in terms of security culture. Neither the EU nor Turkey is a monolithic actor when it comes to security understandings and preferences. This thesis argues that, due to the existence of a plurality of security cultures within Europe, EU member states can be grouped according to those supporting the project of a Global Power Europe, Humanitarian Power Europe and Minimum Power Europe. For its part, Turkey has two security cultures, which I have called “Republican” and “neo-Ottomanist”. This thesis argues that an assessment of Turkey’s impact on the role of the EU in the world stage must take into account the three existing normative approaches for the future of the EU (Global, Humanitarian, and Minimum Power Europe) and the characteristics of Turkey’s Republican and Neo-Ottomanist security cultures. After locating where Turkey’s security cultures sit in the broader picture of European security landscape, this thesis concludes that Turkish membership is unlikely to significantly alter the EU’s role in the international system. With or without Turkey, the EU will probably continue to resemble a Humanitarian Power in the world stage. This finding makes an important contribution to the literature by challenging the binary logic that pervades the discussion about Turkish membership in the areas of foreign and security policies and has important implications for EU policy towards Turkey.
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I declare that all the material contained in this thesis is my own work.
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<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Justice Party (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Motherland Party (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy (of the EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEC</td>
<td>Central and Eastern European Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPOL</td>
<td>European Police College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPS</td>
<td>Center for European Policy Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy (of the EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEIK</td>
<td>Foreign Economic Relations Board (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Left Party (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTP</td>
<td>Democratic Society Party (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defense Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighborhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy (now CSDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-3</td>
<td>UK, France and Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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1 All Turkish acronyms will remain in their original form, and only their English translation will be provided. For example, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) will appear above and throughout the text as Justice and Development Party (AKP).
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<thead>
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<th>Full Form</th>
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<td>Istanbul Chamber of Commerce</td>
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<tr>
<td>KRG</td>
<td>Kurdish Regional Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Nationalist Action Party (Turkey)</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>National Salvation Party (Turkey)</td>
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<td>MGK</td>
<td>National Security Council (Turkey)</td>
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<td>NDA</td>
<td>New Defense Agenda</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy (of the United States)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation (now OECD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC</td>
<td>Organization of Islamic Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5 + 1</td>
<td>Five permanent members of the UN Security Council (United States, China, Russia, United Kingdom and France) and Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee (of the EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOs</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RP</td>
<td>Welfare Party (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SETA</td>
<td>Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TESEV</td>
<td>Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty of the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIM</td>
<td>Turkish Exporters Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>Turkish Contractors Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOBB</td>
<td>Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSIAD</td>
<td>Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UND</td>
<td>International Transporters Association (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAK</td>
<td>International Strategic Research Organization (Turkey)</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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Introduction

This thesis’ main research question is “What impact would Turkish membership have on the European Union (EU) with regards to the Union’s foreign, security and defense policies?” To phrase it in a different way, would Turkey help the EU become a more relevant actor in the world stage in the areas of foreign, security and defense policies? Or would Turkish membership hinder the prospects of the EU becoming a more relevant international actor? Therefore, this thesis attempts to assess the impact of Turkish membership on the EU’s role in the world.

Turkey’s relationship with the European Union dates back to 1959, when the country applied for associate membership in the then European Economic Community (EEC). In 1963, an “Association Agreement”, aiming to integrate Turkey into a customs union with the EEC, was signed. Turkey first applied for full membership of the European Union in 1987, when its request was denied. Nevertheless, Turkey proceeded with a closer integration with the European Union by agreeing to a customs union in 1995. The country finally received candidate status in 1999 at the Helsinki European Council, and negotiations began in 2005.

In the discussions concerning Turkish membership of the European Union, many different arguments have been made to support or to oppose the acceptance of Turkey. The state of the Turkish economy, the religion followed by the majority of its population, and Turkey’s geographical location have all been used to either support or oppose Turkish membership. Supporters of Turkish membership argue that Turkey’s vibrant economy, young population, Muslim character, and ties with surrounding regions would be great assets for the European Union. Opponents of Turkish membership point to Turkey’s low GDP per capita, the possibility of an influx of migrants, its non-European culture, and its Middle Eastern borders to suggest that Turkey has no place in Europe. Among all the arguments in favor or against Turkish membership, the question of whether Turkey would enhance or undermine the EU’s role in the world stage has been gaining prominence.
For a group of people, including European supporters of Turkish membership, and Turkish officials, Turkey would significantly contribute to the EU’s soft and hard power. Turkey’s political, economic and cultural ties with the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia, its Muslim and democratic credentials, its proximity to energy resources, and its military capabilities would prove to be great assets to a Union which wishes to increase its influence in the world.

On the other hand, opponents of Turkish membership argue that, instead of helping the EU to become a Global Power, Turkey would actually imperil the European political project. Because of its size and specific characteristics, Turkey would cause the dilution of the European political project and the Union would be turned into just a free trade area.

Both assessments seem to provide simple answers to a complex question. I find it problematic to automatically assume that Turkey’s ties with the surrounding regions and military capabilities would be beneficial to the European Union. They would only be beneficial if the nature of Turkey’s ties with its neighborhood were considered positive by the European Union, and if Turkey was willing to work together with the EU. In addition, I question whether all EU member states view Turkey’s military capabilities as something useful, since some member states seem to have a view of world affairs in which the usefulness of military force is being questioned. Similarly, I question if all EU member states agree with what constitutes the European political project and if all of them subscribe to it.

A more nuanced approach to analyze the possible impact of Turkey on the role of the EU as an international actor is needed. This thesis aims to contribute to this debate by using the concept of security culture. I argue that any analysis of the impact of Turkish membership on the EU’s role as an international actor needs to take into account existing divisions within Europe in terms of security culture and divisions within Turkey. Neither the EU nor Turkey is a monolithic actor when it comes to security understandings and preferences.

Thus, the concept of security culture will be employed in this thesis as a tool to help identify Turkey’s understandings of itself and of Europe; Turkey’s understandings of its relationship with and place in Europe; Turkey’s
understandings of its relationship with and place in the Middle East; and Turkey’s views on how it should relate to Europe with regards to matters concerning the Middle East. It is important to inform at this point that this thesis is solely concerned with Turkey’s and EU’s member states security understandings and preferences with regards to the Middle East and North Africa. Although at some points in this thesis I will refer to other regions of the world, my investigations, descriptions and analyzes will concentrate on these two regions.

It will be argued that the EU, at the present time, has been unable to be a more relevant international actor because there are significant differences between EU member states’ security cultures. The existence of different national security cultures means that international situations are interpreted in different ways by member states, and different responses are envisaged to deal with them. As a result, the EU is unable to have a say in the most important international challenges of our time. In addition, these different security cultures generate three broad visions for the future of the EU as an international actor: Global Power Europe, Humanitarian Power Europe and Minimum Power Europe. The likely effects of Turkish membership vary depending on which of the three projects for the future of EU as an international actor is being considered. For its part, Turkey has two security cultures, which I have called “Republican” and “neo-Ottomanist”, vying for dominance. This thesis will then attempt to assess how Turkey would affect, given the characteristics of its security culture(s), each of these three different scenarios for the future of the EU.

This thesis will try to understand the possible contributions of Turkey to the EU via the concept of security culture for several reasons. First, as will become clearer in chapter 4, in order to understand why the EU is not a relevant international actor yet, it is important to point out to the different national security cultures existing in Europe, and how they lead to contending visions for the Union’s future. Second, the contributions Turkey can make to the EU in the areas of foreign, security and defense policy will depend on the characteristics of Turkey’s security cultures. I believe it is important to focus on Turkey’s security understandings, views and perceptions because material
factors alone (such as geographical location, economic performance, military capabilities) are not enough to help us understand how Turkey would impact on the EU, since these factors can be used in different ways, depending on whether one is in favor or against Turkish membership. Therefore, it is paramount to deepen the investigation in order to find out how Turkey views its relationship with the EU and the contributions it is willing to make. In other words, we are better placed to understand Turkey’s contribution to the EU in the spheres of foreign and security policies if we identify and characterize Turkey’s security culture(s).

The thesis will proceed as following:

In Chapter 1, I will review the literature concerned with Turkey’s impact on the EU’s relevance as an international actor in the spheres of foreign, security and defense policies, and give reasons why I find them problematic. In addition, I will introduce and define the concept of security culture, identify its strengths and weaknesses, justify its use as the analytical framework to study Turkey and explain the research designs and methodology employed.

Chapters 2 and 3 will deal with the origins and characteristics of Turkey’s security cultures. The analytical framework described in chapter 1 will be employed in order to understand how assumptions about what constitute insecurities and the best means to tackle them were constructed in Turkey. These chapters will investigate how certain historical experiences Turkey and its predecessor the Ottoman Empire went through were interpreted and propagated thus helping form certain identities, the corresponding natures of the others and the preferred and acceptable ways to relate to these others. In these chapters, it will be argued that although Turkey’s two security cultures – Republican and neo-Ottomanist – are different enough so that one can distinguish between the two, they also share many common traits. To focus on the common traits is important for two reasons. The first reason is that to identify the commonalities between Turkey’s two security cultures has not been done before in a systematic manner, and therefore, by doing so, this thesis is introducing a novel element on scholarly work on Turkey’s security and foreign policies. Second, some of these common traits are of fundamental importance if one is trying to understand how Turkey would impact on the EU.
In chapter 4, I will explore the multiplicity of security understandings co-existing in Europe and the different approaches for the future of the EU as an international actor they originate. This chapter will thus develop a taxonomy of the multiple security cultures co-existing within the EU in order to assess the likely impact of Turkish membership on the Union’s foreign and security policies. It will be argued that EU member states can be divided between those supporting the vision of a Global Power Europe, Humanitarian Power Europe and Minimum Power Europe. In order to illustrate and make sense of the various security cultures existing within the EU, and introduce Turkey’s own security understandings into the picture, in this chapter I will also analyze the EU’s, member states’ and Turkey’s responses to the conflict in Libya in 2011. Finally, this chapter will assess where Turkey’s two security cultures stand in this broader picture of European security cultures and consequently how the country will influence the role of the EU as an international actor.

By taking into account the plurality of security understanding within Europe and within Turkey, this thesis will conclude that Turkey’s impact on the EU’s role in the world should not be overestimated. The EU is likely to continue to resemble a Humanitarian Power in the world stage, with or without Turkey. This argument differs from most of the literature which assesses Turkey’s impact on CFSP, which will be analyzed in chapter 1. By challenging the binary logic that pervades the discussion about Turkish membership in the areas of foreign and security policies, this thesis will be making an important contribution to knowledge.
Chapter 1 – Literature Review and the concept of security culture

Introduction

This chapter will provide a review of the literature concerned with Turkey’s impact on the EU’s role as an international actor in the spheres of foreign, security and defense policies, including the literature which contrasts Turkey’s and EU’s security cultures and provide reasons as to why I find them problematic. In the second part, this chapter will introduce and analyze the concept of security culture. Several questions will be addressed. What exactly is security culture? Where is the concept located in the international relations discipline in general, and in security studies in particular? In the third section, the insights and critiques of the concept of security culture made by poststructuralist’ scholars will be introduced. Their insights will then be integrated and advanced in order to answer questions about the foundations of identity, the concept of security culture and how it is operationalized through foreign and security policies. In the final part of this chapter, I will make the case for the use of security culture as an analytical framework to study Turkey, explaining its usefulness; I will propose my own definition of the concept; and explain the research designs and methodology employed.

Literature review

The discussions about Turkey’s membership of the European Union involve many aspects. Arguments against Turkey include its low level of income per capita, its huge population (predominantly Muslim), its lack of democratic credential and its ill-treatments of minorities. Turkish membership would be problematic because, among other reasons, Turkey would have more votes in the Council because it would be the most populous member state by the time it joins and an influx of Turkish immigrants would inundate European cities, a scenario very disturbing considering the discussions about immigration and Islamic terrorism already taking place in some member states.
When it comes to Turkey’s contribution to EU’s relevance in the world stage, two different scenarios are contemplated. In the first case, Turkey is considered an asset, for several reasons. First of all, Turkey is already part of the European security architecture via NATO. During the Cold War, Turkey helped maintain stability in Southeast Europe and it served as a “bulwark” against the expansion of Soviet power (Aybet and Muftuler-bac 2000, p. 578). Turkey as a member of the EU would add to the EU’s hard and soft power capabilities (Muftüler-Baç 2009, p. 61). Turkey would contribute to the Union’s soft power because, by accepting a Muslim country, the EU would have its credibility and its ability to project its norms and values to its Southern borders enhanced (Muftüler-Baç 2009, p. 61). “Turkey’s endorsement of the European stand in world matters could bring legitimacy to the EU’s position in the eyes of non-Europeans” (Muftüler-Baç 2009, p. 66). In addition, Turkey could help bring about an understanding between European and Muslim civilizations (Muftüler-Baç 2009, p. 65). Furthermore, in other regions of the world, such as the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey’s linguistic and cultural ties would also prove to be beneficial for the EU. In terms of hard power, Turkey could increase the Union’s capability to act autonomously from the United States, if Turkey’s large number of troops (NATO’s second largest) was used in EU missions. In short, Turkey would enhance the capacity and the credibility of the European Union to act in the regions bordering Turkey.

This argument is often made by Turkish and European officials who are in favor of Turkish membership of the EU. According to this line of reasoning, without Turkey, the EU would be “an irrelevant Western peninsula on the Asian continent” (Bagis and Michel 2011, p. n/a). However, through enlargement, the EU can expand “not only geographically, but also politically, economically, culturally and socially. Enlargement is a mechanism that serves directly the emergence of the EU as a global power” (Bagis and Michel 2011, p. n/a). Thus, because of its economy, young population, Muslim character, proximity to energy resources, military capabilities and ties with the surrounding regions, Turkey “would provide the Union with the leverage for its ambition to become a global power” (Bagis and Michel 2011, p. n/a).
Similar arguments have been put forward in a report published by the Independent Commission on Turkey, a group composed of former European heads of state, foreign ministers and commissioners, chaired by Martti Ahtisaari, former President of Finland. While the report recognizes that “the accession of a country with the size and specific characteristics of Turkey would doubtlessly present the EU with substantive challenges”, it argues that these challenges are “by no means insurmountable” (Independent Commission on Turkey 2009, p. 7). It goes on to say that “the accession of a transformed, democratic and modern Turkey, a country in a unique geo–strategic position with great economic potential and a young and dynamic workforce, would bring considerable benefits to the European Union” (p. 7). These benefits include helping “manage and assist European interests in the Middle East and elsewhere” since “an EU-empowered Turkey could add Europe as a player to a region currently dominated by Russia, China and the United States” (p. 29). The report adds that “Turkey cannot solve any crisis or problem for the EU single-handedly, but without Turkey, the EU’s task in the region becomes a harder uphill struggle” (p. 29). The Independent Commission also argues that “Turkey’s full integration into Europe would not lead to further entanglement of the EU in dangerous situations in the Middle East and South Caucasus, but on the contrary enable it to better help solve these problems and to project stability into its volatile neighborhood” (p. 45). It concludes that “the unique geopolitical position of Turkey at the crossroads of the Balkans, the wider Middle East, South Caucasus, Central Asia and beyond, its importance for the security of Europe’s energy supplies and its political, economic and military weight would be great assets. Moreover, as a large Muslim country firmly embedded in the European Union, Turkey could play a significant role in Europe’s relations with the Islamic world” (Independent Commission on Turkey 2009, p.49).

In the opposite scenario, Turkey is considered to be a potential liability to Europe’s global relevance. This type of argument is connected to debates about widening versus deepening and the absorption capacity of the Union. It claims that enlargement can lead to the dilution of the Union. “We cannot go on enlarging forever. We cannot water down the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area in a continental scale” (Prodi
2002, quoted in Edwards 2009, p. 53). In addition, according to this other line of argument, Turkey’s history of problematic relations with neighboring countries (including Syria, Iran, Iraq, Armenia, Greece and Cyprus) would be “imported” by the Union. Therefore, instead of using Turkey as a bridge to reach out to the Middle East, the EU would be engulfed in conflicts it did not need to be involved (Buzan and Diez 1999).

Another type of argument takes into account the differences in security cultures between Turkey and the EU. Analysts such as Buzan and Diez (1999), Bilgin (2004), Oguzlu (2002), Desai (2005), Ruacan (2007), Oguzlu and Kibaroglu (2008) and Ustun (2010) point out that Turkey’s and the EU’s different security cultures may make Turkey a difficult partner in the construction of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy.

It is important to note the not all of the above analyses use the term ‘security culture’. Ruacan (2007), for example, uses the concept of ‘strategic culture’, which, as will be further explored below, is narrowly focused on issues of war and the use of force. Oguzlu (2002) writes about the incompatibilities of Turkey and EU security identities, and uses the terms ‘security culture’ and ‘security understanding’ interchangeably. Desai (2005) uses the terms ‘strategic culture’ and ‘security perspectives’, but does not focus exclusively on military issues. Oguzlu and Kibaroglu (2008) use the term ‘security culture’, but their analysis differs from most of the scholarship on security culture in that their view is that Turkey’s security culture does not stem from domestic sources, but from the influence of the external environment. According to the latter authors, Turkey is not entirely compatible with the EU’s security culture, (which they label as “Kantian”), because it is engulfed by the “Hobbesian” security culture of the Middle East. Buzan and Diez (1999) do not use any of the above terms, but contrast the EU’s post-Westphalian and Postmodern character and political identity, with Turkey’s modern character. Only Bilgin (2004) and Ustun (2010) use the concept of security culture as it will be employed in this thesis.

Below is a summary of the main features of EU and Turkey’s security cultures identified by these scholars:

EU’s security culture:
- Recognizes multiple referent objects of security (individuals, societies within states, fragmentation of the EU itself) and soft security threats, having therefore a broad conception of security (Bilgin 2004, Oguzlu 2002, Desai 2005, Oguzlu and Kibaroglu 2008);

- Avoids securitization of issues (using the language of security), represents conflicts as “normal” political issues (Bilgin 2004, Oguzlu and Kibaroglu 2008);

- Constructed a security community, which does not entail the use of force among its members, by fostering an integration process (Buzan and Diez 1999, Bilgin 2004, Oguzlu 2002, Desai 2005, Oguzlu and Kibaroglu 2008). Its member states were bonded in a network of interdependence in an attempt to make the recourse of military means to solving disputes more difficult; it represents a model of relations between states that goes significantly beyond the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention (Buzan and Diez 1999);

- Is a civilian-normative international actor (Oguzlu 2002), a “Post-Westphalian” project (Buzan and Diez 1999, Bilgin 2004) that is not concerned with security issues (which were NATO’s duties) although since the end of Cold War it has been trying to establish a Common Security and Defense Policy more independent from NATO and the United States (Bilgin 2004, Oguzlu 2002, Desai 2005). Nevertheless, this evolution into an international actor with a military logic is modest. Moreover, the EU usually employs development aid as a means to root out the causes of instability and prefers dealing with threats through negotiation, consensus building and engagement, not containment. Therefore, it prefers to employ soft security measures and civilian means (Oguzlu 2002, Desai 2005, Oguzlu and Kibaroglu 2008, Ustun 2010).
Turkey’s security culture:

- Territorial integrity and the secular, homogenous features of the nation-state are the main referent objects (Bilgin 2004, Oguzlu 2002, Desai 2005);

- Culture of insecurity, in which many issues, internal and external, are viewed through the lens of security (Bilgin 2004). Realist security culture, characterized by defensive realpolitik, justified in terms of its geographical location in an unstable region. The anarchical external environment is used to justify its foreign and security policies (geographical determinism – the idea that Turkey is besieged by internal and external enemies) (Bilgin 2004, Desai 2005);

- The security culture is military-focused and state-centric. Although “soft” security threats, such as terrorism and drug-trafficking, were included in Turkey’s agenda, they are still approached from a national security perspective (Bilgin 2004). It is a “hard security actor” (Oguzlu 2002, Desai 2005, Ustun 2010), with sovereign sensitivities, unwilling to have its sovereignty and independence undermined and with a low level of tolerance to interference in its domestic affairs (Buzan and Diez 1999, Ustun 2010). It still values the threat or the use of military force beyond its borders to counter threats considered fatal to its national security (Oguzlu 2002, Desai 2005).

To sum up, Turkey is characterized in these analyses as possessing a culture of insecurity, in which many issues, internal and external, are viewed through the lens of security. The sovereignty, territorial integrity and the homogenous and secular character of the country are the main security referents, to be protected with the threat or the use of force, if necessary. The EU, on the other hand, has built a security community through a process of desecuritization and the adoption of broader and non-military conceptions and
practices of security that recognize multiple referent objects, such as individuals and societies inside member states. The EU is governed by a logic which goes beyond the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. It recognizes military and non-military threats but refuses to use the language of security for fear of invoking military responses, whereas Turkey uses the language of security indiscriminately, creating a sense of insecurity in the country. The EU would be a “soft security actor”, “post-Westphalian”, whereas Turkey would be a “hard security actor” and a “modern” state.

More recent analyses have began to question the dichotomy between Turkey’s and EU’s security cultures by pointing out that both Turkey and the EU have been changing at a fast pace in the last decade with regards to security issues. For example, Herd (2009, p. 59) argues that there is a growing convergence between the EU and Turkey in strategic cultures, orientations and identity. He argues that Turkey is a member of NATO and therefore is part of the transatlantic security community, sharing the norms, values and patterns of behavior of other states within this security community (Herd 2009, p. 59). In addition, there is an increasing overlap in EU and NATO membership and doctrine (role, missions and duties). NATO members have adopted and adapted to a NATO strategy and doctrine which moved away from collective defense towards collective security (Herd 2009, p. 59). In addition, Turkey is becoming less Hobbesian and the EU less Kantian in its approach (Herd 2009, p. 60), since he identifies a growing militarization of the EU strategic culture (p. 64).

In addition, a more recent branch of literature considers that several changes occurring in Turkish foreign policy, particularly the rapprochement with surrounding regions and the new preference for the peaceful settlement of disputes, are due to an Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy taking place in Turkey since it was granted candidate status in 1999 (Aydin and Acikmese 2007, Ozcan 2008, Altunisik 2009b). Others point out to desecuritization processes taking place in Turkey in general, which led to the questioning of Turkey’s traditional security discourse and foreign policy practices (Bilgin 2005, Aras and Polat 2008, Polat 2010).
Finally, some courses of action taken by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), in power since 2002, particularly its stance on Iran’s nuclear program, its support for Omar Al-Bashir from Sudan, and its worsening relations with Israel, led to accusations that Turkey is pulling away from the West and shifting the axis of its foreign policy towards the East (Cagaptay 2009a and 2009b) – thereby refuting the idea that Turkey’s and EU’s security cultures are becoming more alike or that Turkey is “Europeanizing”.

Problems identified in the literature

I will now identify the main problems I find in the above analyses.

This thesis finds the argument which claims that Turkey would enhance the Union’s soft and hard power problematic because it is based on a number of assumptions which are not necessarily correct. First, it assumes that, with Turkey’s endorsements of EU positions, the Union would gain more credibility. This assumption would only prove to be correct if Turkey endorsed the EU position, and if there is an EU position to be endorsed. In several issues Turkey did not align its policies with those of the EU. For example, in 2010, Turkey refused to adopt tougher EU sanctions against Iran, choosing instead to adopt the sanctions agreed by the UN, and the same case was seen in Syria in 2011, as will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. The compatibility rate of Turkey’s foreign policy with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy has been steadily declining in recent years, from an 85% compatibility rate in 2008 to 48% in 2011 (European Commission 2008 and 2011). Second, it assumes that the Union would like to increase its military power, which is not a position agreed with by all member states, as will also be discussed in subsequent chapters. Thus, this type of argument ignores the possibility that Turkey’s security understandings and preferences might not coincide with those of the EU and it also ignores that there are different views on the usefulness of military power inside the EU.

The argument that Turkey would imperil the “European political project” assumes that there is an agreement among EU member states on what constitutes this “political project”. This thesis will argue that there are competing
projects for the role of the EU as an international actor, and the impact Turkey will have, if any, will depend on which project is being referred to.

The problem with the analyses which contrast Turkey’s and EU’s security cultures is that they do not take into account the different security cultures operating within the EU and within Turkey. They ignore that EU member states individual security cultures are also different from each other and that there are two security cultures operating within Turkey. The same is true of the literature which claims that Turkish foreign policy is going through a process of Europeanization. These analyses consider that the EU as a collective possesses a common security understanding, which is being internalized by Turkey, which are two assumptions which can be questioned.

My argument is that an assessment of the impact Turkey will have on the EU with regards to foreign, security and defense policies must take into account the internal divisions present in both the EU and Turkey. Turkey will hinder or help the EU in its quest to become a more relevant actor in the world stage depending on what is understood by a more relevant international actor in the case of the EU and on the characteristics of Turkey’s security cultures.

Before exploring these issues in subsequent chapters, the rest of this chapter will: first, present the concepts of strategic and security cultures: their origins, their evolution, the debates generated around the concepts and their location in the security studies literature. Second, it will engage with criticisms made against these concepts by poststructuralist scholars, and incorporate some their observations in order to move beyond some of the deficiencies in these concepts. It will then explore the nature of the relationship between identity, security culture and foreign and security policy. And finally, it will provide a definition of the concept of security culture; present the research design adopted and the methodology employed.

**The concept of strategic/security culture**

The concept of security culture is a spin-off of the term strategic culture, first coined by Jack Snyder in 1977, in the report “The Soviet Strategic Culture – Implications for Nuclear Options”. In that report, Snyder argued that neither
Soviet nor American strategists were purely rational game theorists and that abstract, game-theoretical conceptions of American strategy did not necessarily represent universal truths (Snyder 1977, p. 6). Instead, strategists were socialized into distinctively modes of strategic thinking. Strategic cultures, which he defined as “the sum of total ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regards to nuclear strategy” (Snyder 1977, p. 8), serves as a lens through which the international environment is seen. Although not being the only variable affecting Soviet behavior in a nuclear crisis, it certainly deserved attention.

A couple years after the publication of Snyder’s report, Ken Booth published the book *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (1979), in which he tried to raise awareness to the fact that most societies, and the strategists which are part of their societies, tend to view others through their own frames of reference. In other words, Booth warned against the dangers of being ethnocentric when producing strategy.

Colin Gray in 1986 published *Nuclear Strategy and National Styles*, in which he acknowledged the influence of the writings of Jack Snyder and Ken Booth, among others, and advanced the proposition that although “culture and style are useful keys for helping to improve our understanding of why particular security communities behave as they do” (p. xiii), “perspectives of history and cultural anthropology are notably lacking in contemporary strategic studies” (p. xiv).

The use of the concept of strategic culture by Ken Booth, Jack Snyder and Colin Gray in the late 1970s and 1980s evidenced a growing dissatisfaction with the state of the discipline of strategic studies. The dissatisfaction had already begun to be expressed by some authors such as Graham Allison and Robert Jervis, who explored the domestic sources of decision-making and the perceptions and misperceptions of decision-makers (MacMillan, Booth and Trood 1999, p. 6). Now there was a growing audience willing to hear different accounts of foreign and security policy decision-making.

It is important at this point to further explain the key assumptions underpinning the dominant theories of strategy at the time: structuralism and
rationalism. According to structural theories of security, the anarchical structure of the international system compels all states to act more or less the same way, i.e., they try to accumulate power and to balance other states’ power, in order to ensure their survival (Waltz 1979). This in turn creates the security dilemma, because in an anarchical structure, the self-help attempt of states to look after their security needs tends to lead to rising insecurity to others. In addition, rational-choice based explanations of state behavior stressed the ability of statesmen to objectively read structural imperatives and rationally craft policies which maximize benefits and reduce costs.

In short, most of the work being produced consisted of ahistorical analyses based on structural and rationalist assumptions. The effect of norms operating in the international environment on states identities and interests, and the "cognitive and motivational biases impairing rationality" rooted in different understandings and worldviews were usually not considered worth of studying (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, p.49). Cultural explanations of state behavior were considered as explanations of last resort, not positivistic or scientific enough.

Cultural theorizing was not considered scientific enough because it is "not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning" (Geertz 1974, quoted in Desch 1998, p. 153 and 154). In addition, cultural studies are usually difficult to generalize, because the aim of the analysis is to understand particular case studies, not to provide a general theory that explains all states’ behavior. Therefore, "cultural explanations are also unsatisfying for a social scientist because they run counter to the social scientist’s proclivity to generalize" (Huntington 1987, quoted in Desch 1998, p. 154).

In spite of the above criticisms, since the end of Cold War, there has been an impressive proliferation of culture-based research which incorporates ideational variables in the study of state behavior. This "cultural turn" in international relations theory in general, and security studies in particular, led to an emerging consensus that norms, identity and culture can affect state behavior. In fact, Colin Gray (2007) argues that “it seems as if the case for cultural analysis has been made and now is widely accepted” (p. 2) and that
"today it seems that, at long last, culture is, or is serious danger of becoming, the big idea of the moment" (p. 4). This rediscovered interest in cultural approaches can be explained by a dissatisfaction with neorealism’s failure to predict to end of the Cold War. In addition, this new generation of scholarly works interested in the utility of cultural interpretations was very much inspired by the rise of constructivism, which promised to return culture and domestic politics to international relations theory (Lantis 2002, p. 96).

Constructivists in general are concerned with how ideational factors, such as identities and norms, might influence the behavior of actors in the international system, but there are different types of constructivism. Systemic constructivism, developed mainly by Alexander Wendt (1992), focus on how state identities are created through their mutual interactions in the international arena. As a general rule, Wendt’s analysis leaves the domestic realm out of the picture and focuses only on the social identity of states (their external “personality”), thereby repeating many of pitfalls of other structural analyses, such as ignoring domestic politics. Normative constructivism, represented for example by Finnemore (1996) and Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999), usually focuses on the effects of international institutions and norms on domestic settings. In the study of international institutions the dominant school used to be neoliberal institutionalism, premised on rational choice, which acknowledged the role that institutions can have in conditioning the behavior of actors, but restricted this role to the provision of opportunities and constraints (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein 1996, p. 41). These mainstream studies ignored the possibility that international institutions reach deeper, to the level of identity and interests. Therefore, in the neoliberal institutionalism view, international institutions affect behavior but do not constitute actors’ properties. On the other hand, normative constructivists like Finnemore (1996) argued that norms propagated by international institutions can change states interests and practices; thus institutions not only constrain but also constitute states interests.

Checkel (1998) criticized some systemic and normative constructivist works for overemphasizing the role of social structures and norms at the expense of the agents who help create and change them in the first place. In addition, he pointed to a neglect of domestic politics, without which it is
impossible to understand why norms diffuse differentially across countries. He attributed the neglect of agency in constructivists work to the reliance on the insights of sociological institutionalism, which is built upon a branch of theory that excludes questions of agency. He challenged constructivists to demonstrate when, how, why and which actors and mechanisms bring about change.

Given the shortcomings with the systemic and normative strands of constructivism discussed above, Ted Hopf (2002) adopted an approach which he calls social constructivism and which has many similarities with the concept of strategic culture. In his book, Hopf (2002) focused on the domestic origins of identity and interests and provided an account of the relationship between identity and foreign policy.

Peter Katzenstein’s *The Culture of National Security* (1996) edited volume also made an important contribution to the international relations scholarship that took ideational variables seriously. The essays presented in the book tried to formulate alternative perspectives on the study of national security. The book as a whole focuses on the effects that norms, culture and identity have on the formulation of national security. The cultural-institutional context of the environment (rather than just the material context of balance of power and bureaucratic politics) and the construction of identity were incorporated into the analysis of national security.

Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996, p. 52) argued that normative, cultural and identity features of both the domestic and the international environment can shape states’ security interests and policies. Cultural or institutional elements of state’s environment (ex. norms) can shape states interests and policies and even, on a deeper level, states identities. In addition, variations in state identity can affect security interests and policies, which in turn can affect interstate normative structures, such as regimes and security communities. This latter approach is closely related to Ted Hopf’s social constructivism, since it affirms that identities shape actors interests and policies, in so far as national security interests depend on a particular construction of identity, which is conceived in relation to the identity of others, and a change in identity can precipitate a substantial change in interests that shape national
security policy. Two essays in particular in Katzenstein’s edited volume argued that national cultures have stronger effects on national security policies than the international structure: Berger (1996)’s analysis of Japan’s and Germany’s politico-military culture and Johnston (1996)’s study of China’s strategic culture.

Berger (1996) tried to explain German and Japanese anti-militarism by looking beyond international structures and examining the domestic cultural-institutional context in which defense policy is made. His main argument is that Germany and Japan, as a result of historical experiences, and the way those experiences were interpreted by domestic political actors, have developed beliefs and values that make them particularly reluctant to resort to the use of military force. These beliefs and values were institutionalized and are now part of their national identities and politico-military cultures. His analysis challenged two main assumptions of the dominant international relations scholarship: structural determinism and material rationalism (Berger 1998, p. xi). According to him, systemic pressures and understandings of material factors are interpreted by domestic actors. Therefore, different countries can behave differently even when faced with similar structural and material situations.

Johnston (1995) aimed to measure the effects of strategic culture on the process of making strategic choices by following three steps. First, he provided a definition of strategic culture as “an integrated ‘system of symbols (e.g. argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which act to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and the efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious” (Johnston 1995, p. 46). Strategic culture in Johnston’s view is comprised of two parts. First, it is comprised of assumptions about the strategic environment (whether war is aberrant or inevitable), about the nature of the adversary and the threat it poses (zero-sum or not) and about the efficacy of the use of force. These together form the basic paradigm of strategic culture according to Johnston. Second, strategic culture is comprised of assumptions about which strategic options are considered most efficacious to counter threats. At this level it is possible to see the effect of strategic culture on behavior, where one can find empirical
referents (the strategic preferences) of strategic culture. For example, if the strategic environment and the threat posed by the enemy are not considered to be of a “zero-sum” nature, then there will be a preference for negotiation. On the other hand, if the threat posed by the enemy is considered to be of a “zero-sum” nature, then coercive, violent strategies are more likely to be employed, in order to eliminate the threat.

A problematic aspect of Johnston’s work, in my view, is that he has chosen which assumptions form the basic paradigm of a security community’s strategic culture, instead of letting the actors speak for themselves. Based on his model, he identifies two ideal types of strategic culture: the “idealpolitik extreme shared by states in the democratic security community” and the “realpolitik extreme shared by states operating outside this zone” (p. 61). He argues that state formation tends to lead strategic cultures towards the realpolitik end of the spectrum, because most states try to achieve a strong sense of in-group solidarity and identification, which tend to require the presence of would-be adversaries. Therefore, he argues that the sources of durability of the self-help system might not be located in the structure of the international system as neo-realists argue, but in the shared strategic culture of the units. He is more concerned with providing a general explanation of states’ behavior than with understanding how particular security communities have developed their security understandings, which is one of the aims of this thesis. Therefore, I do not find his basic paradigm, which is constituted by predetermined assumptions about war and the use of force, very useful.

All the authors introduced above used the concept of strategic culture, which is solely concerned with issues of war and the use of force. Strategy, in their understandings, is synonymous with military strategy: the use of force to achieve political objectives. As such, the concept can not address broader issues of a state’s orientation towards how best to achieve its security. Paralleling the calls for the broadening and deepening the concept of security (Cox 1991, Ullman 1983, Buzan 1983, Booth 1991, Krause and Williams, 1997), Keith Krause (1999) suggested the introduction of the concept of security culture. He defined it as “enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes and symbols that inform the ways in which a state’s interests and
values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced by political actors and elites” (p. 14). This definition clearly builds upon the work on strategic culture but moves it away from its emphasis on military affairs and the use of force. In other words, the concept of security culture incorporates all the aspects of a community’s quest for security, including, but not restricted to, the use of force.

The concept of strategic culture remains dominant in the literature, in spite of Krause’s call for its broadening more than a decade ago, with some exceptions, such as Howorth (2002), Gariup (2009), Kirchner and Sperling (2010) and Ustun (2010).

Sperling (2010, p. 11) considers security culture to function as a lens through which policy-makers see the position of their state in the international system; apprehend and understand perceived threats to their national security; and which helps define the instruments and the preferred modes of cooperation considered appropriate to tackle those threats. Sperling identifies two types of security cultures: Westphalian and Post-Westphalian. The first type tends to view the international system as populated by states concerned with sovereignty and territorial integrity; to view oneself in opposition to existentially threatening others; and to have a preference for coercive instruments and unilateralism. The second type would view the international system as populated by states concerned with the welfare of their citizens; to view oneself as part of a broader community; and to have a preference for persuasive instruments and multilateralism (p. 12).

These two types of security cultures are very similar to Johnston (1995)’s identification of two types of strategic culture (realpolitik / idealpolitik) and Oguzlu and Kibaroglu (2008)’s Hobbesian and Kantian security cultures. These three studies a priori stipulate which types of security/strategic cultures exist and then try to “match” different states to their typologies. I find this problematic because “as soon as we begin to impose categories on evidence, that evidence stops meaning what it meant in its earlier context” (Hopf 2002 p. 25). In other words, although I concede that their categorization helps simplify reality, I also think that it may impair our ability to understand how each security community views itself and to appreciate its behavior on its own terms. For example, to
label Turkey’s security culture as Westphalian, Realpolitik or Hobbesian does not tell us much about how Turkey came to develop its security understanding and how Turkey views itself and its own actions in the international arena. Therefore, instead of creating a priori categories, and then setting out to find out which one Turkey belongs to, I prefer to trace each actor's own narratives of themselves and see how they apprehend the external environment and delineate which are the acceptable and unacceptable courses of action.

Although in the chapter on the European Union I will create a taxonomy of member states’ security cultures, it will be done in order to map out the European security landscape in order to situate the place of Turkey’s two security cultures within it. In addition, this grouping of EU member states will be done based on the similarities in their security cultures. In other words, I will not create a priori categories and then try to match up member states to different groups. My starting point will be each member states security understandings and preferences, which will in turn lead to their placement in different groupings.

In the following section, I will deal with criticisms that have been made against the concepts of strategic and security culture by critical security scholars and provide possible ways to overcome the weaknesses of these concepts by incorporating some of the insights provided.

**Rethinking the concepts of strategic and security culture: critical voices**

As demonstrated above, most strategic/security culture scholars justify their use of the concept by pointing to the problematic aspects of mainstream international relations theories underpinned by structuralist and rationalist assumptions. They do not usually respond to criticisms made by the critical security studies literature. However, the concept of security culture has been criticized by many authors, such as Waever (2001), Hansen (2006), Burgess (2009) and Campbell (1992). Based on the works of Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Julia Kristeva, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, these authors question many of the premises on which constructivism and the concept of security culture are based.
First, these authors argue, it is important to rethink the dichotomy between material and ideational realms and acknowledge that every discursive structure has a material character (Waever 2001, p. 22). Neither ideas nor materiality have a meaningful presence without each other (Hansen 2006, p. 19). Materiality is given meaning by a particular set of identity constructions (Hansen 2006, p. 20). The material is always discursively mediated (Hansen 2006, p. 22). According to these authors, both rationalists and conventional constructivists accept the division between material and ideational factors, but rationalists give preference to material factors whereas constructivists give priority to ideational factors (identity, ideas, norms and culture). Therefore, the concept of security culture can be considered limited and limiting because it confines culture to the realm of ideational factors, hence accepting the idea that material and ideational realms can be separated (Waever 2001, p. 22).

Similarly, Campbell (1998) criticizes authors who use the concept of security culture, such as those who contributed to the book *The Culture of National Security* (Katzenstein et al 1996) because, in those analyses, “culture” is considered all that is nonmaterial, such as ideas and beliefs. Hence, Campbell (1998) thinks that constructivists are unable to escape the same assumptions of realists from whom they want to be distanced, i.e. that the material and the ideational realms can be distinguished (p. 221).

Second, the constructivist approach to identity is criticized, for two reasons. The first reason is, according to the poststructuralist critique, that constructivists conceive identity as something that states and other collectivities have independently of the formulation of foreign policy, whereas poststructuralists see the relationship between identity and foreign policy as co-constitutive (Hansen 2006, p. 2). In other words, poststructuralists adopt a non-causal epistemology, since identity is not defined as a variable that is casually separate from foreign policy (Hansen 2006, p. 4).

allow for the separation between identity and foreign policy, because there is no identity prior to and independently of foreign policy (p. 23). Current political communities were not created in isolation and did not develop their identities without any contact with the external world. Campbell (1998) disagrees with those who argue that the international system influences domestic politics and with those who argue that domestic influences are important in the construction of foreign policy, because these perspectives grant the international and the domestic spheres existence prior to history and politics (p. 62).

The second critique of constructivist’s approach to identity has to do with how stable identities are. Constructivists are blamed for providing a theory of “non-change” (Weaver 2001) and for rendering identity in essentialist ways, “secur[ing] some dimensions of identity as a way of anchoring analysis” (Campbell 1998, p. 223). On the other hand, critical security theorists argue that identities are context-bound instantiations and cannot, therefore, be stable. States do not have a pre-discursive and stable identity; they rely on “regulated and stylized repetition of practices like Foreign Policy to contain contingency and secure the self” (Campbell 1998, p. 197). Iver Neumann (1999) quotes Chantal Mouffe (1994), who wrote: “[…] not only are there no ‘natural’ or ‘original’ identities, since every identity is the result of a continuing process, but that process itself must be seen as one of permanent hybridization and nomadization. Identity is, in effect, the result of a multitude of interactions that take place inside a space whose outlines are not clearly defined” (quoted on page 210).

In subsequent sections I will evaluate the claims made above, especially as it relates to: a) the division between material and ideational factors; b) the nature of the relationship between identity and foreign policy; and c) how stable identities are.

A) the division between material and ideational factors

It is true that authors working with the concept of strategic/security culture, and constructivists in general, accept the division between material and ideational factors. Critical security scholars and constructivists have a different
ontological starting point. Constructivists, as “much of the social sciences […] have adhered ontologically to a distinction between the ideal and the material” (Campbell 2005, p. 951). Since this is an irreconcilable ontological disagreement, it is suffice to say that in this thesis I accept the dichotomy between material and ideational factors.

This is not to say, however, that I agree with the proposition forwarded by some strategic culture scholars, such as Lantis (2005), who argues that the sources of strategic culture are both material and ideational. The material factors, according to Lantis, would comprise geography, climate and resources. In his view, geographical circumstance is key to understanding why some countries adopt particular strategic policies. In my view, to identify both ideational and material factors as the origins of strategic/security culture is highly problematic. By making the distinction between these two factors, the authors above are implying that some factors are non-ideational, and thus are missing the point, i.e., that actors will always interpret the material realm through specific prisms. Geography in itself does not mean anything. It is the interpretation of geography by actors that renders it meaningful. As will be argued in the second and third chapters, Turkey’s geography has been invoked by actors across the political spectrum, and from different institutions, to justify their disparate courses of action. In this case, it never became clear what exactly geography was telling Turkey to do, since different strategies were adopted supposedly in response to the dictates of Turkey’s geography. Therefore, although I accept the division between material and ideational factors, I do not subscribe to the view that it is possible to access an objective reality that exists “out there” independent of human thinking; the material world will always be interpreted through different prisms.

B) The nature of the relationship between identity and foreign policy

First of all, it is important to mention that not all constructivist accounts of the relationship between identity and foreign policy consider identity as an independent variable in a causal relationship with foreign policy. Many authors working with the concept of strategic culture (such as Colin Gray 1995, 1999,
2007 and Neumann and Heikka 2005, for example) recognize that there is a constitutive relationship between culture and behavior (or an interplay between discourses and practices). In fact, the main debate among strategic culture scholars, particularly between Gray (1999, 2007) and Johnston (1995, 1999) is whether one should include behavior in the definition of culture, or, in other words, whether security culture is an ideational milieu that influences behavior by limiting behavioral choices (Johnston 1995, p. 46) or whether it also constitutes behavior (Gray 1999).

Neumann and Heikka (2005) argue that the debate on whether behavior is part of culture began in the 1950s and in fact has already been solved in other social sciences, such as anthropology and sociology. According to them, anthropologists and sociologists have moved away from an analysis of culture based on beliefs, ideas and norms to a notion of culture which is considered to be an interplay between discourses and practices: “[…] discourses are the precarious fixities that precipitate from human practice and from which further practices arises” (Schatzki 2001, p. 44, quoted on Neumann and Heikka 2005, p. 11).

On the other hand, it is also true that several authors working with the concepts of security and strategic culture (such as Berger 1998, Kier 1997 and Legro 1995) separate the two (culture and behavior / identity and foreign policy). In addition, political scientists using the concept of political culture consider culture primarily ideational, as a “shorthand expression for a ‘mindset’ which has the effect of limiting attention to less than the full range of alternative behaviors, problems and solutions which are logically possible” (Elkins and Simeon 1979, p. 128, quoted on Johnston 1995, p. 45). Berger (1998) argues that, although in practice it is almost impossible to separate culture (or identity) from behavior (or foreign policy), to perform such separation is fundamental if one wants to avoid engaging in tautological reasoning by deriving culture from behavior. Jeffrey Legro (1995) and Elizabeth Kier (1997), in their studies of militaries’ organizational cultures, also separate culture from behavior to avoid “defining culture by the behavior one is trying to show was influenced by culture” (Legro 1995, p. 30).
Therefore, these authors use the separation between identity and foreign policy as a research device to avoid the tautology of inferring culture from behavior, and then using the inferred cultural perspectives to explain the same set of behaviors (Posen 1996, p. 20). This is not to say that these authors disagree with the assertion that identity and foreign policy have a constitutive relationship, but they separate the two (identity and behavior) in order to avoid engaging in tautological reasoning.

Gariup (2009) proposes another solution to Johnston’s and Gray’s debate on whether security culture has a causal or constitutive relationship to behavior. She resorts to Anthony Giddens’ bracketing technique, in which context help define behavior at time zero and behavior becomes context at time one. In other words, previous policies pursued are taken into consideration when formulating new policies: policy-makers can look at the tradition of their country in a specific issue area and think “this is how we have always done it and therefore this is how I will do it now”.

Gariup (2009) analyses language in order to find out the cultural assumptions underpinning it and the behavioral expectations that arise from it. In other words, a dominant discourse is indicative of a dominant security culture and it also constrains and enables particular courses of actions. Discourse is thus an interface between culture as context and culture as behavior. Language represents a particular worldview and constrains other alternative modes of thought. Discourse provides the “physical residues” of beliefs and culture, “it is an actor’s self-perception of its identity” (p. 51), while at the same time limiting the options which are considered acceptable and legitimate. A successful dominant discourse affects agenda-setting and limits the range of policy options, functioning as a precursor to action. Therefore, Gariup considers security culture to be primarily an ideational milieu which can be accessed by analyzing language, but also recognizes that discourses can influence practices by limiting what is considered acceptable, a consideration I agree with.

Campbell (1998), argue that states have “no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality” and thus are “always in a process of becoming” (p. 12). In other words, state identity is not securely grounded prior to foreign relations (Campbell 1998, p. 61). Hansen (2006) also
argues that identities are produced and reproduced through the formulation of foreign policies, but also that foreign policies rely on representations of identity (p. 1, emphasis added). She goes on to say that identity and foreign policy cannot stand in a causal relationship with one another because representations of identity are simultaneously a pre-condition of and (re) produced through foreign policy formulation (Hansen 2006, p. 9, emphasis added). In other words, identity constitutes foreign policy and is produced by foreign policy (Hansen 2006, p. 20, emphasis added). Policy discourses rely on a particular construction of problems and subjectivities, but problems and subjectivities are also constructed through policy discourses (Hansen 2006, p. 15, emphasis added).

In this thesis, I do not contest the argument that identity and foreign policy have a constitutive relationship and that there are no primary identities, established prior to foreign policy. For example, as will be explored on the chapters on Turkey, “Republican Turkish” identity did not emerge out of thin air, not it was “always there”. This particular identity was in part formulated in response to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Thus, contact with the outside world and the foreign policy implemented helped constitute this particular Turkish identity. However, in time, this (constructed) identity has begun to influence the conduction of foreign policy as well. Thus, there is a feedback from the articulation of identities to policy (Hansen 2006, p. 23). It is this “second move” - how (constructed, unstable and contested) identities influence foreign policy - I’m interested in and explore in this thesis.

A second and related argument made by Campbell (1998) is that foreign policy is one practice among many that serves to discipline ambiguity and construct the identity of the state, through “stylized and regulated performances” (p. 65 and 73). He differentiates between “foreign policy” and “Foreign Policy”. The first, “foreign policy”, refers to all practices of differentiation and exclusion that constitute some things as “foreign” (p. 68): “foreign policies are all those practices of differentiation implicated in the confrontation between self and other” (p. 88). The second, “Foreign Policy”, “is concerned with the reproduction of an unstable identity at the level of the state, and the containment of challenges to that identity” (p. 71). One contains, confines, controls and
disciplines difference within by locating otherness outside. The outside “other” serves as a “warning” for the different within (Campbell 1998, p. 114). It reminds “different insiders” of what they would become if they were not disciplined. Therefore, while Foreign Policy produces external others, it also disciplines “domestic” elements that challenge a dominant conception of state identity, through “exclusionary practices in which resistant elements to a secure identity on the ‘inside’ are linked through a discourse of ‘danger’ with threats identified and located on the ‘outside” (Campbell 2005, p. 948).

There is much to be gained from Campbell (1998)’s argument that Foreign Policy helps produce and reproduce the identity of the state and that representations of others abroad serve to locate and discipline others at home. For example, as will be discussed on the following chapters, two different identity conceptions have been developed in Turkey, which I have labeled Republican and neo-Ottomanist. The Republican identity construction established the Muslim Middle East as an inferior other, backward, irrational, and prone to conflict. According to this Republican narrative, Islam is partially to blame for the shortcomings of the (Muslim) Middle East. The Foreign Policy prescribed was non-interference and mostly isolation. Conversely, religious people at home were also considered backward, inferior, and dangerous, therefore forbidden to hold political power, and in need of being disciplined and of becoming “modern”, western and secular. But whereas Turkish Muslims had the capacity to learn and become civilized, the Muslim Middle East, because of its Arab character, could not be redeemed and therefore contact should be avoided. However, even though I agree with the idea that Foreign Policy serves to domesticate and discipline identities at home, in my thesis I’m less concerned with how foreign policy serves to establish and reinforce domestic identities than how certain identity conceptions influence certain types of foreign policy.

**C) Stable identities**

As we have seen, constructivists are accused of providing a theory of non-change and of depicting identity in an essentialist manner. I will now deal with these two criticisms.
Regarding the first accusation, it is true that the concept of security culture in general is primarily concerned with aspects that are deeply rooted and pervasive and therefore do not change easily. However, a debate about how easy it is for security culture to change has been going on among security cultural scholars for some time.

Some of the strategic culture literature assumes that strategic cultural thoughts are deeply embedded and therefore do not change easily, even when faced with a significant shift in the international environment. Cultures are resistant to change because, among other reasons, dissonant information tends to be discarded, whereas information which is in accordance with collectively-held ideas tends to be readily assimilated (Duffield 1999, p. 770). Change is possible, but only gradually, or when precipitated by dramatic events or traumatic experiences (Duffield 1999, p. 770).

Other authors, such as Lantis (2002, p. 111) questions whether a change in security culture can be easier than previous works on strategic culture would allow. In his view, security cultures can evolve when external shocks challenge existing beliefs and undermine past historical narratives and when primary tenets of strategic thought (such as support for democracy and pacifism) directly conflict with one another in certain situations.

Meyer (2006) developed a theoretical framework for explaining change in the norms composing a strategic culture. In his view, strategic culture comprises “socially-transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behavior that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defense goals” (p. 20 – emphasis added). Although there are normative, ideational and behavioral components of strategic culture, Meyer focuses only on the first element, since, following Katzenstein’s (1996) argument, norms are the most persistent and deeply rooted aspects of strategic cultures. There are three causal mechanisms which explain normative change: decline and growth of threat perceptions, learning from media coverage of crisis and institutionally driven socialization.

In my view, the second and the third mechanisms are useful in understanding shifts in security cultures, but I think there are some
unaddressed issues with regards to the first mechanism. Decline and growth of threat perceptions already indicates that there has been a shift in a given security culture – it is thus an indication that the security culture has changed; it is not the cause of change. Security culture is precisely the lens with which the external environment is read. If the reading of the external environment has changed, then the lens must have changed, since threat perceptions are intimately linked with an actor’s conception of its identity.

Some scholars using the concept of strategic/security culture can be accused of depicting identity in an essentialist manner. For example, Gray (1999)’s reference to “the Germans”, “the Britons”, “the Russians” ignores that groups might exist in the same security community espousing different security cultures. However, not all strategic/security culture scholars adopt the same approach as Gray’s. Berger (1998) makes an important point when he argues that security cultures are not held by entire societies unanimously. Rather, there is a negotiated reality between elites. Elites bearing distinct security cultures, different from the “traditional” one, may redefine the limits of the possible when in power, albeit still paying respect to deeply held convictions of a dominant strategic culture. The negotiated reality between elites means that certain groups can begin to construct a new discursive path and pursue legitimacy for preferred policy courses that may not conform to traditional cultural boundaries.

Thus, the security culture scholarship recognizes that different security cultures can emerge in the same community. As will be further explored below, security cultures originate from the interpretation of historical experiences and their propagation, which help form or reinforce identities. These identities are constructed in opposition to other groups, who can become sources of insecurities, but not necessarily so. Different groups in the community may interpret historical events in different fashions, and narrate them in different ways, reinforcing or creating different identity constructions and corresponding insecurities, leading to different security cultures. In other words, security cultures and the identity narratives underpinning them can be contested. In the case of Turkey, for example, it will become clear that the Republican educational system has narrated a view of history (conspiratorial and suspicious of both East and West) and constructed a type of identity (Western, secular and
homogenous) that is not widely accepted among all segments of the society (Islamists, Kurds, Liberal elites).

Therefore, not all usage of the concept of security culture renders culture and identity essential, primordially given, natural, fixed, deterministic, static, unitary, homogenous or singular. In much of the scholarship, and in this thesis, the terms "culture" and identity" are understood as "socially constructed, fragmented, diverse and dynamic", sharing “two central motifs: the perception of multiplicity” and the “pervasive theme of construction” (Lapid 1996, p. 7).

It is also important to point out that, even though authors such as Campbell argue that “there are no foundations of state identity that exist prior to the problematic of identity/difference that situates the state within the framework of inside/outside and self/other” (Campbell 2005, p. 948), it is possible to conceive that overtime dominant meanings and conceptions of identity can be established. For example, Neumann (1999) points out that there are political discourses and other narratives that essentialize representations of identities, presenting these identities as "context-traversing" (p. 212-214). This is not to say that identities are stable and fixed, but that certain political actors will try to present them as such, and through constant processes of identity reproduction, certain identities might come to be perceived as primordial and essential, even though they are not.

Having engaged with the overlaps between the literature of security culture and critical security studies, it is now important to develop these insights. The interactions between these two literatures generate important questions about the foundations of identity, the concept of security culture and how it is operationalized through foreign and security policies.

**Identity, security culture and foreign policy: negotiating self-other relationships**

Identity and foreign policy have a co-constitutive relationship. Foreign policy relies on representations of identity and identities are produced and reproduced through foreign policy. In this thesis, although I accept the co-constitutive relationship between identity and foreign policy, I will focus
exclusively on *how representations of identity* and *particular constructions of subjectivities* are a *pre-condition of foreign policy formulation* (Hansen 2006, p. 9, emphasis added).

Unlike some strategic culture scholars, such as Johnston (1999), I do not conceive identity and security culture as independent variables that cause behavior. I do not subscribe to the view that there is a one-to-one relationship between cultural preferences and actual choices and a “neat” link between cause and effect. I agree with MacMillan, Booth and Trood (1999) who argue that “even if neat causes do not lurk there and methodological difficulties lie in wait”, strategic culture is an important variable that permits us to “investigate the shadowy regions of international politics” (p. 22). The basic assumption is that strategic cultural inputs have a relationship with strategic policy outputs which is not straightforward or easily identifiable (Macmillan and Booth, 1999, p. 363). Even though strategic culture does not determine behavior, certainly it helps to shape the process of foreign policy-making. But how exactly does it help shape behavior?

Security culture forms a framework for apprehending the world. Policy-makers, who are embedded in their cultural systems, perceive the world through specific lens. The same international circumstances can be read quite differently by actors using a different lens. The origins of this lens, or the roots of security culture, are to be found in a security community construction of its identity. Any identity is established in relation to a series of differences (Weldes et al 1999). These differences can be articulated in different ways. Here critical security studies’ insights can also contribute to the application of the concept of security culture.

Not all relationships between self and other are antagonistic, i.e., not all others are radically different and existentially threatening (Weaver 2001, p. 24). Some authors, like David Campbell (1998) do focus exclusively on radical others. For Campbell (1998), because states are “always in a process of becoming” (p. 12), constant articulations of danger are necessary. “Both the state and the church require considerable effort to maintain order within and around themselves, and thereby engage in an evangelism of fear to ward off internal and external threats, succumbing in the process to the temptation to
treat difference as otherness” (p. 50 and 51). “Otherness” as Campbell understands here is related to the radical other, the one who poses an existential threat.

However, not all others are radical others. There are friends and relatives; inferior and superior others or simply different others, neither inferior nor a threat (Diez 2005, p. 628). Consequently, the relationship with the other can involve conflict, but not necessarily so. There are non-antagonistic systems of difference (Weaver 2001, p. 24) and degrees of difference and otherness (Hansen 2006, p. 33). Identity is constructed through processes of linking and differentiation, and is spatially, temporally and ethically situated (Hansen 2006, p. 33). The other can be considered to be superior to the Self and therefore it should be emulated, or the other can be considered to be the same as the Self, only temporarily distant (Hansen 2006 p. 35). The policy prescribed will vary according to how the other is conceived. In other words, there are different ways to respond to difference, including annihilation, assimilation, transformation, support, isolation, deterrence, accommodation (alteration of the self’s identity in the direction of the other) and therapy (bringing the different other to “normality”) (Hopf 2002, Hansen 2006). When the other is framed as an existential threat by a securitizing actor and this characterization is accepted by the audience, then it is more likely that the policies pursued to tackle this threat will be confrontational (or “exceptional” in the language used by Waever 1995 and Buzan, Waever et al 1998). If the other is perceived to be inferior, then likely policy options include to ignore it or to provide “therapy” in order to “improve” it.

As an example, in European discourses about Turkey, Turkey is usually described a geographical or unethical other, but also sometimes viewed as a temporally inferior other, for example when it is described as a modern state, in opposition to postmodern Europe (Buzan and Diez, 1999). Similarly, in Turkish Republican discourses, the West is seen as temporally superior, but Turkey is capable of reaching the levels of contemporary civilization if it keeps its westernizing reforms. In the case of Republican discourses about the Middle East, the region is viewed as temporarily inferior (backward, primitive) but not capable of being transformed, so the policy prescribed was isolation from it. In
the case of neo-Ottomanist discourses, the Middle East is still seen as temporarily inferior, but capable of being transformed, especially with the support of Turkey, which is seen as a “big brother”. Neo-Ottomanist discourses of Europe conceive Turkey and Europe as equals in terms of power and influence, but Turkey is morally superior: Europe cheats, does not keep its words and is hypocritical.

Thus, security culture helps condition the basic foreign policy goals that are to be pursued (reflecting a particular identity construction and the corresponding conceptions of the others); conditions the type of policy options that are considered acceptable, legitimate and appropriate; influences the evaluation of these options; and therefore helps shape foreign and security policy choices (Duffield 1999, p. 771). In other words, security cultures participate in the definition of the realm of the possible and acceptable, limiting attention to less than the full range of possible behaviors. Security culture constrains or enables predispositions towards certain policies.

Even though the nature of the relationship between security culture and policy preferences has been established, in practice policy preferences do not always correspond to the final policy outcome. How can this mismatch be explained? Other factors might influence behavior, such as domestic and international constraints. These constrains can also be of an ideational kind: as stated previously, norms operating in the international system might constrain an actor’s freedom of maneuver and there might be different security cultures vying for dominance inside a country. A useful example is Turkey’s intervention in Northern Iraq to crush PKK forces. During the 1990s, when Turkey’s foreign policy-making was dominated by the military and its security culture, Turkey intervened twice, with a large number of troops, disregarding international disapproval for such actions. In the late 2000s, the government, espousing a different security culture, favored a political solution to the PKK problem, but the military’s preference was for the sending of troops once again into Northern Iraq. At the end of the day, troops were sent, but only after the government had managed to secure approval for the action from several Western capitals, and had made sure that other ways of solving the issue were kept in the agenda. In
this case, the policy outcome did not reflect the government’s security culture and policy preferences, but an accommodation between two security cultures.

**Definition of security culture, research design and methodology**

Based on all the definitions and debates that have been discussed above, I propose a simplified, yet useful and comprehensive, definition of security culture, *as a set of ideas, rooted in a security community’s pluralistic conception of its identities, comprising assumptions about what constitutes insecurities and the best way to tackle them.*

Security culture thus: a) is rooted in the interpretation of historical experiences and their dissemination; b) these (likely contested) historical narratives serve to inculcate or reinforce a certain identity, which is formulated in relation to other groups’ identities; and c) the constructed nature of othering (threatening, inferior, superior, etc) will influence the choice of particular policy actions.

Security culture is a lens through which communities perceive and interpret the outside world. It influences policy because it constrains or enables certain courses of action by creating realms of the possible. It is a very useful analytical framework because it provides an understanding of apparent “irrationalities” in thinking and behavior of actors and it contributes to an appreciation of an actor’s security understandings and attitudes on its own terms (Booth 2005). It is an essential concept, because “to deny its existence is to claim that the diversity of attitudes and behavior with regards to the threat and the use of force is entirely the result of material and structural factors unrelated to societal or cultural variables” (Booth and Trood 1999, p. vii). To propose that “strategic history, past, present, and future, can be explained strictly by reference to relations among political entities, with no regard paid to their domestic processes is, frankly, preposterous” (Gray 2007, p. 6).

Now that a definition of security culture and the case for its use as an analytical framework has been made, we turn to the research design and to methodological issues. Two different research designs will be used: one for the two chapters on Turkey and another for the chapter on the European Union.
The difference in research design will be justified below. The research designs are based on Hansen (2006), in which she developed three intertextual research models. The first model focuses on official foreign policy discourses (statements, interviews, speeches), the second includes opposition parties, the media and corporate organizations (NGOs, firms, trade unions, armed forces) and the third includes popular culture and more marginal political discourses (Hansen p. 11). Lene Hansen (2006, p. 72) argues that research designs can vary according to the number of selves studied, the number of events, the time span analyzed and the number of intertextual models. Thus, one can study foreign policy discourses of one single self or several selves through one event or several events, using different intertextual research models. However, because it is difficult to pursue a research design that includes all intertextual models and several selves through a large number of events occurring through a long time span, choices must be made across the four dimensions (Hansen 2006, p. 67).

The concept of security culture will be applied on the chapters on Turkey. Based on the definition I proposed above, the first task will be an investigation of how historical experiences were interpreted and propagated helping form certain identities, the corresponding natures of the others and the preferred and acceptable ways to relate to these others. I have included two selves (Republican and neo-Ottomanist) and included sources from the first two models (“official foreign policy” texts such as statements, speeches and interviews with Government officials and diplomats), and also texts by political parties in opposition, academics and journalists – primarily through interviews and journalistic writings. In addition, I focused on a large number of events through a long time span (since the final years of the Ottoman Empire until 2011). Thus, for Turkey, my research design was based on a historical analysis tracing the evolution of Turkish identity and its influence on foreign policy making.

For the European Union, a different research design will be employed. I will also focus on various selves (UK, France, Germany and EU officials), but will only include “official” foreign policy texts, and one event (the Allied intervention in the conflict in Libya in 2011). Therefore, for the EU, I will map
foreign policy debates around one “key event.” According to Hansen (2006, p. 69), if the study is focused on one single event, this event should be of a “striking character” and subject of intense political debate, such as conflicts and wars. Through an analysis of EU officials and some member states discourses on the conflict in Libya, it will be possible to locate their understandings of the situation and their foreign policy preferences, including about who should respond to the conflict and how.

The difference in research design for the chapters on Turkey and the chapter on the EU is due to pragmatic concerns. Given that an EU-wide identity and related security culture has not replaced member states’ own security cultures (an assertion the will be further discussed later), if I focused only on the construction of EU identity and its influence on foreign policy, I would be providing an incomplete picture of the European field of existing security cultures. To be comprehensive, I would have to include a historical study, as done for Turkey, for at least the EU big-3 (UK, France and Germany), plus for the European Union itself, which would be a very difficult task. Thus, I will rely mainly on secondary sources depicting EU and member states’ security cultures, and will use the case of Libya to illustrate, confirm or discredit the divisions established by the existing literature, and ultimately to establish my own groupings of EU member states.

This discussion on EU and member states’ responses to the conflict in Libya will be linked to the chapters on Turkey in the following way. I will frame the discussion around Turkey's views (obtained through journalist material and semi-structured interviews) on UK’s, France's and Germany's positions on the conflict in Libya and how to respond to it. This discussion will serve to illustrate the Republican’s and neo-Ottomanist's views about how Turkey should behave in this situation and whether and how the country should get involved in responding to it along with European countries.

In terms of methodology, I have used interpretivist methods analyzing primary and secondary sources and have conducted fourteen semi-structured elite interviews: ten interviews in Turkey with politicians from the AKP and the main opposition party (CHP); diplomats, including a special advisor to the foreign minister and a retired ambassador; journalists from secular and
conservative-oriented newspapers; and academics; and four interviews with EU officials working in the Commission, European External Action Service and COREPER (see full list in the bibliography). The sources I have analyzed can be divided into three groups:

- Secondary sources which: explore the processes of identity construction in Turkey; describe the identities created in Turkey and the nature of the others; and provide a picture of Turkey’s, EU’s and EU member states’ strategic/security cultures;

- EU primary sources: the aforementioned four interviews with EU officials, official documents which describe the overall foreign and security policy objectives of the EU and its security strategy in particular; writings, declarations and speeches of EU officials and of member states (only UK, France and Germany) with regards to the conflict in Libya.

- Turkey’s primary sources: Unlike the EU, Turkey does not have a published security strategy document. The National Security Policy Document, which establishes the threats to the country and preferred ways to block them, is a secretive document, whose content is only known when bits and pieces are leaked to the press. In addition, my basic knowledge of Turkish does not allow me to analyze some primary sources which can be relevant to the study of Turkey’s identity construction, such as school textbooks, party manifestos and speeches by policy-makers, when these were not available in English. I have tried to remedy that by recurring to secondary sources which have analyzed these types of sources and by conducting ten semi-structure interviews in Turkey mentioned above. In addition, I have relied on two Turkish newspapers published in English, Today’s Zaman and Hurriyet Daily News, for accessing declarations, statements, and speeches by Turkish actors, when these were not available in English in the Turkish Government’s official websites.
Chapter 2 - Turkey's Republican security culture

Introduction

This and the next chapter will be dedicated to the study of Turkey's security cultures. The analytical framework described in the previous chapter will be employed in order to understand how assumptions about what constitute insecurities and the best means to tackle them were constructed in Turkey. As argued in chapter 1, in order to obtain this answer, it is paramount to investigate how certain historical experiences Turkey and its predecessor the Ottoman Empire went through were interpreted and propagated thus helping form certain identities, the corresponding natures of the others and the preferred and acceptable ways to relate to these others.

It will be argued that there are two security cultures vying for dominance within Turkey. To name these two security cultures is no easy task. The first security culture could be named Republican, Kemalist, Secular, Traditional, Official, or some other term not mentioned here. Similarly, the second type could be named Islamist, Imperial, Neo-ottomanist, etc. All of those are loaded terms and choosing any of them can stimulate a barrage of criticisms. After careful thinking, I have chosen to use the terms Republican and Neo-Ottomanist, the primary reason being that the view actors in Turkey hold about the Ottoman Empire and its former territories goes a long way in indicating which of the security cultural paradigm one ascribes to, as will be explained in these two chapters.

To argue that there are two different security paradigms within Turkey is not new: Mufti (2009), for example, argued that there are two different strategic cultures animating Turkey's security and foreign policy, which he labeled as Republican and Imperial strategic cultures. The difference between Turkey's traditionally western-oriented, non-interventionist, pro-status quo foreign policy pursued throughout the Cold War and the Justice and Development Party (AKP)'s foreign policy pursued since 2002 has also been much discussed in the press (see Cagaptay 2009a and 2009b). In these discussions, the AKP has
been accused of holding a significantly different view of world affairs from its Republican counterparts. It will be argued in this and the following chapters that indeed the AKP holds a different security culture, but its security culture also presents several residues of its Republican counter-part.

Thus, I will argue that, although these security cultures are different enough so that one can distinguish between the two, they also share many common traits. To focus on the common traits between the two security cultures is not common in the literature. In fact, I am not aware of any academic work which has done so. There have been some analyses which have shown some similarities between the AKP’s and Republican elites’ discourses. For example, Bilgin (2007) has shown how pervasive the idea of geographical determinism is, and Karaveli (2010) and some journalists, such as Today’s Zaman columnist Cengiz (2011), have pointed to the persistence of Turkish nationalism even among Islamic actors. However, a more systematic approach identifying all the common traits has not been done as far as I am aware. Apart from the novelty element being introduced to scholarly work on Turkey’s security and foreign policy, I believe it is important to emphasize these common traits because they explain both camps’ paradoxical attitudes towards the West and EU membership in particular, and contradict some of the analyses that accuse the AKP of pulling Turkey away from the West. I will argue that Turkish actors holding these different security cultures, notwithstanding their differences, are likely to continue to pursue the goal of being accepted as a member of the Western community of nations. However, both security cultures are also characterized by an ambivalent view towards the West, which is seen as meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs, exploiting domestic grievances, and treating Turkey unfairly. As a result, both are very sensitive to what they regard as interference in Turkey’s sovereignty. Third, they share a sense of Turkish superiority over minorities at home and over former members of the Ottoman Empire.

This chapter will deal with the Republican security culture, its origins and its influence on foreign policy. The first task will be to investigate how what is now considered Turkey’s “official” identity was first articulated in the early Republican period and then how it was propagated and re-confirmed throughout
Turkish Republican history. After this investigation, the following section will consolidate the arguments and describe the characteristics of the Republican security culture, who are its “others” and how they should be dealt with. The chapter will then demonstrate how a gradual contestation of this official Turkish identity emerged in the Cold war years and how the Republican security culture influenced the conduction of Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War.

The final years of the Ottoman Empire: initial attempts of constructing a Turkish identity and “westernization” as a survival strategy

As has been discussed in chapter, 1, there are no ‘natural’ or ‘original’ identities: they are always constructed. This is also the case of what can be considered today Turkey’s “Republican” identity. The slow development of a Turkish identity began to occur at the turn of the 20th century, as a result of the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire. During Ottoman times, the Ottoman rulers saw themselves primarily as the defenders of Islam, and the word Turk, when used inside the Empire, was used to refer to Ottoman subjects who spoke Turkish, but it usually had a derogatory connotation, referring to the “ignorant nomad or peasant from Anatolia” (Kushner 1977, p. 2). An account from 1908 by Henry Charles Wood described the situation as following: “if you say to a Mohammedan in Turkey ‘are you a Turk?’ he is offended, and probably answers ‘I am Osmanli [Ottoman] [...] An Osmanli Turk, if he says a man is a Turk, could mean that he was a lout or a clodhopper” (quoted in Kushner 1977, p. 20). Even Ottoman publications, such as the encyclopedic dictionary by Semseddin Sami, noted that “some peoples who are of Turkish origin do not accept this name and consider it to be an insult” (quoted in Kushner 1977, p. 21). Outside the Empire, Europeans often employed the term Turk to describe the rulers of the Empire and both the Turkish-speaking and other non-Turkish speaking Muslims subjects of the Empire, often in a derogatory manner as well. Many travel accounts, memoirs, articles and historical works criticized the Turks “misdeeds” (Kushner 1977, p. 8 and 9). Although Turkish, written in the Arabic script, was the official language of the empire, Turks did not have any privileges in comparison with other non-Turkish Muslim citizens.
The origins of the active (and positive) articulation of a Turkish identity are deeply connected to the Ottoman Empire’s decline and the role Europe played in it. The Empire’s gradual decline from the early 18th century onwards was brought about by, among other things, successive nationalist upheavals, some of which were encouraged by the West, and military defeats, some of which to the West. In addition, violations of the Empire’s sovereignty – such as the system of Capitulations – were often justified by the West pointing out to the backwardness of the Empire (Bilgin 2009, p. 117). These events pointed out to the Ottoman rulers the fact that the West was becoming militarily and technologically superior, and that it could pose a threat to the Empire either directly, by defeating it in the battlefield, or indirectly, by fostering discontent among the Empire’s subjects. In order to prevent further decline, and ultimately survive, the Empire began to adopt a strategy which would have a great impact on some the Ottoman elites’ worldviews, and would later be transmitted to Turkey’s Republican elites: modernization along Western lines in order to be recognized as an equal European state.

First, having recognized the West’s military and administrative superiority, a program of modernization of the army and the administration along Western lines was adopted. High-ranking statesmen were sent to Europe to study its military, civilization and education, and exchanges in the realms of military techniques and organization began to spread to other areas of life (Bozdağlioğlu 2003, p. 37). Young army officers and embassies’ bureaucrats became familiar with Western ways of life, culture and secular and materialist ideas. These military and bureaucracy officers trained in Westernized military schools or sent to Europe would emerge as the prime Westernizing/Modernizing force in modern Turkish history, particularly in the Young Turk period (1908-1918) and in the early years of the Republic (Bozdağlioğlu 2003, p. 38).

Second, the Empire attempted to be recognized as a part of the European State system (Karaosmanoglu 2000, p. 203). At first glance, the Empire’s wishes to be recognized as an equal European power seem to have been granted with the Treaty of Paris (1856), however Bilgin (2009, p. 116) argues that the fact that the Capitulations remained in place hints that the
Empire was not considered a full member, since its sovereignty continued to be disrespected. This desire to be recognized as an equal member of the European State system – which continued to be pursued by the Turkish Republic, the latest manifestation being its EU membership application - will be further explored later.

Third, in order to prevent internal discontent and, again, to avert European interference on behalf of the Empire’s Christian subjects, a reform movement, known as the Tanzimat [reorganization], was launched in 1839, aiming among other things, to grant full rights to non-Muslim subjects of empire. The idea was to inspire loyalty to the Empire among both Muslims and non-Muslims by fostering an Ottoman identity, a policy, known as Osmanlılık, or Ottomanism (Kushner 1977, p. 3). This policy of treating Jews and Christians as equals was not easily accepted by the Sunni Muslim majority (Karaveli 2010, p. 60). In addition, Ottoman rulers themselves were hesitant to part with Islam’s predominant position (Kushner 1977, p. 3). With the failure of this policy, the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1908) tried to instill loyalty among its subjects by appealing to the Islamic character of the Empire, a policy which became known as İslamiçilik, or Islamism. Again, this policy failed to achieve its goal of uniting a multi-cultural Empire under the Ottoman banner, and ethnic nationalist revolts led to the loss of several territories, including Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia. More worrying, even Muslim citizens, such as the Arabs, Kurds and Albanians, were also beginning to assert their identities (Kushner 1977, p. 5). Therefore, the reforms which aimed to prevent internal unrest and Western meddling in the Empire’s affairs failed on both counts.

The increase in the self-awareness of non-Turkish populations, and their growing desire to pursue self-determination, meant that the Turkish-speaking citizens were becoming the only loyal citizens of the empire. This fact did not go unnoticed among intellectuals, and in 1904, the Russian émigré Yusuf Akçura (1876-1933) published an article entitled “Three Ways of Policy” in a newspaper called Türk in Cairo, arguing that Turkism was a more viable political project than Ottomanism and Islamism. The state should be based on Turkish-speaking people, so that it could be founded upon “a faithful and cohesive nation” rather than on subjects with questionable loyalty (Kushner 1977, p. 5). Thus, the fist
articulations of Turkish identity were made out of the necessity to prevent the
Ottoman Empire from total collapse and it originated from a sense of
uniqueness and isolation felt by the Turkish-speaking part of the population.

The growth of self-awareness among the Turkish-speaking elite of the
Empire was also fed by several works published by European Orientalists, who
were increasingly interested in Asian peoples and their cultures (Kushner 1977,
p. 9). Kushner (1977, p. 9) mentions, among others, the works of Joseph de
Guignes (1756-1758), which contained facts about the pre-Islamic history of the
Turks, and of Arthur Lumley Davids (1832), whose grammar of the Turkish
language also included an appraisal of Ottoman Turks’ contributions to literature
and civilization in general. Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha, a Polish exile converted
to Islam, in a work published in 1869, also praised the Turks’ contribution to
civilization and developed the theory that Turks and Europeans belonged to the
same “Touro-Aryan race” (Kushner 1977, p. 9). Furthermore, the growing
number of Turkish-speaking émigrés from Russia, such as the above-
mentioned Yusuf Akçura, also contributed to an increase in the feeling of self-

These developments meant that, by the end of the 19th century, the term
Turk began to be more widely used and in a less derogatory manner. An article
published in the daily newspaper Ikdam in 1896 stated that “By religion
(diyanet) we are Muslims, by social order (heyet-I ictimaiye) we are Ottomans,
by nationality (kavmiyet) we are Turks” (quoted on Kushner 1977, p. 25).
History books published in the Hamidian period also began to focus on the
Turkish origins of the Ottomans. Ottoman historiography concentrated on the
period after the Ottomans had both converted to Islam and settled in Anatolia,
and only briefly mentioned their history before these two events. In contrast,
most of the history textbooks published after 1877 referred to the Turkish tribes
of Central Asia as the ancestors of the Ottomans (Kushner 1977, p.27-31).

The first general Turkish history book, published in 1900 by Necib Asim,
contains some of the defensive elements vis-à-vis the West which would later
characterize much of the early Republican historiography. The desire to be
recognized as an equal member of the European state system as a defensive
mechanism against European intervention is stated by the author, who
described as his purpose to prove the Turks’ inborn capacity to become civilized and civilize others, thereby disproving previous portraits of Turks as barbarians made by Europeans (in Kushner 1977, p. 31). Europe’s meddling in Ottoman internal matters, which was justified by Europeans pointing out to uncivilized and barbarous ways of the Turks, was trying to be countered by narratives portraying the Turks as civilized as Europeans. Therefore, praising the historical achievements of the Turks throughout history served two aims: to raise pride and self-awareness among the Turkish population, which were beginning to be recognized as the only loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire, and to stave off European criticism in order to avoid interference and thereby survive. This paradoxical view of the West and of Europe in particular, both admired for being perceived as the height of civilization and loathed for its desire to weaken and disintegrate Turkey will be one of the most enduring characteristics of Turkey’s Republican identity narrative and will have a fundamental impact on Turkey’s foreign policy. The Ottomans began a quest to be recognized as being part of the Western civilization in order to survive. The Republican elites would continue to pursue this quest, less as a matter of survival, and more as a matter of having Turkey recognized as a Western country, but the suspicion towards the West never fully subsided, as will be explained in these chapters.

Another enduring characteristic of the Turkish Republican psyche, blaming its geographical location for its misfortunes, can already be seen in an article published in Ikdam in 1896, which justified the fact that the Turks had not left great monuments such as those left by the Greeks, Romans, Iranians and Chinese by making reference to the places they managed to settle: “they [the Turks] were often surrounded by peoples who were bent on destroying what the Turks had built” (quoted on Kushner 1977, p. 31). The negative view towards the Arabs, exacerbated after World War I, as will be explained below, was also already being articulated in 1871, as can be seen in an article published in the newspaper Basiret, which described the Arabs as prone to internal strife and hasty action and disregarding of law and order, whereas Turks were described as being organized, having a concern for the law and thinking before acting (Kushner 1977, p. 34).
Even though during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid there were some manifestations of Turkish self-awareness, the Young Turks, who ruled the empire from 1908 to 1918 through the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) represented by a triumvirate of Enver Pasha, Cemal Pasha and Mehmet Talat, were reluctant to promote a Turkish identity. The Young Turks were a group of discontents with the despotic rule of Abdulhamid formed in schools like the military academy, school of medicine, school of administration, and the law school (Bozdaglioğlu 2003, p. 42). When in power, they embraced both Ottomanism and Islamism as their primary concern was saving the Ottoman Empire from disintegration, more than promoting a Turkish identity (Uzer 2011, p. 111).

The CUP continued to face pressures which were present long before it acceded to power such as the designs of European states on Ottoman territory and separatist movements among the non-Turkish communities of the Empire. After a coup d’état in 1913, the CUP gained complete control of the political situation and continued to pursue an agenda of modernization along European lines. The judicial and educational systems were secularized; religious courts were brought under the control of the secular Ministry of Justice and the religious colleges under the Ministry of Education. Nevertheless, most aspects of family law were still in the territory of Sharia law (Zurcher 1998, p. 121 and 122).

The Ottoman Empire finally collapsed after the First World War, and apart from having lost all of its territories outside Anatolia, the landmass of present day Turkey was divided between the winners of the conflict. The Treaty of Sevres (1920), negotiated with the Sultan, put Izmir under Greek rule, Antalya under Italian rule, Cilicia under French rule, the Straits under international control and it also suggested an Armenian state in North East Anatolia and a Kurdish entity in Southeast Turkey (Mufti 2009, p. 20). Greek troops were already in Izmir, Italian troops in Antalya, French troops in Cilicia and British, Italian and French troops were in the straits (Hale 2000, p. 46).

This Treaty represented the culmination of European designs to disintegrate the Empire, and exacerbated the already-present fear of European ill-intentions towards the Turks. Sevres would have left Turkey “helpless and
mutilated, a shadow state living on the sufferance of the powers and peoples who were annexing her richest provinces” (Bernard Lewis quoted in Drorian, 2005, p. 257). The Sevres Treaty had an enormous impact on Turkey’s perception of the West. Ties with the West have been distorted through the prism of the “Sevres Syndrome” (Drorian 2005, p. 258) and the Republican elites seems to hold on until today to the idea that Europe still wants to carve out Turkish territory. According to Philip Robins (2003), “Turkey smells conspiracy whenever Europeans insist on conditionality” (p. 103). Memory of schoolbooks featuring the map of Anatolia if Sevres had prevailed “is always very vivid in the minds of all those who have gone through the Republican educational system” (Soysal 2004, p. 41).

The picture of international politics that began to be propagated after Sevres is one in which foreign powers want to deny Turkey its territory and its very existence, which can only be guaranteed by the power of Turkish military and the self-sacrifice of the Turkish population, who must always be on alert to unmask the schemes plotted against Turkey, as will be further explored below. Robins (2003, p. 104) argues that this particular interpretation of Sevres is unfair, since the Treaty was never implemented and almost all Turkish wishes were later granted by the West in the form of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923). Regardless of that, the point is that the Treaty of Sevres has been frequently invoked by the Turkish state elites throughout Republican history and even to this day.

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk formed the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, bypassed the Sultan, declared sovereignty in the name of Turkey, and led the resistance against the occupying powers. During the War of Independence (1919-1923), the resistance movement was supported by the Bolshevik government with arms and material aid (Hale 2000, p. 51). Through diplomatic efforts, France and Italy, which were not willing to fight another war, signed peace deals and left Turkey in 1921. The resistance then fought a direct war with the Greece – being aided by Britain - which was won in 1922 (Hale 2000, p. 48, 49 and 51).

The War of Independence was not fought in the name of the Turkish nation, but in the name of Anatolian and Rumeli Muslim people (Altinay 2004, p.
18 and 19). In a speech outlining the national borders envisaged for the new Republic given in 1920, Mustafa Kemal said: “These borders have not been drawn only with military considerations; they are national borders [...]. But it should not be assumed that there is only one kind of nation within the Islamic element inside these borders. Within these borders there are Turks, there are Çerkes, as well as other Muslim elements. These borders are national borders for sibling nations” (quoted on Altinay 2004, p. 19).

The borders of the new Republic were consolidated after more than ten years of constant warfare. From 1914 to 1923, eighteen percent of the Muslim population had died (Mufti 2009, p. 181). The societal make-up of the country was also becoming less heterogeneous, due to the Armenian massacre of 1915 and the population exchange between Greece and Turkey, which took place between 1922 and 1924 and after which 1.2 million Greek Orthodox Christians from Anatolia and 400,000 Muslims from Rumeli were displaced. In 1913, one in five people in the territory that constitutes modern day Turkey were non-Muslims; by 1923 the ratio had become one in forty (Kadioglu 2011, p. 40). Even with all these changes in the societal composition of the new Republic, the country remained heterogeneous, the Kurds being the most numerous minority.

Heterogeneity had become synonymous with social unrest. The Ottoman Empire had crafted the policies of Ottomanism and Islamism to encourage loyalty among its diverse subjects to no avail. Allowing manifestations of ethnic diversity then became to be perceived as a first step towards disintegration and annihilation (Karaveli 2010, p. 90). The Young Turks and Republican elites, continuing the task of searching for a secure societal base, tried to solve the issue by diminishing and/or suppressing diversity, which not only led to terrible human suffering, but ultimately failed to achieve its aim (Karaveli 2010, p. 92).

The fact that foreign countries had aided minorities in their struggle for self-determination in order to weaken the Empire would lead to a view that domestic threats are fuelled by external sources, which would become very visible in the Kurdish case, for example. During the 1990s, Greece and Syria support for the terrorist organization PKK culminated in the idea that Turkey should be ready to fight two and a half wars (Elekdag 1996). More recently, when the AKP launched a “Kurdish initiative” in the summer 2009, with the aim
of granting more rights to Kurdish citizens, some members of the Republican elite, such as Yılmaz Ates, member of the Republican People's Party (CHP), perceived it as an American intrusion in Turkish internal affairs (Karaveli 2010, p. 28). The deputy argued that “the AKP did this [launch the initiative] because America demanded it”, with the intent of saving the PKK and establishing a Kurdish state in the region to serve as an ally. In addition, the deputy invoked Sevres and remembered how Western powers had tried “to evict us from Anatolia” after the First World War, thereby implying a sense of continuity between the two events (Karaveli 2010, p. 28).

**The early Republican period: the formulation of an “official” Turkish identity**

The new republic led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk started works to instill in the population a new Turkish identity. The writings of Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), the main ideologue of the CUP, are generally considered to have been very influential on the formulation of a Turkish identity (Taspinar 2005, p. 48). His view of Turkism incorporated aspects of Islam – which could be used as a bond of solidarity among the population – and of the West – in particular its scientific and technological advancements (Uzer 2011, p. 115). In Gökalp’s view, there was a difference between civilization and culture. While it was acceptable for Turkish culture to have an Islamic component, in order for the country to be modern, it would have to adopt European civilization. Because Islam belonged to the realm of culture, and westernization was a civilizational matter, it was possible to secularize and modernize the country without compromising the role of Islam in its culture (Taspinar 2005, p. 20).

Ziya Gökalp’s view of a nation did not entail “primordial” ethnic or racial characteristics, but acquired language, religion, morality and aesthetic received through the same education. In his view, racial differences are socially constructed and he thought that different capabilities of races and nations were not due to biological reasons, but due to social ones (Altınay 2004, p. 23). Different from Gökalp’s view that it was possible to adopt Western civilization without changing the culture of the country, others (like Yakup Kadri
Karaosmanoglu and Ahmet Agaoglu) thought that civilization could not be separated from culture, and prescribed the complete adoption of western civilization (minds, hearts, views and mentality as well as western science, knowledge and institutions) (Kosebalaban 2008, p. 12 and Kadioglu 2011, p. 47).

Some of Atatürk's writings suggest that he agreed with Gokalp's separation between civilization and culture. According to him, the Turkish nation was “a political and social entity composed of citizens tied together by a common language, culture and collective consciousness and ideals” (quoted on Taspinar 2005, p. 62). In practice, however, Atatürk did not seem to accept this division between culture and civilization. In order to become as powerful as the West, one needed to adopt western ways of life in their entirety. In addition, a racial/ethnic understanding of Turkishness became very strong in the early years of the Republic (Altinay 2004, p. 23).

Efforts at re-writing Turkish and Ottoman history began in the 1930s, with the aim of fostering a Turkish homogenous identity and proving the argument, already made in the late years of the Ottoman Empire, that Turks were never barbaric, but always civilized. The Turkish Historical Society and the Turkish Linguistic Society were founded in the early 1930s by Mustafa Kemal with these purposes. One of Atatürk’s adopted daughters Afet İnan, who became an influential member of the Turkish Historical Society wrote in 1939 that: “in 1928, in French geography books, there was a statement about Turks belonging to the yellow race and, thus, having a secondary status in European thinking in terms of their genotype. I showed it to him [Mustafa Kemal] and asked: ‘is this true?’ He said: ‘No, this cannot be true. We need to work on this. You should study this’ “ (quoted on Altinay 2004, p. 22). In her PhD research, completed in 1939, Afet İnan compared the skulls of sixty-five thousand Turks and concluded that Turks were a broad-headed race, which defines the white race (Altinay 2004, p. 22).

The movement towards the rediscovery of the Turks pre-Islamic past, which had began in the previous century, gained strength, and the glorious past of the pre-Islamic Turkish civilizations began to be praised. Among the “findings” of the Turkish History Thesis, which became the framework for
rewriting history textbooks, were that the Turks were members of the brachycephalic white race, had never been through a barbaric phase, and had founded many states and civilizations throughout history, including early civilizations in Egypt, Sumerian civilization in Mesopotamia, the Hittite Empire in Anatolia, the Great Hun Empire in Central Asia, the Seljuks, the Mogul Empire in India, and the Ottoman Empire (Altinay 2004, p. 22-25). Although the Turkish History Thesis is considered extreme nowadays, it still informs some textbooks (Altinay 2004, p. 130). For example, a textbook from 1998 used high school courses has the following quote from Ataturk: “[…] the Turkish nation is […] a great and old human community that has spread out towards and settled in the valleys of Mesopotamia and Egypt to start with, Central Asia before recorded history, Russia, Caucasus, Anatolia, old and new Greece, Crete, Central Italy before the Romans, in other words the coasts of the Mediterranean” (quoted on Altinay 2004, p. 128).

These researches also aimed to “prove” that Kurds, Laz and Çerkes had Turkish origins, but had forgotten about them (Altinay 2004, p. 23). Those “sibling nations”, recognized by Ataturk as such during the War of Independence, were denied existence. Now they were considered ancient Turks who had to be re-educated and reminded of their Turkishness (Kramer 2000, p. 40). This claim, although sounding absurd, was repeated until recently. In a course about the Kurdish issue given by the National Intelligence Agency (MIT) to diplomats in the 1980s, intelligence officials argued that there were no Kurdish people or Kurdish language, and that Kurds were actually Turkish nomads who made the sounds “kart, kurt” as they walked in the mountains (Karaveli 2010, p. 49). The Turkification policies continued with a campaign entitled “Citizens Speak Turkish” and the Turkification of non-Turkish names (Kadioglu 2011, p. 40). In 1925, the use of the ethnic terms “Kurd”, “Laz”, “Kurdistan” and “Lazistan” were banned. The use of Kurdish language was forbidden as were Kurdish names for children and Kurdish towns received Turkish names. Article 66 of the present constitution (from 1982) states that “everyone who is bound to Turkey by bonds of citizenship is a Turk” (Karaveli 2010, p. 77). Article 3 of the law on Family names, still in place, bans the use of surnames “belonging to foreign nations and races”. A recent Constitutional
Court ruling rejected an appeal by a Turkish citizen of Syriac origin to change his name on the grounds that it was “against national unity” (*Hurriyet Daily News* 2011b, p. n/a).

The Turkification policies also included the violence suppression of resistance movements against Ataturk’s conception of what the new Turkey should be like. In the early years of the Republic there was continuous resistance from Kurdish groups against the secular and nationalist ideology of the new country. The Kurdish provinces, which enjoyed great autonomy under the Ottoman Empire, also resented the centralized state authority, which was manifested in taxation, military conscription, police force and standardized education, among other things (Taspinar 2005, p. 79). Of the 18 anti-Ankara resurrections between 1924 and 1938, 17 were of Kurdish origin (Taspinar 2005, p. 79). A particularly bloody suppression campaign was the Dersim Operation. The government, led by Ismet Inonu, responded to a rebellion in Dersim, which took place in 1937 and was led by Seyyid Riza, the chief of a Kurdish tribe in the region, with air strikes. According to non-official records, 40,000 people were killed in the operation and 206 villages were evacuated. The leaders of the rebellion were executed and the province had its name changed to Tunceli (*Today’s Zaman* 2011d, p. 06).

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk promoted a series of westernizing/modernizing reforms which were similar to the reforms promoted during the Tanzimat period and by the Young Turks. The reforms had the aim of taking the country towards the level of contemporary civilization, namely European civilization. Again, to modernize in order to be recognized as an equal partner of the civilized West was a course of action that had already been taken during the Ottoman Empire. But the reforms undertaken in the early Republican period went a lot further. They were designed to create a complete rupture with the Ottoman past and included the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate (1923 and 1924, respectively); the re-modeling and secularization of the legal system along European lines, including family law, by the adoption of the Swiss Civil code and the Italian Penal code (1926); the replacement of the fez with European-style hat; the adoption of western calendar, numerals, weights and measures; the establishment of Sunday as the official day of rest instead of Friday; and
adoption of the Latin Alphabet (Taspinar 2005, p. 22 and 23). These changes served to improve ties with the West while at the same time cutting the links with the Islamic World and of Turkish society from its Ottoman and Middle Eastern Islamic traditions.

This early Republican period modernization project, which aimed to establish a secular and homogenous Turkish nation-state out of the collapsed Ottoman Empire, later became the basis of Turkey’s state ideology named as Kemalism, or Ataturkism. According to Çinar and Duran (2008), Kemalism “is the Turkish foundational ideology that can be defined as a controlled modernization project that aims at modernizing the polity and society, while, at the same time, failing to come to terms with the full implication of the unfolding modernization project” (p. 26). The basic principles of this ideology, which are represented by the six arrows depicted in the Republican People’s Party (CHP) logo, are: secularism, republicanism (Turkey should be a modern state, as in opposition to the Ottoman Empire), populism (aiming at no class division and the well-being of the whole population), nationalism (single, unified, homogenous nation), etatism (state influence on the economy), and revolutionism (continuous adaptation to new circumstances) (Buzan and Diez 1999, p. 44). This ideology has been transmitted to the majority of the administrative elites of Turkey - bureaucrats serving in the Foreign, Interior and Finance Ministry – by the education they receive at Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Sciences (Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi). This faculty is a continuation of the School of Political Sciences established in Ankara in 1938, which itself was a continuation of Mekteb-i Mülkiye founded in 1859 during Ottoman times (Mufti 2009, p. 24).

In terms of foreign policy, the Kemalist ideology is summarized by the slogan “Peace at Home, Peace in the World”. In Mufti (2009)’s view, this phrase represents the state elites’ quest for unity and order at home (Peace at Home) and to be left alone and leave others alone (Peace in the World) “to better pursue their overarching objective: engineering the transformation of Turkey’s masses into a modern nation-state” (p. 50). In other words, in the early years of the Turkish Republic, in order to consolidate the territorial integrity, sovereignty and homogenizing project envisaged for the country after years of wars, it was
considered vital to avoid international entanglements and expansionism. Atatürk’s approach was to avoid Pan-Turkism or Pan-Islamist ideas, and to settle for “Turkism in one country”.

To summarize so far, the Turkish identity that was formulated in the early years of the Turkish Republic stressed the homogeneity of the population, Turks in-born capacity to become civilized, as demonstrated by the Turkish History Thesis, and that further reforms were needed if Turks were to attain the level of contemporary civilization. One of the most important changes that had to occur in order to attain the level of contemporary civilization, in the eyes of Mustafa Kemal, was to replace the Ottoman-Islamic way of thinking based on superstition and religion with a modern way of thinking based on rationality and science. Islam was considered by Mustafa Kemal backwards and non-democratic and a hindrance to progress. According to one of his biographers, Atatürk thought that “Islam stood for authority, not discussion, for submission, not freedom of thought. The roundabout habits of mind and method which he [Atatürk] abhorred were habits inherent in the Moslem mentality. To him [Atatürk], political reform meant, in the first place, religious reform” (Kinross 2004, p. 45).

Education and law were secularized, but the secularization of the state was not complete. According to Kramer (2000, p. 57), the Republican regime maintained the Ottoman tradition of state control over religion, instead of the full separation between the two. The Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) was created to run mosques and to provide personnel for preaching. The national class of priests (Ulema) became state officials representing “official (Sunni) Islam”, but “folk Islam”, which has mystical elements and is represented by the Sufi brotherhood and religious orders, was declared illegal (Taspınar 2005, p. 25). Sufi religious schools were banned and an effort was made to de-Islamizing social life by eradicating the folk Islam preached in convents, lodges and shrines by sheiks and dervishes (Taspınar 2005, p. 26). Therefore, the secularization efforts of the early Republican period aimed at the secularization of social life, by attacking popular Islam, while at the same time it did not fully secularize the state.
A very important sub-product of this negative view of Islam was the othering of the Muslim Middle East as inferior by the Republican elites. As mentioned before, even though Islam was the “glue” that united Turkish and non-Turkish Muslims citizens of the Empire, there were already derogatory accounts about the Arabs being made in the late 19th century. With the nationalist upheavals in the Muslim territories of the Empire, Islam ceased to be a bond between Muslim Turks and non-Turks. The Turks were increasingly feeling isolated as the only loyal supporters of the Ottoman state. This feeling of isolation and mistrust vis-à-vis the Arabs was exacerbated during the First World War, when the Turks were “stabbed in the back” by the Arabs who aligned themselves with the winning powers (Jung 2005, p. 5). This negative view is exemplified by the words of Murat Karayalçin, member of CHP, former mayor of Ankara and foreign minister, who remembered the destruction of the Hicaz railway system: “Perhaps you’ve heard the name of Lawrence of Arabia, have you? That man...[laughs] in collaboration with ‘our Muslim brothers’ destroyed all that railway system” (Interview with Mural Karayalçin, 28.04.2011).

These bitter historical memories – which led to the view that Middle Eastern countries are untrustworthy - and the development of the view that Islam was backward contributed to the establishment of the Muslim Middle East as model of civilization that Turkey did not want to be identified with. If Europe was threatening because it was superior, the Middle East was viewed as threatening because it was inferior, a backward zone of conflict in which Islam introduces an element of irrationality, superstition, inefficiency and of dubious morals (Jung 2005, p.7). The preferred way to deal with this inferior other was through a “cautious, non-interventionist and hands-off approach” (Jung 2005, p. 7) in order not to be dragged into their conflicts. In the Turkish historical narrative, Turkey had become “encircled” by unfriendly countries, both by the former members of the Ottoman Empire and the West, always plotting to weaken or even disintegrate the country.

To summarize so far, according to the narrative of the Republican elites, the Ottoman Empire collapsed because of the betrayal of some its former members, who were aided by the West, which in any case was already plotting to weaken and disintegrate the Empire. All of these misfortunes were allowed to
happen because the Empire was too weak and corrupted by an Islamic mentality. Since the Empire’s demise, Turkey was left in a unique and difficult geographical location, being surrounded by the unstable regions of the Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans. Another element that was added to this narrative was that the only reason why the Turkish republic managed to survive given its traumatic history and its unfortunate geographical location was because of the military prowess of Ataturk and the self-sacrifice committed by the Turkish population during the War of Independence.

**The dissemination of “Turks have no friends but Turks”**

This idea that Turkey has a “unique” geographical position and is surrounded by unfriendly countries has had important consequences domestically and for Turkey’s relations with the outside world. Internally, the assumption that Turkey faces threats like no other European country has justified the military’s involvement in foreign policy making. In addition, the dissemination of a particular understanding of geopolitics as a “scientific” perspective on statecraft, understood only by the military, removed space for public debate on the conduction of Turkish foreign policy (Bilgin 2007, p. 746). Externally, this negative view of Turkey’s geography has led to a feeling of encirclement and the adoption of a cautious approach towards surrounding regions.

Bilgin (2007, p. 742-746) has shown that a geopolitical discourse gradually became rooted in the discourse of both the military and civilian actors. Geopolitics as a term and a body of knowledge was introduced to Turkey during World War II in articles written by authors impressed with Germany’s offensive strategies and the contribution of German geopoliticians to those (at that stage) successful strategies. After the war ended, even though geopolitics became stigmatized in the West because of its links with Nazi expansionism, in Turkey it continued to be portrayed as a “new science” that provided insight into the dynamics of regional and world politics. Geopolitical ideas began to be disseminated by the military, first as a series of lectures introduced in the curriculum of the Military Academy and then formalized as a course in 1967. By
framing geopolitics as a privileged perspective (because of its “scientific” quality) mastered by the military, these actors tipped the civil-military balance in favor of the latter. The military began to present itself as possessing “objective” knowledge whereas politicians would be holders of “subjective” beliefs and ideals. Therefore, alternative perspectives to the “geopolitical truths” professed by the military were labeled as unscientific, political or ideological.

Turkey’s geopolitical discourse was then disseminated by a variety of institutions, including compulsory military service (with access to all males older than 18 years-old) and the National Security Academy, which provides in-service training to high level civil servants and journalists (Bilgin 2007, p. 753). Another crucial channel of dissemination of geographical determinism has been the compulsory high school course “National Security”, designed and taught by the military since 1926. The course is taught by military officers on active duty, or, if one is not available, by a retired military officer (Altintas 2010, Today’s Zaman, p. n/a). In 1973, the textbook adopted in the course had the following description of geopolitics: “the definition and administration of government policies according to the necessities and inclinations of geography” (quoted in Bilgin 2007, p. 745).

The 1998 textbook claims that “the Turkish Republic, because of its geopolitical position, has to face schemes devised by external powers. The Turkish youth needs to be prepared to deal with such schemes” (quoted on Bilgin 2007, p. 746). The introduction page of the textbook states that:

“The Turkish Republic is faced with [political] games that have their origins outside of Turkey due to its geopolitical positioning. The Turkish youth needs to be ready for these games. And the most important requisite of being ready is to accept a secular and democratic system for Turkey and to have a developed awareness regarding this issue. The way to do this is to embrace Ataturk’s principles and revolutions not only at the level of ideas, but also at the level of lifestyle. As long as the Turkish youth is aware of these games and accept Ataturk’s principles and revolutions as a life style, there is no doubt that Turkey will reach the level of contemporary civilization. The aim of the National Security Knowledge is to inculcate these two important behaviors. The Turkish youth will learn these behaviors, and, thus, will not let Ataturk down” (quoted in Altinay 2004, p. 134).

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2 On January 24, 2012, the AKP government announced that the course would be abolished. (Today’s Zaman 2012, p. n/a)
The textbook provides a picture of Turkey as a country with no friends and of the outside world as potentially threatening, sometimes even existentially so. According to the textbook, Syria, Armenia and Greece all want a piece of Turkish territory and Iran wants to turn Turkey into a theocratic state. Internal threats, like Kurdish separatism, are originated externally. Given all the dangers surrounding Turkey, Turkey must have a strong military, and the only reason why Turkey has not been attacked in so many years is precisely because it has one (Altinay, p. 136).

This conspiratorial view of the outside world portrayed in these textbooks is not accepted by all segments of society. A civil society organization, The Freedom Association (Ozgur-Der), has frequently criticized the compulsory course. In the words of its President, Ridvan Kaya; “All aspects of political and social life in Turkey are overtaken by the weight of militarism. [...] the discipline and logic of the barracks remains uncompromised in its hold over every sphere of the country [...] Children start every day with the national anthem and pledge of allegiance and are subject to indoctrination by the official ideology. [...] The national security courses are the most concrete and ugliest instruments of this barracks-like education regime” (quoted in Altintas 2010, Today’s Zaman p. n/a).

As the quote above suggests, the textbooks prepared for the National Security course are far from being the only texts articulating the view that Turkey is surrounded by threats and alone in the world, depending on its military and on the self-sacrifice of its population to survive amidst so much hardship. In the pledge of allegiance referred to above, students have to take an oath every morning promising to “Let my existence be a gift to Turkish existence” (Hurriyet Daily News 2011a, p. n/a).

During the military rule from 1980-1983, a clip with the singer Muserref Akay, dressed in red uniform with the crescent and the star, and performing the song “Turkey my Paradise” was regularly aired on state TV. The clip featured the singer with Turkey’s monuments, tanks and soldiers alternating on the background. The lyrics of “Turkey My Paradise” include:

“Betrayal has infiltrated my heroic race
My enemies are not brave, they are cowards
There is no friendly nation to the Turk [...] 
Let us celebrate the principles of our father [Mustafa Kemal] 
Let us run towards the goals he has shown us 
Turkey, Turkey my paradise” (Oktem 2011, Today’s Zaman, p. 06)

According to Kerem Oktem, “Turkey My Paradise” was used in torture sessions during the junta years and the rights to the song were bought in 2007 by a survivor of torture, Cem Yilmaz, to prevent the song from being performed in public again (Oktem 2011, Today’s Zaman, p. 06)

Although “Turkey My Paradise” cannot be listened to in public any more, (except for in the internet, where it is readily available) other means are still in use in order to inculcate in the Turkish youth the idea that they stand alone in the world and that the Turkish nation depends on them and on a strong military in order to survive. Atatürk’s 1933 “Address to the Youth”, presented in textbooks and classroom walls, begins as “O the Turkish Youth, your first duty is to preserve Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic forever. This is the only basis for your future and your existence” and then goes on to warn Turkish children that Turkey might be attacked anytime by “enemies from within and from without” and that “imperialists […] want to enslave the Turkish nation” (quoted by Akyol 2011a, Hurriyet Daily News, p. 12).

When columnist Mustafa Akyol wrote a piece suggesting the abandonment of the “Address to the Youth”, he received hundreds of comments blaming him for “insulting Ataturk, insulting the Turkish nation, helping the ‘enemies without’ and being one of the ‘enemies within’”. Dozens of readers also labeled him as a traitor who deserved to be imprisoned or killed, while others directly threatened him (Akyol 2011a, Hurriyet Daily News, p. 12).

Annual festivals in commemoration of certain feats of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s life also serve as a reminder of the severity of threats faced by Turkey in the past, which were only eliminated by the combination of the military prowess of Atatürk with the self-sacrifice of the Turkish nation. The “Youth Day” on May 19th celebrates the arrival of Atatürk’s boat in Samsun, where he launched his mission to join and lead the War of Independence against allied powers occupying Turkey; “National Sovereignty and Children’s Holiday’ on April 23rd celebrates the day Atatürk opened Parliament; August 30th commemorates Atatürk’s victory in the battle against the occupying Greek
forces, October 29th celebrates the proclamation of the Republic; and November 10th commemorates Ataturk’s death (Akyol 2011b, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a).

During these festive days, students gather in school yards or stadiums and are “enlightened about all the great things that Ataturk did for us: he ‘saved’ us from the Sultan, liberated us from the enemies and gave us the unshakable ‘principles’ that will guide the nation to eternity” (Akyol 2011b in Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a). The celebrations for “Youth day” also include “thousands of youngsters in stadium tribunes, who hold placards that collectively form huge images as the national flag, portraits of Ataturk, or slogans referring to Ataturk, such as ‘we are on your path’ (Akyol 2011b in Hurriyet Daily News, 20.05.11, p. n/a).

Other means to inculcate Ataturk’s principles and views about what Turkey should look like include writing contests among primary school children in commemoration of April 23rd “National Sovereignty and Children’s Holiday”. In 2011, the topic of the contest in southwestern Fethiye was “If Ataturk were alive, how would he have wanted Turkey to be”? The winning essay, written by a 12-year-old girl, and entitled “Our Eternal Leader” included the following: “As every child born as a Turkish citizen, I started to learn about Ataturk at an early age. We learn about him, his principles and his view of life first from family members then continue learning about him through our school life. I wish I had the opportunity to know him. When Ataturk made the hat and dress revolution, he wanted Turkish women to dress according to a modern society. In today’s Turkey, Ataturk would have seen many deficiencies in this area” (quoted by Sahindas 2011, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a) probably referring to women who wear the Muslim headscarf.

Gradually, civilian actors also began to invoke geographical determinism when articulating foreign policy choices. The 1961 constitution, adopted after the 1960 coup, helped create a domestic environment in which it was possible to question the previous consensus in foreign policy. New parties with different views began to enter the National Assembly and to question policy positions. Nevertheless, some of them also began to make their case for a different foreign policy orientation invoking assumptions of geographical determinism. For example, Bulent Ecevit, Prime Minister during certain periods in the 1970s,
justified his reevaluation of Turkish foreign policy by saying that “Turkey is geopolitically situated in such a critical part of the world that she is bound to be influenced by events and developments taking place in the distant parts of the world” (quoted on Bilgin 2007, p. 748). Others with more conservative convictions on foreign policy issues resorted to geopolitics when defending the status quo. In other words, different political and military actors began to embrace the discourse that Turkey’s geographical location is more unique than others are and that it has more deterministic power over Turkey’s policies than in some other countries. The result was a de-politicization of foreign policy choices and the marginalization of alternatives.

As a result, this view that Turkey has no friends and that there are countries plotting to weaken and disintegrate Turkey became widespread among the population, as can be seen in the answers to the question “Do you think many countries make plans to separate Turkey?” posed in a survey conducted in the 2000s:

Table 1: Do you think many countries make plans to separate Turkey? (USAK 2010, p. 162)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>54.55%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>36.27%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No idea</td>
<td>9.18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Although there was a decrease in the percentage of people who think there are states plotting to divide Turkey in the 2009 survey, 54.55% - more than half of the population – still think this is the case, which is still quite high for a healthy state and society (USAK 2010, p. 162).

**Characteristics of the Republican security culture**

As described in the first chapter, security culture is a **set of ideas, rooted in a security community’s pluralistic conception of its identities, comprising**
assumptions about what constitutes insecurities and the best way to tackle them. I argued in the first chapter that security culture is rooted in the interpretation of historical experiences and their dissemination; that these historical narratives serve to inculcate or reinforce a certain identity, which is formulated in relation to other groups’ identities; and that the constructed nature of the other will influence the choice of particular policy actions.

Following this framework, the previous sections described how the development of the Republican elites’ conception of Turkish identity is deeply connected to the Ottoman Empire’s decline and the role its former members and Europe played in it. As we have seen, according to the narrative of the Republican elites, the Ottoman Empire collapsed because of the betrayal of some of its former members, who were aided by the West, which was already plotting to weaken and disintegrate the Empire. All of these misfortunes occurred because the Empire was too weak and corrupted by an Islamic mentality. Since the Empire’s demise, Turkey was left in a unique and difficult geographical location, being surrounded by unfriendly countries. In this narrative, the outside world is viewed with suspicion and labeled as potentially threatening, sometimes even existentially so, and important others are Europe and the Muslim Middle East.

Europe is both admired and viewed with suspicion. The bitter historical memories of the West contributing to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire by fostering internal discontent and of the Treaty of Sevres, which would deny Turkey most of its territories, still influence the way the Republican elites perceive the West. In order to counter the initial threat posed by Europe, the preferred course of action became to pursue a modernization program (in order to reach the levels of contemporary civilization and stave off European criticism) and to be recognized as an equal partner in the European State system. Although in time the wish to be recognized as equal became less about survival and more about having its Western identity confirmed, a certain mistrust towards Europe still remains in the Republican security culture.

This mistrust would become very clear later in the stance taken by the Republican elites towards EU membership. Although they want to become a part of the Western community of nations, particularly the EU, to have their
Western identity confirmed, they are very fearful of some of the conditions needed to be met in order to be accepted as a member state. Because of the bitter historical memories mentioned before, the Republican elites became very sensitive with regards to Turkey’s sovereignty. In their view, if the sovereignty of the country is disrespected, this could precipitate the disintegration of Turkey. For example, EU demands that Turkey recognize and grant rights to minorities, such as the Kurds, and strengthen democracy by reducing the power of the military, are filtered by the Sevres Syndrome and perceived as the latest attempt by the West to disintegrate Turkey with the help of internal enemies. Therefore, although to be accepted by the EU is a goal, actually participating in the European integration process, which entails the delegation of some national powers to Brussels, is seen as problematic.

The Middle East is another which, although not so threatening as Europe, is also viewed with suspicion. Historical experiences led to the view that Middle Eastern countries are untrustworthy and the construction of Turkish identity as secular – and the corresponding negative view towards Islam – contributed to the establishment of the Muslim Middle East as a backward and irrational zone of conflict that can drag Turkey to an undesirable place. The preferred course of action in this case has been to stay away from Middle Eastern affairs.

Finally, the successive nationalist upheavals, which sped up the contraction of the Empire, led to a sense of isolation among the Turks which felt as the only loyal supporters of the Empire. The fact that European powers had aided minorities in their struggle for self-determination led to the view that domestic threats are fuelled by external sources. In addition, the fact that Turkey remained surrounded by former members of the Empire, and Europe, led to the idea that Turkey is in an unfortunate geographical location, alone in the world, being surrounded by unfriendly countries bent on weakening Turkey.

To summarize, the Republican security culture is rooted in a Turkish identity seen as western, homogenous, modern and secular and is characterized by a sense of isolation (“Turks have no friends but Turks”), of being in a unique geographical location, surrounded by unfriendly countries devising schemes to weaken or even disintegrate Turkey with the help of
enemies within. This security culture has influenced a foreign policy aiming at Turkey being accepted in the Western community of nations, while at the same time being very defensive of its sovereignty. To prevent being engulfed by the problems emanating from the Muslim Middle East, Turkey should avoid engagements with the region. Domestically, because Turkey is faced with so many threats, the military, as the master of “scientific” geopolitical knowledge, should maintain a privileged position in foreign policy-making. In addition, a large army is maintained through conscription (Drorian 2005, p. 269) and a high military spending is justified because “the geopolitical realities of the region compel Turkey to increase her defense expenditure in order to be able to protect her territorial integrity and maintain her security” (Elekdag 1996, p. 33). Moreover, Turkey should be ready to employ force to defend its national security, since the projection of military force, or the threat to use force outside Turkish borders are considered essential according to Turkey’s Republican security strategy (Oguzlu 2002, p. 66).

Dissenting voices: contesting the “official” Turkish identity as secular and homogenous

As has been discussed in chapter 1, security cultures and the identity narratives underpinning them can be contested. Different groups in the same community may have different interpretations of historical events, and narrate them in different ways, reinforcing or creating different identity constructions and corresponding insecurities. This has been the case in Turkey. The attempt by Ataturk and his followers to inculcate a new Turkish identity in the population was not completely successful. Ataturk’s attempt to create one Turkish nation by creating one secular educational system with teaching and schoolbooks monopolized by the state, controlling religion and banning folk Islam activities partially failed (Inalcik 2006, p. 89). In spite of all the efforts to ban folk Islam during the early Republican period, religious orders (tarikatler) and communities (cemaatler) clandestinely continued in rural Anatolia. The heterogeneity of Turkish society persisted.
In an article entitled “Who are the Turks?” Mustafa Akyol (2011c) argued that Turkey is nowadays composed of “several nations under the Star and Crescent” (p. 17): the conservatives (muhabzakarlar), whose main source of values is Sunni Islam and are currently represented by the Justice and Development Party (AKP); the secularists (laikler) or Kemalists, represented by the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Military, and other state institutions; the Kurds, who constitute about 15% of the population; and the religious minorities, including Muslims of the Alevi sect and non-Muslims such as Armenians, Greeks and Jews.

These different groups have different ideas about what constitutes Turkish identity and consequently have different views about Turkey’s external environment and how Turkey should engage with it. In this thesis I focus only on conservatives and Kemalists because they are the ones who have managed to capture power and gain access to foreign policy making. Although the other groups are sometimes represented in Parliament, they do not constitute a strong enough group to have their views expressed in foreign policy. The Kemalists’ view of Turkish identity, which groups are perceived as others, which are the natures of these others and how they should be dealt with has been explored in this chapter. The identity conception of the conservatives and their accompanying foreign policy views will be explored in detail in the next chapter.

This part will briefly sketch how manifestations of heterogeneity began to timidly appear during the Cold War years, revealing cracks in the Republican project to create one nation with homogenous features. The next chapter will deal in more detail with the rise of the conservatives, but it is important at this point to describe their slow ascendance during the Cold war period.

During the years of single-party rule, the ruling CHP prioritized statist industrialization at the expense of the heavily taxed agricultural sector (Taspinar 2005, p. 121). In contrast, after the transition to multiparty politics, the Democratic Party (DP) began to represent the interests of rural Anatolia. In addition, from the late 1940s onwards the militant secularism of the 1920s and 1930s was replaced by the instrumental use of Islam in electoral politics, facilitated by the anticommunist stance of the centre-right parties that dominated Turkish politics during most of the Cold War. The DP had a more
relaxed approach to Islam and after 1950, under the Adnan Menderes government, several religious brotherhoods, such as the Nurcu order, were allowed to operate relatively openly and there was an extension of religious education, with the opening of Iman Hatip schools (Kramer 2000, p. 61). All centre-right parties, such as the Justice Party (AP) led by Suleyman Demirel in the 1960s and 1970s and the Motherland Party (ANAP), led by Turgut Ozal in the 1980s, encouraged the establishment of these schools. The pupils of these schools have all entered Turkey’s public and private sector (Kramer 2000, p. 61). Hence, people from religious backgrounds began to populate the civil service and the judiciary, slowly breaking the monopoly of the Kemalist elites. Moreover, these parties all established good relations and (sometimes patron-client) networks with the religious orders, which has originated the expression “Tarikat vote” (Kramer 2000, p. 63). Therefore, these centre-right parties that have been in power almost interruptedly have tried to incorporate Islam as a cultural tradition to politics (Kramer 2000, p. 63).

In fact, in spite of the fervent secularism of the early Republican period, and Ataturk’s personal dislike of Islam, Islam has been considered an important component of Turkish identity. The non-Muslim minorities recognized in the Treaty of Lausanne (Jewish, Armenians and Greeks) were considered half-Turks. The Wealth tax imposed in 1942-1944 which taxed non-Muslims much more heavily than Muslims and the September 6 and 7 1955, when shops of non-Muslims were attacked, are some of the incidents which illustrate this point.

The Democratic (DP), Justice (AP) and Motherland (ANAP) parties, although they did softened Kemalist principles, they did not deviate from them, since Islam did not represent a political ideology for these parties, but the cultural tradition of the Anatolian masses to be explored for electoral purposes (Kramer 2000, p. 63).

While the mainstream political parties tolerated Islamic values without negating Kemalist principles, in the 1970s proper Political Islam began to emerge, in the form of the National Salvation Party (MSP) under Necmettin Erbakan. Erbakan managed to gather support from conservative and economically less developed regions of central and eastern Anatolia and was backed by Sufi orders. Contrary to the Kemalist policy of denying the Ottoman
past, this party began to idealize and praise the old Empire. The Ottoman religious past began to be reevaluated positively and to be viewed as a helpful way to allow Turks to rediscover their Muslim past after the secular reforms and state-sponsored histories imposed by Kemalism (Guida 2008, p. 44). Turkey, as the obvious heir of the Ottoman Empire, according to the Islamist view of foreign policy, should play a more central role in the Middle East since it is the natural leader of the Islamic nations, demonstrating a “somewhat narcissistic self-understanding” (Guida 2008, p. 44). When part of governing coalitions in the 1970s, however, the National Salvation Party (MSP) avoided radicalization, and operated within the system rather than trying to bring about an Islamic revolution (Taspinar 2005, p. 136).

Furthermore, even the secularist establishment started to treat religion as an ideology that could be co-opted for its own ends and could serve the interests of the state (Taspinar 2005, p. 138). After the unrest in the 1970s caused by left-right clashes, the centre-right parties, Islamist groups and the military united in the fight against communism, and supported “a dose of religion [which] was considered by all groups to be an effective vaccination against leftism” (Kramer 2000, p. 64). The military government, after the coup of 12th of September 1980, actually relied on religion to re-educate the people, and the 1982 Constitution established the mandatory teaching of Islam in primary and secondary schools. Schoolbooks were re-written to reconcile nationalism and Islam: “The best Turk is a Muslim Turk and the best Muslim is a Turkish Muslim” (quoted in Kramer 2000, p. 65-66). The army itself began to support the idea of a “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” to de-politicize Turkish society and curb the influence of the left. It is important, however, to point out that the military, although no longer against Islam as a source of morality at the level of the individual, continued to be against Islam at the level of the state (Heper 2005, p. 228).

As for the Kurds, in the 1960s, given the economic underdevelopment of the Kurdish provinces, and the fact that most of the land was owned by Kurdish landlords, Kurdish intellectuals began to embrace a leftist ideology (Taspinar 2005, p. 90). However, in the 1970s, dissatisfied with the way their cause was being handled by Turkish leftists, Kurdish activists increasingly wanted to be
recognized as a separate ethnic group capable of leading a proletarian revolution of their own (Taspinar 2005, p. 94). It was under these circumstances that the PKK was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1977, mobilizing the most destitute Kurdish population against the collaboration of Kurdish landlords with the Turkish ruling class (Taspinar 2005, p. 94 and 95). The 1982 constitution drafted by the military junta drastically strengthened cultural and political suppression in the southeastern provinces (Taspinar 2005, p. 96). All the provisions of the constitution towards this end, such as the prohibition of expressing, diffusing, publishing opinions in any other language than Turkish, were formulated without a single reference to the word ‘Kurdish’ (Taspinar 2005, p. 97), following the principle of denial of Kurdish ethnicity by the Kemalist establishment, which considers granting Kurdish cultural rights as the first step towards the formation of a Kurdish federation and the eventual disintegration of Turkey. Furthermore, the military engaged in a brutal repression of the PKK in the southeastern provinces, with the counterproductive effect of boosting Kurdish dissent and PKK popularity. In 1984, the PKK initiated its attacks on Turkish forces (Taspinar 2005, p. 99).

This brief historical overview aimed to show that the Republican elites’ conception of Turkish identity was not accepted by the entire Turkish population. Different groups held different views about what being Turkish meant, what the external environment is like, and how Turkey should engage with it. In other words, the Republican security cultural paradigm was not accepted by every actor in Turkey. The next session will illustrate how the Republican security culture influenced the foreign policy conducted during the Cold War. It will also show some timid attempts by other groups to deviate from the Republican foreign and security policies.

The attempts to establish better relations with the Middle East or the Soviet Union, as will be described below, were made mainly as a result of disappointment with the West or when Islamists and Leftist-oriented actors were in government. However, these attempts at diversifying Turkish foreign policy did not fundamentally challenged the Republican elites’ quest for acceptance to the Western camp because the governments in power could only go so far in their attempt to establish ties outside the Western alliance. This limited space
for maneuver of Turkish governments was due to the fact that, during the Cold War years, although there were discussions about some aspects of the country’s foreign policy, the grand strategy belonged not to the government of the day but to the “highest priests of Kemalism” namely the diplomats in Ministry of Foreign Affairs and senior officer corps of the military (Robins 2003, p. 69). As explained above, the bureaucrats from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were in the main educated in the same institution, Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Sciences (Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi). As for the military, it expressed its opinion on foreign policy through the National Security Council (MGK) which gained constitutional status in 1961. Therefore, governments had, for the most part, to implement the policies formulated by the Turkish bureaucratic elite, especially if these policies were labelled “state policies” or “national causes” (Kaliber 2005, p. 329). On “national security” issues, for example Cyprus, a former Foreign Minister declared that “governments may have changed and may change, but policy on Cyprus does not change” (Haluk Bayulken quoted on Kaliber 2005, p. 329).

**Republican security culture and Turkish Foreign Policy during the Cold War**

From 1923 until the beginning of the Cold War, the new Turkish Republic adopted a position of neutrality. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s priority during those two decades was to establish the borders and the sovereignty of the new state and to consolidate his domestic reforms. Turkey did develop close political and economic ties with England and France (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 57) and initiated the Saadabad Pact with Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan (p. 115), but overall the strategy was to avoid dependence on any single power. Therefore, Turkish foreign policy in the early years of the Republic risk-averse and non-interventionist.

During the Second World War, Turkey, led by Ismet Inonu since Ataturk’s death in 1939, continued to adopt a position of neutrality, shifting its policy according to the circumstances and managing to resist the pressure to join the war either on the Axis or Allies side (Hale 2000, p. 79). Turkey finally joined the
war in February 1945 against Germany as a bargaining chip to be admitted into
the proposed United Nations.

After the end of the Second World War, Turkey abandoned its position of
neutrality and finally joined the Western alliance, first by joining the then
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, now OECD) in 1948,
then the Council of Europe in 1949 and by applying to become a member of
NATO in 1950 and an associate member of the European Economic
Community in 1959 (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 58). Turkey’s application for NATO
membership was first rejected on the grounds that Turkey “did not belong either
to Western Europe or the Atlantic” (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 59). Turkey was
finally accepted in 1952, after sending troops to Korea.

There are different interpretations as to why Turkey abandoned its
neutral position and joined the Western camp. According to Hale (2000, p.
110), Turkey joined the Western alliance because it was feeling threatened by
the Soviet Union. Stalin had plans to revise the use of the straits, to establish
bases there, and he claimed parts of Turkish territory, Kars and Ardahan (Hale
2000, p. 111 and 112). Ahmad (2004, p. 24) adds that there was the wish to
reap material benefits from the alignment with the West. Both the Republican’s
People Party (CHP) and the Democratic Party (DP) wanted to develop the
economy and modernize the country, and in their view this would only be
achieved with outside help, particularly from the United States, which was seen
as the best-equipped country to provide Turkey military and financial aid. This
aid materialized in the form of the Marshal Plan and the Truman Doctrine.

Although both concerns seem legitimate, it should not come as a surprise
that Turkey chose to join Western institutions, since it had been trying to be
recognized as a member of the West since the late years of the Ottoman
Empire. In the words of former President Suleyman Demirel, writing in 1999: “on
February 1952, Turkey became a member of NATO. Turkey was not only
compelled by her anxieties emanating from Soviet claims concerning her
territorial integrity and sovereignty, but also by her strong belief in the common
values of the Alliance. By deciding to join NATO, the Turkish nation anchored its
destiny to the West […] Turkey’s membership of NATO also constituted a
reconfirmation of Turkey’s Western credentials” (quoted in Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 83).

The prospects of being accepted as a European state, which began as a quest for survival and later became a quest to have Turkey’s Western identity confirmed, intensified with the signing of the Ankara Agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963, which provided a road map for future integration, such as the future establishment of a custom union and possible full membership (Robins 2003, p. 105 and 106). Ismet Inonu argued that “being a member of the Western world and in view of our regime, from the start we were always enthusiastic about the EEC. We want to join the community” (quoted in Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 69). Similarly, the vice Prime Minister of Turkey stated at the time that “Turkey’s desire to participate in the European Economic Community as an associate member was not based only on short term and simple foreign policy trade calculations. It confirms that Turkey shares the same destiny with the free West and that European borders are drawn through east and southern Turkey” (Turhan Fevzioglu, quoted on Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 69). At the signing of the agreement, Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin recognized that “this agreement is essentially an economic agreement” but also emphasized that it “confirms and approves Turkey’s desire to be part of Europe” (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 70).

One of the most controversial foreign policy initiatives taken by Turkey during the Cold War was its decision to join the Baghdad Pact, a Middle East defense alliance established in 1955 by Turkey, Britain, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. It was controversial because it was one of the only instances in which Turkey abandoned its policy of non-involvement in Middle Eastern affairs during the Cold War period. In addition, it was not well-received in the Middle East, with Egypt and Syria denouncing it as an instrument of Western imperialism (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 118). The Pact was short-lived and ended in 1958 due to the fall of the pro-Western government of Iraq in a coup d’etat, although it continued to exist as a weak alliance between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan until the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Hale 2000, p. 127). Adnan Menderes, the Prime Minister at the time, was a fierce anti-communist and suggested military intervention in Iraq to restore the previous pro-Western regime and sent troops
to the border of Syria when there was a danger of takeover by local communists (Hale 2000, p. 128 and 129). Mufti (2009, p. 4 and 5) argues that the Menderes government’s more activist foreign policy broke with the Republican paradigm of non-involvement in Middle Eastern affairs because it was animated by a different strategic culture, which he calls Imperial. Holders of this Imperial strategic paradigm, such as Menderes and his foreign minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu, considered that the Turkey’s external environment could bring great benefits to Turkey if engaged with and reshaped. Mufti (2009) claims that Turgut Ozal, and possibly the AKP, also hold this other strategic culture. It is important to stress that, even if it was that case that the Menderes government did not share all of the Republican elites’ security perceptions, it did not deviate from their Western orientation. After Menderes was ousted by a military coup in 1960, the military thought that the Baghdad Pact had been a fiasco, and decided to revert to the position of non-interference in Middle Eastern affairs, maintaining “correct” relations with the Arab countries and Israel (Robins 2003, p. 99).

Membership of several Western institutions seemed to point out that Turkey was finally being welcomed in the European/Western community of nations. However, the sense of isolation, the idea that “Turks have no friends but Turks” and that the West was not to be trusted resurfaced after two events which took place in the early 1960s: the Cuban missile crisis and the Johnson letter. To resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962-63, the United States decided to remove Jupiter missiles based in Turkey in exchange for the Soviet Union not installing missiles in Cuba (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 61). Turkey felt that its security needs were not being met by the United States.

US president Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 letter to Prime Minister Inonu came as a response to Turkey’s considerations on whether it should intervene militarily in the island of Cyprus, which had been experiencing an increase in intercommunal fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The letter warned that, if Turkey intervened in Cyprus, and if it was attacked by the Soviet Union as a response, NATO forces would not protect the country (Hale 2000, p. 149). This letter reinforced the feeling that, even though it had been accepted in a Western security alliance, the West did not keep its commitments, and Turkey
ultimately had to rely on itself for its security. Turkey eventually intervened militarily in Cyprus in 1974, and as a response the United States imposed an arms embargo against the country, further reinforcing the perception that the West is not a trustworthy partner.

The Cuban Missile Crisis, the Johnson letter and the American arms embargo led to an increase in anti-American feelings in the country and to demands from some sectors of society, especially the Islamists and the leftists, that Turkish Western foreign policy orientation be revised. In the mid-1960, Turkey began a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which was materialised in the form of financial aid and the shift of Soviet position on Cyprus, especially after the 1967 right-wing military coup in Greece (Hale 2000, p. 150 and 151).

In addition, a more pro-Arab stance began to be observed from the government of Suleyman Demirel (Justice Party) who took the post of Prime Minister in 1965 onwards. Furthermore, during the 1970s, a coalition government between the National Salvation Party led by Necmettin Erbakan and the Republican People’s Party led by Bulent Ecevit began to question Turkey’s reliance on the West, but for different reasons. Erbakan had an Islamist worldview and claimed that Turkey belonged to the Islamic civilization, whereas Ecevit had a more leftist orientation and wanted to diminish Turkey’s dependence on the West (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 125). As a result of the disappointment with the West and the accession to power of leftists and Islamist groups, Turkey’s relationship with the Muslim Middle East improved. Turkey began to participate in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1969, refused to have its bases used by the US to send aid to Israel in the wars of 1967 and 1973, but allowed the Soviet Union to use its air space to send aid to Egypt and Syria in 1973 (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 125). Furthermore, a Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) office was opened in Ankara in 1979 (Hale 2000, p 171) and in 1980 Turkey downgraded diplomatic relations with Israel (Martin 2004, p. 181). Moreover, from 1965 to 1992, no Turkish minister visited Israel (Inbar 2001, p. 115).

Hale (2000, p. 169) argues that Turkey decided to participate in the OIC and to have a more pro-Palestinian policy as a result of disappointment with the West after the Johnson letter and with Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. In
addition, Turkey wanted to secure Arab support for its stance on Cyprus and to guarantee Middle Eastern oil in a time of oil price rises. Kirisci (2000, p. 39) agrees with Hale on the realpolitik motivations behind the rapprochement with the Arab world, but also points out to the fact that pro-Islamic or leftist parties were in power when this reconciliation happened.

The negative economic effects of the association with Europe established in the 1963 Ankara Agreement, and confirmed with the signature of the Additional Protocol in 1970, also exacerbated anti-Western sentiments in the country. Turkish national industries were struggling to cope with the growth of imports from Europe. Islamists opposed the Common Market on the grounds that it was a scheme to assimilate Turkey into Christian Europe and leftists disagreed with the free market principles underpinning the agreement (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 73). In 1978, under the government of the coalition of leftist Ecevit and Islamist Erbakan, the terms of the Ankara agreement were frozen. There was a decrease in the volume of trade and in the amount of financial assistance provided to Turkey, which was also a result of the economic difficulties Europe was facing due to the 1973 oil crisis (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 74).

To summarize, successive Turkish governments since the 1960s have tried to diversify the country’s foreign policy, establishing relationships with the Arab countries and even with the Soviet Union at times. These new relationships, however, did not constitute an alternative to the Western alliance. Turkey continued throughout the Cold War to be a firm member and supporter of NATO and pushed for further integration with Europe, signing the Ankara Agreement in 1963 and the Additional Protocol in 1970. A debate in the period from 1966 to 1968 on whether Turkey should remain a member of NATO and adopt a more independent foreign policy did not lead to any significant change (Hale 2000, p. 151 to 153). Nihat Erin, foreign policy spokesman of the CHP, said in 1968: “Turkey is a Western country and will follow a Western foreign policy as Ataturk showed […] Turkey is a country which is striving to be modern and taking her place in the front ranks of Western civilization” (quoted in Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 66).
The traumatic events of the Missile Crisis, the Johnson letter and the American arms embargo reinforced the idea that the West is not trustworthy, and therefore Turkey had to rely on itself. These betrayals by the West triggered an attempt to improve relations with the Soviet Union and Arab countries, but the quest to be accepted by the West remained as strong as its suspicions about the West. Turkey continued to pursue further integration with Europe and in 1987 it applied for full membership of the European Community. Vahit Halefoglu, then Foreign Minister, explained that the application was a “result of our foreign policy goal to integrate Turkey with Western civilization since the establishment of the Republic” (quoted in Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 70).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have investigated how historical experiences were interpreted and propagated in Turkey, helping form certain identities, the corresponding natures of the others and the preferred and acceptable ways to relate to these others. I have also mentioned that, even though this particular identity construction was not accepted by all segments of Turkish society, it nonetheless became the “official” Turkish identity and became the roots of the Republican security culture.

The Republican security culture is thus rooted in a Turkish identity conceived as Western and homogenous and is characterized by a sense of loneliness, geographical misfortune, and an insecurity complex. This security culture prescribes integration to Western political structures as a confirmation of its Western identity, and non-involvement in Middle Eastern affairs, in order not to be dragged to a zone of conflict whose identity Turkey does not want to be identified with. During the Cold War, the Republican security paradigm influenced the adoption of a foreign policy aiming at being fully integrated with Western institutions and a careful approach towards the Middle East.

Therefore, the analyses by Buzan and Diez (1999), Bilgin (2004), Oguzlu (2002), Desai (2005), Ruacan (2007), Oguzlu and Kibaroglu (2008), and Ustun (2010), reviewed in chapter one, which concluded that Turkey possesses a culture of insecurity, in which many issues, internal and external, are viewed
through the lens of security, describe Turkey’s Republican security culture. As we have seen, according to those analyses, the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the homogenous and secular character of the country are the main security referents, to be protected with the threat or the use of force, if necessary. This picture is correct, in so far as it describes one of Turkey’s security cultures.

From the 1980s onwards, this Republican security culture will begin to loose ground. Other identities will begin to resurface, and different security discourses will begin to make themselves heard. These identities and security discourses which began to be heard more frequently from the 1980s onwards will be discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 3 – Turkey’s neo-Ottomanist security culture

Introduction

In the previous chapter, the analytical framework developed in chapter 1 was employed in the analysis of Turkey’s Republican security culture. I looked at historical experiences and how they were interpreted and propagated helping form Turkish identity and the correspondent insecurities and natures of the others. I also illustrated the influence of this security culture on foreign policy by looking at Turkey’s behavior in external affairs during the Cold war.

I explained that attempts to modernize the country were initially made in order to reach the same level of the West in military and administrative matters, to prevent the West from meddling in the Empire internal affairs and to allow the Empire to be recognized as an equal partner in the European state system. Recognition as an equal partner was, at first, a survival strategy. However, the civil and military elites who came into contact with Western civilization and later became the leaders of the new Turkish Republic continued to promote westernizing reforms, but, at this later stage, the purpose of conducting reforms became less to do with survival and more to do with having Turkey’s Western identity recognized. This is not to say that mistrust towards the West had disappeared. It hadn’t, because throughout the Republican history this mistrust has been transmitted to the generations via the educational system, military service, and other means which were described in the previous chapter.

I concluded that Turkey’s Republican security culture, rooted in the Turkish identity seen as Western and homogenous, and characterized by sense of isolation (“Turks have no friends but Turks”), of being in a unique geographical location, surrounded by unfriendly countries devising schemes to weaken or even disintegrate Turkey with the help of enemies within was translated into a Western foreign policy orientation, aiming at being fully integrated with Western institutions, and a cautious approach to neighboring countries, especially the Muslim Middle East, whose identity was conceived as the opposite of Turkish identity.
In this chapter, I will explain how a neo-Ottomanist security culture began to be gradually seen in Turkey since the 1980s and achieved maturity with the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since the end of 2002. In addition, I will show that the EU membership process contributed to the neo-Ottomanist security culture taking centre stage, because EU-related reforms empowered political and societal actors espousing different security understandings and helped curb the power of the military, the most powerful actor holding the Republican security paradigm.

In order to do so, I will first show that Turgut Ozal in the 1980s introduced a new identity narrative which influenced a new approach to foreign policy. Then, this chapter will point out to the return of Turkey’s security-centered foreign policy in the 1990s, explaining that this “anachronism” came about due to insecurities of the military elite with the end of Cold War. Finally, it will show how the prospect of EU membership and the coming to power of the AKP, with its new identity construction and foreign policy vision, contributed to a significant transformation in Turkey’s security discourse and foreign policy practices.

This chapter thus makes it clear that there are two security cultures, which I call Republican and Neo-Ottomanist, vying for dominance within Turkey. The most important argument made in this chapter is that, even though these two security cultures are very different on a number of aspects, they also share a number of traits. As far as I am aware, to establish the similarities between the two in a more systematic manner has not been done before.

Most of the literature about Turkish foreign policy under the AKP government agrees that it is very different from previous foreign policies pursued. The disagreements are about what caused this change and whether these changes are positive or negative. In the worst case scenario, the AKP is considered to be animated by an Islamist worldview, to be pulling Turkey away from the West and shifting the axis of Turkish foreign policy towards the East (Cagaptay 2009a and 2009b). Another branch of literature considers the AKP changes in foreign policy, especially the rapprochement with surrounding regions, to be a positive development, which is occurring due to an Europeanization of Turkish foreign policy taking place in Turkey since it was granted candidate status in 1999 (Aydin and Acikmese 2007, Ozcan 2008,
Altunisik 2009b). Others point out to desecuritization processes taking place in Turkey in general, which led to the questioning of Turkey’s traditional security discourse and foreign policy practices (Bilgin 2005, Aras and Polat 2008, Polat 2010) and to the AKP’s different identity and security discourses (Murison 2006).

This chapter argues that the shift in foreign policy was influenced by the fact that the AKP holds fundamentally different views about what constitutes Turkish identity and how the country should engage with the outside world. It will be argued that the neo-Ottoman security culture, rooted in a Turkish identity seen as multicivilizational, is characterized by a sense of shared bonds and responsibility towards the neighborhood, and a positive view of Turkey’s history and unique geographical location, replacing the Republican paradigm sense of insecurity with a sense of self-confidence.

However, this chapter will also demonstrate that the AKP’s security understandings share a number of traits with the Republican elites’, even though the two are generally considered to be the antithesis of each other. First, both are characterized by a wish to be recognized and accepted by the West in general, and the EU in particular, albeit for different reasons. Whereas the Republican elites seek EU membership to have Turkey’s Western identity confirmed, the neo-Ottomanist elites seek EU membership as a matter of prestige. Thus it will be argued that the AKP has taken over from the Republican elites the pursuit of recognition and acceptance from the West, in spite of analyses which argue otherwise, albeit for different reasons. Second, both security cultures are characterized by an ambivalent view towards the West, which is seen as meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs, exploiting domestic grievances, and treating Turkey unfairly. As a result, both are very sensitive to what they regard as interference in Turkey’s sovereignty. Third, they share a sense of Turkish superiority over minorities at home and over former members of the Ottoman Empire.

How these characteristics will impact on Turkey’s possible contributions to the EU in the spheres of foreign, security and defense policy is the topic of the next chapter. However, at the end of this chapter, I will list some of the conclusions which can be reached with regards to Turkey-EU relations in
general based on the characteristics of Turkey’s security cultures and anticipate some of the arguments which will be made in the next chapter.

The 1980s – Change begins with Turgut Ozal

The military rule, which lasted from 1980 to 1983, introduced major changes to Turkey’s political life. The military composition of the National Security Council (MGK) was changed from the Chief of Staff and three service commanders to include a fourth service commander and a MGK Secretary-General, without voting rights, but with agenda-setting prerogatives (Mufti 2009, p. 52 and 53). The members began to comprise, on the military side, the Commanders of the Army, Navy, Air force, Gendarmerie and the Chief of General Staff and, on the civilian side, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior. Although apparently there was balance between civilian and military members, the military was stronger because it virtually nominated the Minister of Defence and held the agenda-setting power. With this change, the military strengthened the platform through which it expressed its views on national security matters. The 1982 constitution, drafted under the military rule, also made religious education compulsory in primary and secondary school in order to curb leftism, as mentioned in the previous chapter, and a law in 1983 criminalized the use of minority languages (Mufti 2009, p. 52).

All pre-coup political parties were also banned from politics, which opened the way for new actors to appear in Turkish politics. Turgut Ozal, the leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP), was elected Prime Minister in 1983, a position he held until 1989, and then President until his death in 1993. Ozal had a different background from most of the previous political elites of Turkey. He was born in Malatya, a town in Eastern Anatolia, and came from a family with Kurdish roots and conservative religious beliefs (Mufti 2009, p. 58). Ozal did not go to Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Sciences, as did most of the Turkish political elite, but to Istanbul Technical University, where he studied electrical engineering (Mufti 2009, p. 58). Ozal then worked for the DP government and then became the director of the State Planning Organization,
where he and his team were called the “beclogged ones” in reference to the clogs they used while performing ablution for prayer (Mufti 2009, p. 58). Ozal tried to be elected for Parliament running as a candidate of Erbakan’s Islamist party, but was unsuccessful.

Ozal acknowledged his Kurdish roots in 1989, thereby recognizing the existence of a Kurdish identity, something which was not accepted by the Republican elites. He was also the first Turkish President to attend Friday prayers and to do the pilgrimage to Mecca (Mufti 2009, p. 80). Although he was clearly from a different background, according to Mufti (2009, p. 58) the military tolerated him because he had served in the World Bank and was supported by Washington.

But the truth was the Republican establishment never saw Ozal as one of them: “The Turkish elite never warmed to the Ozals […]. They […] have been a subject of secret ridicule […] The Turkish elite did not view the Ozals from Malatya as fit for the Prime Ministry or Çankaya [the Presidential residency], which in its heart is reserved for blond, French-speaking Istanbulites” (biographer of Ozal quoted in Mufti 2009, p. 58).

During his government, the import-substitution model of development was replaced by an export-oriented economy (Kırizci 2009, p. 43). A series of economic liberalizing reforms, including the privatization of many state-owned companies, led to the emergence of new industrial centers in Anatolia, outside the traditional Western centers. These new classes of businessmen, usually from a conservative background and lifestyle and often referred to as “Anatolian Tigers”, would in time begin to question Turkey’s security conceptions and the foreign policy practices associated with them and later would become supporters of the AKP (Kırizci 2009, p. 43).

Liberal political reforms also led to the emergence of a civil society. The liberalization of Radio and TV broadcasting led to the creation of several television channels, many Islamic oriented, breaking the monopoly of the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) (Yavuz 1997, p. 25). Islamic civil society groups, trade unions, business associations and Islamic media, including TV stations, magazines and newspapers boomed. In addition, the liberal market policies put in place in the 1980s eventually led to the
emergence of strong business interest groups, increasingly able to access foreign policy decision-makers (Kirisci 2009, p. 46). All these developments increased political debate, including in foreign policy orientation, and a wide range of actors, whose views differed from those of the traditional foreign policy makers, begun to have a say in foreign and security policies.

Ozal’s view of how Turkey should engage with the outside world was different from the view of the Republican security elites. In his view, “in the years of the Republic we see a timid Turkey, a Turkey that remained closed in on itself and […] took care to have as little contact as possible with the outside world” (quoted on Mufti 2009, p. 63). He thought that Turkey should look in different directions, both West and East, since “in the balances of the future […] we will hold two cards. One is the card we hold with the Western countries and the other is the card we hold with these Islamic and Arab countries. Turkey is obliged to carry these two cards” (quoted on Mufti 2009, p. 64). Ozal held the view that Turkey should be a bridge between the West and the East, and that, in order to fulfill this role, Turkey should engage with a variety of actors in the East, while at the same time keeping Turkey’s Western orientation (Aras and Gorener 2010, p. 80). Aras and Gorener (2010, p. 80) note however, that the bridge conception did not mean that Turkey should have two feet in both places, but that Turkey should promote the values of the West in the East.

Ozal did not seem to be informed by any exclusionary identity discourse, either Western or Islamist and embarked on policy described by columnist and academic Cengiz Candar as neo-Ottomanism (Murison 2006, p. 946). Neo-Ottomanism in this sense meant a diversified and multi-directional foreign policy based on Ottoman heritage. He saw some aspects of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War as a great opportunity for Turkey – “the greatest opportunity presented to our nation in 400 years” (Ozal quoted in Mufti 2009, p. 76) – because it liberated some of the territories that once...

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3 For example: TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association), TOBB (Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges), TIM (Turkish Exporters Assembly), DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board), UND (International Transporters Association), TMD (Turkish Contractors Association) and ISO (Istanbul Chamber of Commerce). Besides having access to the government and therefore having the capacity to influence foreign policy making, these groups are also capable of shaping public opinion, as would become evident in the 2000s. For example, TUSIAD mobilized public support for a change in Turkey’s traditional Cyprus stance and recommended the support for the Annan Plan to reunify the divided island (Kirisci 2009, p. 46 and 47).
belonged to the Ottoman Empire. According to Ozal, “all the Kurds, Turks, Albanians, Bosnians, whoever it may be who were once Ottoman citizens and remained in those lands after we left are kinfolk of our own citizens today” (quoted in Mufti 2009, p. 77). This idea that the common Ottoman past provides a basis for developing stronger ties with former members of the Empire, first expressed by Ozal, was later picked up by the AKP and developed in a more coherent policy by Ahmet Davutoglu, the former chief foreign policy advisor to the AKP government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs since May 2009, as will be explained in a subsequent section.

As mentioned above, the government began to promote an export-oriented economy, integrated with the world, which led to an internationalization of Turkish businesses. Hence, Turkish foreign policy agenda was expanded to include trade and investment with new regions (Kirisci 2009, p 43). Turkish diplomats began to search for new markets in the Middle East, Russia, and later in the former Soviet Republics. The business community benefited greatly from the new contacts and commercial ties established abroad. Turkey began to explore Soviet gas as a cheap alternative to Middle East oil and managed to get economic advantages from both Iran and Iraq by maintaining its neutrality during the war between the two countries in the 1980s (Robins 2003, p. 56 and 57).

Ozal was able to pursue this active and multidirectional foreign policy because he saw more opportunities than threats emanating from its neighborhood, especially economic opportunities, and he promoted the idea of establishing economic interdependence between Turkey and surrounding countries as a way to provide markets for Turkish exports and businesses and also as a tool for conflict resolution and peace building (Kirisci 2009, p. 43 and Altunisik 2009a, p. 179). The Middle East in particular was seen as a promising market for the developing Turkish industry, and Ozal did not refrain from emphasizing a shared Islamic identity between Turkey and the region (Altunisik 2009a, p. 180). Although Ozal’s “internationalist” outlook faced criticism from some in the traditional establishment, others, even in the Foreign Ministry,
begun to embrace his ideas of interdependence and the promotion of Turkish business interests abroad⁴.

Although Turkey was looking in other directions, it was not turning its back to the West, quite the contrary. In fact, Altunisik (2009a, p. 180) argues that Ozal tried to improve Turkey’s relations with the Middle East having the interests of Turkey’s businesses in mind, but also in order to elevate Turkey’s importance in the eyes of the West. To enhance Turkey’s status was considered vital at a time when Turkey, due to the end of the Cold war, thought that its importance was diminishing. Turkey’s participation in the Gulf War of 1991, by allowing the use of its bases for the bombardment of Iraq and by supporting the sanctions against Saddam Hussein by closing two very lucrative oil pipelines from Iraq to Turkey, was to provide proof of Turkey’s alignment and continuing relevance to the West. According to Robins (2003, p. 59 and 60), the decision to get involved was a product of Ozal’s leadership more than anything else, since the move was very controversial in Turkey and even the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense and the Chief of General Staff resigned in protest. This involvement, although short of sending troops, was also very painful for Turkey economically and also politically, because of the impact it had on the Kurdish issue due to the relative autonomy Northern Iraq achieved as a result of the war.

Relations with Europe, which during the military regime deteriorated because of Turkey’s poor human rights record and lack of democracy, also began to improve under Ozal. In several occasions Ozal stated that his economic and political reforms were aimed at the full integration of Turkey with Europe, which culminated in his application for full membership in 1987. At this stage, there was a great degree of consensus in Turkey in favour of EU membership, except for a few Islamic radicals, and when the EU deferred Turkish membership indefinitely in 1989, parties of both left and right became hugely disappointed (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 78). An article published in The Economist magazine claimed that the rejection “sharpened a Turkish inferiority complex” (quoted in Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 78).

⁴ Kirisci (2009, p. 45) cites as examples former Ambassadors Onur Oymen, Ozdem Sanberk and Volkan Vural.
Therefore, the rule of Ozal in the 1980s paved the way for the emergence of a civil society in Turkey and for the empowerment of Islamic and secular business groups, which in due course would begin to question Turkey’s traditional security conceptions. In addition, Ozal emphasized the need to redefine Turkish national identity and expressed the idea that Turkey could be a bridge between East and West (Bozdağlıoglu 2003, p. 128). Thus, he tried to diversify Turkey’s foreign policy without turning its back to the West, and realized that Turkey had to potential to operate in the West and in the East due to the country’s multicivilizational character. His view therefore was very different from the view held by the Republican elites. He did not see the Muslim Middle East as a backward zone of conflict, but an area which could bring benefits to Turkey. In addition, he did not hold a negative view of the Ottoman Empire, and thought that a shared Ottoman past could form the basis for the development of closer ties with some of its former members.

The 1990s – The Republican security culture strikes back

Many authors have recognized that, since the first steps towards activism in the neighborhood taken by Ozal, Turkey’s external relations have undergone a profound change. There has been a significant transformation in comparison with the cautious and non-interfering foreign policy conducted during the Cold War. The multi-directional foreign policy introduced by Ozal was fully developed, and Turkey became much more active in its neighbourhood, establishing ties with the Caucasus and the Turkic Republics, participating in

5For example, Makovsky and Sayari (2000) claimed that Turkey became much more assertive, establishing the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Zone, developing ties with the Turkic states and Israel, participating in peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, sending troops to fight the PKK in Northern Iraq, and threatening a war with Syria. Rubin (2001), when referring to the 1990s, talks about a post-Ataturk era, since Turkey became much more active, citing the same examples: the involvement in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans and the role it played in the 1991 Gulf War. Kut (2001) also argued that Turkish foreign policy became more active in the 1990s, not because there was a change in principles, but because there was a change in Turkey’s neighbourhood, so Turkey had to respond to them. Altinisik (2008a) also thinks that the trend of transformation had already begun with the end of Cold war, not only under AKP. As markers of change she cites a stronger activism and assertiveness: in the use or threat to use military force (against the PKK in Northern Iraq, threats against Syria and Greece in the 1990s, contribution of peacekeeping missions on Bosnia, Kosovo and Somalia) and in the pursuit of political and economic relations with regions it did not have relations before.
peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, and promoting economic relations with Black Sea countries.

However, a darker side of this activism in foreign policy was observed in the 1990s, when Ankara’s ready resort to the threat or the use of military force was particularly visible. Turkey launched regular military operations into Northern Iraq to crush PKK forces; threatened to use force against Greece in 1995 if it extended its territorial waters to twelve miles and again in 1996 because of a dispute over islets in the Aegean; against Cyprus, as a response to the island’s plans to deploy Russian S-300 missiles in 1997 and against Syria in 1998, due to its support for the PKK (Kirisci 2009, p. 31). This constant resort to the threat or use of force to solve foreign disputes in the 1990s led to Turkey being labeled as a “post-Cold War warrior” (Kirisci 2006, p. 8), a “coercive regional power” (Onis 2003, p. 84) and a “regional bully” (Kramer 2000, p. 212).

Turkey’s increased reliance on the use of confrontational tools during the 1990s can be explained by the growing sense of insecurity caused by the end of the Cold War. With the absence of a Soviet threat, Turkey’s importance as a member of the Western alliance was being questioned. Concerns about the loss of Turkey’s strategic importance to the West, exactly at a time when the instability and threats in the neighbourhood were growing, aggravated the security concerns of the Republican elites (Kirisci 2006, p.13).

The events happening on the borders of Turkey (the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the break-up and wars in former Yugoslavia, the Gulf war) seemed to confirm the idea that Turkey is in a very unfortunate geographical location, faced by threats like no other country, and therefore needs its military, as the only expert in formulating policies in accordance to Turkey’s geographical position, to remain involved in foreign policy making. The Chief of General Staff declared in 1993 that “the army, in the face of recent international developments, has to assume duties that are far more important than it used to carry out” (Ozcan 2001, p. 24). The fact that the civilian political leadership was weak and fragmented during the 1990s, with a series of weak coalition

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6 In March 1995, Turkey launched an operation which involved more than 35,000 troops and attracted a lot of international criticism, especially from Europe. In the summer of 1997, another 50,000 troops entered Northern Iraq in an operation that lasted more than six weeks (Taspinar 2005).
governments, frequent change of Foreign Ministers – there were nine different ministers between July 1994 and June 1997 – also helped make the military more assertive (Robins 2003, p. 64). Thus, the result was that the military increased its role in foreign policy-making, which was manifested mainly in its actions through the National Security Council (MGK) and Turkish foreign policy became increasingly confrontational. The meeting of the MGK originates the National Security Policy Document, commonly referred to as the “Red Book”, which establishes the threats to national security, the priorities and the policy guidelines. In 1992 the document was updated to include Kurdish separatism as the major security threat and in 1997 to include radical Islam.

The insecurity felt by Turkey’s Republican elite in the 1990s is clearly demonstrated in an article written by Sukru Elekdag, former diplomat and CHP politician, in 1996, entitled “Two and a half war strategy”. In this article, Elekdag (1996) argues that Turkey should be ready to fight two and a half wars, against Syria, Greece and the PKK. He claims that “Greece and Syria […] have claims over Turkey’s vital interests and territory and support a covert war aiming to break up this country” (p. 34). This sentence contains elements of Turkey’s Republican security culture, namely the idea that Turkey is surrounded by enemy countries which plot to disintegrate Turkey by supporting internal enemies. The idea that Turkey’s survival depends on a strong military is also expressed: “peace with Greece is solely dependent upon Turkey’s maintaining an indisputable superiority in the balance of power between the two countries. The key to stability in the Aegean is Turkey’s deterrent force” (p. 37) and “no matter how capable a foreign policy might be, it cannot be stronger than the military might it relies on” (p. 44).

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the existence of the NATO alliance was being questioned, which was a strong source of worry for Turkey: “Let us for a moment assume that Russia has embarked upon a massive attack against Turkey. In such an eventuality Turkey can no longer rely on NATO. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO has totally lost its function of providing support for Turkey’s defense […] In the event of such a conflict, Turkey will have to fight it out against the aggressor for a considerable length of time solely by her own means […] Turkey’s benefitting from NATO’s collective defense
should not be counted on anymore” (Elekdag 1996, p. 42 and 43). These sentences show that concerns about the West unreliability, already felt during the Cold War especially during the Missile Crisis and the Johnson letter episode, were aggravated with the end of the Cold War.

In addition, for Turkey, NATO membership also symbolised membership to the West. It is therefore no surprise that Turkey was one of the most vocal countries expressing support for the continuity of NATO. President Demirel argued that “We will continue to be a strong a reliable member of NATO, which undoubtedly is the most successful alliance that humankind ever witnessed” (quoted on Robins 2003, p. 20).

An additional source of concern was the EU’s questioning of Turkey’s “Europeanness” (Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 79). Turkey, which was a member of the Council of Europe, the OECD and NATO, and had signed the Ankara agreement in 1963 and applied for full membership in 1987, had its European credential increasingly questioned by some European politicians. In addition, Central and Eastern European countries, which until recently were members of a rival organization which Turkey helped keep at bay, were being admitted into the EU before Turkey, which added insult to injury.

Feeling threatened on so many fronts and having its place in the Western community questioned, Turkey in the 1990s turned to Israel, signing several trade, tourism and military agreements, a move which further distanced it from the Muslim Middle East. The alliance between the two countries was motivated by common security concerns such as countering Iran’s and Syria’s support for the PKK and Islamic groups in the case of Turkey and Hezbollah and Hamas in the case of Israel and to have access to military equipment without having its human rights credential scrutinized (Yavuz 1997, p. 27). However, another important component of the move towards Israel was Turkey’s wish to confirm its Western orientation, which, as we have seen, was being questioned since the end of the Cold War (Yavuz 1997, p. 27). Apart from establishing closer links with Israel, Turkey also tried to reinforce its Western identity and to be recognized as a member of the Western community by participating in peace operations in the Balkans, Caucasus and Somalia, neither of which seriously threatened Turkey’s security (Oguzlu and Gungor 2006, p. 472 and 479).
In the midst of all these problems, the emergence of new Turkic Republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus provided an opportunity for Turkey to devote its energies to other regions. The “discovery” of these regions seemed to abate to a certain degree the feeling of isolation characteristic of the Republican security culture: “all of a sudden we learnt that [Central Asia and the Caucasus] consisted of different nations, some of which are very close to Turkey, like Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan [...] We can understand each other without having any education in their language [...] it was a big shock for Turkish people to see the difference between what the textbook said [the National Security course textbook which states that Turks have no friends] and the reality. All of a sudden all the Turks began to see a very big world, a friendly world [...] So all of a sudden the Turkish people began to think that they share more with other parts of the world than [they do] with the Europeans, so it contributed to a change in the minds of the Turks” (Interview with Zeynep Gurcanli, 27.04.2011). A member of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) argued that “if Turkey had spent less time and effort that it had been spending to enter the EU for these republics, it could have created a political and economic union against the EU” (quoted in Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 98). Demirel went so far as to say that Turkey should assume the leadership of a giant “Turkic world stretching from the Adriatic Sea to China” (quoted on Bozdaglioglu 2003, p. 96).

In spite of this welcomed development, most of the military’s security concerns were significantly aggravated with the end of Cold war. The final blow to the military’s sense of insecurity was the coming to power of the Islamist Welfare Party (RP). During its brief time in power, the government tried to formulate a foreign policy in accordance with its Islamist identity construction. Inevitably, this led to confrontation and a “postmodern coup”, known as the 28 February 1997 process.

The Welfare Party in power: different identity, different foreign policy, and the military’s response

As explained in chapter 2, the process of “Westernization” and “modernization” promoted by the Kemalist regime required that interaction with
the Middle East was kept to a minimum, which was the case during most of the Cold war, with the exception of the Baghdad Pact. Because Turkish “national interests” were based on the secular elite’s self-ascribed Western identity, a foreign policy orientation towards the West was the priority. I have also mentioned in the previous chapter that this consensus in foreign policy began to be broken gradually since the multi-party system was introduced in the 1950s, and the ascendance to power of parties like the Democratic Party, led by Adnan Menderes, and the Justice Party, led by Suleyman Demirel, which were close to Islamic-oriented groups such as the Nurcu and Naksibendi Sufi orders. Especially during the 1970s, with the disappointment with the West mainly because of lack of support for Turkey’s stance on Cyprus, the growing economic importance of the Middle East and also due to the salience of Islamic and pro-Third world sentiments in Turkey, there was a (limited) rapprochement with the Arab world, exemplified with the opening of PLO offices in Ankara.

The process of economic liberalization promoted by Ozal, which led to the emergence of a new class of Islamic entrepreneurs, helped form the economic basis of the contestation of Turkish identity as Western and secular. In addition, the diversification of cultural discourses facilitated by the privatization in education and media exposed the emergence of a new elite with a new identity discourse, which began to constitute a radical challenge to the Kemalist establishment. This Islamic revivalism culminated in the 1990s with the Islamic Welfare Party, led by Necmettin Erbakan, winning important cities such as Ankara and Istanbul in local elections in 1994 and finally gaining the majority of seats in parliament in the 1995 general election (Yavuz 1997, p. 29). The Welfare Party formed a coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party, led by Tansu Ciller, and took office in June 1996.

The Welfare Party was the new reincarnation of the Islamist political parties led by Erbakan since the 1970s. According to this Islamic group, Islamic identity was imagined in collective terms in relation to a homogenously constructed secular/westernist other, which was responsible for the exploitation of the Muslim world and led to moral degeneration (Çayir 2008, p. 65). These Islamic actors invoked an “us” versus “them” discourse, and blamed Kemalist modernization for the stigmatization and exclusion of Muslim actors from
society. Therefore, the Welfare Party was against Turkey’s Western orientation, including in foreign policy, because it did not reflect Turkey’s “true” character according to them (i.e. Islamic) (Dermitas-Çoskun 2008, p. 35). Instead, Turkey should take on a leadership role in the Islamic world and establish United Nation of Muslim countries, an Islamic NATO, a free market and common currency of Muslim countries (Dermitas-Çoskun 2008, p. 35). Accordingly, when in power, Erbakan had a strong anti-Western and anti-Israel rhetoric, visited Iran and Libya, and advocated closer relations with the Muslim world at the expense of Turkey’s relations with the West, especially with the European Union, which for them was a scheme to assimilate Islamic Turkey into a Christian Union (Bozdağlıoglu 2008, p. 65 and 66).

Naturally, this was more than the secular establishment was willing to put up with, and on 28 February 1997, the Turkish Armed Forces, operating via the National Security Council, ordered the government of Erbakan to implement an eighteen point plan to curb Islamic political and social movements, including the surveillance of economic activities of Islamic groups and the closure of Qur’anic schools and Iman Hatip schools, which, ironically, were encouraged by the military after the 1980 coup in order to curb leftism (Yavuz 1997, p. 30). In the end, Erbakan was forced to resign.

To conclude this section, the military’s growing sense of insecurity in the 1990s generated a security-centered and confrontational foreign policy. Turkey’s Republican security culture (rooted in a Turkish identity conceived as Western and characterized by a sense of loneliness, geographical misfortune, and an insecurity complex) was manifested with an intensity which had not yet been seen. Following Buzan et al (1998) it is possible to argue that during the 1990s many issues (such as Syria support for the PKK) were being framed by the securitising actor with “social capital” (the military via the MGK) as an existential threat to a particular referent object (the territorial integrity of the country), and in order to counter this threat, a right to handle the issue through extraordinary means (the threat or the use of force) was invoked by the securitising actor and it was accepted by the audience. However, these securitizing moves were not accepted by everybody.
The 2000s: From regional bully to regional power

The fact that Turkey was conducting a militarist and security-oriented foreign policy after the end of the Cold war, when Europe was perceived to be moving towards the establishment of security culture in which issues were desecuritized and handled with peaceful and political means, did not go unnoticed among government leaders, business elites and civil society organizations that benefited from the process of economic liberalization from the 1980s onwards. These new actors became increasingly more vocal and began to question the established approaches to issues (Bilgin 2005, p. 176).

Ismail Cem, foreign minister from 1997 to 2002, following the steps of Turgut Ozal, formulated an alternative perspective for the conduction of Turkish foreign policy. He emphasized Turkey’s multicivilizational character and the need to engage with the neighborhood more constructively. In his view, Turkey possessed “an extraordinary background of cultures as civilization” but it “consciously […] deprived itself of her cultural assets in her entirety”. “For Turkey, the way forward, particularly in foreign policy, requires a new awareness of her own identity and history, of her assets and shortcomings. A nation whose foreign policy is alienated from its own cultural roots and historical past cannot be a serious player on the world scene”. In the Middle East in particular, “a common and positive experience of centuries” was “disregarded and short-term antagonisms were played-up. This then was transformed into a justification to keep at a distance a region and a people whose significance for Turkey’s interests is indeed paramount” (quoted on Altunisik 2009a, p. 184 and 185). Therefore, Cem stressed the multi-civilizational character of Turkey’s identity and the utility of the country’s historical and cultural assets. The policies he pursued as foreign minister reflected this new identity formulation. During his tenure Turkey’s relations with Syria and Greece began to improve through dialogue and economic interdependence. He also began to open up to Iran, initiating institutionalized dialogue through security meetings (Altunisik 2009a, p. 184).
The impact of the EU membership process on Turkish foreign policy

The decision of the European Union to accept Turkey as a candidate country at the Helsinki Summit held in December 1999 represented a fundamental turning point for Turkey. It provided Turkey with a template to conduct reforms strengthening democracy, freedoms and human rights, gave a boost to Turkey’s self-confidence, and empowered political and societal actors, thereby having an influence on the transformation of Turkish foreign policy.

A series of reforms packages were passed in the parliament, including the lift of the ban to broadcast and teach in Kurdish and the end of the death penalty. These bold reforms were engineered by a weak coalition government composed of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) led by Bulent Ecevit, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), led by Devlet Bahceli and the Motherland Party (ANAP), led by Mesut Yilmaz (Onis 2003, p. 13). It was the ANAP, the party of Turgut Ozal, who pushed stronger for EU membership and associated reforms.

EU reforms empowered societal actors, opening up space for new voices to be heard with regards to domestic and foreign policy issues. Several laws which have been passed with regards to civil society matters – Law on Associations, Press Law, Law on Meetings and Demonstrations, Law on Foundations – enable civil society groups’ entry in politics (Polat 2010, p. 65 and 66). In addition, the EU provides funds to civil society organizations. These societal actors participate in the discussions about “taboo” issues in domestic and foreign policy and can influence public opinion. Several civil society groups have joined public debates, such as the Association for Liberal Thinking, Turkish-Asian Center for Strategic Thinking, SETA, USAK, TESEV, TUSIAD and TOBB (Aras and Polat 2008, p. 501). Business organizations such as TUSIAD (representing big firms) and TOBB (representing small firms) urged their views to be reflected in foreign policy and advocated Turkey’s integration with the EU and the precedence of economic considerations over “security” matters (Ozcan 2009, p. 89 and 90). TUSIAD used the slogan “less geopolitics, more economics” (quoted on Ozcan 2009, p. 90), issued reports and organized seminars on the liberalization of the political regime, the democratization of the
legal system and on foreign policy matters, such as Cyprus. These debates in the public sphere also meant that the military could no longer mobilize public opinion on a number of issues, which in turn made it more difficult for the military to exert pressure on the government (Ozcan 2009, p. 101).

The prospect of acceding to the Union thus stimulated public debate of issues considered to be taboos. Since the end of the 1990s, several painful events in the history of Turkey, which had not been discussed previously, began to be remembered, such as the Dersim operation, the Armenian massacre of 1915, the wealth tax imposed on non-Muslims during the Second World War, the events of 6-7 September of 1955 in Istanbul and the torture committed in the Diyarbakir prison after the 1980 military coup (Kadioglu and Miroglu 2011, p. 23 and 24). Books, films and television series began to deal with these and other traumatic episodes of Turkish history.

The Helsinki decision to grant Turkey candidate status has also increased Turkish confidence. The feeling of being encircled by unfriendly countries, so pronounced in the 1990s, and aggravated by constant EU rejections of Turkish applications for membership, was placated. Turkey felt that its European identity was being confirmed and its feeling of insecurity, which generated the securitized foreign policy of the previous decade, diminished (Altunisik 2009b, p. 146). However, paradoxically, the prospect of EU membership began to be opposed by some in the Kemalist establishment, who feared the loss of Turkey’s sovereignty. Some members of the military, the nationalist MHP and the CHP, then led by Deniz Baykal, voiced their opposition to Turkey’s EU membership whereas a coalition of “soft” Kemalists, liberals, Kurds, business people and the Muslim middle classes supported Turkey’s accession to the Union (Bechev 2011, p. 13)

The process of EU membership has also had an impact on the transformation of Turkish foreign policy because EU-related reforms decreased the power of the military, the most powerful actor espousing the Republican security culture, and, as a consequence, elected politicians were empowered. Furthermore, the EU provided justification and legitimacy to certain policy courses which would be considered unacceptable.
The most important reform which reduced the role of the military in security and foreign policy issues was the change in the composition and in the working procedures of the National Security Council (Aydin and Acikmese 2007, p. 269). More civilians were admitted into the Council, and the Secretary General also became a civilian, and its role was reduced to an advisory body. Thus, EU reforms led to a gradual reduction in the legal prerogatives and bureaucratic instruments of the military in the formulation of foreign policy, thereby consolidating the influence of elected officials (Ozcan 2009, p. 85). With the changes in the National Security Council, the military lost the most important platform it had to voice its opinions of foreign and security matters.

The EU also helped empower political actors by providing an external justification and legitimacy for foreign policy moves which otherwise would have been unacceptable, which was the case of AKP’s support for the Annan Plan to re-unite the island of Cyprus in 2004, at odds with the traditional view of “no solution is the solution”. If it wasn’t for EU pressure and the legitimacy it conferred to the new policy, the AKP would not be able to change Turkey’s stance on such sensitive issue.

Thus, domestic reforms conducted in the process of EU membership have had an impact on Turkish foreign policy by empowering societal and political actors at the expense of the military. However, the impact that EU has had on the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy should not be overestimated. This thesis is skeptical of analyses which attribute change in foreign policy to an internalization of EU foreign policy norms. I will now clarify how the EU has not made an impact on Turkish foreign policy.

A branch of the literature analyzing EU’s impact on Turkey makes the argument that the EU has been able to influence Turkish foreign policy because of the need for Turkey to adopt the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) *acquis politique*, which includes legally binding international agreements, common positions, declarations and joint actions, sanctions and restrictive measures (Aydin and Acikmese 2007, p. 272). Some, like Altunisik (2009b) include in the CFSP *acquis politique* the presence of certain European norms that the candidate countries are expected to internalize. According to this line of argument, European “norms of appropriate behavior” - preference for
multilateralism, the use of soft power, conflict prevention, management and resolution through peaceful means – are being diffused to Turkey through regular political dialogue with the EU (Altunisik 2009b, p. 148 and 149). As evidence of the internalization of EU norms, Altunisik (2009b, p. 149) cites the 2003 Progress Report which congratulated Turkey for engaging in diplomatic efforts at a multilateral level to find a peaceful solution to the Iraqi crisis, by creating the Iraq’s Neighbors Initiative.

Several other academics and politicians have pointed out the similarities between the AKP’s and the EU’s foreign and security policies objectives and methods. Aras and Polat (2008) and Aras and Fidan (2009) think that EU norms have been appropriated, and they claim that Ahmet Davutoglu’s “zero-problem” policy, which will be described in the next section, is a “reflection” or an “imitation” of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Similarly, Eralp and Torun (2011, p. 58) argue that Turkey’s foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Balkans and in Africa, which are pursued with the declared objective of creating interdependencies to reduce conflict, is similar to the EU approach to foreign policy. Suat Kiniklioglu, AKP’s deputy chairman of external affairs, stressed that Turkey’s regional policies share a similar objective to those of the ENP (Kiniklioglu 2011, p. 66). Furthermore, the Turkish foreign minister himself, Ahmet Davutoglu, has claimed that “is having zero problems with our neighbors compatible with being a candidate for the EU and a member of NATO? From our perspective, yes, they are compatible. This is the whole philosophy of the EU itself, which emerged through minimizing political problems with its neighbors. And this is exactly the European approach, based on European philosophy and European values” (quoted on Matthews, Belgici, and Gumusel 2009, Newsweek, p. n/a).

Notwithstanding the fact that some of the AKP’s policies, in particular concerning Iran’s nuclear program, Omar Al-Bashir from Sudan and Israel have raised alarm bells in Western capitals, even in cases in which similarities between Turkey’s and EU’s foreign and security policies are observed, it does not necessarily follows that norms originated in the EU have been internalized by Turkey and thereby influenced a different foreign policy.
For example, in the case of the aforementioned Iraq’s Neighbors Initiative, it is not clear whether this initiative took place because Turkish policy-makers internalized the norm of multilateralism and peaceful settlement of conflicts, or if it was the result of a Neo-Ottomanism impetus. Murison (2006, p. 954) interpret the gathering of the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iran, Jordan and Egypt in the Cirag Palace Hotel, an Ottoman-era Palace, as hugely symbolic of Turkey’s attempts to become a regional leader following the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, Altunisik (2009b, p. 155) admits that the AKP has a quite distinct Middle East foreign policy vision, advocating involvement in the region, and framing this involvement as being “Ankara-centered”, meaning that it is not necessarily linked to the EU or the US.

The fact is that, as will be argued in the next chapter, the internalization of CFSP norms is most likely to occur among officials working in EU structures, who have more opportunity to participate in processes of institutional socialization. Studies of the process of Europeanization in the areas of foreign and security policies such as Smith M. (2000)’s and Major (2005)’s have shown that actor socialization is extremely important for norm internalization to occur in these policy areas in which the EU impact is less binding than in those policy areas in which there is the obligatory implementation of EU law. Both authors have shown that regular communication and consultation about foreign policy issues between member states are paramount for the diffusion of ideas, social learning, and the institutionalization of habits of co-operation to emerge.

However, as will be further discussed in the next chapter, even with intense and frequent socialization, member states remain divided on several important foreign policy issues and Turkey, as a candidate country, has even less platforms to socialize and discuss foreign policy matters with other European member states. Before the Lisbon treaty, there were contacts between Turkey’s foreign minister and EU officials within the framework of Troika meetings, which occurred twice a year when the Presidency of the Council rotated. Since the Lisbon Treaty came into force in 2009, the Troika meetings have been replaced by the Turkish-EU political dialogue ministerial level meeting, attended by the Turkish foreign minister, Turkey’s chief EU negotiator, the EU High Representative for foreign affairs, and EU Enlargement
Commissioner (*Hürriyet Daily News* 2010, p. n/a, Barysch 2011, p. n/a). The problem is that this meeting also only takes place twice a year.

Foreign minister Davutoglu also participates in the informal “Gymnich” meetings of EU foreign ministers which take place once during the six-month tenure of each presidency (Barysch 2011, p. n/a). Another platform for socialization is the EC-Turkey Association Council, which meets twice a year at ministerial level (Tocci 2008, p. 981). Therefore platforms to discuss foreign policy matters and interact with EU member states are still very limited in the Turkish case, thereby making the process of norm internalization more difficult.

To summarize this section, I have argued that the EU has had an impact on the transformation of Turkish foreign policy because it helped decrease the power of the military; it empowered societal and political actors; and provided legitimacy to certain foreign policy courses which would otherwise not have been accepted. I have also stated that I do not agree with the proposition that EU foreign policy norms have been internalized by Turkish political actors. My argument is that the change observed in Turkish foreign policy is best explained by the different security culture espoused by the AKP, which will be the theme of the next section.

**The AKP’s identity and security narrative: the neo-Ottomanist security culture takes center stage**

As mentioned before, the assertion that the foreign policy conducted by the AKP is different from previous Turkish foreign policy is almost uncontested. The disagreements are about what caused this change in foreign policy and whether these changes are positive or negative.

I argue that AKP politicians hold a neo-Ottomanist security culture, which influences a different type of foreign policy. However, I also stress that there are some similarities between the neo-Ottomanist and Republican security cultures, even though they are usually considered to be the antithesis of each other.

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7 One exception is Ret. Ambassador Ozdem Sanberk, who told me in an interview that “the basic thrust which lies behind Turkish foreign policy has not changed” and that the “zero problem policy” formulated by Ahmet Davutoglu is a continuation of the “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” pillar of traditional Turkish foreign policy (Interview with Ozdem Sanberk, 21.04.11).
Emphasizing these common traits is important because it has not been done before in a systematic manner, and because it helps to understand Turkey’s ambivalent relationship with the EU.

The AKP was founded in 2001 by a younger generation of Islamists, who, unlike their predecessors, refrained from employing an overt religious discourse and espoused a pro-EU stance (Cizre 2008b, p. 4). The AKP distanced itself from the Islamic platform of the Welfare Party and adopted instead what it calls a conservative-democrat identity, predicated on Turkey’s center-right platform of the Democratic Party of the 1950s, the Justice Party of the 1960s and 1970s and the Motherland Party of the 1980s (Yildiz 2008, p. 42). By conservative democracy, the AKP means it is politically and economically liberal, whilst being sensitive to certain societal values and traditions, religious or not (Yildiz 2008, p. 43).

Different from the older generation of Islamists led by Erbakan, the AKP claims that it does not want to turn Turkey into a Islamic state, but that religious freedoms in Turkey should increase so that individuals can live their personal lives in accordance to Islamic principles (such as going to university with a headscarf) (Çayir 2008, p. 74). In other words, the AKP claims that they do not aim for a religious state, but a state that respects religion.

This claim is not accepted by some members of the secularist camp in Turkey, who remain suspicious of an AKP’s “hidden Islamic agenda”. According to this line of reasoning, the AKP embraced the prospect of EU membership for instrumental reasons, namely, to decrease the power of the military and consolidate its own political power. When the government nominated Abdullah Gul, whose wife wears a Muslim headscarf, for the Presidency in 2007, the secularist establishment thought this represented “one of the first coups against the principle of checks and balances” (Criss 2010, p. 49). The military voiced its discontent by releasing a memorandum on its website warning the AKP to preserve the secular tradition of the Republic and threatening to take action if it failed to do so. This e-memorandum received support from parts of the press, with a columnist arguing that the military had “eased the concerns of millions of people with the April 27 statement” (quoted in Vural 2011, Today’s Zaman, p. 05).
In addition, the AKP is accused by this group to be taking over state institutions, such as the police and the judiciary, by infiltrating them with more conservative-oriented people (Criss 2010, p. 49). They argue that since the AKP’s power has been consolidated, the pace of EU reforms has diminished and the Prime Minister has adopted a more authoritarian behavior, targeting opposition media outlets and supporting a witch hunt against opposition forces via the *Ergenekon* and Sledgehammer court cases which investigate alleged plots to overthrow the government.

Since the e-memorandum was released, the AKP has managed to tip the civil-military balance to its favor. In July 2011 the chief of General Staff and the commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force resigned in protest over the arrest of senior military officers as part of the Sledgehammer investigation (*BBC News* 2011, p. n/a). Much still remain to be done in order to normalize civil-military relations, such as subordination the Chief of Staff to the Defense Ministry, instead of the Prime Ministry, and increasing civilian control over the military budget (*Hurriyet Daily News* 2011e, p. n/a), but the elected officials have manage to increase their powers in detriment of the military power significantly.

The AKP security discourse has its roots on a different conception of Turkey’s identity. This different conceptualization of Turkish identity and this new security discourse did not emerge out of thin air. As previously mentioned, both Turgut Ozal and Ismail Cem held a different conception of Turkish identity and a different worldview with regards to Turkey’s neighborhood. Both Ozal and Cem stressed the multi-civilizational character of Turkish identity, and did not see the neighborhood as particularly threatening. In addition to these political actors, some societal actors such as civil society groups and businesses have embraced this new conception of Turkish identity and have supported conciliatory gestures towards Turkey’s surrounding regions.

The AKP also benefitted from the EU membership process, which, as we have seen, has empowered political and societal actors who hold alternative views while it disempowered those espousing traditional security understandings, particularly the military. Therefore, because of the EU
membership process, the AKP has had more space to have its worldview voiced, heard and acted upon.

I will elaborate below on the AKP’s different narrative of Turkey’s identity and history, its different understanding of Turkey’s geography and desirable place in the world, its views about the regions surrounding Turkey and how Turkey should relate to them. Then I will identify the traits from the Republican security culture which have persisted in the neo-Ottomanist security perspective.

Turkish identity

Similar to Turgut Ozal and Ismail Cem’s perspectives, the AKP party members stress Turkey’s multicultural and multi-civilizational character. A brochure prepared by the Prime Ministry Secretariat General for EU Affairs, stressing Turkey’s possible positive contributions to the European Union, takes pride in Turkey’s multicultural society: “Various ethnic and religious communities have been living side by side for centuries on the territory of modern day Turkey. Today, Turkey is still home to many different ethnicities and religions namely Kurds, Alevi, Assyrians, Arabs, Armenians, Circassians, Laz, Greeks, Roma, Jews, Christians and others, making Turkish society a mosaic of diverse cultures” (Prime Ministry Secretariat General for EU affairs, n. d., p. n/a). This narrative is very different from the Republican view which emphasizes a homogenous Turkish identity. It is remarkable that the heterogeneity of Turkish society is portrayed as an asset in an official government document.

In addition, instead of constructing Turkish identity as solely Western, the AKP points out that Turkey is part of several civilizations. In the words of Ahmet Davutoglu: “Turkey is not just any old Mediterranean country […] Turkey is at the same time a Middle East and a Caucasus country […] Turkey is as much a European country as it is an Asian country. Indeed, Turkey is as much a Black sea country as it is a Mediterranean one. This geographical depth places Turkey rights at the center of many geopolitical areas of influence” (Ahmet Davutoglu quoted in Sozen 2010, p. 109).
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Ottoman history and former members

The Ottoman past is viewed positively by this security perspective. The Republican elites demonstrated a “hostility against the Ottoman Empire and declared all Sultans traitors and cowards [particularly] two sultans, Abdulhamid and the last Ottoman sultan, Vahdettin” (Gulerce 2011, in Today’s Zaman, 27.04.2011, p. 17). To question this official historiography was to be subjected to criticisms. When Bulent Ecevit once questioned the view commonly held about Sultan Vahdettin as a traitor, and suggested that the last Sultan might have covertly supported the War of Independence by leaving gold and money behind when he left Istanbul, former President Demirel reacted harshly, saying that “Ecevit’s statement is surprising. Turkey is not in a position to accept this kind of statement […] we should look at what Ataturk said about Vahdettin, not Ecevit […] Ataturk is the reference for everyone” (quoted in Gulerce 2011, Today’s Zaman, p. 17).

Contrastingly, the conservatives in Turkey, including the AKP, frequently express admiration for the Ottoman past. Terry Richardson, in article on the Suleymaniye mosque in Istanbul, published in the conservative newspaper Today’s Zaman, wrote that: “Nothing better demonstrates the caring nature of both Islam and the Ottoman Empire at its height than the pious and charitable institution of the kulliye [a complex in the mosque comprising a soup kitchen, a hospital, a bath, an inn, a library and a theological school]” (Richardson 2011, Today’s Zaman, p. 09).

As we have seen, according to the Republican narrative, former members of the Empire were considered traitors who stabbed Turkey in the back and were part of a backward civilization. The neo-Ottomanist discourse is very different: according to this different perspective, having shared a common Ottoman past naturally creates bonds between former members. Thus, a common Ottoman past is seen as a basis for the establishment of ties with former members of the

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8 Interestingly, Ecevit’s version proved to be correct. A British report written in 1921, and disclosed by the UK in 2011, in fact suggests that Sultan Vahdettin actually openly supported the War of Independence by providing weapons and ammunition (Gulerce 2011, in Today’s Zaman, 27.04.2011, p. 17).
Empire and for the projection of Turkey's influence. This idea is clearly formulated in the book “Strategic Depth”, written by Ahmet Davutoglu and published in Turkey in 2001, and reiterated in several articles and speeches written and made since then.

According Davutoglu, the Ottoman Empire was at the center of the traditional imperial world order which finished after the First World War. During the Cold War, Turkey was relegated to the status of a frontier country, but the end of bipolarity has “defrosted” some of the deep connections between Turkey and its neighborhood. Thus, since the end of the Cold war, and because of the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey has the possibility and the responsibility to become once again a central country (Davutoglu 2010a, p. n/a). Because Turkey is located at the center of Afro-Eurasia, and has historical connections to the regions, Turkey has great responsibilities and should engage with all the regions in its neighborhood.

In other words, Turkey should no longer be a frontier country, as it was during the Cold war, or a bridge between civilizations, as it was perceived in the 1990s. Now Turkey should be a central country providing security and stability in its areas of influence, where it has historical responsibilities, namely the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Gulf and the Caspian, Black and Mediterranean Seas (Davutoglu 2008, p. 79). Furthermore, Davutoglu advocates the development of a balanced approach towards global and regional powers, including the EU and the US. All these actions should transform Turkey in a global power.

The use of Ottoman references by Davutoglu has been noticed by Murat Karayalçin, member of the CHP, former mayor of Ankara and foreign minister: “Davutoglu gave a speech […] in which he said that in 12 years time, Turkey will become a world state”. Karayalçin noted that instead of using the word “dunya” which means “world” in modern Turkish, he used the word “cihan” instead, which is “world” in Ottoman Turkish. “Cihan Devteli [world state] means a glorious, conquering state, the most powerful state. The term 'cihan' is a specific term” (Interview with Mural Karayalçin, 28.04.2011). Similarly, in an interview by Al-Jazeera's program “Empire”, Ahmet Davutoglu was greeted by the reporter with the words “Foreign Minister, welcome to Empire”. Davutoglu’s
telling reply was “thank you, and welcome to the capital of the Empire” (Al-Jazeera 2011, p. n/a).

According to the AKP’s deputy chairman of external affairs, Suat Kiniklioglu, Ottomanism “reflects a certain amount of self confidence as its outlook is not merely national but regional and legitimizes Turkish outreach to a distinctly Ottoman geopolitical space […] neo-Ottoman streak favors normalization with Arabs, Muslims and Kurds as Ottoman cosmopolitanism allows it to do […] the neo-Ottoman outlook naturally embraces the Ottoman geopolitical space and has no qualms about being a proactive actor in this geography” (Kiniklioglu 2007, Today’s Zaman, p. n/a).

Although some members of the AKP, such as Suat Kiniklioglu quoted above, to not shy away from employing the term Ottomanism, others, such as Prime Minister Erdogan, are more reluctant to use it: “Turkey is rediscovering its neighborhood, one that has been overlooked for decades. It is following a proactive foreign policy stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East and the Caucasus […] This is not a romantic neo-Ottomanism: it is realpolitik based on a new vision of the global order” (Erdogan 2011, Newsweek p. n/a).

Perhaps the reason for the reluctance is that the use of the Ottoman past to establish closer relations with the former members of the Empire sometimes can lead to negative reactions, as described by journalist Deniz Zeyrek: in a meeting of the Arab League in Egypt, Davutoglu gave a speech in which he “started talking about the Ottoman empire, and there were some guys from different Arab countries [sitting] next to me, and they said ‘we got rid of the Ottoman Empire, we fought against them, and he [Davutoglu] speaks like a guy from the Ottoman empire’. It is a disturbing thing for Arabs. It is the same in the Balkans […] when he [Davutoglu] talked about the Ottoman era, they really hated it” (Interview with Deniz Zeyrek, 27.04.2011).

Whether emphasizing the common Ottoman past or not, the need to revise commonly held views about the former members of the Empire is stressed. In the words of Prime Minister Recep Erdogan: “We have grown up with the motto that Turkey is surrounded by three seas and neighboring enemy countries […] ‘Arabs stabbed us in the back during the First World War’ was the common saying until very recently. You know what? I even feel ashamed when I recall it,
but the word ‘Arab’ was the common way of calling a stray dog on the street […] Our policy is not to create enemies but to establish stable ties with all countries. Turkey’s relations with Middle Eastern countries are only natural as is the case with Balkan or Caucasus countries” (quoted in Demirtas 2010, *Hurriyet Daily News*, p. n/a).

The aim to achieve peace between Turkey and its neighbors is encapsulated in the “zero-problem policy” formulated by Davutoglu. According to him, the policy rests on four pillars: the *indivisibility of security*: “security is not a zero-sum game whereby the safety of ‘country A’ can only develop at the expense of the well-being of ‘country B’”; the *primacy of political solutions*: “all issues and problems should and can be resolved through diplomacy and political interaction”; *economic interdependence*; and *cultural harmony and mutual respect* (Davutoglu 2010b, p. n/a, *Hurriyet Daily News*, p. n/a, emphasis added).

According to Davutoglu, the zero-problem policy is “the fundamental principle we have applied in foreign policy for eight years, deepening friendships, intensifying and growing fraternity. This is why we have a ‘zero problem policy’. This is why we said […] we will all doors with our neighbors […] doors of friendship and fraternity […] let siblings meet, mingle with each other; and let the fraternity which comes from the depths of history be transferred to the future generations” (quoted in *Today’s Zaman* 2011a, p. 04).

These natural bonds between Turkey and its neighbors developed by a shared past – a “fraternity which comes from the depths of history” - seem to make AKP members be more at ease with people from the Middle East, as was noticed by a journalist, who defines herself as a “true believer of Turkey being a part of the West”: “as a journalist, when I travel with the Prime Minister, the Ministers or anybody else from the government to […] the Eastern, Islamic part of the world, I feel that our politicians feel closer to these guys than to us [the Turkish delegation that travels with the government]” (Interview with Zeynep Gurcanli 27.04.2011).

Therefore, the AKP narrative shows an admiration for the Ottoman past, and emphasizes that a shared history provides the basis for the establishment of closer relations with former members of the Empire. This is significantly different
from the negative view the Republican elites hold about the Ottoman Empire and its former members.

It is worth noting at this point that according to the neo-Ottomanist discourse, Turkey is to have a leading role in the surrounding regions. This point will be explained in more detail in the section on the persistence of Turkish nationalism in the new security perspective below. But two quotes, one from Prime Minister Erdogan, and one from US Ambassador in Turkey Jeffrey James, illustrate this idea. Prime Minister Erdogan has said that the Ottoman Empire had “three continents under its wings and embrac[ed] numerous tribes and countries with loving care” (quoted on Cosar 2011, p. 182, emphasis added) and in a cable sent from the US embassy in Ankara, revealed by Wikileaks, US ambassador Jeffrey James summarized an Ahmet Davutoglu's speech in the Balkans in 2009 as following: “His [Davutoglu’s] thesis: the Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East were all better off when under Ottoman control or influence; peace and progress prevailed. Alas the region has been ravaged by division and war ever since. He was too clever to explicitly blame all that on the Imperialist Western powers, but came close. However, now Turkey is back, ready to lead – or even unite” (Jeffrey 2010, p. n/a). Therefore, the neo-Ottomanist perspective emphasizes the brotherhood ties between Turkey and the former members of the Empire, but it is implicit in the narrative that Turkey is the country to have a leading role among its “brothers”.

**Turkey’s geography**

The doctrine of Strategic Depth is very much infused with ideas of geopolitics, just as traditional recipes for Turkey’s behavior in external affairs have always been (Bilgin 2007, p. 749). Turkey’s unique geographical location is once again invoked to justify certain foreign policy choices. However, the AKP and Davutoglu’s reading of Turkey’s geography is significantly different from the reading of traditional actors, and therefore his policy prescriptions also differ. Instead of seeing Turkey’s history and geography as a burden, they see them as strategic assets (Kalin 2011, p. 53).
This reading of Turkey’s geography as something positive can be seen in the AKP party program: “The geopolitical situation of Turkey has the potential to create an attraction zone for many cooperation projects [...] Our Party shall follow a realistic foreign policy befitting the history and geographical position of Turkey” (AKP party program, n.d, p. n/a). The AKP is invoking the geography of Turkey as a determinant of its foreign policy, just as the secular elites have done in the past. However, the AKP’s reading of Turkey’s geography as fortunate is the opposite of the view propagated by the textbooks described in the last chapter. As we have seen, according to the Republican narrative, Turkey is situated in a very unstable region, encircled by unfriendly countries all involved in “playing games over Turkey”, and faced by threats like no other European country. In order to avoid being dragged to the Arab swamp, Turkey should adopt a very cautious approach to the region.

Davutoglu also views Turkey’s geography as unique, but in a positive way: Turkey is located halfway “from all the centers of civilization [such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, Mediterranean and Persian basins] [...] and this is a factor that will in all probability increase the contribution of Turkey” (Davutoglu quoted on Sozen 2010, p. 110). Turkish history, geography and its multiple regional identities provides the country the “capability as well as the responsibility to follow an integrated and multidimensional foreign policy” (Davutoglu 2010b, *Hurriyet Daily News*, p. n/a). Instead of avoiding regional neighbors, Turkey can and, in fact has the responsibility, because of its history and geography, to engage with its “areas of influence”. According to Davutoglu, Turkey should contribute to the establishment of peace and stability in the region by promoting economic interdependence and diplomatic relations and helping solve conflicts, prioritizing dialogue as a means of solving crisis and acting as a facilitator, setting channels for political dialogue (Davutoglu 2010b, *Hurriyet Daily News*, p. n/a). Thus the prescription for Turkey’s approach to the Muslim Middle East has changed from avoidance to responsibility to become involved.

To summarize so far, when compared to the Republican security culture, the neo-Ottomanist paradigm can be considered significantly different. As previously described, the Republican security culture is characterize by a sense
of isolation (“Turks have no friends but Turks”), of being in a unfortunate geographical location, surrounded by unfriendly countries devising schemes to weaken or even disintegrate Turkey with the help of enemies within.

The neo-Ottoman security culture stresses Turkey’s multi-civilizational character, the shared bonds between Turkey and the former members of the Ottoman Empire and sees Turkey’s unique geographical location as an asset and an opportunity to project Turkey’s influence abroad. Therefore, the deep sense of insecurity felt by the Republican elites is replaced by a sense of self-confidence, of Turkey reclaiming its central position in the region.

However, this is not the whole story. Although there are fundamental differences between the Republican and the neo-Ottomanist security culture, they also share a number of traits, which will be identified below.

**Common traits of the Republican and neo-Ottomanist security cultures**

*The quest to be accepted as member of the West*

The first commonality between the two security cultures is the perennial quest to be admitted as a member of the Western community of nations, in spite of the presence of a sense of mistrust towards the West. This argument might seem surprising to some members of the Republican elites, who accuse the AKP of shifting the axis of Turkish foreign policy to the East. As mentioned above, they accuse the AKP of not embracing the prospect of European Union membership wholeheartedly, and point to the fact that, since 2007, when the process of EU membership stalled, the pace of conducting EU-related reforms has diminished. In addition, some of the AKP’s external behavior, notably its support for Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, the worsening of its relations with Israel, and its stance on how to deal with Iran’s nuclear program, contributed to a perception that Turkey under the AKP was turning its back to the West.

I argue that this is not the case. The AKP has taken over from the Republican elites the pursuit of recognition and acceptance by the West, but for different reasons. The Republican elites sought EU membership to have its Western identity confirmed, to prove that Turkey had finally reached the level of
contemporary civilization. Implicit in this Republican discourse was a feeling of inferiority to Europe, which would be placated once Turkey was finally admitted. The AKP, on the other hand, does not seek membership to have a Western identity confirmed, since it does not consider Turkey’s identity as solely Western, but multi-civilizational. It seeks EU membership primarily as a matter of prestige. The AKP’s discourse frequently emphasizes that, notwithstanding some of the reforms that still need to be made, Turkey is already an equal to Europe. If Europe refuses to acknowledge this fact and refuses to admit Turkey, it will be at its own peril.

In an article entitled “The Robust Man of Europe”, Prime Minister Erdogan noted that: “Turkey is a regional player, an international actor with an expanding range of soft power and a resilient, sizable economy. And yet, the fact that it can withstand being rebuffed [by Europe] should not become a reason for Turkey’s exclusion. Sometimes I wonder if Turkey’s power is an impediment to its accession to the Union”. The Prime Minister added that “It’s been more than half a century since Turkey first knocked at Europe’s door […] The Turkey of today is different. We are no more a country that would wait at the EU’s door like a docile supplicant […] Europe has no real alternative to Turkey. Especially in a global order where the balance of power is shifting, the EU needs Turkey to become an ever stronger, richer, more inclusive, and more secure Union. I hope it will not be too late for our European friends to discover this fact” (Erdogan 2011, Newsweek p. n/a).

Therefore the idea that Turkey should be accepted as a member of the West, which was first formulated as a survival strategy and then became a matter of having its Western identity confirmed, is turned on its head. Now it is Europe who needs Turkey if it wants to continue to be safe and to have relevance in the world state. This argument has been continuously made by AKP politicians. Turkey’s Chief EU negotiator, Egemen Bagis said: “Turkey is not a candidate for the EU just for the sake of it and it does not desperately need to join the 27-member union […] The European Union needs Turkey more than Turkey needs to be part of the bloc” (quoted in Tuncel 2011, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a).
This idea that Turkey is *already* an equal to the West and Europe must recognized Turkey as such is perfectly expressed by Suat Kiniklioglu, AKP’s deputy chairman of external affairs: “Turkey’s increasing self-confidence is often met by European arrogance and an inability to treat Turkey as a strategic partner rather than as an ordinary applicant country” (Kiniklioglu 2011, p. 66). Therefore, according to this AKP deputy, Turkey is *not* an ordinary applicant country; it is a powerful country in its region, a strategic partner of Europe and it is Europe’s loss if it doesn’t recognize it as such. He adds that “Turkey is not content with a fragile, unfair and unequal relationship with Europe. It seeks a proper, respected and dignified position (Kiniklioglu 2011, p. 68). 

This is not to say that AKP politicians think that Turkey doesn’t need to conduct any more EU-related reforms. As explained to me by a special advisor to the foreign minister, “We really want to become a member; it is an aspiration for us [...] the EU sets some kind of standards [...] benchmarks that we need to have, what kind of work that we need to do”. However, he contended that “it is not like we are always going to be knocking on the door [...] I’ll be honest with you. In 10 or 15 years time, we will still be pursuing the same objective, to become a member. But, in the end, [whether Turkey gets accepted or not] will not be a unilateral decision, it will be a mutual decision. The EU will make a decision, but we will also make a decision”. He added that “Our economy has changed substantially, we are having better standards in human rights and democracy, we are improving our relations with our wider geography, we have much more say in our domestic individual issues and also we are starting to have much more say in global issues as well”. He concluded that “in 10 years, if we continue to improve our economy at this speed, I don’t know whether we are going to want to be in the EU”. (Interview G, 02.05.2011).

Therefore, the AKP has continued to pursue recognition and acceptance by the West, not to have its Western identity confirmed, but as a matter of pride, prestige and dignity.
The untrustworthy West and sovereign sensitivities

As we have seen, the Republican elites hold an ambivalent view about the West: it is a civilization that Turkey wants to be recognized as being part of, but it is also seen as untrustworthy because of its plans to weaken and even disintegrate Turkey. The belief, imprinted in the Turkish collective psyche, by years of Republican education, is that “if Turkey exists at all today, it is not because of the West, but in spite of it” (Idiz 2011b in Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a.). The Republican elites thought that the West planned to weaken Turkey by meddling in its domestic affairs and exploiting domestic grievances and therefore became very sensitive to what it perceives as attacks to Turkey's sovereignty.

Although the AKP does not seem to share this extreme assessment that the West is trying to weaken or divide Turkey, mainly due to that fact that they perceive Turkey as being a powerful country in its own right, more able to protect itself, it still displays a defensive attitude towards what is perceived as the West's interference in Turkish internal matters, a suspicion that the West is supporting enemies at home and that it does not treat Turkey fairly.

For example, at the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly in April 2011, Prime Minister Erdogan, when faced with criticisms about the state of Turkey’s democracy, told the European deputies that they should not interfere in matters which are “nobody business but the Turks” (quoted in Idiz 2011a, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a). In addition, the AKP party program states in the third paragraph on the section on foreign policy that “Turkey, which is respectful of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other countries, deems it its right for other nations and international agencies to respect its territorial integrity and sovereignty” (AKP party program, n.d., p. n/a).

It is telling that the AKP felt the need to stress that its sovereignty should not be trampled on right in the beginning of its party program’s section on foreign policy, when it is going through an accession process which requires constant monitoring of Turkey’s domestic developments and which will lead to membership of an entity that requires its member states to relinquish a
substantial part of their sovereignty. It is also telling that Erdogan thought that
the Council of Europe should not comment on Turkish political developments,
when this is precisely one of the remits of that organization. Thus, the fact that
the AKP is very unreceptive of Europe’s criticisms of Turkey’s domestic
situation hints that it has inherited the Republican elites’ sovereign sensitivities.

The suspicion that foreign powers are purposely supporting adversaries at
home has also persisted. When the magazine *The Economist* published an
article in June 2011 urging the Turkish electorate to vote for the opposition CHP
in order to improve Turkey’s democracy, Prime Minister Erdogan reacted
harshly: “I am calling on the Economist: you are French to this country. And you
are French to the CHP as well [referring to an expression used in Turkey to
describe someone who speaks without being knowledgeable about the subject].
[…]. The CHP’s new leader is not a national project but an international project.
We knew that the CHP’s new leader was part of the project of the gangs in
Turkey, but we didn’t know that it is also the project of global gangs“ (quoted in
*Hurriyet Daily News* 2011c, p. n/a). The most important member of these “global
gangs” is identified in the following quote: “The international media, because
they are backed by Israel, wouldn’t be happy with the continuation of the AK
Party government” (Prime Minister Erdogan quoted in *Hurriyet Daily News*
2011d, p. n/a).

A columnist for the conservative *Today’s Zaman* agreed with Erdogan’s
assessment: “certain journalists, writers and academics in Turkey […] clearly
[…] receive support from dynamic forces within the country and from their
powerful collaborators on the outside […] some Western institutions and media
organizations […] are […] becoming tools of the biased, dark and gray
propaganda” (Kenes 2011, in *Today’s Zaman*, p. 03). Three other AKP
ministers also blamed Israel for criticisms towards Erdogan’s increasingly
authoritarian behavior voiced by the international press (Bekdil 2011 in *Hurriyet
Daily News*, p. n/a).

The constant criticism of Turkey’s press freedoms coming from Europe led
to the deputy chairman of the AKP, Bulent Gedikli, to claim in February 2012
that there was a “brotherhood” formed by internal and external actors conspiring
to “discredit and unseat the government by spreading propaganda to show it
ha[s] become a ‘civilian dictatorship’” (Gedikli 2012 in Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a). According to this deputy, the Israeli President Shimon Peres is the “coach of the anti-AKP team,” which he compared to a football team. He claimed that PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was the goalkeeper; Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy and Benjamin Netanyahu were in the defense; five suspected members of Ergenekon network were in the midfield; and the leaders of CHP and the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) were forwards (Gedikli 2012 in Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a). These remarks show the persistence of the idea that there are ill-intentioned external and internal actors collaborating to cause harm to the country.

Finally, the AKP’s negative view towards the West also stems from a perception that the West treats Turkey unfairly, it doesn’t keep its promises, and it says one thing and does another. This perception is particularly strong when it comes to Turkey’s EU membership. Turkish politicians frequently react to Germany’s Angela Merkel’s and France’s former President Nicolas Sarkozy opposition to Turkey’s membership by invoking the term *pacta sunt servanda*, which means that agreements must be kept. The fact that Greek Cyprus, who rejected the Annan Plan, was admitted into the Union, and that Turkish Cypriots, who supported the referendum, continue to be isolated, also contribute to this view that the EU acts unfairly. According to a special advisor to Turkish foreign minister, “the whole history of Turkey-EU relations is of broken promises” (Interview G, 02.05.2011).

The portrait of the EU as unfair and insincere has become widespread in Turkish society: “it is the feeling of the whole Turkish people, whether they are secular or Western-oriented or Eastern-oriented […] All the people in Turkey think that the EU has some double-standards, and that it will never accept Turkey” (Interview with Zeynep Gurcanli 27.04.2011). This is clearly visible in the shocking number of people who believe that the EU behaves insincerely and unfairly towards Turkey, seen in the poll below:
Table 2: Does the EU behave sincerely and fairly towards Turkey? (USAK 2010 p. 124)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Choices</th>
<th>III. Survey October 2006</th>
<th>II. Survey June 2005</th>
<th>I. Survey December 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No idea</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkish nationalism

At a first glance, the AKP ideology seems to go beyond the Turkish nationalism of the Kemalist elites, since it usually stresses religious and historical bonds (Islam and the Ottoman Empire) instead of ethnic ones. Liberal intellectuals in Turkey and abroad commonly held the assumption that conservative Turkish middle class embraced a liberal, post-national vision (Karaveli 2010, p. 63). The AKP’s Kurdish opening and development of better relations with the Kurdish Regional Government in Northern Iraq, its stance on Cyprus and its efforts to normalize relations with Armenia seemed to confirm this assumption that the AKP was trying to replace Turkish nationalism with a broader post-national vision. This ‘openings” towards Kurds, Cyprus and Armenia led to criticisms from the Nationalist MHP, who accused the AKP of betraying the Turkish diasporas – the Iraqi Turkomen, the Turkish Cypriots and the Azeris by introducing those policies (Jeffrey 2010, p. n/a).

Nevertheless, the fact is that Turkish nationalism remains a strong component of the Party’s worldview. That is particularly visible in the government’s stance on the Armenian massacres of 1915; on the Kurdish issue; and on the place Turkey should occupy in its neighborhood.

The government’s stance on the Armenian killings is the same taken by the Republican elites, i.e., that no genocide was committed; the Armenians had sided with Russia and both Turks and Armenians died as a result. Although there has been some recognition of the Armenian massacres by civil society in
Turkey, the government insists on denying that atrocities were committed. Since 2010 there have been commemorations of the tragic events of 1915 in several Turkish cities with the participation of journalists, politicians, academics, writers, artists and NGO representatives holding banners saying “Say stop to Racism and Nationalism” and “This pain belongs to all of us” (Ziflioglu 2011 in Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a). Nevertheless, the government continues to adopt a policy of denial, visible in Ahmet Davutoğlu’s complaints about President Barack Obama’s 2011 annual speech on the Armenian Remembrance Day: “Lots of pain was endured in the Ottoman territories during the break-up of the empire. We would also have expected Mr. Obama to also remember the sufferings of Turks back in those days […] Obama’s statement is unfit historically and it is biased. We find this remarks that distort historical truths very problematic and we regret them” (quoted in Enginsoy 2011, Hurriyet Daily News, p. 05).

In the view of Today’s Zaman columnist Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “Muslims in Turkey […] were unable to keep a distance from that political tradition when it came to the Armenian genocide taboo due to the nationalist component inside of them. Turkey managed to overcome the mentality of being a country surrounded by enemies on all sides under the administration of the AKP, but despite these developments this government exhibited the same reflex any nationalist government would show in Turkey when the ‘Armenian genocide’ bill was being debated in the US Congress (Cengiz 2011, Today’s Zaman, p. n/a).

This issue has also caused problems between Turkey and France. In late 2011, the French National Assembly passed a bill criminalizing the denial of what it calls the Armenian genocide. Turkey’s response, apart from accusing France of committing genocide during its colonial occupation of Algeria, was to impose political, economic and military sanctions against Paris. In addition, crowds in Ankara chanted “We have not committed genocide, we defended the homeland. Wait for us France, we will come”. (BBC News 2011b, p. n/a).

When it comes to the Kurdish issue, the AKP stance is marked by inconsistency. As part of the reforms demanded for EU membership, Kurdish language publications and private Kurdish language courses were made legal, and a Turkish state television channel began broadcasting in Kurdish in January 2009 (Karaveli 2010, p. 9). In July 2009, the government announced a “Kurdish
initiative” or a “democratic move” to try to solve the Kurdish issue based on extending democratic rights and improving freedoms (Today’s Zaman 2009, p. n/a). The first stage of the initiative was to consult with civil society organizations, political parties and academics in order to gather their suggestions on how to best solve the problem. Some of the items to be part of the reform package included more opportunities for Kurds to learn their native tongue and the restoring of original Kurdish names of villages and towns whose names were changed to Turkish in the early years of the Republic.

The government’s initiative faced a lot of resistance from Kemalist circles, as was to be expected. The then leader of the CHP, Deniz Baykal, said that the government’s “democratic move” would make Turkey like Lebanon, Iraq or Yugoslavia and that the project would damage the national unity and the basic political identity of the Republic. The MHP leader Devlet Bahceli claimed that the Kurdish move was a U.S. project, and the then leader of the CHP agreed, saying that this is an example of games being played on Turkey. The then Chief of General Staff Gen. İlker Basbug warned that “The Turkish Armed Forces will not allow any harm to be done to the nation-state and the unitary state structure” and that “the Turkish State, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish” (Hurriyet Daily News 2009, p. n/a). Such discourses do not come as a surprise at all, and are a manifestation of Turkey’s Republican security culture.

In December 2009, the initiative was pretty much killed by the decision of the Constitutional Court to close the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) for links with the PKK and the arrest of more than 2000 Kurdish mayors, politicians, and NGO activists (Karaveli 2010, p. 17 and Baydemir 2011, p. 45). Although the AKP was not directly responsible for the closure case and the arrests, it did not voice its opposition in strong terms.

During the 2011 pre-election campaign, Prime Minister Erdogan, who in a speech in Diyarbakir in 2005 had recognized that the Turkish state had made mistakes with regards to the Kurdish issue, becoming the first Turkish Prime Minister to do so, argued that “There is no longer a Kurdish issue in this country. I do not accept this. There are problems of my Kurdish brothers, but no longer a Kurdish question” (quoted in Today’s Zaman 2011c, p. 06). By denying
the existence of a Kurdish problem, Erdogan had reversed to the traditional discourse which blames the discontent on the Southeast on poverty, feudal structures, or the meddling of foreign powers, not as the manifestation of a legitimate struggle for recognition and autonomy. After the 2011 elections, the PKK increased the frequency and intensity of its attacks and the Turkish government responded with aerial bombardment of PKK bases in Northern Iraq.

Although the Republican establishment, represented by the some in the judiciary, the military and the CHP and MHP are perhaps more to blame for the failure of the Kurdish opening and for the continued use of military responses to the Kurdish problem, the AKP shares part of the blame for adopting an inconsistent approach.

The AKP’s inconsistency is explained by Umit Aktas, an Islamist intellectual, as a result of divisions within the AKP between a Sunni conservative current that embraces a narrow Turkish nationalism and an Islamist current which embraces a more “Ummah-oriented, universalist vision” (Karaveli 2010, p. 69). Because the AKP depends to a large extent on the Sunni conservatives, it has to pay attention to the concerns of this group.

The notion of a Sunni Turkish superiority over other ethnicities and religious groups in the country has its roots in the political configuration of the Ottoman Empire, in which Muslim Turks were the ruling nation (Akçam 2007 in Karaveli 2010, p. 71). An AKP parliamentarian argued that “There can be no question of [Turkish-Kurdish] equality […] it is a fact that cannot be overlooked that Sunni Turks constitute 80 percent of the population” (quoted in Karaveli 2010, p. 71). According to Ahmet Insel, “The Ottoman ruling nation deemed the Imperial edict [which decreed in 1856 the principle of universal equality of all peoples of the Ottoman Empire] the worst disaster that had ever befallen on it. The Sunni Turkish population cannot accept equality with those who are not Turkish and Sunni” (quoted in Karaveli 2010, p. 71).

In terms of foreign policy, the AKP’s neo-Ottomanism – the idea that the Ottoman heritage provides a basis for Turkey’s projection of influence abroad- is also based on a vision of Turkish nationalism (Taspinar 2011, p. 16), or on a “somewhat narcissistic self-understanding among many Turkish intellectuals of the idea that Turkey, as the natural heir of the Ottoman empire, ought to play a
more central role in Middle East and world affairs” (Guida 2008, p. 44). This self-aggrandizing perception is also manifested in Davutoglu’s speeches which stress Turkey’s role as a “regional leader” and “regional protector” with a “responsibility’ to provide security for the neighboring regions (Aras and Gorener 2010, p. 81). Although he stresses the brotherhood ties between Turkey and the former members of the Empire, it is implicit in his discourse that Turkey is the big brother.

To consolidate, the neo-Ottoman security culture, rooted in a Turkish identity seen as multi-civilizational, is characterized by a sense of shared bonds and responsibility towards the neighborhood, and a positive view of Turkey’s history and unique geographical location, replacing the Republican paradigm sense of insecurity with a sense of self-confidence. However, it shares with the Republican security culture an ambivalent view towards the West, which is seen as meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs, exploiting domestic grievances, and treating Turkey unfairly. Thus, both security cultures display a defensive attitude towards what is perceived as the West’s interference in Turkish internal matters. Furthermore, they both share a sense of Turkish superiority over minorities at home and over former members of the Ottoman Empire. These characteristics will influence a foreign policy geared at being recognized as an equal power to the European Union, while at the same time guarding Turkey’s sovereignty, and becoming a regional leader in the Middle East.

**The neo-Ottomanist security culture and AKP foreign policy**

Given the security culture espoused by the AKP, it is not surprising that under the AKP government, Turkey’s relations with the Muslim Middle East flourished. Turkey’s relations with Syria, Iran and Iraq (including the Kurdish Regional Government) improved dramatically. 51 agreements on several areas including tourism, education, health and transportation were signed with Syria and 48 with Iraq (Davutoglu 2010a, p. n/a). Moreover, Turkey has established visa-free regimes with 58 countries, including Russia (International Herald Tribune 2011, p. 10). The share of trade with the Middle East increased from
18.79% in 2003 to 29.3% in 2010 (Onis 2011, p. 56). Because of Turkey’s frequent and intense criticism of Israel’s policies and strong support for the Palestinian cause, Turkey’s popularity in the region improved substantially. According to a survey conducted in six Arab countries, Turkey received the highest favorable ratings (Today’s Zaman 2011e, p. n/a).

The fact that the AKP is a political party with an Islamist roots also contributed to Turkey’s leverage in the region. The AKP has been willing to portray Turkey as a model of how to reconcile democracy and Islam. In a speech delivered at Harvard University in 2003, Prime Minister Erdogan said “I do no subscribe to the view that Islamic culture and democracy cannot be reconciled. As a politician who cherishes religious conviction in his personal sphere, but regards politics as a domain outside religion, I believe this view [i.e. of irreconcilability] is seriously flawed” (quoted on Altunisik 2008b, p. 46).

Apart from establishing closer economic and political relations, Turkey began to act as a mediator in regional conflicts. Some examples include Turkey’s mediation between warring Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, between rival parties in Lebanon, between Israel and Syria and Iraq and Syria. These initiatives seem to have been influenced by the neo-Ottomanist security culture, in particular the idea that Turkey should take on a leadership role because it is the natural heir of the Ottoman Empire, which had the neighborhood “under its wings” and embraced with “loving care”.

This new self-confident Turkey wants to be involved in regional matters, feels that it deserves to have a say in important regional issues, and it thinks it can contribute to the resolution of problems. It gets very frustrated if its efforts are not recognized or if it is excluded from decisions regarding the region. Two examples are particularly helpful to illustrate this point: Turkey’s stance on Iran’s nuclear program and its posture with regards to the uprising in Libya in 2011 and the ensuing plans to establish a no-fly zone and conduct air strikes in that country (which will be dealt with in the next chapter). It is also important to focus on these two cases because, together with Turkey’s worsening relations with Israel and supportive stance towards Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir, they form the basis of the accusation that Turkey is shifting its axis to the East. As I have argued above, and as these two cases will illustrate, Turkey’s intention is not to
abandon the Western alliance, but to have a say in regional issues and to be acknowledged by the West as a power in the region.

In May 2010, Turkey, together with Brazil, trying to find a solution to the problem of Iran’s nuclear program, brokered a deal with Iran in which the country would send 1200 kg of low-enriched uranium to Turkey in exchange for highly-enriched uranium for a civilian medical research reactor (Pop 2010, *EU Observer*, p. n/a). This formula was based on a nuclear fuel swap proposal put forward by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) the previous autumn – and rejected by Iran - which also stated that Iran would not be subjected to further sanctions if it didn’t enrich uranium over 4 percent (Pop 2010, *EU Observer*, p. n/a). However, in May 2010, Iran’s stocks were already much larger than 1200 kg and the country had announced it was producing 20 percent enriched uranium (Dermitas 2010b, *Hurriyet Daily News*, p. n/a). The deal was considered insufficient by the P5+1, and the day after the agreement was signed, the UN Security Council agreed on a package of fresh sanctions against Iran, thereby effectively killing the deal. Turkey, then a non-permanent member of the Council, voted against the sanctions and later decided not to apply the US and EU’s tougher sanctions against Iran, but those proposed by the United Nations (*Hurriyet Daily News* 2010b, p. n/a).

Turkey framed its attempts to broker a deal not as the ultimate solution to the problem, but as a confidence-building measure, which was supported by the United States at the time. In order to prove that the US was behind the deal, the Brazilian government released a letter sent by President Obama to President Lula in April 2010 in which the US set the conditions for accepting a nuclear fuel swap deal; conditions which were met by the Tehran Declaration (Rozen 2010, p. n/a).

A special advisor to the Foreign Minister told me in an interview that Turkey was disappointed with the US for withdrawing its support for the Brazil-Turkey-Iran deal at the last minute and for not consulting Turkey before agreeing on the sanctions in the UN Security Council. He said that, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council at the time, and as an ally of the United States, he expected Turkey to have been consulted about the sanctions: “you shouldn’t expect us to say ‘yes’ to something which we haven’t been involved
in [...] it is not going to work that way. It is not going to work in NATO, it is not going to work in the UN Security Council. We don’t like to be dictated on those things” (Interview G, 02.05.2011).

This case shows that Turkey wants to have a say in regional matters; it thinks it can contribute positively to the solution of regional problems; and it wants the West to treat Turkey as a regional power, which should be involved in important decisions concerning its neighborhood.

The same dynamics can be observed in Turkey’s stance towards the conflict in Libya, which will be analyzed in the next chapter. Turkey’s policies with regards to Iran’s nuclear program and the conflict in Libya reveal that Turkey wants to be involved in high profile issues in the region, it thinks that it can contribute to solving regional problems and that the West should acknowledge Turkey’s status as a regional power.

The goal of having zero-problems with the neighbors was shaken by the Arab spring. Turkey was accused by some of pursuing “zero problems with dictators” (Akyol 2011c, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a), since Turkey tried to forge closer ties with regional governments most of which were dictatorships. Turkey refrained from openly defending a pro-democratizing agenda, adopting instead an approach which consisted of encouraging regional governments, usually behind closed doors, to conduct reforms. When the Arab Spring started, Turkey was slow to adapt to the new circumstances, which was particularly visible in the Libyan case, described above, and in the case of Syria.

Initially, Turkey’s response to Syria’s violent oppression of protestors was to appeal to the Syrian authorities to act with restraint and to advise the Syrian government to listen to the will of its people. Prime Minister Erdogan held phone conversations with Bashar al-Assad and send Turkish envoys to Damascus to say that Turkey would stand by him if he pursed more democratic reforms (Hurriyet Daily News 2011f, p. n/a). Foreign Minister Davutoglu explained this weak response by the government, which was short of asking Assad to step down, by saying that “we have always supported the legitimate demands of the people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria [...] At the same time, as a country who feels responsible for the future of the region, we have done our best for the peaceful progress of these transition periods” (quoted in
Kart 2011b, Today's Zaman, p. 04, emphasis added). The AKP administration was feeling confident that, if any country in the world could make a contribution to help solve the problem, it was Turkey: “we are making our best efforts to encourage the Syrian administration to make reforms […] who else knows Syria more than us? Who else can contribute more to a peaceful process in Syria or in Iraq more than Turkey? […] This is our geography” (Ahmet Davutoglu, Al-Jazeera 2011, p. n/a).

While advising the Syrian government to proceed with democratic reforms, Turkey also set up refugee camps on its border with Syria, saying that “the peoples in the neighboring countries are our siblings. When they have humanitarian needs, it is out of the question to keep our distance […] no matter what their ethnic roots and religious sects are, all Syrians are our siblings” (Davutoglu quoted in Kart 2011b, Today’s Zaman, p. 04).

With Turkey’s urging for the Assad government to reform falling on deaf years, Turkey raised the level of its criticism, but still insisted that an orderly transition to democracy was the best option. After government forces attacked the city of Hama, killing 95 civilians, Davutoglu said: “while we were expecting the government of Syria to make reforms, we learned about the operation [in Hama]. It is very wrong to conduct such an operation on the eve of the holy month of Ramadan […] It is the best option to encourage the Syrian government to make more reforms […] but if the problems are left unsolved and every day scores of people are killed, no one can remain silent” (quoted in Kurtaran 2011, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a).

Finally, with the killings continuing, Prime Minister Erdogan announced in September 2011 that Turkey was no longer in contact with Syria: "I have halted talks with the Syrian government. I did not want it to come to this point, but the regime there pushed us to make such a decision" (quoted in Hurriyet Daily News 2011g, p. n/a). Turkey then announced that it would impose its own sanctions on Syria, even though the UN Security Council failed to pass a resolution to that effect because of China’s and Russia’s opposition (Albayrak 2011, Wall Street Journal, p. n/a).

Turkey, however, only began to apply sanctions on Syria after the Arab League decided to impose its own measures at the end of November 2011. It is
interesting to note that even though the European Union had been gradually strengthening sanctions against the Assad regime, Turkey only decided to impose sanctions after the announcement by the Arab League. A diplomatic official said that “we have always said from the very beginning […] that sanctions should have first come from a regional organization […] And they did. And as Turkey, we will stand neither behind nor in front of the Arab League. We will be nearby […] obviously measures we will take against Syria will be national ones […] as a neighboring country which has a 900-km-long border with this country, our measures could differ from those of the Arab League in size and in timing” (Dermitas 2011b, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a). Therefore, in this case, Turkey did not align itself with either regional organization, and decided to pursue its own “national measures”.

According to news reports, the Turkish government felt very frustrated by the Assad regime’s unwillingness to listen to Turkey. According to a source close to Prime Minister Erdogan, who spoke to The Guardian, Erdogan “believed that he had Assad’s word […] then it became clear that everything he said he was not honoring […] there was built up frustration in Ankara at the stubbornness of the regime in Damascus”. In addition, according to academic Sinan Ulgen, “the government believed that they had established such a strong relationship with Assad, that they would be able to nudge the government in a certain direction” (quoted in Chulov 2011, The Guardian, p. n/a).

Attempts by Turkey to lead the way, since it feels that “nobody knows Syria more than Turkey”, was not very welcomed by Bashar Al-Assad, who accused Turkey of trying to revive “imperial dreams” in the Old Ottoman territories: “some in Turkey are still clinging to the dream of reinstating the Ottoman Empire” (quoted in Dermitas 2011b, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a).

With violence in Syria escalating, and another UN Security Council resolution condemning the Assad regime being blocked by Russia and China in February 2012, Turkey announced once again its desire to take a leading role in solving the Syrian crisis. Prime Minister Erdogan indicated that he was willing to form a contact group on Syria involving concerned parties. The idea of forming a contact group had already been expressed by France. However Turkish-French relations, in the beginning of 2012, were shaken by the bill passed by
the French National Assembly criminalizing denial of the Armenian genocide. According to Suat Kiniklioglu, AKP’s deputy chairman of external affairs, “France apparently has proposed such a group but Turkey does not consider Nicolas Sarkozy’s France a friendly country. Any move should be led by the US and Turkey along with other interested states” (Kiniklioglu 2012, in Today’s Zaman, p. n/a).

Turkey and France’s increasing rivalry in the Middle East – particularly visible in the case of Libya, which will be explored in detail in the next chapter – can be explained by pointing out to the similarities between Turkey’s neo-Ottomanist and France’s traditional security culture. These similarities will be examined in more detail in the next chapter, but it is important to indicate at this point that both security cultures are characterized by a sense of responsibility towards the Middle East and North Africa, and a sense of “knowing best” about how to deal with these regions because of Turkey’s and France’s historical legacies. Both countries wish to be regional leaders, and seem to be competing for influence. This competition between France and Turkey in the Middle East can have consequences for the Global Power Europe scenario, as will be elaborated in the next chapter.

Thus, the Arab Spring severely shook the policy of zero-problems with neighbors, since the policy was predicated on establishing relations with the authoritarian regimes in the region. Turkey thought that it could help solve the problems in the region by supporting a peaceful transition to democracy, which proved not to be the case. Although the Arab Spring has soured Turkey’s relations with Syria, and consequently with Iran, Syria’s most important ally, Turkey is still pursuing its goal to have good relations with the Middle East and to be a regional leader. The AKP then reformulated its policy by supporting the uprisings, even if a little bit late, especially concerning Libya and Syria.

Prime Minister Erdogan’s visit to Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya in September 2011 can be understood as an attempt to show that Turkey is a regional leader in tune with the Arab populations, and that it can help transform the region. During that trip, Prime Minister Erdogan received a “hero’s welcome” in Cairo, which displayed four billboards showing pictures of Erdogan, with Turkish and
Egyptian flags and the message, "With United Hands for the Future" (Cook 2011, p. n/a).

When it comes to the West, and the European Union in particular, the neo-Ottomanist security culture has influenced a foreign policy geared towards achieving recognition as an equal partner. At the same time, because the West is seen as meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs, exploiting domestic grievances, and treating Turkey unfairly, the relationship with Europe has been marked by many problems.

The AKP has pursued the goal of acceding to the EU by conducting several reforms demanded as part of the process of accession. However, the negative view towards Europe, a feature of both the Republican and the neo-Ottomanist security cultures, has been intensified during the membership process. The EU has been perceived by actors holding both security cultures as not treating Turkey as it treated other applicant countries, and of putting artificial obstacles in the path of Turkey’s EU membership.

After Greek Cyprus was admitted to the EU without the reunification of the island, Turkey refused to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot’s vessels and aircrafts and the European Union blocked eight of the negotiation chapters in 2006 in response. Nine other chapters are frozen by either France or Cyprus (Hakura 2011, p. 13). The European Union is blamed for not keeping its promises to Turkish Cypriots, who voted in favor of the Annan Plan, and were not rewarded with an end of their isolation. In addition, France and Germany’s outright hostile attitude towards Turkish membership, even though Turkey was declared a candidate country, contributes to the view that the EU doesn’t honor its commitments. A third issue which confirms the perception of the EU as untrustworthy is its reluctance to offer Turkey visa liberalization, which has been offered to other candidate countries.

Turkey has also expressed its aspiration to be fully involved in the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It wants to replicate the type of membership Turkey used to enjoy in the WEU, in which the country, as an associate member, was able to exert a considerable amount of influence in European security matters. In that organization, Turkey was able to submit
proposals, participate in working groups, and voice its opinions and concerns before decisions were taken (Blockmans 2010, p. 5). In addition, Turkey contributed to all the limited non-military operations carried out by the WEU (Blockmans 2010, p. 5).

Since the CSDP was created in 1999, Turkey has been excluded from the EU decision-making process in security issues, since it cannot participate in the forums where decisions are taken, namely Council meetings, the Political and Security Committee and the Military Committee. Therefore, Turkey felt that its role in the European security architecture was being downgraded. “The abolishment of the Western European Union where Turkey had an equal say in decision-making was [...] a blow to Turkish confidence about its place in Europe” (Logoglu 2011, p. 39). Even though Turkey is excluded from the decision-making procedures of CSDP and from the European Defense Agency, the country is one of the largest non-EU contributors to CSDP operations. Turkey has contributed to seven CSDP missions: EUFOR Althea (with 300 personnel) and EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Concordia (military) and EUPOL (police) in Macedonia, EULEX in Kosovo (with 400 personnel), in Congo (with a C-130 cargo airplane and 17 personnel) and Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden (Blockmans 2010, p. 16 and Muftuler-Baç 2009, p. 69).

Turkey also poses obstacles to the cooperation between the EU’s CSDP and NATO. The Berlin-Plus framework governing the relationship between the two allows the EU to use NATO assets in EU-led operations in which NATO does not want to be involved. In Turkey’s view, the Berlin-Plus agreement excludes non-signatories of the Partnership for Peace, such as Cyprus, from EU-NATO discussions. The EU, however, insists that Cyprus should participate in EU-NATO dialogue, since it is a member state, a position which Turkey fundamentally disagrees with. According to a special advisor to the Foreign Minister, “the EU expects us to sit with the Greek Cypriots, which will not be the case until there is a settlement on the island” (Interview G, 02.05.2011). As a result, Turkey has blocked much formal contact between the EU and NATO, and thus prevented common planning between the two bodies.

So far, only two operations have been conducted by the EU with the support of NATO: Operation Concordia in Macedonia and Operation EUFOR
Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Howorth 2009a, p. n/a) and Turkey has obstructed discussions between NATO and the EU on their operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, it has been impossible to reach an agreement on the protection of EUPOL staff by NATO (Smith S. 2010, p. 20). In the absence of a formal agreement between the EU and NATO, EU personnel are not included in the NATO’s Blue Force tracking system, which allows NATO to know the whereabouts of its personnel at any given moment (Smith S. 2010, p. 21). In Kosovo, Turkey has officially prevented Cyprus from helping train the Kosovo police force, which is one of the tasks of the EULEX rule-of-law mission, although in reality Turkey turns a blind eye to the fact that there are Cypriot experts on the ground (Smith S. 2010, p. 19).

Turkey insists that in “parallel to the contributions made by Turkey inside NATO until the present day, efforts shall be maintained for Turkey to take the place it deserves within the new European Security and Defense Concept created within the framework of the new European defense strategy” (AKP party program, n.d., p. n/a, emphasis added). Recently, Turkey has once again tried to develop a partnership with Europe in foreign policy and security matters by suggesting the establishment of a foreign-policy dialogue with the EU, which still haven’t been accepted by Europe (Dermitas 2011, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a).

Turkey also felt very disappointed when a French invitation to Turkey to participate in a EU foreign ministers’ meeting discussing developments in Syria on November 30th, 2011 was reportedly blocked by Greek Cyprus. Before the Cypriot veto, a Turkish Foreign Ministry official had warned that the EU’s decision on whether to invite the country “will show whether the European Union is ready to become a global power or not” (Hurriyet Daily News 2011i, p. n/a). After the Greek Cypriot veto, Omer Çelik, deputy chairman of the AKP, said: “Turkey does not need the EU's ideas on Syria. But Turkey’s opinions are as essential for the EU as oxygen” (in Yanatma 2011, Today’s Zaman, p. n/a). Foreign Minister Davutoglu argued that “They [Greek Cyprus] can impose a veto bureaucratically but they cannot veto Turkey’s historic role in the region” (in Hurriyet Daily News 2011j, p. n/a).

Therefore, some of the attitudes displayed by the EU, especially France and Germany’s opposition to Turkey’s membership, the support for Greek
Cypriots, the refusal to liberalize the visa regime, and to allow Turkey to be part of the EU’s security framework, have fuelled the already-present mistrust towards Europe and, as a result, have worsened the Turkish perception of the EU and made Turkey a difficult country to work with.

But, at the end of the day, Turkey does not want to be excluded from the Western Alliance, which was quite visible in Turkey’s position regarding Barack Obama’s plans to install radars for a NATO missile shield in Turkish territory. Turkey posed three conditions for accepting the radars: that Iran was not identified as a threat, that Turkey held joint command of the radars and that any intelligence gathered by the system would not be shared with Israel (Idiz 2011d, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a). Turkey managed to get concessions on all three points. As was the case with Libya, when it comes to important security issues being discussed by the West, Turkey has shown that it wants to be involved.

Conclusion

There are two security cultures vying for dominance within Turkey. The Republican security culture is rooted in a Turkish identity conceived as Western and homogenous and is characterized by a sense of loneliness, geographical misfortune, and an insecurity complex. This security culture prescribes integration to Western political structures as a confirmation of the country’s Western identity, and non-involvement in Middle Eastern affairs, in order not to be dragged to a zone of conflict whose identity Turkey does not want to be identified with. On the other hand, Turkey’s neo-Ottomanist security culture, rooted in a Turkish identity seen as multi-civilizational, is characterized by a sense of shared bonds and responsibility towards the neighborhood, and a positive view of Turkey’s history and unique geographical location, replacing the Republican paradigm sense of insecurity with a sense of self-confidence.

Although these two security cultures have very different features, they also share a number of traits. First, both security cultures are characterized by a wish to be recognized and accepted by the West, albeit for different reasons. The Republican elites seek EU membership to have Turkey’s Western identity confirmed whereas the neo-Ottomanist elites seek EU membership as a matter
of prestige. Both hold an ambivalent view towards the West, which is seen as meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs, exploiting domestic grievances, and treating Turkey unfairly. As a result, they are very sensitive to what they regard as interference in Turkey’s sovereignty. Furthermore, they both share a sense of Turkish superiority over minorities at home and over former members of the Ottoman Empire.

The basic features of both security cultures are summarized in the table below:

Table 3: Basic Features of Turkey’s security cultures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republican security culture</th>
<th>Neo-Ottomanist security culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkish identity</td>
<td>Western and homogenous</td>
<td>Multi-civilizational, but Sunni Turks take a leading role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of the West</td>
<td>Ambivalent: “Height of civilization”, but aims to weaken and divide Turkey, meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs, exploits domestic grievances and treats Turkey unfairly</td>
<td>Ambivalent: Sets universal standards but often doesn’t apply them, meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs, exploits domestic grievances and treats Turkey unfairly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred means to deal with the West (EU primarily)</td>
<td>Acceptance and recognition as an member, with the objective of having Western identity confirmed</td>
<td>Recognition as an equal power as a matter of prestige</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>View of the Middle East</td>
<td>Negative: Backwards zone of conflict, identity opposite of Turkey’s</td>
<td>Ambivalent: It is a zone with a “flow of blood and tears” (AKP party program, n.d, p. n/a) but with historical and cultural ties to Turkey, who is a “natural” leader of the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferred means to deal with the Middle East</td>
<td>Caution and non-interference</td>
<td>Intense involvement, deepening of economic and political ties; mediation to solve regional crisis, leadership role</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
How these characteristics will impact on Turkey’s possible contributions to the EU in the spheres of foreign, security and defense policy will be explored in the next chapter. I list below some of the conclusions which can be reached with regards to Turkey-EU relations in general based on the characteristics of Turkey’s security cultures, and anticipate some of the arguments which will be made in the next chapter:

- In spite of analyses which predict the contrary, Turkey’s trajectory towards the West, which began more than 150 years ago, is likely to persist, whether the country is governed by political actors holding the Republican or the neo-Ottomanist security cultures. In spite of obstacles, setbacks and disappointments, it is likely that Turkey will, in the short-term, continue to pursue EU membership;

- Although both the Republican and the neo-Ottomanist elites want Turkey to be admitted into the EU, neither is invested in the idea of the EU becoming a Global Power, even though this idea features quite prominently in the neo-Ottomanist discourse. Republican elites want Turkey to join the Union to confirm the country’s Western identity and neo-Ottoman elites want to join as a matter of prestige and in order to enhance Turkey’s power, not the EU’s;

- Both security cultures are characterized by an ambivalent view of the West and the EU in particular, and are thus reluctant to part with the country’s sovereignty. This can be considered problematic by advocates of a Global Power Europe, who wish to see the EU more integrated in the areas of foreign, security and defense policies. A more integrated EU would require member states to relinquish a substantial part of their sovereignty, which is something that Turkey seems unwilling to do;

- Neither of Turkey’s security cultures are opposed in principle to the idea of the EU becoming more autonomous in foreign, security and defense matters, and acquiring more military capabilities, as long as Turkey is included in the decision-making structures;

- The neo-Ottomanist security culture influences a foreign policy aiming to make Turkey a regional leader in the Middle East and former Ottoman territories in general. This quest for increased influence in the region is leading
to a competition with France, which also aims to be a regional power. When
governed by actors holding the neo-Ottomanist security culture, Turkey is likely
to insist on being consulted and having its voice heard on regional matters,
being treated as an equal and recognized as regional power, and will tend to be
uncooperative if it thinks it is not getting the respect it feels it deserves.
Chapter 4 - European security cultures, projects for EU’s role in the world and Turkey’s impact

Introduction and outline of the chapter’s structure

In this chapter, it will be finally assessed how Turkey, given the characteristics of its security cultures, analyzed in the previous chapters, will possibly affect the Union’s foreign and security policies. In order to do that, it is important to first understand what the current state of affairs of the Union is when it comes to security understandings and visions for the EU’s role in world affairs. Only after identifying the multiplicity of security cultures in Europe and the different approaches for the future of the EU as an international actor they originate, it will be possible to see where Turkey fits into this complex picture and the impact it will have.

This chapter will develop a taxonomy of the multiple security cultures co-existing within the EU in order to assess the likely impact of Turkish membership on the Union’s foreign and security policies. It will be argued that EU member states can be divided between those supporting the project of a Global Power Europe, Humanitarian Power Europe and Minimum Power Europe. These “visions” or “images” are presented here as ideal-types which will allow us to locate where Turkey’s security cultures sit in the broader picture of Europe’s security understandings. It will be argued that an assessment of Turkey’s impact on the role of the EU in the world stage must take into account the three existing normative approaches for the future of the EU (Global, Humanitarian, and Minimum Power Europe) and the characteristics of Turkey’s Republican and Neo-Ottomanist security cultures. This chapter will conclude that, given the existing divisions within the EU and the traits of Turkey’s security cultures, Turkish membership is unlikely to significantly alter the EU’s role in the international system. With or without Turkey, the EU will probably continue to resemble a Humanitarian Power in the world stage.

This argument differs from most of the literature which assesses Turkey’s impact on CFSP, introduced in chapter 1. As we have seen, this literature
presents Turkey’s contribution in stark terms, either as an asset which will help
the EU to become a more relevant international actor or as a liability, which will
reduce the Union’s ability to perform a more important role in the world stage.
By challenging the binary logic that pervades the discussion about Turkish
membership in the areas of foreign and security policies, this thesis will be
making an important contribution to the literature.

The chapter will proceed as following. This first section will provide a
cursory glance at the literature focusing on the security cultures of EU member
states, particularly the UK, France and Germany, with the objective of
illustrating the complexity of security understandings inside the EU. In the
second section, it will be presented the works of authors who organize the
multiplicity of security understandings within the EU into groups according to
their similarities. I will also briefly present in this second section the literature
which focuses on the emergence of a distinct EU security culture, which exists
in parallel with member states security cultures. It will be argued that a distinct
and parallel EU security culture is emerging due to processes of socialization of
EU officials working in EU structures dedicated to the formulation of EU foreign
and security policy.

In the third section, I will provide a historical overview of the development
of these institutional structures, giving emphasis to a particular aspect of
institutional socialization in foreign and security policy making: the consensus-
seeking behavior of its participants. However, it will also be argued that
institutional socialization has not, so far, led to the effacement of fundamental
differences between member states security cultures. Persisting national
differences, coupled with the need for unanimity, hamper the EU’s ability to
respond to the most important political challenges of our time.

In order to illustrate and make sense of the various security cultures
existing within the EU, and introduce Turkey’s own security understandings into
the picture, in the fourth section I will analyze the EU’s, member states’ and
Turkey’s responses to the conflict in Libya in 2011. I will analyze speeches of
EU officials engaged in foreign-policy making at the EU level, of member states
(UK, France and Germany), and Turkey with regards to the conflict in Libya.
The discussion about Libya will allows us to identify the differences and
similarities in security perceptions and preferences of the EU, UK, France, Germany and Turkey. Most importantly, it will allow us to see how these differences and similarities are played out in face of an international crisis.

This discussion on the responses to the conflict in Libya will be framed around Turkey's views on UK's, France's and Germany's positions on the conflict and how to respond to it. The framing of the discussion around Turkey's perspective will serve to illustrate the neo-Ottomanist's and Republican's views of the three EU countries, and help clarify under what conditions Turkey is willing to get involved in such actions (and which could give us a hint about the kind of contribution Turkey is willing to make to the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, if it becomes a member).

In the fifth section, I will establish my own grouping of EU member states, based on the discussion of secondary literature at the beginning of the chapter and on EU member states' responses to the conflict in Libya. As stated above, I will group member states according to those supporting the vision of a Global Power Europe, Humanitarian Power Europe and Minimum Power Europe. These groupings will serve as a framework to understand the broader picture of European security cultures and the place Turkey occupies in it.

In the final section, I will analyze how Turkey “fits” within this picture of the EU. The findings, as pointed out above, contradict both the optimistic and the pessimistic assessments concerning Turkish membership and its impact on the EU's role in the world. By taking into account the plurality of security understandings within Europe and within Turkey, it becomes clear that that it is not appropriate to portray Turkey’s contribution in a binary way.

This chapter's research design differs from the one adopted on the previous chapters on Turkey in the following way. In the previous chapters, I focused on a historical analysis of the evolution of Turkish identity, the constructed nature of the others, and its influence on foreign policy. I studied two “selves” - Republican and neo-Ottomanist - and included “official foreign policy” texts such as statements, speeches and interviews by government officials and diplomats, as well as texts by members of political parties in opposition, academics and journalists – primarily through interviews and analyses of journalistic material. In addition, I focused on a large number of
events through a long time span (since the final years of the Ottoman Empire until 2011).

For the European Union, I will also focus on various selves (UK, France, Germany and the EU), but will only include “official” foreign policy texts, including four interviews\(^9\) with EU officials, and one event (Libya). As mentioned in chapter 1, this research design is based on Lene Hansen (2006, p.28)'s proposal of a methodological technique based on mapping foreign policy debates around “key events” which appear on the political and media agenda. If the study is focused on one single event, this event should be of a “striking character” and subject of intense political debate, such as conflicts and wars (Hansen 2006, p. 69). Through an analysis of EU officials’ and some member states’ discourses on the conflict in Libya, it will be possible to identify different perceptions about who should respond to the conflict (EU, NATO, coalitions of the willing?) and how (diplomacy, sanctions, air strikes?).

The difference in research design for the chapters on Turkey and the chapter on the EU is due to pragmatic concerns. As will be shown in the chapter, a distinct EU security culture is more likely to be espoused by officials, bureaucrats and diplomats permanently placed at EU institutional structures, and it does not, and probably will not, replace member states’ security cultures. In other words, an EU-wide identity and related security culture has not replaced member states’ own security cultures: they exist in parallel. Thus, if I focused only on the construction of EU identity and its influence on foreign policy, I would be providing an incomplete picture of the European field of existing security cultures. To be comprehensive, I would have to include a historical study, as done for Turkey, for at least the EU big-3 (UK, France and Germany), plus for the European Union itself, which would be a very difficult task. This is not to say, however, that I deny the importance of a detailed analysis of member states security cultures, but that this thesis is focused on where Turkey’s security cultures sit in the broader picture of Europe’s security understandings.

\(^9\) The interviews were conducted in October 2012 with two European External Action Service (EEAS) officials: the Head of the Global Issues and Counter-Terrorism Division and a Political Officer working with the Turkey Advisor inside the EEAS; a recently retired Commission official, who worked for over 20 years at DG Enlargement; and a member of the Permanent Representation of Germany to the EU, dealing with EU Enlargement matters.
National security cultures within Europe – a complex picture

As discussed in chapter one, different historical experiences, and interpretations of these historical experiences, contribute to the creation of a frame of mind through which the outside world is filtered and understood. EU member states’ histories have been interpreted and propagated helping to form or to reinforce certain identities, perceptions of who constitute “others”, the nature of these “others”, and preferences about how to engage with them. Due to differences in security cultures, the same event can be interpreted in different ways by different communities, and different responses might be envisaged to deal with the same event. In other words, differences between member states security cultures mean that in some situations there are opposing views on the causes of problems, and about how they should be dealt with and by whom (Toje 2010, p. 124).

There is a vast literature focusing on the origins and characteristics of security cultures of EU member states, particularly the UK, France and Germany. As stated above, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a detailed picture of member states’ security understandings, as has been done in the preceding chapters for Turkey. Instead, this thesis endeavors to rethink the placement of Turkey’s security cultures in the broader picture of EU security understandings in order to assess Turkey’s impact on the Union’s foreign and security policies. Thus, this section will provide only a cursory glance at the literature on some EU member states security cultures in order to illustrate the complexity of security understandings existing inside the EU. Since it is these differences and similarities that serve as the basis to place member states into different groupings, it is important to delineate the core features of the EU’s “big three” security cultures (France, Germany and the UK) and some of the common features of Central and Eastern European states and “post-neutral” countries, as described in the literature.

Before proceeding, a caveat is in order. The descriptions provided below are quite general. They do not include the possible existence of contending security understandings within each country, nor current and subtle evolutions.
Furthermore, these descriptions should not be taken at face value. For instance, countries which will be described as having a preferred attachment to the Atlantic Alliance will not always automatically align with the US and reject any form of autonomy for the EU in defense matters.

The traditional French security culture influences policies aimed at maintaining France’s status as a great power, and the use of military instruments is considered to be an important part of the French strategy (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, p. 22). Due to its former role as a colonial power, French elites think that the country has a special role to play and an obligation towards Africa and Middle East (Behr 2009, p. 81). In addition, the events of the Second World War were interpreted by French elites in a particular way: they stressed the need for the country to have military capabilities to defend and protect its national interests (Hyde-Price 2004, p. 325). The priority is given to military and diplomatic responses to events, rather than civilian and preventive responses (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, p. 22). In addition, the traditional French security culture emphasizes sovereignty and independence, and that is why France insists on preserving the intergovernmental nature of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, p. 25). Furthermore, although France is part of all key international security institutions, it prefers multilateralism and international cooperation when there is a formal or informal hierarchy of states, such as in the UN Security Council, and in the EU-3 directorate that deals with Iran’s nuclear program, and it does not refrain from acting unilaterally when it judges necessary (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, p. 25). Nonetheless, most of French military operations have received a UN mandate (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, p. 35) and the French preference is to deploy troops in EU missions sanctioned by the UN (p. 36).

The literature acknowledges that French security culture has been changing since the end of the Cold War. France now recognizes the existence of “new threats” to its security, such as terrorism, cyber attacks, organized crime and natural disasters – thereby adopting a broader conception of security - and the emphasis on multilateralism and the primacy of civilian means are gaining strength (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, p. 23 and 39). In addition, as Meyer
(2006, p. 156 and 157) and Irondelle and Besancenot (2010, p. 21) note, new actors in France, such as former President Nicolas Sarkozy, are more in favor of cooperating with the US and bringing France and NATO closer together. However, France still values the use of force to defend its interests and still pursues a foreign policy geared to maintaining French “grandeur” (Irondelle and Besancenot 2010, p. 39).

Germany’s security perspective has its origins in different memories of the wars of the 20th century. The interpretation of the Second World War events has influenced the pursuit of primarily civilian policies in a multilateral framework (Lindley-French 2002, p. 793 and 794). Germany’s reluctance to use force abroad in a more robust manner is deeply rooted in its society (Harnisch and Wolf 2010, p. 46).

Even though Germany has increased its participation in military operations since unification, its military deployments have been to address humanitarian crisis or breaches of International Law rather than to guarantee material resources or to counter balance other countries (Harnisch and Wolf 2010, p. 57). In addition, Germany insists on receiving UN mandates before any military mission is deployed. Therefore, although Germany has been deploying military personnel in ever more dangerous situations, these deployments were embedded in multilateral frameworks and performed humanitarian tasks (Harnisch and Wolf 2010, p. 47). Furthermore, Germany’s defense expenditure is remarkably lower than those of France and the UK (Harnisch and Wolf 2010, p. 58).

Germany’s increased military deployment since the end of Cold War can also be understood as a response to allies’ calls for Germany to share some of the burden of maintaining international security (Harnisch and Wolf 2010, p. 44). Germany has been contributing more to CSDP missions than those carried out by other international institutions, and Harnisch and Wolf (2010, p. 49) explain that this is because CSDP missions are more in line with Germany’s security culture, since they are mostly post-conflict missions.

The three core features of the British security culture are: an emphasis on having military capabilities which can be used across the full spectrum of operations, on the maintenance of the UK’s global role, and on the special
relationship with the US (Smith M. 2010, p. 96, Longhurst and Zaborowski 2004, p. 386). Accordingly, the UK does not show a great level of commitment to UN, OSCE or EU missions (Smith M. 2010, p. 87). For example, even though the UK government signed up to the development of the CSDP, British involvement in EU missions has remained limited, with the exception of operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was transferred from NATO to the EU at the end of 2004. But even in that case, once the transfer from NATO to the EU took place, British commitments in terms of the number of personnel deployed decreased dramatically (Smith M. 2010, p. 88 and 89). This reveals that the UK shows a greater commitment to military operations carried out by NATO or by US-led coalitions of the willing (Smith M. 2010, p. 89).

Central and Eastern European states, because of their historical experiences, and the way those experiences were imprinted in these countries’ collective memories, have certain views on international law, multilateralism and the use of force which is different from those held by some Western European states and are more similar to the views held by the United States (Longhurst and Zaborowski 2004, p. 385). Therefore, like the UK, some Central and Eastern European countries tend to be more NATO-centered and less CSDP-friendly (Tardy 2009, p. 25). They tend to be more attached to the United States as the main provider of security (Meyer 2005, p. 53).

Since the 1990s, some neutral countries (Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Austria) have progressively become less reluctant to use force, and became supporters of limited use of force by the EU, sanctioned by the UN, for humanitarian reasons (Meyer 2005, p. 53). However, these countries still want the CSDP be to remain a “consensus-driven regionally-oriented crisis management initiative (Toje 2005a, p. 11). They do, however, agree with France’s position of a more autonomous EU role.

Therefore, some member states have developed a security culture which is hesitant to use force or at least think that the use of force must be restrained as much as possible (Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland), whereas others consider the projection of force a fundamental part of their strategies (France, UK). Some member states have developed a special bond with the United States and attach great importance to NATO (UK, Denmark, most
Central and Eastern European states), whereas others prefer a more autonomous role for the European Union in foreign and security policies (France, Belgium) (Rynning 2003, p. 483). Other differences can be added: Toje (2010, p. 125), for example, mentions that some member states would like the EU to have a more visible presence in the South of the Union; others would rather see the EU increase its visibility in the East of the Union. Germany and the Netherlands are more pro-Israel whereas France, Italy and Greece have a more pro-Arab stance (Dannreuther 2009, p. 139).

**Grouping together similar security cultures in Europe**

Even though there is a multiplicity of security understandings within Europe, several authors try to group similar understandings together in order to map out the broader picture of European security cultures. In this part, I will present the literature which groups EU member states according to their security cultures and ideas about the role of the EU in the world. In addition, I will also briefly present the literature on the emergence of a distinct EU security culture, and how it would exist in parallel with member states security cultures, without replacing them.

There are several possible different groupings, depending on the author. Howorth (2002) groups the differences between member states along the lines of allies and neutrals, Atlanticists and Europeanists, those favoring power projection and those in favor of territorial defense, those preferring civilian over military instruments, large and small countries, weapons system providers and weapons system consumers, nuclear and non-nuclear states (p. 89). Smith (2003) notes that EU states still disagree on what should be the role of CSDP: a support arm for NATO (the UK), an independent EU force (France) or solely a peacekeeping/humanitarian force (Germany and Sweden) (Smith 2003, p. 258).

Rynning (2003b) argues that Europe has been traditionally split between those who support the idea of “Europe puissance” and those in favor of “civilian actor” role for the EU. This division is a result of differences in member states’ security cultures. Europe is split between member states that “abhor the idea of power” and therefore support a vision of “civilian power Europe” and member
states like the UK and France who “have the habit of power” but who are “historically antagonistic” (Vedrine 1997, quoted on Rynning 2003, p. 24). Thus, France supports the idea of “Europe puissance” whereas the UK does not.

Rynning also sees a new scenario emerging: the formation of a directorate in which in specific cases the capable and willing will act on behalf of Europe (Rynning 2003 b, p. 21). The emergence of a directorate has been made possible by the absence of a deeper and unified political vision for the EU coupled with the development of EU institutions that are able to articulate and implement policies. Thus, this “directorate” is composed of those states who have high-end capabilities and who, in spite of the absence of a common political vision, can agree on a case-by-case basis (Rynning 2003b, p. 27). In other words, the CSDP directorate will act only in particular cases, when “specific” and “momentary” visions of what must be done are shared (Rynning 2003b, p. 28). In addition, the directorate will serve as a bridge between US security policy (global and high intensity) and EU security policy (regional and low intensity, in early and late phases of conflict management) (p. 28). Rynning (2003b) concludes that the EU will remain a civilian actor involved in low intensity conflict management but, in specific circumstances, some willing and capable EU countries will offer military and political support to US actions (Rynning 2003b, p. 30). This diagnosis would be perfectly manifested in the response to the conflict in Libya, as we will see in a subsequent section.

Meyer (2006) sees the existence of three visions for the future of the EU in the foreign and security policy spheres: “Helvetica Europe”, “Global Power Europe” and “Humanitarian Power Europe”. Meyer (2006) divides member states between those who are traditionally neutral, pacifist, defensive-minded and risk averse, with higher authorization threshold for the use of force, and those who are less reluctant to use force in high-risk situations and to advance economic and political interests (Meyer 2006, p. 11).

These divisions between member states with regards to the future of the EU as an international actor are also rooted in a deeper disagreement, existing since the postwar period, about the aims and means of political integration: whether it should be intergovernmental or supranational (Smith 2003, p. 67). Some states have been willing to coordinate their views and positions on
foreign policy matters, while still maintaining their full sovereignty on this area, whereas others wish to see “a common foreign policy as the expression of a European Union” (Nuttall 1992, on Smith 2003, p. 65). The smaller states (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands) historically have preferred the latter, to avoid the domination of larger states, whereas France and the UK have preferred the former (Smith 2003, p. 65).

Even though there are considerable differences between member states’ security cultures, a growing body of literature claims that, in spite of these differences, an EU security,strategic culture is in the making, and it exists in parallel with member states’ own security understandings. In general terms, this literature argues that the EU is in the process of developing its own security,strategic culture as a result of processes of institutional socialization taking place in EU structures.

Meyer (2006) argues that, even though national strategic cultures are still distinct, a European strategic culture is emerging as a result of a process of convergence which pushes all EU countries’ own strategic cultures in different directions, thereby creating a median, or hybrid, European set of norms (Meyer 2006, p. 30). Neutral countries such as Austria, Sweden, Finland and Ireland are becoming less averse to the idea of the EU as military actor and authorization thresholds are being lowered in Germany. This process of “ironing out differences” (p. 42) is leading to the creation of a Humanitarian Power Europe, in which there is a growing attachment to the EU as an actor, with preference for civilian means (Meyer 2006, p. 30). The use of force is not excluded, but it can be used only if properly authorized, in low risk situations, and to defend human rights. This process of “ironing out” the differences between member states is taking place, according to Meyer (2006, p. 42), because of processes of institutional socialization, changes in threat perceptions since the end of the Cold War, and because of mediatized crisis learning, especially in the cases of Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq.

Meyer (2006) tested levels of diversity across four strategic norms: goals for the use of force, way in which force is used, preferred mode of cooperation and level of domestic and international legitimacy for the use of force (Meyer 2006, p. 185). He concluded that there is a wide acceptance of the legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention, preference for non-military means first and maximum restraint against civilian targets, growing support for the EU as a security actor and attachment to UN authorization, multilateralism and a rule-based order. In addition, the Franco-British gap regarding partnership with the United States is closing (Meyer 2006, p. 157).

Similarly, Kirchner (2010) thinks that an EU security culture is emerging, although it will exist in parallel with member states’ security cultures, without replacing them (p. 103). Based on Meyer (2006)’s definition, Kirchner (2010) argues that this parallel EU security culture would be comprised of ideas, norms and values with regards to security that are shared by all member states (p. 103). In addition, Kirchner (2010, p. 106) thinks that threat perceptions and preferred responses to threats are converging among the British, the French, the Germans and the Italians.

Howorth (2002) also argues that the harmonization of CFSP approaches is in process, and that all member states at least accept that the EU should be a security actor with military instruments at its disposal, which is an enormous step forward in a policy area marked by intergovernmentalism (p. 90). Therefore, there are signs that a European strategic culture is in the making (Howorth 2007, p. 206). The different strategic cultures of member states have been pooled or merged in a “broader, consensual European strategic culture” (Howorth 2010, p. 2). He argues that although it is too soon to provide definitive answers regarding an EU strategic culture, there are certain attributes to the EU approach to international relations which are quite distinctive (Howorth 2007, p. 205). These key features (laid out in the European Security Strategy) are: the integration of different policy instruments (civilian and military), prevention of conflicts for the long-term and preference for multilateralism (Howorth 2007, p. 203 and 204). Taken together, these distinctive attributes come close to articulating the bases of a European strategic culture.

Biava, Drent and Herd (2011) also argue that the EU has already developed a strategic culture. The authors understand strategic culture in a broader sense than most of the literature. Also based on Meyer (2006, p. 20)’s definition, they consider that strategic culture comprises “the identity-derived norms, ideas and behavior about what is appropriate and legitimate concerning
the use of military and civilian instruments for security goals” (Biava, Drent and Herd 2011, p. 1243, emphasis added). The authors argued that the fact that the EU has published a European Security Strategy (ESS), which identify threats and responses, developed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and within that a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which includes a military capability that has been deployed (i.e. the EU does use force) indicate that the EU has developed a common strategic culture (p. 1240).

According to Biava, Drent and Herd (2011), the EU’s strategic culture is based on the Union’s broad conception of security (encompassing different referent objects and threats and seeking internationally legitimated multilateral solutions that include civilian and military instruments) and on a general consensus, reflected in the ESS, with regards to threat identification and management, strategic objectives and principles (p. 1234, 1235 and 1244).

To summarize so far, there is a plurality of security understandings within Europe. However, even though national security cultures are still diverse, it is possible to observe gradual changes taking place due to the process of EU integration. It is also possible to group countries with similar security understandings and which share similar visions for the future of the EU together. This grouping is necessary because it constitutes a framework to understand how Turkey fits into the broader picture of the security landscape in Europe. In addition, the emergence of a distinct and parallel EU security culture is taking place. The EU security culture is emerging due to processes of socialization of EU officials working in EU structures dedicated to the formulation of EU foreign and security policy.

I will now provide a historical overview of the development of these institutional structures, giving emphasis to a particular aspect of institutional socialization in foreign and security policy making: the consensus-seeking behavior of its participants. It is important to focus on these institutional structures for two reasons. First, the emerging EU security culture is most likely to be espoused by those officials who work in those structures. Second, the differences in member states security cultures, including disagreements on the preferred mode of cooperation and goals for the use of force, has influenced the shape of these structures and the policies formulated.
Building a EU foreign policy and security culture: institutional structures and consensus-seeking attitudes

Two important aspects of the development of institutional structures to design and implement policies at the EU level deserve attention. The first is that European Union foreign policy not only has persisted over the years, but it has gradually expanded. Even security issues, which were considered taboo when the European Political Cooperation forum was created 1970, gradually began to appear in the agenda. Therefore, EU member states have been cooperating ever more intensely on foreign and security policy matters, even though their security understandings are still diverse. Since 1970, EU foreign policy has evolved from an informal and intergovernmental “gentlemen’s agreement” with no written rules to a formal system, involving organizations with budgets, staff and permanent headquarters (Smith 2003, p. 11). The second aspect is the prevailing consensus-seeking behavior of participants throughout the whole enterprise.

The first attempt to develop a common foreign and security policy in Europe dates back to the mid-1950s, when the plan to launch a European Defense Community (EDC), with a fully integrated European army under supranational control, was rejected in 1954 by the French National Assembly (Marsh and Mackenstien 2005, p. 8). At that stage, foreign and security policies were considered to be “domains reserves” of member states or to belong exclusively to the remit of NATO.

In 1970, European Political Cooperation (ECP) forum was created, located outside the Community framework. The ECP aimed to increase understanding of foreign policy matters among member states by informing and consulting one another, coordinating policy positions and, where possible, acting jointly (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, p. 165).

According to Smith (2003), the creation of the EPC followed the logic of intergovernmental bargaining. France wanted to establish a more independent European voice in world affairs, while keeping it intergovernmental by excluding the Commission and the European Parliament. Smaller member states agreed
with the establishment of the EPC in exchange for enlargement, which was seen as a way to dilute French and German influence. In addition, smaller member states expected the EPC and the European Community to become closer over time. For its part, Germany supported the establishment of the EPC so that it could pursue a more active foreign policy that was acceptable to other states (Smith 2003, p. 70).

It is important to stress, however, that even though smaller member states held a supranational vision for the EPC, these states wanted defense matters to be excluded from the discussions, either because of a preferred attachment to NATO in the area or because of their neutral status (Smith 2003, p. 72). Thus, although the most important factor for the creation of the EPC was France’s vision of a more independent Europe in world affairs, smaller member states also had their concerns met, by having defense issues excluded from the EPC remit and by gaining support for enlargement (Smith 2003, p. 76).

In spite of a beginning marked by intergovernmental bargaining, institutional cooperation slowly began to take root. The officials working in the Political Committee of the EPC, which met at least 4 times a year to prepare the agenda of ministerial meetings, as well those working in sub-committees and working groups, became more aware of the positions of other member states and became enthusiasts of the project, which could be because of “a natural bureaucratic tendency to expand an agency’s function and status” (Smith 2003, p. 78). Gradually, the participants of the Political Committee began to develop an esprit de corps and to see themselves “as professional foreign policy experts and participants in the construction of “Europe” (Smith 2003, p. 83). Lower-level diplomats and technical experts who were regularly involved in European foreign policy-making added a sense of substance and permanence to the project (Smith 2003, p. 91).

In the workings of the EPC, participants adopted a problem-solving policy-making style instead of bargaining, attempting to forge consensus whenever possible. Smith (2003) argues that a possible explanation for this behavior was that national governments viewed the EPC as “a taking shop” in the beginning, therefore not very important. The forum was created for views on foreign policy matters to be exchanged: if a common interest was discovered in
the course of the discussions, then common positions could be taken; if not, there was no obligation to act (Smith 2003, p. 88).

It is important to mention that “taboo” and “sensitive” issues to some member states (such as Northern Ireland, relationships with colonies and military issues) were kept out of the discussion (Smith 2003, p. 123). As will be discussed later, this pattern of leaving certain issues out of the agenda is still true of CFSP, although the number of issues considered off-limits has been significantly reduced.

The Commission gradually became more involved in the EPC. In the early years of the EPC, the Commission was invited to have its views known, mainly with regards to economic implications of EPC decisions. After the London Report of 1981, the Commission became associated with the EPC at all levels, including the European Council, EPC ministerial meetings and EPC working groups (Smith 2003, p. 158). However, the influence of the Commission on foreign policy matters varied depending on which state held the Presidency. When France, for example, was the President, the Commission’s influence was kept at bay; when smaller states such as Belgium or Luxembourg held the Presidency, the Commission’s role expanded (Smith 2003, p. 160).

A Permanent Secretariat based in Brussels for the EPC was only created with the Single European Act in 1986. This had an important symbolic dimension, since for the first time a permanent organization for the EPC was created (Smith 2003, p. 169).

Significant steps to enhance the Union’s foreign policy-making capacity were taken as a result of the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of violence in the former Yugoslavia. With the US commitment to the Atlantic Alliance being questioned and the ineffective response of the Union to the conflicts in the Balkans, for the first time a serious debate on whether the Union should develop autonomous military capabilities took place. In June 1992, at a Western European Union (WEU) meeting at Petersberg, the willingness to participate in conflict prevention and crisis-management operations, including humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and peacemaking, was declared. The Petersberg Tasks, as they came to be known, were later incorporated in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) (Martinsen 2003, p.11).
In 1993, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) intergovernmental pillar was established. The UK, France and Germany defined the broad outlines of the new CFSP, primarily its relationship with the EC, its decision-making procedures and the mention of defense matters. However, small states and EC organizations helped define the specifics of CFSP (Smith 2003, p. 179). The Commission’s role in foreign policy increased with the TEU, and it could no longer be excluded from CFSP matters, including those related to defense (Smith 2003, p. 187). This expanded role demanded a number of internal changes in the Commission, including the creation of new directorate-generals.

The TEU also stated that “the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which in time may lead to a common defense” (quoted on Martinsen 2003, p. 8). Thus, “hard” security issues had finally entered the domain of the EU.

After the TEU, EU external policies became divided according to three institutional structures (Smith 2003, p. 212):

- EC-dominant policy areas where supranational EC organizations (such as the Commission) and procedures (Qualified Majority Vote) dominate, such as economic policies (trade, aid, development);
- Mix-competency policy areas where EC organizations and procedures and intergovernmental organizations (European Council, Council of ministers) and procedures (unanimity) interact, such as issues with political and economic ramifications (for example, economic sanctions);
- Intergovernmentalism-dominant policy areas where intergovernmental organizations and procedures dominate, such as security and defense.

An example of an external policy which is of mix-competency is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was launched in 2003 with the aim of “strengthening the prosperity, stability and security” of the Union’s Eastern and Southern neighbors (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, South Caucasus nations, Maghreb and Mashreq countries, Israel and the Palestinian Authority).
In the case of the Southern neighbors, the ENP was an attempt to reinvigorate the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), launched in 1995, and which comprised financial assistance, bilateral agreements with political conditionalities and multilateral dialogue meetings (the Barcelona Process) (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, p. 156).

The ENP functions through commonly agreed Action Plans, which cover several issues such as trade, development, energy, environment, human rights, rule of law, conflict prevention, Weapons of Mass Destruction, organized crime and counter-terrorism (Edwards 2009, p. 45). The EU provides support for human rights, judicial reform, elections, institution-building and increased political dialogue (Edwards 2009, p. 44). The relationship between the EU and the third countries is then deepened as the Action Plans are implemented, a strategy referred to as positive conditionality (Edwards 2009, p.47 and 48). The EU offers more if the third country implements more aspects of their action plans, instead of suspending the agreements if human rights are violated, for example (Edwards 2009, p. 47). Therefore, by asking third countries to adopt the EU acquis, the ENP uses similar techniques to those used in enlargement process, but without offering membership, a formula commonly known as “sharing everything but institutions” (Edwards 2009, p. 48).

The European Commission plays a very central role in the policy-making processes of ENP. The Commission is responsible for the day-to-day management of ENP, and it drafts the country strategy papers, reports and the Action Plans (Gaenzle 2008, p. 10). The Council is responsible for taking strategic decisions, such as those involving membership and financial distribution. In addition, the Council decides whether to move relations with third countries to the next level based on the country reports and Action plans submitted by the Commission. In other words, “The Council defines the major rules and the Commission plays the game” (Gaenzle 2008, p. 10).

A policy review of the ENP was published in 2011 in light of the Arab Spring (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2011). The main idea underpinning the review is “more for more”, which means that that the countries which make more democratic reforms receive more EU money and get to establish closer
relations with the Union. These closer relations refer to increased mobility of people and more access to European markets (Rettman 2011, *EU Observer*, p. n/a). Therefore, the three main carrots proposed by the EU to foster democratization in the region is money, mobility and markets access. In addition, the Commission has increased funding dedicated to the region with an additional 1.2 billion (Raik 2011, p. 1).

As for the CFSP itself, it has three legal instruments: common strategies, determined by the Council and providing an overall cross-pillar approach towards a country or a region; joint actions, to address specific situations such as sanctions or the appointment of an EU special representative to a region or country; and common positions (Bretherton and Vogler 2006, p. 167 and 169).

A major development with regards to the Union’s foreign policy capabilities came in 1998, when the UK and France agreed at St. Malo on the need to develop a capacity for autonomous action, backed up by military forces, to respond to international crises. It was a very significant event, since for the first time the UK agreed on the existence of an independent European military capability outside NATO. It is interesting to note, however, that the UK has claimed that it accepted the development of a more autonomous EU role in security and defense because it would actually strengthen the alliance with the US. According to the this argument, Europe would act in cases in which NATO as a whole would chose not to be engaged, thereby sharing some of the burden of strengthening international security with the US and revitalizing the Atlantic alliance (Howorth 2004, p. 222 and 227).

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) established the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and the position of High Representative for CFSP, occupied by Javier Solana until the position was modified by the Lisbon Treaty. The decision to launch CSDP missions must be unanimous and activities include the training of police forces in post-conflict areas (police missions), technical assistance in establishing the rule of law and criminal justice systems (rule of law missions), monitoring border controls (border missions), security sector reform missions and military missions (Kirchner 2010, p. 106). The specific military and civilian capabilities the EU would need in order to carry out

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10 The Lisbon Treaty changed its name to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and from now on the term CSDP will be used in the text.
CSDP missions were set respectively at the 1999 Helsinki Council and the 2000 Feira Council. Since the first mission was launched in 2003, the EU has deployed 24 CSDP operations to date (December 2011): 16 civilian missions, 1 mixed civilian-military mission and 7 military missions (Council 2011a, p. n/a). Only three military missions are still being carried out: EUFOR Althea, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with 1289 troops, essentially a peacekeeping mission on the ground since 2004, when it took over from NATO; EUNAVFOR-ATALANTA, with 1458 troops, a mission off the coast of Somalia which protects UN World Food Program vessels carrying humanitarian aid to that country against pirate attacks; and EUTM Somalia, which has only 74 personnel deployed (Council 2011a, p. n/a).

The Nice Treaty (2003) created the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which can be considered the linchpin of CSDP. The socialization processes occurring in this committee have been paramount for the development of a distinct EU security culture. It is composed of member states’ Brussels-based ambassadors who are responsible for the day to day monitoring of CFSP and CSDP. Their tasks include being informed about international security issues; helping define policy options for the Council, and monitoring the implementation of policies (Meyer 2006, p. 116). The Committee also meets up with NATO representatives, EU Special Representatives, Presidency and Council representatives.

The decisions taken by the PSC go via COREPER II (comprising the permanent representatives of the member states) to the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC\textsuperscript{11}), which meets once a month and comprises foreign affairs’ ministers from the member states and a representative of the Commission.

Howorth (2010) has conducted interviews and surveys with members of PSC and the results attest to their commitment to the project of the EU as an international actor and to the search of consensus among them. The ambassadors to the PSC describe themselves as being “very attached” (53%)

\textsuperscript{11} The Lisbon Treaty split GAERC into two different Councils, the General Affairs Council and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC). All aspects of the EU's external relations, including Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) fall under the competence of Foreign Affairs Council. The FAC is chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), who is also the Vice-President of the European Commission.
or “fairly attached” (47%) to the EU and believe that CSDP as a policy area is “important” (50%) or “very important” (50%) for the development of an EU identity (p. 8). In addition, the PSC ambassadors consider themselves to be “pioneers” in CSDP (p. 15). However, when answering the question “whom do they represent”, they all saw themselves as representing “their country” (p. 9). In addition, when asked “whose views were most valued”, 94% replied the member states (p. 11).

When it comes to consensus-seeking behavior, a feature seen since the EPC, all of the participants said that the prevalent style of interaction in the committee is “consensus based” and 63% said that the prevalent attitude within the committee is “cooperative and consensus-seeking”, with 37% describing it as “rational bargaining” (Howorth 2010, p. 9). To illustrate the prevalent search for compromises, an ambassador who had been in post for just over two years had this to say to Howorth (2010, p. 16):

“I think we all have a trust in each other that whatever compromise is possible we will find it. [...] We often take some minutes off in the meeting when somebody needs to call home and say “Hey, this might be a possible compromise line, couldn’t we follow that?” And so, even if you have instructions where you have to cross your own red lines, you can then get back to capitals. It is really true that there is a trust among colleagues that they try to find wherever a common basis is possible. It would be a different thing altogether if you always met 26 different colleagues. You simply would not have that crucial element of personal trust that everybody is doing their utmost, whatever is possible to find the best compromise. That is the main element which helps”.

However, it is important to stress that issues which are considered to be too sensitive to some member states - and hence on which reaching a compromise would be nearly impossible - are kept off the agenda. This is a state of affairs that has remained from the early days of the EPC. During the Iraq crisis of 2002-2003, for example, many PSC ambassadors received instructions from their capitals not to discuss the issue (Howorth 2010, p. 19).

Therefore, the PSC tends to discuss issues which do not involve entrenched national interests and thus have a realistic chance of being agreed on by all member states. According to one ambassador interviewed by Howorth (2010), “There are a lot of policy fields where our policy is defined along national lines. And there are a lot of others where we really have no national
interest, where we just ask ourselves: is the best option A, B, C or D? When we can see that the mood in PSC is moving towards ‘B’, we can argue at home, ‘OK let’s go with B… This is obviously the majority mood here’. And one can convince one’s own capital readily easily, as long as there is no direct national core interest at stake” (Howorth 2010, p. 17, emphasis added).

A similar conclusion was reached by Giegerich (2006), who assessed whether and to what extend CSDP affects member states policies (p. 26). Giegerich (2006, p. 27) argued that the “aspirations and inherent logic” defined in CSDP creates different degrees of ideational pressures on national strategic cultures, depending on the level of ideational misfit between national strategic cultures and CSDP norms related to the use of force (Giegerich 2006, p. 43). Giegerich (2006) found that adaptation is unlikely to occur when the ideational misfit between “collective expectations for behavior defined in ESDP” and national strategic cultures is too great (p. 194).

Other important milestones were the publication in 2003 of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the establishment in 2004 of the European Defense Agency (EDA), which aims to improve the Union’s military capabilities through the pooling of procurement and production of military hardware.

The idea to write the ESS came from the PSC ambassadors of France and Germany, who successfully sold the idea to their respective foreign ministers. The foreign ministers then convinced the UK that the ESS was necessary and asked Javier Solana to draft it (Meyer 2006, p. 132). Solana sought advice from experts from the EU and abroad, worked with member states and the Commission to refine the text, and discussed the document in research conferences organized by the EU Institute for Security Studies. The document was drafted by Robert Cooper (Head of the Council Secretariat’s External and Politico-Military Affairs Department) and Christoph Heusgen (Head of Javier Solana’s Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit) (Bercher 2004, p. 347) and the final version was approved in December 2003.

The threats to Europe, according to the ESS are: the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), regional conflicts (above all in the Middle East), terrorism, state failure and organized crime (ESS 2003, p. 3-5). The document established three strategic objectives: addressing key threats,
building a secure neighborhood and building an international order based on effective multilateralism (ESS 2003, p. 6-10).

The ESS praises NATO and multilateralism; devotes great attention to economic and social causes of conflict; stresses the importance of civilian instruments, claiming the military means alone does not solve anything; and dedicates two pages to promoting a rule-based international order. The ESS recognizes the need to deploy force where other tools do not deliver but demands a multilateral political process before the deployment of force.

It has been pointed out that the ESS uses a very vague language in order to accommodate the divergent views of member states (Toje 2010, p. 121). It hides disagreements, especially with regards to cooperation with the US and the use of force to prevent threats (Meyer 2005, p. 52). The strategy does not offer clear and precise guidelines about when and how the EU should use the myriad of instruments on its toolbox, including military power (Lindley-French 2004, p. 4). As observed by Toje (2010), the only direct reference to the use of force in the document is in the sentence “in failed states military instruments may be needed to restore order” (quoted on page 82). Toje (2010, p. 121) also notes that the ESS does not express a clear vision for the purpose of European power. In the words of Lindley-French (2004), the ESS “stated what was important for Europe but did not and could not say what Europe was prepared to do about it” (p. 5). The European Security Strategy (2003) and the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (2008) do not contain any statement on what Toje (2010, p. 83) calls the “elephant in the room”, namely the fact that the EU can not agree on the ends towards which means are to be applied (Toje 2010, p. 83).

The US accepted the development of autonomous European military force, as long as there was no duplication of what was done by NATO, no decoupling from the US and NATO, and no discrimination against non-EU members such as Turkey (Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s famous three D’s) (Howorth 2009a, p. 100). In order to govern the relationship between the EU and NATO, the Berlin Plus framework was agreed in 2003.

It allows the EU to use NATO assets to carry out CSDP operations in situations where NATO does not want to be involved (Howorth 2009a, p. 100).
The approval of the use of assets has to be unanimous among NATO states. Although there is a framework governing the relationship in place, only two operations so far have been conducted by the EU with the support of NATO: Operation Concordia in Macedonia and Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Howorth 2009a, p. 96). As has been discussed in chapter 3, Turkey, because of its dispute with Cyprus, is responsible for such problematic relationship.

The final changes in institutional structures came with the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 2009. The office of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) – combining the roles of the Council’s Office of High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations – was introduced, along with the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s new diplomatic corps, with around 1,150 staff based in Brussels, and 136 delegations around the world (Charter 2010, E! Sharp, p. 34 and 35). EEAS staff was recruited from the European Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Diplomatic Services of member states, which, as will be discussed below, has been a source of problems.

The HR is also Vice-President of the Commission. By wearing “two hats”, the HR is supposed to ensure greater consistency and coordination of EU external policies. In addition, the HR chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, which can be considered an important step in increasing the coherence of EU policies. This was the evaluation of an official working for the EEAS, who told me in an interview that “We are a step further with the Lisbon Treaty. In the past [EU foreign policy] was managed by the Council, and, in particular the Foreign Affairs Council, which was chaired by the [rotating] Presidency. Now my boss, Catherine Ashton, is chairing all the FAC meetings, including the one with foreign ministers, but also the ones with trade and development ministers. So we are a step further compared to five years ago. [In addition], she is not only chairing the meetings but she is also setting the agenda. So that means that we are moving towards more coherence on EU external policies, not in pure decisional terms but also in terms of having more debate and a more coherent approach among the ministers. Of course nothing is perfect but I think we can
say that Catherine Ashton is managing it quite well and I think this is recognized by our fellow ministers” (Interview L, 15.10.2012).

This positive assessment of the post of HR is unsurprising, given that it was made by an official in the EEAS. There have been, however, less optimistic views about the new institutional structures set up by the Lisbon Treaty. There are reports of turf battles between the European Commission and the EEAS, since the Commission is responsible for funding both foreign programs and the day-to-day activity of the EEAS (Rettman 2011h, EU Observer, p. n/a). A retired Commission official told me that “I don’t think European External Action Service works very well. We have created it after Lisbon to have a sort of diplomatic corps but there are many difficulties. The mix of personnel coming from the Commission, the Council and the member states… most of my colleagues who have joined the service are always fighting because of the different positions of the member states and of the Commission. And the Commission has the money, you see? And the bureaucracy, having many directors, and deputy-directors, means that there are more heads than troops” (Interview N, 09.10.2012).

In addition, many of the problems which already hampered the effectiveness of EU foreign policy before the Lisbon Treaty have not been solved. For example, the established rule of unanimity in CFSP, including for initiating new CSDP missions, was maintained. As the official of the EEAS concluded “we are [still] facing constraints which are linked to the way [CFSP] is decided [with unanimity], the interests of EU member states and the lack of information on certain issues, such as intelligence or defense issues, [since they are] the competence of member states” (Interview L, 15.10.2012).

To summarize so far, processes of socialization taking place in EU institutional structures are leading to a greater convergence in security understandings among member states and to the emergence of an EU security culture. However, significant differences between national security cultures still persist and the emerging EU security culture exists in parallel with member states’, without replacing them. This distinct EU security culture is most likely to be held by those Brussels-based national representatives and EU officials working in EU structures.
The problem is that only a small number of individuals participate in these Brussels-based processes and they “ought to know that they are operating on thin ice without sufficiently convergent national strategic cultures” (Meyer 2005, p. 53). The diplomats, bureaucrats and officials directly involved in foreign policy-making at the EU level (such as those working on the PSC or in COREPER II) have more opportunity to socialize with each other, are more aware of each others positions, try to reach consensus decisions and consider it appropriate for the EU to act as a unit in the world stage (Smith 2003, p. 59). However, member states’ perspectives on foreign and security policies remain considerably different, and since the areas of foreign and security policies are intergovernmental, it is also important to take into account the “underlying dynamics represented by the member states in the constitutive politics and processes of European foreign policy (Aggestam 2008, p. 4).

The areas of disagreement – the nature of the relationship with the US and NATO; the preferred degree of EU autonomy in the areas of foreign, security, and defense policy; how far political integration in these areas should go; the use of force in high-risk situations - affect the EU’s ability to act in the world stage and generate competing visions about what kind of international actor the EU should be. Because the decision-making in CFSP is characterized by unanimity, differences in member states’ security cultures lead to the formulation of non-controversial policies that can be achieved by consensus and, in the worst cases, to paralysis. It is telling that none of the deployed EU missions so far addressed major political issues, being instead “pre and post crisis” missions, which, as pointed out by Toje (2005a, p. 10), “could have just as successfully been handled by NATO or one of the major powers”.

All of these disagreements will be illustrated in the next section, which will deal with member states and EU’s response to the conflict in Libya.

The crisis in Libya – EU’s, member states’ and Turkey’s responses

In this section, the responses of three EU member states (UK, France and Germany) to the crisis in Libya will be analyzed, along with the response of the European Union. Turkey’s own response to the crisis in Libya will also be
presented, and most importantly, Turkey's views on EU and member states' positions with regards to the conflict in Libya will be examined. By framing the discussion around Turkey's views on UK's, France's, Germany's and EU's positions on the conflict in Libya and how to respond to it, I will be making the link between the chapters on Turkey and this chapter on the EU.

The case of Libya highlights the problematic issue of achieving consensus within the EU when it comes to the contending issues of using force in high risk situations and the preferred mode of cooperation when force is to be deployed. Most importantly, having looked at the different security cultures within Turkey, the case of Libya will help clarify under what conditions (neo-Ottomanist and Republican) Turkey is willing to get involved in such actions and will tell us something about Turkey's willingness to contribute to the Union's CFSP if it becomes a member.

The uprisings in Libya began on the 17th of February 2011, inspired by the protests in Tunisia and Egypt. When the population began to take to the streets calling for change, Colonel Gaddafi responded with deadly force. The Libyan crisis was the first major crisis to appear in the international stage after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. It started one and a half months after the EEAS had been declared operational and thus represented an early test for the new institutional structure (Koenig 2011, p. 7).

The EU was divided on how to respond to Gaddafi's crackdown on rebels. France and Britain favored a military response, whereas Germany preferred a political solution. Germany did not take part in the military operation to enforce the no-fly zone and conduct air strikes against Gaddafi forces and abstained from the UN vote which authorized it (UN Resolution 1973). Because of the division between the member states, the EU could not go beyond issuing statements, applying sanctions, and suggesting the establishment of a EUFOR Libya mission, which was never deployed. Turkey for its part did a complete u-turn during the course of events: it fiercely opposed any type of military intervention in the country in the beginning, but later decided to take part in the NATO operation.

On the 20th of February, the High Representative for CFSP Catherine Ashton issued a declaration on behalf of the EU stating that the Union was
“extremely concerned by the events unfolding in Libya” (Council of the European Union 2011f, p. n/a) and urged the Libyan authorities to refrain from the use of violence. The EU then implemented the sanctions against Libya adopted by the UNSC Resolution 1970 (26th of February) and went beyond them. On 28th of February, the Council adopted decision 2011/137/CFSP imposing an arms embargo against Libya and targeted sanctions, including visa bans and an asset freezes on people related to the Gaddafi regime (Council of the European Union 2011g, p. n/a).

About ten days after the beginning of the uprising and the ensuing response by Gaddafi, the UK announced that it was working with its allies on a plan to establish a military no-fly zone over the country. Prime Minister David Cameron warned on 28th of February that “the murderous regime must end” and that “the use of military assets” was not ruled out (BBC News 2011c, p. n/a). The Foreign Secretary, William Hague, called for an immediate end to violence against protesters and said that “this is a warning to anyone contemplating the abuse of human rights in Libya or any other country. Stay your hand. There will be a day of reckoning and the reach of international justice can be long. We must […] ensure that there can be no impunity for crimes committed in Libya” (BBC News 2011c, p. n/a).

David Cameron explained that the planning for a no-fly zone had to start at that point because “no-one knew what Col Gaddafi would do to his own people and one might have to be put in place very quickly”. However, the Prime Minister insisted that the UK would comply with international law (BBC News 2011c, p. n/a). The Ministry of Defense stated that the plans were still at an early stage, and the UK was at that time focusing on which countries would back the plan and which military assets were necessary to enforce it. In the meantime, the Prime Minister announced that the UK government was “taking every possible step to isolate the Gaddafi regime”, having frozen the British-held assets of Gaddafi and his family, withdrawn their diplomatic immunity and imposed an export ban on Libyan banknotes, which were printed in the UK. David Cameron also reiterated that the UK was cooperating with other EU member states to freeze the assets and impose travel bans on several
individuals connected to the Gaddafi regime, along with an arms embargo (BBC News 2011c, p. n/a).

Turkey declared that it was against imposing sanctions on the country, saying that they would hurt the population, not the leadership, and accused some in the international community of acting not from a humanitarian perspective, but out of oil interests (Idiz 2011c, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a). Turkey was also opposed to plans to establish a no-fly zone in the country and to conduct air strikes, warning that “NATO’s involvement should not be used to distribute Libya’s natural resources to certain countries” and saying that a “NATO intervention in Libya would be absurd” (Prime Minister Erdogan quoted in Yinanç 2011, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a).

On the 8\textsuperscript{th} of March, the UK and France announced that they were drafting an UN resolution establishing a no-fly zone over Libya, and that the matter would be discussed by NATO defense ministers on the 10\textsuperscript{th} of March (BBC News 2011d, p. n/a). William Hague also said that Arab and African support, and the legal backing of an UN resolution, were conditions that needed to be met before the no-fly zone could be implemented (BBC News 2011d, p. n/a). At that time, the Gulf Arab states had declared in favor of a no-fly zone and had requested an urgent meeting of the Arab League on the following Saturday (12\textsuperscript{th} of March) to discuss the issue (BBC News 2011d, p. n/a).

UK and France’s enthusiasm for establishing a no-fly zone was not shared by all European leaders. In a meeting of European Union foreign ministers in Brussels on the 9\textsuperscript{th} of March, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle warned that “we must […] take care that we do not slide onto a slope at the end of which we could find ourselves in a lasting military conflict, at the end of which we could effectively be a party in a civil war” (Casert 2011, The Washington Post, p. n/a). At that meeting in Brussels, EU foreign ministers managed to agree on tightening the sanctions against the Libyan regime and providing more humanitarian aid.

In an EU summit two days later (11\textsuperscript{th} of March), UK hopes of including an explicit reference to NATO and a no-fly zone in the summit final statement were effectively killed. German Chancellor Angela Merkel noted that there was no legal basis for a no-fly zone and the EU High representative Catherine Ashton
said that “the risks are high for potential civilian casualties and potential collateral damage. The efficiency of a no-fly zone is very questionable”. She was even reported as saying “hold your horses” to interrupt David Cameron in the summit debate (Traynor 2011b, The Guardian, p. n/a).

The Heads of State at the summit declared that Gaddafi had lost all legitimacy as an interlocutor and urged him to step down. They welcomed and encouraged the Transitional National Council in Benghazi, which, while not recognized as the sole representative of Libya, was henceforth considered “a political interlocutor” (Council of the European Union 2011h, p. n/a). The final summit statement said “The European Council expresses its deep concern about attacks against civilians, including from the air. In order to protect the civilian population, member states will examine all necessary options, provided that there is demonstrable need, a clear legal basis and support from the region” (European Council 2011, p. n/a). David Cameron noted that “All necessary options is a strong language”, but also said that “of course the EU is not a military alliance and I don’t want it to be a military alliance. Our alliance is NATO” (Traynor 2011b, The Guardian, p. n/a). French President Nicolas Sarkozy expressed his discontent with the split among EU leaders: “The British and ourselves are wondering what happens if peaceful civilians...are being targeted by aircrafts and helicopters shooting directly at the crowd. David Cameron and I wondered: should we simply stand by...or react...we cannot stand by and watch civilians being massacred” (Traynor 2011b, The Guardian, p. n/a).

France and the UK tried once again to make their case for imposing a no-fly zone over Libya a few days later in a G8 foreign ministers meeting on the 14th of March, but were again frustrated by Germany’s opposition. Germany foreign minister Guido Westerwelle said after the meeting that “we are very skeptical about a military intervention and a no-fly zone is a military intervention” (EurActiv 2011, p. n/a). Meanwhile, the EU sent a two-day mission to the rebel town of Benghazi in order to “gather information and assess the situation to support ongoing prudent planning in response to the Libyan crisis” (EurActiv 2011, p. n/a).
UN Security Council Resolution 1973, authorizing the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya, was approved on the 17th of March. France, UK, the United States, and seven other non-permanent members of the UN Security Council voted in favor of the resolution, whereas China, Russia, Germany, Brazil and India abstained (BBC News 2011e, p. n/a). The resolution demanded “an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the […] attacks against civilians”, imposed a no-fly zone and tightened sanctions, asset freezes and the arms embargo on the Gaddafi regime. It also authorized “Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (UN Security Council 2011, p. n/a). The voting was preceded by an Arab League call for the establishment of a UN no-fly zone over Libya on the 12th of March, which was evidence of growing regional support for the action.

It is important to note that Germany’s decision to abstain was heavily criticized by some German political actors. Former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer said that “Germany has lost its credibility in the United Nations and in the Middle East” and that “German hopes for a permanent seat on the Security Council have been permanently dashed and one is now fearful of Europe’s future” (Spiegel Online 2011b, p. n/a). Moreover, he stated that “the behavior of Germany’s government during the Libya conflict, its abstention from the UN Security Council [vote], was a one of a kind debacle and perhaps the biggest foreign policy debacle since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany. Our country’s standing in the world has been significantly damaged” (quoted in Spiegel Online 2011d, p. n/a). The former general inspector of the Bundeswehr, the highest ranking position in the German Military, stated that “Germany has turned the idea of a unified European Union foreign policy into a farce”. He went on to say that “the opposition to our closest partner France is a break with all constants of German foreign policy since 1949 […] it is the legacy of [Konrad] Adenauer and [Helmut] Kohl – all of German’s chancellors in fact – that Germany can never again be isolated. And now it is supposed to be in Germany’s interest to throw that all over board and risk going it alone because
of the vague risk of becoming involved in a war in Africa?” (Klaus Naumann quoted in Spiegel Online 2011b, p. n/a).

German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle justified the decision to abstain by saying that “we want to stop the dictator. Indeed from the very beginning, we have spearheaded international and European efforts to impose sanctions. But military missions and air strikes are something else. I don’t want us to venture onto a slippery slope that would lead to German troops participating in a war in Libya […] we will not take part with German troops, no matter how honorable the motives of our partners who have decided differently […] when it comes to military operations, I see myself as part of a tradition of restraint. The most important thing is to protect people and provide humanitarian aid” (quoted in Spiegel Online 2011c, p. n/a).

The EU welcomed the UN resolution. In a joint statement, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and EU’s foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton stated that “we reiterate the 11 March Declaration of the European Council that the safety of the people must be ensured by all necessary means. Resolution 1973 provides a clear legal basis for the members of the international community to provide protection to the civilian population” (Council of the European Union 2011d, p. n/a).

On the day that the resolution was adopted, Turkey hosted representatives of Transitional National Council and declared that it was holding intense negotiations with both parties in Libya. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, said: “we exerted our best efforts to have the issue settled within Libya using all diplomatic tools – some of which you know of and some you do not know about. Perhaps, these have not been comprehended fully, but history will confirm how Turkey acted responsibly on this issue and how it displayed a friendly manner towards Libya” (Today’s Zaman 2011h, p. n/a).

Two days after the resolution was approved, leaders from Europe, the US and the Middle East were invited to an emergency meeting in Paris to discuss the next steps in implementing the no-fly zone. The prime ministers or foreign ministers from the US, UK, Canada, Germany, Norway, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, Poland, Qatar, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, the outgoing and the incoming leaders of the Arab League, the EU foreign policy
chief and the UN Secretary-General were invited (Kirkpatrick, Erlanger and Bumiller 2011, *New York Times*, p. n/a). With the news that Gaddafi’s forces were attacking the rebel town of Benghazi, French warplanes initiated the campaign, called Operation Odyssey Dawn, even before the end of the emergency meeting in Paris.

Turkey was against France taking the leadership of anti-Gaddafi war efforts and was angry at not being invited to the meeting in Paris. In an interview, a special advisor to the Foreign Minister made it clear that Turkey did not want France to lead the operation “I’m asking these questions: are the French the chairman of the United Nations? No. Are they the chairman of the EU? No. Are they the chairman of NATO? No. Where did they get the authority to conduct this type of operation? We were not against the operation. We were against the way the operation was being conducted”. In addition, he expressed Turkey’s frustration for not being invited to the Paris meeting, and said that even the US was surprised about Turkey’s exclusion: “Hillary Clinton [US State Secretary] called us on the same day […] and told us that she didn’t know that Turkey had not been invited to Paris. In that call she said that it was a big mistake that Turkey hadn’t been invited” (Interview G 02.05.2011).

Criticisms of France were voiced by other Turkish officials. Defense Minister Vecdi Gönül said that “it is impossible for us to understand France being so prominent in this process. We are having difficulty in understanding it acting like the enforcer of United Nations decisions” (*Today’s Zaman* 2011h, p. n/a). Turkey’s Minister for the EU went further and said that “[French President Nicholas Sarkozy] began his election campaign by organizing a meeting that led to a process of air strikes against Libya. He acted before a NATO decision, and his act was based on his subjective evaluation of a UN resolution” (Watt, Hopkins and Traynor 2011, *The Guardian*, p. n/a).

Foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu added: “before everything else, there is a procedure in international law for the forming of such a coalition. We don’t have the conviction that this procedure has been applied sufficiently. We also conveyed [to British Foreign Secretary William Hague and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton] that we found it inappropriate that an operation – which should have been under UN governance and which should have absolutely
been within the parameters of fundamental UN principles and which should have been open to participation – is launched at a meeting attended by a small group of countries. A decision was made and the operation was started. While the operation has been going on, we made all kinds of suggestions to all parties regarding acting responsibly, not leading to human casualties and the protection of peace and soundness of Libyan people” (Today’s Zaman 2011h, p. n/a).

There was confusion about which country was leading the operation, as France, Britain and the United States were leading their own operations. The United States was credited by the French Defense Ministry for being the “lead coordinator”, but not the commander, and the United States declared that it wanted to step back and let NATO take charge of maintaining the no-fly zone and the arms embargo, a move opposed by France (Erlanger 2011, New York Times, p. n/a). French Foreign Minister, Alain Juppe justified his country’s objection by saying that “the Arab League does not wish the operation to be entirely placed under NATO responsibility. It isn’t NATO which has taken the initiative up to now […] it is a coalition of countries leading the operation, so they are in political control of it, and Arab countries, North American and European countries are participating” (quoted in Erlanger 2011, New York Times, p. n/a). The UK, however, agreed with the US and declared that the intent was indeed to transfer the command to NATO. David Cameron told Parliament: “let me explain how the coalition will work – it’s operating under US command with the intention that this will transfer to NATO […] clearly the mission would benefit from that and from using NATO’s tried-and-tested machinery in command and control” (Erlanger 2011, New York Times, p. n/a).

Turkey also continued to oppose the operation and the transferring of its command to NATO. After the operation had begun, Turkey called for an immediate cease-fire, and Prime Minister Erdogan said: “military intervention by NATO in Libya or any other country would be totally counterproductive […] in addition to being counterproductive, such an operation could have dangerous consequences” (Spiegel Online 2011, p. n/a). Therefore, ironically, France and Turkey were leading the opposition to transfer the operation’s command to NATO.
Turkey continued to criticize France during that week. Responding to comments made by the French interior minister, who stated that Sarkozy was “leading a crusade” to stop Gaddafí massacring civilians, Prime Minister Recep Erdogan said that “those who use such hair-raising, frightening terms that fuel clashes of civilizations, or those who even think of them need to immediately evaluate their conscience” (Traynor and Watt 2011, *The Guardian*, p. n/a).

After a four-day meeting of NATO members in Brussels and phone calls from President Obama to Nicolas Sarkozy and Recep Erdogan, and between Hillary Clinton, William Hague, Alain Juppe and Ahmet Davutoğlu, France and Turkey’s stances began to soften. It was agreed that NATO would finally take over the day-to-day military command of the no-fly zone, while political oversight would be handed to members of an international coalition including Arab countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which are not part of NATO. The fact that political oversight would not be provided by NATO but by an international coalition was portrayed as a victory by Paris, since it showed that NATO was not completely in command of the operation. At the same time, it represented a setback for Sarkozy, who did not want the alliance to play a prominent role (Watt, Hopkins and Traynor 2011, *The Guardian*, p. n/a).

Turkey for its part did a complete U-turn. Only five days after the beginning of the mission, Turkey agreed that the command of the operation to enforce the no-fly zone and the arms embargo and to conduct air strikes against Gaddafí forces should be given to NATO. After receiving the approval of the Turkish parliament, Turkey then began to take part in the operation by assuming control of the Benghazi airport to coordinate the delivery of humanitarian aid, sending five ships and a submarine to help enforce the arms embargo and later by freezing Gaddafí’s assets and imposing sanctions on the Libyan leadership.

Government sources explained the u-turn by saying that Turkey reviewed its position once the UN Security Council resolution authorizing the operation was approved and the Arab League showed its support, thereby making the operation legitimate (Head 2011, *BBC News*, p. n/a). However, as we have seen, even after the resolution was approved and the operation had begun,
Turkey continued to voice its discontent. So what could explain Turkey’s change of mind?

It seems that, once it became clear that the operation was going to be carried out, Turkey did not want to be excluded from it. It then began to insist that NATO, not France, took the lead, so that Turkey would also have a say on those matters. In fact, after Turkey lifted its opposition to NATO taking control of the operation, Turkey began to play a crucial role, since NATO’s airbase in Izmir was chosen to be the command center. Prime Minister Erdogan said that the decision to have NATO commanding the operation and to have the Izmir airbase as the command center was “a positive development”, since “Paris has begun to be excluded” (Hurriyet Daily News 2011a, p. n/a).

The main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), voted in favor of the Government bill which requested authorization from the Turkish Grand National Assembly for the country to take part in the NATO mission (Logoglu 2011, p. 41). However, the party criticized the first stance adopted by the AKP. According to the deputy leader of the CHP, Osman Koruturk, “the AKP should not have opposed NATO intervention, but rather discussed the issue within NATO — as a NATO member — in order to influence the alliance’s policy toward Libya” (Koruturk 2011, p. n/a).

Turkey then continued its efforts to become involved by suggesting a road map for the political resolution of the conflict, which consisted on three points: the withdrawal of Gaddafi forces from besieged cities, the establishment of aid corridors and democratic change (Kart 2011a, Today’s Zaman, p. 04). When neither side of the Libyan conflict endorsed the road map, Turkey then agreed with the position, taken by the US, UK and France, that Gaddafi had to step down (Today’s Zaman 2011g, p. 04). Foreign minister Davutoglu explained that “when Gaddafi didn’t listen to us, we made our position clear: now you must go because you didn’t listen” (Al-Jazeera 2011, p. n/a). The Turkish ambassador to Tripoli was recalled and Foreign Minister Davutoglu visited Benghazi, where he joined the rebel crowds in Tahrir Square without a bullet proof vest, and said, in Arabic “I have brought you greetings from the Turkish people […] we have a common history and a common future”. The crowds shouted “Thank you, Turkey” and “Erdogan, Turkey, Muslim” (quotes in
Ozerkan 2011, *Hurriyet Daily News*, p. n/a). Finally, after Gaddafi left Tripoli, Prime Minister Erdogan visited Libya one day after David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy. This visit is hugely symbolic of Turkey’s attempts to be recognized as an equal to Western powers, particularly European ones.

As for the EU, on the 1st of April the Council adopted a decision to establish EUFOR Libya, a military operation consisting of 1000 troops, whose objective would be to secure land and sea corridors for aid delivery, if requested by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Philips 2011, *EU Observer*, p. n/a). Therefore, it would be a limited mission to support humanitarian assistance. However, OCHA declared that the mission would not be needed, because it could endanger aid workers by associating them with military actors, which effectively killed the initiative (Philips 2011, *EU Observer*, p. n/a). A member of the European Parliament called EUFOR Libya an “April’s fool joke” (Gomes 2011, *EU Observer*, p. n/a).

The limited role for the EU in the crisis in Libya can be explained by the reluctance of some member states to embark on a military mission. According to a European diplomat, “some member states were not in favor of a CSDP operation. (...) The only possible result was a minimum role for the EU. This was EUFOR Libya” (quoted on Koenig 2011, p. 11). Germany, as we have seen, had abstained from the UN Security Council vote which authorized a no-fly zone over Libya. In addition, Sweden blocked the adoption of the concept of operations for EUFOR Libya at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council on the 12th of April. According to Koenig (2011, p. 11), this was a sensitive matter to Sweden, because the country was the framework nation of one of the two Battlegroups on stand-by, whose deployment was being considered in the context of EUFOR Libya.

On the 22nd of May, the High representative opened a liaison office in Benghazi in order to support “the nascent democratic Libya in border management, security reform, the economy, health, education, and in building civil society” (quoted in Koenig 2011, p. 4).

French President Nicolas Sarkozy argued that the intervention in Libya was a lesson for EU foreign policy, because “Europeans have shown for the first time that they are capable of intervention in a decisive way, with their allies,
in an open conflict on their doorstep” and that it meant that in the future the EU would play a bigger role vis-à-vis the US in providing security in the Middle East and North Africa (Rettman 2011b, *EU Observer*, p. n/a).

However, as pointed out by a Commission official “it was the British and the French [who acted], it was not CFSP” (Interview N, 09.10.2012). Therefore, it was not the EU who acted in Libya, but NATO. So when Sarkozy spoke about “Europeans” being capable of intervening in a decisive way, he was referring to the UK and France, and not to the EU as a whole, which in this case was divided and could only come up with a very limited mission to secure aid delivery.

A representative of the German delegation to the EU had a different assessment. According to him, “Ms. Ashton was rather quick in reacting, but there was the question of several member states having different views. So basically it was a NATO US led campaign. It was an example of the EU certainly sharing some sort of political assessment about the situation but having different opinions on how to react. So it reflected the way of being of the Union. We certainly are not yet at a point these two sides (political assessment and reaction) go hand in hand. But I think that the fact that the political statements were rather clear, that the messages were clear, was a good sign. So I don’t think there was much to reproach the EU with regards to its reaction to the conflict in Libya” (Interview M, 15.10.2012)

I will now provide an analysis of the responses of the UK, France, Germany, Turkey and the EU to the conflict in Libya, which will serves several purposes. First, it will illustrate these countries’ and the EU’ security understandings and preferences. Second, it will help elucidate some of the difficulties faced by the EU in reacting to major political crisis in the world stage. Third, it will increase understanding about how Turkey could affect the current dynamics.

France and the UK think that they have an important role to play in solving international crisis and value the use of military force to achieve their objectives. It is striking that only ten days after the conflict in Libya began the UK announced it was making plans which did not exclude military options. However, whereas the UK is more attached to the US and to NATO (in the
aforementioned words of David Cameron: “of course the EU is not a military alliance and I don’t want it to be a military alliance. Our alliance is NATO”, France prefers more autonomy for Europe. That explains France’s reluctance to put the operation under NATO command and Sarkozy’s rhetorical attempts to present the mission as one of “Europeans”, even though the United States played a crucial role. Therefore, French and UK’s security cultures share a sense of responsibility for maintaining international security, and a willingness to deploy military force in high-risk situations, but diverge when it comes to the preferred mode of cooperation. The similarities and differences in their security cultures generate policies which fit with the directorate scenario described by Rynning (2003b), in which willing and capable EU member states act in case-by-case situations where there is sufficient agreement.

Turkey’s neo-Ottomanist security culture is also characterized by a sense of responsibility towards its neighborhood, and Turkey did try to bring a diplomatic resolution to the conflict. However, the neo-Ottomanist security culture is also characterized by a distrust of the West, and this has been seen in Turkish officials’ harsh remarks accusing some Western countries of having spurious motives to intervene in Libya. However, more important then distrust is Turkey’s wish to be reckoned as a relevant actor in the Middle East, whose opinion should be taken into account. The irritation of Turkish officials of not being invited to the meeting in Paris, and the discomfort of being left out of the operation once it was clear that it was going to be carried out, explains Turkey’s u-turn. Turkey then insisted that NATO commanded the operation, so it could have a say in how it was conducted.

Although some in the opposition in Germany accused the government of breaking in German tradition in foreign policy by failing to support its allies, another tradition was maintained: the reluctance to intervene militarily.

The EU, having its three more important member states in opposing camps, did what it does best: tried to forge consensus decisions. Thus, it released statements, applied sanctions, came up with the idea of EU mission in Libya, and, after the conflict was over, engaged in post-conflict state-building. It is also important to point out that the new institutional structures established by the Lisbon Treaty, such as the Office of High Representative and the EEAS, did
not compensate for member states’ divisions with regards to the conflict in Libya.

Three visions of European Power: Global, Humanitarian and Minimum Power Europe

In this section, I will develop my own taxonomy of EU member states’ security cultures. I will argue that there are three broad projects for the role of the EU as an international actor: Global Power Europe, Humanitarian Power Europe and Minimum Power Europe.

The grouping of EU member states presented in this section is based on the literature on national security cultures reviewed in the beginning of this chapter; the different preferences of member states when it comes to political integration in general and the development of EU institutional structures in particular, discussed in a previous section; and on EU member states’ responses to the conflict in Libya, examined above. After these divisions are acknowledged, it will be possible to locate where Turkey fits within this picture and hence how it could affect the role of the EU in the world.

It is important to point out that these “visions” or “images” are presented here as a framework that allows us to understand the broader picture of EU security understandings in order to locate where Turkey sits within it. While there are certainly overlaps between the three different groups and exceptions within each group, they are distinct enough to be presented as “ideal-types”.

The main supporter of the Global Power Europe project has been France. As we have seen, from the creation of the EPC to the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1993 and the European Security and Defense Policy in 1999, France has been pushing for a more autonomous EU role (Irondele 2009, p. 150). According to the supporters of this image, for the EU to become a Global Power, it would need to act as an autonomous and unitary actor in matters of high politics (Toje 2010, p. 3). The EU would need to be able to stand and act together on major political challenges, including having the political will and the capacity to use force in high-risk situations (Krotz 2009, p. 557).
According to Irondelle (2009), France wants to shape Europe according to French ideas and to transfer its ambitions in the world stage to the European level with the idea of Europe puissance (p. 151). Europe puissance means, according to France, a great power in a multipolar world free from United States dominance, “a Europe capable of defending its interests with the whole spectrum of power” (Jacques Chirac, quoted in Irondelle 2009, p. 151). Therefore, the CFSP would serve as a springboard for France’s grandeur and splendor in the world (Irondelle 2009, p. 152). Gnesotto (1998) aptly describes the situation: “Europe is to France what the US is to Britain, the optimum multiplier of national power” (quoted in Irondelle 2009, p. 152).

The Gaullist legacy which informs this French vision rests on the principles of global role, and, contradictorily, independence and sovereignty. In other words, France wants the EU to become a Global Power, but also wishes to guard its sovereignty and independence, by retaining its nuclear deterrence, its UN Security Council seat and by insisting that CFSP remains an intergovernmental policy area (Irondelle 2009, p. 153). Therefore, France envisions a strong Europe with weak institutions. Furthermore, France feels that its capacity to shape the EU in its own image diminishes every time the Union is enlarged (Irondelle 2009, p. 153), which partially explains some French politicians’ opposition to Turkey’s membership.

France is not alone in supporting this role for the EU. Rogers (2009) also identifies an emerging, and increasingly stronger, discourse coalition formed by what the author calls “euro-strategists”, pushing for the EU to become a Global Power with military capabilities. These “euro-strategists” are part of a Brussels-based transnational policy network, which includes the “Forum Europe” of the New Defense Agenda (NDA), the joint “European Forum” of the Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU – ISS), and individuals such as Javier Solana, Robert Cooper, Chris Patten, Fraser Cameron, Giles Merritt, Nicole Gnessotto and Bukard Schmitt (Ian Manners 2006, p. 191-92). In addition to this network of think tanks, Universities, bureaucracies, institutions and private organizations pushing for a stronger military activism by the EU identified by Ian Manners, Rogers (2009) adds other academic departments, privately-funded security and defense
institutions, and different agencies and bureaucracies within the European Union (list on p. 845).

For example, the EU Institute for Security Studies (EU – ISS) Taskforce Scenarios 2004 identified five scenarios in which the EU could use its CSDP capabilities: large-scale peace support operations, high-intensity humanitarian intervention, regional warfare in defense of strategic European interests, counter terrorism and homeland defense. In the case of the latter two scenarios, the report argued that the EU might not need an UN mandate (in Gariup 2009, p. 184 and 185). Thus, these EU-ISS Scenarios foresee the use of force by the EU in high-risk situations, including to guarantee strategic interests and without international authorization.

“Euro-strategists”, however, disagree with France when it comes to the issue of deeper political integration. Whereas France wishes CFSP to remain an intergovernmental policy area, “euro-strategists” in general think that the EU needs greater integration in the areas of security and defense in order to play a greater role in the world (Rogers 2009, p. 848 and 849). Thus, they support the delegation of more responsibility to a common authority and limiting the consensus-based decision-making rule (Smith 2003, p. 253).

The euro-strategist “Global Power” discourse coalition, although becoming larger and gaining strength, still has to “out-argue” the group which wants to EU to remain primarily a civilian power (Rogers 2009, p. 845). Therefore, this discourse of a Global Power Europe, although growing, and increasingly able to shape EU’s foreign and security policies and influence the creation of necessary institutions and structures, has not yet claimed hegemonic status (Rogers 2009, p. 852). It still competes with other views about what type of role the EU should play.

Some member states (such as Germany, Ireland, Austria, Sweden and Finland), because of the characteristics of their security cultures, discussed previously, are reluctant to strengthen the EU as a military power. These member states prefer the EU to remain a primarily civilian power, which uses force only sporadically to diffuse regional crisis - closer to Meyer (2006)'s notion of a Humanitarian Power Europe. They prefer the EU to rely primarily on civilian means and to deploy force only in cases which have been sanctioned by
International Law, are embedded in multilateral frameworks, and in which there are low risks of civilian and military casualties.

The support for the vision of a Humanitarian Power Europe is also found in academic circles. Smith K. (2000, p. 27), for example, thinks that being a civilian actor is what gives the EU its identity and legitimacy, and considers the acquisition of military capabilities by the EU harmful. Similarly, Ian Manners (2006, p. 183) argues that militarizing processes are weakening the normative claims of the EU. Manners (2006) think that there is a danger that the militarization of the EU beyond the crossroads provided by the ESS will lead to the diminution of its normative power, if the process of militarization is characterized by the pursuit of “great power” (p. 194).

Manners (2006) argues that the pursuit of “sustainable peace” is a central norm of EU’s normative power. Sustainable peace means the emphasis on addressing the causes of conflict, including short-term problem solving and, most importantly, long-term structural solutions (Manners 2006, p. 185). Sustainable peace is different from humanitarian assistance and intervention (which are “charitable acts”), since it is informed by the need to build indigenous capacity for resolving internal tensions before they escalate (Manners 2006, p. 186). At its heart is the concept of human security, which refers to people-centered freedom from fear and freedom from want (Manners 2006, p. 192). The EU predisposition towards long-term structural conflict prevention, in Manners’ view, reflects its own experience after the Second World War (p. 187).

However, according to Manners (2006), since the publication of the ESS, the EU has taken an unwelcomed sharp turn away from the promotion of sustainable peace towards a full spectrum of instruments for robust intervention. Javier Solana’s (2004) “A Human Security Doctrine for Europe” refers only to freedom from fear, which, in Manners’ view, separates the concept of security and development and favors human rights interventionism (Manners 2006, p. 192). In other words, there is a turn away from the common understanding of human security and causes of conflict towards the use of force as part of a Responsibility to Protect (Manners 2006, p. 192). As examples of cases in which the EU has prioritized military objectives over local capacity building, Manners cites Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
Operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina (p. 190). Thus, some member states and other actors within the EU do not want the EU to become a “Global Power” in the sense the term is understood by France and “euro-strategists”. Their preference is for the EU to remain a “Humanitarian Power”.

Finally, some Central and Eastern European member states, and particularly the UK, because of their historical experiences and characteristics of their security cultures, are unwilling to give Europe a greater role in foreign and security policies than it already has, preferring instead to rely on the United States and to preserve NATO as the main transatlantic security arrangement (Krotz 2009, p. 566, Lindley-French 2004, p. 11). They are the supporters of a Minimum Power Europe. Although in practice the role they favor for the EU is similar to the role of a Humanitarian Power Europe, their preference stems from different sources. They are reluctant to transform Europe into a Global Power not because they are risk-averse, are normatively against the use of force, or have a preference for civilian means, but because of a preferred attachment to NATO.

Therefore, there is an “ontological tension” between member states when it comes to the identity of Europe as a strategic actor (Irondelle 2009, p. 153). The advocates of Global Power Europe face resistance from those member states and other actors who do not wish the EU to develop more military might or become a more autonomous security actor.

Thus, for the vision of a Global Power Europe to prevail, some EU actors will have to convince others that a less limited type of force projection is acceptable, and that the EU is the appropriate framework for the external use of force (Giegerich 2006, p. 202). In other words, for the Global Power Europe vision to materialize the convergence of national security cultures would have to occur around the French model (Giegerich 2006, p. 202) and “euro-strategists” ideas would have to be successfully diffused to other EU actors. Convergence around the French model would mean more acceptance of the use of force - for both humanitarian and realpolitik reasons – higher tolerance for risks and lower authorization thresholds (Meyer 2006, p. 29 and 30).

This process will likely be difficult. Even though the discourse of a Global Power Europe is gaining strength, the use of force by the EU is slowly
becoming more acceptable, and the EU has been, albeit slowly, developing the institutional structures and military capabilities to perform such a role, several obstacles remain in place.

First, in order to speak with one voice and respond to the most important international issues, the EU needs more integration in the areas of foreign and security policies. That means that more member states' powers would have to be ceded to Brussels, which is not something all member states are willing to do, even some of those who wish the EU to become more autonomous, such as France. Second, to be able to use military force in high-risk situations, the EU needs to improve its military capabilities and generate the political will to deploy them. This is difficult to achieve when some member states espouse security cultures which are either reluctant to use force or against the idea of the EU becoming the main security actor.

Now that the landscape of European security understandings has been mapped out and that the characteristics of Turkey’s two security cultures have been examined (in chapters 2 and 3) it will be possible to see where Turkey stands in this broader picture of European security cultures and consequently how it will influence the role of the EU as an international actor. This will be done in the rest of this chapter.

**Assessing the impact of Turkey on the EU’s role in the world:**

*Turkey and the vision of a Minimum Power Europe*

Based on the characteristics of Turkey’s Republican and neo-Ottomanist security cultures, it is unlikely that Turkey would support this vision. Turkey is not against the EU achieving more autonomy in security matters per se, but it is against the country being excluded from the decision-making procedures. In other words, Turkey’s issue with the EU becoming a more autonomous actor in the foreign and security spheres, and acquiring military capabilities, springs from a fear of being excluded from the European security architecture. Actors espousing the Republican and the neo-Ottomanist security cultures want to guarantee a place for Turkey in the decision-making structures of EU foreign
and security policies as a way to gain either acceptance as a Western state or prestige. Thus, neither of them takes issue with the development of an autonomous EU role, but they do take issue with Turkey not being part of it.

As we have seen in chapter 3, even though Turkey’s place in Europe’s security arrangements were downgraded since the CSDP was created, Turkey is the largest non-EU contributor to CSDP missions and it keeps insisting on taking a seat at the European Defense Agency. In addition, Turkish officials also suggested the creation of a platform for Turkey and the EU to discuss foreign policy issues of mutual concern and they get offended when Turkey is excluded from important meetings, such as the Paris meeting on Libya. Therefore, Turkey does not oppose in principle further EU autonomy on foreign, security and defense matters or further EU acquisition of military capabilities, as long as Turkey is part of the decision-making structures.

In addition, neither the Republican nor the neo-Ottomanist security culture is characterized by a preferred attachment to the US or NATO, as is the case of the UK and some Central and Eastern European countries. Although historically Turkey has been a strong ally of the United States and has highly regarded its membership of NATO - according to former President Demirel, “the most successful alliance that humankind ever witnessed” (quoted on Robins 2003, p. 20) – the country’s attachment to the US and NATO has been connected to the quest to be accepted as a Western state, as has been Turkey’s pursuit to become a member of the EU. NATO membership, a good relationship with the US and EU membership have all been part of the Republican’s elites’ quest for acceptance in the Western community of nations. The neo-Ottomanist elites took over from the Republican counterparts the quest to be accepted as a member of the EU, but as a matter of prestige. Thus, neither of Turkey’s security cultures presents a preference for NATO or an objection to an autonomous EU role in principle, as long as Turkey is part of it.

Another example serves to illustrate this point further. In 2007, Turkey withdrew its pledge to contribute to the 2010 EU’s Headline goals with a private brigade of 6000 troops, aircraft and ships, which would have made Turkey the fifth largest contributor to the EU force (Muftuler-Baç 2009, p. 71). The reasons for the withdrawal were twofold. First of all, Turkey disagreed with EU’s plans to
include Cyprus in the upcoming EULEX mission in Kosovo. According to Turkey, this would be unacceptable, since the Berlin-Plus agreement excludes non-signatories of the Partnership for Peace, such as Cyprus, from taking part in EU missions that make use of NATO assets, which was to be the case of the EULEX mission. As we have seen in chapter 3, although Turkey has officially prevented Cyprus from taking part in the mission, in reality Turkey turns a blind eye to the fact that there are Cypriot experts on the ground (Smith S. 2010, p. 19) and Turkey is the sixth largest contributor to the mission, with 83 staff (EULEX Kosovo 2011, p. n/a).

The second reason is more telling. The EU decided to list Turkey’s contribution as a reserve force, which Turkey did not approve: “We cannot accept being a substitute force. This private brigade is a well-equipped one. We warned them, we gave them time, but they did not give us a place in the basic list (Turkish government sources quoted by Muftuler-Baç 2009, p. 71).

Thus, this example, in conjunction with others already mentioned, illustrate the proposition that there is no element in either Turkish security cultures which is opposed in principle to an autonomous EU role in security matters, nor the acquisition of more military capabilities, as long as Turkey is occupying the place it feels it deserves within the EU structures.

*Turkey and the vision of a Humanitarian Power Europe*

Given the characteristics of Turkey’s security cultures, and the current state of the EU, Turkey is likely to support and strengthen the role of the EU as a Humanitarian Power. This is not to say that Turkey’s security cultures are also characterized by a reluctance to use military force and the preference for civilian means. The Republican security culture does not exclude the possibility of using or threatening the use of force to defend what is considered to be Turkish interests. Similarly, although the neo-Ottomanist security culture is characterized by a desire to engage economically and diplomatically with Turkey’s surrounding regions, and to contribute to the peaceful settlement of disputes between Turkey’s neighbors, it is also marked by a nationalist streak, as seen in particular with regards to the Kurdish issue. As discussed in chapter
3, in spite of attempts to solve the Kurdish issue in the political sphere, military force continues to be used against the PKK in Turkey and in Northern Iraq, and even AKP officials, such as Prime Minister Erdogan, do no refrain from using a belligerent language from time to time.

However, there are several reasons why Turkey is likely to strengthen this scenario. As has been discussed previously, Turkey has historically and currently been very much willing to take part in multinational peace support operations, be they carried out by the UN, NATO or the EU, for reasons of gaining acceptance or prestige. As we have seen, for Turkey’s Republican and neo-Ottomanist elites, it does not matter if Turkey’s contributions are to NATO or EU missions, as long as Turkey is allowed to sit at the table where decisions are being made. Even though Turkey is not at the present time part of the decision-making structures of CSDP, the country already supports several EU missions.

Thus, by being included in the decision-making structures of CSDP, the country is likely to continue to contribute to EU missions and will be able to provide logistical advantages to CSDP missions carried out in the regions surrounding Turkey and provide more military capabilities to the EU.

Furthermore, if Turkey becomes a member of the Union, the obstacles which prevent further cooperation between Turkey and NATO will have been removed, allowing the relationship between NATO and the EU to run much more smoothly.

Thus, even though neither of Turkey’s security cultures shares similarities with those EU member states’ security cultures which support this vision, Turkey would probably bolster this scenario.

**Turkey and the vision of a Global Power Europe**

The possible implications of Turkish membership for this scenario are more complex. The first reason, which is not directly related to the characteristics of Turkey’s security cultures, is that there are some in-built contradictions with the French idea of strengthening the EU as a Global Power. As has been discussed, even though France is one of the most vocal
proponents of a Global Power Europe, the country is reluctant to part with its sovereignty and therefore insists that CFSP remains an intergovernmental policy area. However, it has also been noted that France has been joined by a coalition of euro-strategists, who are increasingly pushing for the EU to become a Global Power with military capabilities, and who push for more integration in this area. Therefore, the main supporters of this vision disagree on the issue of greater political integration and the transferring of more powers to Brussels.

The second reason is that the question of whether Turkey would help or hinder the EU’s in its quest to become a Global Power is deeply contested. We have seen that European supporters of Turkish membership, and Turkish officials themselves, are very much willing to portray Turkey as a great asset for the EU if it wants to become a Global Power. According to this line of argument, Turkey’s political, economic and cultural ties with the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, its proximity to energy supplies, its Muslim and democratic credentials and its military strength would add to the Union’s soft and hard power, and would help the EU to increase its role in the world.

Opponents of Turkey’s membership, on the other hand, argue that enlargement in general increases heterogeneity within the Union and thereby increases the difficulty of reaching common decisions. The need for consensus and unanimity in foreign and security matters means that a new member state is potentially another veto-wielding country, which could then slow down even more the decision-making process or even bring paralysis. This type of argument fits with the French view that its capacity to shape the EU in its own image diminishes every time the Union is enlarged. In addition, given the size and characteristics of Turkey, its membership would be particularly problematic, to the point where Turkey could “water down” and “dilute” the European political project and turn the European Union into just a free trade area.

As has been argued in chapter 1, analyses of the impact that Turkey will have on the EU must take into account the current divisions within the EU and the characteristics of Turkey’s security cultures.

On one hand, it can be argued that Turkish security cultures share a problematic “common core” when it comes to the Global Power Europe scenario and that Turkey’s neo-Ottomanist security culture in particular has
some specific characteristics which could have important implications for this scenario. However, I will argue that Turkey’s impact on this scenario is likely to be negligible, given that its main supporter (France) is also unwilling to accept greater integration in the area, and that there is great resistance from other groups within the EU against this project.

I will first explore the possible argument that there are some aspects of both of Turkey’s security cultures which might be seen as problematic by proponents of the Global Power Europe vision. Both the Republican and the neo-Ottomanist security cultures are characterized by an ambivalent view about Europe and as a consequence by a reluctance to part with the country’s sovereignty. Because of its attachment to sovereignty, it is unlikely that Turkey would be willing to cede powers to Brussels in the areas of foreign and security policies. Second, although both Republican and neo-Ottomanist elites want Turkey to join the European Union, neither of them wants to do so because they are invested in the idea of the EU becoming a Global Power. Rather, their desire to be part of the Union is connected to the wish to see Turkey’s Western credentials recognized or as a matter of prestige.

The idea that Turkish membership is paramount for the EU’s relevance in the world stage features quite prominently in the self-confident neo-Ottomanist discourse. As we have seen in chapter 3, AKP officials claim that without Turkey the EU would become irrelevant, a political dwarf, but with Turkey the EU will become a Global Power. However, as also analyzed in chapter 3, in other speeches these officials stress Turkey’s destiny to become a regional power, and maybe a global power, in its own right. It is my argument that these actors are not invested in the idea of the EU becoming a Global Power by accepting Turkey, but Turkey becoming a global power by joining Europe. Therefore, their aim seems to be to join the EU in order for Turkey to enhance its power and prestige, instead of joining the EU to enhance the Union’s power.

When it comes to the Middle East, actors who hold the neo-Ottomanist security culture think that, because of Turkey’s history and geography, they know best about how to engage with the region, and are not reluctant to dismiss EU positions if they do not coincide with Turkey’s stances, as seen in the cases of Iran’s nuclear program, and the uprisings in Libya and Syria, among others.
Furthermore, the similarities between Turkey’s neo-Ottomanist security culture and France’s traditional security culture are leading to increasingly visible rivalry between the two countries in the Middle East, which has important implications for the Global Power Europe scenario.

Both France’s traditional security culture and Turkey’s neo-Ottomanist security culture are characterized by a sense of responsibility towards the Middle East and North Africa. Because of their historical (i.e. colonial) legacies, these two countries feel that they know these regions best and that they should be involved in regional developments. These two countries seem to be involved in a power struggle in the region, trying to increase their influence to each other’s detriment. Whereas France seeks “the reincarnation of its rank in the world through Europe” (Irondelle 2009, p. 150), Turkey, when governed by those holding the neo-Ottomanist security culture, wants to reincarnate Turkey’s rank in the world by itself, with or without Europe - although being a member of the EU is perceived to help Turkey in this endeavor.

As previously mentioned, Turkey and France’s difficult relationship stems from a number of sources, including some French politicians’ opposition to Turkey’s membership on the grounds that the country is in Asia Minor, therefore not European; France’s snubs of Turkey – such as the failure to invite Turkey to a meeting on Libya convened in Paris in 2011; and France’s stance on the Armenian killings of 1915. As mentioned in chapter 3, after the French National Assembly passed a bill criminalizing the denial of what it calls the Armenian genocide in late 2011, Turkey imposed political, economic and military sanctions against Paris.

The content of the sanctions is telling. Turkey recalled its Ambassador and announced it would boycott a join economic meeting in Paris in January 2012. Most importantly, Turkey announced that it would cancel joint military drills and joint exchange and training programs; cancel annual blanket over-flight permission for France’s military planes, henceforth ruling on a case-by-case basis French requests to use Turkish airspace or military bases; and cancel permission for France’s warships to dock in Turkish ports (Dermitas 2011c, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a and Al-Jazeera 2011, p. n/a). Turkish diplomats speaking on the condition of anonymity told the Turkish press that
these measures would severely affect France’s access to the Middle East: “France has intense ties with so many countries in our neighborhood. It has military and other sorts of cooperation with these countries. They gained a great advantage in reaching out to these regions using the blanket permission we have long provided to them [...] Now they will lose time and money in doing so” (quoted in Dermitas 2011c, Hurriyet Daily News, p. n/a, emphasis added).

Thus, there is a risk that, if it joins the Union, Turkey will be another powerful actor inside the EU, and there might be a clash between France and Turkey when it comes to the Middle East, since both countries seem to think that they know best about how to deal with the region. Both Turkey and France then would be competing to project their influence (and splendor and grandeur) to the Middle East. With this perspective in mind, it is possible to argue that Prime Minister Erdogan had a point when, in a Newsweek article, he wrote that “Sometimes I wonder if Turkey’s power is an impediment to its accession to the Union” (Erdogan 2011, Newsweek p. n/a). It is only an impediment if the Global Power Europe scenario is being considered.

This concern was expressed to me by a retired Commission official, who worked at DG Enlargement:

“Turkey is the heir of an empire. And I think it is possible that, once Turkey joins the Union, we are going to have the same difficulties with Turkey as we have now with the British and with the French. Turkey, the UK and France were once the head of empires. And these countries still think like that in a way. Smaller countries, like Italy or the Netherlands, do not have a willingness of hegemony, to say “we want things like this”. [But] when you listen to a French politician in Europe they think like this, the British are still thinking like this. If Turkey joins, it will not be easy. Because [the country is the heir of] the Ottoman Empire, it will be difficult. I’m sure that Turkey inside [the EU] will be as difficult as the British. We are going to have a very strong contest inside the Union if Turkey joins.” (Interview N, 09.10.2012).

Thus, one could argue that Turkey’s impact on the Global Power Europe scenario, given the characteristics of its security cultures, could be significant. First, because of an ambivalent view of Europe, and consequent sovereign sensitivities, Turkey is unlikely to be willing to cede more powers to Brussels. Second, neither security cultural paradigm seems to be invested in the idea of the EU becoming a Global Power. The neo-Ottomanist perspective, in particular, is more concerned with joining the EU in order to enhance Turkey’s
own power. Third, the wish to see Turkey as a regional power, characteristic of the neo-Ottomanist security culture, and Turkish-French competition for influence in the Middle East, could mean that the EU would have another powerful and potentially clashing “pillar” in its midst.

However, my argument is that Turkey will neither help the EU become a Global Power nor be single-handedly responsible for the collapse of this project. Given that France is also unwilling to cede more power to Brussels, and that there is great resistance from some member states against this vision, either due to a reluctance to increase EU’s autonomy, or to a reluctance to deploy military force, it is unlikely that the membership of Turkey would alter the current state of affairs of the Union. Even though neither of Turkey’s security cultures is invested in the idea of making the EU a Global Power, the country is not alone in this position. Thus, the current divisions within the Union and within Turkey are taken into account, it becomes clear that claims that Turkey would “make or break” the Union are overstated.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued there is a multiplicity of security understandings within Europe. Even though a distinct EU security culture is emerging due to processes of socialization taking place within EU institutional structures, important differences in national security cultures remain in place. These differences generate three distinct projects for the future of the EU as an international actor.

By providing a broader picture of the current landscape of security understandings within the EU and delineating the three projects for the EU as an international actor that currently exist, it was possible to locate where Turkey stands. I argued that, given the existing divisions within the EU and the traits of Turkey’s security cultures, Turkish membership is unlikely to significantly alter the EU’s role in the international system.

First, Turkey’s security cultures do not share with the supporters of a Minimum Power Europe a preferred attachment to NATO. Second, even though neither of Turkey’s security cultures are characterized by a preference for
civilian means and a reluctance to use force in high-risk situations, Turkey is very much willing to contribute to CSDP missions, and is more likely to do so if it is allowed to have a place in the decision-making structures, which could strengthen the Humanitarian Power Europe scenario. Third, even though neither group in Turkey shares France’s vision of a Global Power Europe, other EU member states are also reluctant to support this vision due to the characteristics of their security cultures. Thus, with or without Turkey, the EU will probably continue to resemble a Humanitarian Power in the world stage.

This thesis has thus contributed to the literature that tries to assess Turkish membership impact on the EU’s role in the world stage by taking into account divisions within Europe and within Turkey in terms of security cultures. Once these divisions are acknowledged, Turkey’s contribution to the EU can no longer be portrayed in stark terms: either as an asset which will increase the EU’s potential to become a more influential actor in the world stage; or as a liability, which could potentially lead to the dilution of the European project.

Thus, this thesis has challenged the binary logic that dominates the discussion about Turkey’s impact on the EU’s relevance in the world stage and has argued that a more nuanced approach to the debate reveals that impact of Turkish membership should not be overestimated, at least in this policy area.
Conclusion

This thesis has argued that, in order to assess Turkish membership impact on the EU’s role in the world stage, it is paramount to take into account divisions within Europe and within Turkey in terms of security cultures. Only if these divisions are acknowledged, it is possible to analyze the impact Turkey will have on the EU’s foreign, security and defense policies.

Analyses which do not take into account such divisions tend to portray Turkey’s contribution to the EU in stark terms: either as an asset which will increase the EU’s potential to become a more influential actor in the world stage; or as a liability, which could potentially lead to the dilution of the European project. Even analyses which use the concept of security culture do not recognize the multiplicity of security cultures existing within Europe and the two security cultures found inside Turkey.

Thus, this thesis has argued that a more nuanced approach to the debate about Turkey’s impact on the EU’s relevance in the world stage was needed. This more nuanced approach consists of pointing out the different security cultures operating within Europe, and the three broad visions these different security cultures generate for the future of the EU; and the existence of two security cultures vying for dominance within Turkey.

The concept of security culture has been considered extremely valuable as a tool to understand Turkey’s vision of its place in the world, its place within Europe and the contributions it is willing to make. It was argued that material factors such as geographical location, military capabilities, and economic performance were not enough to explain the likely impact of Turkey on the EU, since these factors can be used to both support and to oppose Turkish membership. Therefore, the security understandings and preferences of Turkish policy-makers need to be factored in any analyses of Turkey’s impact on Europe. Turkey’s resources will be assets or liabilities to the EU depending on how they are used by Turkish policy-makers.

This thesis has proposed a definition of the concept of security culture as a set of ideas, rooted in a security community’s pluralistic conceptions of
identities, comprising assumptions about what constitutes insecurities and the best way to tackle them. In order to identify Turkey’s security cultures, this thesis has investigated how historical experiences were interpreted, propagated, contested and reinterpreted in Turkey, helping form certain identities, the corresponding natures of the others and the preferred and acceptable ways to relate to these others. It was established that Turkey has two security cultures, which I have labeled as Republican and Neo-Ottomanist, and which have different features, but also some similarities. I have argued that it is important to focus on the similarities between Turkey’s two security cultures for two reasons: because it has not been done before in a systematic manner; and because it helps us understand some of the views, preferences and attitudes of Turkish policy-makers which could impact on the country’s contribution to the EU.

Turkey’s Republican security culture is rooted in a Turkish identity seen as Western and homogenous and is characterized by a sense of isolation (“Turks have no friends but Turks”), of being in a unique geographical location, surrounded by unfriendly countries devising schemes to weaken or even disintegrate Turkey with the help of enemies within. This security culture has influenced a foreign policy aiming at: a) Turkey being accepted in the Western community of nations - as a confirmation of the country’s Western identity - while at the same time being very defensive of the country’s sovereignty; and b) non-interference in Middle Eastern affairs, in order to avoid being dragged into a zone of conflict whose identity Turkey does not want to be identified with.

Turkey’s neo-Ottomanist security culture is rooted in a Turkish identity seen as multicivilizational and is characterized by a sense of shared bonds and responsibility towards the neighborhood, and a positive view of Turkey’s history and unique geographical location, replacing the Republican paradigm sense of insecurity with a sense of self-confidence. These characteristics have influenced a foreign policy geared at being recognized as an equal partner to the European Union, while at the same time guarding Turkey’s sovereignty, and becoming a regional leader in the Middle East. Actors espousing the neo-Ottomanist security culture insist that Turkey should be consulted and have its voice heard on regional matters; should be treated as an equal and recognized
as regional power; and tend to be uncooperative if Turkey does not receive the respect it deserves.

In spite of the differences, the Republican and the neo-Ottomanist security cultures share a number of traits. First, the elites espousing the neo-Ottomanist security culture have taken over from the Republican elites the quest for recognition and acceptance from the West, albeit for different reasons. This second group thinks that Turkey is already an equal to Europe, and it should be recognized as such, as a matter of prestige. An ambivalent view towards the West, which is seen as meddling in Turkey’s domestic affairs, exploiting domestic grievances, and treating Turkey unfairly, has also persisted; as has the reluctance to part with the country’s sovereignty. Furthermore, they both share a sense of Turkish superiority over minorities at home and over former members of the Ottoman Empire.

As for the EU, the differences in national security cultures have generated three different projects for the role of the Union as an international actor: Minimum Power Europe, Humanitarian Power Europe, and Global Power Europe. Supporters of the Minimum Power Europe vision – the UK, and some Central and Eastern European countries - are unwilling to give Europe a greater role in foreign and security policy matters, preferring instead to rely on the United States and to preserve NATO as the main transatlantic security arrangement. They do not support further integration in these policy areas, and do not wish to see an increase in Europe’s autonomy or military capabilities in any way that could jeopardize the primacy of NATO. The vision of a Humanitarian Power Europe is mostly supported by countries referred to as neutrals or “post-neutrals”, such as Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Austria, and to a certain extent Germany. These countries, because of the characteristics of their security cultures, are reluctant to see an EU with greater military muscle, and prefer the Union to remain primarily a civilian power, using force only when authorized by International law, for humanitarian reasons, and when there is a low risk of civilians or military casualties. Finally, the vision of Global Power Europe, supported mostly by France and a coalition of “euro-strategists”, entails a more autonomous role for the EU in foreign, security and defense matters and
the possibility that military force might be used in a more robust manner to defend European interests, if necessary.

It has been my argument that Turkey’s impact on the role of the EU in the world stage varies depending on which of the three visions for the future of the EU is under consideration and on the characteristics of Turkey’s two security cultures.

I argued that there are no elements in either of Turkey’s security cultures which suggest that Turkey would support the vision of a Minimum Power Europe. There is no opposition in principle to the idea of the EU gaining more autonomy in foreign policy and security matters, as long as Turkey is part of the decision-making structures. Turkey’s only issue with the EU becoming a more autonomous actor, and acquiring greater military capabilities, springs from a fear of being excluded from the process. This fear of exclusion has different roots, depending on which of Turkey’s security culture is being considered. Actors holding the Republican security culture want to guarantee a place for Turkey in the decision-making structures of EU foreign and security policies as a way to gain acceptance as a Western state, whereas those espousing the neo-Ottomanist security cultures want it for prestige and for gaining recognition as a power to be reckoned with. Moreover, I argued that neither the Republican nor the neo-Ottomanist security culture is characterized by a preferred attachment to the US or NATO.

It has also been argued that Turkey has a potential to strengthen the Humanitarian Power Europe scenario. Both of Turkey’s security cultures are marked by a willingness to contribute to CSDP missions, either to gain acceptance or prestige. Once Turkey becomes a member of the EU, this willingness is likely to persist, and the relationship between NATO and the EU is likely to be more cooperative.

When it comes to the EU as a Global Power, I argued that Turkey will neither cause this scenario to succeed nor individually be responsible for the collapse of this project. Even though it is true that Turkey’s Republican and neo-Ottomanist elites are not particularly attached to this vision, this is also true of several other EU member states. In addition, the main supporter of this vision,
France, is also unwilling to transfer more powers to a supranational authority when it comes to foreign and security policies.

Thus, I concluded that, given the existing divisions within the EU and the traits of Turkey’s security cultures, Turkish membership is unlikely to significantly alter the EU’s role in the international system. In other words, there is no reason to despair or to be overly optimistic about Turkey becoming a member of the EU, when it comes to the impact Turkey will have on the role of the EU in international affairs. The propositions that Turkey would either help the EU become a Global Power or dilute the Union to such a point that the European political project would be terminated are both exaggerated. With or without Turkey, the EU will probably continue to resemble a Humanitarian Power in the world stage.

This thesis main contribution to knowledge has been to challenge the binary logic that permeates the debate about Turkish membership impact on the Union’s foreign and security policies. By acknowledging the divisions within Turkey and within the EU with regards to security understandings, this thesis has been able to move beyond “either/or” types of arguments which overestimate the likely impact of Turkey. A secondary contribution to the literature has been to establish, in a systematic manner, the similarities between Turkey’s two security cultures, which are usually considered the antithesis of each other.

These findings have important implications. First, there is no reason to fear Turkey’s “drift” to the East and complete abandonment of the Western community of nations. Second, neo-Ottomanist actors’ “arrogance” – manifested in discourses which predict the decline of EU’s relevance if Turkey is excluded – is unwarranted. Third, there are no grounds to exclude Turkey from the EU based on overplayed fears of the consequences of Turkish membership for the future role of the EU in the world. The final implication, which can make an important contribution to EU policy towards Turkey, is that Turkey will tend to be much more cooperative if the country is consulted and allowed to have a say on matters regarding the Middle East. By being treated as an equal and recognized as regional power, Turkey can be a much less difficult partner of the EU.
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