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How people successfully get in and get on in the UK broadcast television industry: implications for skills policymakers

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**How people successfully get in and
get on in the UK broadcast
television industry: implications for
skills policymakers**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of
a PhD programme by research

Peter L. Block | June 2020

Abstract

This thesis examines the working lives of early career media workers in the UK broadcast television industry (BTI) during the 2010 decade. It is a continuation and builds on the 1990s British Film Institute (BFI) study of media workers and labour studies by the Centre on Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance. This research presents an area of work that has not been looked at to date and gives a new perspective on working in the media by focusing on a cohort of workers, aged 30 and under, deemed successful '*hot shots*' by their managers and peers.

The research takes two lines of enquiry. First, it is an audit of the BTI working environment in the 2010s. It reviews data from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) to question the claim from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) that the UK creative industries are engines of growth in gross value added (GVA) and jobs in the UK economy. The work offers an interpretation of new evidence in its critique of the data on the creative industries. The findings refute the case for growth in terms of GVA and workforce numbers.

Second, the empirical study presents and analyses fieldwork data from two groups. The 25 *informants* from across the BTI offer the employers' view. A series of in-depth interviews with 31 *respondents* supported by an online self-evaluation questionnaire examines the workers' perspective. The questionnaire is based on the career development model devised for this study. Specifically, it identifies common attributes of successful young media workers. The attribute-composition model of professional identity based on expertise theory, derived from the fieldwork, is a synthesis of ideas not made before in this field.

This research questions the role and effectiveness of the skills policy community in the creative industries. The findings challenge policymakers' argument that high-skills lead to high skilled jobs. Marginalising the vocational pathway offered by universities and further education colleges with sector skills councils (SSCs) has done little to enhance career progression for workers in high skills industries. Furthermore, these SSCs have failed to increase the creative industries' diversity or inclusivity.

This thesis argues that personal and social skills — rather than functional capabilities — are key to employability in the BTI. The research demonstrates that successful modern workers can cope with change and the precarious nature of employment in the industry by developing the high level skills they need in professional practice, rather than at university or college. Outside of a few technical roles, at the point of entering the industry a media qualification offers limited, if any, competitive advantage in securing a BTI job. The thesis concludes with 14 recommendations for media workers, employers and policymakers alike.

Acknowledgements

The ambition to study the motivation that drives an individual to work in the precarious media industry has influenced my work since I was the director of the Broadcast Equality and Training Regulator. By examining the lives of media workers I hope I might make a difference and help the aspiring entrant.

I am grateful to my supervisors Dr Maria Michalis and Dr Paul Dwyer in helping me shape, refine and focus my academic capabilities through this study. It was Paul who first suggested I might join the University of Westminster to teach and share my knowledge of television programme making. It was Maria who cajoled me to be more academically rigorous. I also want to thank colleagues of the 'flying faculty' Alessandro, Barry and Charlie who helped me convert intuitive and tacit industry knowledge into useful teaching material for our students. This core media management knowledge underpins this work.

No research of this nature can be delivered without willing subjects. I wish to thank all who gave of their time to be interviewed or respond to a questionnaire. It is their insights into the industry and reflections on their own behaviours and attitudes that have shaped my analysis and conclusions. I hope that collectively we might make a small difference to an industry that has changed out of all recognition since I joined it; it is clear that the ambition by those interviewed to make worthwhile programmes to reach audiences remains.

I thank my fellow doctoral toilers for their shared war stories; you are not alone.

The support and endless patience of my wife, Kalpana, has been astonishing; so no more; enough, it's now one all, and, we are done. This work is dedicated to you.


Dear reader, you should also be grateful to her - imagine how much longer and turgid this would have been without her red pen.

Statement of original authorship

I declare that this thesis and the work presented in it are my own and has been generated by me as the result of my own original research.

I confirm that: -

1. This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree at the University of Westminster;
2. Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly attributed;
3. Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With the exception of such quotations;
4. this thesis is entirely my own work.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "P. L. Block". The letters are cursive and slightly slanted to the right.

Peter L. Block
June 2020

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ACTT	The Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians
BAFTA	British Academy of Film and Television Arts
BAME	British, Asian and minority ethnic
BECTU	Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre Union
BETR	Broadcast Equality and Training Regulator -see BTR
BIS	Department of Business Innovation and Skills
BFI	British Film Institute
BTI	UK broadcast television industry
BTR	Broadcast Training and Skills Regulator – see BTR
C&G	City and Guilds
CBI	Confederation of British Industry
CCI	creative and cultural industries
CIC	Creative Industries Council – A DCMS body
CDN	Cultural Diversity Network
CIF	Creative Industries Federation
CIPD	Chartered Institute of Professional Development
CPD	continuing professional development
DCMS	Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
DfE	Department for Education
EBPM	evidence-based policy making
ESFA	Education and skills funding agency
ECIA	European Creative Industries Alliance
EFA	Education Funding Agency
ESRC	Economic and Social Research Council
FISSS	The Federation for Industry Sector Skills & Standards
GVA	gross value added
HEI	higher education institute
HEPI	Higher Education Policy Institute
HESA	Higher Education Statistics Agency
I	informant – format Ix where x is their numerical identifier
IoD	Institute of Directors
IT	information technology
ITF	Indie Training Fund
LMI	labour market intelligence
M	mean
NESTA	National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts
NVQ	national vocational qualification
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONS	Office for National Statistics
PACT	Producers Alliance for Cinema and Television
QAA	Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education
quango	quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation
RD	respondent – developer – format RDx, x is their numerical identifier
RI	respondent – initiator – format RIx, x is their numerical identifier
RQ	research question

SIC	standard industrial classification – SIC2007 is the current version
SD	Standard deviation
SFA	Skills Funding Agency
SKOPE	ESRC Centre on Skills, Knowledge and Organizational Performance
SMG	Shanghai Media Group
SPAD	special political adviser
SSC	sector skills council
SSP	sector skills plans
TVET	technical and vocational education and training
TV	television
UKCES	UK Commission for Employment and Skills
WBUKTV	Warner Bros Television UK
WG	Working Group

Chapter One Overview: scoping the research

"... Look, you're a painter, and a good one. I happen to have a little drive. That's a good combination. Besides, you have to face the critics sometime."

Spoken by the wealthy socialite (Nina Foch) to the struggling artist (Gene Kelly) in *An American in Paris* (1951)

1.1 Introduction: aims and rationale for the research

Chapter One establishes and outlines the aims and rationale of my research. It is about the working lives of media workers in the UK broadcast television industry (BTI), their relationship to the wider creative industries landscape and the impact of government skills strategies that have been in place for most of their adult education and career development.

To establish the context of the matter, I describe and analyse the changing role of the media worker in the uncertain landscape of the creative industries from the 1979 Thatcher government to date. I explain how media workers, specifically those employed in the BTI, make sense of the precarious nature of their work by drawing on insights from writers on theory and practice. Over the same period, I review the legislation and policies that have had a profound impact on the media worker, both before and after they join the industry.

I posit a working hypothesis ***that having a media degree offers no greater prospect of career success in the creative industries in the UK than any other qualification.*** This challenges the thrust of the creative industries skills policy embodied in the sector skills council, ScreenSkills, established to support and encourage industry specific qualifications.

This is examined by three research questions, which seek to address the issues raised by my hypothesis by analysing the behaviour and actions of government, industry and the media worker within the BTI employment landscape. After providing working definitions and explanations of key terms, I set out the structure of the thesis and outline the key issues I explore. I also establish the rationale for my research approach and chosen methodology. Finally, I endeavour to put some boundaries to the work, however porous,

so that the focus and scope remains clear to the reader. I adopt a solution-orientated approach to the work and draw on an approach first suggested by Hart (1998) and follow the case made by Petzold (2019) to *'build a strong bridge between theory and practice'*. I review what has been done and establish what needs to be done and identify gaps in our knowledge. I offer a new research perspective and devise two analytical tools to support this study, which other researchers can apply.

1.2 My working hypothesis and research questions

This thesis is a personal journey of discovery and understanding. It focuses on employment within the BTI and the changes that took place to this working environment; initiated by legislation of the 1979 Thatcher government. My research starts from a single premise: **What does it take to get in and on in the UK BTI?**

This research is a multi-layered examination of government skills policy, labour market economics and career development theories that offer insights into the behaviour of current and potential workers across the creative industries. I use these theories to develop a career pathway development value chain model which I apply in my fieldwork. I conclude my thesis with a critique of current and past governments' skills strategies in the unregulated, high-skills creative industry sectors such as the BTI.

1.2.1 An education and skills system in continual change

The UK's education and skills environment is complex, particularly at the tertiary stage. At the time of writing, 20 years have passed since tuition fees were first introduced (September 1998) and almost 10 years since the cap was set at £9,000 (September 2010). Over that time, the university sector has transformed into a market-driven model that many have argued has precipitated the current student recruitment and funding crisis (Jeffreys, 2019). The lack of clarity and consistency in the UK government's skills policy agenda has brought about this crisis, devaluing industrial skills in favour of traditional three-year university education that fails to produce skilled and capable individuals. The City & Guilds Group (C&G) conducted two recent reviews of the government's skills and

employment policy in 2016 and again in 2019. The C&G chief executive, Chris Jones summarised their findings as...'*But when it comes to implementation, it's a case of two steps forward and one step back*' (Jones, 2019). The London Economics¹ report on graduate skills highlights poor literacy and numeracy (Conlon, 2018). For the creative industries — of which the BTI is a subsector — the issues are multi-factorial. Although BTI has a workforce of which over 80% are graduates (ScreenSkills, 2019a), too many graduates have media degrees that employers state are not fit for purpose (CBI, 2018). At the same time, the creative industries are facing pressure from a complex group of stakeholders, including three government departments (DCMS, DfE and until 2016 BIS), to be more diverse and inclusive in their recruitment strategies (Eikhof, 2011, Ofcom, 2018b). My own research into inclusion and diversity indicates that there is a mismatch between the rhetoric and delivery of equal opportunities; what other researchers have called an '*empty shell*', (Hoque and Noon, 2004) there is no substance to claims made about progress to equality of opportunity (Block, 2017a). Andrew White notes the mercurial nature of creative industries careers: '*all over the world... [new government] policies ought to present some new, long-term opportunities for cultural workers, but in practice they seem more likely to universalise the traditionally precarious work profile of artists*' (White, 2009 p1).

My motivation for, and approach to, this research is based on personal experience. With more than 30 years' experience working in the BTI — from graduate trainee studio engineer, to freelancer, production company manager and chief executive/owner — I have developed a deep knowledge and understanding of the complexities of the industry. From 2007 until 2011, before my academic post at the University of Westminster, I was the director of the Broadcast Training and Skills Regulator (BTSR) — renamed the Broadcast Equality and Training Regulator (BETR)² — on behalf of Ofcom, when the remit to review equality in the industry was added to our role.

¹ London Economics is a specialist policy and economics consultancy that has produced well respected reports for the public and private sector.

² The BTSR became the BETR in 2009 when its remit was extended to include monitoring equal opportunities under Section 27 of the Communications Act 2003 – see Appendix 2A. Throughout this thesis, I reference the BTSR or BETR according to their name at the time of publication.

Three experiences during my tenure at the BTSR/BETR prompted this doctoral research. First, when I conducted training and skills validation visits between 2007- 2010 to some of the 70+ radio, terrestrial, cable and satellite television companies that made up the BTI, I met and interviewed a wide range of production staff. Despite encouragement from employers, promotion through the trade press, support from the industry's trade union BECTU, very few had ever completed the biennial workforce survey administered and distributed by Skillset (BETR, 2008, 2010a).³

Second, whilst director of the BETR, I conducted a joint research project with the University of Hertfordshire Business School to examine the working lives of BTI freelancers. I ran a series of evening workshops across the UK, which were predominantly attended by out-of-work freelancers, most of whom could not maintain a living wage from their freelance television work. I was overwhelmed with stories of the seemingly disenfranchised and disadvantaged. Without doubt, these were personal tragedies, but they were not a basis on which to draw conclusions about the life or plight of the freelancer. With a few exceptions, those in work did not attend. So I learnt a lot about those who were out of work, but little about those who were in work (BTSR, 2008).

Third, from 2009 to 2010, I sat on the research board for Skillset, the sector skills council (SSC) for the creative industries, later called Creative Skillset and now known as ScreenSkills. In this role, I found that the distribution of census forms and gathering of employee data for its biennial workforce survey was at best ad hoc and did not stand up to rigorous examination (Randle and Block, 2013a). As a result, Creative Skillset's data did not provide a true picture of the working lives of BTI media workers. Yet, to this day, these data form the basis for some very wide-ranging assumptions and are quoted by thinktanks, government sources and academics in several papers, including some very influential industry reports (DCMS, 2019, PACT, 2019, Cade, 2019, Select Committee on Communications and Digital, 2019).

³ Over the time of this research, Creative Skillset — the sector skills council for the creative industries — changed its name from Skillset to Creative Skillset (1st April 2012) and to ScreenSkills (1st October 2018) as a rebranding exercise. As with BTSR/BETR, I cite the source according to the organisation name at the time of publication.

Furthermore, these questionable data are used to support the claim, accepted as a commonplace by many academics and policymakers, that the creative industries are an exceptional engine of economic growth (BIS, 2012b). The government, Producers Alliance in Cinema and Television (PACT), the Institute of Directors (IoD), the Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre Union (BECTU), academics and Creative Skillset have all substantiated their case of economic growth and based their workforce skills and training needs on a remarkably small pool of data supplied to, and reported on, by Creative Skillset (2015b). I analyse this poor sampling and the extrapolated outputs in Chapter Six (See Appendix 8B).

The Office for National Statistics (ONS), on the other hand, makes much more measured statements for the sector's economic performance, placing it in line with the leisure industry and behind aerospace (ONS, 2012b, 2013b). More recent data from the International Monetary Fund places the creative industries eighth in overall ranking and fourth in growth, *'the fastest-growing category for the United Kingdom was exported miscellaneous business services via a 22.1% increase from 2013 to 2017. In second place was maintenance or repair services (up 20.7%) trailed by telecommunications, computer and information services (up 7.9%), transportation services (up 3.7%), financial services (up 3.3%) then personal, cultural and recreational services (up 0.3%)'* (Workman, 2019). In 2012, headline copy and press releases from the Department of Business Innovation and Skills (BIS) (2012a) presented unqualified support for the film and TV sector as an engine for growth. In its latest official statistics for 2017⁴, the Department for Digital Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) stated that the gross added value (GVA) of all DCMS sectors was £267.7bn and has *'seen an increase of 3.4% since 2016 (£258.9bn in 2016) compared to 4.8% for the UK economy as a whole'* (DCMS, 2018c p1) yet continues to extol its virtues. It is a matter of concern that BIS (at the time), the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the IoD show such strong support for the creative industries while the ONS national growth strategy reports pay little regard to the sector (ONS, 2012a, 2014).

Anecdotal first-hand experiences from my fellow practitioners, formal industry reports and many independent and quasi-independent reviews of government policies on

⁴ These estimates are released by DCMS 28 November 2018 based on ONS data and are not fully signed off till mid 2019

education and skills also counter these expressions of unqualified support (Guile, 2010), questioning assertions about the creative industries' exceptional value and contribution to the UK economy. In Chapter Six, I offer a more detailed analysis of how recasting the creative industries to remove the subsidies cultural subsectors but include the very profitable information technology sector of 'IT, software and computer services' (DCMS, 2018d) has over-inflated the GVA of the group. It is computer games and IT that makes the DCMS Creative Industries sector that includes the film and TV industries appear so profitable (Garnham, 2005). I show in Chapter Six that there is evidence of double counting of the workforce across the film and television industry as reported by the BFI (2018), it inflates the perception of growth and job opportunities.

This poses career choice implications for the current and aspiring workforce. *'What is needed [of graduate labour] is new research that examines skills supply and demand and the development and demand for these skills'* (SKOPE, 2011b). This need remains and this research examines the quality and reliability of labour market intelligence (LMI) and the industry demand for graduate skills.

The insufficient and — as I argue in Chapter Six — ambiguous statistics available on the media workforce inspired me to look at this problem through a new lens. I chose to look for successful workers, to see what they can tell us about the industry and develop a theoretical perspective of what is happening and why. I am particularly interested in the mechanisms that influence personal development, such as institutional frameworks and government skills policies that modify the structures within which a media worker operates and that enable or disable their agency to act and control their working environment. No study to date has taken this approach to examine the relationship between worker, institution and government. It is a critical study of government policy formulation and explores the seemingly fundamental ambiguities between policy and the lives of BTI workers.

1.2.2 Transitions: moments of change

A SKOPE report in 2012 calling for new research to examine skills supply and demand — particularly at the transition points between stages in education or at work — prompted me to research the labour market and government skills policy. The report stated that the

'issue of transitions — from education into the labour market, from one stage of education to another and from one job to another' was a worry across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and underpinned *'many elements of current education and training policy. Smooth transitions into the labour market are required to reduce youth unemployment and are a concern'* (SKOPE, 2012 p3).

The SKOPE report referenced the Harvard Graduate School of Education's *'Pathways to Prosperity'* report (Symonds and Ferguson, 2011), which underlined similar worries in the United States and pinpointed entry to higher education and social mobility as specific transition problem areas in the UK; *'Transitions from apprenticeship routes into higher education has long been a policy goal in the UK, but to date progress on making this a reality has been slow and limited'* (SKOPE, 2012 p47). The report also pointed out that, whilst transitions in the form of progression up the job ladder are essential to social mobility and to moving into better-waged employment, our knowledge of how individuals progress is quite limited.

A monograph, also from SKOPE, argued that *'these seven trends (what is happening in the labour market) and their effects contradict the conceptualisation of the graduate labour market which [is] dominant within media and policy discourses'* (Tholen, 2013 p1).

The seven trends Tholen (2013 p9) identifies are:

1. The fast expansion of higher education
2. The recession and the widespread effects on the general labour market
3. Global economic integration
4. The emergence of new graduate occupations
5. New types of work organisations and technological change
6. The war for talent and the elite labour market
7. Increasing wage differentiation

These labour market trends chime with my industrial and more recent academic experience. I discuss the implications for the BTI in Chapters Seven and Eight.

The end of the '*binary system*' of higher education in 1992 (Taylor, 2003) mirrors many of the policy issues which have impacted the BTI. Until the early 1990s, higher education was in its own way a duopoly between polytechnics / Further Education and universities. There was an aspiration to widen choice and diversity for students, but research suggests that institutional diversity has reduced.

1.2.3 The aim of this research

This research explores employment processes in the creative industries. My aim is to gain a deeper understanding on how media workers get in and on in the BTI and to consider the effectiveness of the government's skills policy. Specifically, I discuss the career realities for media workers and consider the personal, socioeconomic and employment factors that are informed by: established theoretical economic models of human capital; occupational psychology though motivation and career development; and the policy strategies that have facilitated the new employment landscape.

I question the veracity of official statistics which define the creative industries and examine the policy networks that bind formal and informal relationships between government and other stakeholders. By examining the concept of institutionalism, I explore how quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations' (quangos) need to legitimise their own roles — not the needs of BTI workers — that maintain the vested interests of quangos.

To date, a significant number of research papers have discussed why certain groups of workers face seemingly insurmountable barriers to entry into the creative industries — whether through gender, race, disability or, more recently, socioeconomic disadvantage. While these studies contribute to our knowledge of the media worker, I argue that their sampling and coverage is not representative of the whole population and so they offer little in the way of workable solutions.

We know that creative industry workers are willing to endure poor pay and long hours in exchange for creative opportunities, esteem and freedom (Hesmondhalgh, 2013). The intrinsically motivated driven artist will endure privation for potential artistic rewards (Towse, 2006). There is a complex process that drives the individual to a state of self-

actualisation, the term Maslow uses to describe the pinnacle of his hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1963). For the creative, I characterise this process not as discrete steps but as a series of ladders (and some snakes). Seemingly essential needs are subsumed and delayed in terms of the promised rewards of great things to come (Block, 1999 pp186-87). The promise of greater things to come is at the centre of the exploitative media worker–employer relationship (Marsden, 2010). The mantra that ‘*you don’t have to be “white, male and middle-class — but it helps”*’ (Eikhof, 2011 p1) has underpinned much recent academic discourse on the matter. Bar this assumption we know little of the successful media worker.

The working environment for all workers in the creative and cultural industries has changed dramatically over the last 30 years, particularly in the BTI, where even permanent staff are said to have a ‘*freelance mentality*’ (Preston, 2002 p1). Contracts of employment have slowly transformed from stable long-term engagements to short-term rolling contracts. I discuss the mix of issues that precipitated this change to what Deuze (2007, 2016) calls ‘*the precarious nature of the work*’ in Chapter Four.

I examine the policy strategy that high-skills lead to high skills jobs to justify the establishment of the sector skills councils (UKCES, 2010). This thesis questions that assumption on which successive governments have based their skills policies. Others have also challenged the effectiveness of the current education and skills framework, they go further and suggest that universities are a ticking time bomb failing to deliver employable graduates at a cost that is unsustainable (Jeffreys, 2019). Existing research has challenged the simplistic link that the Department for Education (DfE) and SSCs present between qualifications and labour market entry (Guile, 2010). A recent Universities UK (2018) report examining the supply and demand for higher-level skills concluded that it is not just a matter of employability, but that graduates find themselves ‘*mismatched*’ in the labour market. I address the relevance of the recommendations set out in the Universities UK report to the BTI in Chapter Eight.

For the skills policy to be effective in the creative industries, ScreenSkills should be co-ordinating the various national and regional sector skills plans (SSPs). These plans should be based on reliable labour market and economic data that establish the size of the

labour force, the predicted growth, outline the skills demand, current and future needs and therefore identify the skills gaps that exist in the sector and predict the need. There should be a direct correlation between having a media degree and getting a job in the BTI. I argue that to date ScreenSkills, and its predecessors have failed in this requirement, their assessment has been based on inflated industry needs through poor datasets. This has helped maintain the oversupply of graduates hoping for work in the sector.

My research seeks to gain new insights into the attitudes and behaviours of early career workers as they try to establish a role and reputation in the industry. I drew my subjects from cohorts of media workers in production roles who have been celebrated as ‘hot shots’ in an annual recognition award (from 2013–18) organised by the trade magazine *Broadcast*, supported by The Royal Television Society (Parker, 2013). Whilst scoping this research to test my hypothesis, I gathered preliminary evidence from five pilot interviews which substantiated the evidence from my time at the BETR that successful media workers do not partake in official industry surveys and are largely missing from industry data. I came to the view that they were worth examining, arguing that this important, yet unaccounted community of workers can provide new insights into a rethink government skills policy.

The approach I take to examine the BTI environment for jobseekers is from three perspectives: the jobs market, working terms and conditions and the skills and qualifications they need. I also look at policy discourse. Drawing on the literature, I identified the main issues for each (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. The main issues facing jobseekers in the BTI

Job market	Employment terms and conditions	Skills and qualifications	Policy discourse
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oversupply of new entrants leads to low pay and exploitative employer–employee relationships • Workers with significantly higher-than-average education levels, but lower-than-average incomes • This maintains the uncertainty and the precarious nature of the work. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unpaid internships, short-term contracts and freelance work dominate • Earnings and success cannot be explained through classical economic models • Media company recruitment strategies pay little regard to domain-specific qualifications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Overselling of media courses to undergraduates • Lack of formal career structure or earnings progression • Low percentage of workers with a media-related qualification 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mismatch between the UK government policy rhetoric that culture-based industries are a key driver for economic growth and national statistics

Source: Author’s own

A huge number of graduates with media-related degrees try to enter the BTI every year, and often have to engage in what the Centre for Economic Performance calls ‘*entry tournaments*’ to secure a foothold in the industry (Marsden, 2010 p3). Graduates from other disciplines also wish to pursue careers in the creative industries. Data from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) indicate that, despite the economic downturn, over the last few years the number of potential joiners to the BTI has been higher than its entire workforce (HESA, 2018).

There are other complexities to this oversupply. Although the gender balance within the industry reflects the UK's national profile, ethnic groups are significantly underrepresented. And there is a lack of diversity among potential joiners that compounds the existing lack of diversity. This is an open wound in the industry and has become a matter of concern across the sector, spilling into the trade and popular press (Henry, 2008, Wyatt, 2015). My own research on this matter reveals a clear mismatch between rhetoric and action on diversity and inclusion (Block, 2017a).

1.2.4 Research hypothesis and research questions

The hypothesis that drives my research is that having a media degree offers no greater prospect of career success in the creative industries in the UK than any other qualification. The inference is that high-skills (a level 6 qualification), as the UK government defines them, make a limited contribution to career progression in highly qualified yet unregulated industrial sectors such as the creative industries. These skills provide limited competitive advantage in the creative industries (See Section 1.2.6 for more detail on skills).

To address this hypothesis, I posit three **research questions (RQs)** that consider the matter from the perspective of the worker, their employer and the UK government:

RQ 1. What are the most important factors for an individual to successfully join and progress in the BTI?

RQ 2. Do BTI employers care about BTI specific qualifications?

RQ 3. Is the high-skills policy useful for unregulated high skills industries such as the BTI?

In tackling these questions, my objectives are to:

- Set out the definitions and explanations for some key industry-specific terms

- Review the legislative framework designed to encourage a high skills economy in the UK, focusing on the aspects of policy networks and institutionalism that maintain the status quo
- Examine the definition and use of terms such as skills, functional skills, high-skills, and higher level skills in relation to graduate employability
- Examine labour market economics to understand the media worker's behaviour at the macro level, informed by the work from SKOPE
- Consider how social and human capital theories apply to new joiners and early career media workers in the BTI
- Construct a career development assessment model that builds on previous BFI research and incorporates elements drawn from occupational psychology, using theories on career development, motivation measures and the acknowledgement of the attributes or factors key to success
- Use this assessment model to create an online career pathway development self-evaluation tool to support my fieldwork with a sample respondent group in a series of semi-structured interviews
- Analyse the interview and online survey results; to find out how respondents got into the industry to identify whether they have any shared attributes unique to media workers and whether we can draw any lessons for the wider creative industries workforce or those charged with improving the employability of new entrants,
- Gather data from secondary sources that establishes the size and predicted growth of the of the BTI and therefore the job opportunities,
- Draw conclusions that address my research questions and hypothesis.

1.2.5 Other questions that emerge from the research

This research analyses the relationship between government education and skills policies and career success in the BTI, where over 80% of entrants are graduates.

The notion of a national skills strategy for the creative industries has been a government policy objective for over 20 years (Parker, 1999), since the Skills Task Force was established. More recently, as part of the industrial strategy a policy paper on the

creative industries stated, *'This Sector Deal is just the beginning: the first iteration of an agreement that will develop over time. If we can get the conditions right and the creative industries continue to outperform the rest of the UK economy, their exports will increase by 50% by 2023, they will be worth £150 billion and create 600,000 new jobs. Together we can build on the UK's position as a global leader and strengthen its advantage as a creative nation by increasing the number of opportunities and jobs in the creative industries across the country, improving their productivity, and enabling us to greatly expand our trading ambitions abroad.'* (DBEIS, 2018). Do note that this is a joint paper between the DCMS and the Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. The theme for the industrial strategy for this sector is about people and the creation of 600,000 new jobs yet it quotes old data based on a 2012 analysis plus it references the creative industries but talks about the creative economy.

If the government skills strategy has been effective there should be evidence of its impact on the employer and employee. For the employer, it should be evident that their needs for new employees are being met by graduates who are employable (this is not as obvious as it may seem). Plus that they can recruit experienced hires who have maintained their career professional development (CPD) through appropriate industry based training. For the employee, they should leave the HEI with an academic qualification endorsed by ScreenSkills and supported by the higher-level skills to enable them to successfully join the industry.

A number of studies have looked at the disenfranchised (Holgate and McKay, 2007, Holgate, 2009) and worker–employer relationships (Stoyanova, 2009a). The BFI longitudinal study of the 1990s recorded the life of over 450 media workers over four years; captured through questionnaires and personal diaries, it is the most comprehensive study to date (Paterson, 1998). This research has the same ambition of the BFI study: to have *'a better understanding, from an individual's perspective, of the complex relationship between new conditions of employment, changing technology and the environment for developing programming ideas'* (Paterson, 2000 p2). I, too, have *'investigated what it means to have a career in television'* (Paterson, 2000 p2) in the

fragmented uncertain environment some 25 years after the BFI research. The work from SKOPE states that *'academic accounts of the impact of graduate labour have resulted in an insufficient understanding of the issues involved in the supply, demand, development and deployment of graduate skills'* (SKOPE, 2011a p1). My aim is to improve our understanding of the issues and the factors that influence the media worker as they manage their career in the current precarious BTI employment landscape.

My research is the first to look at successful *'hot shot'* workers. I set out to establish if there are any common characteristics and attributes to their success, or whether other theories — for example, that being white, male and middle class eases the pathway to success in the industry (Eikhof, 2011) or that creative individuals will invariably flourish in the creative industries (Florida, 2004) — are closer to the truth.

Tom Peters (1997) coined the phrase *'the brand called You'*; and Charles Handy (2002) made reference to the *'portfolio career'*. We can apply both terms to the media worker who offers a portfolio of skills and capabilities under their personal brand based on programme credits and production skills as an evocation of their professional identity. More recently, others have considered reputation capital as a key attribute to success in the *'atypical employment'* of the creative industries (Eigler, 2016 p3) using signalling theory as their research model. These concepts, along with Deuze's analysis of the transformation of employment contracts from stable long-term engagements to short-term rolling contracts (Deuze, 2007) inform my research methodology and provide a theoretical background to my research questions. In considering these questions, additional — or implicit — questions emerge, which I consider in Chapters Six and Seven using evidence from the literature review and my fieldwork interviews with industry leaders and media workers. I cluster these issues under three headings that map directly onto RQs 1, 2 and 3.

Skills and capabilities (RQ1)

- Does the UK provide high-quality, relevant education training and development for the BTI? Are skills levels improving?

- Is there wider participation in the industry due to greater transparency in the recruitment process and opportunity to progress brought about by a more inclusive workplace?
- Do employers really care about a skills match in the creative industries? Or, do they agree with Stoyanova's '*we will learn 'em*' approach that they just need '*clever*' candidates since they will teach them all the skills their employees need (Stoyanova (2009a)?

Structure (RQ2)

- What matters most to employers when seeking new talent; specific academic qualifications or higher-level skills?
- What can we understand about the motivations, behaviours and actions of the three prime stakeholder groups in the UK workforce landscape: government, employers and individual workers?
- Has or can government skills policy provide any effective intervention in high skills industries, specifically the BTI?
- Does evidence-based policymaking (EBPM) or an industrial policy in the skills agenda underpin the case for economic growth and for the creative industries' contribution to gross value added (GVA)?
- Is there any evidence that interventions within the BTI have had any impact or effect on diversity and inclusiveness, along with equality of opportunity for individuals within the industry?

Policy (RQ3)

- Is the UK government's high-skills policy a viable or useful framework for unregulated high skills industries?
- Are higher education institutions (HEIs) equipping graduates with the appropriate higher level skills to make them employable.
- Are people with the right skills now in the industry as a result of government policy?
- Is this the right skills policy model for the creative industries?
- How does government skills policy attempt to match demand and supply?

- Where is the industrial policy that uses the high-skills that the government suggests are needed?
- What does this tell us about government skills and training policy in high skills industries?

I cover these matters in my summary findings for the three research questions in Chapter Eight.

1.3 Terminology: definitions and explanations

Before I proceed any further, I present definitions and explanation of the key terms as I apply them in this thesis. Terms such as the BTI, high-skills, higher level skills, the creative industries, creativity and the digital economy have been the subject of much debate and interpretation by academics and governments. They are context-sensitive and need explanation. This section is not a full glossary;⁵ rather, it is an introduction to the key terms used by government, academics and the industry itself, some of the ambiguities and debates that surround them and how I apply them in this research.

This thesis does not set out to debate the validity of these terms, but to ensure the reader is clear on the context within which I and other authors use them. As O'Connor tells us, authors — indeed, sometimes the same author — have used different terms to describe what I and others often somewhat loosely call the '*media industry*' in different contexts over time (O'Connor, 2007).

1.3.1 Creativity and the creative person

Widely used in a variety of contexts, creativity is a '*promiscuous word*' (Redman, 2010) attached to many activities, from creative writing to car hire. It is a catch-all term applied to many activities in business, art and — somewhat disingenuously — accounting.

There is no single definition for what creativity is, despite '*a general consensus on the importance of creativity — in media industries*' (Dwyer, 2016 p343). Much of the debate is about knowing it when we see it and what it takes to kill it. According to Sir Ken Robinson,

⁵ See Appendix 1A for a complete glossary.

we kill creativity from the day a child starts school.⁶ The concern for the creative industries is about managing creativity beyond what many call *'the aha!'* moment.

Most attempts to define creativity refer to some aspect of novelty — being unusual, statistically infrequent or unique — but also an appropriate solution. For the purposes of my research, I use the following definition: *'A product or response is creative to the extent that (a) it is a novel and appropriate, useful, correct or valuable response to the task at hand, and (b) the task is heuristic rather than algorithmic'* (Amabile, 1982 p997).

'Creativity' has become a buzzword to indicate something fresh, new, inventive and innovative (Redman, 2010). While there may be tacit agreement that crafting a film score, producing a new screenplay, directing or editing a production would meet the definition of a creative role, many activities within the production process would fail a creativity test. Many ordinary cognitive activities are, in themselves, not creative. Although these activities *can* be creative, Hanard argues that *'creativity is somehow complementary to ordinary cognition'* (Hanard, 2006). Csikszentmihalyi suggests most of us exhibit *'small 'c' creativity'* but only a few demonstrate *'big 'C'— exceptional creativity'* (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996). Others argue that creativity is not the sole province of the creative industry, indeed *'collective creativity'* can be found in engineering and management (Shirley, 1997).

As to the creative person, it would seem they are defined by the attributes they present to the world in attitude, behaviour and skills demonstrating *'big C'*. There are approaches to codify and ascribe a creativity quotient to an individual (Torrance, 1966) but as with other psychometric tools, it is not a universally accepted measure.

In attempting to redefine the creative industries and the occupations therein, academics, policy analysts and government face a further challenge — that is, to understand the very notion of creativity and to *'have a unifying or consistent governmental definition of what 'creativity' means'* (Neelands and Choe, 2010). A definition of creativity and what is a creative occupation is key to the determination of what industrial sector falls within the

⁶ www.ted.com/talks/ken_robinson_says_schools_kill_creativity

creative industries as this is based on a construct known as creative intensity, discussed in Section 1.2.3.

1.3.2 The creative industries


Whilst a handy shorthand the term, *'creative industries'* is one of three diverse subsectors within the DCMS. Defined as *'those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property'* (DCMS, 2017). The DCMS definition is based on international occupation codes. These are the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2007 codes and will be discussed in some detail in Chapter Six. A simpler, yet wider, definition for the creative industries are those that *'supply goods and services that we broadly associate with cultural, artistic, or simply entertainment value'* (Caves, 2000a p1).

The Creative Industries are one of three overlapping subsectors — digital, cultural and creative — with a 52.2% (DCMS, 2018b) overlap between the creative industries and the Digital Sector and no satisfactory explanation of why DCMS have joined the three subsectors with overlapping SIC codes. This has muddied the data waters, as the DCMS admits (DCMS 2017, p7). The implications for inflating the contribution to the UK GVA is analysed in Chapter Six. There are enormous differences even within the creative industries' subsectors — for example, between radio, terrestrial television and satellite and cable television channels in the broadcast industry. Members of the broadcast industry contend that the only thing they hold in common is an Ofcom licence (Informant I, 2015). The BETR reports (BETR, 2010a, BETR, 2011b) highlight these differences. They are evident in recruitment, succession planning, promotion, team management approaches and relationships between production and back office roles (BETR, 2011c). In the UK, recent governments have in principle backed the creative industries as a success story that bucks the trend in the UK economic landscape. Yet the scrapping of the UK Film Council in 2011 demonstrates that government backing is not unqualified.

There have been several attempts to present models of the creative industries sector, based on an understanding of the terms creativity, cultural components, levels of mass

production and type of service. These models all attempt to segment and codify the sector (Throsby, 2007, Hesmondhalgh, 2002, Scott, 2004, The Work Foundation, 2007, NESTA, 2006) from slightly different perspectives. The Work Foundation (Figure 2) maintains the idea of a cultural core to this sector, with a periphery of creative industries with all considered a subsector of the knowledge economy but does not name the sector as a whole. This has been characterised as a politically astute position (O'Connor, 2007).


Figure 2. The Work Foundation model for the creative industries



Source: The Work Foundation (2007)

The National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA) model (Figure 3) is more pragmatic and widely accepted as useful because it focuses on 'the conditions on which profits are made' rather than on subjective cultural value or quality, an approach presented by O'Connor (O'Connor, 2007).

Figure 3. The NESTA model for the creative industries



Source: Bakhshi (2013b)

Despite providing a useful snapshot of the sector, these models are too broad a sweep for academics or policymakers to draw any useful insights or conclusions. There is no consensus model. The NESTA model suggests there are four major groupings, but in 2013, the DCMS bundled these activities into its three subsectors, creating a new level of ambiguity.

Two Sector Skills Councils (SSCs) cover the creative industries: ScreenSkills and its previous incarnations (Creative Skillset and Skillset) is responsible for 12 subsectors; Creative & Cultural Skills is responsible for seven. The former focuses on mass media as it tends to generate income; the latter, which focuses on what many would recognise as 'high art' or culture, is often subsidised and dependent on lottery funding.

My experience suggests that no media worker claims to work in 'the creative industries'; rather, they work in film, TV, corporate video, radio, the music industry or for a specific magazine. Individuals identify with specific subsectors and forge their occupational

identities through their specific roles within them. Drawing on the Broadcast magazine Hot Shot listings, the respondents for this research all work in TV.

The Creative Industries are one of the eight sectors covered by DCMS and comprises of nine sub-sectors: advertising & marketing, architecture, crafts, design & designer fashion, film, TV, radio, videographics & photography, IT, software and computer services, publishing, museums, galleries & libraries, music, performing & visual arts. The two others are the Cultural Sector and the Digital Sector.

To some analysts, this is contentious. By partitioning part of the 'cultural industries' to the 'creative industries', the UK government bundled commercially successful subsectors, such as computer games, broadcast TV and film, into a single sector — the creative industries — deemed an engine of economic growth for UK plc (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). Subsidised subsectors such as dance, the visual and performing arts are part of the cultural sector. ONS figures indicate that IT and computer games account for most of the growth in the creative industries over the 10 years to 2016 (ONS, 2016). IT and computer games also overlap with the digital sector, which adds to the complexity of assessing contribution to GVA. This ambiguity between the three subsectors — creative industries, cultural sector and digital sector — is demonstrated by the fact that subsector Group 5 (Film & TV), based on SIC2007 occupation codes appears in all three subsectors. But, slightly recast in terms of occupations groups that are included, for example sound is excluded from one and photography excluded from another. This makes establishing a true picture of the contribution of the BTI very difficult; a matter I unpack in Chapter Six.

The UK was the first government to provide a definition of the creative industries. Other countries — including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and some European Union (EU) member states — have widely adopted the UK definition, adapting the subsectors according to local commercial and cultural importance. Academics across the globe also use this definition; authors such as Terry Flew (2012), Jason Potts et al. (2008), Richard Florida (2004) and Gillian Ursell (2006) have referenced this definition of the creative industries in their papers.

In the UK creative industries structure, the creative and cultural sector refers to the subsectors supported by Creative & Cultural Skills, the SSC for the subsidised performing arts subsectors. ScreenSkills supports the other subsectors. Some academics, predominantly from the social sciences, use the term '*creative and cultural sector*' to describe the entire industry (European Union, 2012). The EU includes all nine subsectors (as in the UK) and uses the term '*creative and cultural industries*' (CCIs) to describe them (European Union, 2010a). The EU refers to the film, TV, video and multimedia markets as the '*audiovisual industry*' (EIB, 2001). However, this is under debate and may be renamed as '*digital media*' (KEA, 2018). I discuss the logic and benefits of this recasting in my recommendations in Chapter Eight.

The debate is likely to continue, depending on the government in power and the effectiveness of special interest groups (Deuze, 2007). The notion of what comprises, for example, the automotive sector or the pharmaceutical industry is relatively clear. This is not the case with the creative industries and therefore the BTI.

There is a widely accepted view among government, industry bodies such as the CBI and independent thinktanks such as NESTA, that the creative industries provide models of innovative working practices. NESTA and the DCMS also contend that the creative industries are exemplars of people management and a significant engine of economic growth (NESTA, 2006, DCMS, 2012). I explore this matter further in Chapters Six and Seven.

This perception of growth and potential jobs has an impact on students with aspirations to join the industry and on universities that offer more courses to feed the growing market. Between 1999 and 2009, the number of media-related courses at UK universities grew from 37 to 111 (Ramsden, 2012). According to WhatUni?, 92 universities offer degrees in media-related topics 2019. There is a great deal of module overlap, but it is reasonable to assume there are over 700 undergraduate programmes with relevance to BTI employment (WhatUni?, 2019).

1.3.3 Creative intensity

An understanding of creativity and what processes need to be in place for creativity to flourish must have a part to play in government thinking on finessing the definition composition of the creative industries. This ambiguity has influenced DCMS policymakers to revisit the composition of the industry several times since 2000.

In 2012, the DCMS admitted that the occupational and group classification system, which had been in existence since it produced its first estimates in 1998, for those industries that made up the broad classification of the cultural industries, had some methodological inconsistencies. These related to *'(i) the areas of industrial activity which are included and (ii) the use of [Standard Industrial Classification] SIC codes to capture the data'* (DCMS, 2013b). The DCMS sought a new approach.

The DCMS 2013 consultation on reclassifying the creative industries included a new set of creative occupations that the government and NESTA — which instigated the whole process (NESTA, 2013a) — defined as *'creative'*. See Appendix 1B. It also recast the industry groupings within the creative industries. The consultation produced the idea of *'creative intensity'*, defined *'as the proportion of people doing creative jobs within each industry to suggest which industries should be included. If the proportion of people doing creative jobs in a particular industry is substantial, above a 30% threshold, the industries are candidates for inclusion within the Creative Industries classification'* (DCMS, 2013b p4). At one point, certain creative sectors, such as pottery and jewellery design, were left out of the creative industries group for failing to meet the *creative intensity* criteria and nearly became casualties of this shuffling of the creative industries deck (DCMS, 2013b).

DCMS went on to say: *'The use of a SIC code listing is not the most accessible listing and are not always a useful communication tool. So, we propose organising these SIC codes into "groups" which are recognisable to the wider user. These will be comparable to the "sectors" in the original DCMS estimates. On this basis, we have groups for Advertising and marketing, Architecture, Design and designer fashion, Film, TV, video and radio, IT telecommunications, software and computer services, Publishing, and Music, performing and visual arts.'* (DCMS, 2013b). This approach was not universally welcomed and many

responses to the consultation paper were openly hostile (see Appendix 1C), but the DCMS Secretary of State ratified it, nonetheless.

By my estimates, the BTI could have fallen foul of the Cameron government's definition of *creative intensity* (DCMS, 2013b) as my own data gathered for the BETR shows a workforce below the 30% threshold for creative occupations (Randle et al., 2013a). Conveniently, government data gave the BTI a creative intensity of 34%: it would have been unthinkable for the government to consider the TV industry as not creative.

1.3.4 Media industry

Academics and policymakers alike have long discussed what makes up the media industry. The former seek a clear definition of the domain to provide clarity and scope to the field of work that they are examining. For the latter, it impacts on a range of government interventions, from taxation, education and skills to legal frameworks and regulations.

Küng in the first edition of her book *Strategic Management in the Media* suggested that: *'The media industry is not a monolith, but rather a conglomeration of different industries that have the creation of mediated content as a common activity'* (Küng, 2008 p17). The notion of a conglomeration is one I share and underpins my analysis in later chapters. I note that in the second edition of 2017 she is more circumspect on the matter.

In the last 20 years, the meaning of *'the media industry'* has changed profoundly. We no longer differentiate between what is printed, projected, transmitted, distributed on the web or performed, although many still segregate these into low and high culture. Oliver & Picard (2020) also highlight that the traditional boundaries of the industry are more ambiguous as ownership and consolidation have blurred demarcation lines. They suggest that in pursuit of corporate goals some firms have transitioned *'from being a 'UK, single product TV firm' into a 'European, Multiproduct Media Firm... competing in the 'European Entertainment and Communications Industry'* (Oliver & Picard, 2020 p13). The same can be said of traditional telecom companies as they transition from network operator to service provider (Klein, 2017).

For the purposes of this research, I consider the media industry to comprise those sectors of the creative industries that are engaged with recorded image and/or sound. This is essentially film, TV and radio — or the mass media or as some academics and the EU call it, the audiovisual industry.

1.3.5 Media company or firm

The '*media company*' is at the centre of the BTI. Much of the early management literature used the word '*firm*' to mean an organisation with a defined business purpose. The term 'company' usually means an entity that has limited liability and, in the UK, is registered at Companies House.

Thomas Hess argues that the old definition of the media company as broadcaster, publisher or professional content producer — the '*publishing-broadcasting approach*' — is no longer valid in the world of internet and technology (Hess, 2014). Although the disruption caused by these advances is self-evident, I suggest that their major impact on the media industry is to change the notion that companies are media companies and therefore part of the sector. As previously discussed, DCMS attempted to resolve this argument by saying a sector / group needed a **creative intensity** of at least 30% to be included in the creative industries.

It was an Ofcom report that prompted DCMS to reclassify and redefine '*media company*' according to creative intensity. But its concern that user-generated content would undermine the television industry and sweep away the power of mass media providers — '*It's not a new thing – but it's "gone mainstream"*' (Turner Hopkins, 2013 p4) — has yet to materialise. Instead, it has shifted the focus of media distribution from broadcasters to content aggregators — also known as the '*platform approach*' (Hess, 2014). Hess suggests that these new companies have three attributes worthy of note: their interaction with their audience/consumers/customers is bi-directional; they are multimedia; and they benefit from low barriers to entry — for example, they do not need an Ofcom licence to broadcast.

As a result, major IT companies such as British Telecom and content suppliers such as Netflix have entered the marketplace. For a while, the ONS distinction between digital

and media companies held good. Then Netflix began investing in content production, most notably producing the US version of *House of Cards* followed in 2013 by *Hemlock Grove* and *Orange Is the New Black* with over 30 titles added to the portfolio between *Sex Education* (January 2019) and *Raising Dion* (planned release October 2019), ‘in December 2016, just 4% of the catalogue was made up of Netflix Originals. This had increased to 11% by December 2018, as the streamer moves steadily away from relying on acquired content’ (Ampere Analysis, 2019). The demarcation lines along with traditional viewing habits are being eroded.

It is important to understand the characteristics of a media company as defined in this research in the current BTI environment. The fragmentation of the production value chain, typified by significant levels of outsourcing, has an impact on who works within a company (Block, 2013). The fluidity of boundaries — who is just inside and who is just outside a company — also has an impact on an employer's responsibility towards, and their relationship with, employees (Preston, 2002, Block, 2014). This, in turn, impacts on managers' and owners' employment strategies (Dex et al., 2000, Paterson, 2010), often leading to short-term and rolling contracts, typically renewed every three months as interviews with industry informants reveal. I have already cited this precarious working environment (Deuze, 2007) and will return to the matter in Chapters Four and Seven.

If the boundaries within the industry are fluid, the barriers for the entrepreneur are low. As Ofcom noted, the number of production companies flex by up to 31% in any one year (Ofcom, 2018a). It appears to be easy to set up a media company; there are few barriers to entry. At the same time, technological innovation and ‘big media’ are sources of support and opportunity (Compaine and Hoag, 2012). This situation led me to ask my research respondents: ‘*Why not go it alone or set up your own company?*’ I capture their responses in Chapter Seven.

To provide a working definition for the term ‘*media company*’, I draw on the DCMS definition of the *creative industries* and offer the following: A media company is an organisation whose core competency is the creation of intellectual property content, disseminated to consumers via one of many channels, including print publishing, radio

and TV broadcasting and internet publishing. This competency is based on the creativity, skills and talent within the company.

1.3.6 Skills, high-skills, higher skills, higher level skills and UK skills policy

Skills

In the UK, skills are generally seen as something specific and task-orientated. In presentations to government Leitch, the architect of skills reform in the UK, talks about a *'particular occupation or activity'* (DIUS Committee, 2008, 2009). The UK government's definition is *'the ability to perform tasks and solve problems'* (UKCES, 2010). In theory there is a set of skills associated with each of the nine qualification levels of the UK system.

High-skills

The term high-skills has been used since the Leitch Report to be synonymous with at least a level 5 (NVQ) or a level 6 (NVQ or bachelor degree) qualification. The definition of high-skills as used by the UK government as they relate to the Leitch Report and are about high functional skills – not necessarily graduate attributes. For some observers, such as the Chartered Institute of Professional Development (CIPD) this is not a sufficient measure of skill (CIPD, 2017).

Higher skills

The European Qualification Framework of the EU offers a definition for higher skills as *'the ability to apply knowledge and use knowhow to complete tasks and solve problems'* (Brockman et al., 2011 p85). This definition is seen by common consent as a *higher order level of skill* and is discussed in Chapter Four.

Higher level skills

This term is more ambiguous and are *'complex and are used with a range of meanings and contexts'* (Sheffield University, 2010). The QAA do not have an easily accessible model to assess them but expects course (at HEIs) to address intellectual, practical and transferable/key skills set out in the QAA Annex on Outcomes Classification Descriptions (2019a) within the academic programme.

Universities UK do not have a single definition or 'skill set' but take the ONS standard occupational codes (SOC2010)⁷ of the first three major codes 1-3 – as demonstrating higher level skills, they suggest these are skills acquired on a level 6 programme. They evaluate higher level skills as a set of attributes that are developed alongside the academic work, the graduate's portfolio should encompass qualification level, subject knowledge, core and employability skills. Of late, the focus by universities has been about enterprise and employability – measurable outcomes.

The QAA expects programmes to implicitly address the three attributes of intellectual, practical and transferable/key skills without setting a standard of measure. For this thesis, I take as my working definition for high-skills to be about a qualification and higher level skills to be about those attributes that make someone employable. See Appendix 1A for a more detailed analysis on all these definitions.

The skills debate focuses on two matters: definition or current meaning and implications for policy. Understanding what 'higher level skills' means in the UK labour market is key to understanding the role of the creative industries' SSCs and terms of trade. I discuss this matter in Chapter Three.

1.3.7 Career success and 'Hot Shots'

For the purposes of this research, I define career success as something attained by people whose colleagues consider them as successful or 'hot shots'. According the Broadcast Magazine the weekly journal, *'Our annual supplement will highlight the brightest, sharpest and most promising individuals aged 30 and under from across the television industry, who are fast becoming the next generation of television decision-makers'* (Broadcast, 2019).

The findings of the qualitative aspect of my research also determine how the subjects themselves define career success. In exploring career success from the individual's —

⁷ <https://www.ons.gov.uk/methodology/classificationsandstandards/standardoccupationalclassificationsoc/soc2010>

rather than the organisation's — perspective, I do not attempt to assign or define career success in terms of hierarchical progression, financial rewards or programme credits.

1.3.8 Occupational job families

Occupational job families describes roles that have an underlying set of shared attributes (See Chapter 4 for a more detailed breakdown and Appendix 1A for a definition of a role). I divide my proposed sample population into six families, that covers groups of occupations that the BTI recognises. I allocate specific occupations examined in this study into two subsets:

'initiators' of writers, directors and production staff; and

'developers' of craft & post, digital media and business

1.3.9 Industrial policy

An industrial policy is a state's active approach to supporting and developing the economy through a coherent economic strategy that supports innovation and industry. This had been explicitly lacking in the UK for more than 15 years (Mazzucato, 2013). The May government set out an Industrial Strategy White Paper (UK Government, 2018a) but Brexit has overshadowed its aspirations. There is evidence of a strategy for the creative industries sector but no evident action (CIC, 2018). An industrial strategy is prone to ideological shifts, between interventionist policies and small government, which *'lets the market decide'*. Without an industrial strategy, the role of the SSCs is questionable. *'Sector Councils were formed to help business and government collaborate, coordinate and agree opportunities for intervention and support. Sajid Javid, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (2015–16), rejected this approach in favour of more general, horizontal support: for example, championing the reduction of red tape for all business'* (Norris, 2017 p16).

The UK's industrial policy fell into disrepute when the government failed to support its ailing heavy industry in the 1970s. In the decades that followed, successive government positions were characterised by the absence of intervention and a *laissez-faire* approach, letting the market identify optimum industrial outcomes.

In 2012, the Labour Party leader Ed Miliband and Vince Cable, Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, rekindled the discussion on industrial policy when they both offered supportive speeches at the Engineering Employers' Federation Manufacturing Conference 2012. They were the first politicians to address the issue following the trade union movement's renewed efforts to raise the matter some three years earlier (TUC, 2009).

Mariana Mazzucato, professor in Economics of Innovation and Public Value and director of the Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose at University College London, called for a more proactive industrial policy in 2012 (Mazzucato, 2012). In 2013, she told the BBC Radio 4 *Today* programme that the UK had lacked a coherent industry strategy, supporting innovation and productivity for 10 years. She said it was not about the government '*picking winners*', but rather about following the example set by China, Finland, South Korea and Germany and making large investments in new sectors such as new energy cars (her term), information technology and energy-saving technology. The lesson from Silicon Valley, she said, was that '*courageous, bold government funding*' led the way when the private sector was too cautious to invest (Mazzucato, 2013).

In this research, I discuss industrial policy because successive governments from Blair (1977- 2007) to May (2016–2019) have focused on the supply — rather than the demand — side of workforce skills. They have assumed that raising skills will give industry a workforce that is ready to respond to the demands of growth. In 2019, we still await the results of Teresa May's rhetoric. Since opening the debate on a new industrial policy at the start of her term of office (May, 2016), it has been side-lined by other events, such as Brexit.

1.3.10 Broadcast television industry

No single definition covers the BTI, even though those of us in and around it know what we are talking about. The DCMS, ScreenSkills and PACT all loosely apply the term to sub-sectors of Group 5 of the Creative Industries comprising of film, TV, video, radio and photography (DCMS, 2013).

For this thesis, I use the term BTI to refer to all companies that hold an Ofcom TV broadcast licence plus the BBC and the production companies that supply broadcasters with programmes to be transmitted in the UK. Ofcom and other regulatory bodies use this grouping to define the sector (BETR, 2011d) and I follow suit. The section on the creative industries industrial landscape provides more detail of the sector.

1.4 Methodology

1.4.1 A convergent parallel mixed methods approach

This research explores the outputs of a series of semi-structured interviews with 31 'hot shot' BTI workers across six occupational job families. I posit a framework of career realities for BTI workers that integrate environmental, personal and employment factors and are informed by established theoretical models of human capital, motivation and career development. I also consider the effectiveness of economic labour market theories in explaining decisions that individuals make about their personal investment in education, training and career choices at two key transitional moments in their career development: when they make degree choices and in their transition from higher education to first job.

I analyse the role of non-governmental agencies in shaping the knowledge, values and beliefs of industry workers, developing their vocational practice and social capital to progress through the industry. I concur with Guile (2010) who challenges the '*simplistic link*' between skills and getting a job.

To investigate these issues, I apply a career pathway development value chain based on the work of Parson *et al*, which Super integrated into a single model (Super, 1990). This model underpins the framework for my fieldwork and provides the backdrop to the rationale for my sample selection of media workers.

My fieldwork examines the lived reality of the media worker and seeks evidence of the impact of government policy on skills and training in the broadcast industry. I interview two groups of workers in the UK television industry using a series of semi-structured questionnaires, informed by the work of Silverman (2011) who sets out helpful guidelines

for the researcher applying qualitative techniques. The two groups are influencers or 'suits' (described in this work as **'the informants'**) and 31 'hot shots' (my subject group, described as **'the respondents'**) from across the BTI's six job families.

My informants are a group of 25 individuals from across the BTI who occupy, or have occupied, positions of influence in the industry. They did not answer questions about themselves; their role was to critique and validate my line of enquiry, offering their insights to my thesis questions.

My respondents — the 'hot shots' — are a representative sample of successful media workers in the BTI. I expand on the rationale for selecting this group in Chapter Four. Bryman suggests that in this mixed methods approach, a researcher needs to interview a minimum of between 20 to 30 people (Bryman, 2015 p416). However, I prefer the pragmatic approach highlighted by Silverman (2011 p145) and others: stop when you start getting repeated, predictable responses, as this is your point of data redundancy (Baker, 2011). Although I reached that point well before I had interviewed all 31 respondents, I wanted to get a plausible mix of workers across the job families, so I continued. Even the last few interviewed revealed new insights. Moreover, given the time frame from the first set of interviews in 2014, I wanted to ensure that matters of concern raised in 2014 were still live for the 2018 cohort.

My research draws a dotted line around the companies that hold an Ofcom licence to transmit television programmes in the UK and those that supply them with the programmes they broadcast — the BTI. I chose the BTI as my unit of study for two reasons: these are the companies most media graduates wish to join (Creative Skillset (2015a, 2015b) and the traditional broadcast schedule just about continues to dominate the UK market: when we include time-shifted programmes in total audience figures, they still have an audience share of around 60% (Ofcom, 2018a).

1.4.2 Data mining secondary sources and examining the outputs of the fieldwork

My research is informed by approximately 100 hours of face-to-face interviews with informants and respondents. At the macro level, my analysis challenges the usefulness of Creative Skillset's (now ScreenSkills) data for determining the needs of BTI workers. I

question the policy narrative that the creative industries are an *'engine for growth'*. I also challenge whether the UK government's high-skills policy has any relevance to well-educated (degree level), non-regulated (by statute) occupational groups and dispute the notion that the creative industries are a meritocracy.


I discuss the implications for policymakers and question the validity of considering the creative industries as a single group for GVA analysis and policy. I argue that the government's focus on the labour market's supply side has more to do with *'muddling through'* than EBPM strategies (Parsons, 2002). In accord with several economists, I posit that there is no industrial policy to help shape the demand for the skilled worker.

At the micro level, I suggest that functional skills have a minimal impact on an individual's career progression and that the set of attributes expected of graduates under the term *'employability'* as defined by the higher education sector are essentially too little, too late. Insights from signalling theory (Eigler, 2016) and high social capital that are encapsulated in the *'brand of Me'* tell us more. Finally, I conclude that the BTI needs an effective career development strategy and plan that will support workers at key transitional points.

1.5 Insights into policy, industry structure and skills

This research draws on three academic social science disciplines to explain worker behaviour (see Figure 4). My literature review is in three corresponding parts: skills policy, the structure of the labour market economics and theories of career development.

Figure 4. The academic domains considered in this research



Source: Author's own

1.5.1 Policy

I argue that government education and skills policies are key drivers for the current situation of workforce oversupply in the cultural industries' labour markets. The Leitch Report (2006) has led successive governments to pursue a high-skills strategy and I argue that the resulting education and skills policies have created a flood of graduates into the labour market with unrealistic expectations of a graduate job, especially in the creative industries. According to the CIPD, employers do not consider that many graduates have high-skills (CIPD, 2017). Plus, *'Although they are often treated interchangeably, skills are not the same as qualifications'*(CIPD, 2017 p3). Skills and qualifications have been on parallel tracks until the focus on employability came to the fore (Tomlinson, 2012). There is a lack of integration between qualifications and skills as argued by the CIPD report and acknowledged by UK Universities UK (2018). Finally, there is debate about the skills acquired as part of a FE/HE programme and those needed by the changing graduate labour market – there is a 'fuzziness' (Green and Henseke, 2016) in defining a graduate job, especially in the creative industries.

Although partly due to government rhetoric regarding the creative industries contribution to GVA, overstated claims by UK universities admissions processes are also responsible. This is evidenced by the BBC's November 2017 headline '*Universities to be warned over misleading adverts*' (BBC, 2018) and the Advertising Standards Authority report (2018) that considered some university claims about an undergraduate course without '*adequate substantiation*' and '*misleading*'. For example, some universities promote their media-related degrees programmes as a fast track to a job in the creative industries. John Bradley (2018) goes further to highlight the way misleading data and claims are made by UK universities in terms of job opportunities. I explore the impact of such claims in Chapter Seven.

1.5.2 Structure

My review of the performance of the agencies deployed to deliver government skills policies draws on existing policy and policymaking literature (Muzzucato, 2012, 2013, Ross, 2007, Parsons, 2002, Waller et al., 2010). As part of my review, I analyse the impact of successive government interventions on career opportunities and progression for post full-time education and graduate entrants into the workplace and for those already employed.

The literature attests to a common misconception that policymaking is a rational process. It is almost 60 years since Charles Lindblom coined the phrase '*the science of muddling through*' when referring to government policymaking, a point he reiterated 20 years later (Lindblom, 1959, 1979).

The UK government has singled out the creative industries as an engine of growth and regeneration; a success story. The BTI has enjoyed a reputation as a glamorous and exciting industry that can also be financially rewarding. Historically, the approach of actively managing the industry's skills base has been complacent. This research investigates the effectiveness of the government's strategy for delivering a high skilled, diverse workforce to enable this growth, based on a strong reliance on supply-side economics under the '*skills for growth*' banner (BIS, 2011). If this strategy were effective, we would see evidence of its impact on companies and individuals in the BTI. Graduates from ScreenSkills approved courses should have an advantage over non-approved

programmes. In simple terms, an effective skills policy would deliver skilled graduates from industry approved courses that meet the needs of the sector employers. These graduates should get the jobs. The evidence suggests this is not the case.

My research seeks to demonstrate that the current skills policy is not an appropriate approach for all industrial sectors, especially those with a highly qualified graduate entry.

1.5.3 Skills

Central to my fieldwork is a review of several models of career development and theories of employment that I amalgamate into a career pathway development value chain model. This provides a unified framework for examining career pathways and quantifying the factors at transitional career events. I hope it will prove useful for other researchers.

John Kampfner, chief executive of the Creative Industries Federation, rhetorically asked in 2016: *'Which other sector can do all of the following — help improve social mobility, help repair societal rifts, drive exports, grow the economy and define the UK internationally?'* (Kampfner, 2016). In this thesis I will show that his overblown hyperbole is not an isolated commentary on the industry. Apart from the international reputation possibly demonstrated by the growth in film and TV exports, there is no evidence to support his case. He muddles up social worth and economic growth. Social mobility is at an all-time low, especially in the creative industries, the number of jobs are static and growth across the sector is piecemeal.

It is against this backdrop that I examine the role of the sector skills councils (SSCs) that cover the creative industries, they are Creative & Cultural Skills and ScreenSkills. The BTI falls with the remit of ScreenSkills. It is the actions and impact of this SSC on employees and employers, from its inception as Skillset⁸ (2002), its rebranding as Creative Skillset (2012) and now as ScreenSkills (2018), that I examine in this research. I review the effectiveness of the industry led skills policy model that has been in place since the Leitch Review.

⁸ Skillset was the creative industries training organisation from 1992, it became the sector skills council in 2002

I draw on SKOPE's call as the starting point for my research, to look for new insights into the current approach to skills policy. *'If better academic understanding of graduate labour is to be achieved... What is required is new research that examines skill supply and demand, and the development and deployment of these skills...From such research, government thinking about upskilling can be better supported and the efficacy of policy determined.'* (SKOPE, 2011a p1)

My objective is to examine the impact of government interventions on people and organisations within the BTI. I seek evidence of the impact and effectiveness of these interventions to help us understand the motivations, behaviours and actions of the three prime stakeholder groups in the UK's workforce landscape: government, employers and individuals. I explore whether any government skills policy has or can provide effective interventions that influence or change employment opportunities for the media worker within the creative industries (predominately the BTI). I question whether these skills policies have had any impact on inclusiveness or widened opportunities for individuals within the industry.

1.6 Limitations of scope and key assumptions

It took relatively few respondent interviews in each job family to hear common themes and stories of how the individuals got in and on in the BTI. Once I had uncovered the parameters for each job family, I could follow up with new respondents with a more targeted and concise telephone interview. Inevitably time constrained the number of respondents I could interview in depth and even if each new respondent offered a unique story and insight. However, I was able to satisfy myself that my research questions were being addressed.

This research examines government skills policy as it has been applied in the BTI. Outside this context, it is questionable whether the results will apply to other high skilled industries or to skills policies in general. It is for other researchers to take a view on its applicability.

1.7 The contribution to knowledge

In this thesis the original contributions I make to the collective body of knowledge in the field reside within three themes. Within the themes I highlight how this thesis is of significance and present the implications for the field. I do so by mapping the contribution to one of the *'fifteen ways'* of originality suggested by Phillips and Pugh (2010 p69). I present the summary below; further details on the three themes are set out in Chapter Eight, Section 8.5.

In the first theme, I **bring new evidence to bear on an old issue** in the critique of the data of the creative industries **using known material but with a new interpretation** to refute the case for growth in terms of GVA and workforce numbers.

The second theme focuses on my contribution to theory and practice. The career pathway development model and associated on-line questionnaire is an **original technique** and tool for **observing** the media worker at a point in their career. It is available for other researchers to apply. The attribute-composition model based on expertise theory is a **synthesis of ideas not made before** in this field.

Under the third theme I conduct **empirical work** and look at **an area that people in the discipline have not looked at before** in my contribution to the body of knowledge about the lives of BTI workers. Specifically, I identify common attributes of successful young media workers. I examine the process by which they acquired their skills. In my comparison with the BFI study of the 1990s I present a **continuation of a previously original piece work**. I discuss the implications for skills policymakers who attempt to create frameworks that assist the learner acquire these capabilities through formal education or skills training.

In doing so, this research questions the role and effectiveness of the skills policy community in the creative industries. The findings challenge the argument made in policy circles that high-skills lead to high skilled jobs.

1.8 Structure of this thesis

In **Chapter One**, this introductory chapter, I set out the three research questions I use to address my working hypothesis and introduce the rationale of my research approach. I clarify my working definitions of key terms and set out the structure of the paper and my chosen methodology. I also outline the key issues I explore in later chapters, discuss the insights I gained from academic sources and endeavour to put some boundaries to the work, however porous, to ensure the focus and scope remain clear to the reader. In **Chapter Two**, I set the context, provide the historical background to my research and introduce the stakeholders.

Chapters Three and Four focus on the literature relating to policy and the media worker. **Chapter Three** discusses government processes for developing and delivering its skills policy. In **Chapter Four**, I explain the issues around the structure of the current BTI labour market and explore the behaviour of individual media workers through an assessment of the relevant literature and theories of career development which offer a range of perspectives on their behaviours and actions.

Chapter Five presents the methods I use to test the validity of the research questions and address my working hypothesis that there is no direct link between having a media qualification and career success in the creative industries. The methods I select are underpinned by the career pathway value chain model described in Chapter Four. I also explain the rationale behind my choice — and number — of respondents.

Chapter Six presents a critique of published secondary data associated with the creative industries. I consider in detail data from the DCMS, the BFI and ScreenSkills that present the size of the workforce, the growth in the sector to date and the predicted needs for workers in the sector.

In **Chapter Seven** I present my analysis of the data from my informant and respondent interviews. I relate my findings to those of earlier researchers, particularly the BFI's longitudinal study of BTI media workers in the 1990s. My findings raise questions to the

effectiveness of the skills policy in general and the role of ScreenSkills in particular to support HEIs to supply appropriately skilled and employable graduates.

Chapter Eight summarises the outcomes from my research, offers my conclusions and sets out the implications for individual media workers, employers and the government, through its appointed agencies. I consider policy and employer behaviour as a constraint or enabler for individuals to act as free agents and make informed choices in their career decisions. I highlight the attributes of the successful media worker, that these ‘*hot shots*’ share; and, discuss the implications for policymakers of the social and functional skills needed to survive in high skills industries such as the BTI.

Chapter Two Education, skills and the BTI from duopolies to fragmentation

2.1 Introduction: setting the scene, background and context

My primary research focuses on analysing the impact that successive government skills policy interventions have had on supporting the career opportunities and progression for BTI media workers; the aspiring graduate entrants to the workplace and those already employed in the industry. I examine the role, impact and effectiveness of the sector skill council tasked with delivering this agenda to the BTI from the perspective of its managers and workers.

In providing a framework for this work, in this chapter I endeavour to set the BTI in the UK labour market context in time and place. First, I summarise the historical background. Then, I examine the current structure of the BTI, comparing it with other UK sectors — particularly the leisure industry, which has similar employment issues (Wyman, 2012) and Higher Education, which also employs highly skilled people on a multiplicity of contracting terms and conditions.


With a more extended timeline I present the UK education legislation and skills policies that gathered pace in the 1980s, which continue to date. The industry legislation impacting the BTI was designed to create a more open market in TV production. The skills policies were expected to deliver a highly skilled and diverse workforce, both ambitions are laudable, the outcomes questionable. I highlight an aspect of the BTI that suggests upward mobility has come to an end. Alan Milburn, the *'mobility tsar'*, argued that even the children of the current professional classes have *'fewer opportunities for advancement'* than their counterparts did 30 years ago (Milburn, 2012 p2). Studies suggest that this is as much to do with there being *'no room at the top'* (Bukodi et al, 2014 p93) as with elitism and social exclusion. I explore this further in Chapter Eight.

2.2 Historical background

2.2.1 The BTI from 1979 to date: a period of disruption and change

My timeframe for this research starts with the first Thatcher Conservative government of 1979. The Broadcasting Act of 1980 heralded the beginning of deregulation in the BTI (Prosser, 1992), which continued under the Broadcasting Acts of 1990 and 1996. Figure 5 shows these and other key dates that changed employment conditions in and helped shape the BTI.

Figure 5. The UK television broadcasting industry timeline, 1927–2019



Source: Author's Own

Government policy interventions over the last 40 years have instigated profound changes in the BTI, creating the current precarious working environment for the media worker. The recommendations of the Report of the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting (1977) chaired by Lord Annan led to the creation of Channel 4 and paved the way for all UK television broadcasters to contract out 25% of their original programme making to independent production companies. This created the beginnings of the large freelance pool we have today as the broadcasters shed workers, without appreciable growth in the demand for labour. Changes in employment regulations, the curtailment of union power

and the fragmentation of the BTI with the breakup of the *'cosy duopoly'* between the BBC and ITV as the industry transitioned from *'firm to market'* added to uncertainty for the media worker (Deakin et al., 2004 p3 and p42).


Under Tony Blair's Labour government, the 2003 Communications Act created Ofcom as the industry's single regulatory body. A House of Lords amendment, instigated by Lord Putnam, added workforce development and equality of opportunity to its remit: Section 27 of the 2003 Act sets out Ofcom's duties for the BTI workforce.⁹ The impact was to highlight the industry's obligation to train the workforce and monitor equal opportunities for BTI workers. To comply with the Act the Broadcast Training and Skills Regulator (BTSR) was created. I was appointed its Director and embarked on the task to monitor and help improve skills in the BTI.

2.2.2 Education and skills from 1979 to date: from a binary system to confusing options

The number of changes and rate of change in education and skills policy was also gathering pace in the 1980s and continues to date (see Figure 6). From the Thatcher era onwards, each new government has developed a new policy for education and skills, a new flagship strategy to *'ensure unemployment among young people is a thing of the past'* (Green paper, 1985).

⁹ See Appendix 2A for details on this and other legislation.

Figure 6. The UK education and skills timeline, 1872–2019



Source: Author's Own¹⁰

The nature of skills policy and policymaking within the UK government has been influenced by several significant reports on education at all levels and the demand for an improvement in skills across the UK workforce. Current thinking on skills began with the Leitch Report (2006); this was followed by more focused reports that consider tertiary education in general (Wolf, 2011) and higher education in particular (Wilson, 2012).

The end of the 'binary system' of higher education in 1992 (Taylor, 2003) mirrors many of the policy issues which have impacted the BTI. Until the early 1990s, higher education was in its own way a duopoly between polytechnics / Further Education and universities.

¹⁰ See Appendix 2B for more detail.

There was an aspiration to widen choice and diversity for students, but research suggests that institutional diversity has reduced.

'Education, education, education' was a key theme of Labour's 2001 election campaign (Blair, 2001) and Blair's government recast the education system. This mantra was echoed by shadow Education Secretary Tristram Hunt in the 2015 election campaign, with his call for *'Skills, skills, skills or else we're stuffed'* (Hunt, 2015). He claimed that apprenticeship schemes and improving the skills of the workforce would be key to the UK's future success. His own party in the guise of the Blair government had already put a skills strategy in place, culminating in the creation of the Sector Skills Councils (SSCs) focused on an employer demand-led system of education and training curriculum development (UKCES, 2010). Was his call a tacit acceptance of the failure of the extant policy? Academic research had already asserted that the policy had failed to realise its ambition (Hammond, 2012). I argue that subsequent skills policies have also failed. The first CEO of the steering body of the skills councils I interviewed for this research supports my case that the SSCs did not live up to the rhetoric (Informant L, 2015).

Informant L: *'it was difficult to gather coherent employee data. It was hard to progress from analysis and commissioning reports to action. The meetings were just employer talking shops.'*

The shift in focus on skills development from full time vocational education to industry led SSCs and the changes in the UK industrial landscape forced many of the new universities to close down their vocational programmes. Traditional programmes, such as engineering could not be filled plus there was an aspiration to ape their more established partners in expanding their offering to potential students. More recently, they (the old polytechnics) have needed to re-invent themselves and a new term — *business facing* — emerged, in which the University of Hertfordshire took a lead. Professor Sir Tim Wilson, the retired Vice Chancellor of Hertfordshire with no sense of irony recommends in his review of university–business collaboration, that: *'Sandwich degrees should be encouraged through a new compact between students, universities, government and employers, reflecting the benefits to all parties from the enhanced employment outcomes*

arising from them' (Wilson, 2012 p5). The case for a new compact is built on the consensus, already highlighted, that many graduates are not employable. The degree has not conferred wider opportunity. With the polytechnics, employability was not a factor, as many students were already employed or on a vocational pathway.

'There appears to be widespread, and growing, regret in political and academic establishments that the divisive binary system was ever abolished. In the eyes of ministers, the post-1992 universities' main role is as "business-facing" institutions producing graduates in vocational disciplines and applied research — as if "vocational" and "applied" were straightforward labels. Even a Labour MP has pondered the need to recreate "something like the polytechnics"' (Scott, 2012). The 'messiness' and 'adhococracy' of the education and skills policy is a result of 'neo-pluralism' (Ball, 1993) where all vested interests, of which government is but one, create a system that is self-defeating in its aims. And the result; a call to recreate something like the polytechnic.

More recently the Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA) was formed in April 2017 as an executive agency of the Department for Education with merger of the Education Funding Agency (EFA) and the Skills Funding Agency (SFA). For the first time skills and education are being explicitly managed by a single body, but not for the HE sector. There remains a lack of continuity of skills development throughout full-time education as the learner transitions from school or FE to higher education and acquires the higher level skills associated with a degree programme (See Chapter One Section 1.2.6).


The ad hoc nature of the intersection (some might call misguided and dysfunctional) between education and the creative industries SSC was embodied in The Film Business Academy (Film London, 2006). This was a public sector joint venture conceived by Skillset supported by the UK Film Council and delivered by the CASS Business School (Full name - Sir John Cass Business School). Cheek (2011) offers a scholarly analysis of its failure in concept, design and delivery; along with the waste of £1.3m allocated by Skillset to fund the venture. He highlights the paucity of data and the lack of clarity on how education and the creative industries can work together. The closure of the programme in 2010 is testament to the lack of understanding of the needs of the industry and how skills are developed by individuals in their career pathway.

Both parties to this contract were under pressure from their stakeholders to deliver tangible outcomes to their remit. Skillset were required to demonstrate their understanding of the labour market in the creative industries and respond to business needs. City University as embodied by the CASS Business School was under pressure to generate income partnerships (often termed ‘third stream revenue’) with business as a consequence of the commodification of higher education.

2.3 The creative industries

In Section 1.2, I introduced the term ‘*creative industries*’. This needs positioning within the UK economy. It was the UK Government’s 2001 Creative Industries Mapping Document that first defined the *creative industries*, alongside two other concepts: the *creative economy* and a formal expression of a *creative occupation* (see Figure 7). Neither were well expressed until the Creative Industries Economic Estimates Methodology (DCMS, 2013c) set out the details based on a consultation process in 2012 . The same process formalised the use of ‘*creative intensity*’, the implications of which I will return in Chapter Three. The creative economy ‘*includes all creative occupations outside the creative industries*’ (DCMS, 2016).

Figure 7. The creative economy, industries and occupations



Source: *Creative Industries Economic Estimates Methodology (DCMS, 2013c)*

It is estimated by the Creative Industries Federation and the DCMS (CIF, 2019) that the creative economy employed between 2.8 - 3.2 million people. The number of people in the creative industries is more accurate as they are based on the SIC2007 occupational codes that identify role and industry. However, the overlap between the sectors within DCMS by occupation, role and function makes the efforts to create clear demarcation lines over subsectors a challenge. The current methodology fails to resolve and leads to double counting data. It is unclear how DCMS separates out the creative, cultural and digital sectors and their overlapping subsectors. This presents a difficulty for any researcher to have a high confidence level in a) the data gathered by Skillset / Creative Skillset and b) the use of ONS data with the recasting of the creative industries data set over the last 20 years to show meaningful trends. In my view, this is where the cheerleaders for the sector get it wrong, the total contribution by the sectors is less than the sum of the parts, as my detailed analysis in Chapter Six will show.

2.3.1 Structure and economics of the creative industries

In this section, I present the structure of the creative industries based on current ONS data to situate it within the overall UK economy. The creative industries comprise the following nine 'groups' (groups is an ONS term): Advertising and marketing; Architecture; Crafts; Product, graphic and fashion design; Film, TV, video, radio and photography; IT, software and computer services; Publishing; Museums, galleries and libraries; Music, performing and visual arts.

Table 1 shows the gross value added (GVA) to the economy by the creative industries from 2010, when the DCMS first applied the new SIC 2007 occupational group codes. As shown in Table 1, the percentage change takes 2010 as the baseline.

Table 1. GVA of creative industries groups 2010, 2014 and 2017 (value and percentage share)

Sub-sector	2010		2014		2017		Summaries	
	£m	%	£m	%	£m	%	% change of GVA 2010 - 2017	% of UK GVA 2017
Advertising and marketing	6,220	9.38	10,775	12.76	13,302	13.10	113.9	0.7
Architecture	2,298	0.16	3,534	0.21	3,898	0.21	69.6	0.2
Crafts	265	0.40	405	0.48	298	0.29	12.6	0.0
Product, graphic and fashion design	1,968	2.97	2,636	3.12	3,949	3.89	100.6	0.2
Film, TV, video, radio and photography	12,807	19.31	14,635	17.34	16,709	16.46	30.5	0.9
IT, software and computer services	25,402	38.29	33,240	39.37	40,620	40.01	59.9	2.2
Publishing	10,366	15.63	10,361	12.27	11,751	11.57	13.4	0.6
Museums, galleries and libraries	1,342	2.02	1,394	1.65	1,451	1.43	8.1	0.1
Music, performing and visual arts	5,664	8.54	7,441	8.81	9,547	9.40	68.6	0.5
Creative Industries	66,333	<i>baseline</i>	84,419	27.00	101,526	53.00	53.1	5.5
UK	1,429,621	<i>baseline</i>	1,645,955	15.00	1,839,924	29.00	28.7	100.0
% of GVA	4.64%		5.13%		5.52%			

Source: Extracted from DCMS Economic Estimates 2017 (DCMS, 2018c), with percentage values (blue cells) added by author

The BTI sits within Group 5: Film, TV, video, radio and photography. Table 1 shows that in 2017 more than 40% of the creative industries' income comes from IT and software, it also shows the greatest growth (59.9%) and represents almost 40% of the sectors contribution to GVA (last column: 2.2% of the 5.5% contribution). e-Skills — the predecessor of Tech Partnership, the network of employers collaborating to create the skills for the digital economy — also claimed IT and software for their industry. This reflects the complexity that surrounds the formal occupational location of some of the creative industries workforce, which resides within both the creative industries and the digital economy (DCMS, 2015c, DCMS, 2018c).

For example, DCMS reports that the **digital sector** contributed £130.5bn to the UK economy in 2017, accounting for 7.1% of UK GVA. The contribution from this sector has increased by one-third since 2010 (£98.2bn in 2010). As shown in Table 1, the creative industries contributed £101.5bn to the UK economy in 2017; an increase of 53.1% since 2010 (£66.3bn). This was a much-heralded figure by the secretary of state (DCMS, 2018a) yet, as I have already noted, IT and software account for a significant proportion of breaking the £100bn barrier. This growth needs to be assessed along with the overall growth of the UK economy. There are many other sectors that outperform the DCMS. According to the data in Table 1 (See full DCMS Creative Industries GVA data Appendix 6A), the creative industries' overall contribution to UK GVA has remained at around 5% throughout the reporting period.

The DCMS Economic Estimates report that the **cultural sector** contributed £29.5bn to the UK economy in 2017, an increase of 38.5% since 2010 (£21.3bn) (DCMS, 2018). It is challenging to compare the data as DCMS use different yardsticks in its economic estimates for the headline figures — as it refers to GVA for one and merely an ‘increase’ for another. A point accepted by my DCMS informant.


Informant V: *“...I think my rationale behind that was just to pick out the main check points for each of the sectors because I wrote this so my rationale behind it was to just to pick out what our users would be interested in...Maybe I might have been a bit biased because half of my job is working with digital policy colleagues so maybe I sort of had an idea of what their views must have been...”*

We discussed the logic of a more consistent form of data presentation for the 2020 estimates.

Informant V: *“ ... So just to keep it consistent between all the different sectors is what you would prefer?”* Not my preference, but a logical approach by a government department helping the reader understand the data.

Group 5 (Film, TV, video, radio and photography) has seven sub-groups: Motion picture, video and TV programme production; Motion picture, video and TV programme post-production; Motion picture, video and TV programme distribution; Motion picture projection; Radio broadcasting; TV programming and broadcasting; Photography.

Figure 8. GVA of Group 5: Film, TV, video, radio and photography within which sits the BTI, 2014



Source: Author's own, using data from ONS (2016)

Figure 8 shows that the total GVA from Group 5 for 2014 — the year I started my fieldwork — as £10,807m (ONS, 2016). This is lower than the DCMS data used in Table 1. At the time of writing this thesis (September 2019), the ONS has not responded to my request for an update to Group 5 data. The challenge for my research is to establish a working definition of the BTI and extract useful data from the ONS figures that I can cross-reference with data from Ofcom, BFI and other advocates for the growth of the creative industries. The ONS segmentation of groups within the Film & TV Group makes it almost impossible to pinpoint the size and contribution of the BTI. As Figure 8 shows, GVA from television spans four sub-groups and leads to a confused picture of income and workforce. The ONS reported total income for the Film & TV Group of £10,807m, yet Ofcom reported £13,160m for TV alone. The BFI have a different metric, referencing 'high-end TV' (BFI, 2015). It is not clear whether this is just *'The Night Manager'* (the most successful long-form BBC1 drama of 2016) or high-quality 'shiny floor' shows such as *'Strictly Come Dancing'*. As a result, it is impossible to cross-reference data from these sources. Table 1 also shows that Film, TV etc has shrunk in terms of its percentage share.

The government expects the digital sector and creative industries to be drivers of growth and further expansion over the next few years; but not all analysts agree on the subsectors. The relevance for my research is establishing the true number of jobs in the BTI, the true nature of growth and the possibility of misrepresenting the creative industries' GVA and overall size.

The DCMS estimates that the creative industries contribute around 6% of the UK's GVA (around £100 billion a year) and employs around 1.5 million people (DCMS, 2016). The digital economy (not the DCMS Digital Sector) crosses standard industrial sector boundaries and is calculated by the ONS using data that also include the creative industries (Carter, 2009, BIS, 2009). Depending on how you cut these data, you can take a view that the broad sweep of the creative industries employs about 900,000 people. I reach this conclusion from my own analysis of ONS data (see Chapter Six for the methodology I used) and from a discussion with ONS, DCMS (previously cited) and BFI statisticians.

The government considers the creative industries to be income generators and flag carriers for UK plc and the UK brand. But government, CBI and NESTA figures vary, placing the size of the workforce between 1.5 and 2.5 million and its contribution to the economy between 3 and 6%, as illustrated in their key position statements:

'Our creative industries are a real success story. They are worth more than £36 billion a year; they generate £70,000 every minute for the UK economy; and they employ 1.5 million people in the UK. According to industry figures, the creative industries account for around £1 in every £10 of the UK's exports.' (DCMS, 2013d).

'The creative industries — ranging from advertising to architecture and fashion to film — constitute one of the fastest-growing sectors in the UK. The creative industries contribute 6% of GDP and employ over 2 million people'.(CBI, 2013).

'The UK's creative economy is one of its great national strengths, historically deeply rooted and accounting for around one-tenth of the whole economy. It provides jobs for 2.5 million people — more than in financial services, advanced manufacturing or construction

— *and in recent years, this creative workforce has grown four times faster than the workforce as a whole*' (NESTA, 2013a). See Appendix 2C for the full statements from each organisation.

NESTA's use of the term '*the creative economy*' while referencing the creative industries renders this an empty statement, as creative occupations permeate many industries, including advanced manufacturing and construction.

Despite this unqualified support for the sector, others dispute the view of its current and long-term contribution to the UK economy. I share the analysis of Terry Flew (2013), who challenges the assertion that the creative industries are an engine of growth, noting that the global nature of the industry is overstated. Most media organisations derive their revenue from their home countries. He also notes that several sectors within what was once called '*the cultural industries*' are loss-making: 'the arts' have to be subsidised. So, commercial subsectors effectively support the high culture arts. This has been termed the patronage or social welfare model of the nation's creative industries.

While the DCMS, CBI and NESTA all state that the sector is an engine of growth; many within the academic community take the view that the claims for the industry are overblown (Garnham, 2005, Elliott, 2007, Flew, 2011, Randle et al., 2013a). Either way, the sector remains in the spotlight for many reasons, both good (contribution to GVA, exports, soft power (McClory, 2018) and bad (The Jimmy Savile sexual abuse scandal, discrimination cases such as Miriam O'Reilly's case for age discrimination, BBC payoffs and so on).

2.3.2 What are the creative industries?

I contend that the debate moved from the output of symbolic content or economic contribution, embodied in products with intellectual property associated with it, to one of inputs and process. The DCMS (2013b) asserted that the creative intensity approach focuses on industries where creative activity happens and would produce a classification to provide direct estimates of employment and contribution to the economy, with no double counting. But as we have already seen, the creative and digital economy groupings have led to just this. The creative intensity model does not attempt to capture all activity

further down the value chain — for example, in retail activities — which I understand is how Ofcom arrived at their figures. NESTA and the DCMS both argue that generating classifications in this way can provide a starting point for indirect economic estimates that include wider economic effects along the supply chain (DCMS, 2013b). But as Figure 8 illustrates, the model still provides an unsatisfactory data set as it is not possible to get an estimate of film or TV contribution to GVA as separate groups.

The difficulty of classifying the subsectors within the creative industries persists beyond the 2013 consultation. The 2017 economic estimates demonstrate the difficulties of grouping any sector, with an admission that there is significant overlap on the data (DCMS, 2018c). And, although the debate continues, it is highly unlikely that the broadcast sector will find itself outside of the creative industries, so it has little impact on the rationale for this research. But it does tell us about the forces at work in the policy process.

There is much debate as to the composition of the creative industries, the nature of a creative occupation and the creative intensity test used for defining creative occupations and therefore the number of jobs within the Film & TV Group.

My case is that DCMS policy changes have impacted on the creative and cultural industries structure due to external pressures, notably from NESTA. However, a poor structure creates ambiguity; and in the case of the creative industries, it has enabled stakeholders to play fast and loose with the evidence and present an exaggeration of its growth and contribution. Others agree with my analysis of what they termed *'definitional chicanery'* and go further to suggest that *'The trouble is that all this "success" has come at the expense of any cultural, artistic or creative integrity that the sectors once had before they were herded into a single political concept'* (Mould, 2019). In essence the current model of the *creative industries* has been harmful to the creatives.

In 2018, under pressure from the EU, DCMS was obliged to offer an estimate for the audiovisual sector, a grouping not usually presented by DCMS statisticians. The data were drawn from 10 SIC2007 codes that included motion picture, video and TV programme production activities, post-production activities, programme distribution activities along

with sound recording and music publishing activities, radio broadcasting, TV programming and broadcasting activities, news agency activities, other information service activities, renting of video tapes and disks, and leasing of intellectual property and similar products, except copyrighted works.

This reveals that the audiovisual sector contribution to GVA was 1% between 2010–2015 and 1.1% in 2016–17. Its relative growth has remained largely static. As to employment between 2015–2017 the sector has remained around 0.5% of the UK workforce (see Appendix 6B for audiovisual sector calculation and workforce numbers). In Chapter Six, I take a closer look at the secondary data the DCMS use to provide the economic estimates for the three sectors relevant to this study.

2.4 The Broadcast Television Industry

In 2014, a report to Ofcom estimates that there were between 334 – 456 active production companies in the TV market, although some 6490 companies are on the ONS database registered as producing TV programmes (Ofcom, 2015 p17). Many were microbusinesses and others had only a few permanent staff members. Just under 100 had an Ofcom license to transmit programmes (Ofcom, 2013), broadcasting 536 channels to UK television viewers. For Ofcom, the BTI produces programmes to be watched on a device at the time of broadcast (Ofcom, 2018a). The industry comprises national organisations such as the BBC, ITV, Channels 4 and Five, plus the UK divisions of global players — QVC, Discovery, Disney, Warner Bros and so on — who broadcast their own or commissioned programmes to the domestic market and supply programmes and formats to a global market.

2.4.1 'The indies' – a cottage industry?

From the 1950s in the UK there have been small production companies making corporate films or the occasional 'look at life' film as a cinema short shown before exhibiting the feature film. Their work was recorded on 16mm film and predominantly edited in small studios around Soho in London. Two matters profoundly changed this cottage industry;


the first was lightweight video equipment that took camera technology out of the studio to replace film. The second was legislation that created Channel 4 in 1982 and later the formal requirement for broadcasters to contract out 25% of their non-news output. In response, hundreds of companies were formed and began to pitch for Channel 4 commissions (Hogan, 1997, 1998). The rise and subsequent consolidation of the sector was a consequence of policy interventions, enshrined in law, by the UK government to stimulate a competitive market for programme making (Doyle and Paterson, 2008). For a period of about twenty years the independent sector — known as *'the indies'* enjoyed a rapid growth in numbers, it was estimated that one time there was up to 1000 companies in the sector. However, by the start of 2000 consolidation was well underway (North and Oliver, 2010).

Since 2014, there has been a significant degree of consolidation in the independent production sector. There are around 230 small producers and others have been amalgamated through mergers and acquisitions (Ofcom, 2018a). A significant number of *indies* supply programmes to broadcasters. A few of these — Endemol, Lime TV and Hat Trick — have been labelled *'super-indies'* due to their longevity and percentage share of original programme making (Chalaby, 2010). Many are now part of international companies, which have effectively become umbrella organisations that pitch new programme ideas and formats to commissioning editors. For example, Ricochet, TwentyTwenty, Wall to Wall and Outright Distribution (formerly the Shed Media Group), are now part of Warner Bros Television UK (WBUKTV), which is owned by Time Warner.

According to Apex Insights (2017), the top global indies were reported to be: All3Media, Banijay, EndemolShine, FremantleMedia, ITV Studios, Red Arrow, Tinopolis, Warner Bros International TV Production (of which Warner Bros UK is a subsidiary). *'These groups, which have grown through a combination of acquisition and organic growth: - Have widespread geographical operations encompassing both TV production, distribution of content and digital activities. - Account for an increasingly large share of programming and content spending in most countries. EndemolShine remains the market leader'* (Proud, 2017 p1). A consequence of the Shed Media Group becoming part of WBUKTV (a *super-indie*), is that they no longer qualify as an independent producer — and public service

broadcasters must still commission 25% of their non-news programmes from other independent producers. Figure 9 provides an overview of the organisational types in the independent sector.

Figure 9. The four types of independent broadcasting organisation



Source: Author's own - modified from Proud (2017)

Their rise has made the UK the second-largest global exporter of programmes and formats after the United States (Chalaby, 2010). But by the standard sizes measure of other industrial sectors, these companies would be considered 'large' small and medium-sized enterprises, with fewer than 250 full-time employees. The well-respected journalist and media analyst Torin Douglas provides a masterly summary of the situation and raises concerns about the lack of diverse voices as the commissioning process looks to these *super-indies* to provide the low-risk commissioning option in 2017 and beyond (Douglas, 2016). The independent production sector remains relatively small.

2.4.2 The BTI workforce

Alongside the *super-indies*, a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises, contractors and freelancers continually form value chains and networks, often for a short duration, to provide broadcasters with a pipeline of new products or services (Hesmondhalgh, 2002). They often work in conjunction with the *super-indies*. Even the larger indies will flex the number of staff they employ, depending on the number of programmes they have in production, by up to 80% of their workforce.

Contract and freelance workers provide a continual flow of production staff and services to these companies as needed. This form of working relationship has been termed a latent organisation and has some specific characteristics unique to the BTI. The loose but enduring relationships between freelance and contract staff who subcontract based on trust and mutual professional respect enables ‘*effective*’ production (Starkey et al, 2000). I examine the nature and employment characteristics of the BTI workforce in more detail in Chapter Four and return to the importance of the latent organisation to the media worker in Chapter Seven.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter I set out to help the reader understand the historical background and context to my research. I introduced the key stakeholders and power brokers (such as the DCMS, CBI, NESTA, Pact, ScreenSkills and Ofcom) who as the next chapter shows have shaped the skills policy and the structure of the BTI.

Over the last 50 years the UK creative industries have been impacted by profound changes to its structure and employment landscape. The rise and subsequent consolidation of the independent sector was a consequence of these policy interventions, enabled by technology, enshrined in law to stimulate a competitive market for programme making. There is much debate as to the composition of the creative industries; the nature of a creative occupation and therefore the number and growth of jobs and the GVA of the BTI. This creates ambiguity in establishing the current and future needs of the employer and potential job opportunities.

Changes in employment regulations, the curtailment of union power and the fragmentation of the BTI has created the current precarious working environment for the media worker. Alongside this, the shift in focus on skills development from full time vocational education to industry led SSCs has required the individual to take more responsibility for their own career development. This will be examined in more detail in Chapter Three.

Chapter Three The skills policy process and its relevance to the BTI

3.1 Introduction


This thesis examines the fundamental ambiguities between skills policy and the lives of BTI media workers. I show that, despite the rhetoric about evidence-based policy-making (EBPM), policy changes in the BTI has more to do with effective lobbying than well-researched evidence supported by appropriate data. My research challenges successive governments' skills policy mantra that high-skills lead to high skilled jobs. This refers to a degree (level 6) academic qualification, not an explicit skill set. My work is a critical study of government skills policy formulation as devised and deployed in the BTI.

Chapters Three and Four present a review of the literature that inform this research. In this chapter I examine the policy and policy processes that the UK government has in place to develop and deliver its skills policy. Currently the framework is structured around the sector skills councils (SSCs). They were established to deliver the government skills policy objectives as a consequence of the Leitch Review of skills in 2006: *'Prosperity for all in the Global Economy: World Class Skills'*. I review the reports and legislation that have flowed on from this seminal work that set 2020 as the target year to achieve the goal of world class skills. I analyse the current role of the sector skills councils (SSCs) and conclude with a review of ScreenSkills, the SSC for the BTI.

3.2 Government and public policy

In Chapter One, I identified the three spheres of influence on a job in the BTI as structure, policy and career (Figure 4). Figure 10 presents these three spheres of influence with the addition of some of the factors that surround the media worker in the BTI, from which I draw my themes for Chapters Three and Four.

Figure 10. The 'domains of influence' that impact on the BTI job families



Source: Author's own

In this section, I define what I mean by public policy, examine the policy processes and how particular policies impact on BTI employers and workers. It sets the scene for a more detailed examination of government training and skills policy.

3.2.1 Defining public policy

For the purposes of this thesis, when I use the term 'policy', I mean public policy. It is clear from the literature that scholars prefer to describe the process — or their view of it — rather than stick to a single and seemingly restrictive definition of public policy. There is no consensus on a definition; context is all.

Box 1. Definitions of policy

1. *'The term 'government policy' can be used to describe any course of action which intends to change a certain situation. Think of policies as a starting point for government to take a course of action that makes a real life change.'* (UK government, 2018b)
2. Public policy is *'whatever governments choose to do or not to do.'* (Dye, 1992 p1)
3. *'Public policy-making is not merely a technical function of government; rather it is a complex interactive process influenced by the diverse nature of socio-political and other environmental*

forces. These environmental forces that form the policy context lead to the variation in policies and influences the output and impact.’ (Osman, 2002 p6).

4. Cairney describes policy as being purely government action from start to finish. He challenges claims that policymaking is measured or based on evidence, suggesting that neither the public nor elected policymakers have much influence on what happens in their name (Cairney, 2011).
5. *‘Public policy is the sum of government activities, whether acting directly or through agents, as it has an influence on the life of citizens’ (Peters (2012, cited in Birkland, 2015 p21).*
6. *‘Policy is part of a strategy to attain specific political goals’ (Freedman, 2008 p3).*

Cairney, Dye and Osman all highlight the issue of examining what governments say they will do and comparing it with what they actually do.

Osman’s description is more aligned to the BTI environment, as its relatively high profile and perceived impact on society brings out numerous stakeholder groups and policy networks (see Table 2) to influence the policy discourse.

Thomas Dye says that he *‘discourages elaborate academic discussions of the definition of public policy ... [as they always] seem to boil down to the same thing’ (Dye, 1992 p333).*

This seems somewhat minimalist and not very helpful, although it is biased to government taking some sort of action to solve a problem – see below. I suggest that policy is also about setting the framework from which a course of action might follow.

The literature tends to focus on the attributes of the policy process, or how a government may (or may not) respond to a problem that requires attention on the public’s behalf. The process usually involves: a goal; a change of state or a professed solution; government interpretation and delivery; and the appointed agents or private actors who will have different interpretations of problems, solutions and their own motivations.

I take the view that the term *‘problem’* — often cited in the policy discourse — focuses on the *‘something that must be done’*. And because problems are rarely universal, much is about context and the sector of government concerned. For some stakeholders, there might not be a problem to resolve. With all this in mind, my interpretation is that a

government designs and develops public policy in response to an issue, what it chooses to do or not do, for and on the behalf of the public.

3.2.2 The policy process

As well as aiming to understand the behaviours of a selected sample of media workers in the BTI, this thesis explores the public policy discourse on the value of a qualification, an individual's skill set and employability of the UK graduate – specifically the graduate of a media programme. Despite having the all the hallmarks of a logical, rational policymaking process that addresses the call that *'something must be done'*, I will show that, along with many other policy initiatives, the skills policy has failed to deliver.

Central to my research is the role of government and its espoused set of policies for developing and sustaining the skills of the UK workforce in general and the high-skills industries exemplified by workers in the BTI in particular. At the start of this research, three government departments — the BIS,¹¹ DCMS and DfE — had a direct role in, or impact on, skills policy in the BTI. Each had their own strap line:

DfE *'is committed to creating a world-class state education system. We will work to improve the opportunities and experiences available to children and the education workforce by focusing on the following priorities...'* (DfE, 2012).

DCMS *'works to make sure the communications, creative, media, cultural, tourism, sport and leisure economies have the framework to grow and have real impact on people's lives. We create the conditions for growth by removing barriers, providing strategic direction and supporting innovation and creativity'* (DCMS, 2012).


BIS *is making a difference by supporting sustained growth and higher skills across the economy. BIS: working together for growth* (BIS, 2012a).

The interaction between departments and their delivery agencies is complex and multi-layered. These *'non-government "intermediary organisations"'* (Guile, 2010 p1) as shown in Figure 11 have between two and four tiers of fund management. Many of the first-tier partners have agencies working to them. For example, during the early period of the

¹¹ Dissolved 14 July 2016. Superseded by Department for International Trade, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy.

fieldwork for this research (2014–16) UKCES — a tier 2 partner (T2) — provided funds to the SSCs via the (Alliance of) Sector Skills Councils, who in turn funds the SSC for the BTI, Creative Skillset (now ScreenSkills). In the BTI, the prime agents of policy delivery were Ofcom (T2) and Creative Skillset (T3). Ofcom now sits under the DCMS and regulates employers. ScreenSkills impacts on the citizens — in this case, the media worker. Along with other stakeholders in the industry, Creative Skillset funded the Indie Training Fund (ITF) a T4 agency; which still delivers training programmes to workers in the sector. All of this funding flow is driven by government skills policy. Until it was dissolved in 2016, BIS had 19 partners engaged in the delivery of programmes based on the skills policy of the period. Implicit in RQ3 is the question as to whether this delivery framework has had any impact on improving the skills base of workers in the BTI. A matter I address in Chapters Seven and Eight.

Figure 11. The skills funding trail from DfE, DCMS and BIS, 2013–16



Source: Author's own

The UK's general approach to skills policy over the last 10 years has been to focus on the supply side by raising the qualifications of the low-skilled, increasing the supply of qualified labour and encouraging public-private partnerships with employers to build a 'world-class' skills base (Keep, 2011). The challenge is that, if the policy does not consider demand in general and sectoral needs in particular, it can create a glut of unemployed workers who are not suitably skilled with what both the QAA and HESA call 21st Century

skills (QAA, 2017). This is the situation in the BTI, a problem that no government — Labour, Conservative or coalition — have been able to address. After BIS was dissolved in 2016, ownership of the skills agenda moved back to the DfE. UKCES, the Learning and Skills Council and the Skills Funding Agency were also closed and replaced with the Education and Skills Funding Agency as an executive agency of the DfE.

3.2.3 Formulating and delivering policy

Policymaking is a political process as much as an analytical or problem-solving one that emerges from a deliberate, measured and logical analysis of a ‘problem’. *‘The policymaking process is by no means the rational activity that it is often held up to be in much of the standard literature. Indeed, the metaphors that have guided policy research over recent years suggest that it is actually rather messy, with outcomes occurring as a result of complicated political, social and institutional processes which are best described as “evolutionary”’* (Juma and Clark, 1995 pp128-9).

In this section, I explore a range of government and academic sources and draw on an interview I conducted for this research with a senior civil servant who was a policy advisor in BIS until it was dissolved (Informant A, 2015). He had over 10 years’ experience in crafting policies and seeing them through from consultation to legislation. His insights of policymaking in practice add context to this analysis. I also draw on my own insights from working alongside ministers, policymakers, members of parliament, lobby groups and other stakeholders as director of the BTR / BETR, the regulatory body for training and equality in the BTI.

The literature on policymaking offers a range of issues that might instigate policy development, including:

- Scientific or technical breakthroughs
- Long-term changes in social structures
- An immediate crisis
- The response to a long-term issue that requires change, or
- Professional codes that need to be revised or changed.

There is a whole range of institutions and change agents who network and are stakeholders in trying to affect change, whether for the common good or their own self-interest. Of course, government itself is at the centre of policymaking. I intend to show in this thesis that the BTI has strong groups and networks that influence the formal institutional structures to change policy more profoundly than almost any other sector.

This research considers the interaction between the inner circle of Whitehall (the centre of UK government) and those that seek to lobby for change. In the BTI, organisations with their specific agendas will bring their case to ministers, who favour some groups more than others, considering them the legitimate voice of the sector. ScreenSkills engagement is assured because it was established by government policy and will work through 'legitimate channels'. Ministers will also listen to the Royal Television Society; its royal charter and membership comprising well-known film and TV performers and directors makes it a powerful lobby. If they are ignored, they and the British Academy of Film and Television Arts (BAFTA) can (and do) turn to the media to pronounce on a matter (Henry, 2008).

Other groups are also gaining legitimacy. The Producers Alliance in Cinema and Television (PACT), set up as a lobby group in the early 1980s, has gained membership from most production companies in the UK. It is the legitimate voice of a powerful income generating group with a Minister of State producing a supportive foreword to the PACT report on TV programme exports for 2018-19, estimated at £1.3 billion (PACT, 2019). It is now part of the core stakeholder community consulted by government. Ofcom or the DCMS would not consult on a matter for the sector without ensuring John McVay from PACT is at the table. Single-issue groups such as the TV Collective have emerged over recent years. Founded in April 2009 as a community interest company '*dedicated to promoting the creative and commercial value diversity brings to the British TV, digital media and film industries*' (Pennant, 2018), the TV Collective has been an effective advocacy lobby group. Gathering leading voices such as Sir Lenny Henry and Baroness Oona King of Bow to promote their campaign, they are also now invited to comment and contribute to the policy debate in the BTI. Without doubt, Henry and King get the group star treatment; without them, it would be marginalised. Bolstered by the award of an

MBE Simone Pennant of the TV Collective is now a recognised expert in her own right and is invited to contribute to Ofcom and DCMS enquiries. The TV Collective has gained legitimacy.

Table 2 shows forms of policymaking groups and networks that impact the creative industries in general and the BTI in particular. These agents of change have more influence in the BTI — where formal policymaking processes are more limited — than they would be in, say, the medical professions, with their formal councils and regulatory bodies.

Table 2. Policymaking groups and networks that impact the BTI, with some examples

Internal	External
<p>Primary (A1) The CEO The management team Line managers Regional managers / CEOs</p>	<p>Primary (B1) Customers / Buyers Suppliers Government agencies - HSE Government / Industry Bodies Thinktanks Pressure groups and representative bodies Local government Professionals and academics with relevant expertise EU / EC – policies, harmonisation and funding</p>
<p>Secondary (A2) The workers Recognised trade unions</p>	<p>Secondary (B2) Sector Skills Councils Lobby groups Other industry organisations Trade unions Ad hoc pressure groups and advocacy groups</p>

Source: Author's own

Changes to policy and legislation can come from many sources. Take, for example, the requirement under the 2003 Communications Act for Ofcom to take action over training, skills and equal opportunities in the BTI¹² — a late addition to the Act, instigated by Lord David Puttnam. But, despite being enshrined in the Act, Ofcom did little to comply with these requirements. Lord Puttnam, respected as a knowledgeable person in the industry, lobbied ministers to act and they set up BTSR. But that was not where it ended, as networking does not finish when the policymaking is done. In my role as director of the

¹² See Appendix 2A.

BTSR, I kept Lord Puttnam informed of progress. In turn, he maintained a dialogue with DCMS and Ofcom to ensure the matter was not *'kicked into the long grass'* (Puttnam, 2008). I had a sponsor inside Whitehall to informally keep the issue alive.

In the policy arena, influencers can fade. The trade union BECTU started losing its legitimate power after Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told ITV bosses at a Downing Street summit in 1987 that the BTI was *'the last bastion of restrictive practices'* (Douglas, 2013). This instigated new legislation to curb union power that removed the need to have a union card to work on broadcast programmes. The breaking of the union was in part facilitated by the introduction of new technology into the production process with the introduction of lightweight cameras and portable recording formats. Crew sizes could be reduced and the demarcation lines between location and studio, film and tape became blurred (Block, 1999). BECTU's influence waned further when, in January 2017, it became part of the Prospect trade union. It is now largely ignored by government, even though it produces papers and reports in response to policy consultations.

A framework for examining the policymaking process

Although this picture is of the informal, possibly chaotic nature of the policy process in the creative industries, there have been attempts to offer a framework for academics and analysts to examine the policymaking process across all government departments. Here, I use Peter John's (2013) four models— sequential, implementation, rational and incremental — to underpin the issues raised by other writers on policy in the BTI.

John suggests that the **sequential model** follows a cause and effect process. It is logical and follows what those in government call the policy cycle. Ministers, informed by political ideology, set policy goals. This is the political step. Documents from the Institute for Government suggest that the role of civil servants is to turn the political aspiration into action, either by policy initiatives within existing frameworks of authority or by drafting new legislation. They are led by the policy director in each department, whose job is to *'ensure that ministers are adequately engaged in the policy process'* (Institute for Government, 2011 p9). The expectation is that civil servants, led by the permanent secretary, are politically neutral and follow the fundamentals of good policymaking.

The civil servants (or *'agents of change'*) interviewed for the paper *'Policy-making in the real world'* took the view that policy cycles are *'divorced from reality'* (Hallsworth et al., 2011 p5) — they do not base policies in response to real situations.

But despite this disengagement from reality, government applies a multiplicity of tools and models to manage and monitor the policy process. This is the **implementation model**. In theory, all governments apply what the Institute for Government suggests are *'certain fundamentals of good policymaking which need to be observed at some point in the policy process.'* The checklist highlights *'goals, evidence-based idea generation, rigorous policy design, thorough appraisal and clarity on the role of central government and accountabilities'* (Hallsworth et al., 2011 p8).

The sequential and implementation models highlight the need to establish effective mechanisms for feedback and evaluation (Hallsworth et al., 2011) — all good indicators of a rigorous process. Many sources find that assessing the impact of policies is in what I would call the *'too hard to do'* box, particularly where policy has failed (Foresight, 2013 p5). So, government focuses on improving the policy-making process (Hallsworth et al., 2011). There is an acknowledged gap between the theory and practice of policy-making. The consequence is that *'Government has a tendency to recreate policies and organisations on an alarmingly regular basis. New organisations replace old ones; one policy is ended while a remarkably similar one is launched'* (Norris, 2017 p5). This has impacted on civil servants' efforts to improve their market intelligence and validate the case to put before ministers and back to the various stakeholders.

The first two models indicate a coherent and logical — ideally linear — approach to the policymaking process. The other two models are from the same mould. The **rational** model suggests that the process is *'logical, reasoned and neutral'* (John, 2013 p24). This model would:

- Have a rational definition of the nature of the issue
- Propose possible courses of action

- Assess the advantages and disadvantages of each of these alternatives
- Model these for risk and impact, and
- Have a process for choosing the option that offers the best solution.

The policy would then be implemented and the outcome ideally evaluated (Sutton, 1999 p9).

The **incremental** model has its corollary in the behaviours of managers. In their discussion on emergent strategies, Mintzberz et al. (1998) observed that companies arrived at strategic change through a series of manageable steps. It is an iterative process of controlling an organisation's ecosystem and not opening it up to disruptive change. Because it is a risk-adverse and bounded process, the approach is attractive to policymakers.

Policymakers look at a small number of alternatives for dealing with a problem and tend to choose options that differ only marginally from existing policy, focusing on small changes to existing policies rather than dramatic fundamental changes. The model suggests that major change occurs through a series of iterative small steps, each of which does not fundamentally *'rock the boat'*, so what is feasible politically tends to be only marginally different from existing policies. The *'policy process is one of disjointed incrementalism or muddling through'* (Lindblom, 1979 p522).

Policy is primarily initiated by politicians and managed by civil servants. My policy-specialist informant told me: *"I think 80% of the work we do is actually driving policy forward or managing policy. Only 20% of it goes into what is on the statute books and I think most of the work we do is trying to come up with a policy or trying to bring the Act [referencing a particular Act] into life through policy-making"* (Informant A, 2015). He went on to explain that civil service policymakers monitor the impact of government legislation and follow an **incremental** model, bringing forward policies for ministerial approval to drive the government agenda. Civil servants instigate new policies or bring ideas to ministers' attention and are aware of vested interests embodied in stakeholder groups, lobbyists and thought leaders set out to influence policy development.

A comprehensive report on policymaking came from three former senior civil servants: Morris, Simpson and Waller. Its credibility is based on the premise that *'It is simply our account of how things work'* (Waller et al., 2010 p4). Their report speaks to the notion that *'Policy in Government is a well-understood concept. Everyone has an instinctive understanding of what it means and what it involves. It is essentially a term for the Government's attitude towards any given aspect of public life – and what it proposes to do, or is doing, to tackle the issues involved'* (Waller et al, 2010 p15). Given the matters I have discussed in the previous sections, I cannot say I agree with their assumption. However, I reference their example of the renewal of the BBC Charter in the section on **Influencing policy** to illustrate the policy process.

Evidence, groups and networks

To the independent observer, it may seem obvious that policies — whether in a private business or created by government — should be based on evidence. Yet the idea of EBPM only became part of the government agenda under the first Blair government, when David Blunkett, Secretary of State for Education at the time, posed a seemingly innovative proposal in a speech to the ESRC. He said that, for policy initiatives to be effective, they should be based on what works and that civil servants need to advise on why they work and provide evidence of this (Blunkett, 2000b). Parsons summed up the matter of policymaking in his paper *'From muddling through to muddling up'* (Parsons, 2002).

Until that time, the essence of public policy was driven primarily by political diktat expressed in the manifesto of the successful winner of the general election. Independent reviews that look back on UK government policies since 1945 and their effect across all industrial sectors describe them as *'an almost unmitigated failure'* (Foresight, 2013 p4), based on short-term goals and a stop-start interventionist approach. Whatever the starting point and influences on the way, policy is about government action or inaction and the route to legislation.

The relevance for this thesis is the quality of the evidence and the way in which various policy networks of organisations, groups of individuals and other stakeholders present that evidence to influence policy. In the context of this thesis, I focus on how this

influences the skills policy agenda in particular, where we have already seen that when politicians agree with a particular position, *'they may invite the experts into the circles of power, providing an opportunity for such communities to have a substantial influence on the policy process.'* (Sutton, 1999 p12). As I have previously stated, it is better to have those voices (see Table 2) inside than outside the process.

Richardson and Jordan (1979) address how groups influence and drive policy, and Rhodes (1997) explores this issue from a more specific UK perspective. But, while there may be an audit trail of evidence to support current skills policy, the data I gathered for this research lead me to challenge whether the quality of the evidence is enough to substantiate current skills policy in high-skills industries such as BTI. Rhodes's analysis might go some way to explain why the BTI policy community — exemplified by Creative Skillset and NESTA, *'a restricted set of actors and organisations which influence decision making in a policy sector'* (John, 2013 p185) — drives through change despite opposition from those who represent an issue network. The consultation exercise to invoke the creative intensity model is a case in point: NESTA's view became the model despite strong opposition from industry representatives who united to form an ad hoc issue network to influence and ideally block this policy proposal (see Appendix 1c for the submissions by the Craft Council and the Creative & Cultural Skills sector skills council).

The various forces of political pragmatism and social reality (see Table 2) set the political agenda for the civil service to develop and deliver viable policies. In the case of the creative industries and the BTI, various interest groups continue to lobby policymaking and the government decisions. I consider their efforts in Chapter Six and Seven.

Organisations with a vested interest in the BTI produce their own policy papers to influence government directly or via Ofcom — for example, NESTA's *'Manifesto for the creative economy'* (2013a) and the Work Foundation's position paper lobbying for the future of the creative industries (Reid et al, 2010). Creative Skillset made the case for policy changes on an annual basis — within its biennial reports on the workforce (Creative Skillset, 2010, 2013a, 2015b) and through data gathered from employers (Creative Skillset, 2011, 2014). Some observers suggest this is as much to ensure the continuation

of Creative Skillset/ScreenSkills' own role as it is about the needs of the creative industries (Informant I, 2015) (see Chapter Six for further discussion).

At the start of 2018, Ofcom began a new consultation round on equality and diversity. At the close of the consultation (February 2018), 19 organisations submitted evidence papers and a number were called to a round table event in July 2018 chaired by Sharon White, the Ofcom CEO. PACT, BECTU, ScreenSkills and others have professional lobbyists ready to respond to consultation papers, in addition to their regular engagements with regulators and policymakers. They get a seat at the table. Those devising policy take soundings from these organisations to ensure a smooth development and delivery process. Smaller organisations and individuals are not consulted, so their voices are often lost. The outcome was another report, with, in terms, *could do better*, as the last line of the executive summary (Ofcom, 2018c). The vested interests set out in the skills policy community in Chapter Seven Figure 31 might go some way to explain this lack of progress.

Policy does not always conclude with a new piece of legislation. It can be about government putting a greater focus on existing powers and expecting their agents to take a more active stance on the matter. The outcomes of policy can also have unintended consequences. For example, the focus on ethnic diversity in the BTI (and film industry) in 2016 redirected government funding via Creative Skillset/ScreenSkills from a successful women directors' mentoring scheme led by Women in Film & TV that had been running for over five years (Informant D, 2016). The programme was under threat of closure but managed secure funding from other sources.

Networking is an inherent part of working in the creative industries. It is how people get jobs and exchange ideas on concerns (Lee, 2011, Eigler, 2016). The promotion literature for any event held by the Royal Television Society, BAFTA or BFI includes a line about the networking opportunity. Favoured social venues such as the Groucho club, the Hospital

Club and BAFTA are where the ‘movers and shakers’ gather to see and been seen and exchange views. Some events are explicitly arranged as networking opportunities¹³.

In Table 2, I set out the different parties that can contribute to the policymaking process, classifying them as internal to the process (A) — some writers call them actors as they have the power to act — and external to the process (B). The internal people are elected; the external are unelected. For both types, I suggest that there are primary (A1 & B1) and secondary (A2 & B2) stakeholders.

NESTA is unelected and has no constitutional role of official legitimacy. But DCMS adopted NESTA’s ‘*Manifesto for the creative economy*’ and its proposal for ‘*creative intensity*’ (Dynamic mapping NESTA, 2013) despite great opposition from B2 stakeholders during the consultation process (DCMS, 2013b). Without a doubt, favoured thinktanks with a direct line to a minister trump any B2 policy groups despite suggestions that producer groups have a greater influence over policy decisions than consumer groups (Beer, 1965). The fading power of BECTU fits that model. But as an autonomous organisation, the influence of NESTA is more complex. It also wields great influence within DCMS, as it was established by Lord Puttnam.

This leads onto the issue of the forms of **evidence** and how the evidence is qualified and validated. Data from some sources — particularly Creative Skillset’s biennial workforce data report — were neither examined nor challenged, yet they become axiomatic to thinktank and academic reports. The workforce data and changes to the definition of the creative sector as instigated by NESTA have skewed the structure of the creative industries by removing the loss-making subsectors. This has made comparisons with historical data almost impossible and makes it harder to triangulate ONS and Creative Skillset data. In recognition of questions over the validity of historical data, ScreenSkills have adopted a different methodology in partnership with the Work Foundation and adopted an approach that gathers data and ‘*evidence assessment and insights gained*

¹³ <https://rts.org.uk/event/new-year-networking>

from a series of in-depth Delphi Panel interviews with 22 industry experts' (ScreenSkills, 2018).

Influencing policy

Policymaking has come under increasing scrutiny by internal government agencies, independent thinktanks and academics. An Institute for Government study of policymaking during and after the Blair leadership concluded that, although policy processes were well defined, there was no quality control to create robust policies and the process required improvement (Hallsworth et al., 2011). Parsons had previously highlighted the same issue, asserting that the old model was about *muddling through* and the new model was about *muddling up* (Parsons, 2002 pp53-57).

The BBC Charter renewal in 2006 illustrates the complexity of the policy process in the creative industries. The renewal was a matter of wide public interest and concern (Waller et al 2010 pp24-25) prompting the government to engage in an almost unprecedented public consultation as well as producing Green and White papers in the normal round of the legislative process. Waller concluded that the wider consultation *'faced down sectional interests'* (Waller, 2010 p25). I suggest that the ability for any stakeholder to submit their statement to this process online and have the consultation process open to all has curtailed (to some extent) a perception of decisions being made behind the closed doors of Whitehall. However, the caveat — as noted in the 2018 Ofcom consultation on diversity — is that the B1 groups noted in Table 2 have professionals ready to lobby their cause. In tune with Cairney's (2011) view, this wider consultation process is really only a marginal democratisation of the process.

Informant A: *"Stakeholder management and consultation becomes an integral part and element because I think it is just not [that] the policy doesn't come out as a surprise to people as the policy is supposed to be kind of driven and work done with the key stakeholders and I think the key stakeholders then become your voice out in the space, in the field, and try and drive the policy. I would be very surprised if any government policy comes out which is kind of largely a surprise unless the prime minister or right at the top, they want to make a political statement through obviously either the budget or in*

anything else. Often everything that comes out has come through the proper channels. I think we have the policy professional framework within the government which we are supposed to follow which has got the different steps for me to take to make sure our policies are evidence driven... “

As policy development has become more professional, so have the efforts of those seeking to influence policy. The rise of EBPM has, to an extent, given focused more attention on evidence from stakeholders than the ‘*evidence as an argument*’ that Cairney (2016) highlights. The philosophy of open government and consultation has prompted ministers to engage a new breed of individuals to help filter the incoming material. Special advisors working closely with politicians try to keep the government one step ahead of the opposition, the media and external lobbying groups to position its case in an appropriately positive light. In the popular press some have called this ‘*spin*’.

Informant A: “*...as you know the SPADs [special political advisers] are the ones who are obviously very political and as things stand you need to go through both the Lib Dems and the Conservative SPADs, because obviously they need to under the coalition agreements [The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government lasted from 2010- 2015, known as the Cameron–Clegg coalition]. I think they might help convert which is like a civil service language into a political language instead of one thing, but I think the role of the civil service finishes because the SPADs would put it in the shape they really want it.*”

Without doubt, special advisors are the first among equals. Those attempting to influence policy can be seen as inside or outside ‘the big tent’, depending on how inclusive the government of the day wants to appear (BBC News, 2007).

Any policy has multiple stakeholders. There are those who are part of the process and those who are outside it, yet want to influence it. Table 2 shows the range of interested parties and their initial position to influence to any policy. In practice, there can be hundreds of stakeholders vying for policymakers’ attention. They can change according to the value the internal workings of Whitehall place on their contribution or sponsorship.

Other ways to impact the decisions politicians make include a campaign in the popular press or voicing opinions via an MP's surgery. The UK government argues that *'Consultation is a great way for everyone to have a direct say in the policy-making process'* (UK government, 2018b).

Three individuals within NESTA — Hasan Bakhshi, Ian Hargreaves and Juan Mateos-Garcia — were able to influence the DCMS minister of state to recast the definition and hence the composition of the creative industries based on NESTA's formula. The new model based in creative intensity has completely changed the structure of the industry. It was a solution looking for a problem. The reformation of the creative industries (which I analyse further in Chapter Six) was concluded despite much opposition from other organisations and individuals who responded to the consultation process. Since 2015, the ONS has used the new data model to define the sector composition, workforce and statistics. Removing some sub-groups and including others has significantly increased the sector's contribution to GVA (ONS, 2016) enabling ministers and others to extol the contribution of the booming creative industries in press releases: *'Creative industries' record contribution to UK economy - GOV.UK'* (DCMS, 2017a). In Chapter Seven I return to this matter and recast the creative industries policy community based on insights provided by my informants.

3.3 Current skills policies

I began this thesis with a view — based on personal experience of leading the BTSR/BETR — that there was little to link the development and delivery of workforce training and education in the BTI to the evidence of need. I argue that the process for identifying needs, communicating these to government and the policies that emerged from this process were based on poor labour market intelligence from Skillset, then renamed Creative Skillset now ScreenSkills, the SSC responsible for the BTI. Creative Skillset reports to the DCMS had limited validation and there was no independent triangulation.

In this section, I discuss education and skills policy, the debate about the UK's high-skills workforce and the consequential impact on the BTI.

3.3.1 Education policy

Education policy is a fundamental element to the role any government. It goes to the heart of the debate between state intervention and a *laissez-faire* approach. As Bell suggests, *'the state almost universally has a key role in the provision and/or regulation of education services'* (Bell, 2006a p25).

But can government — any government — implement an effective education and skills strategy? Opposing forces will pick over the debate between state and private education; the state's role in developing the skills of the workforce and employers' role in training and developing their staff; and getting a degree or doing an apprenticeship. What emerges is the rise of one form of education or skills development and the devaluation of the other.

The policy strategy of marketising post-secondary education, supported by all governments since Thatcher, has transformed universities. Some argue that the purpose of UK higher education sectors is now as a centre for training and wealth generation in the so-called 'knowledge economy', underpinned by neo-liberal economic ideas at odds with the pre-Thatcherite *'ivory towers'* model (Canaan and Shumar, 2008). This research asks whether developing the skills and employability of graduates who aspire to be media workers has worked.

In an article for the Independent on Sunday setting out the policy for the next Labour government, Tristan Hunt reworked Tony Blair's 2007 mantra: *'We need skills, skills, skills or else we're stuffed'* (Hunt, 2015). In the article, the man who would have been education secretary said he would be *'delighted'* if one of his children chose an apprenticeship rather than university, he pledged that technical and vocational education would be his *'number one mission in the job'*. He did not get the job, Nick Boles did — and he also had to extol the virtues modern apprenticeships. *'Announce you've decided to do an apprenticeship, and many will assume you either failed to get into university or you want to be a tradesman. "A lot of parents and teachers don't understand that pretty much everything from law to web developing can be accessed through a modern apprenticeship," says Nick Boles, minister of state for skills and equalities'* (Dickinson, 2016). The policy to encourage at least 50% of all school leavers to get a degree has

devalued the apprenticeship route to high-skills in the minds of parents. This issue, unique to the UK in the European context, has precipitated the crisis in higher education as the reliance on overseas post-graduate students to financially prop up an institution is under threat by competition within the sector, the inflated salaries of vice-chancellors and their senior management teams. Now, the Augar Review (2019) into post-18 education and funding recommends lower home student fees and a more interventionist policy in the post-18 education market that is failing to deliver skilled graduates (Jeffreys, 2019).

In her book *'The language of education policy: from Thatcher to Blair'*, Mulderrig (2009) discusses the issue of *'truths'* and how policy is legitimised by the stories governments publish and their attempts to simplify the debate. This supports Cairney's (2011) argument that evidence as an argument is a powerful influence on policy, summed up as the context of influence. When vested interests such as the CBI, SSCs and academia lobby Whitehall, it has little to do with the needs and capabilities of the UK workforce, because time and again skills shortages come as a surprise to industry and government. Social inclusion, diversity and social mobility form part of the rhetoric that drives policy as much as hard evidence because, as Prime Minister Cameron announced, *'it is the right thing to do'* (Cameron, 2011).

3.3.2 Defining skills and crafts

Before considering skills policies in detail, I will review the concept of skills as applied in the UK context. At the 1996 Labour Party Conference, Tony Blair famously stated: *'Ask me my three main priorities for government, and I tell you: education, education, and education'* (Blair, 1996). But like every other UK government in the last 40 years, his government focused on developing the skills of the workforce — not on education — as the government-commissioned Leitch review of the skills needed to have world class capabilities attests.

In the UK, there is a strong focus on the supply side of the economy as a driver for growth (Leitch, 2006). A highly skilled workforce is seen as a prime requirement to stimulate sustainable economic growth (Mandelson, 2010, Payne, 2000, 2011) and this underpins many government policy initiatives. The UK literature on vocational education and

training (VET), as Winch (2011 pp101-17) points out, repeats the phrase that *'high skills lead to high (economic) growth'*. He makes the case that, *'compared to many countries in Europe particularly France, Germany and the Netherlands, [the UK has] a profoundly different understanding of "skill"'*. Winch also questions the domination of skills in the discourse and delivery of the UK's VET policy agenda, from SSCs to the Leitch Review, all of which consider high-skills to be panacea to the UK's economic woes.

In the UK, a lack of skills is considered a key barrier to economic growth and a factor in limiting job opportunities, particularly for new joiners to the workforce (Keep and James, 2011). BIS, created in 2009, incorporated higher education and skills into one single government department. This move signalled the priority given to HE, skills and employability that past governments had failed to deliver (Tomlinson, 2007). Skills and employability became key determinants to prosperity and growth potential in the UK economy (BIS, 2010).

Most of the UK's learning classification and skills development systems that make explicit reference to knowledge, skills and attitude can be traced back to Bloom's cognitive, affective and psychomotor domains of 1956. Some have argued that Bloom's Taxonomy¹⁴ lacks rigour as it was not based on measurable indices, or scientifically rigorous (Kompa, 2017). Nevertheless, it remains a reference tool that has influenced full-time education and continuing development programmes within industry, as seen in the College of Optometrists' continuing professional development model (2018).

Bloom's Taxonomy has congruence with the UK's VET system, where skills — particularly those that sit on the lower rungs of the taxonomy hierarchy — are the key output. The ability to evaluate and synthesise — two of the higher order attributes in the cognitive domain — are not considered in the work-based National Vocation Qualification (NVQ) levels 1-4 (City & Guilds, 2018). This functional approach to skills in the UK context undermines Leitch's notion of world class skills (Leitch, 2006). An ESRC research report argues that world class skills must embrace the higher order capabilities (Keep, 2011), but in its current use in the UK, *'skill'* focuses on functional ability. France, Germany and the

¹⁴ www.learning-theories.com/blooms-taxonomy-bloom.html

Netherlands do not share this approach; rather, they focus on developing overall competence.

The meaning of 'skill' in the UK labour market

The skills debate focuses on two things: its definition or current meaning and the implications it has for policy. Understanding what skill means in the current UK labour market is key to understanding the role of the creative industries' SSCs and their terms of trade. In Chapter One (Section 1.2.6) I presented some definitions for a skills hierarchy as applied to the UK. However, the matter is open to interpretation as Box 2 shows.

Box 2. Definitions of skill

1. *'The ability to do something well'* (OECD, 2018). This applies to anyone, from a skilled craftsman supervised by their guild to a skilled surgeon supervised by their professional practice organisation.
2. *'The ability to apply knowledge and use knowhow to complete tasks and solve problems'* (EU, 2019).
3. *'A particular occupation or activity'* (Leitch, 2006 p xi). This view sees skills as something specific and task-orientated.

Winch (2011) suggests that a set of skills does not necessarily define a job or competence. For example, a PhD student may acquire a set of research skills, but this does not indicate how well he or she can complete the task of producing a thesis to defend in the *viva voce*. It is just a checklist. Leitch did much to influence this deconstruction of the *'skilled worker'* into a set of functional operational abilities primarily valued in the workplace (Leitch, 2006). This focus on basic and transferable skills suppressed and undervalued the higher-order level of skills that craftspeople of the past may have learnt and demonstrated through apprenticeships and appointment to the guilds.

In an interview for this thesis, Linda Clarke, professor of European Industrial Relations at Westminster Business School (and co-author with Winch) suggests that *'the employer-led approach embodied in the sector skill councils focuses on firms' specific needs and the task to be completed [Firms] are not explicitly looking for professional skills or higher-order capabilities defined by Bloom's Taxonomy. They want the task done, a Taylorist approach'* (Informant J, 2016). This supports my earlier comment about addressing the needs of

both employers and the economy, not nourishing the high-skills vision for the benefit of the individual. The pragmatists might talk about meeting a need and higher education not residing in the ivory towers. The libertarians might suggest that we should be developing renaissance people who are capable of applying themselves to a wider range of novel challenges. I explore this further in my review of the hot shot research respondents in Chapter Seven.

3.3.3 Applying skills to qualifications and work

Box 2 presents three working definitions of the term 'skill', they are centred on an ability and linked to an action (not necessarily competently) as part of a task within a job. UKCES, the organisation charged with developing a high-skills economy, found it easier to talk in terms of a skills gap than a defined need: *'It's a trickier question than you think... If you have a member of staff who is not fully proficient in their job role, then that is what we'd define as a skills gap'* (UKCES, 2015). This seems to duck the question of a skill, not address it. It suggests a *'we know it when we see it'* point of view.

City and Guilds (C&G) (2019), provides services to education and has a long history of qualification design and management, predominantly in work-based learning. C&G offers a taxonomy of skills and argues that the term *'skills'* has become synonymous with technical and vocational education and training (TVET). This has created an assumption that skills from TVET programmes only relate to technical — also known as *'manual'* or *'non-cognitive'* — skills (City & Guilds, 2018).

C&G has four skills domain subsets, which this thesis has incorporated into its career model:

- **Basic:** literacy and numeracy skills that are the foundation for developing all other skills
- **Generic:** also known as interpersonal or life skills, these have a broader relevance to daily life, not just to the workplace
- **Employability:** these skills are transferable between sectors and occupations and help individuals become and remain active participants of the labour market, and
- **Technical or job-specific** skills needed to work in a given industry or business; it is possible for one person to have more than one area of technical expertise.

Historically, skills were associated with a specific job within a craft occupation. A time-serving apprentice would work alongside their mentor to develop the skills required to complete a task or produce a product. Along the way, they absorbed the rites and rituals of the craft community they were destined to join. The end of the apprenticeship was often celebrated with a passing out ceremony. One of the most famous is that of the newly qualified cooper, or barrel maker, who would get their indenture papers after being placed in a new barrel, covered in soot and rolled round the cooperage.

Today, skills are no longer unique to a craft or job. Of the four broad capabilities or domains, as set out by C&G, only one is job-specific. What emerges from the discourse on skills is the shift from the notion of a craftsman skilled in a trade to a portfolio of attributes that all UK workers should have, which include soft, transferable skills that are not specific to any one job. High on this set of attributes is the much-debated requirement for graduates to be employable. But even on this attribute, there is no accord. Box 3 shows four definitions of 'employability'.

Box 3. Definitions of employability

1. *'The capability of getting and keeping satisfactory work'* UK Universities (Department of Business Innovation and Skills, 2008).
2. *'The skills almost everyone needs to do almost any job'* (UK Commission for Employment and Skills, (2015).
3. *'A set of achievements, understandings and personal attributes that make individuals more likely to gain employment and to be successful in their chosen occupations'* Higher Education Funding Council for England /DfES ESECT group (Knight and Yorke, 2003).
- 1 *'A set of attributes, skills and knowledge that all labour market participants should possess to ensure they have the capability of being effective in the workplace — to the benefit of themselves, their employer and the wider economy'* (CBI, 2013).

Employability is about getting and keeping a job, not by being skilled in a trade or craft, but by having the soft or social skills that this research will demonstrate are as important in the BTI as the functional skills of any job or occupation.

To illustrate this in the context of the BTI, I offer the example of a production worker logging 'takes' on a location shoot. They are expected to note the start and finish timecodes (a system that identifies each frame of the recording) as well as any comments from the director. However, a logger might also note the light, the match of continuity to

the previous or following shot, any notes from the sound recordist or anything else they may think is important. This will be based on their experience of working with a director or production team. It is these extra notes that differentiate the experienced competent worker from the new entrant. The functional ability is one of the subsets of skills under the heading '*Overseeing cues, timings and continuity during recording*' in the production assistant's job description on the ScreenSkills website. This example illustrates how the meaning of the term 'skills' in UK skills policy discourse excludes non-task specific capabilities such as communication and management skills that may make someone effective in the workplace. Not only are these applied to a job — in this case, production assistant — they are also considered transferable to other roles.

I question the usefulness of employability when divorced from a specific role. As Keep and Payne (2011) argue, boosting the supply of skills as a route to improved economic prosperity and social inclusion or mobility is not enough. Tackling the '*skills problem*' needs a more integrative and holistic approach, which may come under the generic or transferable skills identified by C&G.

Skills are a key policy lever for delivering economic performance and social mobility, but the emphasis is on skills supply rather than employers' demands as Tristram Hunt (2015) argued. A series of SKOPE working papers argue that skills policies need to be better integrated with economic development and business improvement policies (Keep, 2011, 2012). The 2010–15 coalition government's White Paper on skills for sustainable growth emphasised demand-led funding, with the Skills Funding Agency routing funds to providers according to learners' and employers' purchasing choices (BIS, 2011). However, the central assumption — that there is a latent or pent-up demand for education, training and skills in both employers and individuals, to be released in a more flexible market — remains to be proven. In Chapter Eight, I make the case that a skills policy without an industrial policy is a limited model, a matter resurrected by Prime Minister May in August 2016.

The marginalisation of craft

The governments' mapping of the creative industries in 2012 shows that the term 'craft' is under pressure (Taylor, 2013). Although individuals in the creative industries talk about

their craft, the coalition government proposed to remove craft as a subsector of the creative industries because it was deemed not to be creative (Dodd, 2013a).

A definition of 'craft' usually references the practical application of skills within a community of practice. But the notion of craft has been devalued, as the current creative industries model does not consider the tradition of a craft honed through guild membership to be creative. The DCMS case that crafts are hobbies was challenged by Dodd (2013a) on behalf of the Craft Council.

The term still has modern relevance. For example, the Cine Guilds of Great Britain was set up in 1990 to work alongside the existing three guilds of writers, directors and cameramen to *'ensure that the latest standards for various grades in the industry more closely reflect the actual work done in the different sectors of film and television work'* (Cine Guilds of Great Britain, 1990). All see themselves as crafts people. Devaluing the notion of a craft may also be a consequence of the precarious nature of working in the creative industries, as a craft requires longevity in a role.

Trade, craft, job or occupation?

Most users of the terms trade, craft, job or occupation will apply them as the situation or mood dictates. People might talk about doing their job or honing their craft. An application form for a graduate post in a TV company may ask for details of a candidate's previous occupation —and within that occupation (or role) the individual might have a defined qualification. The same company might ask a rigger or driver about their last job.

Trade has at its root the notion of exchanging goods and services. It becomes more focused with the term 'tradesman' (or woman) that the Cambridge business dictionary describes as *'someone who works in a trade that needs skill at using your hands, usually in the building industry'*. Tradesmen working in the building industry — carpenters, plumbers, plasterers and bricklayers — will without doubt exhibit craft skills. There is also a hierarchy in the building industry, based on the apprenticeship, qualifications and guilds to which some of these workers might belong. The notion of a craft remains and implies the development of skills acquired through practical application.

The Cambridge Business Dictionary defines a **job** as *'regular work that someone does to earn money'*. A **job** refers to an employment contract. An **occupation** is defined as a job, but is also a formal category of labour. So, for example, while paediatrician is an occupation, a corresponding job would be a registrar at a hospital. The job description will involve specific tasks within a specific working environment as defined by the lead consultant or medical director. Similarly, a media worker may list *'video editor'* as their occupation, but their job as a post-production news editor for the BBC. It is the job, not the occupation, that involves processes and editorial policies to determine a set of tasks.

Box 4. Working definitions for knowledge, skill, ability, craft, capability and competence

Drawing on the discussion set out in the previous sections, these are the working definitions I use in this thesis: **Knowledge:** the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject.

Skill: task-based ability developed through training or experience.

Ability: the quality of being able to do something.

Craft: the practical application of skills within a community of practice.

Capability: the potential to develop abilities based on skills built on knowledge.

Competence: a measure of the output of delivering a skill or set of skills to an agreed standard.

3.3.4 UK skills policy: not a framework; but a muddled set of initiatives and random actions

Having defined skills and associated terms, in general, I now consider the UK skills policy. The current framework for policies on skills was established by the Leitch Report (2006), which has informed the UK skills policy since its publication, underpinning policy discourse with a focus on the supply of skills... *'Without increased skills, we condemn ourselves to a lingering decline in competitiveness and a bleaker future for all'* (Leitch, 2006 p6).

The DCMS and DfE are the government departments with a direct role in — or impact on — the workforce skills policy in the BTI. Both departments support the case for the supply side and make repeated reference to the Leitch Report.

In the preceding section, I argue that the UK's functional, technical, job-specific approach to skills does not focus on high-skills. Lloyd and Payne (2003) consider the language of skills policy in a paper that examines and questions the description of the UK as a *'high-*

skills society'. They note the commitment by Tony Blair's 2003 government (a pledge that the consequent Conservative government retained) to a high-skills future for the UK.

Lloyd and Pane identify three constituencies with very different perspectives on the skills policy debate: government and 'social actors'; educationalists; and industry (Lloyd, 2003 p126). They note that, despite the use of terms such as '*knowledge economy*', '*high-skills society*' and '*a learning society*'... '*confusion, tensions and contradictions*' still exist.

Although their discussion avoids, or misses, the more nuanced debate around where to draw the line between low, medium and high-skills, I agree with their point that '*high skills are far from being the consensual policy option they initially appear*' (Lloyd, 2003 p117). I examine the debate around high-skills and higher level skills in Chapters Seven and Eight, where I argue that none of the skills policy debates are about high-skills / higher level skills occupations, and that this has implications for the BTI, which tends to recruit people with those higher level skills.

Bell and Stevenson (2006b pp27-29) consider in their text the work of Taylor et al. (1979) to devise a list of questions for the education policy analyst. With apologies to both, I have taken this framework and recast it for skills instead of education. The questions follow the logic of the sequential model I discuss in Section 3.2.3. I use them in Chapter Seven to help structure my analysis of the skills policy as it impacts on the BTI.

Fundamentally, we can define a policy as a statement made by an organisation that sets out its attitude and possibly behaviour towards an issue. It may also set out its goals, aspirations and guidelines for achieving those goals. There are many routes to public policymaking, underpinned by the relationship between the policymaker, knowledge and power (Parsons, 2002). In principle, government policy is a consequence of the strategy set out in a political manifesto or formulated from a course of action to address a social issue highlighted by a minister of state. Most commentators agree that it is a fluid process of negotiating, bargaining and accommodating many stakeholders who wish to influence a policy. An aspect of any policy is a government's ability or capability to predict and provide or just cope with events. Changes in demographics, industry needs, international issues — even the economy — impact and often undermine government aspirations.

It has been suggested that until the second Blair government of 2001–05, policymaking had been about *'muddling through'*, as Lindblom (1959) first described it. Parsons (2002) develops his case for the poor implementation of EBPM since 2001 with reflections on *'muddling through'*, given the influences and pressures from various policy networks. The case for taking a scientific approach and to look for evidence to either define a policy to change it through EBPM, to be independent of the political framework (as much as it can be) is managerial and incrementalistic in nature. A defining moment for this new approach to policy formulation came when David Blunkett essentially set out the case for public policy to be driven by the evidence (Blunkett, 2000a).

There is no definitive UK government policy document on skills. The consensus view from independent analysts and sectional interests are that the system is fragmented and not delivering high skilled workers to industry. *'Skills policy in the UK has focused almost exclusively on increasing the supply of skills, with the assumption that the availability of a more highly qualified workforce would lead employers to shift to higher-value product market strategies...this productivity miracle has clearly failed to materialise'* (Atkinson, 2019 p6).

The expressed goals of the UK skill policy is to boost productivity (Campbell, 2016). This established the rationale to put employers at the centre of the skills system with the SSCs and make the process demand led. According to the Association of Employment and Learning Providers, employers having control is *'more rhetoric than reality'* (Fino, 2019).

To boost productivity the objective is to have a high skilled workforce. This has also been subject of much criticism. There are two dimensions to this matter, the understanding of the level of skills and the mismatch and utilisation of appropriately skilled people in the workforce. As discussed in Chapter One within the policy-making community high-skills have become synonymous with a degree level qualification. This is not the view shared by industry where skills are considered distinct and different from a qualification. In recognising the difference Universities UK use the term higher level skills for the QAA skill set (See Chapter One Section 1.3.6).

Some analysts are highly critical of the current model and the focus in the UK has been to deliver low-level skills through the Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs). The relationship of the LEP network to the creative industries SSC has been at best piecemeal and focused on the low skilled jobs.

In summary, what emerges from all the reports reviewed for this research from 2008 onwards is that the mismatch and poor utilisation of high level skills coupled with poor management has, in part, maintained the UK's poor productivity. The rationale from Universities UK may be different from the CIPD and the UK government's Foresight Future of Skills and Lifelong Learning project but the outcome and impact is agreed; poor literacy and numeracy '*a low skills equilibrium*', the mismatch between supply and demand, limited adult or continuous learning have kept the UK disadvantaged in comparison with our key competitors in Europe.

An earlier CIPD's report was also critical to the '*It is tempting to focus on a few select, topend sectors and on high growth companies. The fashion changes, but at the moment it is high tech and exports to new markets that are paraded as the easy solutions. They are important, but ultimately they are not enough to ensure a broad-based competitive economy*' (CIPD, 2014 p23). This focus has not changed, the creative industries are a '*topend sector*'.

This research set out to establish if the current UK skills policy is effective in delivering appropriately skilled graduates to the creative industries and to the BTI in particular. To accomplish that objective as all the independent reports attest timely and accurate labour market intelligence is key. In Chapter Six I review the data on the BTI.

3.3.5 The UK skills policy delivery, UKCES and the Sector Skills Councils

The main purpose of the SSCs are to provide the evidence government needs to modify its skills policy. Their role is to gather labour market intelligence (LMI) from sector and subsector employers and predict trends so that UK plc can provide the skills needed by

the industry in the future. I argue in Chapter Six that Skillset / Creative Skillset have not delivered robust LMI.

UKCES set up the SSCs under the banner of the Alliance of SSCs. They included Skillset (now ScreenSkills) and another 24 councils. Skillset's tasks were to gather and feedback data to UKCES to:

- Support employers in developing and managing apprenticeship standards
- Reduce skills gaps and shortages and improve productivity
- Boost the skills of their sector workforces, and
- Improve learning supply.

Like all the SCCs, Skillset produced an employers' and workforce report on a biennial basis. Today, ScreenSkills continues to gather data but in a modified form . UKCES used these reports to inform government and recommend revisions to policy in its annual report, which aggregates data from all SSCs to support employers, reduce skills gaps, boost skills and improve learning. This task now falls to The Federation for Industry Sector Skills & Standards (FISSS) and its effectiveness is discussed in Chapter Eight.

This is a very simplified model, as SSCs separately lobby their relevant government department and ministers. They also commission thinktank and academic reports to help make their case for funding and support.

The CIPD summed up the situation in a 2017 report on skills in the UK over the last 20 years. Its title — *'From "inadequate" to "outstanding": making the UK's skills system world class'* — says it all. The report concludes that *'at the heart of addressing the UK's low productivity level and the associated high proportion of low-skilled and low-paid jobs in the economy is the improvement of how skills are both developed and used. At the same time, we will only raise employer demand for investment in higher skills through improvements in how people are led and managed and increasing the proportion of high-performance workplaces'* (CIPD, 2017 p3).

The CIPD report is damning on the whole skills policy process. *'There is a strikingly constant theme in official statements announcing new developments in the UK skills system, which is a yawning gap between the ambition of the statement and the means to achieve significant change'* (CIPD, 2017 p34). The academic community supports this point of view and in a report makes the point that: *'...the Government to take a step back and learn from the mistakes of the past, such as the short-lived 14-19 Diplomas. The report notes that employer unwillingness to engage with Government initiatives has been a key factor in past failures; for current reforms to be successful, business leaders need to be convinced that what is proposed will provide added value'* (Jones, 2019 p1).

However, one analyst was more supportive of the SSCs, *'The Sample SSCs show gains of between £100m and £130m a year from Government and Industry funding of £5m a year. The assumptions made in the detail of the analysis can be discussed, and perhaps adjusted (down or up), but the point remains that the return from the SSCs' involvement is considerable, particularly when it is recognised that not all of each SSC's work has been evaluated, particularly in the case of Skills for Health, which has chosen not to evaluate some project outcomes for the purposes of this report. When viewed together, this indicates an average 'amplification value' of at least 20 times the original investment.'* (Clifford, List and Theobald, 2010 p5).

This thesis argues that the laudable intent of EBPM in the skills area has made matters more muddled and does not offer the virtuous circle that both politicians and policymakers would like to believe takes place. There are many theories about the policymaking process. I argue that in the creative industries and cultural sector, sectional interests and pressure groups exemplified by policy networks have outweighed the evidence for a particular course of action. Indeed, at times, they have managed to override published ONS evidence that counters their position.

In the literature the terms skill and qualification are used interchangeably as proxies for each other. This confuses the issue: a qualification such as a degree will have some skills associated with it. Both the CIPD and Universities UK agree that it is the skills mismatch that is at the centre of the employability debate not the qualification attained at university. The qualification is an indication of capability and potential competence. It is

the set of skills acquired at work that help build a career. It was in 2017 that the separation of Education and Skills was recognised as a failing of the current configuration of the education system and the ESFA was formed.

The integration of skills and a qualification was discussed in correspondence for this research with the Quality Assurance Agency for UK Higher Education (QAA) (2019). The agency does expect the high / higher level cognitive skills, practical skills, transferable skills and professional competences (if appropriate) to be part of course design. It accepts that the descriptors associated with the above skill set can only *'signpost student achievement generically'* (QAA, 2019a p1). The qualification may get the applicant the interview *'but employers make recruitment decisions informed by their own competence-based selection process'* (QAA Quality & Standards, 2019).

Universities UK (2018, p4) talks in terms of higher-level skills and offer three measures:

1. Qualification level (bachelor's degree, foundation degree, GCSE)
2. Specific core and employability skills (literacy, numeracy, problem-solving and leadership)
3. Domain or subject-based knowledge (industry knowledge, such as working in the BTI)

The role of the SSCs should be to endorse the applicability of the first measure to the creative industries. To more directly support the third measure by identifying functional needs and support training or education programmes to meet those needs.

3.3.6 ScreenSkills, the sector skills council for the BTI

The Leitch report recommended establishing a new body to strengthen employer voice and increase employer influence over the employment and skills system. The UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES) was established in April 2008 after Leitch put the case to Parliament at the Universities, Science and Skills Committee. UKCES was at the centre of successive governments' skills implementation arrangements and a significant force in determining skills policy (Creative Skillset, 2015a).

'A genuinely employer-led organisation, with commissioners drawn from the highest levels of the private, public and voluntary sectors, supported by trade union leadership,' UKCES

aims to *'raise UK prosperity and opportunity by improving employment and skills'* (DIUS Committee, 2008). It established 25 Sector Skills Councils (SSCs) covering all aspects of the UK workplace to report on employer-led needs in their sector. From the start, there was some scepticism that SSC goals were achievable, with The Centre on Skills, Knowledge and Organisational Performance (SKOPE) research group warning: *'UK Sector Skills Councils...are seen as critical to policymakers' aspirations to develop an education and training (E&T) system that is both 'demand-driven' and 'employer-led' and where employers 'play their part' in national upskilling. However, the concept of employer leadership remains deeply problematic in the English context, with some commentators arguing that the system is better viewed as government/target-led.'* (Payne, 2008 p1)

SKOPE also raised a concern about labour market intelligence (LMI): *'...is whether SSCs are able to accurately articulate and represent employers' views on skills. In the end, the ability of SSCs to do so rests upon two central claims. First, that SSCs structure their governance arrangements, for example the SSC board, advisory councils for different sub-sectors and regionally-based standing groups, so that they are broadly representative of the sector as a whole. Second, they conduct large-scale, high quality labour market intelligence (LMI) and data gathering exercises, not least those underpinning the construction of SSAs [Sector Skills Agreements]'*(Payne, 2008 p35).

Despite the words of warning about the ethos of an employer-led system and the ability to gather high quality LMI (a matter I raised at the start of this thesis and will return to in Chapter Six) the UKCES coordinated the needs of each sector and reported to the relevant government departments and ministers. It was dissolved in March 2017 and effectively replaced by the Federation for Industry Sector Skills & Standards (FISS). I analyse and critique its role in Chapters Six and Seven.

This research examines the effectiveness of the work of the SSC responsible for the BTI. Rebranded for third time at the end of 2018 as ScreenSkills, it gathers biennial LMI from industry employers and the workforce to produce two key biennial reports, in turn on employees and employers. It also identifies current and future needs of particular groups of workers — such as freelancers or make-up artists — and seeks to influence policy and secure government funding for the BTI (Creative Skillset, 2013c, ScreenSkills, 2018).

3.3.7 Policymaking communities in the creative industries

As shown in Table 2 there are a number of vested interests in the creative industries. The policymaking process for the creative industries is influenced by the CIC set up by the DCMS as; *'a joint forum between the creative industries and government' ... 'set up to be a voice for creative industries, the council focus on areas where there are barriers to growth facing the sector, such as access to finance, skills, export markets, regulation, intellectual property and infrastructure. Action will be taken forward in these areas through the work of a small number of 'task and finish' working groups'* (DCMS, 2019). Elsewhere, I and others argue that the needs of the creative industries sub-sectors are so disparate that they have little in common that would gain from a single forum. The minutes from the CIC meetings tend to confirm that view.¹⁵

Another network that seeks to influence government is the Creative Industries Federation (CIF): *'We are the voice for the UK's creative industries, lobbying decision makers and government on issues that matter most to our members. Since our foundation in 2014, we have called for our sector to be at the heart of economic policy. It was at our anniversary event in 2017 that secretaries of state for business and culture announced, for the first time, the creative industries as a priority in government's industrial strategy'* (CIF, 2019). A review of the CIF board reveals that many members also sit on the CIC, which means an external lobby group (the CIF) has direct access to government (through the CIC) by joint membership.

A final external stakeholder is a new research group, the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre (PEC). An offshoot of NESTA, the PEC sets out its stall as:

'The vision of the Creative Industries Policy and Evidence Centre is to provide independent research and authoritative recommendations that will aid the development of policies for the UK's creative industries, contributing to their continued success.

The Centre provides a step-change for our three main stakeholders — industry, policymakers and the wider research community — in the quality of evidence for the

¹⁵ www.gov.uk/government/groups/creative-industries-council

creative industries, asking some of the best researchers across the UK the most pressing questions about the sector' (PEC, 2019).

Again, the same people from NESTA and the PEC appear on the CIF and the CIC. It is hard to conclude that a diversity of voices will be heard within this industry closed shop.

Other policy groups come, and, it seems, go without a trace nor any output to contribute to the debate. *'The European Creative Industries Alliance (ECIA) is an integrated policy initiative that combines policy learning with 8 concrete actions on innovation vouchers, better access to finance and cluster excellence & cooperation. It is an open platform that brings together policymakers and business support practitioners from 28 partner organisations and 12 countries. Its overall aim is to shape a community in Europe that actively supports creative industries as a driver for competitiveness, job creation and structural change by developing and testing better policies and tools for creative industries'* (ECIA, 2019).

The policy community in the creative industries is centred around the DCMS ministers, the various select committees and the devolved powers organisations established by statute such as Ofcom. The various agencies and committees consider a wide range of issues around structure and issues of growth, of which, there is a considerable focus on the workforce. The skills policy community is led by the CIC, the agenda is influenced by a few key individuals who sit on several of the BTI bodies and the CIC. It is also evident that some organisations such as NESTA and the Work Foundation have close links with senior civil servants and SPADS. They provide the continuity of policy discourse, not ministers, whose role is short lived in comparison. In Chapter Seven I expand on this matter with views from my informants and what this means for the various vested interests.

3.4 Conclusion

The issues of policy and policy-making networks explored in this chapter present a network of sectional interests within the BTI. It goes some way to explain how the BTI arrived at the current structure set out in Chapter Two.

Two overlapping policy communities impact on the aspiring and current BTI worker. The first influencing their full time education, as managed by the DfE. The second established to support their skills needs led by ScreenSkills working with the DCMS to produce a sector skills plan (SSP). Both communities highlight the need for a high skilled workforce. It is not clear if there is an accord as to what this actually means. The terms ‘*skill*’ and ‘*qualification*’ are used interchangeably as proxies for each other; the qualification is an indication of capability and potential competence; it is the set of skills acquired at work that help build a career.

As to the UK’s policy to develop a high skilled workforce, many voices from both academia and industry criticise the model and delivery instigated by the Leitch Report. The 2017 CIPD report is particularly damning. It is worth noting that the Augar Review (2019) makes limited reference to Leitch and skills and focuses on finance. My fieldwork seeks to test whether high-skills lead to high skills jobs. My review of the term ‘*skills*’ as applied in the UK concludes that there is a mismatch between functional skills and the highly competent worker demonstrating higher level skills. It would seem that is for the ESFA to harmonise skills and qualifications but that stops short of HE, where the QAA takes the lead.

My fieldwork questions the effectiveness of the existing policymaking model and the added value it brings to the BTI and those working in it. I question the quality and validity both of the data gathered by Creative Skillset/ScreenSkills as a true reflection of the needs of those working in the industry and of the contribution it makes to addressing those needs. The literature reveals a history of policy failures across all sectors. I suggest this is due to lack of evidence – the Augar Report highlights the paucity of data and suggests more research is required. While this may be true, I argue that vested interests can influence and change policy, despite the evidence or a need. Doing nothing can be a policy decision.

A report from the Institute for Government sums up the issues; *‘Government has a tendency to recreate policies and organisations on an alarmingly regular basis. New organisations replace old ones; one policy is ended while a remarkably similar one is*

launched... In education... 'since the 1980s there have been 28 major pieces of legislation, 48 secretaries of state with relevant responsibilities, and no organisation has survived longer than a decade' (Norris, 2017 p5). The evidence on the UK skills policy points to a system not driven by a unified vision across all levels of education but a series of siloed initiatives and random actions to plug a perceived skills need gap. Gavin Williamson Secretary of State for Education contributes to a long line of training initiatives: *'The introduction of T Levels from September 2020 will be a game changer'* (Williamson, 2019). A game changer? Possibly, but employers and other providers are already criticizing and withdrawing from the curriculum development programme. These initiatives appear to offer little to the media worker in the precarious working environment of the BTI as discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter Four The precarity of creative labour in the BTI

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I review the literature that has examined the employment landscape for the media worker and the labour market in the BTI. Drawing on existing research that covers the period from 1979 to date, I look at the workforce and labour market and explore what it means for new entrants as they aspire to make the transition from higher education into the workplace. I discuss issues for individual career development and expectations as they compete to get into and progress in the BTI.

My research considers those who work or have the ambition to work in the BTI. This is the broadcast industry, not the corporate or industrial sectors that the ONS labels ‘*video*’ or ‘*audio-visual*’. These are the jobs within the creative industries but not within the BTI — a fine, but important, demarcation. Jobs in the creative industries are more fluid than many other sectors, but all my respondents have the ambition to work in what Ofcom considers broadcast television (Kurnaz, 2015). This includes companies with an Ofcom license to transmit and the companies that supply programmes to those broadcasters. My subjects consider creating their own companies or working on non-broadcast projects — for example, making corporate videos or making training videos for Video Arts, a company started by John Cleese and other comics of the Monty Python era — as their second-best option or an expedient strategy to enter the market.

Irrespective of how we classify the BTI, there is a huge oversupply of people — estimated at hundreds to one, for each job — hoping to enter the industry. They will be competing for fewer than 6,000 new jobs each year (BETR, 2011d), and of these, fewer than 600 are in the larger media companies (High Fliers Research, 2019). The BTI is characterised by a large peripatetic workforce working alongside a small core team of full-time staff. The industry has a workforce of approximately 60,000. Of these: 80% are graduates, 44% women, 11% from ethnic minority groups and 2% declared disabled (BETR, 2011b). Full-time employees are typically the executive team, heads of department, retained talent

and company owners — such as Jamie Oliver, Monty Don or Kevin McCloud — and a small team of staff who provide the organisation's basic infrastructure and back-office functions. But many — even at the BBC — are short-term staff on rolling contracts (Neilan, 2011).

This chapter examines the current BTI labour market — a market that has been shaped by the blurring of traditional lines between jobs as a consequence of trade union legislation that removed the closed shop, eroded national agreements between the employers and workers and undermined agreed staffing levels. The changes enabled employers to require staff to take on multitasking roles, a process that was facilitated by the disruptive move to digital technology which deskilled many technical roles. I explore the difficulty of allocating functional skills attributes in the current precarious labour market.

I introduce the use of the term '*occupational job families*' as applied in the BTI to describe roles with an underlying set of shared attributes I use in this research. I explain how I divide my sample population and their six job families into two subsets: **initiators** and **developers**.

The theme of the individual draws on research by several authors who have examined the attributes that define an individual's skillset in the workplace. I discuss '*skills*', '*social capital*' and '*motivation*' in the context of the labour market in the BTI in preparation for the fieldwork for this research. Using the sets of factors that we can assign to an individual, I present a model of career development for evaluating the media worker's attitude and behaviour. By so doing, this research provides a new framework to examine the attributes of media workers in the BTI. This analysis will be of use to education and skills providers to the mix of higher level skills and academic qualification required to be successful in the BTI.


4.2 The labour market in the BTI

4.2.1 Who works where

In Figure 12, I show archetypical production relationships, commissioning options and contract relationships that affect the BTI media worker. The large grey circle represents

the traditional broadcast television company: a vertically integrated producer-broadcaster, such as the BBC and the original ITV companies. The red circles represent internal production teams staffed with full-time employees with protected employment rights, in times past a multiplicity of teams would be working across the broadcasters productions. Many staff could be on a roster for any production. This was the prevalent model prior to the creation of Channel 4 in 1982. The changes in the labour market brought about by legislation impacting ownership, licenses and the curtailment of union power created a whole new range of supply chain and contractual relationships, represented by the blue circles. Channel 4, the UK's first publisher-broadcaster, stimulated the independent production sector, as '*literally hundreds of little independent production companies were spawned specifically in order to serve the needs of the channel*' (Hogan, 1998 p5).

Figure 12. An archetypical broadcaster/production-broadcaster: work modes and location of employment



Source: Author's own

The power brokers in the new model post-1982 are the programme commissioners working for the broadcaster, a model developed by Channel 4. The third-party suppliers work to a governance model determined by the programme commissioner. This is typical of the relationship between a programme maker and broadcaster. There are other forms of contracting. The wholly-owned subsidiary is a company set up for a single production

or one-off series, enabling it to operate under different business rules. 'Arm's-length' might be typified by long-term 'indie' or 'super-indie' programmes commissioned by a broadcaster. Core to the commissioning process is that the broadcaster funds the project. Issues over copyright and secondary rights have been a *cause célèbre* for PACT, the indie representative. Some *indies* may make programmes with their own resources and sell to the market prompted by the zeitgeist of the time.

While a media worker may be working on a BBC programme, they could be employed by a sub-contractor to the independent production company. They may have no protection or assurance that their role will last beyond the current project or that the company will comply with BBC employment standards (BETR, 2008).

How did the BTI arrive at its current structure?

Within the creative industries, the BTI had a strong internal occupational labour market (the red circles in Figure 12) until the arrival of Channel 4 in the early 1980s. During the BBC's monopoly period (1926–55) and the BBC/ITV duopoly (1955–82), new entrants to the industry would undergo formal training and induction as a route to progression through the television company. There were clearly demarcated lines between job roles and clear required attributes for those roles. In this respect, these organisations also exhibited an internal labour market, as staff progressed to more senior roles (Block, 1999).

Significantly disrupting this framework, the Broadcasting Act of 1990, set out to create a more competitive market and required broadcasters to subcontract 25% of their original programme production to external providers to increase competition. In 1993, BBC's 'Producer choice' internal market first enabled BBC programme makers to outsource the programme facilities they needed to complete a production (Horrie and Clarke, 1994). Producers became budget holders at liberty to spend their programme budget where they wished. Instigated by the Director General John Birt, this lasted 13 years. Although it stimulated the growth of third-party facility companies, BBC studios and edit suites were left empty as they were priced out of the market (Born, 2011). It also led to an exodus of experienced production staff, who set up independent facility houses to service the producer choice arrangement, such as Informant C (2016) who set up a post-production

studio. In the 1990s and early 2000s, the restructuring of regional ITV franchise ownership rules (Ofcom, 2005) resulted in Carlton and Granada taking over all the smaller players. They eventually became one ITV company in 2013.

This legislation and associated policies fundamentally changed the workforce from almost 100% protected employed staff to one in which over 50% of workers are freelance, with the uncertainty that brings (Dex et al, 2000). ScreenSkills (2018) confirms that this situation continues to date.

‘Some older workers have faced redundancy if they have held on in broadcasting institutions and belatedly had to seek work as a freelancer, or decided on a complete change. As the workforce adjusts to insecurity and uncertainty, people in the industry have developed strategies for coping, but questions remain about the long-term effect of these new ways of working on programme quality’ (Paterson, 2000 p2).

Since the 1980s, the broadcast industry's internal labour market has shrunk considerably. The formal occupational labour market has been undermined by the reduction in union power and new technologies, both of which have brought about the rise of the multitasking, multi-disciplined media worker. During the 1980s and 1990s, Skillset (now ScreenSkills) — the SSC with responsibility for the broadcast industry — made several attempts to codify the skills and attributes of occupational groups to regulate the industry's skills base (Skillset, 2010b). The union lost its power to act as gatekeepers to the industry with the abolition of the closed shop, which removed the need to be a card-carrying union member¹⁶ to work on a broadcast programme (Heery et al, 2004). BECTU's aspiration for workers to have some form of *‘production passport’* (BECTU, 2018) as an accreditation to work on a broadcast production, based on Creative Skillset's skills attributes, has never become a reality. The proposal was that a worker should demonstrate appropriate skills before they are hired for a job. It was an attempt to protect experienced workers, keep day rates high and stop productions being staffed by interns and inexperienced workers. The evidence from a number of reports indicated that

¹⁶ In the 1980s, I carried my Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (ACTT) card (the predecessor of BECTU) as one of the few freelance sound and broadcast system engineers allowed to work on broadcast programmes using the new lightweight electronic cameras for electronic news gathering.

exploitation, unintended or otherwise, had become the norm (Broadcast, 2011a, Creative Skillset, 2015a). The fragmentation of the BTI created a pool of self-employed freelance workers added to every year by a large number of graduates with expectations of joining the BTI with, or without, media-related degrees (Tomlinson, 2007).

The external labour market has become the broadcast industry's prevalent characteristic. Potential employees, whether freelance or contract, compete for each new job or contract. In the past, other industrial sectors' external labour markets were considered secondary labour markets (Peck, 1996), predominantly focusing on low-skill occupations. This is clearly not the case in the BTI, where many jobs are on a shift roster and, while we may argue are high skills roles, are also interchangeable (Ursell, 2006). In my own case – as a studio sound supervisor, I would take over from a colleague who was managing the sound desk for the same production on the shift before mine.

These changes also shifted responsibility for career development from the firm/organisation to the individual. Haunschild and Eikhof describe these media workers as '*self-employed employees*' (Eikhof and Haunschild, 2006 p156). There are some exceptions: notably, the resurgence of the BBC as the focus of training in the broadcast industry following the 2009 re-launch of its training services under the BBC Academy banner. However, my informant at the BBC attests that the shift to short-term, typically three-month rolling contracts, even within the BBC, inherently disincentivises contract staff to take up training opportunities, as it results in time away from production. The competitive nature of contract work makes taking time for professional development too risky (Informant G, 2016). In Chapter Eight I recommend what would enable successful contract and freelance workers to attend training courses while on a production. It is evident from industry reports that while those not working (on the bench) gather a plethora of short course certificates with marginal advantage to career advancement (BTSR, 2008).

Another reason for not taking time off to train is that, unless you are a senior member of the crew and have a protected role, aspiring entrants are prepared to step in and take your place. This may be through unpaid internships or work experience — both crucial steps for getting into the industry. The fear of being replaced is as strong as the chance of

being replaced (BETR, 2008). Marsden talks of extended entry tournaments as workers seek to find and keep a job (Marsden, 2010).

Despite this fragmentation of occupational labour markets and the reduction in job role demarcation and competencies required for those roles, there are still career pathways in the BTI. Multitasking may have blurred those lines, but individuals tend to focus their efforts into one of the industry's six recognised, though loosely defined, occupational job families — production and development; craft and post; digital; writing; and directing and business (Broadcast, 2011b) — as shown in Table 3. Being flexibility specialised in media production a term applied by Michael Storper (1989) is assumed by worker and employer alike. ScreenSkills describes 95 BTI job roles on its website. Excluding on-screen talents such as presenter and back-office functions, there are 54 production roles that map onto the six occupational groups I use in my research. In Chapter Seven, I include some key points from a discussion with the Broadcast magazine *'hot shots'* supplement editor who applies them for the Hot Shot awards categories (Informant H, 2014).

For this thesis, I separate the six occupational families into two groups: *creative initiators* and *creative developers*. These terms approximate the *creators* and *transformers* presented by Aris and Bughin (2005 p454), but I argue that *initiator* and *developer* are a closer match to the roles they represent.

Table 3. The six BTI occupational job families used in this research

CREATIVE INITIATORS	
Production and development	A coordinating or management role, supervising all aspects of production on a TV programme. Roles that fall under this heading include above-the-line roles such as producer and floor manager and supporting roles such as production manager, who is responsible for organisational aspects of scheduling and budgeting. The most senior role, executive producer, is responsible for overall quality control and the success of TV productions. The most junior role, a runner, is part of the team that supports the work of senior post-production personnel and clients. Responsible for finding and developing stories and screenplays that will make successful TV programmes and formats, development personnel must understand what makes a good programme and what appeals to audiences.
Writing	At its simplest, this is someone who writes screenplays, alone or as part of a team. Writers research and develop story ideas, provide pilot programmes and work up scripts for a whole series. They also write links for presenters. If it is spoken on camera, there is a good chance a writer has written it.
Directing	Directors are responsible for a production's look, sound and technical standards. They enhance, refine and realise original ideas into finished programmes.

CREATIVE DEVELOPERS	
Craft and post	The prime role is that of editor. On big budget projects using complex computer-generated images (CGI), craft and post work starts during pre-production. The supervisor liaises with the CGI company and makes sure the producer is aware of all creative and budgetary considerations. On smaller budget projects, they advise on what can be realistically achieved. Post-production managers liaise with the editor and producer (and sometimes the director) about hiring post-production staff such as sound editors, titles designers and mixers.
Digital	This covers online delivery, integration and use of social media as a marketing channel and everything to do with digitising new content and legacy material.
Business	A wide range of roles that include sales; managing talent; public relations; negotiating contracts; deploying crews; securing the rights to property; and setting up and running a business.

Source: Author's own, extracted from terms used by Creative Skillset (2013b) and the supplement from Broadcast Magazine (Parker, 2013).

I show that in most sections of the BTI technical capabilities are less important than a general level of educational attainment and social capital. In others, technical capability is a core competence; a door opener. In Chapter Six, I show that there is a greater requirement for formal technical skills in the developer roles than the initiator ones. For example, in post-production editing, it is a prerequisite that even a junior editor can use one of the industry standard systems such as AVID Technology. In initiator roles, the capacity to generate new ideas is essential. The type of qualification the individual has gained is not relevant.

External labour market workers will focus their capabilities within one of the six job families, even if the multitasking environment means they apply a wider set of skills. When workers progress to more senior roles, the direction of travel — if it happens at all — is from developer (with technical skills) to initiator; it is rarely the other way.

The working environment has changed dramatically for all UK workers over the last 40 years. *'More and more professionals think of themselves as on a temporary assignment with an organisation. Loyalty goes first to one's team or project, then to one's profession or discipline and only thirdly to the organisation where these skills are practiced.'* (Handy, 2002 p161). Handy references the BBC director general as a case in point, without naming him. This was John Birt, who contracted himself into the BBC via his own company; to many BBC staff this signalled his lack of commitment to the organisation. His pay and that of other senior staff had ramifications long after his time. Pay reforms were introduced in

2017 with a requirement to be *fair, consistent, transparent, competitive and clear* that only now (2019) are having an impact on the overall wage bill (NAO, 2019).

This shift in the way we work is particularly significant in the television industry, where *'even permanent staff have a "freelance mentality"'* (Preston, 2002 p1). Academics have applied different terms to this approach to work, including *'portfolio worker'* — first coined by Charles Handy (1995 p212) — and *'flexible specialisation'* as applied to the working environment of the US film industry (Storper and Christopherson, 1987 p104, 1989 p273). Piore and Sabel (1984) applied the term to the flexible use of machinery by skilled workers to produce a wide range of products. An apposite term for film and TV production teams who craft different media products from the same basic *'machinery'*.

4.2.2 The brand of 'Me'

It took over 20 years, from the mid-1980s to the early 2000s, for this disruptive change in the labour market to be embedded in the BTI, as those who joined in the 1970s retired with their final salary scheme benefits. The new generation — the under 30s — accepts the current mode of employment and the precarious nature of the work (Ursell, 2006); they know no other. Almost every new joiner to the creative industries must grapple with the changing dynamics of autonomy, creativity and commerce all at once. In the past, they could focus on each of these aspects to their career path separately without having to deal with all three at the same time (Hesmondhalgh, 2013). An individual could focus on being creative without having to worry about the commerce side or deal with having to be autonomous. As the wealthy socialite said to the struggling artist in the film *An American in Paris*, *'...Look, you're a painter, and a good one. I happen to have a little drive. That's a good combination.'* This division of roles is less likely in the modern media environment.

Inkson suggests that *'The boundaryless career type provides a model of career development that appears to have some advantages over traditional occupational or organizational models. In a changing environment, it encourages mobility, flexibility, the development of knowledge and networks, and the taking of responsibility for one's own career'* (Inkson, 2006 p48). I argue that the advantages are only apparent to those who

find this portfolio way of working acceptable and can, as Storper contends, flex their skills and adapt to the job demands. There are many reluctant freelancers (BETR, 2008).

The characteristics of this way of working *‘resonates effectively with the temporary organization structures and “knowledge workers” becoming characteristic of the new century ... It appears a particularly appropriate way of understanding careers in industries, such as film production and software development, that are based on temporary projects rather than permanent structures, but these industries may be merely extreme examples of a wider loosening and crossing of boundaries in the world of work’* (Inkson, 2006 pp49-50).

The changes in the way of working and the rise of the external labour market are not just a phenomenon of the creative industries. *‘The organizational career is dead or dying, and boundaryless careers are representative not just of a creative elite of workers, but of the mainstream’* (Inkson, 2006 p51).

The change in employer–employee relationships can be summed up as the rise of the *‘me brand’*: where the individual is the organisation and sells their services as needed. Tom Peters (1997) first identified this approach as *‘the brand called You’*; he also observed that we are the *‘CEO of Me Inc’*. This was somewhat prescient; social media and professional sites such as LinkedIn or personal blogs on WordPress have become essential marketing tools in this world of micro entities and networking.

In Table 4, I show the characteristics of the old and new media worker career models. The old, organisational career model, in place until the mid-1990s, was typified by a stable, long-term relationship with one employer, from intern to pensioner. The new, precarious model (Deuze, 2007) is typified by the non-staff serial contractor who works to a production or project rather than for a company. There is no loyalty on either side; exacerbated by the concern of the worker that they have to *‘make it’* early on in their careers due to the short *‘shelf-life’* and *‘rate of attrition’* as they reach the mid-point in their careers (Wallis, van Raalte and Allegrini, 2019). In Chapter Seven, I reflect on the response of young media workers to the conditions indicated by the new model.

Table 4. The old and new media worker employment models

Old model: organisational career	New model: precarious career
Collective bargaining	Individual bargaining
Long-term contracts	Short-term contracts
A mutually accepted relationship – company loyalty	A contractual relationship – limited company loyalty
Single cradle-to-grave employer – the 40-year employee	The portfolio worker
Control exercised by company benefits such as final salary pensions	Portable, stakeholder pensions; no benefits to staying with one company
Defined by the company, whether public or private sector	Defined by capabilities, competences and professional bodies; the individual is the company
	Need to adapt and adopt the new company processes
	Capable of providing ‘flexible specialisation’
Single skill specialisation	Location less important; more activities are computer-based
	Risk tends to be with the individual; high risks don’t lead to higher rewards
	More likely to move for work; less engaged in local community
Several generations working for the same firm and location	Long/high ‘material’ horizon – what we are missing?
Risk tends to be with the firm	Isolated – no-one is a witness to another person’s life
Own less but fixed to community	
Low ‘material’ horizon	

Source: Author’s own, collated from Deuze (2016)

The consequence of this new precarious employee–employer relationship is a multiplicity of employment contract types within the production chain, as shown in Figure 13. The column on the left lists the types of company with an Ofcom broadcasting licence and the types of company that supply programmes to the broadcasters. The far-right column (white) represents the back-office workers, who typically have stable roles with the company. The inner columns and rows illustrate the range of company and contract types by which any media worker might be engaged.

The old model as described by Deuze (see Table 4) is represented by the dark green area of this figure. According to the annual report from ScreenSkills (2019a) under 50% of the production workforce is employed full time, yet across the sector as a whole only 28% are reported to be self-employed. It may seem out of date but other researchers suggest this is as little as 20% (Preston, 2002). ScreenSkills (2019a) accept that more research is

needed on this matter. This is the first time the creative industries SSC has used ONS data and recognised the ambiguities of the workforce data.

In the report ScreenSkills identifies ‘self-employed’ workers as contractors or freelancers. Of the workers selected for this thesis, the ‘hot shots’, may not stay in one type of company, they tend to remain within the green area. The ‘pink’ area is indicative of a section of the workforce employed by shopping channels such as QVC, financial channels such as Bloomberg TV, technical service companies such as Sport Information Services (SIS) or Forces TV (military). I do not include them in my study because they do not produce programmes that fall within the framework of a project-based product or programme genre. This is not to suggest they do not maintain broadcast standards or exhibit broadcast skills, but for the purposes of this research, the role of the company and its relationship with the media worker is significant. I also exclude all back-office roles, whether full-time, contract or freelance.

Figure 13. Where and how media workers contract in the BTI

Orange - Ofcom license to broadcast Yellow - programme maker and supplier to broadcaster	Full Time Production Staff	Defined Period Contractors	Defined Period Self-employed	Ad hoc Defined/Undefined Freelancers	Short term/ Undefined Interns	Full Time Back Office
Broadcasters	GREATER SECURITY AND LONG-TERM PROSPECTS 					FULL TIME / RETAINED STAFF - OUT OF SCOPE
Global Company with UK broadcast subsidiary						
Indie (Large) / could be part of a global organisation						
Indie (Med)						
Indie (Small)						
Non-traditional broadcaster - Shopping Channels	OUT OF SCOPE PRODUCTION STAFF					
Anomalies - Financial such as Bloomberg						
Contract suppliers, such as Aquiva / SIS						

Source: Author's own

My research focuses on the media worker who is engaged in production that will be broadcast — those in the green area. Some will begin as an intern and progress from right to left across this grid, hopping between company types as they go. See Figure 31

(Chapter Seven) for a populated version of this figure that shows the mix of respondents and contract type.

One last lens by which to consider the media worker is their rationale for joining the BTI. The main motivation among my sample population is to be an artisan. Professionals typically join a company in a back-office function such as media lawyer or HR director, progressing and often leap-frogging production staff to senior management roles (Bevir, 2013). Entrepreneurs see a commercial opportunity to start a business in an exciting industry (Block, 1999).

Informant C: *"I realised that while out on a shoot that can take months to materialize, I can make money by hiring out the little off-line edit suite I bought. Others started to hear about it, and hire it, so I bought six more. Our USP - to help save money and reduce time in the on-line facility. I stopped being a small production company and expanded NATS".*

These three personal drivers — artisan, professional or entrepreneur — underpin the occupational job families I examine in my fieldwork. Johannsson summarises their attributes to explain individual behaviour: the artisan has an urge to create, the professional to have a company career and the entrepreneur seeks independence (Block, 1999 pp163- 65).

This thesis considers the individual worker as a micro-entity, a personal brand with a portfolio of resources made up of skills, personal attributes and behavioural capabilities that help them cope with the uncertainties of modern employment — an evocation of the portfolio worker as first described by Handy (2002).

4.2.3 Defining the media worker

In this section, I review the literature that discusses the changing nature of work and the capabilities of the media worker. We can summarise the changing and precarious nature of media work as *'old model=stable; new model=precarious'* (Deuze, 2007), as shown in Table 4. Preston takes up this theme, referring to the *'freelance mentality'* (Preston, 2002) that enables the worker to cope with the precarity of the industry. This is echoed by one of my informants who, although an experienced assistant producer at the BBC, has yet to have a contract longer than three months (Informant K, 2018). Randle and Culkin (2009)

talk of the aspiring media worker filling in time as a barista in Hollywood with the rolled up script. In a longitudinal study of new entrants to the industry in a single firm, Stoyanova summarised the acquisition of skills in the Film & TV industry as ‘*we will learn ‘em*’ — in other words, if your face fits, we will teach you what you need to know (Stoyanova, 2009a).

Gillian Ursell provides a model of four approaches to media work: as an economic resource, an exploited worker, a professional or a social discourse and debate about identity (Table 5).

Table 5. Approaches to media employment: a summary of the main points

	Economic Resource	Exploited worker	Professional	Constructed in discourse
Principal assumptions	Workers exist as a source of labour power	Capital use labour to make profits, collective workers can resist, deskilling, degrading	Distinct occupations with social or client goals	Occupational identity is constructed in discourse
Empirical focus	The firm, Resource based view, flexible specialisation	Labour force, labour market	Occupations in society	Symbols, codes and meanings
Attention drawn to	Employer strategies for business structure and employment, trends and changes in economic organisation	Worker respond to employer-led strategies and tactics, economic, industrial relations, patterns of work and employment trends	Domain knowledge, codes of practice, expert or moral ownership of the job, collective organisation	Identity construction and experimentation in self-actualisation; the production and reproduction of systems of belief and practice in everyday life
Concept of power	Vested in economic ownership rights	Employers have power but workers resist and qualify it	Exercise of authority	Power is not power; everyone has some, it is dispersed. We are all responsible for it
Key writers / commentators cited in this thesis	Piore & Sabel (1984), Storper & Christopherson (1989), Barney (1991), Block (1999), Atkinson (2019)	Peacock (1986), Paterson (1998), Blair (1988), Randle (1998), Culkin (2009)	Ursell (2000), Hesmondhalgh (2002), Florida (2004), Deuze (2007), Millar (2016), Oliver (2017)	Haunschild & Eikhof (2006), Hesmondhalgh & Baker(2010), Lee (2011), Noonan (2015), Eigler (2016), Wallis (2019)

Source: Drawn from Ursell (2006), with academic sources key writers / commentators cited in thesis added by the author

Hesmondhalgh (2006) provides insights and critiques of the production process , while Block (1999) offers a broad sweep of how to manage in the media. Comparisons can be made with Blair and Rainnie's analysis (2002) of the UK film production industry and Blair, Gray and Randle's (1998) examination of the precarious nature of working in the film industry, which we now see echoed in the UK television industry. Many workers are an exploited resource, but some do thrive in this environment and I want to know how and

why. It is a more nuanced and complex working environment than many academic sources suggest.

The predominant theme among academic writers is to highlight the disadvantages and barriers to a career in the media industry. Many of these writers have not worked in the creative industries, and certainly not as a creative. They may find it hard to understand the aspirations of the driven artist — someone who is a risk taker and will offset stable employment for the opportunity, or possibility, to fulfil their artistic aspirations. It is hard to imagine the academic on a regular salary empathising with this worldview.

Anthropologically speaking, this must appear as exploitative even if the artist is a willing participant in their own exploitation.

The few research projects at the micro level make some unsubstantiated assumptions about the unemployed: *'Entry is 'latent', unclear and conditional. It often results in lengthy and repeated attempts to secure jobs, many of which are unpaid, without having a clear demarcation point. The interviewees of the current research were all already in the industry so by its very sample and design the study did not reach those failing to enter. However, it can be assumed that such unclear beginning of a career combined with an increased number of paths into the industry leads to a situation where attempts to enter may be both continuous and fruitless.'* (Stoyanova, 2009a p317). I do not accept that it *'can be assumed'*. This indicates more about the writer's assumptions than an evidence-based insight. The rebuttal to this assumption is that because there is no formal career pathway, anyone can seek a job in the BTI, and many will be disappointed. I suggest that potential joiners have unrealistic expectations informed by universities' public relations and pronouncements in the press.

Richard Florida (2004) is one of the few writers to take an optimistic view in his influential text on the rise of the creative class that they will flourish if the external conditions are right. His theory is that it is the environment, not the employment, that will *'attract creative people'* (Glaeser, 2005). We can see this in the transformation of Shoreditch in East London, with the growth of small media companies.

In their review of HRM in media companies Costello & Oliver (2018) consolidate the matters raised elsewhere in this thesis into four themes. They note that casualisation continues apace through ‘downsizing’; that continuous ‘*innovation in technology*’ challenges the employer and worker to keep up to date; the emergence of the ‘*social voice*’ of all stakeholders; and, the complexities of ‘*succession planning*’ due to the impact of the baby boomers long tail retirement from fulltime work. What emerges from this review and others cited in this thesis is the need for more research to gain a greater understanding of the media worker, the changing nature of work and therefore the implications for an organisation’s HRM strategy. A matter central to this thesis. Finally, Costello and Oliver suggest somewhat pugnaciously that media organisations’ HRM strategies need to be ‘*invests and adapt, or die*’ (Costello & Oliver, 2018 p108).

4.3 Career development theories

4.3.1 Labour market models

Following Florida’s theory, I move onto how media workers make sense of the BTI environment and plot a viable career path. To do this, I consider labour market theories that help us understand an individual’s behaviour, looking at the structure of the labour market and how individual survive in the fragmented BTI labour market.

Classic labour market models consider the economic cycle of supply and demand. As demand flexes with need, supply expands and contracts. Economic models have tended to focus on quantifiable measures such as remuneration as the prime determinant of career choice.

The cobweb model explains the classic case for a dynamic (time-dependent) rebalancing of supply to demand ‘*characterized by supply adjustments lagging behind the changes in demand because of the lengthy training periods required. The path of wages and employment in such models traces out a cobweb pattern when plotted on a supply and demand diagram*’ (MSU, 2017). Economic theory predicts that where there is free choice, available labour will migrate from a sector that is over supplied and pays lower wages to one with higher demand for labour and therefore higher wages. There is an inherent lag in the labour supply to meet the need. In low-skilled industries, this lag can be quite

short; a matter of weeks or months. In high skilled industries, on the other hand, a shortfall in skilled workers can take many years to address as suitably qualified graduates appear on the market. The resultant supply and demand curve over time produces a graphic similar in form to a cobweb (Bachir, 2004).

Should economic conditions remain strong and more qualified people emerge — whether through the education system, from other industries or via international recruitment — the lag in supply will inevitably lead to oversupply. In an economic downturn, individuals with non-creative, industry-specific skills should in principle be able to apply their skills to other industry sectors. In recent years, when supply-side market forces produce a glut of graduates, overqualified individuals are employed in non-graduate roles (Gosling, 2013).

ITV's financial difficulties in 2006–2007 and several rounds of job cuts within the BBC released thousands of experienced staff to the freelance pool, creating a glut of workers that remains to this day (Creative Skillset, 2009). The economic theory of supply and demand suggests that these well-educated workers would seek alternative employment outside of the sector, but they do not (Creative Skillset, 2013a).

The BTI has to an extent always been characterised by periods of temporary unemployment. The oversupply of qualified media workers is exacerbated each year by the number of graduates aspiring to join the creative industries. Since 2014, the annual number of aspiring joiners has exceeded the total number of the media workforce. A Higher Education Policy Institute (HEPI) report found that the number of universities offering media studies degrees tripled in the 10 years to 2012 (Ramsden, 2012). The current market-driven model places no obligation or incentive for higher education to manage the supply; yet the demand for a university place in a media-related degree remains high. It is a long-term issue and by its very nature is unique to the creative and cultural industries. The struggling artist will always be with us, balancing the desire for *'Art for art's sake'* and *'Money for God's sake'*.¹⁷

¹⁷ From 10cc's song, *'Art for art's sake'* www.songfacts.com/facts/10cc/art-for-arts-sake

4.3.2 Behavioural theories and labour markets

Previous economic research into career choices indicates that graduates are influenced by three factors: wages, training time and support (Dolton and Silles, 2008). The cobweb economic model for labour works in sectors where potential new entrants consider a range of jobs to be equally attractive. It does not, however, explain the behaviour of those seeking to join the BTI, where there is high risk of unemployment and a notoriously low likelihood of securing a short-term contract, let alone gaining a permanent staff post.

Behavioural theories offer an alternative to conventional economics in attempting to answer the question of why creative industries remain oversupplied with labour. Caves (2000a) has suggested that economists consider the worker as a resource that has little engagement with the qualities of the product he or she produces (this would correspond with the first column in Table 5).

An alternative approach is to assume that, even when not working, the media worker finds an inherent attractiveness in remaining in the creative industries in general or the BTI as a notional freelancer (Caves, 2000b). The mythology that every bartender in Hollywood has a script rolled up in their back pocket is supported by the research of Blair (1988) when she interviewed hopeful media workers. The same is true in the UK: with those attending focus groups for a BETR study considered themselves freelancers in the BTI even if they had only had a few weeks' work in the past 12 months (BETR, 2008). The drive to be creative — the act of creation — seems to be an intrinsic motivation. Caves terms this as the creative versus humdrum inputs: those engaged in humdrum roles will seek to maximise their compensation and scan the outside market to look for alternative opportunities. Those engaged in creative roles, on the other hand, will pursue their art come what may (Caves, 2000a), with support from the humdrum worker and the entrepreneur to take their output to market. To return to the *'American in Paris'* quote, the artisan needs the entrepreneur.

The challenge for the economist is to try and quantify this aspect of economic behaviour within the creative industries. It has been called it the *'motley crew'*¹⁸ property how an

¹⁸ The motley crew refers to the team assembled to work on a production, they may or may not worked together in the past – but they have to function as a team – even if from diverse backgrounds and experience.

individual *'develops and maintains intellectual capital (creative ideas), social capital (networks), and cultural capital (recognized authority or expertise)'* (Townley, 2009 p5).

The weighting we might give to these three sets of attributes compared to or underpinned by functional skills I test in my fieldwork. A matter expanded on in Chapter Seven in my review of the findings from this research; how expertise is developed.

Human capital theories offer little help in finding a model to describe the expertise evident in the BTI. Many of the attributes that contribute to an individual's skills or characteristics as identified by human capital theories focus on humdrum roles and increasing worker productivity (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). However, they also provide useful indicators to identify and map individual differences that form part of the creative worker's career pathway development value chain as devised for this research. I offer a more considered view of this factor and what it means in Chapter Seven.

4.3.3 Modelling behaviour in the BTI

None of the current economic models provide a convincing explanation for the behaviour of creative industry workers. Claude Diebolt, economics research director at the University of Strasbourg has written extensively on the matter of the behaviour of labour. In personal correspondence, he stated *"Each market has its own rules and a (general) model remains a model... The challenge is, for sure, to bring the stylised facts (the model) in accordance with reality, the facts (according to the labour market sector studied)"* (Diebolt, 2016). To do this, we need to understand individual behaviour in the BTI from which we might generalise and model the attributes needed of the media worker.

For my research, I consider whether the economic cycle impacts on the behaviour of potential entrants to the creative industries. Previous research suggests that the BTI worker is impervious to market changes and will leave the industry with great reluctance. The literature suggests that the following factors influence potential joiners to the industry:

External factors / influences:

- The perceived growth of the sector — although the BTI has only grown in line with UK averages
- The glamour — real or vicarious
- Total earnings naivety — how much they might earn in a working lifetime

- The influence of higher education marketing, which encourages and raises (possibly unrealistic) expectations

Internal factors/ personal attributes:

- The potential for self-actualisation and fulfilment as a creative
- Financial support from family or spouse
- (Non-financial) family support

Any model that attempts to explain why such large numbers of young people are studying media and aspiring to join the creative industries must consider these factors. Economic theories work on the premise of the rational being. But media workers are not being rational if they stick to the BTI without work. Cognitive dissonance might explain what economic theory would suggest is irrational behaviour that individuals justify (to themselves) as rational behaviour. Behavioural economists have suggested that we misattribute the utility of a behaviour and are insensitive to factors that should influence a decision (Ariely and Norton, 2008). It is for others to think that self-belief is delusional, but some people will succeed, and they are the models not the failures.

The external factors if oversold and exaggerated will heighten unrealistic expectations of the potential new joiner. Chapter Six provides a critique of the industry's size, growth and contribution to GVA.

4.3.4 Government intervention in labour markets

The effects of education and training policy on the operation of labour markets could offer a possible explanation for continuing oversupply (as opposed to a time lag). Despite many attempts to model labour markets and behaviour, in 2013 the UK government was unable to predict the need for more nursing staff. The same happened in the digital media sector in 2014, when SSCs, universities and the government failed to predict an urgent need for significantly more graduates with hard coding capabilities to build on the success of digital media companies such as Framestore, which devised the digital effects for the feature film Gravity. Policymakers have suggested that the country's emergence from the 2007 recession and businesses' response to the economic cycle made it hard to predict demand-side needs.

In summary, economic and behavioural labour market theories fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for the oversupply of willing new joiners to the BTI or those unwilling to leave the freelance labour pool and seek alternative employment. Labour market research has tended to focus on the disenfranchised and the barriers to entry they encounter.

4.4 A career pathway development value chain

In this final section, I develop a career pathway value chain by amalgamating several existing theories, some of which I have cited earlier in this chapter. The basic idea is to provide a unified framework that provides a model to assist my fieldwork as I examine individual career pathways and the strength of factors at transitional moments.

Career development is a *'continuous lifelong process of developmental experiences that focuses on seeking, obtaining and processing information about self, occupational and educational alternatives, life styles and role options'* (Hansen, 1976 p42). It is the process by which individuals progress in their career supported or hindered by a multiplicity of personal, socioeconomic and employment factors.

Career development theories fall into four categories:

- Trait factor: matching personal traits to occupations (Frank Parson, 1920s)
- Psychological: matching personality types to work environments (Holland, 1980s)
- Decision: situational or sociological, self-efficacy (Bandura, 1970s)
- Developmental: self-concept over lifespan (Super, 1950s).

All four categories provide insights into an individual's behaviour. But for this research, vocational development is key, and the work of Donald Super provides the most useful starting point.

Donald Super's 1957 model, developed from his fieldwork, is based on an individual's career timeline. It provides what most would argue is a logical, if not intuitive, mapping of an individual's career trajectory from growth to ultimate decline as shown in Figure 14. A

key aspect of Super's model is the development of self-concept: how the individual views their competences and capabilities, particularly at points of transition in their career (Super, 1990).

Figure 14. Super's five career development stages



Source: Author's own, based on Super (1957)

Super's model and the five development stages provide a useful baseline. But they do not describe the status or factors that influence an individual's status within each stage nor, more importantly, the issues at transition points between stages.

With reference to previous literature, I cluster the factors that may impact on an individual into two external sets and one internal set. The external ones are socioeconomic and employment. The internal set concerns personal determinants. Together, they define a portfolio of factors that shape an individual's career profile. I begin with personal determinants.

4.4.1 Personal determinants

Personal determinants consist of four sets of attributes: motivation, competence or skill, experience and social capital.

Figure 15. Personal determinants



Source: Author's own

Motivation: intrinsic vs. extrinsic

Motivation is a fundamental driver of behaviour. It is *'the force that initiates, guides and maintains goal-oriented behaviors. It is what causes us to take action, whether to grab a snack to reduce hunger or enroll in college to earn a degree. The forces that lie beneath*

motivation can be biological, social, emotional or cognitive in nature' (Ashton, 2015 p275).

There are several ways to examine motivation, which all consider whether motivation arises from outside (extrinsic) or inside (intrinsic) the individual. Extrinsic motivation *'refers to behaviour that is driven by external rewards such as money, fame, grades, and praise'* (Cherry, 2019), or, actions to avoid punishment. Intrinsic motivation is about the internal drive to do something, that has its own reward. In terms of this research, the drive to be creative – the act of creation – is an intrinsic motivation. It is what Caves terms as creative versus humdrum inputs: those engaged in humdrum roles will seek to maximise their compensation and scan the outside market to look for alternative opportunities (extrinsically motivated). Those engaged in creative roles, on the other hand, will pursue their art come what may (Caves, 2000b) with support from the humdrum worker and the entrepreneur to take their output to market.

Among psychologists, there is considerable debate as to which is best or most effective. For the purpose of this research, humanistic theories of motivation seem to offer the most useful explanation. Maslow's hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1963), which presents different motivations at different levels, has proved a useful model to explain behaviour within the work environment. First, people are motivated to fulfil basic biological needs for food and shelter, as well as those of safety, love and esteem. Once the lower level needs have been met, the primary motivator becomes the need for self-actualisation, or the desire to fulfil one's individual potential. A modification of this hierarchy of needs as the *'delayed gratification ladder to self-actualisation'* (Block, 1999 p186) is when an individual can look beyond their immediate needs to the potential of self-actualisation. This is an attribute of new joiners, often exploited by potential employers in the broadcast industry.

Competence: vocation practice and functional skills

The terminology in this field is open to wide interpretation. For the purposes of this research, I have restricted the concept of skill to that used in the UK labour market. In particular, I use the following: *'...to possess a skill is to have mastered a technique for carrying out a type of task within a work situation'* (Brockmann et al., 2011 p84). A bundle

of related skills, along with nationally recognised qualifications, become the definitions of a craft, trade or profession. But this does not define the job, occupation or competence. An individual may be skilled in and qualified for a task but unable to function effectively in the workplace. This is where experience has a role.

Capability: from novice to expert

At one time, experience and competence were synonymous. The changing nature of work has, to some extent, devalued experience. This is particularly relevant in creative developer roles in the BTI, where changes to post-production technology have undermined experiential knowledge (Brockmann et al., 2011).

Experience offers the amalgamation of core skills, functional capabilities and job competences, the *'seen it, done it, got the T shirt'* confidence to deliver the product (Dreyfus, 2004), along with organisation-specific — often called tacit — knowledge that helps an individual understand an organisation's rites, rituals and ways of working (Stacey, 2007).

Social capital: social skills and reputation

Storper (1989) and Tomlinson (2007) consider employability and flexibility as the two key attributes of the media worker. Storper coined the term *'flexible specialisation'* with reference to the creative industries. Ursell's study of the UK BTI asked media workers: *'On what basis are people asked to join the work team?'* The answer is: by reputation and familiarity, conveyed in a mix of personal acquaintance, kinship, past working connections and past achievements, all features of the theory of the latent organisation, *'You're only as good as your last job'* (Ursell, 2000 pp131-173).


Social skills help build reputation capital. Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) talk about networking as a key component to career success. While Eikhof and Haunschild (2006) make the case for media workers bringing creativity to the market as self-employed employees, media workers are entrepreneurs wherever they work and however they work — whether full time or as contractors. In essence, both studies reinforce the concept that media workers have a freelance mentality; as portfolio workers, they are always building a reputation through their network and programme credits (Eigler, 2016).

As previously mentioned, Peters argues that workers identify themselves as a personal brand 'Me' ('You' in his text), they are no longer company men or women climbing the greasy pole in one company; today, people work for company X, for now (Peters, 1997).

4.4.2 Socioeconomic factors

Socioeconomic factors concern an individual's familial systems that support them in their career aspirations.

Figure 16. Socioeconomic factors



Source: Author's own

Family

In their study of the influence of family and the implicit expectations to be ambitious, Eikhof and Warhurst (2011) highlight the advantages of being middle class and male. An aspect of this research is to see if anything has changed.

Finance

Laug (2010) and Snowdon (2011) discuss the advantages of financial support for unpaid internships and conclude that extended periods as underpaid runners are only possible with additional private income.

Support: coach/mentor

This is often a practice-based relationship and has a multiplicity of terms, some might say interchangeable. I suggest coaching is about performance and is task orientated. A mentoring relationship is more supportive, crossing formal work boundaries and can be sustained throughout an individual's career. Independent mentors are particularly important or useful at transitional points of one's career.

Garvey (2010) suggest that a mentoring model *'blends human development with the dimensions of mentoring. It is assumed that the dimensions of the model are continuous and multidimensional. We recognize three interactive dimensions that surround the mentoring interaction which shape the mentor and protégé relationship. These dimensions are defined as: socialization; task development; and lifespan development.'*

The value is recognised by WFTV (2013), the Media Trust (2019) and ScreenSkills (2018) among others as an aide to career progression. In my fieldwork, I gather data on the impact and usefulness of a mentor, asking whether the *'hot shots'* are someone's protégés.

Education

I have already discussed this element, along with skills, at length in Chapter Three. Within this model, the focus is on where and what someone studied within higher education.

4.4.3 Employment factors

Employment factors concern the working environment. Initiators have a bias to be an artisan, possibly an entrepreneur. Developers may also want to be an artisan with a more mixed bias to be an entrepreneur or professional.

Figure 17. Employment factors



Source: Author's own

Autonomy, creativity and commerce

The desire to be creative and have value through work is a key factor for the media worker. The dilemma for the worker is whether the environment enables them to achieve that goal and make a living wage. Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2010) raise the matter of *'good'* and *'bad'* work that creative workers may consider in their ambition to be creative. This idea of good and bad work is a link to motivation and the potential for self-actualisation as identified by Maslow. However, the authors prefer to talk about *'self-*

realisation' rather than self-actualisation, perhaps because there comes a stage where full self-actualisation is limited by the reality of getting and keeping a job.

Role focus

People enter the BTI under one of Johansson's three broad sets of attributes: as an artisan, professional or entrepreneur (Block, 1999 p164). These three personal drivers underpin the job families examined in the fieldwork of this research.

Schein (2010) highlights the shared values and behaviours that in his model anchor an individual within their organisation and frames their self-concept as first postulated by Super. We can use this set of attributes, perceptions and values to test an individual's fit to an organisation and to determine their needs at any given time in their career development. Key to Schein's work is the role of leaders and leadership in an organisation and their impact on its culture. In the last few years, the idea of inclusive leadership has emerged as a practical response to the changing nature of workforce demographics (Shapiro, 2011).

Culture of occupational groups


There are differences between the six occupational groups I analyse in this study. The main demarcation is between initiators and developers.

Some factors will cross the three high-level attributes of personal, socioeconomic and employment. The test is to understand which factors are important or not important to the individual. I discuss their relevance to career development and the other factors identified in the overall career pathway development value chain in Chapters Seven and Eight.

4.4.4 A working model for the BTI

In Figure 18, I bring all these elements into a single framework, where the complexity of the factors that impinge on the individual become clear. I anticipate that interviews with the selected sample population will reveal that at different moments in the career timeline, some factors will be more significant than others.

Figure 18. The career pathway development value chain



Source: Author's own

I describe this as a value chain because it is a career timeline for an individual as they progress from *growth* to *maintain*, adding value to their career through new qualifications, skills and experience. The three Level One factors — personal, socioeconomic and employment — have 11 associated Level Two factors. I analyse the contribution and importance of these factors to an individual's development in Chapter Seven.

4.5 Conclusion

The current BTI labour market is over subscribed. The number of graduates willing to work as unpaid interns and the pool of underemployed media graduates fuels the case for market failure as the Augar Review and earlier research has highlighted. I argue that, as long as the government in the guise of the DCMS along with advocacy groups such as the CIF, CIC, ScreenSkills, the BFI and Pact tell us that the creative industries are an exceptional engine of economic growth, with many job opportunities, then the oversupply of potential workers to the 'entry tournaments' for the limited number of jobs will continue. In turn this overstatement on the industry, along with the marketisation of higher education, has encouraged HEIs to expand their creative industries related degree programmes, some are oversubscribed, some are oversold. In this environment we will continue to see an oversupply of media graduates with unrealistic expectations of a job in the creative industries sector, such as the BTI, not in the wider creative economy.

To understand more about the attributes of those who do successfully get into the industry, I devised a framework by which to evaluate an individual's skill set in the workplace. In developing the career pathway development value chain, I integrate the domains of the current theories of career development into a unified model which I use to gather qualitative and quantitative data from my respondents. The combination of the semi-structured interview with the questionnaire mapped to this model enabled me to gather a comprehensive picture of the successful media worker's attributes that others might model.

This review lays the groundwork for my fieldwork, which I describe in Chapter Five. We need to know more about workers in the BTI. By examining the working lives of a sample of successful media workers, this study provides a foil to the many extant research sources that predominately focus on those who are excluded from or disenfranchised within the BTI.

Chapter Five Research methodology and methods

5.1 Introduction

This chapter considers the methodology and associated methods applied to address my research hypothesis and associated research questions. I set out my research philosophy, consolidate the strands of theory and existing research into an overarching methodology for my fieldwork. I explain the rationale behind my choice — and number — of informants and respondents.

My fieldwork takes two lines of enquiry. First, I review industry data from the ONS, the DCMS, the BFI and Creative Skillset. I examine the claim by all, bar the ONS, that the UK creative industries are engines of growth in the UK economy, in its contribution to the overall Gross Value Added (GVA) and jobs.

Second, I conduct a series of semi-structured interviews with both informants and respondents. The 25 *informants* from across the BTI offer the employer's view. The 31 *respondents*, winners of the industry's annual '*hot shot*' title provide the workers' perspective. In addition, I ask my respondents to complete on-line questionnaire based on the career pathway value chain model presented in Chapter Four.

After discussing the practicalities of my fieldwork and how I analyse the data, I conclude with a discussion of the ethical guidelines and the limitations of this study.

5.1.1 The problem restatement

This chapter brings together the insights from earlier chapters into an overarching methodology and associated methods to address my working hypothesis and associated research questions set out in Chapter One. The questions I seek to answer consider:

- The factors for the individual to successfully join and progress in the BTI
- The weighting we might give to social capital versus functional, formally taught skills,
- The value of formal skills in the creative industries, and

- The implications for government skills policies.

The literature that informs this thesis is drawn from a diverse set of authors. The secondary data I gathered from academic writing and official/industry sources are distinct and make different contributions to my research.

The insights drawn from **academics** are predominantly based on their primary data. They tend to use existing theories or offer a new theory or model to explain '*what is going on*'. They provide context for my own methods by drawing attention to the gap in our knowledge of the individual media worker.

Reports from **government departments**, their executive bodies or **delivery agencies** and position papers from **thinkthanks**, which have influenced policy, all tend to be based on collated third-party data provided for them, predominantly from Skillset/Creative Skillset. Many academics quote these data as a backdrop to their primary research. More recently ScreenSkills and the BFI have used benchmark ONS data to build their reports. However, in a BFI report, the collation of the ONS data raise questions on the chosen data to evidence a case. In Chapter Six I examine, discuss and challenge the validity and robustness of several reports.

5.2 Research philosophy: hypothesis, paradigm, methodology and methods

5.2.1 Forming a hypothesis

In Chapter One, I established the rationale for this research. In my role as regulator, I had concerns about the relevance of government skills policy, as there was limited evidence that the broadcasters recruited employees on the basis of media-related qualifications (BETR, 2008). These concerns were echoed by other voices at conferences on creative industry careers that challenged the transparency and fairness of securing a job in the industry (Snoddy, 2010a, Informant I, 2015).

My review of the academic literature that focuses on the BTI shows that, with a few exceptions, most academic research has been detached from the life of the media

worker. Only the BFI's longitudinal study of the 1990s (Paterson, 1998) has come close to evaluating the lives of workers in the television industry. However, as I discuss in Chapter Four, the industrial landscape and working environment of the 1990s, as the BFI study attests was very different from the current situation for most media workers in the UK.

There is an evident need to investigate how people get into and on in the BTI. A fresh perspective is needed to move away from the prevailing academic literature reporting on disadvantaged unemployed and underemployed media workers. My initial and intuitive view was to examine the lives of successful workers, who are largely absent from existing research literature. Therefore, the initial aim of my research was to test whether there is any correlation between career success and having accredited, media industry-specific skills before entering the industry. Are domain-specific skills — such as a degree validated by the industry SSC — a prerequisite to entry? Or is a good degree enough to get in, and get on, in the industry, with on-the-job training providing the skills required (Stoyanova, 2009a).

5.2.2 The research process

To answer the issues highlighted above and embodied in the three research questions set out in Chapter One I decided to identify media workers who are celebrated as successful and ask them to reflect on the pathway that brought them to their current status. I used an **inductive approach**, requiring that I interview enough media workers (my respondents) to detect a pattern that will support or refute my hypothesis. The objective of my fieldwork was to gather appropriate data to analyse the relationship between government education and skills policies, delivery agencies and the media worker, to clarify and explain what is happening in the BTI. It is situated in the lived reality of the BTI media worker.

My prime research method, a semi-structured interview with each respondent, immediately followed by an online questionnaire. These two methods capture qualitative and quantitative data of my respondent. Creswell (2013) defines this technique as a convergent parallel mixed method. Creswell suggests that this approach puts the research problem at the centre of the methodology.

Drawing on the insights provided by Bryman (2015 pp465- 499) the semi-structured interview conducted in close proximity with an online questionnaire enabled me to compare and reject or compare and substantiate the respondent's answers. The online questionnaire providing quantitative data to evaluate with the insights drawn from the interviews providing context; the two sources enable *'contradictions or incongruent findings are explained or further probed in this design'* (Creswell, 2013 p44). See convergent parallel mixed method in Figure 19. The ability to triangulate the data from two sources provided a high level of confidence in the data. The questionnaire addressing the *'how, where, what and when'* of the respondent's career. The semi-structured interview being a process of discovery, as I sought to understand the *'why'* and *'who'* of their development.


As to the semi-structured questionnaire itself, Adams suggests the researcher should first consider the disadvantages. These are; the work is *'time-consuming, labor intensive and require interviewer sophistication'* (Adams, 2015 p494). I had factored up to 40 hours for the actual interviews with a half day required to attend each session. These interviews were core to addressing the research questions. As to sophistication, I am an experienced interviewer and trainer used to putting people at their ease and drawing them out to talk openly.

The advantages outweighed the disadvantages. The relaxed conversational engagement with each respondent at a time, based on an outline interview guide (See Appendix 5A) of closed and open-ended questions covering the themes of the research provided an oral history that a questionnaire alone cannot provide. Often, follow-up enquires revealed much about the respondent's attitude and values. As Adams suggests: *'All in all, effectively conducted semi-structured interviews, even though labor intensive, should be worth the effort in terms of the insights and information gained'* (Adams, 2015 p492).

In this research the online questionnaire was a data gathering exercise to a) validate core data on the individual and b) provide a scalar value to a respondent's attitude and values explored in the face to face interview. The pre-coded Likert scales made the analysis of the group as a whole a relatively straightforward task. Incorporating the BFI 1990s study framework provided a useful baseline comparator, discussed in Chapter Seven.

The second method I use in my fieldwork applies Creswell's exploratory sequential mixed method (Bryman, 2015 pp638-39) in my approach with the informants. This was a looser process as I sought to understand the issues of employment from the employers' and other informed stakeholders (Figure 19).

Figure 19. The three mixed methods applied in this research



Source: Author's own, based on Creswell (2011) in Bryman (2015 p639)

The research design is structured to validate my three research questions and is informed by my career pathway development value chain model. The interview and questionnaire methods both capture the social, personal, and environment attributes of the media worker.

I piloted my research methods with cohorts of University of Westminster MA students to test accessibility of the online model and to baseline the dataset with media workers at an earlier stage in their career. I further tested the online tool with a sample group of Chinese media workers in the Shanghai Media Group (SMG) for a conference paper that presented insights into the differences in behaviours and attitudes of media workers in China and the UK (Block, 2017b).

By its very nature, the process of interviewing informants and respondents cannot be a mechanistic model. It requires reflection after each encounter to build on each. My methods are underpinned by the career pathway development value chain model, which captures the personal, social and employment attributes of the media worker throughout their employment lifecycle.

I interview 25 informants — including established television industry figures, policymakers, politicians, academics and pundits — to help me test my assumptions, critique my findings and contribute to the discussion of theory and process. My 31 respondents are all successful early career media workers who have been nominated as *'hot shots'* by their managers and peers in an annual competition by Broadcast, the UK TV's industry weekly magazine.

The data collection in my research has three components:

- The literature review and data gathering from secondary sources
- A pilot study testing of the online questionnaire, and
- A series of in-depth interviews with informants and respondents.

The prime objective of my research is *'to understand and explain what is going on'* (Saunders, 2016 p390) in career development in the industry, a research paradigm that Burrell and Morgan (1979) have defined as interpretive. My aim is to build a theory based on an inductive route with an interpretive output (Bhattacharjee, 2012). My expectation is that this sample can offer insights that I can extrapolate to wider understanding of employment in the BTI.

I also followed Creswell's explanatory sequential mixed methods model in my literature review and when gathering secondary data. The literature and theories of employment both inform the career pathway development value chain I developed as an output from the literature review.

I present my detailed findings from the secondary data in Chapter Six, where I question the validity of data gathered by Creative Skillset / ScreenSkills, the government- authorised body tasked with gathering and analysing BTI workforce data.

5.3 The fieldwork stages

My research was divided into five distinct stages:

- Stage 1: Provided a refinement of the scope of work, identified the key literature sources and authors, gathered a first pass on industry data
- Stage 2: Validated the research methodology, developed the career pathway development value chain with the data set of selected personal, social and environmental attributes; pilot study: a first round of respondent interviews tested the value of the process and I tested the online questionnaire with University of Westminster MA students
- Stage 3: The main fieldwork: a series of in-depth interviews with informants and respondents
- Stage 4: Data analysis
- Stage 5: Conclusions and implications with a review of the analysis.

Below I set out the more detailed actions and outcomes for each stage.

5.3.1 Stage 1: Scoping the work and secondary data analysis

I began my research in 2014, analysing sources of UK television workforce data including a range of reports from the ONS, the BIS, the DCMS, Creative Skillset and various independent bodies and thinktanks such as The Work Foundation and NESTA. There is an initial review of these data in Chapter One.

There were two tracks to this work. The first looked for evidence of reports that influence and drive government policy to understand the dynamics within the complex partnerships that deliver government skills policy to the creative industries sector. The second was to get a deeper understanding of the sources of UK television workforce data and their validity.

I reviewed quasi-official/peer-reviewed material from national bodies recognised by

government as reputable sources, such as NESTA's (2013b) '*Manifesto for the creative economy*' and The Work Foundation's (2007) economic model for success. Government ministers have cited both papers (DCMS, 2013b, DCMS, 2015c, DCMS, 2015a) and they have had a profound influence on government policy initiatives. I question the usefulness and reliability of these sources and their data, which are primarily based on workforce and employer surveys commissioned by Creative Skillset. I argue that these can only offer at best general trends.

My data-mining exercise examined three sectors:

- Cultural and creative industries, using ONS national surveys for data on size, growth, contribution to GDP and exports and number of workers
- UK television industry workforce, using Creative Skillset and Ofcom data on the number of companies with an Ofcom licence, the composition of the workforce and numbers recruited each year. But Creative Skillset gathers its data from self-evaluation questionnaires circulated via company administrators, BECTU and other stakeholder groups such as PACT. This is an opportunistic, rather than a systematic process. Ofcom's data are more reliable, as there is a regulatory requirement for all broadcast licence holders to report workforce data (Ofcom, 2006).
- Higher education, using Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA) data on the number of media and media production courses and the number of graduates entering or expecting to enter the industry each year and cross-referencing it with the number of new joiners to the industry (HESA, 2018).

5.3.2 Stage 2: Validating the research methodology

According to Hansen, career development is a '*continuous lifelong process of developmental experiences that focuses on seeking, obtaining and processing information about self, occupational and educational alternatives, life styles and role options*' (Hansen, 1976 p42). In my review of academic sources on careers and career development in Chapter Four, I built a picture of the current debates, theoretical background and models that relate to the issues I explore in this research. This prompted me to develop a career pathway development value chain to assist research into career development (Figure 18),

which maps the generic career pathway for any worker, illustrating the process by which individuals progress in their career, supported or hindered by 11 factors clustered under three personal, socioeconomic and employment themes.

This integrated model became the source framework for the online career development self-evaluation questionnaire I developed and applied in this thesis.¹⁹ The questionnaire covered the 11 factors from the career pathway development value chain, under three sub-headings:

- Employment factors: environment, role focus and culture of occupational groups
- Personal/social: social competences, level of expertise, vocational practice and skills and humanistic motivation, and
- Environment: family, financial status, professional support and education.

The questionnaire evaluates the strength of each component on a 10-point Likert scale (see Figures 20 and 21).

Figure 20. Sample questions from the online self-evaluation tool based on environmental factors

Family
How important are your family in influencing, supporting and encouraging you at this stage of your career.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not important Very important

Finances
How dependent are you on external financial support? To pay university fees, help you through internships, help subsidise your current job etc.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not dependent Very dependent

Source: Author's own

Part 2 of the questionnaire recorded respondents' responses to a modified version of an empirical analytical interview methodology first used in the longitudinal BFI study of the 1990s (Paterson, 1998). The format of these questions is slightly different from those based on the career pathway development value chain, as I use a five-point Likert scale aligned with the BFI study to aid my analysis (see Figure 21). This section of the

¹⁹ An open access version of this tool is available at <https://forms.gle/uZc5zuWcw9HhPvUW6>

questionnaire provided further data to internally validate my research and triangulate it to the earlier study of the BFI. Richard Paterson, lead researcher on the BFI study, reviewed and endorsed the questionnaire.

Figure 21. Four sample questions from the online self-evaluation tool based on the BFI study



The image shows a screenshot of an online self-evaluation tool with four questions, each followed by a five-point Likert scale. The questions are:

- Working with talented individuals**: 1 2 3 4 5, with 'not important' at 1 and 'very important' at 5.
- Trust between colleagues**: 1 2 3 4 5, with 'not important' at 1 and 'very important' at 5.
- Effective management**: 1 2 3 4 5, with 'not important' at 1 and 'very important' at 5.
- Good rates of pay**: 1 2 3 4 5, with 'not important' at 1 and 'very important' at 5.

Source: Author's own


The full questionnaire is in Appendix 5B.

Key education and career transition points

The starting point for this thesis is that little is understood about the career path of the successful BTI media worker. SKOPE highlighted how little we know about graduate labour at key career transition points and examined the lack of a relationship between employment in the creative industries and formal qualifications (SKOPE, 2012). These findings prompted me to consider examining successful media workers at an established state in their career.

The four vertical arrows in Figure 22 highlight the significance of the career pathway value chain for this thesis. The blue arrows indicate key education and career transition points: from school to higher education; embarking on a career path; and once a worker has established their career and built their reputation. The red arrow indicates the selected point for this research — my respondents have embarked on their careers and have begun to establish themselves.

Figure 22. Points of transition in the career pathway development value chain



Source: Author's own

Purposive sampling

The next step was to select a purposive sample — in other words, one that is *'relevant to the research questions posed'* (Bryman, 2015 p408). I needed respondents who complied with the red line to offer credible evidence for my opening hypothesis and associated questions. My fieldwork would examine their subjective experiences of working in the television industry. By examining and analysing the forces that had shaped their experiences and career trajectory so far, I sought to demonstrate the effectiveness, or otherwise, of government education and skills policy.

The career pathway development model provides the context for my respondents' interviews. The online career development evaluation tool – **the questionnaire I** developed and applied maps to the 11 component attributes identified in the career pathway development value chain (Figure 23).

Once I had established my research tools, I considered the nature of the two sample populations to be interviewed. I believe that my chosen populations comply with two of Bryman's *'criteria for assessing a qualitative study: **trustworthiness and authenticity**'* (Bryman, 2015 p384) as well as **internal and external validity**, criteria put forward by LeCompte and Gooetz (1982) and Bryman (2015 pp383-85). I make the case for internal

and external reliability by triangulating the results with other studies of workers in production companies (Stoyanova, 2009b) and broadcast television media workers (Paterson, 1998).

There are a multiplicity of roles in the television industry. Many people are engaged in tasks that could be found in almost any complex organisation. These non-specific jobs, even if conducted by highly qualified individuals, are back-office functions that are not directly associated with the production process. Within the BTI, they are defined as below-the-line roles. Those directly engaged in the production process are known as above-the-line workers. These terms differentiate programme or project-specific roles from those needed to maintain a basic infrastructure. BETR data gathered for Ofcom's annual UK TV workforce report recorded that over 50% of all workers in the UK television industry are below-the-line workers (BETR, 2011d).

According to Towse (2014), the creative industries compose three populations:

- **Creatives:** staff directly engaged with the production process, or above-the-line workers
- **Non-creatives:** staff whose role is not specific to the production process and whose skills could be applied in several sectors, or below-the-line workers, and
- **Creative people working outside the creative industries:** for example, graphic artists or media production specialists who work for internal corporate communication services.

My review of existing literature found a considerable body of work dedicated to the many facets of media workers' lives: uncertainty (Preston, 2002); exploitation (Broadcast, 2011a, Dex et al., 2000); and the precarious nature of modern work (Deuze, 2009). Gillian Ursell (2006) references the idea of the exploited resource and David Hesmondhalgh (2013) highlights the various challenges on workers' quality of life in terms of pay, working hours, security, esteem and freedom. Almost without exception, these studies have focused on the plight of the media worker. Among the academic community,

Richard Florida (2004) is a lone voice striking a positive note with his theories on the rise of the creative class.

These academic texts highlight a key gap in our collective knowledge of workers in the industry: the successful individual. No study of the BTI to date has looked at those who have thrived in this environment. I decided to conduct some research to fill that gap.

Defining and measuring success

The case for who is successful in the creative industries merits a research paper on its own. The Harvard Business Review (2012), UK government (DCMS, 2013b), The Work Foundation (2007) and Creative Skillset (2010a) each have a view on this matter.

However, they focus on outcomes not process; contribution to GVA, the cultural influence of the UK — *‘Portland Communications’ 2018 Soft Power 30 report placed the UK first in the world for overall cultural influence, and it’s not hard to see why. The influence of British creativity is felt worldwide, and if trends do not catch on in the UK they are unlikely to be considered truly global’* (Kent, 2019). In this research, I focus on creative workers who are deemed successful by their peers.

The informants

My informants are drawn from what Towse designates as non-creatives. By coincidence, none had ever been in a definite creative role — one had been a producer, which is debatably a creative role. This says much about the industry's management process, as many managers are drafted in with limited knowledge or experience of the production process (Bevir, 2013). For example, Lucy Adams, BBC human resources director between 2012 and 2013, was externally recruited and had limited knowledge of the creative process. By common consent, her time at the BBC was a disaster overshadowed by the Jimmy Savile affair and the management-staff pay gap. The view was that she had little understanding of the people she was supposed to be supporting (Crush, 2014). She now works the conference circuit and with no sense of irony will offer her four strategies for supporting staff (Adams, 2017).

My informants were 25 individuals from across the BTI who occupy, or have occupied, positions of influence in the industry. They did not answer questions about themselves;

their role was to critique and validate my line of enquiry, offering their insights to my thesis questions. Media workers who are directly engaged in the production process often refer to these influencers as 'the suits' (Bilton, 2007 p1). Several of my respondents used this term.

My informants represent stakeholder communities and advocacy groups with an interest in influencing government policy in training and skills in the BTI. I interviewed at least one individual from each stakeholder group, choosing those who have publicly voiced strong views in industry forums. My advantage over many academic researchers is that I am a trusted industry colleague of all the influencers I interviewed.

Prior to each meeting, I set out the objectives of the interview and the issues we would explore. I also obtained consent to record the session. I held the meetings in private — usually in their office or an in-house meeting room. I did not limit the number included in this group, I interviewed people as the opportunity presented itself. Of those I contacted, none declined to be interviewed. Full details of the process, compliant with University of Westminster research policies, is set out in Appendix 5A. I recorded and transcribed all interviews and obtained my informants' permission to use all their quotes — attributed or not — in this thesis.

There are two sub-groups among the influencers I interviewed:

External agencies: Recruitment agencies, training companies, Creative Skillset/ScreenSkills, Ofcom, government ministers, BECTU and the Cultural Diversity Network (CDN). Discussions with these individuals focused on policy and strategy.

Industry insiders (employers): Human resources directors, talent managers, suppliers to broadcasters such as PACT, production and post-production houses. Discussions with these individuals focused on eliciting details on their staff policies, processes, approaches and actions around the employment lifecycle as they seek to recruit, retain and develop staff.

The business leaders I interviewed had very strong views on the industry workforce and

could talk about it at length. I often had to steer them back to my core questions, as time was at a premium. Each interview lasted approximately an hour; in that time, I was able to gather enough information for the purposes of this research. The encounter with my informants was a dialogue. It was an opportunity for them to reflect on the industry with someone who understood the environment yet was appropriately independent of their particular circumstances. After only a few interviews, I found that people from across the industry were bringing up the same concerns: unpaid interns, the industry's poor reputation around employment practice, entry tournaments and workforce diversity. Many raised their concerns about the effect of graduate oversupply and government and stakeholder pressures from organisations such as PACT, BECTU, CDN and high-profile individuals such as Lenny Henry on the industry. A rather resigned human resources director summed up the matter of graduate oversupply as *"We can't do much; let the market decide"* (Informant B, 2016). My informants' responses helped shape the direction of my research and some of the questions I posed to my respondents.

I shared some of my research findings with my informants, to gauge their response, and returned to the statements broadcast company leaders had made at first interview. Company leaders often argue that changes and progress take time, and some time had passed since the first round. In a follow-up interview with five of the informants, I picked up on matters they had raised the first time, particularly on statements they made on their organisations' progress to greater inclusiveness and diversity in recruitment. These second interviews were shorter — lasting approximately 30 minutes — and held over the phone or Skype. Again, these exchanges fed into my conclusions. Appendix 6D has a full anonymised list of informants interviewed.

I had one final group of informants — the academics — five of whom kindly gave their time to explore and clarify theoretical issues that impact on this research. I have added their insights to my analysis and conclusions. Three were face-to-face interviews lasting about an hour and two were via email.

The respondents: and why 'hot shots'?

I set the boundaries for selecting my sample population as people who are creative

(Towse, 2014), established (Super, 1990) and successful (Seibert, Kraimer and Liden, 2001) in the BTI. My respondents fulfilled these criteria.

Previous research has shown that gathering data on the media worker is no easy task. Creative Skillset's employment surveys report on the challenge of accessing a group in this industry that meets probability sampling criteria (Creative Skillset, 2013a, Creative Skillset, 2015a). Many researchers rely on word of mouth and networking to gather subjects for their research. I term this as **opportunistic sampling**.²⁰

My conversations with researchers on their public reports reveal a reliance on word of mouth and BTI networks to contact subjects (Genders, 2019). Anecdotal evidence, efforts to gather freelancers at B TSR events (B TSR, 2008) and the concerns raised by Randle and Culkin (McKinlay and Smith, 2009) that only job seekers join industry bulletin boards and LinkedIn point to an inherently skewed pool of possible participants, not representative of the target population. Facebook and Broadcast Freelancer websites are populated by agencies, not job seekers, as those already in work tend not to network in these employment pools. So, these open online sources are not a good place to recruit study participants.

When I was at the BETR, my research team concluded that successful workers do not complete questionnaires or attend research focus groups (BETR, 2008). When asked in interviews and via online questionnaire, none of my respondents had completed the Creative Skillset biennial workforce survey. In Chapter Seven, I argue that the conclusions from existing studies are flawed because the Creative Skillset data do not meet probability sampling criteria. Ruth Towse (2014) and Gillian Ursell (2006) both agree with this position.

Purposive sampling is a deliberate strategy to offer a new viewpoint, a lens by which to examine the BTI workforce. Bryman (2015) advises that if the chosen sample population

²⁰ There is a certain irony in the ad hoc nature of this process that researchers rely on networking to gather subjects; yet a number of academic papers consider this mode of recruitment to a media project a failing of the creative industries.

is relevant to the research questions, then there is validity in the process. In these terms my selected sample, set out below, meets the criteria. However, he also says that we cannot generalise this approach to the wider workforce. Silverman (2011) argues that there is no such thing as good or bad data, just how we define their use. In extrapolating my findings from the sample population, I will show in my analysis in Chapter Seven that there are some shared attributes of the successful worker that can be modelled to others in the BTI.

With no single point of access to BTI workers, I had the following options for selecting my respondents:

1. Speaking to participants at induction sessions for non-traditional new joiners to the media industry run by the Media Guardian's *Network* event, which ran alongside The Media Guardian Edinburgh International Television Festival and Channel 4's *Access to media* programme under their Talent banner. I ruled this out because their professional experience was limited, and they were not yet established.
2. Working with BECTU to contact self-employed and freelance media workers. I ruled this out because BECTU is a cautious and suspicious organisation that demands a great deal of detail before supporting any independent research. I discuss my research with BECTU at the end of the fieldwork.
3. My network of new joiners and past students from the University of Westminster's media degree programmes. I used this group to test and provide a baseline for my online self-assessment questionnaire.
4. A call via Facebook, LinkedIn and Twitter. I ruled this out for being too open and needing several filters to find an appropriate cohort. As other researchers (Randle et al., 2009) have noted, it is difficult to reach a specific cohort this way. But it could be a technique for future research, using the online self-assessment questionnaire as a first pass selection filter.
5. Asking contacts in the broadcast companies that I inspected in my role as regulator to provide staff for interview that met my subject criteria. But it is a challenge to get broadcasters to release staff even for a short interview; all the more so now that my

official role as regulator — and their obligation to comply with such requests — has come to an end.

6. The television industry's weekly journal *Broadcast's* annual competition to showcase industry high flyers under 30 years old and its annual supplement — *Broadcast Hot Shots* — which is based on the competition (Parker, 2013, 2014b, 2015, 2016, 2017). This group met my sample criteria. When I interviewed Robin Parker the *Broadcast Hot Shots* supplement editor he supported my proposal to contact and interview the 'hot shots' (Parker, 2014a).

How many qualitative interviews is enough?

There is no consensus on how many interviews are needed to reach saturation in purposive sampling. In their summary of 'expert voices', Sarah Baker and Rosalind Edwards of the National Centre for Research Methods offer the collective wisdom exemplified by Adler and Adler as 'the broad range of between a dozen and 60, with 30 being the mean' (Baker, 2011 p10). Bryman suggests that a minimum number of 20 and no more than 30 would be sufficient for this type of study (Bryman, 2015 p416). For me; the pragmatic approach as Silverman (2011 p145) and others have highlighted, is to stop when you start getting repeated, predictable responses. I reached that point before the full set of 31 respondents, but I wanted to ensure I had a reasonable gender mix and representative sample across the occupational job families. Through my analysis in Chapter Seven, I want to convince a critical reader that my observations are a fair reflection of what is happening in the industry.

Refining and validating the questionnaire

During 2017 and 2018 I piloted, revised and retested the online questionnaire with several cohorts of students (aspiring media managers) from the MA Media Management programme I led at the University of Westminster. In total, I received 212 responses with feedback on the tool's clarity and usefulness. These cohorts are on average younger than my respondent group, mostly in their early 20s and not part of the sample I wished to study. Presented with the questionnaire during a lecture session, it took no more than 10 minutes to complete. I made a few minor modifications based on their feedback.

This pilot proved that the questionnaire was understandable and usable. It also gave me

some baseline data on the attitudes of an international cohort of media managers who are not considered *'hot shots'*. Most of my students were not UK nationals, so their ability to understand the questions was an endorsement of its clarity. Some aspects — including matters relating to knowledge of UK-based organisations such as Creative Skillset, the Royal Television Society (RTS) and BECTU — were an issue, so I modified the text to make this section optional. I enabled users to add international organisations to their responses. The collated output data in Appendix 6C show that this group is predominantly at the 'explore' stage in their careers and highly dependent on family and other financial support. This was not a surprise, but it demonstrated an internal validity.

After creating an international version of the questionnaire, I used it in another pilot study in April 2017 with a cohort of young media workers in the SMG to examine the factors that influence media workers in China, comparing the results with the MA cohort in my UK pilot (Block, 2017b). The interim outcomes indicated that creativity is a lower priority for Chinese media workers and that Chinese media companies need significantly different forms of staff development. This pilot proved that the questionnaire is an externally reliable tool and could be used by others to audit a media worker's career profile (Bryman, 2015 p383). The full set of output data — the raw data and the charts created through Google Sheets, from which these three charts are extracted — are in Appendix 5D.


After testing my questionnaire on these two sample groups, I produced a comparative study on workforce data from these pilots in a conference paper for the European Media Management Association (Block, 2017b). These pilots validated the interview process and helped me further develop my online tool to triangulate the data from the questionnaire with interview responses.

5.3.3 Stage 3: Gathering the data through interviews and questionnaires

My fieldwork had two components: an in-depth, semi-structured interview and an online questionnaire. My respondent interviews also followed the, with shorter, more focused face-to-face interviews supported by the online self-evaluation tool. This was compliant

with Creswell's convergent parallel mixed methods approach (Creswell, 2013) with the simultaneous collection of quantitative and qualitative data, see Figure 23 I was able to triangulate and substantiate the data gathered.

Figure 23. Convergent parallel mixed methods applied in this research



Source: Author's own, based on Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) in Bryman (2015 p639)

I interviewed my respondents — the 2012–18 cohorts of 'hot shots' — between June 2014 and September 2018. Planning and conducting the interviews was time consuming. Although Broadcast Magazine offered to contact the award winners to gain their consent for sharing email addresses with me, this never happened.

So, I had to research my respondents' contact details myself. Some were available via company websites; others via LinkedIn, Twitter or personal websites. In some cases, I had to cold call the company that had nominated them for the award and ask to speak to the individual.

After tracking down the individuals, I had to persuade them to be interviewed, set out the purpose of the interview and agree a time and place to meet. The engagement process is set out in Appendix 5A, but in summary, once I had made contact, it involved:

- A short call
- An email introduction and request for an interview
- A follow-up email with further details and note to ensure all was understood
- Agreeing a time and place for interview
- Recording the interview after gaining signed consent
- Respondent completing the online questionnaire at the end of the interview, and
- A follow-up email with thanks, assurance on usage of quotes and the offer to share

outcomes from the research.

No-one I spoke to turned me down. Getting to them was the challenge. The award had raised their profile and most directors had acquired an agent, who did not pass on interview requests, without several calls.

In terms of managing the interview itself, I preferred to meet at their place of work as it allowed me to note matters about their working environment. Respondents were also more relaxed. But, if their colleagues wanted the interviewee's time, I suggested we adjourn to a previously researched local café. To maintain consistency in the data gathering, the interview process had a careful structure and I used a working script. I allocated time to the different themes to ensure I could get through all the elements of the interview. In some cases, this meant closing down an interesting line of enquiry.

The semi-structured interview format was shorter than the hour I had originally anticipated because the online questionnaire that the interviewee completed immediately after the face-to-face session captured all their basic personal data. In practice, the sessions lasted about 45 minutes and focused on their attitudes and values based on the 11 factors from the career pathway development value chain (Figure 22).

The interview format explored, in greater context than the quantitative element:

- Background
- Education, qualifications and experience
- Entry into the industry
- Work, employment and progression
- Development needs, and
- Career aspirations, goals and barriers to achieving those goals.

If time allowed or the opportunity presented itself, I had more probing, open-questions ready to explore attitudes, behaviours, views on the skills needed to survive and thrive in

the industry, what creativity means to them and whether they considered themselves to be creative. Towards the end of the interview, we discussed motivation and long-term goals.

The 31 ‘*hots shots*’ I interviewed for this thesis worked within one of the six job families that have a shared meaning in the BTI: production; directing; writing; craft and post; digital; or business.

In considering the core activities of these job families, I allocated them to one of two group types (see Table 6). My terms approximate the ‘*creators*’ and ‘*transformers*’ suggested by Aris and Bughin (2005), though I believe ‘*initiator*’ and ‘*developer*’ are a closer match to the roles.

Table 6. Division of UK television job families

Creative initiators	Creative developers
Production	Craft and post
Directors	Business
Writers	Digital

Source: Author's own

Each of these job families include a range of roles; Creative Skillset (2015a) describes 53 jobs in total.

Interviewing my respondents

During this stage of my research, I contacted and interviewed my respondents. All those I contacted were supportive of my research objective — to learn more about the working lives of media workers in the BTI. The outcome from this stage was a useful database from the questionnaire to analyse and a set of content-rich interviews to interpret and analyse.

5.3.4 Stage 4: Analysing the data

I monitored and informally sized the data as I gathered it during my fieldwork. Themes about working in the industry and personal preference soon started emerging from both

the qualitative interview data and the quantitative questionnaire data.

This allowed me to revise the interview process, cutting to the heart of the matter quicker as I got to know what to look for in my subjects. On the downside, this may have caused me to look for answers to fit my presuppositions. My awareness and reflections of these influences and the triangulation provided by the respondents' self-evaluation review mitigated any negative impact.

Qualitative data


I gathered qualitative data from my interviews with informants and respondents. The informants helped shape the research questions and fieldwork. The respondents were the source for evidence to substantiate or refute my overarching conceit: that government skills strategy has little to offer unregulated high-skills industries.

With the respondents' written consent, I audio recorded all the interviews on my phone. After converting them to mp3 format, I used Audacity, a free audio control deck software, to cut out extraneous noises. I then transcribed the files with an on-line automatic transcription service²¹ adding time markers and speaker reference points. I added my own contemporaneous notes about the working environment to contextualise the interview and logged the running order for each aspect of the discussion. This made finding a specific reference easier when reviewing the original audio or consulting the transcribed material.

In analysing the interview texts, I adopted a thematic approach as discussed by Saunders *et al.*, looking for the '*occurrence and reoccurrence of themes*' (Saunders, 2016 p566). Coding these occurrences then provided an aide to analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The career pathway development value chain and the online self-evaluation questionnaire created a convenient coding framework. Figure 24 shows the three Level 1 codes (themes), 11 Level 2 codes (factors) and an unspecified number of Level 3 codes (individual differences/attributes) I could use to identify and code behaviours.

²¹ <https://www.rev.com/automated-transcription>

Figure 24. The career pathway development value chain with coding levels identified



Source: Author's own

I mapped the quantitative data I had captured through the online questionnaire to the coded qualitative statements. This served two purposes: it meant I did not need to make a value judgement on the validity of a statement, and it helped triangulate the percentage confidence on the congruence of scalar return on the Likert scale to the respondents' replies in the interview. Basically, do I have confidence in their responses — do the interviews collate with the questionnaire.

For example, if a respondent completed the questionnaire with a strong 'like' for working in a team but said in the face-to-face interview that they liked working alone, I would discount this attribute from their data set profile. I expand on this matter in more detail in Chapter Seven.

Quantitative data

I used two sources of quantitative data: secondary data from Creative Skillset, the ONS and other research papers and primary data from my fieldwork. I discuss the usefulness and validity of the secondary sources in Chapter Six.

For each respondent, I collected categorical data — job family, qualification, ethnicity and gender — and ranked data, such as degree grade. The data I collected for the work preferences aspect of the fieldwork on the Likert scale were ordinal data. These two

distinct families of data are either fixed or variable. You cannot change your qualification (categorical data), but your attitude to work will probably change over time (ranked). I captured both sets of raw data on an Excel spreadsheet, with a row for each subject, recoding some attributes — such as ethnicity — to enable easier data analysis.

The first review of the data — what I call sizing the data and others call exploratory data analysis (Saunders, 2016) — simply looked for significance in personal preferences. I ran a basic sort using Excel's filter tool to highlight upper or lower quartile preferences. This identified trends and data distribution and eliminated attributes that seemed to have a very mixed significance across the respondents. For example, size of company had little significance on their work preferences. A second simple examination of the fixed data highlighted shared fixed attributes. See Chapter Seven for charts and discussions of the individual attributes.

5.3.5 Stage 5: Conclusions and implications

Some observations on the BTI workforce quantitative data

In Chapter Three, I consider the range of literature that informed this research and my approach to it. But, like other academic and industrial researchers before me (Towse, 2014) I question the validity of the official workforce data as provided by Creative Skillset (2015a).

I contend that Creative Skillset's data returns are suspect in their demographics and their lack of sampling technique. Workers across the creative industries are alerted to Creative Skillset surveys via the weekly *Broadcast Magazine*, BECTU, PACT, the BBC's in-house magazine *Aerial* and other points of contact such as the Creative Skillset website. There is no structured sampling and Creative Skillset take what data they can get. Thus, sample size varies greatly between subsectors, often falling below that which can provide useful and measurable data for industry trends. Towse (2014) also makes this point.

Many academic and industrial studies quote Creative Skillset surveys, referencing them as the industry benchmark. Given my critique of the primary data gathered by Creative Skillset I submit that they are also flawed. A full analysis of the Creative Skillset data for the television industry is provided in Appendix 6F.

A by-product of this research will demonstrate that the data policymakers use to assess training needs belies the supposition that government bases its policy — at least for skills — on sound evidence.

After collating the findings from my fieldwork, in my analysis I contribute to the debate on the validity of the Creative Skillset data on which so many academic papers and government policy documents are based. The outcome of this stage of my research is to challenge simplistic links between qualifications and labour market entry. The government case that high-skills lead to high-skills jobs in the creative and cultural sector is not supported by the evidence.

5.4 Ethical considerations

Everyone I interviewed, consulted or asked to take part in the pilot questionnaire was over 21 years old. My informants and respondents were all drawn from the BTI workforce and gave their time freely. None of my interviewees are considered vulnerable and they were fully informed in writing of the purpose and scope of the interview. I recorded the interviews for transcription purposes. The work is compliant with the University of Westminster ethical code of practice (University of Westminster, 2017).

My research was approved by the University of Westminster and all interviewees signed the required informed consent forms. I fully apprised all interviewees of the purpose and processes involved in the research and made it clear that I would not use any quote from them – unattributed or attributed – without their written permission. The data I use does not identify any individual and is only presented in a collated format to identify trends and shared attributes. The interview cycle and associated documents are set out in Appendix 5A.

5.5 Limitations of the methodology

The mixed method approach is exploratory, and the nature of the respondents (a purposive sample) selected for this thesis has the inherent limitation that it cannot be generalised to the wider BTI population without a further study that applies the methods across the sector. However, the two pilot studies indicated that the online questionnaire can be used to evaluate the relative strengths of the factors for two other populations; a cohort of MA students in London and young media managers in Shanghai.

The techniques and tools I used could be generalised and provide a useful cross-reference tool in future studies. This would require a sample drawn from across the BTI, not just those identified as successful. It would take a longitudinal study to use the questionnaire to predict and identify future successful media workers, or identify the attributes and interests they need to develop to be successful. This encroaches on the domain of psychometric testing and the technique of using interest inventories as a career modelling tool.

My fieldwork follows Creswell's convergent parallel mixed methods approach (see Figure 19), presented as a single pass linear process (Bryman, 2015 p639). In practice, there is an inherent, possibly unconscious, feedback loop that influences subsequent interviews based on my expectations of subject responses.

My assumption that the media workers I interviewed are successful could be open to criticism and lacking in rigour. I argue in Chapters Three and Five that previous studies and BTI industry censuses, even with well-articulated methodologies, have failed to reach a representative sample population of the BTI. Examining this successful cohort enables me to challenge Creative Skillset's ScreenSkills recommendations on the needs of the media worker (ScreenSkills, 2019b).

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I presented the details of my research methodology and associated methods. I set out to build on the insights gained through the literature review that suggest that economic and labour market theories fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for the *'everyday strategies and tactics'* (Deuze, 2016 p335) of media workers in general and those that are successful in particular.

There are two key elements to this process. I conduct an analysis of secondary data that defines the size, composition of sectors and needs of the creative industries in terms of the workforce and their skills. This is discussed in Chapter Six.

In Chapter Seven I present the data collated from interviews with my informants and respondents. The outputs from the interviews with my respondents are cross referenced with an online self-evaluation questionnaire developed for this study. The questionnaire quantifies the personal determinants, socioeconomic and employment factors into 14 measurable individual attributes. The addition of 32 work-based factors derived from the 1990s BFI study enables comparison between the worker of the 1990s with that of today.

The fieldwork for this thesis is an opportunity to examine the attributes and behaviours of media workers as they plot a pathway in their career, in a fragmented and precarious working environment. I also look for evidence that the government skills policies have had any influence on this group of successful individuals.

Chapter Six Deconstructing extant creative industries data

'To be a creative you need a sense of purpose, a sense of vision'

Gurinder Chadha (2019) Director

6.1 Introduction

In Chapters One to Five I set out the stall of issues regarding the working environment and the skills development of the media worker in the BTI. In this and following chapters I present my fieldwork, analysis and conclusions. This chapter presents my findings and analysis of the data I gathered from published secondary sources. I provide an assessment of the secondary data that codify and define the creative industries in terms of workforce and contribution to GVA. From current literature it is apparent that many academic papers and public reports reference these data without question. A key argument of this thesis is my questioning of the accepted viewpoint that the creative industries are a prime engine of economic growth in the UK economy and therefore offer good employment opportunities with a predicted expansion of the workforce. The data I examine does not substantiate that claim.

6.1.1 Setting the scene – sources of data

The data used by the DCMS to craft their economic estimates are, by their own admission, only sufficient to indicate trends. Their data would not pass the rigours of the methodology applied by the ONS (DCMS, 2009, 2018c). Between 2007–10, three industry-based organisations estimated the size of the BTI:

- Data from Skillset industry surveys
- Broadcasters' data returns required under the Communications Act 2003 and submitted to BTR/BETR, and
- DCMS labour force data based on the SIC codes extracted from various ONS databases.

In terms of rigour, the ONS data drawn from employment registers are detailed and thorough. The BETR data were reliable and consistent in as much as, bar a few anomalies,

the dataset was consistent year-on-year, as all broadcasters were required to submit data on their workforce. The ONS data could be triangulated with the BETR data. The reliability of the Skillset data was highly suspect as there was no consistency year-on-year. Arguably the most volatile, it relied on the distribution of surveys and for individuals and companies to voluntarily complete. From these data, Skillset drew their submissions to government for funding to support training in the industry. As it was monitored by UKCES, Skillset data were accepted as a reliable source. In passing, it is unfortunate that the Skillset data were used as a baseline for their workforce sample in the much-respected BFI longitudinal study in the 1990s. The BFI researchers should have used ONS data, as should other academic studies.

In 2019 ScreenSkills has adopted a new methodology for assessing the size and composition of the creative industries. Since the BETR was dissolved in 2010 for a number of years no data was gathered by Ofcom. Under pressure from the industry, the regulator was obliged to return to gathering data from the broadcasters, both of these new models are analysed in this chapter. My analysis and findings of industry secondary data are informed by an exchange with statistician informants from the DCMS, the ONS (Informants U and V) and an email exchange with the current head of research at the BFI.


6.2 Gathering creative industries extant data

I began this process by reviewing the various publicly available datasets and the grey literature²² that inform the collective wisdom of what industrial sectors make up the creative industries, in accordance with Creswell's Explanatory sequential mixed methods (Figure 25). The issue of what is included in the '*creative industries*' is not clear. Since 2001 when the creative industries as an entity was first defined there has been a significant change to the methodology for deciding the composition of the creative industries, the ownership of the datasets and the processes by which the data are gathered. In 2007 new occupational codes were applied to all jobs in the UK and in 2012

²² Grey literature is any information that is not produced by commercial publishers.

the creative intensity filter was overlaid on the sector to determine what is, or is not, a creative sub-sector.

Figure 25. Explanatory sequential mixed methods applied in this research



Source: Author's own, based on Creswell and Plano Clark (2011) in Bryman (2015 p639)

These three changes to the composition of the sector have impacted on the clarity and consistency in the data modelling used by the DCMS to assess the size, scope and activities of the creative industries. The annual economic estimates are just that, estimates. Reports from the DCMS, its executive bodies or delivery agencies; position papers from thinktanks all tend to be based on collated third-party data provided for them from the ONS, from ScreenSkills, or from academic sources. I question the usefulness of these data beyond identifying broad trends. The consequences are multiple: if the size and growth of the sector are ambiguous, the claims of exceptional growth in GVA by the DCMS, CBI, PACT and ScreenSkills cannot be substantiated. It follows that the growth in employment in the sector is also questionable. Yet, Industry skills requirements and submissions to government to have policies that support the sector are based on these data.

My review of ONS data indicate that workforce numbers in Film & TV have remained static. The High Fliers Research (2019) annual report suggests that the numbers being recruited by the top 10 media employers has gone down by 8% from 2018. Overall, there has been little change in workforce numbers from 2014 at the start of my fieldwork (High Fliers Research, 2016). As White argues, *'the categorization of creative industries is governed not by academic disinterest but by the need to be consistent with the responsibilities of the DCMS's portfolio...'* (White, 2009).

6.3 Secondary data: can it substantiate the industry's need for many more workers?

6.3.1 Document analysis: industry sources

I began my research in 2014, analysing sources of UK television workforce data. I analysed secondary data twice: at the start of this research in 2014 and a review of current data in 2019. This was necessary because the roles played by Skillset/ScreenSkills and the DCMS have changed over the timeframe. The ownership of the skills agenda moved to the DfE when BIS was disbanded.

There are two tracks to this secondary data analysis work. The first is a data-mining exercise that looks for evidence of reports that influence and drive government policy to understand the dynamics within the complex partnerships that deliver government skills policy to the creative industries sector. The second is to get a deeper understanding of the sources of BTI workforce data and its validity.

For the data-mining exercise, I examined available data on the creative economy and higher education as well as the grey literature on the creative industries:

- Cultural and creative industries: I used ONS national surveys for data on size, growth, contribution to GVA, exports and worker numbers. I am a registered academic user of the ONS NOMIS service and used the powerful data query service to gather sorted data from the Business Register and Employment Survey based on the SIC2007 codes. Edited results are presented in Appendix 6B.
- UK television industry workforce: I used Creative Skillset and Ofcom data on the number of companies with an Ofcom licence, the composition of the workforce and numbers recruited each year. As previously noted, Creative Skillset gathered its data opportunistically from self-evaluation questionnaires which have a low response rate (Creative Skillset, 2015a). Ofcom's data are more reliable, as there is a regulatory requirement for all broadcast licence holders to report workforce data (Ofcom, 2006).
- Higher education: I used HESA (2018) data on the number of media and media production courses and the number of graduates entering or expecting to enter the


industry each year and cross-referenced this with the number of new joiners to the industry.

- Grey literature: I reviewed quasi-official/peer-reviewed material from national bodies recognised by government as reputable sources, such as NESTA's (2013b) *'Manifesto for the creative economy'* and The Work Foundation's (2007) economic model for success, which are both cited by government ministers (DCMS, 2013b, DCMS, 2013d). The government's most recent economic estimates cite the model of creative intensity — devised by NESTA and as mentioned earlier, opposed by many representative bodies of the creative industries — as part of its methodology (DCMS, 2018b p7). NESTA's influence has had a profound influence on government policy initiatives.
- Workforce and employer surveys commissioned by Creative Skillset: The usefulness and reliability of these sources is questionable as their data are primarily based on a published request through the trade press for workers to complete and until recent times survey forms being left in the foyer of the bigger players such as ITV and the BBC. This is a questionable research method. I argue that this is a flawed methodology that only offer general trends at best. The data tables collated from these sources give evidence to the ambiguous nature of the data, the numbers from TV show an overall return of 2.3% , with terrestrial TV at 4.7%, once broken down to the job level the numbers are vanishingly small (Creative Skillset, 2015a).

Issues for this research

Analysing the data to extract the TV industry's contribution to GVA is a complex process. As explained in Chapter Two (Section 2.3.1) the creative industries are one of the seven sectors within the DCMS, which are: civil society, creative industries, cultural sector, digital sector, gambling, sport, telecoms and tourism (DCMS, 2018d). *'Together they contribute £267bn to the UK economy, accounting for 14.6% of UK GVA.'* (DCMS, 2018c). But Film & TV appear in three of the seven sectors: creative industries, cultural sector and the digital sector (see Figure 26).

Figure 26. Overlap of SIC codes within DCMS sectors



Source: DCMS (2018b p6)

The sectors within the DCMS are clustered by job groups based on the international SIC2007 codes²³. The ONS is the UK custodian of the codes, which provide ‘a framework for the collection, tabulation, presentation and analysis of data [which]... promotes uniformity’(ONS, 2013a p1). The BTI straddles two 2007 UK SIC codes; Section J: Motion picture, video and TV programme production, sound recording and music publishing activities, division codes 59 and 60 (Appendix 1B) and to Section R: Arts, entertainment and recreation, codes 90. The Section J codes map to the two key aspects of the BTI: broadcasting (the channels to market) and programme-making (production). It is from these groups that I draw my numbers. This is the most reliable framework and the ONS produces impartial and rigorous national data. As I will show in my document analysis of secondary sources, the ONS data are often at odds with institutional sources.

In 2010, the DCMS published the first estimate using the SIC 2007 codes (DCMS, 2010), also producing a helpful summary of the 2008 data (Figure 27) from which I extracted

²³ The current Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2007 codes are used to classify business establishments and other statistical units by the type of economic activity in which they are engaged (ONS descriptor). NB: The codes were first devised in the USA in 1937.

Figure 28. In the report, the DCMS notes the almost 50% contribution by software and electronic publishing. Overall, the creative industries contributed 5.6% of the UK's GVA.

Figure 27. GVA estimates for creative industries, 2008

Sector	GVA at basic prices (£million)	Proportion of total UK GVA (%)
1. Advertising	7,800	0.7%
2. Architecture	3,600	0.3%
3. Art & Antiques	300	0.03%
5. Design	1,600	0.2%
6. Designer Fashion	100	0.01%
7. Film, Video & Photography	2,700	0.3%
9 & 10. Music & Visual and Performing Arts	3,200	0.3%
11. Publishing	10,100	1.0%
8 & 12. Software & Electronic Publishing	26,400	2.5%
8 & 12. Digital & Entertainment Media	200	0.02%
13. TV & Radio	3,200	0.3%
Total GVA for Creative Industries	59,100	5.6%
Total GVA for all Industries	1,053,900²	

Source: Annual Business Survey (ABS), Office for National Statistics

Source: DCMS (2010)

There have been two major shake ups to the data model and methodology used by the DCMS to calculate the economic estimates for the creative industries. The DCMS created the 'creative industries' sector in 2001 and remains the term applied to date, however the composition of its groups and associated occupations have changed over the period. The SIC 2007 codes came into force for the period 2009–14 and remain the underpinning coding model for occupations in the UK. In 2015, the DCMS added another filter — creative intensity — to differentiate a creative business with creative jobs from creative jobs conducted in any sector.

For reasons that are not clear, the 2015 economic estimate figures were never released to the public and are missing from the DCMS website. There is a summary (DCMS, 2015b) but it does not have charts as clear as those from 2010. The reader is also advised; *'This release retains that definition [of the creative industries], but uses a methodology introduced last year for determining which occupation and industry codes [in Annex A and Annex B of the full report] are classified as "creative". This methodology makes use of a robust finding from research that having high levels of "creative intensity" — that is, the proportion of the workforce in creative occupations — separates the Creative Industries*

from other industries. Therefore, these estimates should not be compared with estimates published prior to 2014.’ It is a worrying sleight of hand that the DCMS completed a mapping exercise, wiping out data comparisons provided over the previous 14 years.

In 2017²⁴, the DCMS released the first sets of data using the creative intensity model and the three overlapping components of the creative economy seen in Figure 26. This remains the model to date. The DCMS advises that referring back to previous data sets should be done with care. Plus, it admits the total is not the sum of the parts due to the overlap. However, it should be noted that the total GVA for the sector is 5.3%, down from 5.6% in 2008.

Figure 28. GVA estimates for creative industries, 2010 - 2016

Sub-sector	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016 (p)	% change 2015 - 2016	% change 2010 - 2016	% of UK GVA 2016
Advertising and marketing	6,216	6,753	7,799	9,256	10,758	11,758	12,312	4.7	98.1	0.7
Architecture	2,297	2,857	3,040	3,007	3,527	4,025	4,203	4.4	83.0	0.2
Crafts	292	308	284	216	396	368	421	14.6	44.3	0.0
Design and designer fashion	1,968	2,293	2,534	2,705	2,634	3,185	3,537	11.0	79.7	0.2
Film, TV, video, radio and photography	12,793	13,261	13,685	13,763	14,606	14,406	15,361	6.6	20.1	0.9
IT, software and computer services	22,714	24,839	25,596	27,327	29,395	31,154	34,704	11.4	52.8	2.0
Publishing	10,364	9,979	10,318	10,379	10,442	10,791	11,622	7.7	12.1	0.7
Museums, galleries and libraries	1,323	1,225	1,238	1,256	1,227	1,342	1,430	6.6	8.0	0.1
Music, performing and visual arts	5,457	5,733	6,228	6,959	6,969	8,280	8,237	-0.5	51.0	0.5
Creative Industries	63,425	67,248	70,723	74,868	79,953	85,308	91,828	7.6	44.8	5.3
UK	1,422,028	1,458,820	1,505,718	1,564,430	1,638,722	1,684,937	1,744,435	3.5	22.7	100.0

Source: DCMS (2017b)

Two other tables from 2010 present the status of the creative industries in clear and unambiguous terms.

²⁴ The figures for 2016 are made available late 2017 and even then are subject to review based on the national account published in 2018

Figure 29. Number of businesses in the creative industries, 2008

Sector	Number of enterprises	As a proportion of Creative Industry Enterprises (%)	As a proportion of all enterprises (%)
1. Advertising	14,800	8.1%	0.7%
2. Architecture	11,500	6.3%	0.5%
3. Art & Antiques	2,700	1.5%	0.1%
5. Design	14,200	7.8%	0.7%
6. Designer Fashion	900	0.5%	0.04%
7. Film, Video & Photography	9,900	5.4%	0.5%
9 & 10. Music & Visual and Performing Arts	30,800	16.9%	1.5%
11. Publishing	7,700	4.2%	0.4%
8 & 12. Software & Electronic Publishing	81,700	44.9%	3.9%
8 & 12. Digital & Entertainment Media	200	0.1%	0.01%
13. TV & Radio	7,700	4.2%	0.4%
Total	182,100	100.0%	8.7%
All enterprises	2,100,400		

Source: Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR), Office for National Statistics

Source: DCMS (2010)

In summary, the secondary data issues are:

- The definitions of the creative industries, the digital sector and the cultural sector
- Measuring the contribution of each to GVA when excluding the overlap and growth over the last 10 years
- The true size of the BTI
- The number of businesses in the BTI
- The number of people who work in the BTI, full time and part time
- Why the contribution and size of the industry are continually overstated
- Whether the minister of state of the day appreciates the difference between the creative, and economy and the three sectors within the DCMS that overlap?

6.3.2 Baselineing the data and unsubstantiated claims

My concerns about the interpretation and weight given to official and quasi-official data sources — I introduced in Chapter One and analysed above — first came about during my role as industry regulator, when I noted a clear disconnect between the data gathered by my team in the BTR/BETR and Creative Skillset's data: *'The most widely used source of employment data for the sector comes from Creative Skillset. They note in the 2009 employment census that total employment is down from 202,000 in 2006 to 188,150 in 2009 (Creative Skillset, 2009). The recession provides the explanation for the drop. What is*

not clear is how these figures tally with those of DCMS, CBI and NESTA of 1.5 to 2 million. Data from Creative Skillset in 2015 estimates the total workforce at 206,150 (Creative Skillset, 2015c). It is hard, therefore, to understand how these bodies arrive at a figure of more than one million workers in the creative industries, even taking the large freelance population into consideration' (Randle et al., 2013a p13).

As I already noted above, Creative Skillset data do not tally with ONS or BETR data. And without accord between sources, it is impossible to triangulate workforce data from different sources. There is also a lack of shared understanding of the definition of the creative industries sector, what constitutes a creative job and therefore the composition of the workforce. As I discussed in Chapter One, the DCMS adopted the creative intensity approach and required the ONS to recast its workforce data model (DCMS, 2013b, NESTA, 2013b). But it is impossible to use SSC or DCMS data to identify the skills needs of an industry if the sectors are not clearly delineated; i.e. no overlap.

6.3.3 Received wisdoms

In my review of the secondary sources, there is a widely accepted view from government, industry bodies such as the CBI and independent thinktanks such as NESTA that the creative industries are a significant engine of economic growth (DCMS, 2012, NESTA, 2006).

The government sees the sector, not only as an income generator, but as a flag carrier for UK plc and the UK brand, see Box 5. However, government, CBI and the Creative Industries Council (CIC) estimates of the size sector's workforce from 1.5–2.5 million and of its contribution to the economy from 3–6% of GVA.

Box 5. Position statements from three organisations highlight the symbolic value of the creative industries to the UK economy

'Our creative industries are a real success story. They are worth more than £36 billion a year; they generate £70,000 every minute for the UK economy; and they employ 1.5 million people in the UK. According to industry figures, the creative industries account for around £1 in every £10 of the UK's exports. With the right support, they have the potential to bring even more benefits to our culture and economy. We support these industries through financial incentives,

promotion at home and abroad, and reducing unnecessary regulations. We are very proud of the UK's media industry: it is a powerful symbol of an open and free society, as well as an important part of the economy. At the same time, we want to make sure that appropriate regulations are in place so that everyone's rights are protected, and so that we have a plurality (or mix) of owners in the media industry' (DCMS, 2013d).

In 2018, this unqualified support continued, with the Secretary of State Jeremy Wright following the narrative in a press release on the latest economic estimates with *'Our creative industries are not only fly the flag....'* (DCMS, 2018a).

'The creative industries — ranging from advertising to architecture and fashion to film — constitute one of the fastest-growing sectors in the UK. The creative industries contribute 6% of GDP and employ over 2 million people. The sector is forecast to play a bigger role in coming years. If the UK is to achieve a balanced, high-growth economy, it is vital that the key strengths of businesses in the creative sector are nurtured. The CBI is developing policies on a range of issues to show what needs to be done to deliver the conditions under which our creative industries can thrive' (CBI, 2013).

Again, they continue with a similar narrative in 2019 through the CIC: *'The CBI argues that the UK can build on recent initiatives to ensure the creative industries have "the foundations in place for long-term success" and can provide the leading global creative hub by 2025'* (DCMS, 2019).

The CIC asserts that over 3 million people work in the creative economy (CIC, 2018) and add an infographic on MP Perception of the Creative Industries – that 57% of MPs say that the creative industries are vitally important to the creation of new jobs – this is not based on evidence. It is possible that the reason for the difference in numbers quoted by the CBI, CIC and government is that each views the creative **economy** differently. However, an assessment of the contribution that the creative industries make to the economy cannot be made without an agreed baseline on their composition. For example, if we exclude computer software during 1997–2007, growth shrinks from 5% to 3%. If we also remove art and antiques, it shrinks to 2%. I am also concerned that the Creative Skillset/ScreenSkills data in any document I have examined to date have not been cross-

referenced or independently validated by the ONS. This remains true with the latest figures, where Games and IT account for 2.2% of GVA. Removing this sector from the creative industries would cause the industry share of UK GVA to fall to 3.3% of which Film, TV, video, radio and photography provides 0.9% (DCMS, 2018d). A skills policy predicated on erroneous growth will do nothing to cap the number of hopeful workers with aspirations to join the creative industries.

6.3.4 What constitutes the 'creative industries'?

In Chapter Two (Section 2.3) I explained the process by which the classification and composition of the creative industries have changed over the last 20 years. The DCMS recognised the inconsistencies in defining the attributes of what may be considered a creative occupation or industry. In 2013, it completed a new set of occupations that can be considered 'creative' and recast the industry groupings (see Appendix 1B). I argue that the definition of creative industries has been transformed to define inputs and process rather than output of content. The DCMS made the case that the '*creative intensity*' approach focuses on industries where creative activity happens. Its intention was to produce a classification that provides direct estimates of employment and contribution to the economy, with no double counting, rather than attempting to define the sector by its output. The old definitions as discuss in Chapter One (Section 1.2.2) seem to be no longer valid.

The difficulty of classifying the subsectors within the creative industry persists, despite the consultation and recasting of the sector into three related subsectors. The DCMS recognises the difficulties of any groupings: *'The use of a SIC code listing is not the most accessible listing and are not always a useful communication tool. So, we propose organising these SIC codes into 'groups' which are recognisable to the wider user. These will be comparable to the 'sectors' in the original DCMS estimates. We are proposing the industry groups as shown in... [Appendix 1B]. On this basis we have groups for Advertising and marketing, Architecture, Design and designer fashion, Film, TV, video and radio, IT telecommunications, software and computer services, Publishing, and Music, performing and visual arts'* (DCMS, 2013a).

Table 7 shows the SIC2007 codes relevant to the BTI collated from ONS data tables. The % creative column presents the creative intensity percentage of the groups 59.1, 59.2 and 60. I challenge the initial assumption that the moving picture subsector has 56.6% employees engaged in creative work.

Table 7. An extract of Creative industries employment and creative jobs SIC 2007

SIC		Employment		
SIC2007	Description	Sector (000s)	Creative (000s)	% creative
59.1	Motion picture, video and television programme activities, to include	98	55	56.6
	59.11 Motion picture, video & TV programme production activities			
	59.12 Motion picture, video & TV programme post-production activities			
	59.13 Motion picture, video & TV programme distribution activities			
	59.14 Motion picture projection activities			
59.2	Sound recording & music publishing activities	13	5	43.1
60	Programming and broadcasting activities, to include	60	34	57.4
	60.1 Radio broadcasting			
	60.2 TV programming & broadcasting activities			

Source: ONS data tables (see Appendix 1B).

Data from BETR reports indicate that at least 50% of the workforce provides back office functions (BETR, 2010b). Ofcom’s methodology for gathering data from the broadcasters has seven occupational categories of which one is deemed ‘creative and content production’ (Ofcom, 2019). Of those engaged in production work, I argue that those engaged in actively creative work varies between 10–20%. The case for this assertion is based on the employee’s mode of employment. Can the task or role be allocated by a rota? If the answer is ‘no’ then the case for the role being creative and unique to the production is strong. This varies according to the nature of the production and size of crew. This assessment is based on over 20 years’ personal experience of working in creative industries. This is not to suggest that many jobs in production are not demanding and exacting. Jay Barney (1991) discussed the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (a term presented in Chapter One often used by academics instead of the word ‘company’ or organisation) and devised a framework for measuring a firm’s unique capabilities that is still used in business analysis. The same approach can be applied to an individual’s attributes that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable or non-substitutable (VRIN). I

suggest that if the answer to each element is 'yes', we have defined a creative role. The majority of tasks on a production are routine roles *'as a factor of production, to be employed and deployed at the employer's will'* (Ursell, 2006). Table 5 based on Ursell's work on forms of employment presents the worker in Column 1 as an interchangeable resource. Workers are not unique, which is the situation for the majority of roles on a production. Given the above, it remains a moot point as to whether the BTI meets the 30% *'creative intensity'* threshold invoked by the DCMS.

What is clear is that a creative occupation can be found in many more occupational groups than the traditionally understood creative industries, as Figures 7 and 28 indicate, there are overlaps across the creative economy and industries, then at the sector level an almost arbitrary assessment of creative intensity. How can academics, policymakers or pressure groups discuss the attributes of a group, when membership of the group is uncertain? A point raised by the Skills Task Force in attempting to arrive at a national policy (Parker, 1999).

The Creative & Cultural Skills SSC in a discussion piece (see full response in Appendix 6C) challenged the proposition of creative intensity, *'Classification and measurement of the employment of creative workers and their financial contributions to the creative and cultural industries is not the only way to accurately assess where policy makers should intervene in the economy'* (Creative & Cultural Skills, 2013 p4). They also argue that; *Herein lies the problem - a museum has creative workers at its core, but it has apparently diluted them with enough administration staff, security staff, cleaners and other personnel to apparently create institutions which are less creative than, for example, a tech-start-up company, which only employs developers, hires a temporary workspace and outsources its office management, HR, cleaning and associated 'support' jobs* (Creative & Cultural Skills, 2013 p3). This mirrors my own line of argument that just because an organisation is populated with creative occupations does not make the activity intrinsically creative or meet the 30% creative intensity threshold. There also remains the question: how the government can devise a high-skills policy if the nature of what a creative occupation in the creative industries might be is not widely understood, or agreed.

6.3.5 The creative and digital economies: engines for growth?

The terms '*creative*' and '*digital*' economies have been coined to describe the changing industrial landscape. The broad characterisation bases this on creativity, ideas, knowledge and information that have replaced or superseded the traditional model of transactions based on goods and services. For some, this has become a more narrow definition used to link creativity, culture and economics (UN, 2008).

The UN argues that creativity can be found in all societies and countries, rich and poor. It goes on to define creativity in broad terms as '*associated with originality, imagination, inspiration, ingenuity and inventiveness*'. It is predominantly a function of culture and not one that can be found in other sectors of society. Innovative products and ideas can, however, be found in all sectors of the economy and I argue an evocation of the creative 'aha' moment, I discuss in Chapter One (Section 1.2.2). Globally, there are more examples of innovation in IT, technology and media. IBM holds more patents than any other company in the world (IFI Claims Patent Services, 2011).

The creative economy is especially attractive to the UK government because it plays to the notion that we are a '*creative country*' (The British Council, 2013). The much-quoted view is that in the past the UK has failed to support and exploit the output from creative endeavours. At the start of this chapter, I highlighted that the evidence for sector-wide growth is not compelling. As DCMS admits, the current system can be a source of double counting as the DCMS methodology for its economic estimates admits (DCMS, 2013c). Thus, depending on the source, the number employed in the creative industries varies from just over 1 million to 2 million and the GVA from 3–6%.

Without being able to compare share of GVA, number of employees, number of companies with other industries or sectors, it is hard to tell whether it is growth or just churn, as there is no baseline against which to measure these assertions. Two sectors with similar employment profiles worthy of comparison are Professional, scientific & technical (SIC M) and Information & communications (SIC J). The leisure industry also claims to be an engine of growth. Its narrative follows the claims made by the creative industries, along with special pleading for government support. The leisure industry employs 2.6m (9% of the workforce), generates 7% of national income, employs many

young people and makes the case for a strong track record in developing women managers. Yet it is argued that they are *'under-represented and misunderstood by government'* (Wyman, 2012 p2).

It may be possible to validate the case for growth by reviewing ONS data since the application of the SIC 2007 codes (ONS, 2018b, 2016, 2013b, 2012b). An assessment of the summary data of the number of VAT/PAYE enterprises for the 2010–18 should indicate some correlation between the number of registered enterprises and the buoyancy or growth of the sector. But due to the number of mergers and acquisitions the total number of firms has shrunk.

The industry, as a uniform whole, is spoken of as an engine for growth. Between 2010 and 2018, the sector has shown limited growth, with a dip in company numbers in 2011 that might be explained by the impact of the recession and the knock-on effect across the sector, such as ITV job losses. These data challenge the view that the creative industries exhibit exceptional growth. In fact, the mass media industries components of this sector are the poorest performers, with radio and TV showing zero growth.

The broadcast industry was seriously affected by the economic downturn from 2008 onwards. The non-subscription nature of ITV and its loss of advertising revenue meant that nearly 1,000 staff lost their jobs (BETR, 2011a). It clearly demonstrated that creativity was not the key determinant of success, but the extent of advertising and airtime sold to those with something to sell. It was only at the start of 2013 that the ITV share price recovered from an all-time low of 52p (October 2011) to 123p (April 2013). The company took steps to re-brand its image, the most visible sign being the new logo applied to all channels and merchandise at the start of 2013.

The radio sector also went through a period of consolidation as weak channels were bought up by conglomerates (BETR, 2011a). At the same time, the BBC shed 25% of its management staff. The broadcasting industry was undermining the assertion that the creative industry was a pathfinder to economic regeneration and job creation.

The distribution of enterprises in the sector could be another indicator of growth. We might expect to see an increase in new joiners, as many registered companies in the

creative industry are sole traders or partnerships of one or two people (often family members). So, it is not unreasonable to expect that, if the sector was growing, the number of registered companies at this level would have expanded. There has been growth in the sector as the number of micro businesses has increased, but the number of large enterprises has decreased due to mergers and acquisitions, such as the takeover by Warner Bros to create WBUK TV (see the Section 2.4.1).

Other writers also point to the turbulent nature of the creative industries. Oliver (2017) highlights the challenge for organisations to remain competitive in what he describes as the *'high velocity market'* of the sector. In an examination of the GVA of individual workers, he notes there are significant differences between the sub sectors (Oliver, 2017 p11) of which the GVA of Film, TV, Video and Radio is 25% lower than Architecture, the top performer. He also notes that GVA peaked in 2008 and that there has been a weak growth in productivity over the period till 2014. This assessment challenges the case for exceptional growth across the sector and highlights the significant differences across the sub-sectors.

There is little to suggest that the creative industries as a whole are an engine for economic growth, as the economic success relies on games and software, as Figure 30 shows. Since the early 2000s, there has been a glut of labour on the freelance BTI market. The matter is clouded, however, by a few stunning exemplars. But the production of Wonder Woman or The Night Manager does not convert into sustainable income stream for UK plc. In 2018-19 the PACT TV Exports Report shows sales of £1.4 billion with significant contribution to revenue by selling format rights, such as Top Gear, Gogglebox or the Great British Bake Off, across the globe (PACT, 2019). Comparing with available ONS data suggests that exports represent between 10-15 percent of GVA. Profitability is up but my data shows (See Table 8) overall employment growth as static overall but an increase of over 1,200 jobs in programme distribution between 2015 and 2017. The perception created by universities, government departments (notably DCMS) and the other advocates such as PACT, ScreenSkills and the BFI overstate the case of growth and job opportunities, impacting on potential joiners' expectations that there are plenty of jobs – especially creative one.

The headlines from a 2018 DCMS press release states: *'Record breaking figures in the digital industries which are now worth more than £130 billion. 'The UK's roaring creative industries made a record contribution to the economy in 2017, smashing through the £100 billion mark.'* (DCMS, 2018a)

I am reluctant to suggest this is misrepresentation, but my DCMS statistician informant accepted she gives her stakeholders what they want to read.

Informant V: *"I think my rationale behind that was just to pick out the main check points for each of the sectors because I wrote this so my rationale behind it was to just to pick out what our users would be interested in... Maybe I might have been a bit biased because half of my job is working with digital policy colleagues so maybe I sort of had an idea of what their views must have been."*

'The CCIs, in the UK and elsewhere, have long been subject to claims about their economic potential. These claims have been rooted in how CCIs have been defined as a sector of the economy that can outperform other types of occupations.' (O'Brien, Laurison, Miles et al., 2016 p3)

Typical of the many papers written on this matter is *'Are the creative industries meritocratic?'* an analysis of the 2014 British Labour Force Survey by O'Brien et al (2016). The paper contains several factual errors regarding the data model for the sector and several citations on the limited meritocracy the creative industries that purely concern the performing arts and on-screen talent.

'There is a clear question raised as to the coherence of aggregating CCI occupations into a single sector of the economy... This conclusion draws attention to the need for a decomposition of CCIs and attentiveness to the diversity within and between the individual parts. While this has traditionally been approached on an occupation by occupation basis, understanding the components of the CCIs relationally has become central to recent calls from cultural studies scholars to better understand the future role of CCIs in economy and society' (O'Brien et al., 2016 p13).

The aggregated data referenced by academics and industry use data extrapolated across the sector. So, the O'Brien et al. paper uses the discussion regarding on-screen talent to highlight issues across the sector. However, the authors do except that to cluster such a disparate group of industries under one heading does little to serve each subgroup of the creative industries as a whole.

6.4 The BTI workforce

This discussion of the BTI workforce is based on cross-referencing a review of the DCMS Economic Estimates with ONS, Creative Skillset and BTSR/BETR/Ofcom data.

Understanding the size of the workforce allows us to appreciate the numbers of jobs in total and the range of opportunities in the sector, it helps us know whether it is an expanding industry and gives us a view on the number of opportunities available to potential new joiners in terms of roles and location.

As with the data on GVA and the number of enterprises in the industry, I baseline the data in Figure 30 from 2010, when the 2007 SIC codes came into use in the DCMS.

Figure 30. Number of employees in the creative industries, 2008

Sector	Employees in Creative Industries	Self-employed in Creative Industries	Employees doing creative jobs in other industries	Self-employed people doing creative jobs in other industries	Total Employment
1. Advertising	89,100	25,400	163,800	21,000	299,200
2. Architecture	63,300	35,300	26,300	3,500	128,400
3. Art & Antiques	6,600	3,200			9,800
4. Crafts			66,300	45,100	111,400
5. Design	35,000	56,600	113,500	20,400	225,400
6. Designer Fashion	2,500	3,700	3,200	400	9,700
7. Film, Video & Photography	26,000	13,300	10,700	10,500	60,500
9 & 10. Music & Visual and Performing Arts	67,200	136,300	33,300	69,000	305,800
11. Publishing	151,100	20,500	55,700	9,300	236,600
8 & 12. Software & Electronic Publishing	347,000	81,000	290,600	34,500	753,000
8 & 12. Digital & Entertainment Media	5,600	700			6,200
13. TV & Radio	77,300	37,300	10,500	7,200	132,300
Total	870,600	413,200	774,000	220,700	2,278,500

Source: DCMS (2010) extracted from ONS

The ONS figures for the workforce in December 2017 show Section R: Arts, entertainment and recreation 863,000 (2.7%) and Section S: Other service activities 801,000 (2.5%). These are sometimes counted together and give a total of: 1,664,000. This is close to DCMS figure but somewhat adrift from CBI and NESTA data. Further research is needed to establish what organisations are counting or assuming.

My analysis shown in Table 8 collates query data extracted from the ONS. These data are collated from a search using the ONS NOMIS site. Some points to note - to the end of 2018, 66,300 and 77,425 people are employed in the film and TV production process, respectively, full and part-time. It is not possible to delve any deeper and separate out film from TV post production so I have shown core activities excluding post production. It is a function that serves both sub-sectors. In an exchange with the head of statistics at the BFI it was accepted that only 21,500 people work solely in film. Some 12,500 work in post-production but are included by the BFI as part of the film industry workforce. The BFI Film Industry and Industry Employment publication claims that *'In 2017 around 88,000 people worked in the UK film industry'* (BFI, 2018 p3). The explanation made by the BFI for this somewhat inflated figure, is below:

'My understanding of the continued inclusion of Video production and distribution at this stage was that; after consultation with industry bodies there was a large amount of work conducted by companies classified under these SIC codes that would be substantially related to film production and distribution, and thus the decision was made to include them for fear of removing work conducted on film by companies that primarily identified as Video producers/ distributors... In consultation with several of the world's largest visual effects companies (including Double Negative, Framestore, Cinesite and MPC) who are based in the UK we made the decision to include 5912 film, video and TV post production in our estimates, as film work provides a substantial amount of their output and the UK is a leading provider of this content worldwide. For further details on the impact of this sector there is a report from NESTA Next Gen, which I understand reflects similar thinking to why post production was included' (Cade, 2019). In essence, both film and TV sector claim a high percentage of workers as their own.

Table 8. Creative industries workforces Film and TV

Film	2017		2016		2015	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
59111 : Motion picture production activities	21,500	0.1	21,000	0.1	22,000	0.1
59112 : Video production activities	6,000	0.0	5,500	0.0	5,000	0.0
59120 : Motion picture, video and television programme post-production activities	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0
59131 : Motion picture distribution activities	4,750	0.0	4,750	0.0	5,000	0.0
59132 : Video distribution activities	550	0.0	650	0.0	650	0.0
59140 : Motion picture projection activities	21,000	0.1	20,500	0.1	19,500	0.1
Column Total - with post production (cross sector function)	66,300	0.2	64,900	0.2	64,650	0.2
Column Total - without post production Film only	53,800	0.2	52,400	0.2	52,150	0.2
TV	2017		2016		2015	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
59112 : Video production activities	6,000	0.0	5,500	0.0	5,000	0.0
59113 : Television programme production activities	32,500	0.1	31,000	0.1	29,500	0.1
59120 : Motion picture, video and television programme post-production activities	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0
59132 : Video distribution activities	550	0.0	650	0.0	650	0.0
59133 : Television programme distribution activities	1,875	0.0	700	0.0	650	0.0
60200 : Television programming and broadcasting activities	24,000	0.1	29,000	0.1	25,500	0.1
Column Total - with post production (cross sector function)	77,425	0.2	79,350	0.2	73,800	0.2
Column Total - without post production TV only	64,925	0.2	66,850	0.2	61,300	0.2

Source: Author's own, using ONS data (ONS, 2018a). See Appendix 6B for complete data set.

The data in Table 8 along with the baseline data from 2010, are in accord with the data gathered by the BTSR and BETR. In my report to Ofcom, I stated that: *'Broadcasting is a relatively small sector but, by the nature of the beast, is hugely important for matters of diversity and opportunity. Over the past six years, we have seen an almost 20% difference in the companies that reported to BETR. And the work force has shrunk at a faster rate than many others, from 60,935 in 2009 to 58,668 in 2010. The BBC, ITV, SKY, Channel 4, Five and Global Radio employ more than 50% of the total workforce. That is more than the other 60 companies put together and more than all the other small company licences Ofcom issues'* (BETR, 2011d p3). A reader might note that there is no % change in the workforce at the single digit level and that the workforce has flexed up and down over the three years 2015-17.

The most widely used source of employment data for the sector comes from Creative Skillset, who noted in the 2009 Employment Census that total employment was down from 202,000 in 2006 to 188,150 (Creative Skillset, 2009). The recession provides an

explanation for this drop, but what is not clear is how these figures tally with DCMS, CBI and NESTA's. In 2009, Creative Skillset estimated that 500,000 people worked in the industry. They did not gather data from software, antiques or architecture. It is hard to understand how the figure of 2 million plus workers in the industry is established, even considering the large freelance population. Working freelancers are included on census day. The question remains: what is the true economic contribution to GVA?

This confused debate is one that the EU seems to perpetuate and has a multiplicity of viewpoints, even within its EU 2020 Strategy, which names the *'culture & creative sectors'* as a largely untapped resource (European Union, 2012). *'There is a lot of untapped potential in the cultural and creative industries to flourish in a new entrepreneurial culture'* (European Union, 2010b). Yet there is no reference to this sector in the Europe 2020 initiative *'Innovation Union'* (European Union, 2013). The EU concerns are that the community only spend 0.8% on research and development; the target is 3% of EU GDP by 2020, which could create 3.7m jobs and €795m by 2025.

When Creative Skillset/ScreenSkills, Creative & Cultural Skills or Women in Film and Television campaign or lobby government to promote the industry, they do so with a powerful set of film makers, film and TV performers as the face of their campaign as they can marshal the support of many well-known household celebrities (WFTV, 2013). This raises several questions:

1. Is the interest in the creative industries (essentially film, TV, music, and to some extent the performing arts of opera, theatre and classical music) in the UK more to do with the rhetoric of *'Cool Britannia'* than a real analysis of current and potential contribution to the economy?
2. Are we dealing with evidence-based policy or policy-based evidence?
3. Does government develop policy for the creative industries based on independent data or on effective lobbying from the special interest groups?

Finally; a most telling quote, obscured in the details of the DCMS economics estimate report states: *'A definition for each sector is available in the associated methodology note, along with details of methods and data limitations. There is significant overlap between*

DCMS sectors so users should be aware that the estimate for “DCMS Sectors total” is lower than the sum of the individual sectors.’ (DCMS, 2018c p2). This is not just a small overlap, but a *‘significant’* one – text in bold from DCMS.

On any measure; growth (with the exception of IT and VR), contribution to GVA and job opportunities no industry analyst puts the creative industries in the top ten sectors in the UK. Only one media company, Moo Print, features in the FT Future 100 UK — a list of the fastest growing companies in the UK (Smith and Blood, 2018). The data I have analyses suggests no growth in the workforce, however, Deuze reports on *‘massive layoffs in all the creative industries’* (Deuze, 2016 p329). For Deuze this is a *‘fascinating paradox’* as media consumption as gone up. For me this substantiates the small growth in workers engaged with distribution. It also supports my case that the discontinuity between the rhetoric within the policy community and the reality of the data that they ignore.

In a response to the Augar Report, Professor Jon Last, vice-chancellor of Norwich University of the Arts stated: *‘The creative industries – including film, TV, music, fashion and design, arts, architecture, publishing, advertising, video games and crafts — are an undoubted strength of our economy; indeed, they are at the heart of the nation’s competitive advantage ... These are industries that contribute more than £100bn a year to the UK economy and account for one in every 11 jobs.’* (Last, 2019). This message was gleaned from the aforementioned DCMS press release. He goes on to argue that *‘the industry will need 1.2 million more workers by 2022’*. He fails to notice that this is based on an analysis written in 2011 and refers to the *‘creative economy’*, not the media industry of film, TV and games as envisioned by many graduates.

What do the secondary sources about the creative industries tell us? First, there is ambiguity over the definition of the sector. The notion of what represents a creative job or industry is based on a subjective construct of creativity defined by NESTA (Bakhshi, 2013a). This influential body was able to persuade the DCMS, who in turn required the ONS to recast an occupation as creative or not. If a sub-sector does not have 30% or more creative occupations in the group – it is not deemed to sit in the creative industries sector.

The official methodologies for data gathering and analysis are highly sensitive to a recasting of a sub-group; include IT and games, or remove loss making occupations and the group shows good growth. Others have argued that this sleight of hand skews the data to fit the policy narrative.

The debate about the size, scope and activities of the creative industries needs to be clearer. The overlap allows for some double if not triple counting, a matter I raised with the DCMS statistician. The contribution each of the three creative sectors makes to GVA when excluding the overlap is not clear either. However plausible the methodology, GVA estimates seem give too much scope for the industry cheerleaders to *'play fast and loose'* with the data to fit their policy narrative. GVA was at its clearest in 2010 for sector activities, employees and the number of businesses, see Figures 28 and 29. According to Ofcom (2019 p9) approximately 48,829 people (my extrapolation from the 2019 diversity report) were employed by the broadcasters in March 2019, this included contracted freelancers. There is a wide range between the ONS data and that from Ofcom and shows the challenge to size the workforce. However, the true size of the BTI is likely to be around 75,000 to 80,000, as Table 8 indicates, of which, those directly employed by the broadcasters is a sub-set.

At the macro level it is true that the industry does have a higher productivity than many sectors, with a contribution of 14.5% of UK GVA (DCMS, 2018c). But even at the high-level reporting of the economic estimates the data are mixed up. The report talks in terms of percentage contribution for telecoms and sports, yet use percentage increase for the cultural sector, a statistically incoherent presentation.

6.5 The role of Skillset, Creative Skillset and ScreenSkills

6.5.1 Labour market intelligence – the first step to sizing demand

This analysis of available secondary data challenges the usefulness of Creative Skillset reports and any new data provided by ScreenSkills to determine the needs of workers in the UK television industry. Creative Skillset's distribution and gathering of employee data

in its biennial workforce survey was at best ad hoc. Although this is understandable, it does mean the survey does not provide enough data to extrapolate a picture of the lives of media workers.

For example; Creative Skillset (2015a) biennial labour force survey (See Appendix 8A) calls it a **census**: *'We know from our last Census in 2012'* Creative Skillset (2015a p3), but it failed to meet any of the criteria that rigour in data gathering for a census might demand. I argue that the 2014 survey (published in 2015) and those that preceded it present an unrepresentative sample across the creative industries. The low response rate with no links between sample groups across the years is a poor model for data analysis. The summary table in the 2014 returns, starts with 1,325 replies across all workers in TV. Once segmented into subsectors, production or post-production occupational groups, the sample ends up with only one or two people representing some segments of the workforce (Creative Skillset, 2015a p27). Yet government and a number of academics considered the findings a benchmark. No-one has ever challenged their methodology; in my view, the UK Statistics Authority should have conducted an audit of the process.

The SSCs are marginalised under the current policy framework, with core funding removed and their role uncertain. The coordinating body for the SSCs, the Federation for Industry Sector Skills & Standards (FISSS) is more caretaker than policy advisor. ScreenSkills has new partnerships with the BFI and the Work Foundation to conduct their work.

Informant W: "The labour market intelligence gathering which they used to do for our members basically just stopped happening, but all the budgets that went out via the UK Commission to the SSES to do sector by sector labour market analysis just doesn't exist anymore. That just disappeared and all got absorbed into the main contract. I can't remember who delivered it, might have been ISF or BMG, one of the big research houses have done it in the past."

Informant W: "So the 16 agencies and the four I think or five for example UK fashion and textiles take in an element of what the Creative Skillset and footprint that will continue voluntary, both sides agreed it, Creative Skillset decided to become ScreenSkills and focus

far more on the TV and audio visual elements of the world and therefore the wider fashion textile fabric didn't really fit with their remit and the UK Fashion Textile Association weren't very happy to take it on...

So actually, whether you have got a government who are determined to have the right skills in the right place at the right time but actually I don't think really has the means to do that so I suppose those networker sector relationships have been replaced by sort of regional relationships and local relationships through local strategic partnerships, centralised industrial strategies. The jury is still out but it doesn't feel at the moment that it is a particularly very coherent narrative or there is a sort of road to cross."

There is a tacit acceptance that the old LMI collection methodology did not work. *'Most of UK screen is growing quickly and the sector is facing significant challenges relating to skills gaps and shortages, inclusion and diversity ... it is vital that professionals across UK screen work together to prepare the sector for the future. To help achieve this, ScreenSkills launched a new Skills Forecasting Service for the UK screen industries. Delivered with The Work Foundation, the Skills Forecasting Service is an integral part of ScreenSkills' strategy and a key objective of the BFI Future Film Skills Action Plan. Its purpose is to provide the sector with detailed, practical and forward-looking intelligence on the labour market and to identify trends in the way the screen industries work'* (ScreenSkills, 2019b p3).

6.5.2 Identifying workforce needs and validating academic programmes

There is a very mixed response from employers to a media studies degree, to an extent it may be a disadvantage. There is a lack of understanding of the applicability of such degrees to the BTI, even those with a Creative Skillset/ScreenSkills Tick²⁵.

'The Tick was set up in higher education for animation, games and screenwriting in 2005. Between 2012 and 2015, ScreenSkills expanded the Tick across a wider range of sectors. There are currently over 200 ticked courses across the UK. Subject areas cover film, television, animation, games, VFX [Visual Effects]. Since 2005, we have assessed over 400

²⁵ The Tick signifies ScreenSkills endorses screen-related courses that teach practical skills and knowledge wanted by employers in the industry

HE, FE and Apprenticeships for the Tick and engaged over 500 employers in the process.' (ScreenSkills, 2019c)

With so many courses approved by ScreenSkills, unless the employer has experience of graduates from a specific programme or institution, even with the Tick, it remains an uncertainty.

'There is an academic agenda that needs to be respected at university, but underlying that there should be some fundamental things that are relevant to industry ... "One of the things that I found shocking ...was hearing from one student on a course that his senior lecturer was someone who had just graduated a year before and had never worked in industry" ' (Page, 2014). In November 2019 ScreenSkills re-branded the Tick scheme as Select, the rationale is unclear. The administrator asserted in an exchange of emails that: 'We have a range of additional benefits now...We are also making sure that the criteria reflect current industry needs and we check in regularly with our partner institutions to monitor courses and provide advice' (Yilmaz, 2019).

It is only in 2019 that ScreenSkills in seeking to maintain its relevant to the creative industries recognised that continuing professional development (CPD) is essential to sustain a career. *'This is a phrase common in other industries but not in ours – until now. ScreenSkills is supporting the process of continuing professional development by identifying and signposting appropriate development to help fill skills gaps and job roles'* (ScreenSkills, 2019).

One analyst was more supportive of the SSCs, *'The Sample SSCs show gains of between £100m and £130m a year from Government and Industry funding of £5m a year. The assumptions made in the detail of the analysis can be discussed, and perhaps adjusted (down or up), but the point remains that the return from the SSCs' involvement is considerable, particularly when it is recognised that not all of each SSC's work has been evaluated, particularly in the case of Skills for Health, which has chosen not to evaluate some project outcomes for the purposes of this report. When viewed together, this indicates an average 'amplification value' of at least 20 times the original investment.'* (Clifford et al., 2010 p5).

It was this insufficiency of plausible data to support the claims and needs of the creative industries made by Creative Skillset that inspired this research. My analysis of DCMS and Creative Skillset data confirms this point of view. The data from the ONS and the disbanded BETR were and are more reliable and consistent.

Informant W: *“We [The Alliance] became the sort of representative body for the Sectors Skills Council back in around 2008 or something, around that time, maybe a little bit earlier, maybe even go back as far as 2005 and when we were originally given that role, that was at the behest of the UK Commission who wanted to see us behave in a more corporative and collaborative way and to almost adhere to a set of standards really, a code of practice, so separate from the performance management that UKCES is on the SSES regards renewing their licence and funding agreement, it was more about a collaborative voice for sector bodies to be able to talk to the commission and talk to government. When the UK Commission [UKCES] was closed down back in, I think it must have been 2017, at that stage the functions they had all sort of went to different places, so the research functions basically went back in-house to the Department for Education. The big flagship employer’s skill surveys and respective surveys are now run under contract with the Department for Education.”* With the removal of the formal requirement to gather LMI and conduct industry research a key function of the SSCs role was removed.

6.6 Conclusion

This chapter offers an analysis and critique of the widely accepted view — in the DCMS policy communities — that the creative industries are a roaring success. My findings reveal fundamental ambiguities in the data presented by the DCMS, ScreenSkills and the BFI. In Table 8 above, I show that the number employed by the TV and Film industries have remained static at 0.2 percent of the working population over the last three years of audited data. I question the claims by these bodies and other influential voices that the

creative industries — particularly the BTI — are engines of growth in GVA or jobs in the UK economy.

It has been argued that this had much to do with the hype around ‘*Cool Britannia*’ and a new optimism that the ‘*creative industries*’ – the knowledge economy may, in part, fill the gaps in the industrial landscape with the demise of heavy industry. Others have made the case that this new terminology enabled the entire fast-growing computer software sector to be included in the creative industries, thus legitimising the claims for sector size, growth and economic contribution (Garnham, 2005).

The findings set out in this chapter argue that there is more rhetoric than reality when it comes to using the creative industries as an exemplar of British industry. I contend that this may have more to do with the symbolic nature of the industry for UK plc than its real added value to GVA.

Within the skills policy framework, a major plank of the role of the SSCs is to predict and help provide a high skilled workforce for industry. The data presented by ScreenSkills – by their own admission – has been, to date, subject to sample selection bias. This undermines the true nature and number of opportunities for new joiners to the BTI. This has implications for the legitimacy of ScreenSkills current role which I discuss in Chapter Eight.

This chapter analysed the existing secondary data on the creative industries. The next chapter turns to the primary data of my research gathered from the fieldwork with my subject groups.

Chapter Seven Primary data sources: 'suited' informants and 'hot shot' respondents

7.1 Introduction

This chapter presents my analysis and findings of the data gathered from the fieldwork with my informants and respondents.

My informants are a cross section of senior managers in the BTI, representatives of industry bodies, civil servants, business owners and independent consultants. Their commentaries helped position the skills and employment issues for the sector.

In Chapter Six I addressed the matter of the extant data and the overstated claims for the creative industries for its growth and the number of people working in it today, and, the predicted needs for the future. These assertions are the lingua franca of the DCMS and influential bodies such as the BFI, ScreenSkills and NESTA. In turn this upbeat assessment over the last 10 years has encouraged the growth in media related degree programmes across the HE sector.

Reflecting on the insights into the industry from my informants, I present a skills policy community diagram. It recasts the grid of creative industries stakeholders discussed in Chapter Three (See Table 2). It shows where power and influence resides overall in the creative industries and the implications for the skills policy community in particular.

Turning to my respondents, by knowing more about the attributes and capabilities of these 'hot shot' workers, we can assess whether the SSC ScreenSkills adds any value to their development and therefore the value of the current skills policy. This knowledge could assist all providers develop more targeted skills training to complement an academic programme and enhance a graduate's employability.

7.2 The fieldwork data

My fieldwork conformed to Creswell's exploratory sequential mixed methods (Figure 23). I use qualitative primary data from informant and respondent interviews to inform the analysis of the quantitative data gathered from the online respondent questionnaire. I analyse the collated results for relevance to the research questions, presenting summary tables and figures to illustrate significant patterns in my findings. I include extracts from interviews with informants and respondents to substantiate the data. Although I have used insights from my informants to provide context to the debate throughout this thesis, I substantially draw on their comments in this chapter.

My analysis explores the attributes of a cohort of successful media workers. My respondents' interviews reveal a story arc full of serendipitous opportunities and a pattern of shared attributes embodied in their '*values, goals and priorities*' (Deuze, 2016 p335). They seem to thrive in this precarious, portfolio working environment.

My objective was to keep the analysis as simple as possible to address the research questions. Fundamentally, is there any evidence that the skills policy has impacted on worker and manager. For the former, to help them develop their capabilities and career. For the latter, to support them in managing and meeting the needs of their business to have an effective a suitably skilled workforce.

7.3 Outputs from the fieldwork: informants

In Chapter Five, I established the rationale for selecting my informants, who are a cross section of senior managers in the BTI, representatives of industry bodies, business owners and independent consultants. Their contributions mapped across my respondents' career pathways. Their insights and commentaries clarified the issues for the sector and helped fill gaps in my knowledge that academic and grey literature did not provide.

Table 9 presents the group and their occupation and role – see Appendix 7A for more detail. In Chapter Five (Section 5.3.2) I divided the influencers into **industry insiders** — managers, human resources or trainers — and **external agents** — recruiters, consultants (although all have worked in the industry), policy or executive body specialists and academics. In this section, I summarise the comments from these informed sources; citing them in Chapter Eight to substantiate my conclusions and recommendations.

Table 9. Informants by role and job description, ID coded by date of interview

Informant ID	Educator / Trainer
Y	BBC Trainer (Freelance / Contract)
E	Staff Training Managers for Journalists Bloomberg TV
	Human Resources
B	HR Director ITV (at time of interview)
Q	BBC HR Director & HR Project Director for the Olympics 2012
	Business manager / business owner
C	Owner London Post Production studio NATS
D	CEO Women in Film & TV (WFTV)
	Regulation / Policy
I	Chair BETR
R	Diversity Manager Channel 4 TV
L	CEO Steering Body Sector Skills Councils
A	Senior Civil Servant, BIS (at time of interview)
W	Director of Policy, The Federation for Industry Sector Skills & Standards (FISSS)
U	ONS Data manager
V	DCMS statistician
	Academics
J	Professor of European Industrial Relations University of Westminster
S	Creativity in the British Television Comedy Industry
N	Emeritus professor of management and marketing at LBS
	Recruitment
M	Managing Director of Searchlight Recruitment
H	Broadcast Magazine
	Industry managers
X	Warner Bros. UK
T	CCTV China was Editor Current affairs, BBC Scotland
P	HR Manager BBC, was Channel 4, then Nickelodeon
G	BBC News Traffic Production Manager
K	Contract Line Producer factual programmes BBC
	Independent consultants
O	Creative People
F	TV Collective

Source: Author’s own

7.3.1 The industry insiders

Education/training: Are the basics in place?

The consensus view is that many graduates have a limited understanding of the industry

they are hoping to join. The majority have limited business and 'people' skills and poor literacy and numeracy. They are ill-equipped to cope with the demands of the role. Industry reports from business managers in the UK and, interestingly, the USA, tell the same story. Pre-apprenticeship schemes and the new apprentice degrees are for parents and the new employee an attractive alternative to the three-year degree pathway, but only the bigger players have the infrastructure to manage the process. Of apprenticeship schemes, companies do not want under-18s as this would involve having to partner with a college to manage the administration (Informants B, Q, E, Y).

Informant Q: *"Basically we flagged a long long time ago that this explosion of media courses is unhelpful. So we have actually said this isn't good enough. The snag was also that a lot of these media colleges are dire that is why we want to kite mark, so we want less, and we want better... I am absolutely sure that if people do good Science and good Maths and good English, not things like some of the more quirky A-levels and Human Sciences or things which you can't really quantify but if they do Maths, English and Science I am sure that will stand them in good stead anyway."*

The BTI employer professes to want 'clever' people who demonstrate the high level skills discussed in Chapter One. For the industry this translates into intelligent, quick-witted people who can think on their feet, capable, logical and of course creative. These are hard measures to quantify. A paper from London Economics (Conlon, 2018) highlights the need for basic skills of numeracy and literacy in the industry, a point also supported by all my interviewees. As a result, the type of degree is almost irrelevant. People can learn most functions on the job, deep engineering excepted. From my informants point of view, it is clear that the SSCs have no measurable impact on my respondents; and the government's high-skills policy has not assisted their career trajectory.

Recruitment/human resources: Get the right fit

It is expensive to recruit and develop a new employee. Apart from some key roles, specific technical knowledge plays less of a role in recruitment criteria.

Informant B: "... [our recruits] are not Russell Group. We had 8,500 applications for those 15 jobs. Anyway, there were some of them that aren't ... I think the person we took in HR is from Strathclyde University. We are much more interested in the skills that they have rather than the university they went to...

For our graduate programme, we don't accept CVs. We say fill in our application form and as part of filling in that application form we do a questionnaire and make people access the filter. It gives people some scenarios and some options about what decisions they'll make and have been designed to help us understand the sort of people that we would like in the organisation. They will give you a problem; you have three options, what would you do? Would you ignore it, try and do something... They are not difficult options, but it's amazing how useful they are as a filter when you get 12 of them."

Informant T: *"If I was talking to somebody who was finishing their A-levels, I would say do something that is academically robust. Just do what you are passionate about doing. Don't worry about that leading to said job. You get a good degree and it's academically robust you can go and do whatever you want. I think some people tend to think: "I want to work in television, I must do a media degree"; "I want to do this, I must do that degree or this degree". I think, actually ... it shows how random people are... in the last six months I've had two different people with PhDs in genetics working in the team — what are they doing working in development? But they are. They haven't got the media degree. If I had a choice between someone who has got a PhD from Cambridge or someone who has done the Media Studies at Hertford, I would probably take the one from Cambridge in truth..."*

Of the six BTI job families, only two — craft & post and digital/multimedia — need a level of technical competence. As one of my respondents told me:

RI2 Female²⁶: *"If you want to know how to use a camera, to self-shoot, you can just sign up with the manufacturer or the ITF [Indie Training Fund]. My company will pay for that training."* Along the same lines...

Informant B: *"What we need are clever, well educated people with transferable skills plus*

²⁶ Respondents: where I take direct quotations, I refer to them as RI_n Male or RD_n Female, where R is respondent, I is initiator and D is developer and 'n' is their ID number assigned at the time of the interview.

a cultural fit to our business."

Informant Q: *"They just learn practically, so they learn through experience and they learn very quickly from experience so what you have got is a different skill set. You have got people who are coming in and saying, 'I can actually get it, I worked out how to learn quickly, but I'm not any good at writing an essay or if I do a written piece of work for you my words go around the wrong way'. It doesn't mean they are not intelligent. So you have got to be very careful about ruling people out for 'they've got that formal qualification'. I think bright people, wherever they come from is a welcome thing, but I think enthusiastic, real people driven, they really want to get on."*

Many companies see the media internship as the first step to bridge the experience gap. The preference is for employee referrals and interns who become permanent staff (informant C). There is a recognition that in recent years, loyalty and commitment has been lost on both sides.

While interviewing people for this study, I saw a flyer in the lift at the (now closed) South Bank Studios that said: *'Wanted! Recommend a colleague or a friend for a new post and get a reward'*. Universal Pictures (UK Broadcast TV Group) offer £1000 to members of staff who help secure a new recruit (Burnett, 2018). These are cost effective recruitment techniques but unless managed with sensitivity this will not enlarge the diversity of the industry.

Although the case is understood for non-traditional routes to provide a diverse source for new talent, it is risky and only the bigger players have the resources. The BBC created a relationship with a London college, Westminster Kingsway to support their apprenticeship obligation associated with the Olympics.

Informant Q: *"The people who impressed me the most were Westminster Kingsway; they're a further education college. They have a track record in apprenticeships — not in media apprenticeships, but catering, cleaning, all kinds of apprenticeships — but they are*

very used to dealing with the system of assessments, etc, accrediting points against the formal framework. They came on board and acted as a formal partner and actually did the sort of assessments of the individuals and the accreditation and the examination side of it and the English, Maths and IT skills which really we didn't want to do originally.

What we did, because we wanted them to come from the six Olympic boroughs because we were trying to build a social legacy, the apprenticeship started at the Level 3 It was very much about building a social legacy for the Olympics, so we thought if we have brilliant Olympics and brilliant outlook, what we really want to end up with is a legacy which we leave the six boroughs, the London boroughs."

This lack of diversity remains a major issue for all sectors of the creative industries. Almost all my informants highlighted it as untenable and inequitable. Government plays little role in influencing behaviours in recruitment or internal training (Informants B, C, D, F, O, T, W).

Informant B: *"Just to give you some of the stats... if I look at apprentices, 19% are from socially deprived areas according to the indices of deprivation. 60% are female. 11% are from BAME backgrounds. 13% have a disability. 89% of them, when they completed the programme, got a job ... and 78% of them got a job (with us) or somewhere else at the end of their programme. oh, and 83% of them finished the programme against the national average of 75%. So, ... I am really pleased with what we do, considering it's not our core. We are not BT. If you are BT, you've got the resources..."*

Informant C: *"You have got to serve your time and I'm a great one for learning your craft, but learning your craft and serving your time are two different things for me and I think there is a bit of it that says "So, what can you do creatively?" One of the challenges facing the industry is [that] it is very wasteful on people because it has the luxury of having more people wanting to work in the industry than it has got jobs for."*

Informant D: *"The government changes its mind so frequently that I don't tend to spend too much time on it because by the time they have done something they'll change it again in two years' time."*

Business management/owners: We can recruit the resources when needed

The numbers of unsolicited CVs are overwhelming. So, companies use online filtering for applicants, based on keywords and to some extent, artificial intelligence. This process creates tests, asks for examples of work, then the CV. This does little for diversity. If they get through that process, there is an assessment centre. In 2018, I sat in as dozens of disappointed applicants were advised by WBUK TV they hadn't made the cut at the end of the recruitment assessment day in London. All were well qualified and had got through the online process. The degree and technical skills were only a baseline to a possible internship. There remains a preference to engage experienced hires as time-bound contractors or freelancers who can start tomorrow on a project. These are easier and safer routes for staffing a new production. The informal network is at work (Informants B, C, Q).

Informant C: *"It is not really work experience, it's just free labour... planning a new joiner's development is a challenge for a small business... we don't have much time or resources."*

Even the bigger organisations find it hard to support disadvantaged interns beyond the work experience.

Informant Q: *"...It is a genuine concern that you get kids in that can't go any further because of their background, their educational background. Now, I would say are a couple of things here: you have got to look at the breadth of jobs, so if you want someone like a top reporter, top correspondent, a top presenter, a top scientist who works in our science areas and can produce brilliant science programmes, actually you have got to want them to be highly educated..."*

Informant B: *"I had an apprentice in one of the comms teams that I'm responsible for who got hammered at the Christmas party and I was "For God's sake, she's 16!" I looked up at one point and went "She's drunk. Who's let her drink?" Her poor boss was sitting next to me going: "I didn't know!" And I was, like: "You were sitting next to her!"*

For business managers, media-related skills for senior roles are 'almost' irrelevant. Anna Mallett (2013) was appointed the BBC Chief Executive of Studios and Post Production with

no background in TV, but she has a Harvard MBA, a DPhil from Oxford University and consulting experience (Informants B, M, Q).

7.3.2 External agencies

Policymaking: Let the market decide

The shift from an interventionist but nominally employer-led identification of industry needs set up as a New Labour project was superseded by the Cameron (2010) government's light-touch minimal intervention model. Little has changed since. From the skills perspective quangos got 'bonfired', UKCES initially survived, but was considered to add little value. It came under consultation for closure during a second round of spending reviews in 2015 and had its government funding withdrawn in 2016. It was wound up within months.

Informant X: *"I think that is one of the things on government policies. What you want is a standard for it, which is a more consistent framework. Government seems to want to help..., but they keep meddling and as in "meddle", what they do is they make it more difficult, so I won't use apprentices necessarily..."*

Skills policy requires industry sectors to identify needs, even if some sectors are already singled out for special attention; engineering, nuclear energy, scientific knowledge and artificial intelligence are all considered priorities by the current government. In theory it is demand-led, based on the SSCs providing LMI.

Informant X: *"...in the games industry, where it is that mixture to technology software development in a creative context, I think there is a massive demand. The UK games industry is a good growing industry. The government focus on the creative industries is a really good set of policies... but creative industries are the same size as the financial services industry but frankly don't need so much bailing out. I think there's real value the Sector Skills Council can add I think size is when they get too big and I think that there is specific criticism of Skillset who is very politically... is very good... it is a very good political operation. It is very well connected. If it applied the same discipline to its work as to its own survival, I probably wouldn't be half as critical of it. I've used Skillset as a cost of*

doing business. When we didn't fund them, we got loads of crap. I feel as though we fund Skillset ... for Skillset to exist and we spend £100k a year with Skillset."

However, from early days independent analysts saw the process as ad hoc (Payne, 2008). My policy informants believe that we will pay the price for this lack of planning in 10 years' time (informants A, L, W).

Informant W: *"But with the level of graduate under employment we have got at the moment with everybody being a Barista, it has never quite worked in the past, but having said that, the very managed economies haven't worked very well either, we still keep trying to be like Germany, trying to be like Switzerland and trying to have a system more like the Danish one to make it a higher level, to give it better esteem, give parity of esteem with other forms of learning and all of these reforms are designed to do that. Whether they do much about T levels²⁷ that's another new one. I think for me the challenge is that we have such a lack of stability in skills and the skills system in the UK and have done for so long that employers just get used to one offer – like you say, you were engaged at Skillset and you knew the industry but even so things happen and you go 'oh my God, they've changed the whole system'. You just get caught napping but actually it's not your job as an employer to be scanning..."*

Graduate oversupply is an issue that no-one wants to own, though my informants blame the education system for producing such high numbers of media graduates — a point I made earlier in this thesis when reporting graduate numbers. My informants suggest that there is little employers can do. With degree costs of £60K or more, they also take the view that the market may decide for them: if students are put off by the prospect of getting into massive debt, the problem may simply go away (Informants B, C, X).

Informant X: *"I'm not interested in the university they went to, but I am interested in quality of their degree... It's about can they apply yourself, how have they shown discipline*

²⁷ T levels will start in September 2020. It is a two-year course equivalent to three A levels with an apprenticeship component.

[this could be implicit in the higher level skills of employability discussed in Chapter Three], *what have they done at university.*"

A few of my respondents are in middle management roles and leading teams, they are closer to the new joiners and are often approached at networking events:

RD15 Male: *"... I think the problem across the board is shifting a blame game, isn't there? I think the sector will blame universities; universities will blame lack of opportunity. It's a kind of... I think there are too many media degrees out there. This might be a slightly odd thing to say, but I don't think I've got anyone in my team at the moment who hasn't got straight A's at A-level. I look at people's A-level results. If they haven't got an A in English Literature, I'm not going to hire them pretty much. So much of what we do is writing. If they don't have that... In fact, recently I met somebody who I really liked but had a C in English Literature, which sends all sorts of alarm bells going in my head. How can you get a C in English Literature? To which I gently enquired about what other writing she does and that sort of work. It turns out she wrote a blog, kept it up to date every couple of days. I read her blog. Her writing was good. All was okay, my fears were alleviated, and I hired her."*

Yet the war for talent²⁸ is part of the language by business managers. They talk of talent shortages and return to trusted sources, such as Russell Group universities and a few key film and TV degree programmes from places such as Ravensbourne to find their new employees.

Informant M: *"If you are talking about the creative production people, I think a lot of that is still very much being in the right place at the right time and proving yourself. I don't think there are any shortcuts. I have recently filled a role for a creative director/producer — quite a significant one — and looking at people who I interviewed, a lot of them really did come up the hard way as researchers, APs [Assistant Producers], series producers etc. So, I don't think there's anything that can really replace hard graft in that respect. Has*


²⁸ The war for talent is a term coined by McKinsey & Company consultants Ed Michaels, Helen Handfield-Jones, and Beth Axelrod and has become a generic expression to cover the issues regarding attracting, developing and retaining highly talented individuals.

education? Well, I very rarely see Skillset or NVQs mentioned on CVs, it is much more about degrees and getting your first job to allow you to get that first job.”

7.3.3 Reflections on policy and the skills policy community

In Table 2 (Chapter 3 Section 3.2.2) I presented the creative industries policy community as a formal arrangement of elected and unelected stakeholders. The review of the secondary data plus the commentaries from my informants reveals a more informal association through trusted partnerships and inner circles of influence and control, as shown in Figure 31.

Figure 31. Creative industries network and skills policy community



Source: Author's own

The body that sits at the centre of this community is the Creative Industries Council (CIC). The brief 'terms of reference' (DCMS, 2015a) for the CIC provide a forum for this community to meet on a quarterly basis and 'talk shop'. Apart from ministers of state and members of parliament, such as Barry Sheerman, key influential figures within the BTI skills policy community that all sit on the CIC are Hasan Bakhshi (NESTA), Alan Bishop (CIF), Dinah Caine (was Creative Skillset CEO / now at Goldsmiths), Alex Mahon (Channel 4), John McVay (PACT), Amanda Nevill (BFI) and Tim Davie from the BBC, who co-chairs. In their role, they represent the vested sectional interests that maintains the continuity and

the status quo to the benefit of these parties. This inner circle have specialist knowledge that few can challenge and can therefore set the agenda for the sector. This policy community is an evocation of Osman's definition of policy as '*a complex interactive process influenced by the diverse nature of socio-political and other environmental forces*' (See Chapter Three Box 1). This goes some way to explain how changes such as the '*creative intensity*' model can be invoked despite opposition, how the configuration for the creative industries is maintained, and how despite the questions over the added value to the development of people in the industry, ScreenSkills survives.

The notion of a creative industries skills policy community informed by a rigorous policy-cycle process does not stand up to scrutiny. The DCMS website focuses on the action of the CIC to have special interest working groups (WGs) committed to '*task and finish*' a piece of work (DCMS, 2015a). In my review of the WGs initiatives reported in the minutes over the last three years (CIC, 2019) it is hard not to reach the conclusion that the meetings of the CIC are an end in their own right. The outcomes from the WGs are numerous, in as much, that another initiative is instigated, progress reports and action taken as a result are few. There are two WGs of relevance to this thesis; education (and skills) and diversity. The education WG highlights the need to '*develop thinking on priorities*' and the diversity WG talks about the diversity pledge (a new one). Both matters have been on the agenda of the industry since the 2003 Communications Act. See Appendix 8A for a snapshot of some of the literature and projects designed to improve the skills and diversity in the BTI since 2005.

We could look to a range of explanations that maintain this groupthink. There is group homogeneity: this inner circle all know each other and, it would seem, have a common social background and ideology. The UK government needs a success story, the creative industries fulfil that role, it is a flagship sector. Other literature points to these inner circle policy communities being divorced from reality (Chapter Three Section 3.2.3). There is limited exposure to outside information that might be counter to which could be used to help reach more balanced decisions. I am not the only researcher to challenge the validity of the creative industries data and the consequences that flow from that ambiguity. But,

to date, the few academic voices with a counter view have not perturbed the sector zeitgeist. The bottom line is that this arrangement ensures continued support from the government and the funds to sustain their organisations.

7.4 Outputs from the fieldwork: respondents

There are two parts to my analysis of respondents' data. There is the qualitative data drawn from the face-to-face interviews and the quantitative data from their responses to the self-evaluation career questionnaire. I have anonymised individual workers. Where I quote them, I refer to them as RIn Male or RDn Female, where R is respondent, I is initiator and D is developer and 'n' is their ID number assigned at the time of the interview. If relevant, I include their job family. I provide no other detail — such as production company or 'hot shot' cohort — to avoid identification.

7.4.1 The interview and questionnaire data

For the relatively small data set of 31 subjects with 52 data points, simple sorting and standard deviation spreadsheet tools are enough to identify significance in the data. I analysed the three Level One factors, the 11 Level Two factors and, where relevant, I highlight Level Three factors that emerge from the interview collaborated by the respondent's responses to the questionnaire.

The demographic data comprises of six elements of nominal data to categorise the individual as an initiator or developer and allocate them to a BTI job family. The other 46 ordinal data points come from the responses to the series of Likert scale questions. These questions cover the 14 Level One and Level Two attributes of the career development pathway value chain and the 32 attributes associated with work values and the work environment. To remain congruent with the BFI study, the environment questions are on a 5-point Likert scale and the work values on a 10-point Likert scale.

To prepare the data for analysis, I collated the individual responses into a unified database, segmenting the data by initiators and developers (See Appendix 7G)²⁹. I created other sort filters as required to address the needs of data modelling, such as number of

²⁹ All data relating to the respondents can be found in Appendices 7B to 7G.

white female developers. I then analysed data for all the preference-based factors — such as motivation or size of company — by rank ordering the importance for the initiators, the developers and all respondents, and calculating the mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) for the same three groups.

The first pass of data analysis validates the internal integrity of the data for each subject. I cross-referenced coded statements from the subjects drawn from the interview with their questionnaire responses, identifying patterns in the data to highlight shared attributes across all the subjects in their career path to date. I then compared the three sets of factors clustered under personal, social and employment attributes along with respondents' awareness of the structure and processes in the UK television industry to support their careers. I did contemplate using the conjoint analysis technique to determine the relative importance of those key attributes to the respondent group, but the tools available in Excel and through Google Docs were enough to enable an effective analysis.

Next, I discuss my respondents' employment experiences, comparing and contrasting traditional (old model) and current (new model) employment practices as postulated by Deuze (See Table 4). I consider the work of Tomlinson (2007) who has examined graduates' employability and attitude to the labour market.

Respondent group demographics

In Figure 32, I show a scatter diagram of where my 31 respondents work. Although most are full-time workers, they are spread across the broadcast community (the green zone). The data reveal the size of company matters little to this sample. Table 10 shows that the respondents work across most of the company types and size in the BTI.

Figure 32. Where and how respondents contract in the BTI

Orange - Ofcom license to broadcast Yellow - programme maker and supplier to broadcaster	Full Time Production Staff	Defined Period Contractors	Defined Period Self-employed	Ad hoc Defined/Undefined Freelancers	Short term/Undefined Interns	Full Time Back Office
Broadcasters	I R9 R10 R12 D R12 R24 R26	R5 R13				
Global Company with UK broadcast subsidiary	I R2 R6 R8 D					FULL TIME / RETAINED STAFF – OUT OF SCOPE
Indie (Large) / could be part of a global organisation	I R4 R7 D R21 R22 R28 R30					
Indie (Med)	I R1 R15 R18 R19 D R11 R20 R25 R16 R27	R14				
Indie (Small)	I R3 D R17 R23	R31				
Non-traditional broadcaster - Shopping Channels						
Anomalies - Financial such as Bloomberg	OUT OF SCOPE PRODUCTION STAFF					
Contract suppliers, such as Aquiva / SIS						

Source: Author's own data

Notes: I= initiators; D= developers; R1...R31 are the respondents' ID numbers. Their placing within the table represents their place of work at the time of interview

Table 10. Respondents' place of work and job title at time of interview

Company	Job title
A Joy Media	Entertainment producer
TwoFour	Assistant development producer
New Black Films	Producer Director
Keo Films	Assistant producer
Random Acts	Editor
Fresh One	Production Exec
Wall to Wall	Producer Director
Keo Films	Creative Director
BBC World Service	Science Producer
ITV Studios	Development producer
ITV	Researcher
Firecracker Films	Director
Maverick	Director and writer
Flare	Development Producer
Renegade Pictures	Researcher
Envy	Head of VFX support
ITV	Channels Executive
Splice	Post Producer
Barcroft Media	Video editor
Avalon	Head of Business development
The Farm Group	Post Producer
The Farm Group	Dubbing mixer
Banijay	Multiplatform Producer
UKTV	Research and Insight Executive
Firecracker	Editor
CKP Ltd	Agent
Alaska TV	Freelance off-line editor
BBC	Content producer
Molinaire	Post Production coordinator
MPC	VFX Editor
Whisper Films	Editor

Source: Author's own data

My respondents — the 31 'hot shots' — worked within one of the six job families that have a shared understanding in the BTI: production; directing; writing; craft and post; digital; or business. I allocated each of them to one of two group types, creative initiators (producers, directors and writers) and creative developers (craft and post, business and digital), as shown in Table 11. I interviewed my respondents between June 2014 and September 2018. The majority of the interviews took place at their company or at a nearby location. It was an opportunity to see the respondents at their place of work. As Tom Peters famously said, you learn more about a company by sitting in the foyer waiting for a meeting than you do the rest of the day.

Table 11. Distribution of respondents across UK television job families

	Totals			Totals		
	All			Interviewed		
	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All
Initiators						
Production	28	36	64	3	6	9
Directors	15	8	23	1	3	4
Writers	17	12	29	1	1	2
Developers						
Craft & Post	22	9	31	4	4	8
Business	6	19	25	2	3	5
Digital	17	7	24	3	0	3
Totals	105	91	196	14	17	31

Source: Author's own


7.5 Analysing the data

An initial inspection of all the 'hot shots' in Table 11 indicates that the 'hot shot' top talent as selected by the industry is almost evenly balanced by gender (50%M vs 47% F). More women have joined the industry over the last 10 years, as ONS and Creative Skillset data attest. There are still gender enclaves — more women are in productions roles and business, more men in technical roles such as digital and craft and post — but this is changing. The full data set in Appendix 7B shows that in 2012, only one woman was in a craft and post job; in 2018, there was an even split.

Background and education

At the time of nomination as a 'hot shot', all respondents were 30 years old or younger (Figure 33).


Figure 33. Respondents' age n=31



Source: Author's own

Figure 34 shows the respondents' ethnicity. The group was predominantly white British (21). Of these, 11 were male and 10 were female, with an even split between initiators (4 men and 4 women) and developers (7 men and 6 women). Of the 10 British, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) respondents, 7 were initiators (2 men and 5 women) and 3 were developers (1 man and 2 women). There was no discernible difference in roles due to ethnicity.

Figure 34. Respondents' ethnicity n=31



Source: Author's own

I did not specifically ask about socioeconomic groups, but I did ask about family background. Most came from what they called 'ordinary families'. Many reported that their families has no idea about what they did at work.


RD29 Female: *'I am the first person in my family to go to uni and my parents were pretty regular people. My dad's a delivery driver, my mum's a cleaner, so pretty regular people.'*

RI10 Male, when asked about his family knowing what he did: *'No. Slightly funny. Mum on benefits. The rest of the family though kind of lower middle class. So, growing up my grandparents and stuff were absolutely middleclass, but mum and dad were divorced when I was about three and my mum from that point was a stay-at-home mum on benefits... I was a bit of a latch key kid. I didn't have any there was literally zero pressure on me. there was zero I was the first person in my family to go to university. There was no pressure, there were no expectations, but actually the disinterest in what I was if you are getting straight 'A's every time and that doesn't cause interest probably that lends itself to 'I'm going to do even better' so it was that kind of weird reverse psychology.'*

Only one, RD20 Male had a direct BTI link: *'My parents met at the BBC 35 years ago, mum was a script editor, dad a drama producer – I wasn't interested in the dinner table*


conversation'. He got a First from the LSE and worked for Shell. The money was not enough to stop him leaving and (he says) he happened across a maternity cover role at Channel 4. He got the job because he had a 'good world view' – before the LSE, he had two years in the USA when his father's job took the family there.

Figure 35. Qualification type n=31



Source: Author's own

Figure 36. Qualification grade n=31



Source: Author's own

Eighty-four per cent of respondents had a First-class degree or 2.1; only one initiator had a 2.2 (Figures 35 & 36). Among the developers, those with lower grades were the few who had media-specific degrees. For the most part, there was no direct correlation between university, subject and occupation. Only R25D Male, R11D Male and R6I Female who studied at Lincoln, Bournemouth and Ravensbourne respectively could be considered to have taken up their jobs as a direct consequence of the degree they studied (under 10% of respondents). The grade is more important than the subject. As already stated; as far as employers are concerned, studying media is no great advantage.

Table 12 shows that of the universities attended all bar Buckingham are in the top 50% of the Guardian Ranking for 2019-20 (Education supplement, 2019). A cross-tabulation of the associated data shows that a First or 2.1 in English from a Russell Group university is as likely to secure a job in the BTI as any job-specific degree. Within the initiator group 10 of the 15 attended a Russell Group university, only two degree programmes have a clear BTI applicability and an association with ScreenSkills. Of the 31 respondents in this study only one programme, in the developer group has a ScreenSkills Tick. As shown in Table 12, there are six directly relevant programmes (19%) attended by these respondents. Depending on how we might assess a programme's content based on its title, 12 more programmes are media related (38%). Overall 13 respondents (42%) studied programmes with no association to the creative industries. It is quite telling that only one of the respondents had heard of Creative Skillset prior to needing on-the-job training. Not one could remember completing a survey form.

University ranking is only one measure of potential educational experience and probably concerns university applicants the most. The top universities as ranked by employers for recruitment is not as clear cut, Warwick is rated as number one. Specialist HEI such as Ravensbourne or the London College of Fashion have an international reputation in their field and therefore not as vulnerable to these ranking assessments. However, many employers limit their acceptance pool to their top 25 HEIs just to manage the process of recruitment (High Fliers Research, 2019). The implications for HEIs are discussed in Chapter Eight.

Table 12. Respondents' universities attended and degree attained

Subject	Grade	University	Group	Ranking	Tick or Select
English	2.1	Edinburgh	Russell	25	n/a
Eng Lit and Drame	2.1	Royal Holloway, University of London		42	n/a
Natural Sciences	2.1	Cambridge	Russell	1	n/a
History	2.2	Manchester	Russell	40	n/a
History	First	Cambridge	Russell	1	n/a
Content Creation in broadcasting	2.1	Ravensbourne		48	not listed but accredited
Media Professional Studies	First	Liverpool John Moore		63	no - 1 other listed
Archeology	2.1	Durham	Russell	5	n/a
Nanotechnology	PhD	Imperial College London	Russell	7	n/a
English Literature and Film Studies	2.1	Exeter	Russell	10	n/a
English Literature	2.1	Manchester	Russell	40	n/a
Psychology	2.1	Manchester	Russell	40	n/a
Media studies and French	First	National University of Ireland		n/a	n/a
Broadcast Journalism	2.1	Exeter	Russell	10	n/a
English Literature	2.1	Kent		65	n/a
Media Production	2.2	Lincoln		17	no
Drama	2.1	Birmingham	Russell	16	no
Media Studies, Drama, Visual Culture	2.2	Buckingham New University		120	no - BA Film/ TV listed
Social media	n/a	Kingston		48	n/a
Government	First	LSE	Russell	19	n/a
BA Film & Moving Image Production	2.1	Norwich School of Art & Design		n/a	Tick
BTEC National Diploma Music	Tripple merit	Northbrook College		n/a	n/a
Film Studies	2.1	Southampton	Russell	24	no - 1 other listed
Business management	2.1	Aston		36	n/a
Television production	2.1	Bournemouth		73	no - other programmes listed
Drama and theatre studies	First	Kent		65	n/a
The visualisation of music	First	Aberdeen		34	n/a
Digital media	n/a	Warwick	Russell	9	n/a
MA World Cinema	2.1	Birkbeck		withdrawn	n/a
Applied design digital media	2.1	Billy Blue College of Design		n/a	n/a
English Literature	2.1	Southampton	Russell	24	n/a

Source: Author's own

Key to table:

Grade – The 2.1 allocated to Billy Blue College of Design is based on an equivalence table in the questionnaire, n/a = not supplied

Group - whether the University is a member of the 24 Russell Group Universities

Ranking – UK ranking based on Guardian Newspaper's league table (n/a = not available). Birkbeck withdrew from all league tables

Tick or Select This kite mark is awarded by ScreenSkills as a recognition of the quality and standard of the degree with relevance to the creative industries (n/a = not applicable). The course leader has to apply for the award – not having the award is not an indicator of a poor programme.

Time and experience in the industry: getting in

Three interlinked questions covered my respondents' career path to date: their understanding of the industry prior to joining it, the length of time they had been in the industry and the stage in their careers they thought they had reached.

RI20 Male: "...I think I might have just sent cold emails around to people and I think I had met someone at Channel 4 for a coffee on an advice basis and then ended up getting a call back from the person that I had met there some months later, basically saying 'we have a role here that has come up quite suddenly, maternity cover, in our team, a woman in our team has given birth very early, she's fine, baby's fine, it's a surprise, we've been caught

off guard without having anyone in our team recruited yet for this maternity cover. Would you be interested in coming in and formally interviewing off the back of the conversation we had a few months ago?' and I said obviously 'yes' and I went and I interviewed and I don't actually know if they had interviewed anyone else, I think they were a bit desperate to be honest, and I got a call back, I think I ended up doing two rounds of interviews and after the second one I got a call back the same day offering me the job and I think it was a 12 month fixed term contract on maternity cover and in some respects I had a bit of a decision to make in that it was hardly the most secure job that I was going into because of its fixed term contract but I was at that point pretty desperate to leave Shell."

Overall, the initiators reported a better understanding of the industry before they joined it, with a mean of 8.67 and SD=1.35 compared to developers' mean of 6.0 and SD=2.94: 86% of initiators scored understanding at 8 or more out of 10, while only 43% of developers were in the same range.

RD22 Male: *'You don't appreciate the difference between working on the set of a major show and what you learn at uni till you do it, it's for real...'*

RI10 Male: *'I started the MA [Television] at Bournemouth [he did not complete the course] I was learning more at Maidstone Studios – you need to go and do it...'*

In conversation, the initiators had a more artistic/creative bias and a passion for the media from an early age. This is balanced with a remarkably high degree of self-awareness and pragmatism.


RI5 Male: *"I have always had an interest in film and telly I guess from a very early age. I was involved in making stuff and reviewing film at school. I was always interested in the history of film. I was very into art house cinema as a teenager so that was part of my formative experience and even at university a lot of the stuff I studied was cinematic studies or history of cinema revolution and things like that internationally. Totally a voyage of discovery. I think I left university thinking I wanted to be a Director. I realised I*

was quite rubbish at it so ended up producing a lot of independent shorts, the midterm feature length stuff. I then got involved in tele-drama production and mainly because that was the only thing that was paid for at the time that was involved in scriptive stuff. So that is how I ended up in telly...

...It is more and now I get to speak to really high-level Directors who have had brilliant careers, but you are just born to do it. I think there isn't a choice, there is no question in your head, it is just something you have to do so I think if there are niggling doubts and you don't really fancy the hardship that comes with it then you shouldn't do it. It's as simple as that."

This is prevalent in the creative industries, other researchers note that new joiners report, "I applied on a whim..." (Prospect, 2019). A number of well-known creative people report they had an epiphany when by chance they worked on a production. The film director Asif Kapadia 'at 17 worked as a runner on a film and so enjoyed feeling part of a crew that he decided he wanted to make a career in the industry' (BBC, 2019).

Figure 37. Years in the industry n=31




Source: Author's own

RD29 Female: "I am definitely a proficient level. The other person who used to work here, the Facilities Manager, kind of taught me everything when I first started. She has left now so it just me really running the office, so I think I am good there. Obviously, I haven't had

any training or anything like that... I had absolutely no idea [when she started the job]. It has all happened quite quickly really in the last two and a half years. It's progressed quite quickly...in the middle of everyone, getting all the gossip. That's what I love about it because you meet everyone which is good."

Figure 38. Stage in career pathway n=31



Source: Author's own

Figures 37 and 38 show that most of my respondents (29) have established or are maintaining a career in the industry, and 28 had been working in the BTI for 3 years or more. In the pilot study with the MA students, most were at the explore stage.

Overall, the members of this group have established successful careers in the BTI to date. They have experience that gives them insight into what it takes to get in and on in the industry. The prime driver is the motivation to work in the industry.

Motivation

Table 13. Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of the respondents

All	Intrinsic								Extrinsic			Total	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10				
Motivation (Int vs Ex)	15	4	4	2	3	0	1	1	1	0	31	2.65	1.68	
%	48.39	12.90	12.90	6.45	9.68	0.00	3.23	3.23	3.23	0	.			
Initiators														
Motivation (Int vs Ex)	11	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	1.40	0.83	
%	73.3	20.0	0.0	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	.			
Developers														
Motivation (Int vs Ex)	4	1	4	1	3	0	1	1	1	0	16	3.81	2.54	
%	25.0	6.3	25.0	6.3	18.8	0.0	6.3	6.3	6.3	0.0	.			

Source: Author's own

This scale (Table 13) differs from the other factors as the range is between intrinsic motivation (1) and extrinsic motivation rated (10). All the other factors are scaled from 1 (not important) to 10 (very important). Most of my respondents are intrinsically motivated.

RI6 Female: *"My family were "Are you going to get a job now?" and I was: "No, I'm going to do another year." I think it was something I never even considered and when I was doing my dissertation, I really loved it and really loved writing about I don't know, just getting to do your own thing and I found it all really interesting and not difficult — I found it not easy, but it came quite naturally, and I really enjoyed it. My tutor was like "Would you ever consider doing a Masters?" and I was "No, absolutely not ... I don't have the money, I need to leave and get a job" and then he said: 'Birkbeck are doing this really interesting Master's programme, why don't you just email them and go for an interview?' So, I did, and it was quite cheap really. It was about three grand and I just worked three jobs for the year, and it was quite good because it was in the evening and I attended lectures about six hours a week max, so I could work round everything."*

In the next section, we see that working in a creative environment matters to them. Congruent with the data on understanding the industry, over 90% (14) of the initiators are strongly intrinsically motivated. Developers show a more distributed preference (SD=2.54), with 37% (based on a count of the rank ordering of 5 and above) exhibiting a slight or strong bias to being externally motivated. In other words, they favour material rewards.

Ranking of Level One attributes: personal determinants, socioeconomic and employment factors

Personal determinants, socioeconomic and environmental factors are the level one factors (or themes) that frame my respondents' attitude and capability to cope within the precarious nature of working in the BTI. The nature of the contingent connections are revealed through the face-to-face interviews. Unsurprisingly, the hierarchy is personal determinants followed by socioeconomic and then employment factors, which is congruent with Maslow's model of hierarchy of needs. Tables 14–16 summarise the respondents' ranking of these factors.

Table 14. All respondents' ranking, mean (m) and standard deviation (SD) for personal, socioeconomic and employment factors

	Not important								most important		N=31	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
All													
Personal determinants	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	4	7	18	31	9.26	1.15
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	3.2	12.9	22.6	58.1	100.0		
Socioeconomic factors	0	0	0	0	0	2	16	9	1	3	31	7.58	1.03
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.5	51.6	29.0	3.2	9.7	100.0		
Employment factors	0	1	2	5	10	3	3	4	1	2	31	5.74	2.02
%	0.0	3.2	6.5	16.1	32.3	9.7	9.7	12.9	3.2	6.5	100.0		

Source: Author's own

Table 15. Initiators' ranking, mean and SD for personal, socioeconomic and employment factors

	Not important								most important		N=15	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Initiators													
Personal determinants									4	11	15	9.73	0.46
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.7	73.3	100.0		
Socioeconomic factors							10	2	0	3	15	7.73	1.22
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	66.7	13.3	0.0	20.0	100.0		
Employment factors		1	1	4	7	2	0	0	0	0	15	4.53	1.06
%	0.0	6.7	6.7	26.7	46.7	13.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0		

Source: Author's own


Table 16. Developers' ranking, mean and SD for personal, socioeconomic and employment factors

	Not important								most important		N=16	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Developers													
Personal determinants	0				1		1	4	3	7	16	8.81	1.42
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	0.0	6.3	25.0	18.8	43.8	100.0		
Socioeconomic factors						2	6	7	1	0	16	7.44	0.81
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.5	37.5	43.8	6.3	0.0	100.0		
Employment factors			1	1	3	1	3	4	1	2	16	6.88	2.06
%	0.0	0.0	6.3	6.3	18.8	6.3	18.8	25.0	6.3	12.5	100.0		

Source: Author's own

I also present the summary data for all respondents as a set of overlaid histograms (Figure 39) to illustrate the relative importance of these three top level themes.

Figure 39. All respondents' ranking of personal determinants, socioeconomic and employment factors



Source: Author's own

What emerges from examining these data and the charts is that there are small but significant differences between initiators (Table 15) and developers (Table 16) within an overall trend. Key points to note are that personal determinants are key, with a mean of 9.26; socioeconomic factors had a mean of 7.58; and employment mean of 5.74. The overlaid histograms in Figure 39 give a visual indication of the spread of responses. Personal determinants are paramount, all respondents scoring the factor over 5; socioeconomic factors — the support of the family is a slightly wider spread with the 27 respondents scoring this factor 6, 7 or 8.

RD31 Female: *"You've got to be willing to work without a safety net";* others might not have the same appetite for risk.

RD8 Female: *"If I have seen a good show and I have some ideas about new developments, I'll call the producer and say how much I like it, and can I buy them a coffee... it does work."*

RI18 Female: *"...[it] comes at a cost and it comes with a lot of hard work. So speak to people, know that this is 100% what you want to do and that you want to and are kind of*

willing to make a lot of big sacrifices for, whether that's time or money or the hours that you work, social life, relationships all of that stuff, but also knowing the industry inside out."

Finally, as Figure 39 indicates, ranking of their work environment is much more distributed across the scale, yet is more important to developers — see Table 16, where employment factors score 43.8% ranking importance 8 or more compared to initiators who score 22.6%. Developers are more company-orientated: sharing some of the attributes of the old-style media worker, stability and pay matter more to them.

RD11 Male: *"A lot of people who I started with aren't here anymore but there are an awful lot of people who are here who came when the company started, I would say there are an awful lot of people like that. Most of the people within the Smoke³⁰ Department, for example, the actual Smoke Ops, they've been here since day one. Lots of new people just because it's grown so much but I wouldn't say there's too many people who have been here as long as I have now who started who are leaving pretty regularly now I would say the people who have grown here will continue here for a while, not necessarily indefinitely but for a long time... next year I'd say one of two things in a year's time to either be in a more businessy position, so maybe sitting out in Production or being a VFX [Visual Effects] Co-ordinator or something a little bit less hands-on creatively."*

Ranking of Level Two attributes: social capital, family and finances

The 11 Level Two factors give context to the level one themes. I captured three factors in the online questionnaire though Likert scales and the others through multiple choice or yes/no questions. Again, I provide context through the interviews.

Table 17. All respondents' ranking, mean and SD for social capital, family and finances

	Not important										most important		N=31	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10					
All	2	1	0	2	0	0	2	4	8	12	31	8.06	2.76		
Social capital	6.5	3.2	0.0	6.5	0.0	0.0	6.5	12.9	25.8	38.7	100.0				
%															
Family	0	0	1	2	2	4	5	8	2	7	31	7.48	1.95		
%	0.0	0.0	3.2	6.5	6.5	12.9	16.1	25.8	6.5	22.6	100.0				
Finances	3	0	7	4	4	5	3	2	1	2	31	5.03	2.30		
%	9.7	0.0	22.6	12.9	12.9	16.1	9.7	6.5	3.2	6.5	100.0				

Source: Author's own

³⁰ This refers to the Autodesk Smoke post production tool – known as a finishing tool for effects and colour correction

Table 18. Initiators' ranking, mean and SD for social capital, family and finances

Initiators	Not important		3	4	5	6	7	8	most important		N=15	Av	SD
	1	2							9	10			
Social capital	2			0	0	0	1	1	3	8	15	8.27	3.08
%	13.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.7	6.7	20.0	53.3	100.0		
Family				1	1	2	1	4	0	6	15	8.00	2.04
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.7	6.7	13.3	6.7	26.7	0.0	40.0	100.0		
Finances			3	3	0	3	2	1	1	2	15	6.00	2.48
%	0.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	0.0	20.0	13.3	6.7	6.7	13.3	100.0		

Source: Author's own

Table 19. Developers' ranking, mean and SD for social capital, family and finances

Developers	Not important		3	4	5	6	7	8	most important		N=16	Av	SD
	1	2							9	10			
Social capital		1		2			1	3	5	4	16	7.88	2.45
%	0.0	6.3	0.0	12.5	0.0	0.0	6.3	18.8	31.3	25.0	100.0		
Family			1	1	1	2	4	4	2	1	16	7.00	1.86
%	0.0	0.0	6.3	6.3	6.3	12.5	25.0	25.0	12.5	6.3	100.0		
Finances		3	4	1	4	2	1	1	0	0	16	4.13	2.13
%	18.8	0.0	25.0	6.3	25.0	12.5	6.3	6.3	0.0	0.0	100.0		

Source: Author's own

Ranking of Level Two attributes: artisans, entrepreneurs, professionals

Of the respondent group, 15 see themselves as artisans, of which 10 are initiators; six see themselves as entrepreneurs and 10 as professional. Eight of these are developers. These are not mutually exclusive, but when cross-tabulated with work environments that enable autonomy, creativity or are commercially biased, it is no surprise that artisans seek an autonomous or creative environment so they can achieve 'good work' as described by Hesmondhalgh and Baker (2013). Curiously, money matters less to developers than to initiators, as they tend to be in more operational or functional roles. They are not quite as dependent on a particular production. For the initiator, the next deal is key.

RI15 Male writer: "I had just won the New York thing; I had just been to Cannes to pick up the award. I felt surely now was the time to strike. Emailed round to lots of different companies. Very quickly got a reply from Head of Development at Maverick, asked me to come in the following day to meet for a coffee. Did that, had a great meeting with him. He obviously liked what he saw. Gave me a job a couple of hours later, on an initial one-month contract to fill in for a Producer who had been pulled away on a funded development project ... they were obviously impressed with that first month, got offered a six-month extension, then got offered another six months extension and then got offered a three-month extension which brings me up to now. Just got offered a new job yesterday which I start on 2nd December (2017) ..." Networking, having meetings, getting a

development deal is essential to the initiator's survival.

A majority of the group 22 out of the 31 have a mentor.

RI7 Male producer: *"I don't know if you know M* C*, but he was the man who has been my mentor from day one. He and I are still in touch. He has been a huge support from day one and he is the one who gave me the job and nurtured my talent and saw stuff and things in me that I didn't even know were there."*

Work values

Three charts summarise the 14 work values I used in this research, drawn from the BFI study: status, money, achievement, recognition, responsibility, conditions of work, relationship with peers and associates, relationship with management, independence, creativity, uncertainty, intellectual stimulation, excitement and personal growth (see Table 20). This table and the two data tables for initiators and developers can be found in Appendix 7J.

Table 20. All respondents' ranking of work values

All	Not important																				most important					
	1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		10		Total N=31					
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	N	%	M	SD		
Status	0	0.00	2	6.45	1	3.23	1	3.23	2	6.45	1	3.23	8	25.81	4	12.90	9	29.03	3	9.68	31	100.00	7.00	2.27		
Money	0	0.00	2	6.45	2	6.45	1	3.23	2	6.45	5	16.13	7	22.58	9	29.03	3	9.68	0	0.00	31	100.00	6.52	1.98		
Achievement	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	3.23	1	3.23	7	22.58	16	51.61	6	19.35	31	100.00	8.81	0.91		
Recognition	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	3.23	2	6.45	4	12.90	2	6.45	12	38.71	10	32.26	31	100.00	8.68	1.40		
Responsibility	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	3.23	1	3.23	5	16.13	14	45.16	10	32.26	31	100.00	9.00	0.97		
Conditions of Work	1	3.23	0	0.00	3	9.68	1	3.23	4	12.90	5	16.13	3	9.68	8	25.81	2	6.45	4	12.90	31	100.00	6.68	2.33		
Relationship with peers and associates	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	3.23	6	19.35	9	29.03	11	35.48	4	12.90	31	100.00	8.35	1.05		
Relationship with management	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	6.45	2	6.45	10	32.26	10	32.26	7	22.58	31	100.00	8.58	1.12		
Independence	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	3.23	3	9.68	0	0.00	1	3.23	3	9.68	2	6.45	9	29.03	12	38.71	31	100.00	8.35	2.11		
Creativity	0	0.00	1	3.23	3	9.68	0	0.00	1	3.23	1	3.23	5	16.13	5	16.13	10	32.26	5	16.13	31	100.00	7.65	2.27		
Uncertainty	2	6.45	5	16.13	8	25.81	2	6.45	9	29.03	3	9.68	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	6.45	31	100.00	4.10	2.15		
Intellectual Stimulation	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	6.45	2	6.45	1	3.23	0	0.00	4	12.90	9	29.03	9	29.03	4	12.90	31	100.00	7.74	1.98		
Excitement	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	3.23	6	19.35	11	35.48	7	22.58	6	19.35	31	100.00	8.35	1.11		
Personal Growth	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	3.23	1	3.23	4	12.90	13	41.94	12	38.71	31	100.00	9.10	0.98		

Source: Author's own (see Appendix 6J for more detail)

The data indicate that initiators consider achievement, recognition, independence, creativity and personal growth as most important, with a mean score of 8 or more. For developers, most of the factors are more evenly distributed. All respondents can cope with uncertainty or what the researchers of the BFI study called the 'edge of chaos' (Paterson, 2010 p3). The current BTI worker copes with or accepts change.

RI9 Female: "I think my priorities have changed slightly. I have never been driven by money so doing something purely because I am getting financial benefit is not quite good enough. I like to make programmes that I would want to make, I don't want to just do any old rubbish. I wouldn't, I would rather be poorer."

Work environment

The work environment data are the only set that enable direct comparison with the BFI 1990s study. As with work values, the full data set can be found in Appendix 6K. Table 21 presents the summary data from this study, cross-referenced with the published BFI data (Paterson, 2010). Some BFI data were not available. I did ask the BFI statistical team of the time for help, but they had no access to any further data. Richard Paterson, the BFI project leader interviewed for this research retired in 2017 and could not be contacted. However, there are enough data to draw comparisons with the BFI study and by so doing validate this research.

Table 21. All respondents' ranking of work environment, cross-referenced with BFI 1990s study

All	Not important				most important						Total N		BTI		BFI
	1		2		3		4		5		BFI	BTI	M	SD	M
	BFI	BTI	BFI	BTI	BFI	BTI	BFI	BTI	BFI	BTI					
Working a as a team	0.7	0.00	3.1	0.00	12.2	9.68	29.9	48.39	54.2	41.94	288	31	4.32	0.65	4.43
High energy	1.8	0.00	10.5	0.00	24.9	12.90	37.9	48.39	24.9	38.71	285	31	4.23	0.76	n/a
Backup	1.1	12.90	7.7	29.03	21.1	29.03	37.2	16.13	33.0	12.90	285	31	2.90	1.19	n/a
Effective leadership	1.8	0.00	3.9	3.23	9.3	16.13	37.0	45.16	48.0	35.48	281	31	4.13	0.81	4.26
Competitiveness	25.2	3.23	26.2	16.13	27.7	38.71	13.5	22.58	7.4	19.35	282	31	3.39	1.09	n/a
Staff stability	3.2	6.45	15.8	32.26	29.5	16.13	34.0	29.03	17.5	16.13	285	31	3.16	1.24	n/a
Exchange of ideas	0.7	0.00	3.2	6.45	13.0	19.35	38.6	29.03	44.6	45.16	285	31	4.13	0.96	4.23
Adaptability to change	1.8	3.23	4.9	12.90	26.8	9.68	39.4	32.26	27.1	41.94	284	31	3.97	1.17	n/a
Diversity of expertise available	0.7	3.23	8.1	12.90	24.6	3.23	43.3	38.71	23.2	41.94	284	31	4.03	1.14	n/a
Responsiveness to ideas	0.7	0.00	2.5	9.68	13.8	9.68	42.4	35.48	40.6	45.16	283	31	4.16	0.97	4.2
Working with talented individuals	0.3	0.00	2.1	0.00	5.9	6.45	32.5	25.81	59.1	67.74	286	31	4.61	0.62	4.48
Trust between colleagues	0.3	0.00	1.4	3.23	8.7	3.23	33.1	54.84	56.4	38.71	287	31	4.29	0.69	4.44
Effective management	2.5	0.00	6.3	0.00	18.0	19.35	29.6	51.61	43.7	29.03	284	31	4.10	0.70	n/a
Good rates of pay	1.8	0.00	8.4	22.58	32.3	19.35	35.4	51.61	22.1	6.45	285	31	3.42	0.92	n/a
Flexible working conditions	2.5	6.45	8.0	9.68	30.8	22.58	33.9	48.39	24.8	12.90	286	31	3.52	1.06	n/a
Sufficient time	2.1	6.45	3.9	12.90	17.9	58.06	34.7	16.13	41.4	6.45	285	31	3.00	0.93	n/a
Large company/department	45.1	61.29	30.0	16.13	18.7	12.90	4.0	3.23	2.2	6.45	273	31	1.74	1.21	n/a
Small company/department	28.6	61.29	19.2	12.90	29.7	19.35	14.7	3.23	7.9	3.23	266	31	1.74	1.09	n/a

Source: Author's own (see Appendix 6K)

Note: n/a = not available

The BFI study was based on 18 factors and this research follows suit. The general 'sweep' of the data tracks a similar path. There are some notable differences, indicating a change

in attitude and values between the media worker of the 1990s and the worker of the 2010s.

'Six factors were ranked as the most influential by the respondents, each rated at 4 or 5 by more than 80 per cent of the panel, and with a broad consensus across all roles and age cohorts. They were 'working with talented individuals' (mean=4.48), 'trust between colleagues' (mean=4.44), 'working as a team' (mean=4.34), 'effective leadership' (mean=4.26), 'exchange of ideas' (mean=4.23) and 'responsiveness to ideas' (mean=4.20)'(Paterson, 2010 p3).

By comparison, the top six factors for this research are: working with talented individuals (mean=4.61) working as a team (mean=4.32), trust between colleagues (mean=4.29), high energy (mean=4.23), responsiveness to ideas (mean=4.16) and effective leadership (mean=4.13). More interesting are the data that reveal that modern BTI workers feel greater indifference about the size of the company they work in, they are more adaptable to change and place working with talented individuals as preeminent. It is no longer the company, but the project and the team, that matters most. A conclusion reached by earlier research work, discussed in Chapter Four.

7.6 Findings

The fieldwork reveals a more nuanced and diverse set of attributes and individual differences than many other reports and academic writings might suggest. Each story told to me in the interview offers a unique narrative that recognises opportunities grabbed and risks taken. My respondents are not afraid of change.

7.6.1 Personal determinants

In getting into the industry, what comes through is a single-minded focus. These people are dedicated and highly motivated. Although several admitted that they have switched track from a previous direction, they have incredible focus. All are academically very bright. The subject of their degree was almost irrelevant, but a high proportion have a

First or a 2.1. Their literacy and general numeracy were seen as essential by themselves and the employers.

Informant E: *"...we do test everyone who is applying. We give them a standardised test that's a basic run-through of writing skills. We also test for business knowledge although that's of less importance than their basic writing skills."*

RI15 Male: *"...writing was what I was interested in...My predominant role is writing treatments just to pitch to broadcasters, so probably 70% of my job is still writing. Finding good development people is notoriously tricky because you have to be able to write. You would be amazed at the amount of people that can't write, or if they can write, they either write too academically or they write selling documents...it is quite a tough thing to do."*

It was self-evident that they all had excellent social skills. Even the more technical respondents reported that they get on with people. They are dedicated and passionate about the job. The hours worked are irrelevant, as is the company size. They are driven by the producer or director for whom they work.

RD30 Female: *"I think what makes a difference is more so for me is I came with the approach that I was open minded and my attitude of what were the possibilities out there. I wasn't just closed off or had high expectations and it's really corny and it is very lame, but I did go with the flow as well, I think for me I always come with the right attitude.*

I always come with the right positive attitude and the best way to approach things in a logic way and I think a lot of the time the reason why I got both the gigs at MPC and my other job, Coda, the reason why I got these jobs was because I think it is just the way I approach my work. It is definitely logic and always the skills I had behind it but it is also the personality, like if you have a positive personality that they know they can work with, it is something will work with on a daily basis and it makes a difference to how they decide on whether they hire you or not."

7.6.2 Environmental factors

Support from their family was vital to keeping going in a tough industry. They needed the family to trust their judgement. It was not necessarily about money. A majority have a

mentor who took them under their wing and guided them. Within the initiators, most had a boss who recruited them to a new project. It is clear the latent organisation is at work.

RD27 Female: *"They were all very encouraging and Peter Dale was one of the nicest men I have ever met in TV. He was very encouraging and at the time Emma Loach was the exec there and my mum loved that because obviously that is Ken Loach's daughter and she was 'oh lovely, Ken Loach's and our daughter are working together' obviously she was an exec and I was just like ... but anyway, so she was very encouraging as well and actually in the end ... then the managing director was Emily Renshaw Smith and the three of them were very encouraging..."*

7.6.3 Employment factors

Most learnt their technical skills on the job. Many initiators multi-task within their job family to help shape an idea they will research, self-shoot and direct a proof or concept or rough pilot. As one junior producer told me: -

RI14 Female: *"You take out a camera, use it to shoot stuff for development and ask someone what they think of the material..."*

An editor, RI25 Male: *'I want to move into film...I've moved jobs and taken a cut in salary to learn how to cut a drama, it's very different...'*

RI13 Male: *"always ask questions ...you have to develop the craft skills, I took the day off to attend a course at DV Talent [a services and training company] – self shooting, I want to be an AP [Assistant Producer] by the end of the year..."*

The tradition of learning on the job persists.

D22 Male: *"I had minimal qualifications but the whole thing about this, as you know, a lot of it is about your attitude and how you pick up work but a huge part of it is just being keen. At the stage of being a runner you just have to show that you are eager and keen to get stuck in and learn as well, you are not here because you get free toast every day and a free tea on a Friday. You are genuinely interested in the industry and what goes on. I*

think that came across in the interview, it was just a genuine desire to get into the industry and learn everything about it."

It was also apparent that, once they were established and had assured a reputation, they no longer had to attend interviews. They now get the phone call from potential employers, 'We will phone you.'³¹ They report that they are always scanning the business environment, networking at informal coffee breaks or lunches and writing to programme makers. They seek and are expected to seek new opportunities.

Informant M: *"I think that just looking at evidence, people do move very few people in media stay with one company for more than four/six years, I would say, maximum. And if they do, then they are viewed as 'lifers' and that is not always a good thing."*

RI15 Male: *"...it was really tough to leave there because I loved it there and they had done so much for me and I was so comfortable and whatever I wanted to work on ... and to be fair to them they are now getting a lot more work which is outside of sports and they are expanding and they are doing more documentaries, if I'd stayed I probably could have worked on loads of great stuff with them but I just thought they are not going to do drama any time soon so I had to make a change."*

7.6.4 Work values and environment

All my respondents value achievement, recognition and personal growth. Surprisingly, they dislike uncertainty. Curiously, they are indifferent to their conditions of work, even though most of the companies for which they worked are clustered around media or technology hubs such as Silicon Roundabout,³² in Soho or in the hinterland of the Greys Inn Road. The overall location (place) matters to the creative and to the creative industry. It is mutually beneficial: for the former, to change employer and to the latter, to recruit at minimum cost. UK governments consider the clustering of media firms as the catalyst for 'urban development and regeneration' (Noonan, 2015 p1). However, the case of the

³¹ From the phrase: 'Don't call us – we will call you!' – well known in the creative industries

³² www.hoxtonmix.com/silicon-roundabout/

Shoreditch hipster based around Silicon Roundabout as the location for a media hub may have peaked, as the Old BBC Television Centre of West London is resurrected with studios and homes and several media companies such as Publicis Media, Soho House Group, ITV Studios and BBC Worldwide start to use the studios again in 2018³³. The vision of a creative and cultural hub populated by creative workers lasts only as long as core media organisations choose to locate there, and rents remain affordable.

Working in a high-energy environment within a dynamic team with effective leadership are all high on their preference list. A flat hierarchy, responsive to ideas — wherever they come from — makes them feel valued. The size of company or department and stability matter little.

What emerges is that BTI workers develop their high-skills through professional practice, not at university or college. Moreover, apart from a few specific technical roles, a media qualification offers limited competitive advantage in securing a job in the BTI. In fact, as reported by my informants it can be a distinct disadvantage in securing a job in an initiator role. I have no data to qualify their assertions.

My informants and respondents alike agree that personal and social skills — rather than functional capabilities — are the key attributes to employability in the BTI. Comparing the 1990s media worker with my study respondents, I found that the latter place greater importance on the project and the team, rather than the company or stability. Other indicators suggest that the successful modern worker can cope with change and the precarious nature of employment in the BTI.

I found no evidence that government skills strategies or policies have impacted their careers. Specifically, there was little to indicate that the sector skills council for the creative industries — ScreenSkills — has had any impact on or relevance to my respondents' development or career. I asked my respondents if they have ever completed a Creative Skillset/ScreenSkills census. Not one had. In similar terms, in a study of


³³ <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-england-london-43011984/bbc-television-centre-reopens-after-five-year-revamp>

creative workers drawn from a wider pool of the creative sector, Millar (2016) reported that her 36 subjects were 'confused and unaware' of the services offered by Creative Scotland and Creative Skillset. My informants were asked what they thought of the contribution ScreenSkills make to their staff development needs and potential new joiners. Their responses can be summed as 'not much'. I will return to this matter in Chapter Eight.

7.6.5 The dependency heat map

An analysis and extrapolation of the data for Level Three factor set suggests a variation in the importance of the 11 Level Two factors (see Figure 40). This is drawn from the data gathered from the University of Westminster MA students (See Appendix 5C) and the respondents for this thesis. The main thrust of this is that socioeconomic factors are key at while establishing a career. Personal determinants become more defined as their career develops. Employment factors will vary with the role and organisation for which they, the respondents, work.

Figure 40. The career pathway heat map



Source: Author's own. The intensity of the red tone is indicative of the importance of the factor at the stage in career


7.6.6 The development of expertise and professional identity

I complete this chapter with some reflections on the process of developing expertise in the BTI. The career pathway development value chain I devised for this research presents a set of attributes and factors, a snapshot of that individual's score at that instance, as a linear process. The importance of these factors to an individual change over time as the

heat map indicates. For example, the students on the MA programme at the University of Westminster are more dependent on family and education than an experienced worker, such as my respondents.

The career of the creative worker has been characterised as precarious and at times chaotic (Bloch, 2005)³⁴. Although I based my model of the career pathway development value chain on a linear process – well-structured stages based on a classical model of career development presented by Super (1990) throughout this thesis I (and others I have cited) have highlighted the changing nature of work. The literature that has examined the employment of the creative worker presents terms such as flexible specialisation, precarity, freelance mentality as the worker re-invents their career. A simple inspection of my initiator respondents' LinkedIn profiles, or a review of their personal websites reveal an average of five jobs in different companies in their relatively short careers. A matter that is perfectly acceptable in the BTI (see *moving on* in Chapter Eight). What emerges is the notion of the driven artist as they seek to do 'good work' (Hesmondhalgh, 2013) or answer the 'calling' (Lysova and Khapova, 2018), they will look for the next job to further that ambition.

Figure 41. An attribute-composition model that shapes an individual's professional identity



Source: Author's own

³⁴ No relation

The non-linear nature of career development in the BTI points to a reconfiguration of the career pathway development model by applying an attribute-composition model based on expertise theory (Zhou, 2015). In considering the findings of this research in Figure 41 I propose a model that captures the factors described in the career pathway development value chain. This reconfiguration is based on the individual, their practice and what this means for their career in term of skills, capabilities, competence and the resulting brand they present to potential employers.

This research shows that within the BTI personal determinants and socioeconomic factors are core to the individual. Feedback based on work experience in practice could have a positive or negative impact on the individual's basic attributes and values. However, it is in practice that the media worker develops the set of attributes that support their career development and identity (McNutt, 2017). What, in terms of a career, Bloch describes as the '*messiness of life*' and characterises the worker as a '*complex adaptive entity*' (Bloch, 2005 p195); the respondents in this study do adapt to the challenges of the BTI and I argue therein lies their success as they develop their version of the brand of 'Me'.

Regulated workers acquire their professional identity through industry approved qualifications, by being a registrant and by practice (Nuttman-Shwartz, 2017). For the media worker it is through the process of creating a personal brand that the individual begins to establish and validate their career that Deuze (Table 4) and Ursell (Table 5 column four) cite as the goal for the individual worker. Their knowledge, programme credits, abilities developed through practice and validated by their peers – such as being identified as a Hot Shot, substantiate their professional identity.

7.7 Conclusion

This chapter presented an analysis of the data gathered from my fieldwork. My informants provided insights to the recruitment and retention of creative workers of which they report that government skills policy plays no part. Their observations coupled

with my own analysis in Chapter Three, led me to map the creative industries skills policy community; it highlights where power and decision making reside (See Section 7.3.3).

The issue of graduate over supply is a matter on which the informants have little control or influence. This is at odds with the government's skills policy pronouncements to have the process employer led, but is in accord with other sectors and training providers who view the skills system as a muddled set of initiatives (See Chapter Three Section 3.3.4). In accord with other studies, my informants observe that many graduates do not have enough understanding of the industry they are hoping to join, plus they possess limited business and 'people' skills. They, like others, thought that high fees might be a lever of control. This has not proved to be the case. Their critical comments on the effectiveness of the current skills policy and the general quality of graduates suggest that the current system is not working in this sector.

My respondents' data reveals that they value achievement, recognition and personal growth in their current roles. They are not concerned about conditions of work, but place high energy, team working, effective leadership and responsiveness to ideas as key issues in the working environment. Company or department size, stability, backup and trust mattered little to them. In broad terms, these findings are congruent with earlier labour market research in the creative industries that examined primary creators and performing artists. Respondents suggested that the claim or desire to be a creative trumps any simple (or seemingly irrational) analysis of decisions to join the industry. Remuneration is only weakly correlated to the interviewees' desire to work in the industry.

This cohort of successful workers exhibit a single-minded approach to their careers. Although their focus might change, they will remain dedicated to their chosen trajectory. They are academically high achieving, from a wide variety of backgrounds. Their degree subjects are almost irrelevant. Most have a high degree classification and report that their good writing skills are essential. Significantly, they tend to be backed up by a family that trusts and supports them, not necessarily financially. They network within the industry and profess to have good social skills, on the basis of my exchanges with them, this is

indisputable. On the basis of the fieldwork with the respondents I devised an attribute-composition model to illustrate how the media worker develops and substantiates their professional identity. In the next chapter I discuss how these findings address the research questions posed in Chapter One.

Chapter Eight Crafting a successful career in the BTI – conclusions and recommendations

“I had a world. I don’t think I had a career. I made films.”

Agnès Varda

8.1 Introduction

The prime objective of this research is to shed new light on the career discourse of the media worker in the BTI of the 2010s – how they get in, and on, in the industry with what skills and how they develop their capabilities. In Chapter One, I set out my rationale for the research. It is founded on personal experience which indicates that there are significant gaps in our knowledge of the media worker in the BTI. In Section 1.1.2, I explained that this research is inspired by two earlier studies: the BFI longitudinal tracking study of media workers in the 1990s and the series of papers from SKOPE on graduate careers. The BFI study examined the lives of 450 media workers over four years. It highlighted the need to have a deeper understanding of the individual worker. The SKOPE study called for more research into periods of transition in the careers of graduate labour.

My aim is to improve our understanding of the factors that enable the media worker to manage their career in the current precarious BTI employment landscape. In doing so I examine how they acquire their skills and capabilities which shape their professional identity and expertise (Chapter 7 Section 7.6.6). If the skills policy for the creative industries was viable we should see evidence of workers in the BTI benefiting from this framework.

The graduate with a media qualification endorsed by ScreenSkills should be advantaged in the recruitment process with generic and industry applicable higher level skills that meet the employers’ needs. From the respondents interviewed for this study and from the employers’ comments this is clearly not the case. As discussed in Chapter Seven, interviews with my informants and respondents, validated by respondent data (See Table 12) reveal that very few jobs explicitly require a media qualification. As discussed in Chapter Three it is the higher level core skills defined by the QAA acquired as an adjunct

to studying an academic programme at a level 6 or above programme that should give the graduate a competitive advantage of being more employable.

The UK skills policy is also about providing useful labour market intelligence. The purpose of which is to predict need and therefore direct HEIs to provide appropriately skilled workers to join the sector. In Chapter Six, I show that this is inadequate and is a contributing factor in the oversupply of graduates. The data models need reform.

In this closing chapter, I summarise my findings and offer my conclusions as to why: *having a media degree offers no greater prospect of career success in the creative industries in the UK than any other qualification*. Based on this analysis I provide some recommendations for the UK skills policy and discuss the impact for the individual media worker, the employer and the government through their appointed agencies.

8.1.1 Framing the debate – mind the (skills) gap

Many academic and industry-based studies that have examined the worker in the creative industries have taken as a starting point the accepted wisdom that the creative industries are an engine of growth in GVA and for jobs in the UK economy. In Chapter Six, I make the case that at least for the BTI this is not so. Public pronouncements from government ministers, industry insiders and pundits extolling the success of the creative industries indicate that very few people have looked at the primary data produced by the ONS.

The significance of this research is that it challenges several extant pillars of the skills policy discourse that frames the environment of the media worker:

1. That creative industries, particularly the media industry, are engines of exceptional economic growth which cannot be justified on the data produced by the DCMS.
2. The simplistic human capital theory promoted by successive government policymakers that high-skills lead to high skills jobs has no basis in practice.
3. That attaining a degree in media is a fast track to a career in the creative industries.

In Chapter Six, I argued that, in terms of the UK economy, the creative industries (as opposed to the creative economy) do not stand out as exceptional compared with other sectors. Many are either larger in terms of GVA, employ more people or indicate a better growth trajectory as measured by the ONS. The creative industries had an overall growth of 5% in 2010 and this remains steady to date. My two key comparators — the leisure industry and higher education — summarised in Appendix 7H both show better performance characteristics than the creative industries.

It is the DCMS's presentation of creative industries data in its annual GVA estimates that gives credence to many overstatements, not helped by the '*spin*' given to the data by the analysts (Chapter 6 Section 6.3.5).

The creative industries are not '*roaring*'. Most creative industries subsectors perform in line with other moderately performing sectors. This hyperbole has informed the case made by the champions for the industry. This has encouraged universities and colleges to expand their offering in this sector. In turn, this has given the parents of aspiring media workers the confidence to support their child's attendance at one of the many media courses on offer.

In Chapters Three and Four, I make the case that the oversupply of media graduates is a consequence of this flag-waving for the sector. In a response to the Augar review of post-18 education Professor Jon Last, vice-chancellor of Norwich University of the Arts (Chapter 6 Section 6.4) maintains case even though he, like many others, conflates the workforce of the '*creative economy*', with the creative industries of film, TV and games as envisioned by many graduates.

Given this encouragement and over inflated expectations, it is all too easy to find disillusioned and seemingly disadvantaged media workers who might have undertaken one or two jobs in the industry and now see a career elsewhere as second best. As I argued earlier in this thesis, the focus of much academic research is firmly rooted in the debates around inclusion and diversity, access and the poor representation by disadvantaged groups. Due to their position in the cultural life of the nation, the creative industries do enjoy a particularly high profile and responsibility on these issues. Yet as I

previously discussed, to date, no intervention or action has tackled the matter. Project Diamond *'an industry-wide diversity monitoring system used by the BBC, Channel 4, Channel 5, ITV and Sky, and supported by Pact and Creative Skillset, through the Creative Diversity Network'* (Channel 4, 2019b) has yet to deliver useful insights. Moreover, the system is being boycotted by the Writers' Guild and BECTU because individual programme data is not being published.

Regrettably, so much of the debate on inclusion, diversity and socioeconomic disadvantage is predicated on a review of the symptoms and not the cause. I argue that the cause is situated at the heart of the UK education and skills policy, which perpetuates a lack of opportunity from the day a young person first attends school, if not before.

In the UK, the creative industries are a powerful lobby. Since the 1990s, successive governments have flirted with *'Cool Britannia'* in the hope that some star dust will rub off onto the grubbier politicians. After being snubbed by the media glitterati, David Cameron turned his attention to tourism, trading on the world of Harry Potter, highlighting the mutually parasitic relationship between the media and society. Both need and seem to feed off each other in the *'incredibly varied and complex media ritual we go through everyday'* (Deuze 2007). Deuze restates the view that the media creates an atmosphere in which other industries thrive. Soho in London is a major centre for media companies and stimulates wider economic growth (European Union, 2010b).

My analysis challenges the policy narrative that the creative industries are an *'engine for growth'* and debunks the myth that providing skills will automatically lead to growth. I also challenge the usefulness of the term *'creative industries'*, which I believe is counter-productive and has too many disparate subsectors that have little in common is a view shared by others (Banks and O'Connor, 2009 p365). The model of *'creative intensity'* that brings the sector together has little to do with commonality in process, output or channels to market. In my recommendations I suggest a realignment.

The over-supply of media graduates with an over-inflated expectation of a job in the mainstream media industry is a consequence of the supply-side marketplace. My research demonstrates that government skills policies that rely on skills councils to

identify needs in high skills industries add little value. It is not an appropriate approach for all industrial sectors, especially those with a high skilled graduate entry. Rather than invest in skills and training, we need to spend more money in early years education if we are ever going to improve social mobility and provide equality of opportunity for those wishing to join the creative industries. More realistic employment prospects and better control of graduate success data will also provide school leavers and parents with much-needed information. I do not advocate gatekeeping; nor a cap in media courses. However, publishing the outcomes of media courses — for example, through a league table — would provide a better framework than allowing market forces to balance supply and demand. This, along with a more realistic assessment of the number of jobs in the industry, will help manage expectations. During informant interviews, many senior executives in the BTI privately accepted that the current situation is untenable. But they are unwilling to publicly acknowledge the issue as it opens up matters of opportunity, diversity and inclusion.

8.2 Findings from the fieldwork: addressing the research questions

In Chapter One, I argue that high-skills (See Chapter One Section 1.2.6) as the UK government defines them, make a limited contribution to career progression in highly qualified yet unregulated industrial sectors such as the creative industries. As a consequence of this research, bar a few industry linked vocationally biased media programmes, there is an indication that a general media degree could actually be a disadvantage.

The majority of research into employment in the creative industries has been conducted at the macro level. A few researchers (Stoyanova, 2009a, Paterson, 2000, Lee, 2011) have examined career management at the micro level within the creative and cultural industries with a view to identify discernible patterns and strategies that are unique to the individual within the creative industries.

The aim of this study has been to look at the industry through a new lens. No research to date has explicitly analysed the successful media worker in the television industry. This research, by examining the career pathways of 31 workers drawn from the BTI, seeks to inform our knowledge of the worker in the creative environment. It fills a gap in the discourse of the media worker and debunks the simplistic model of government policy that high-skills lead to high skills jobs.

Alongside, I argue that equality of opportunity and diversity within the industry is not exceptionally poor compared to the overall UK industrial landscape. The higher education sector, with its poor progression of staff drawn from BAME groups and with few female senior academics, has a worse track record than the creative industries (Advance HE, 2018). The leisure industry, which makes an equivalent contribution to the economy to the creative industries, has some profound issues around poor salaries, labour exploitation and zero-hours contracts (Wyman, 2012), see Appendix 7H.

I devised three research questions to address my hypothesis. My aim was to add to our understanding of the motivations, behaviours and actions of the three prime stakeholder groups: the media worker, the employer and government.

RQ1 considers the media worker. It seeks to understand the actions and behaviours of the successful media worker and how they get in and on in the BTI. By understanding their attributes, we might formulate skills policies that support and encourage these behaviours in others and help develop career opportunities for current and prospective joiners to the industry.

RQ2 looks at the employment landscape from the employer's perspective. It examines the needs of employers and their expectations of new staff, whether they are work experience students, interns, graduates, experienced hires, contractors or freelance workers. The organisations developing the next cohort of media workers need to understand their needs. Accurate and timely labour market intelligence sourced from employers and their employees as gathered by ScreenSkills, is key.

Finally, RQ3 seeks evidence of a link between government skills policy and career development in the BTI as delivered by the sector skills councils. This question considers the impact that Creative Skillset/ScreenSkills has had on the industry.

The three RQs above inspired a set of supplementary questions (Chapter One Section 1.2.5). My findings for each RQ incorporate these supplementary matters in the summaries below. Together they provide the basis on which I offer my recommendations.

8.2.1 RQ1: what are the most important factors for an individual to successfully join and progress in the BTI?

In Chapter Two, I present a timeline of government interventions, Acts of Parliament, policies and events from 1979 to date that have impacted on the BTI (Figure 5).

Collectively these interventions have radically changed the employment landscape, from the oft-quoted '*stable duopoly*' employment model of 1979 to the current fragmented and precarious employment environment. For the most part, those workers who joined the industry in the 1970s and 80s have retired. The BFI longitudinal study of the 1990s asserts that the intake of the 1970s and 1980s would have weathered the storm of change or left the industry (Paterson, 2010). They would have been recruited and trained by the BBC or one of the 15 regional franchises that formed ITV. This has personal resonance, when I joined Thames television in 1979, I was trained by ex-BBC production staff. Living with uncertainty and change was not part of the deal at that time (See Chapter Four Section 4.2).

The BFI study has two distinct cohorts of workers: those who joined as I did in the 1970s and 80s and those who came later in the 1990s with more limited expectations of a long-term stable career in one company due to changes in legislation and the impact of technology that de-skilled the workforce. With these changes, secure work became more limited and the percentage of freelance workers increased. Almost everyone in the industry effectively became portfolio workers and had to adopt a freelance mentality (Preston, 2002). All the respondents I interviewed for my study have not experienced any other model of employment. Precariousness was not thrust upon them; to an extent it is a known quantity.

My first research question considers the skills and capabilities an individual requires to survive in this precarious industry. The question considers the balance of functional, social and higher-skills that should be evident in the graduate's portfolio. Working in television is an attractive proposition for many graduates, but the current reality of developing and sustaining a career in the BTI is a challenge. For the individual, it is an unstable and uncertain working environment with the need to multitask and cope with an ever-changing skillset need. Deregulation from the 1980s onwards placed the onus on the individual to manage their career pathway. Even if a training programme is available there is a reluctance to attend due to loss of earnings and the willingness of others to cover the current role. Development is conducted in the 'twilight hours' or at times when not on a project. It is only in 2019 that ScreenSkills added CPD in its offering to media workers (see Chapter 6.5). Unfortunately, there is little guidance on how employers might be compensated to cover for someone on a training course. This should be a priority.

Previous studies which have examined the career of the media worker have found their subject groups among the disenfranchised, who often self-select by responding to a call for subjects in the trade press (Randle et al., 2009). In a BETR study of UK freelancers made through an *'open call'*, media workers attended focus group sessions to provide data on their careers to date. For the freelancers, this was an opportunity to express their sense of injustice, that they had not got the breaks. For the most part, they were out of work (BETR, 2008). A more recent study of freelancers around the Bristol media hub also found it challenging to gather a representative sample. The researcher used the industry network to contact subjects for interview and acknowledges that the sample may not be representative of the *'invisible army'* (Genders, 2019).

Creative Skillset's remit was to gather market intelligence on the media worker. Not one of my respondents had ever completed a questionnaire for Creative Skillset; most believed they have never been asked. This supports my argument that many studies to date have given too much weight to marginalised workers to the detriment of the industry and potential joiners. I made the point in Chapter Six (Section 6.5) that the

Creative Skillset biennial survey of media workers presents a non-representative job specific data set. The few research projects at the micro level (Chapter 4 Section 4.2.3) make implicit assumptions about the unemployed – that they have been disadvantaged. I suggest that potential joiners have unrealistic expectations informed by universities' public relations and pronouncements in the press (Chapter One Section 1.6.1). In Chapter Seven, I detailed my findings from 31 research interviews and associated career pathway questionnaire. Here, I set out the key points that address RQ1.

Getting in

A degree is a basic entry ticket to a job in the BTI. Most of my respondents have done well academically; 84% got a First, a 2.1 or, in one case, a PhD (RI9 Female). All those in initiator roles said the subject of their degree was irrelevant but that higher level skills, especially writing, were key (Chapter Seven Section 7.6.1). See also Chapter Three Section 3.3.5 – Skills and qualifications.

Only one respondent in the developer group did not have a degree — he (RD22 Male) had a BTEC National Diploma in Music Technology (Triple Merit) and had worked his way up through the business as a dubbing mixer. Three of the developer group respondents had a 2.2 degree. They all had jobs in craft & post, specifically editing. Of the whole group, 16 (over 50%) had a degree with no discernible link to the media. Only 5 (16%) had a degree with some relevance to the BTI, of which two (6%) could be deemed to be a match to the industry and their role (they studied at Ravensbourne and Bournemouth). My respondents and informants all agreed that joining the industry with a broad base of knowledge beyond media skills is advantageous. Based on my findings, a student with the ambition to be in an initiator role might be better served by studying English than media production.

Overall my respondents attributed their success to their personal attributes. They ranked social skills and networking as highly important (22 out of 31 in the upper decile). Initiators ranked social capital and intrinsic motivation in the upper decile; developers ranked it in the upper quartile. Most respondents considered themselves as either

competent or proficient in their roles based on their vocational practice and functional skills. These attributes were underpinned by their overall educational attainment. The bottom line is a dedication to work and an ability to get on with people. From the interviews, many respondents expressed a single-minded focus to their work: they said they are obsessed by their work (Chapter 7.5).

There is a consensus among this group that getting a job was serendipitous; they managed to be in the right place at the right time. It is beyond the scope of this research, but many of the interviews revealed that this group of respondents fulfilled the maxim that *'chance favours the prepared mind'*. Of the group 16 stated that they had no deep seated aspirations join the industry, it was opportunistic (Chapter Seven Section 7.5). It does seem clear that these people seize opportunities and are willing to take risks and follow their own career pathway.

In addition to their personal attributes, my respondents considered family support and trust as important although not essential: 25 (80%) of the group rated these at 7 or 8 out of 10, with little difference between initiators and developers. In interviews, all reported that family trust in the risks they were taking enabled them to cope in the first few years in the industry. Money was not a high priority, scoring an average of 6.20 out of 10 (SD=2.43). Many come from working families with limited budgets to support the aspiring media worker. They are resourceful (Chapter 7 Section 7.5).

Staying in

Over 90% of the respondents to this study have been in the BTI for three years or more. As evidenced by the effusive *'hot shot'* nominations from their managers, clearly they can do the job and add value to the business. Of R119 Female, her advocate said: *'Full of energy and ideas...goes well beyond the call of duty without ever being asked.'*

The online questionnaire completed by the respondents for this study included two data sets drawn from the BFI study. Of the 14 work values, the four that initiators ranked as most important were achievement, recognition, personal growth and independence, with

all scoring 90% or more. The developers all scored these lower at 80%; relationship with management was second after personal growth. They ranked independence even lower. Being in the business matters more to them.

Although all respondents disliked uncertainty, it was the lowest-ranked factor. Across the group, conditions of work had the widest spread (SD=2.33). Developers are slightly more concerned about uncertainty, but not significantly. The consensus was that it goes with the territory.

There is a high degree of intrinsic motivation (the scale ranks 1 as intrinsic / internally driven and 10 as extrinsic / externally driven) in the initiators (Mean=1.4/SD=0.83) and a greater bias among developers (Mean=3.81/SD=2.54) to extrinsic motivation, particularly among those in a business development role, who reported being more externally motivated (Mean=5.7/SD=2.07).

Working with talented individuals ranked highest among the work environment factors, followed by high energy, teams, effective leadership and responsiveness to ideas. The least important factors were company or department size, stability and backup. My respondents ranked project, team and personal achievements as critical to their work experience and their expression as creative workers (Chapter 7 Section 7.5).

Moving on

When it comes to moving on, there is a clear distinction between the job families. On average, initiators changed jobs more often than developers, having had between three and five jobs. Both informants and respondents expect people to move on after four to six years and create a portfolio of work and credits (Chapter 7 Section 7.5). The initiators are focused on fulfilling their creative ambitions, they value personal achievement and recognition more than the developers, who had had between one and three jobs at the time of interview. This could be because, as below-the-line activities, developer roles are more embedded in the business operations.

Initiators are more engaged in networking and scanning for new projects and new opportunities for creative work. They contact companies or specific programme makers to have an informal coffee or lunch. They write to programme makers to complement them on a project. They reach a pivotal stage in their career when they get the call from a potential employer, rather than the other way around. Several respondents reported that their current job was a consequence of such a phone call. A majority in the group (22) had a mentor who had taken them under their wing and with whom they talked about career opportunities, it is a loose relationship, they are not protégées. The mentor could be their boss or a more experienced programme maker, who recruits them to new projects or companies.

My respondents are dedicated and passionate about their jobs, they are driven artists and have what other researchers label as a **calling** to creative work (Lysova et al., 2018). They considered 'hours worked' and 'organisation' as unimportant, compared to the producer or director for whom they work. They have entered the industry with this model of engagement, but I question whether they will be able to sustain this level of driven dedication to a project once they reach their 30s and possibly have family commitments.

Developing skills

The remit of the SSCs for the creative industries is to gather LMI, identify employer and feed those needs to training organisations and further and higher education institutions. There should be evidence that new industry joiners and those in the early part of their careers have benefited from the insights from these employer-led organisations. An indicator would be that graduates with a qualification relevant to the media industry and endorsed by ScreenSkills would be more successful in securing a role in the industry. I already noted that only five of my 31 respondents had a degree with some media component, and only two had a production bias. My analysis in Chapter Seven shows that educationally my respondents are drawn from a very wide range of subject areas.

The data suggests that skill levels as taught in formal education are not improving. According to the OECD the new graduate worker in the UK is no better skilled than those reaching the end of their careers (Jeffreys, 2019). The term higher skills has been used to

define the set of capabilities that the graduate should possess on leaving university. However, these are harder to quantify, complex and context sensitive (Sheffield University, 2010, QAA, 2019a, QAA, 2019b). The only quantifiable measure is the level of satisfaction by graduate recruiters across all sectors (Chapter Three Section 3.4.5). Employers argue that they are not employable (CIPD, 2017) and UK universities argue that it is a mismatch of skills (Universities UK, 2018). Several respondents criticised their formal practice-based learning whilst at university, there is a significant difference when it is *'done for real'* (Chapter 7 Section 7.5).

Even those who started work with some experience of the production process — whether formally or informally acquired — admitted that this skill was at a very low base compared to the demands of working in a professional environment. The demands of the job put them on a very steep learning curve. They saw the tradition of watching and learning from others, developing skills outside of the working day and, if necessary, putting in unpaid overtime or taking on a lower paid job to learn a new skill as part of the deal. The tradition of learning on the job persists. Within the loose boundaries of their role they do multi-task, research, self-shoot and direct to get a development project off the ground.

My respondents turn to more experienced colleagues to coach them. Although 17 had heard of Creative Skillset (only one had before joining the industry), only five knew what the organisation provided for the industry. The view across the group was that they had little time for a training course that might not meet their needs.

Concluding remarks

The data tables presented in Chapter Seven are collated from my fieldwork — summarising my respondents' personal attributes, work values and what they value in the work environment. They show a broad alignment with the BFI 1990s study. However, the work environment was more important to workers in the 1990s. Current workers focus much more on the project than the company: doing *'good work'* (Hesmondhalgh, 2013) is paramount. The size of company is unimportant; in today's industry, a small company

may well be producing a major show for a broadcaster. They exhibit many of the attributes I discussed in Section 4.2.2. They are 'brand of Me' individuals; they do not place boundaries on their careers, but they tend to remain within their job family. They are flexibly specialised.

What emerges is a cohort of people who are better equipped to deal with uncertainty than their 1990s counterparts in so much as they see it as part of the price to pay to work in the BTI. As a group, both initiators and developers recognise that personal determinants are key (Mean=9.26 with a SD=1.15). The initiators are marginally more likely to say that their personal determinants and social capital are main drivers to their success, shown by a smaller standard deviation (Mean=9.73 and a SD=0.46).

There is a greater sense of uncertainty among the initiator community. These above-the-line roles tend to be production-specific. They are the creative people, the driven artists. The developers, who provide a support role tend to stay in post longer. Their skills are organisational specific – the way of working, roles and function to an extent their skills portfolio is institutionalised. However, coping with the current industrial landscape in the BTI is not for the faint hearted.

8.2.2 RQ2: Do BTI employers care about qualifications?

The subtext to this question concerns what matters most in finding new talent — qualifications, formally taught skills or social capital. My findings regarding RQ2 are drawn from the series of interviews with informants who were: business owners or managers, senior executives, training managers, internal recruiters and the managing director of specialist media recruitment agency. Some of my more experienced respondents manage others and their comments inform my findings to this question.

As previously noted, there is a multiplicity of routes to getting a job. There are also many types of employee: work experience school leavers, interns (who could be on an apprenticeship scheme or work placement as part of a degree), graduate recruits, experienced hires, contractors and freelance staff. Each of these employee types require different rules of engagement for their employment and where needed, specific support and development.

The non-graduate pathway, described by my HR informants as a *'non-traditional route'* can be a diverse source of new talent, but it is risky and only the bigger players have the resources to develop workers in this way (Chapter 7 Section 7.3.1). Plus, as Professor Alison Wolf (a member of the panel on the Augar Review) puts it, there is a *'national obsession with universities'*. She adds that the general public is *'completely fixated on university'* to the detriment of further education colleges, technical training and apprenticeships (Wolf, 2019).

Informant employers say they get nothing from work placements, interns and apprentices who are under 18 years old (Chapter 7 Section 7.3.1). Even the bigger organisations find it hard to support disadvantaged interns beyond the work experience.

Changes in policy can also undermine what the employer sets up with a local college. There is a sense among employers that skills policies are reactive and short term.

Recruitment (getting in)

The focus of this research is the graduate hire with some experience. There is a clear discontinuity between recent graduate expectations and the needs of employers. Graduates expect a well-paid job and career development. Employers want someone who can do the job; today. They want skilled people, not people with qualifications (CIPD, 2017).

My employer informants are overwhelmed by unsolicited enquiries and CVs from graduates seeking jobs. Most of the larger players have a career portal as much to filter the hopeful candidates as to provide a shop window to opportunities. There are also many agency and job sites that advertise freelance and contract work.³⁵

Development

The consensus among my employer informants is to recruit *'clever people'*. I have taken this to mean those who demonstrate higher level skills that make the graduate more employable than functional skills or the academic qualification alone might indicate, as

³⁵ For example, www.bbc.co.uk/careers/trainee-schemes-and-apprenticeships; www.warnerbros.co.uk/info/careers; www.grapevinejobs.co.uk/jobseeker/mediajobs.aspx; www.searchlight.com/vacancies/Vacancies; www.thetalentmanager.com/

discussed in Chapter Three, and when needed, train them. This approach mirrors the experiences gathered from my respondents. Functional skills (using cameras, edit suites etc) is not an advantage; bar a few roles — predominantly in craft and post — they are not essential. However, many employers do recruit at a lower skill than intended. This is validated by an employer survey showing that 61% of employers recruit below the intended grade (ScreenSkills, 2019a). The biggest deficit relates to organisational and production management capabilities. These are the higher level skills (as applied by Universities UK and discussed in Chapter Three Section 3.3.6) that graduates should demonstrate. These generic skills of intellectual, practical and transferable/key skills encapsulate graduate employability have been on the skills policy agenda for over a decade. The CIPD report headline has the subtitle *'From inadequate to outstanding'* (CIPD, 2017) argues that skills in the UK are currently inadequate. Universities UK (2018 p2) accepts that a high number of *'graduates lacking certain core and employability skills fare poorly in the labour market'*. These reports suggest that little has changed since Leitch (2006) to the Augar Review (2019) to improve overall skills and skills gaps in the UK. It is an indictment of the skills policy.

It is far easier and more predictable for employers to recruit a well-educated graduate than a technically well-qualified individual with limited business and people skills and, surprisingly, little understanding of the industry they want to join. Most employers value a candidate with a portfolio of capabilities. Informant X: *"I want to see a genuine love for what we are doing..."*

Government plays little role in influencing behaviour in recruitment or internal training. If anything, it is a disincentive (Chapter 7 Section 7.3.2). Employers do not really care about a skills match in the creative industries (Hooley, 2019). They agree with Stoyanova's *'we will learn 'em''* approach: they just need clever candidates, as they (the employers) will teach them all the skills they need (Stoyanova (2009a).

We should not conflate freelance or contract work with that of someone on work experience or engaged as an intern or a new graduate. It is not unreasonable for an employer to expect a freelance or contract worker to have the skills to do the job for which they have been contracted. No other industry would engage someone to take on a

task for which they are not suited and expect to be trained as part of that arrangement. The locum dentist, doctor, lawyer, pharmacist or optometrist is, within reason, expected to function and comply with the formal requirements of the job at the start of the day. There is a sense of resigned frustration among the employers about this expectation that the employer should train the freelancer. They saw the work of Creative Skillset as a cost to do business. Informant C: *“I write a cheque out and I go: “That keeps them off my back” and I don’t expect any real value out of it.”*

Moving on

There is limited loyalty of either side of the employment divide; more so from my initiator respondents who admit they will follow a manager to a new company to widen their portfolio. Many factors have contributed to this breakdown: the reduction in trade union power and worker protection, short-term rolling contracts and zero-hour contracts have all changed the way the worker views their engagement with an organisation. With the demise of final salary pension schemes, employees are no longer tied to an employer which reduces the incentive for talented people to stay with a company. It may have been paternalistic, but the days of the ‘Shell’ man (sic) or the ‘Boots’ woman have gone to a great extent. Today, we tend to work for... ‘employer X’ ...for now. As Informant M suggested in the creative industries there is a perception that the grass is always greener, but they are willing to take risks despite the many unknowns and variables.

Concluding remarks

The oversupply of graduates willing to work for little or no money to get some work experience to put on their CV remains an issue for the industry. Most of the larger companies who supply the broadcasters have policies in place for themselves and their suppliers not to exploit the situation.

There is a problem with the model of recruitment. In an industry that relies heavily on a freelance community, there remains a line of least resistance. As with the BFI study, personal contacts and recommendations remain a trusted route (See Chapter Seven Section 7.3.1).

The case for exploitation is difficult. There is a need to separate out the matters of disadvantage from the process getting in and getting on in the industry. This is not to give special pleading to the television industry, but the poor treatment of employees is systemic in the current UK industrial landscape. The CIPD report highlights poor management across many sectors. In education, the rush to run wellbeing events masks the deep underlying pressures on frontline staff to deliver higher grades to the students and cope with increasing student numbers (Beech, 2018). A recent paper for the HEPI highlights the challenges for academics in HEIs (Morris, 2019).

The respondents interviewed for this research speak to a broadly supportive industry where hard work and dedication has its rewards. This evidences their willingness to hop jobs, to move on, reflects the new model of working that Deuze (see Chapter Four) describes.

Media managers, BTI human resources professionals and recruiters face the challenge of finding new recruits who understand that they are developing a cultural product, ideally with artistic merit, within the economics of mass entertainment. Workers in the BTI also report that they were not given enough commercial guidance while at university, *'Universities need to respond to shifting work practices by providing curricula in which entrepreneurialism is taught explicitly'* (Genders, 2019 p7). Informant M: *"So many jobs now that we are looking at have to be commercially led. But they have to be... they can't have the luxury of the BBC-type organisation; they have to make money..."*

This research has sought to demonstrate that bar a few exceptions, employers in the BTI care little about specific qualifications, a degree is just *'in the mix'*. This is not unique to the BTI, we see it across all sectors. *'Employers are generally not very interested in the specifics of the qualifications that candidates brandish'* (Hooley, 2019 p1). In an industry where new ideas come from having a diverse workforce, employers are conscious that talent is based on a mix of attributes of which a qualification and formally taught skills are but a part. The polymath with good social skills is their ideal candidate.

8.2.3 RQ3: Is the high-skills policy useful for unregulated high skills industries such as the BTI?

Based on the data gathered while conducting this research and summarised in addressing the two research questions above, there is little to suggest that formal skills in media studies or media production gathered at university or college give the potential media worker a competitive advantage in securing a job. There is some indication that for developer roles — particularly in craft and post-production — technical skills developed on a respected specialist programme are an advantage.

For initiator roles, as the data in Chapter Seven attests, there is a very mixed response from employers to a media studies degree, to an extent it may be a disadvantage. For the employer, there is a lack of confidence in the applicability of such degrees to the BTI, even those with a Creative Skillset/ScreenSkills Tick (Chapter Six Section 6.5.2).

Nationally, organisations such as Ravensbourne, London College of Fashion, Bournemouth and the National Film and Television School stand out as trusted sources of graduate labour. Employers do seek local partnerships, as much to do with their corporate social responsibility agenda as to create a locally based pipeline for new staff. The BBC engaged and recruited within the east London boroughs as part of their commitment for the Olympics (Chapter Seven Section 7.3.1).

Overall, insights gathered from my informants and respondents suggest that many new graduates with an ambition to join the BTI are not employable. This perception is supported by the CBI/Pearson Education and Skills Survey (2018) that asked employers about graduate applicants' job readiness. Employers reported that many lacked basic skills and a high percentage (46%) had little or no relevant work experience. Graduates have inflated expectations built up with the belief they are ready for an operational role within the production process.

Post Leitch (2006) there has been a government policy focus on skills as SSCs were established with a remit to deliver a demand-driven, employer-led and evidence-based framework. The evidence gathered for this research suggests that the UK education system does not provide high-quality, relevant education training and development for the BTI as Universities UK put it *domain or subject-based knowledge*. Skills levels are not

improving simply because they cannot keep pace with the changing demands of the industry, whether technical or operational (See Chapter Three Section 3.5.3).

Interviews with my informants testify to a misguided approach to the UK skills policy. Their practical insights are supported by a several academic commentaries on the failure of the skills policy and the critique of the *'policy reinvention'* that bedevils education and skills in the UK. The Institute for Government also criticises the *'all change'* approach to skills policy (Norris, 2017), a matter to which I return in my recommendations for policy. Since the inception of UKCES the education and skills policy has not only focused on supply side economics but *'has encouraged employers and individuals to invest more within a marketplace for education and training'* (Keep, 2019). The radical policy decision to abolish UKCES and remove funding from the SSCs removed the formal link between employers and government.

In my review of the skills policy community (Chapter Seven Section 7.3.3) there is no mechanism to determine how aligned the extant skills policy is with the needs of the employers and the career aspirations of the media worker. Relatively recent initiatives such as the ScreenSkills Tick / Select kite mark for skills and project Diamond for diversity were established to provide assurance to current and new joiners that action was being taken by the industry to improve employment conditions. It may appear counterfactual to suggest that these initiatives are an indicator of policy inertia, but, these projects like their predecessors have not offered any quantifiable data on their impact or change to the status quo.

At the time of completing this thesis, another skills policy initiative — the apprenticeship levy, introduced in 2017 — was deemed to be failing. *'Worryingly, the number of businesses engaged with schools or colleges is down by almost 10% — something we must reverse if the education system is to prepare young people for the modern world and work'* (CBI, 2018 p9).

Question three goes to the core of the thesis. There is no evidence to suggest that people now in the BTI developed their capabilities as a result of any government skills policy. Of the respondents I interviewed for this research, not one attributed their skills and

capabilities to the efforts of Creative Skillset or ScreenSkills. The simplistic model of the needs of the industry persists, as the BECTU submission to the House of Lords investigation into PSB attests³⁶. BECTU argue that the PSBs train the sector (Select Committee on Communications and Digital, 2019 p34). This research shows that the individual develops their skills from a range of sources and that they carry the burden of training and development, not the employer. The lack of higher level skills, as discussed above, exhibited by workers in all sectors including the BTI has been a matter of concern by industry for some time. The new emphasis by ScreenSkills on CPD, though laudable as a model to assist the media worker, needs to go beyond what the current skills policy defines as a high-skills – the degree or equivalent qualification – and look to model the personal determinants demonstrated by the *'hot shots'* of this study.

This research suggests that to meet the changing needs of the industry requires people who can cope with change (Chapter 7 Section 7.6.1). The data gathered by Creative Skillset were over a year out of date by the time of publishing. To speed up the process ScreenSkills has developed a new model of data gathering with The Work Foundation, featuring a quarterly review as an essential output. However, the conceit of high growth in the Film & TV sectors remains, for which I contend there is no evidence (Chapter 6 Section 6.5.1).

There is an acceptance that the previous efforts in LMI have not delivered. If they had, *'The pace of change in the UK screen industries, coupled with a perceived lack of skilled workers in the external labour market has an impact within companies, with 88% reporting skill gaps among the existing workforce'* (ScreenSkills, 2019a p4) would not be an issue after the ten plus years of the SSCs.

³⁶ It does not help that Box 3 of the report into PSBs has cited the wrong piece of legislation for the 25% quota of contracted out production.

8.3 Insights gathered from this research

*'Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.'*³⁷

Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr (July 1848)

Setting the scene

In Chapter Two, I presented two timelines: one for the UK television industry and another highlighting key interventions in the UK's education and training landscape. In both cases, profound changes in policy began to emerge during the Thatcher era.

For the television industry, the Conservative government limited union power with the breakup of the 'cosy duopoly' between ITV and the BBC. This was enabled by new technologies and lightweight cameras that could significantly reduce crew numbers. Introducing the publisher broadcaster in the guise of Channel 4, followed by the requirement that broadcasters should subcontract 25% of new productions to independent companies, changed the contractual relationship between employer and employee. The precarious nature of work became the norm. Responsibility for training shifted from the employer to the individual.

Education has followed a similar pattern of change. The demise of heavy industry, where at one time the school leaver would '*leave the school gate on Friday and walk into the factory gate on Monday*', was going or had gone by the 1980s. The battle between the miners and the Thatcher government (1984–85) was symbolic of this profound change to the industrial landscape. The traditional model of the apprentice joining these heavy industries was coming to an end. This put more demand on the education system to develop young people who were not university candidates. At the time, less than 5% of school leavers went to university (Chapter Two Section 2.2.2).

Today, almost 50% of those leaving full-time education do so with a degree and the aspiration to get their first job. Several of my informants and respondents (who had taken on management roles) critiqued their raised expectations of the nature of graduate employment, as opposed to starting from the bottom and developing their skills.

³⁷ The more things change, the more they are the same.

Universities UK (2018) argue that the issue is not about skills and capabilities, but matching the graduate to industry. The same body argues the case that there is not an oversupply of graduates but a poor mapping between supply and demand. I explore this matter in my recommendations. Here, I make the point that the purpose of the SSCs was to identify demand and communicate that need to government, which would then craft policy and therefore educational priorities.

The expansion of the university sector to create an educated class was at the expense of the practical skills-orientated approach that technical colleges and polytechnics offered, broadly labelled as the Further Education / Higher Education sector. Many had grown up from technical colleges alongside local industry, training and developing employees. Their focus was vocational, and the model of education delivery was often through a sandwich course, which integrated 6 or 12 months in industry. Hatfield Polytechnic — now the University of Hertfordshire — was considered a pre-eminent institution producing engineers for British Aerospace across the road; they even shared computing facilities.

However, many of those engaged in education and skills policy considered taking this route as second best. John Patten, Secretary of State for Education under John Major's 1992 Conservative government, was privately educated and had studied at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge. The 'polys' wanted to be universities and their directors wanted to be vice-chancellors. They lobbied and in 1992, their wish was granted.

The marketisation of HE has resulted in '*financial incentives, unconditional offers, lower entry requirements and spurious advertising*' (Pratt, 2019). There is a greater emphasis on brand identity, such as the Russell Group or creating marketing terms such as *business facing* by which institutions might differentiate themselves from the competition. Increasing the cap in fees to £9,000 didn't work as a lever of control of students numbers or place to study. David Willetts the minister responsible for universities at the time admits as there was no market at the point of purchase, all universities charged the maximum. No university wanted to be seen as cheap, not did their local student union. It was market failure in a system that should not be about competition (Jeffreys, 2019).

The ‘messiness’ and ‘ad hococracy’ of the education and skills policy is a result of ‘neo-pluralism’ (Ball, 1993) where all vested interests, of which government is but one, create a system that is self-defeating in its aims. And the result; a call to recreate something like the polytechnic (Chapter Two Section 2.2.2).

Sector skills councils

Since the 1980s, a multiplicity of initiatives, schemes, various government green papers and reports have all failed to come up with a long-term policy for education and skills. To address the issues highlighted by Leitch (2006) and the reduction in vocational education, a new policy was required. The focus has been on the supply side of the employment equation, to develop a competitive market for students and to keep fees down. It is well reported that this has failed. It has been a race to the top (for fees), that only now the Augar Report (2019) is challenging.

The SSCs were a construct of New Labour to revive a pluralist model to the employee pipeline that had been eroded with the demise of heavy industry and the polytechnics who supported these industries. The SSCs were a response to the Leitch (2007) report, which concluded that the UK had a low skills base and would need a high skilled workforce in all sectors if it was to become globally competitive.

This demand-side skills policy put the employer at the centre of the process through the SSCs. It was also predicated on the theory that a skilled workforce would attract inward investment (Blair, 2007). This may not have happened for a multiplicity of reasons; others have argued that a key factor is the lack of an industrial policy (Muzzucato, 2012).

The demotion of the SSCs with the closure of UKCES and removal of core funding, which undermined their capacity to gather LMI, began with the Cameron Conservative government of 2010. There is no longer any coordinated LMI — a onetime core function of the SSCs — being fed to government. In the creative industries, the data were never that good, but they were better than nothing. Moving skills to the DfE and making the apprenticeship route part of tertiary education has broken the formal link to Whitehall for the SSCs. Creative Skillset in particular was well connected to the Labour government and had the ear of policymakers. The SSCs are now represented by the Federation for Industry

Sector Skills & Standards (FISSS) and their survival is uncertain. As Figure 31 illustrates the FISSS is not within the inner circle of the skills policy community and ScreenSkills is just one of many voices. The SSC model has lagged behind the changing needs of the industry as the matter of the Film Business Academy illustrated (See Chapter Two Section 2.2.2).

The SSC model is more effective in some sectors than others, predominantly those that focus on functional skills and the industrial sectors are less prone to change. Overall it is argued that the money allocated to the SSCs has a multiplier effect and positive impact on industry (Chapter Three Section 3.3.5). Despite the favourable view from some reports the data in Chapter Six and the commentaries from my informants in Chapter Seven (Section 7.3) suggests that, as far as the creative industries are concerned, the various incarnations of the SSC — Skillset, Creative Skillset and now ScreenSkills — have not affected the ability of media workers to get, move and retain employment and is just a cost of doing business for employers.

Creative industries data

No academic study can provide effective insights into a field without trusted secondary data sources. From the start of this research, I have expressed my concern about the tacit acceptance of the data provided by Skillset/Creative Skillset and more recently the ambiguous data provided by the DCMS. This study has shown that these data must be considered with care. Throughout this thesis, I have highlighted instances of misunderstanding and misuse of the data to support claims about the contribution and size of the sector.

In Chapter Six, I showed that due to the complexity of the sector, it is easy to double count and overstate the contribution of the film and TV subsectors as they appear in three of the seven sectors: creative industries, cultural sector and digital sector (see Figure 26). Although DCMS statisticians do not set out to obfuscate, due to the overlap of SIC codes, the parts are greater than the sum. Few users of the data pick up the point that the contribution to GVA varies greatly across the sector. It is not a homogeneous group, nor one with clear demarcation lines by job code. The key matter to note is that film and TV does not show exceptional growth, yet few papers start their analysis without

referring to growth. The DCMS GVA estimates does make the point that IT, software and computer services drive the growth in the creative industries.

The analysis of the 2014 British Labour Force Survey by O'Brien et al (2016), is typical of the many papers written on this matter (Chapter 6 Section 6.3.5). I make the point that the paper contains several factual errors regarding the data model for the sector and that several citations on the limited meritocracy the creative industries that purely concern the performing arts and on-screen talent. However, we are in agreement that to cluster such a disparate group of industries under one heading does little to serve each subgroup of the creative industries as a whole. I go further to call for the DCMS to formally separate out the screen-based sectors into an audio-visual sector — a term used by the EU, that covers cinema, broadcasting and video/DVD.

The second matter regarding data is the robustness of SSC data. As previously stated, it is based on an insufficient data set. In Chapter Six, I made the case that we need to treat Skillset/Creative Skillset data with caution. The raw returns from the employment surveys differ wildly from year to year and are at odds with BFI and ONS data. To their credit, ScreenSkills are now using ONS data as the baseline data set.

We need better data. For a period (2007–2010), Ofcom collected employment data from all companies with a broadcast licence. It was the most complete and robust source of data. If all the '*super indies*', subsidiaries of multinationals and companies that make programmes for broadcast over an establishment size of say, 50 staff were required to produce a return to Ofcom, there would be a very clear picture of the industry size and composition. This could be triangulated with ONS data.

I agree with Richard Paterson, who makes the case that, '*The growing body of research into the creative industries... has concentrated on the management of creativity at a macro-level, rather than investigating the optimum organisational conditions of creativity*' (Paterson, 2010 p1).

Where I depart from Paterson is that he assumes, along with other writers, that Skillset is an empirically robust source of data, which he used to identify the BFI subject group: '*The*

respondents were recruited from a range of sources and were matched in proportion to the Skillset census of workers’ (Paterson, 2010 p2).

I have an additional concern that many academic papers are circular and self-perpetuating and use what I have shown to be questionable Skillset/Creative Skillset data. In addition the economic estimates from the DCMS used by a wide range of reports can that without careful analysis offer an inflated view of the contribution of the creative industries. These authors, along with others, suggest *‘that there is a pressing need for more research of production within the creative industries and, with it, better understanding of work and employment. Assumptions and assertions must be displaced by evidence. This evidence can then form the basis for better policy-making’* (Eikhof, 2013 p505). While I empathise with their proposals, they all revisit the same territory. There is a need to consider the underlying causes that go well beyond the opportunity to join the film or TV industry and the model of production that Eikhof et al. consider an evocation of the closed shop. I suggest that we should start with a detailed review of the actions taken to date by the industry to address these iniquities — and there have been several initiatives such as Channel 4’s 360 project and CDN’s Diamond project, and address why they have failed to deliver change in the BTI.

Underpinning this research is the claim that many stakeholders assert that the industry is an exceptional engine for economic growth is based on questionable statistics. I also suggest that the industry is used as the *‘whipping boy’* for social and ethnic inequalities (Randle, Forson and Healy, 2013b). My respondents demonstrate that, given the right support early on and at transitional points of their education and career, they can overcome the perception of institutional barriers. Scapegoating the industry for systemic socioeconomic problems clouds fundamental issues that other researchers and reports have identified.

Research conducted by Frank Field MP (2010), Alan Milburn (2012) and others highlight the impact of early year poverty on opportunity and social mobility. Field’s report argues that a new approach to child development based on the first five years of life — *‘The Foundation Years’* — is the bedrock of the rest of the education system. Without this, the

disadvantaged in society will remain and the lack of social mobility that Milburn was asked to analyse will — and in his view, already has — got worse.

My call to academics and industry analysts is to be much more sceptical about data sources. Film & TV is a small industry, employing fewer than 100,000 people, according to ONS statistics. Yet, as I showed in Chapter Six, the BFI (2018) has conflated film and TV work to increase the perception of the size of the film sector, by 75%. The growth in this subset of the creative industries is static in terms of GVA and job numbers. Academics and analysts need to treat each sector as presented by the DCMS quite differently. It is only because computer games and animation outputs are considered as media / screen based activities that IT is clustered under the DCMS banner. It could have sat in engineering, science or had a national academy of its own. This policy decision greatly bolstered the GVA of the creative industries (See Chapter 6).

Higher education (and the neoliberal agenda)

This thesis began with a consideration of the Leitch Report and its recommendations for developing a high skilled UK workforce. Its prime thrust was to enable the UK to meet the demands and needs of modern high-tech industrial base. It bought about the creation of UKCES and its industrial agents the SSCs. I and others argue that it failed to deliver (Hammond, 2012), spectacularly so in the creative industries. The fact that Skillset changed its name three times as well as its scope of work give credence in the main it has been a self-perpetuating institution. My research, albeit focused on a relative microcosm of the industry, indicates that it is either an irrelevance or a nonentity.

It is only fitting that this thesis is being completed at the time of the publication of the Augar Report (2019), which is attempting to recommend a restructuring of the further and higher education system to manage the financial challenges that have come about as a consequence of the Leitch report, which stimulated the vast expansion of the higher education sector. Interestingly, its main recommendations focus on financing and student fees, with no discussion on the quality of education being delivered. There is an implicit devaluation of the value of a liberal arts education with the argument that the humanities

should lower their fees.³⁸ This cut in funding is getting vice chancellors up in arms *'University chiefs angry over 'elitist' student loan plans'* (Fazackerley, 2019). Far be it from me to suggest that the self-interest of university senior management teams see their salaries being capped. What they are suggesting is that, should the Augar report recommendations be accepted, job cuts will follow.

This research is bookended by Leitch and skills at one end, and Augar and money at the other. Neither has addressed the UK needs for appropriate and individual focused development needs. A matter that ScreenSkills has recognised with its new focus on CPD and lifelong learning.

'There have been a few reviews, such as the Leitch review on basic and intermediate skills (2006) and the Foster review of the FE college landscape (2005) but despite widespread acknowledgement that this sector is crucial to the country's economic success, nothing much has happened except for a steep, steady decline in funding' (Augar, 2019 p5). Yet Augar offers no analysis to explain the failure of Leitch. It is interesting that Augar references the Leitch review in terms of basic and intermediate skills, yet Leitch talks about high-skills. Is this an acceptance that the UK further and higher education sector does not deliver high-skills?

The expectation that the high-skills (defined as a degree) acquired through the education system will lead to a high skilled job in the creative industries does not stand up in this study. It was not a specific qualification endorsed by ScreenSkills that enabled my respondents to succeed, but a well-rounded education in the subject of their choice, which could be a media degree. The annual survey of employers conducted by the Institute of Student Employment gives further evidence to this shift in employers' attitude to a formal qualification; *'and there is a growing debate amongst employers as to whether qualifications really serve as a guarantor of good workers' ... 'students are sold a simplified version of human capital theory to motivate them – work hard at school and university and you will be rewarded once you get into employment. Good grades are often*

³⁸ For the record I do not share the John Humphry's view that a media studies degree takes five minutes, as he notoriously stated on the BBC Today programme in August 2019. (see <https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/top-stories/john-humphrys-on-radio-4-1-6241182>). I edited a book that include media and cultural studies. They are academically rigorous subjects – but they are not explicitly about getting a job in the BTI, that some universities claim.

portrayed as the gateway to decent work and a successful career' (Hooley, 2019). Putting the debate of grade inflation aside, I will go further. Evidence suggests that the use of psychometric tests, extended internships and entry tournaments along with competency-based interviews, day-long bootcamps and workshops as used by the BTI, have shifted the wider industrial landscape. Many graduates are just not prepared for the next stage in developing their career in the media industry (Bullmore, 2014).

It is also a false narrative to highlight issues for the creative industries as a whole. Most papers on the media worker focus on the Film & TV industry and to some extent the games sector. It is not helpful nor appropriate to extrapolate from a few studies based on hopeful aspirants to the American film industry or a very closely observed study of a particular media company in the UK to say anything more about the industry other than that it was a particular viewpoint at a particular time.

In its report on elitist Britain, the Sutton Trust (2019) highlighted the media industry, showing that over 40% of the newspaper industry, news media and BBC executives attended independent school and of these, 39% attended Oxbridge. Of the groups they clustered under '*creative industries*', they highlighted the fact that only 2% of top-selling pop musicians attended Oxbridge and over 70% did not attend university at all. However, across this community, which covered film, TV and music, 29% attended independent schools but only 4% attended Oxbridge. Both these examples are compared with the general population, of which 7% attended independent school and less than 1% attended Oxbridge. Across the performing arts, 44% of actors were educated at independent schools. There are family dynasties in the creative industries, particularly in the performing arts. It is true that networking is a precursor to successful engagement in the media industry. Getting into the industry and getting on is also about getting on with others, a tacit knowledge of the social codes.

UK Universities (2018) contend that there is not an oversupply of graduates but a mismatch of approximately 30% to the labour market. If this is so, then school leavers and graduates need to be better informed, so they have a clearer understanding of their employment prospects.

The growth in media-related courses, with undergraduate programmes implying that they are a fast track to a job in the media industry (not the creative economy) continues apace. More students graduate each year from a media course than the total number who work in the BTI. In 2018, 94 universities offered over 1,600 media courses; there were more than 60,000 graduates with a 'media' degree, not counting postgraduates (CUG, 2019).³⁹ Several universities have been taken to task by the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) over unsubstantiated claims made about their media courses.⁴⁰ This has maintained the oversupply of graduates to the media industry. The oversupply does not include programmers who can write code for games, VR or CGI; there is a well-known shortage. My analysis in Chapter Six suggests that there are no more than 4,000 new jobs in the BTI each year. According to Highfliers UK (2019) there are no more than 610 jobs in the top media companies, down by 8% on the previous year. There has been a failure to explain the opportunities and the risks by all engaged in career advice.

Pronouncements from prime ministers and secretaries of state have followed a similar line that education in the form of a degree is the gold standard and the vocational route is second best. According to Andreas Schleicher of the OECD (2018), this is unique to the UK in the developed world. By way of contrast, in Sweden 70% of students undertake a vocational degree. Moreover, while we may generate more graduates, they are no better skilled than those coming to the end of their careers. The consensus is that universities are producing what they know best — potential academics to work at universities. The OECD and a report from London Economics (Conlon and Halterbeck, 2019) suggest that universities have no idea about vocational education.

The media industry is in a state of flux and it is hard to imagine it not being in a state of change. We are attempting to educate people who will retire in the 2060s, but we cannot predict what will happen in the next five years. Therefore, in a high skills industry that is unregulated and where employer needs cannot be predicted even in a relatively short

³⁹ See the 'Communication & Media Studies League Table 2020' in *The Complete University Guide*.

⁴⁰ www.falmouthpacket.co.uk/news/15662607.falmouth-university-number-one-claim-found-to-be-misleading-and-unsubstantiated/
www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/marketing-claims-students-which-university-rankings-advertising-standards-authority-a8547416.html

timeframe, it is inevitable that a good education and intellect will enable someone to survive and thrive. The consequences are that the old hierarchy remains, as Oxbridge, the Russell Group and a few specialist courses retain their competitive advantage.

Implications for careers in the BTI

I recommend that better access to graduate success data need to be published to assist students and workers with decision making at transition points in their education and careers. Although I do not advocate gatekeeping, publishing outcomes would provide a better framework for rational decision making than allowing university market forces to compete for students. The true demand of industry needs to be made open and transparent.

8.4 Implications for skills policy

Policymaking and policies drive government. As I set out in Chapter Three, policies can be initiated from political intent with or without any evidence. Some areas such as education and skills are more prone to churn than others. These sectors are always high on the political agenda, either because of the lack of consensus between political parties or if the matter is one that concerns the electorate. The media are often in the ‘*cross hairs*’ of an incoming government as it seeks to curtail the fourth estate’s capacity to undermine their time in power.

Both education and the media have been subject to numerous policy interventions. In Chapter Two, I presented a timeline for both sectors (Figures 5 and 6). One matter that binds them is the number of policies and organisations which have been established over the period as discussed in Chapter Three (Section 3.4). In the BTI, there have been six major pieces of legislation and 13 Secretaries of State since the formation of the DCMS in 1997. Their average tenure is of two years or less.

The direct costs are substantial: £15m to create a new department or reconfigure an old one (Norris, 2017 p3). The indirect costs — especially for education — include a legacy of

confusion for students, teachers and employers who cannot evaluate the worth of one qualification before a new one comes along; 'T Skills' start on 2020. This has been exacerbated by the ownership of 'skills' moving from BIS to the DfE.

Long-term non-sectarian strategies are an anathema to UK governments. They seem to work on the premise that if the previous regime put it in, it must be bad. These political rivalries have created a complex and dysfunctional education and skills landscape, the impact of which is not felt for many years after the '*here today, gone tomorrow*'⁴¹ politician has moved on. This view on the policy process is shared by the Institute for Government (Norris, 2017 p10), which ascribes this lack of policy stability in skills and education to four issues: competing and often conflicting ideas about what the sector is for; the high level of discretion that ministers enjoy for making changes to the system; organisations not being given time to bed in and make progress on reforms; and, poor levels of institutional memory in Whitehall.

These four issues swamp the Treasury's well-articulated policy process. The Rationale, Objectives, Appraisal, Monitoring, Evaluation, Feedback (ROAMEF) cycle was established to ensure evidenced-based policy development. In theory, policy statements are reviewed and challenged. This research offers the analysis that, when developing a high skilled workforce, if the espoused rigour of the skills policy process resides as it does at the intersection of politics, delivery and evidence, politics will always trump the evidence.

Without an industrial policy that establishes a basic need in the UK industrial landscape, '*it is unrealistic to expect a skills policy, in isolation, to increase the demand for skill*' (Gambin, 2016 p12). A skills policy can only facilitate supply to industry demand as part of the strategic mix within the economy. On multiple occasions, UK government and sector leaders have been caught 'napping' over skills shortages in different sectors. I have already noted that the industry bodies of the CIC, CIF and Creative Skillset failed to predict the need for computer graphic programmers to build on the success of the

⁴¹ Secretary of State for Defence John Nott famously walked out of an interview with Robin Day after he was called a 'here-today, gone-tomorrow politician'.

London company Framestore and its work on films such as Gravity (2013). This leaves me wondering what purpose they serve.

The notion of an industry-led SSC has all but collapsed and the Federation for Industry Sector Skills and Standards (FISSS) that replaced the Alliance of SSCs gets no core government funding. Once again, we see an institution fighting for its survival as opposed to an organisation looking to change the industrial landscape.

With the removal of the core funding several SSCs closed down or became independent bodies, supported by their industries. Creative Skillset at one time expanding its remit had to retrench. It became ScreenSkills with a focus on the audio visual sectors. My informant from the FISSS concludes that in the UK there is no coherent skills narrative (Chapter Six Section 6.5.1).

This thesis can only conclude that with no '*coherent narrative*' that the skills policy in its making and delivery has failed to deliver a skills infrastructure that develops higher level skills in graduates that potential employers can trust.

In 'joining the dots' of the creative class, I look to the works of Florida (2004) Cnaan et al. (2008) who between them discuss the intersection of the neoliberal university, functionalism, skills and the rise of the creative class who want a culturally rich working environment. The unacceptable truth is that both government and the education sector have raised unrealistic expectations around the potential of a career in the media industry. Universities are complicit in this deceit. As a caveat, many in education do make the claim that a media degree and a high level of media literacy will serve someone well in a range of roles. This may well be true. The problem is that most media degrees, as my sample of respondents indicate, offer little to improve the employability of an individual joining the BTI. Their capabilities are hardwired from much earlier educational experiences. Their social capital, personal attributes and professional identity are far more important to employer and employee alike.

In his report about the life chances of people born in Birkenhead, Frank Field gives evidence to inherent social disadvantage of some sectors in society. Changes in their opportunities can only be made with a solid foundation of a good education in the early

years (Field, 2010). A good basic education has a multiplier effect in later years to enhance life chances. A poor education has an equal and opposite effect, limiting opportunities.

There is much written and spoken about employment in the creative industries. The conclusion a casual observer would make is that the industry is awash with downtrodden and exploited workers and robber baron bosses. My sample of respondents would suggest otherwise. The values espoused by the employers I interviewed indicate that a disaffected and disengaged workforce does not produce the creative product. If we are not careful, we create cartoon villains of the employer in the creative industries about issues of social exclusion that are prevalent across the UK industrial landscape.

Much has been written on the theme of poverty of aspiration. This term has been applied to those predominantly from working class backgrounds who are said to self-limit their aspirations due to a lack of support from school or family. This debate needs unpacking. But there is a more acceptable discourse that relates to this matter; that is agency and loss of agency. Agency is about an individual's freedom to act, what Maslow (1963) termed self-actualisation. Whatever term we apply to this matter, it is clear that all my respondents, from their various backgrounds, were not limited in their aspirations. Many writers have drawn our attention to the importance of role models in all sectors of industry, not least those relating to on-screen talent. Career theory highlights the importance of role models, to guide individual development (Gibson, 2004). More could be done in the BTI to support career development.

The UK skills system is a complex ecosystem that this study and other reports have shown is not fit for purpose. It has not kept pace with the rate of change and the needs of industry in the 21st Century. The themes that emerge from my fieldwork and a number of reports cited in this research highlight the need for: improvements to the policy process, stability, greater engagement between employers and government, and, a refocus on high quality vocational education.

8.5 Contribution to knowledge

In this thesis the original contributions I make to the collective body of knowledge in the field reside within three themes. Within the themes I highlight how this thesis is of significance and present the implications for the field. I do so by mapping the contribution to one or more of the *'fifteen ways'* of originality suggested by Phillips et al. (2010 p69).

In the first theme, I **bring new evidence to bear on an old issue** in the critique of the data of the creative industries **using known material but with a new interpretation** to refute the case for growth in terms of GVA and workforce numbers.

The second theme focuses on my contribution to theory and practice. The career pathway development model and associated on-line questionnaire is an **original technique** and tool for **observing** the media worker at a point in their career. It is available for other researchers to apply. The attribute-composition model based on expertise theory is a **synthesis of ideas not made before** in this field.

Under the third theme I conduct **empirical work** and look at **an area that people in the discipline haven't looked at before** in my contribution to the body of knowledge about the lives of BTI workers. Specifically, I identify common attributes of successful young media workers. I examine the process by which they acquired their skills. In my comparison with the BFI study of the 1990s I present a **continuation of a previously original piece work**. I discuss the implications for skills policymakers who attempt to create frameworks that assist the learner acquire these capabilities through formal education or skills training.

8.5.1 Our collective understanding of the data that size the creative industries

My first contribution to knowledge concerns the analysis of published data on the creative industries. I have shown that no data should be taken at face value and that clustering such a disparate set of industries under the umbrella term obfuscates the issues for each sub-sector. The overlap between DCMS sub-sectors and the misuse (accidental or otherwise) of the terms *the creative economy* and *the creative industries*

have led to a confused picture of the size and contribution of the various sectors that cover the cultural, creative and digital industries.

I conclude that much more rigour is required by all who report and use creative industries data to underpin reports or substantiate a line of academic enquiry. I hope that other researchers can use this analysis of the data, in this, or others section of the creative industries to frame their own research.

8.5.2 A contribution to theory and practice

My contribution to theory and practice covers two fields career development and the skills policy process in the creative industries, specifically the BTI.

To support this research I developed a generic model of career development called the career pathway development value chain tailored to be relevant to the media worker. It provides a framework to codify an individual's skills, attitude and behaviour. In support of the model, I created an online career evaluation tool⁴² to quantify those attributes in any fieldwork. The tool can be utilised with a single cohort of workers or applied across sectors to benchmark attributes across industrial sectors. I hope other academics will use it in future studies of the career aspirations of media workers. As a consequence of this research and reflecting on my analysis of the fieldwork data I posit an attribute-composition model based on expertise theory.

On the matter of skills policy, I offer a framework for analysing policy-making in the creative industries and identify the stakeholder groups and networks in the BTI. More specifically, I present the power brokers and influencers of the skills policy community. It is the political dimension that overlays any evidence based policy development cycle that shape the skills agenda in the creative industries.

8.5.3 The media worker, the BTI and skills

Third, I contribute to the body of knowledge about the lives of BTI workers and their skills. Specifically, I identify common attributes of successful young media workers. I examine the process by which they acquired their skills and consider the implications for

⁴² Link to an open-access version: <https://bit.ly/2NQMA9J>

skills policymakers who attempt to create frameworks that assist the learner acquire these capabilities through formal education or skills training.

The purpose of my fieldwork was to discover the attributes that the ‘*hot shots*’ share and to look for evidence of government or government agency impact on this group of successful individuals. This thesis is a call to other researchers to be more critical of the evidence on which skills policy is based in any unregulated high skills industry. This research questions the role and effectiveness of the skills policy community in the creative industries.

This research has gathered and analysed qualitative and quantitative data from 25 informants and 31 respondents to challenge the presuppositions that have been extant in the academic discourse on the media worker, namely that you have to have the *right stuff* to get in and on and that the creative industries are engines for growth. I have attempted to debunk both of these myths throughout this thesis.

This research should draw the attention of other academics to the fact that data on one sector of the creative industries have little bearing on the attitudes and values of another. There is a need to be rigorous in defining the community of workers any research analyses.

8.6 Recommendations

My recommendations follow the same themes as my contributions to the body of knowledge; data of the creative industries, academic insights and issues about BTI workers and the skills policy for the creative industries.

1. **The creative industries data:** There is a lack of clarity around the composition, GVA and jobs in the creative industries, particularly the film and TV sectors. Although the UK will be separated from the EU, the DCMS should develop new definitions for the audiovisual sector and the proposed digital media sector (KEA, 2018) aligned to the EU. This would provide improved data for all analysts of the creative industries and a

better comparator set. I challenge the validity of considering the creative industries as a single entity when it is comprised of such a disparate subset of industries. The implications for the skills policy is that there is no clarity about the skills demand within each sub-sector. Within the BTI there is no evidence to substantiate the growth figure for jobs promoted by the key stakeholders. What limited growth is evident is in distribution. **There needs to be a clearly delineated data model for the creative industries that avoids the ambiguities of the current framework, defining and reporting on an audiovisual sector would be a step in the right direction.**

2. **Secondary data:** I recommend that any **research should validate labour market data on the creative industries by triangulating third party findings with ONS data.**

Several studies have adopted as the starting position the accepted wisdom that the creative industries are growing at twice the rate of the overall economy. Therefore exclusion from the industry is as a consequence of an inherent barrier to certain disadvantaged groups. There may be some truth in this matter, but this research has revealed that of itself social class is not a constraint to opportunity.

3. **Academic research:** Researchers need to set the issues for the creative industries in the wider context of UK employment. Academics should engage with the idea that Film & TV remains a cottage industry in terms of the UK industrial landscape. There are some interesting contradictions in existing academic literature, including: the debate about the meritocratic nature of the industry; that it is an exemplar for project-based employment; and that it is a model for how knowledge workers will be employed in the future.

The BTI is no worse an employer than so many in the UK industrial landscape and any parochial debate actually clouds some of the deep-rooted issues across the employer/employee divide throughout the UK workplace. It is not clear that academic papers differentiate between the skilled contractors and the novice. **Academics need to recognise that any one creative industries sector examined cannot be extrapolated beyond that sector. Even the film and TV sectors, which have very similar production models, have very different employment characteristics.**

4. **A more focused sector skills policy:** Although ScreenSkills has retrenched to its core media industries, it should focus on aligning all job datasets to ONS data. **With clearer demarcation lines between subsectors of the creative industries, ScreenSkills should map its constituencies to a specific subgroup within DCMS,** linked to employment codes used by the ONS. This would make it possible to carry out impact assessments based on SIC employment codes, which would highlight issues for the industry in a consistent manner with any survey. This could also align to the SIC2010 codes that Universities UK apply to its analysis.

5. **Labour market intelligence:** this was at best ad hoc and delivered no truly viable data model. It is time to align the SSCs with the sectors DCMS uses to provide GVA economic estimates. This is not a call to scrap ScreenSkills but to focus its role where it will have the most impact. From the secondary data and informants insights gathered for this research, it is evident that targeted effort should be made by ScreenSkills to engage with the secondary school education. **School leavers need to understand more about the creative industries and the creative economy so that they can make informed choices about their further study and possible career.**

6. **Creative industries skills councils:** Having made the previous points, the SSCs — for the media industry — have failed to deliver any value. There have been a multiplicity of initiatives, from defining NVQs, auditing and billing the Tick kitemark to universities of which there are now so many accredited courses, it has devalued the brand. **The Select scheme has just started (November 2019). This should be more selective and follow the TEF framework and award degree programmes a bronze, silver or gold award for industry applicability.** Given that there is no discernible growth in the BTI (or Film) there needs to be a focus on replacing existing workers, as they leave the industry, with those with higher level skills who can adapt to the future needs of the industry.

7. **Industrial policy:** Without an industrial strategy and associated policies, the efforts of the SSCs will always be reactive, it cannot function in isolation. An industrial policy would assist further and higher education — to an extent — to predict and provide appropriately skilled graduates to match the demand by the supply. **There needs to be tangible actions as a result of the Creative Industries Sector Deal policy paper of 2018.**

8. **A higher level skills policy:** The UK government's skills policy has limited relevance to well-educated (degree level), non-regulated (by regulated I refer to those occupations regulated by statute) occupational groups. The term employability has become the accessible term to describe higher level skills. **There is a need to demonstrate that all university graduates are equipped with these higher level skills to encourage potential employers to not only recruit from the top ranked universities but to be more diverse. This requires a skills development programme that aligns all 9 levels of education with a taxonomy for core skills.**

9. **Education and skills policy:** There is a need to revitalise vocational education and **to have a stable and integrated education and skills policy at all levels of educations that combine academic knowledge with functional skills underpinned by higher level skills.** The UK needs to learn from countries such as Germany and Sweden, where they see the non-degree pathway as a positive choice, not a second best. Organisations need time to prove the worth of a new or revised qualification. It takes at least 5 years — maybe 10 — for the impact of a change in an educational or skills framework to demonstrate its value to an employer and prospective student. This goes some way to explain why employers fall back to what they know or ignore qualifications in preference for other approaches already discussed in this thesis. **There is much merit in an Access to HE or the four-year degree, with the first year focusing on generic skills.** Others agree that the Foundation Year or Access courses have been '*enormously successful*'. However, these need to move from low-grade functional skills to a true higher level as found in EU. These tactical interventions need to be supported by an integrated education and skills policy that starts with Frank

Field's Foundation Years model. This has to be bipartisan and removed from the usual policy-making discourse of Westminster. To paraphrase Tristram Hunt, doing it in any other manner will 'stuff' the next generation of workers.

10. **Higher education:** It may well be true that in terms of total numbers, the UK does not have a surfeit of graduates as argued by Universities UK. The vast oversupply of graduates with an over inflated expectation of a job in the mainstream media industry is a consequence of the supply-side marketplace. **The growth in media related courses, with overselling by universities in a market-driven competition to fill places on courses, needs to be addressed.** This is not a call to cap media degrees but for some universities to stop overplaying the opportunities available in the media industry, a matter that the Advertising Standards Authority has already raised. It is no surprise that employers restrict their intake to reliable sources. Engagement with the industry is key (as many course leaders already know), especially for those universities in the lower half of the various UK rankings. The soft skills defined by the QAA, a version of which have been called 21st Century Skills can only be validated in partnership with the industry. A portfolio of capabilities embodied in a portfolio that extends beyond the core academic work are what employers seek. There remains work to be done to reach a shared understanding of what high-skills and higher level skills actually mean to universities and employers. **Employability has to be demonstrated and HEI programme managers need to show that their graduates do exhibit the higher level skills expected by the BTI employer. There needs to be a better partnership between FE/HE and ScreenSkills.**

11. **The media worker:** I recommend that any new or potential joiner should get on any mentoring scheme they can; it is one of the few ScreenSkills activities I commend. From the data I gathered for this study, a media worker's qualification on joining the industry has no impact on their role and function. At best, it is an entry ticket. **Better training on social skills, networking and capabilities beyond knowledge of the media are better determinants for career success in the BTI.** Other reports have recommended entrepreneurial training – to which I agree. The concept of lifelong

learning through continuing professional development (CPD) is also vital to a sustained career. ScreenSkills has only now (2019) started this approach, it is to be welcomed but the generic skills programmes as offered by ScreenSkills to date are very superficial⁴³.

12. The employer: A key requirement is to provide support for the media worker at moments of transition — recruitment and progression. This should be a commitment from all companies in the BTI — better still if funded by government, if necessary via ScreenSkills. In times past, the supernumerary employee was a feature of the industry, funded by the industry employers as a commitment to develop their employees. **There is a need for greater clarity on the skills demand pipeline of new joiners and the expected attributes. In association with the ScreenSkills CDP programme, there is a need to develop a sector wide CDP programme by BTI companies that helps develop those already employed.** A degree is only an indication of the capacity to learn. Recruiting a graduate should be seen as the start of the career development process. Prior to the establishment of the SSCs, most companies across all sectors expected to train and develop a new joiner. This commitment got lost in the current employment framework in the BTI. Even the BBC stepped back from training until the re-launch of the BBC Academy in 2013. This was in part to recognise its role to train the wider industry and in part to support its case for charter renewal in 2017.

13. Inclusion and diversity: Although not central to this research, this matter persists in the background. Since the Communications Act of 2003, in a response to Section 27 of the Act there have been numerous initiatives to improve representation of BAME groups. This issue speaks to the disadvantages that are systemic, but not unique, to the BTI. There is limited evidence that interventions within the BTI have had any impact or effect on diversity, inclusiveness, or equal opportunities within the industry. Sectional disagreements between BECTU and CDN have thwarted efforts to improve diversity reporting. **Only by having greater transparency in the recruitment process**

⁴³ shorturl.at/ctxR4

and a requirement to report all workforce data, including data on applications, is there any likely opportunity to enable a more inclusive workplace.

14. The issue of who, how and why someone gets into the television industry is significant because, as well as telling us something about the creative industry, it is a pointer to the wider set of opportunities in society. The Film & TV industry gets greater attention because the lack of diversity in programme-making produces a lack of diversity in the programmes and on-screen talent. Much academic research into the industry takes the view that opportunities are predicated on being male, middle class and white. There is still much empty rhetoric (by employers) on the matter, as the report on *Elitist Britain* from The Sutton Trust (2019) supports. I argue that this issue should not solely be laid at the door of the BTI employer. **However, Ofcom could and should take a more active role in setting targets for positive action by those companies with a license.** Ofcom should not rely on another industry initiative such as project Diamond, which it seems, is failing.

8.7 Limitations

To some extent, the limitations of this study would be mitigated by further research. I endeavoured to gain access to all *'hot shots'* from 2011 to 2018, to run an online only quantitative study. The promised support from *Broadcast Magazine* never materialised. Had I managed to gather quantitative data from the entire group, it would have helped validate the findings from the online form with my respondents.

Over 40 people agreed to be interviewed, however, several just ignored my calls after the initial introduction. That in itself raises interesting questions about attitude and behaviour. However, the cross reference with the face-to-face interviews and the congruence with the BFI 1990s study is enough to provide comfort that the data are robust.

More data on my respondents' background might address some of the issues about education and class. Several informants expressed a view that 'A' levels and creative activities outside of academic work are a good indicator for recruitment.

A second round of interviews with my informants based on the findings with my respondents may reveal further insights into the issues for the industry.

8.8 Further research

It would be interesting to replicate the BFI longitudinal study (this was over a period of four years) with my own cohort and ask them to complete the online career analysis tool in another year.

Another avenue of investigation is to find other groups of workers in different sectors of the creative industries and conduct a comparative study that looks at the skills, attitudes and behaviours of workers in these fellow traveller groups. Of particular interest would be workers in the film industry, who share many characteristics of the TV production process. Many TV workers have expressed their interest in working in film and enabling them to understand the attributes that are needed to work in film would be a useful development tool.

The online tool could be used as a diagnostic tool for career development. Career professionals could use the score to discover what matters to someone in terms of their work environment to help a school leaver or undergraduate review their personal preferences and career development. As with any diagnostic tool, it needs to be used with care and ideally alongside other psychometric tools and an assessment from a career development specialist.

8.9 Postscript, a personal reflection

In the early 1980s, I left Thames Television to have a more varied career in television. I

became one of the first freelance engineers and sound recordists in the UK TV industry with an Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (ACTT) ticket. Thames TV provided good pay and stable work. I had a developer role, working on the studio floor and on location. It was a production factory.

I empathise with those who choose to pursue a career in the media industry despite its uncertainty. As a freelance worker, I also experienced many weeks of no jobs or location work away from home for weeks at a time. Despite the uncertainty, it was more fulfilling than working at Thames TV. I went on to set up my own production company in Soho. I suggest to observers of the creative industries that if they cannot empathise with the drive to be artistic, creative or entrepreneurial then I think they might just miss the point that for some people, the risks are worth taking.

Appendices

Appendix 1A: Full glossary of terms

The (UK) broadcast television industry (BTI)

The BTI includes companies with an Ofcom license to transmit or companies that supply programmes to those broadcasters.

Career pathway development value chain

A model of career development based on the work of Parson *et al*, which Super integrated into a single model (Super, 1990). This model underpins the framework for my fieldwork.

Career success

I define career success as something attained by those subjects whose peers have identified as 'successful' and 'hotshots'. The findings of the qualitative aspect of this research will analyse how the subjects, themselves actually define career success.

In exploring career success from the individual's, not the organisation's perspective, the research does not attempt to assign or define career success in terms of hierarchical progression, financial rewards or programme credits.

Creativity

There is no one agreed definition of what is creative. Most attempts refer to some aspect of novelty, being unusual, statistically infrequent or unique, but also an appropriate solution. I reference the following definition for my research: '*A product or response is creative to the extent that (a) it is a novel and appropriate, useful, correct or valuable response to the task at hand, and (b) the task is heuristic rather than algorithmic*', (Amabile, 1982) .

Creative intensity

Creative intensity is defined as the proportion of people doing creative jobs within an industry. If the proportion of people doing creative jobs in a particular industry is substantial, above a 30% threshold, the industries are candidates for inclusion within the Creative Industries.

The creative industries

The UK government's definition for the creative industries — 'those industries that are based on individual creativity, skill and talent with the potential to create wealth and jobs through

developing intellectual property’ (Department for Culture Media & Sport, 2013) — is the most widely accepted. This classification includes 13 sectors: advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film, interactive leisure software (in other words, video games), music, the performing arts, publishing, software and television and radio.

Creative & Cultural Sector (CCS)

Some academics, predominantly from the social sciences use the term Creative & Cultural Sector (CCS) to describe the entire industry (European Union, 2012). In terms of UK creative industries structure, the CCS refers to the sub-sectors supported by Creative & Cultural Skills,⁴⁴ the sector skills council for the subsidised sub-sectors of the performing arts. Creative Skillset supports the other sub-sectors.

The cultural industries

By switching from the 'cultural industries' to the 'creative industries', the UK government was able to bundle commercially successful sub-sectors, such as computer games, broadcast TV and film, with subsidised sub-sectors, such as dance, the visual and performing arts, into one single sector, deemed an engine of economic growth for UK plc (Hesmondhalgh, 2002).

High-skills, Higher Skills and Higher level skills

The terms '*high-skills*' and '*higher level skills*' are different and distinct.

There is confusion over use.

The term ***high-skills*** as applied by Leitch was synonymous with a qualification the equivalent of a degree and level 5 or 6. The CIPD Report (2017) stated that a qualification does not indicate a skill. The QAA defines jobs by qualification and training, knowledge, skills and ability, behaviours at a certain level of experience. So the QAA distinguishes skills as a separate attribute from a qualification.

Higher level skills are '*complex and are used with a range of meanings and contexts*' (Sheffield University, 2010). The QAA do not have a easily accessible model to assess them but expects programmes (at HEIs) to address:

- intellectual skills

- practical skills
- transferable/key skills.

(QAA 'Guidelines for preparing programme specifications', 2006)

Universities UK do not have a single definition or 'skill set' for but evaluate higher-level skills
'through three prisms:

- *Qualification levels*
- *Subject knowledge*
- *Core and employability skills'* (Universities UK, 2018)

There are 9 qualification levels in the UK Education system

Entry level

Each entry level qualification is available at three sub-levels - 1, 2 and 3. Entry level 3 is the most difficult.

Entry level qualifications are:

entry level award

entry level certificate (ELC)

entry level diploma

entry level English for speakers of other languages (ESOL)

entry level essential skills

entry level functional skills

Skills for Life

Level 1

Level 1 qualifications are:

first certificate

GCSE - grades 3, 2, 1 or grades D, E, F, G

level 1 award

level 1 certificate

level 1 diploma

level 1 ESOL

level 1 essential skills

level 1 functional skills

level 1 national vocational qualification (NVQ)

music grades 1, 2 and 3

Level 2

Level 2 qualifications are:

CSE - grade 1

GCSE - grades 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4 or grades A*, A, B, C

intermediate apprenticeship

level 2 award

level 2 certificate

level 2 diploma

level 2 ESOL

level 2 essential skills

level 2 functional skills

level 2 national certificate

level 2 national diploma

level 2 NVQ

music grades 4 and 5

O level - grade A, B or C

Level 3

Level 3 qualifications are:

A level

access to higher education diploma

advanced apprenticeship

applied general

AS level

international Baccalaureate diploma

level 3 award

level 3 certificate

level 3 diploma

level 3 ESOL

level 3 national certificate

level 3 national diploma

level 3 NVQ

music grades 6, 7 and 8

tech level

Level 4

Level 4 qualifications are:

certificate of higher education (CertHE)

higher apprenticeship

higher national certificate (HNC)

level 4 award

level 4 certificate

level 4 diploma

level 4 NVQ

Level 5

Level 5 qualifications are:

diploma of higher education (DipHE)

foundation degree

higher national diploma (HND)

level 5 award

level 5 certificate

level 5 diploma

level 5 NVQ

Level 6

Level 6 qualifications are:

degree apprenticeship

degree with honours - for example bachelor of the arts (BA) honours, bachelor of science (BSc) honours

graduate certificate

graduate diploma

level 6 award

level 6 certificate

level 6 diploma

level 6 NVQ

ordinary degree without honours

Level 7

Level 7 qualifications are:

integrated master's degree, for example master of engineering (MEng)

level 7 award

level 7 certificate

level 7 diploma

level 7 NVQ

master's degree, for example master of arts (MA), master of science (MSc)

postgraduate certificate

postgraduate certificate in education (PGCE)

postgraduate diploma

Level 8

Level 8 qualifications are:

doctorate, for example doctor of philosophy (PhD or DPhil)

level 8 award

level 8 certificate

level 8 diploma

For this thesis I take high-skills to be about a qualification and higher level skills to be about those attributes that make someone employable

Informants

My informants are a group of 25 individuals from across the BTI who occupy, or have occupied, positions of influence in the industry. They did not answer questions about themselves; their role was to critique and validate my line of enquiry, offering their insights to my thesis questions.

(The) media industry

The media industry comprises of those sectors of the creative industries that are engaged with the recorded image and or sound. This is essentially film, television and radio, or the mass media. Some academics describe this sub-sector as the audio-visual industry.

(The) media company

The media company (often referred to as ‘a firm’ by academics) is at the centre of the UK television industry. In trying to provide a working definition of the media company, I draw on the definition of the creative industries and offer my definition as an organisation whose core competency is the creation of intellectual property content, which is disseminated to consumers via one of many channels, including print publishing, radio and TV broadcasting and internet publishing. This competency is based on the creativity, skills and talent within the company.

Occupational job families

Occupational job families describes roles that have an underlying set of shared attributes. I divide my proposed sample population into six families, allocating them into two subsets: ***‘initiators’*** and ***‘developers’***.

These loosely defined, occupational job families — production and development; craft and post; digital; writing; and directing and business (Broadcast, 2011b) — are shown in the table below. ScreenSkills describes 95 BTI job roles on its website. Excluding on-screen talents such as presenter and back-office functions, there are 54 production roles that map onto the six occupational groups.

CREATIVE INITIATORS	
Production and development	A coordinating or management role, supervising all aspects of production on a TV programme. Roles that fall under this heading include above-the-line roles such as producer and floor manager and supporting roles such as production manager, who is responsible for organisational aspects of scheduling and budgeting. The most senior role, executive producer, is responsible for overall quality control and the success of TV productions. The most junior role, a runner, is part of the team that supports the work of senior post-production personnel and clients. Responsible for finding and developing stories and screenplays that will make successful TV programmes and formats, development personnel must understand what makes a good programme and what appeals to audiences.
Writing	At its simplest, this is someone who writes screenplays, alone or as part of a team. Writers research and develop story ideas, provide pilot programmes and work up scripts for a whole series. They also write links for presenters. If it is spoken on camera, there is a good chance a writer has written it.
Directing	Directors are responsible for a production's look, sound and technical standards. They enhance, refine and realise original ideas into finished programmes.

CREATIVE DEVELOPERS	
Craft and post	The prime role is that of editor. On big budget projects using complex computer-generated images (CGI), craft and post work starts during pre-production. The supervisor liaises with the CGI company and makes sure the producer is aware of all creative and budgetary considerations. On smaller budget projects, they advise on what can be realistically achieved. Post-production managers liaise with the editor and producer (and sometimes the director) about hiring post-production staff such as sound editors, titles designers and mixers.
Digital	This covers online delivery, integration and use of social media as a marketing channel and everything to do with digitising new content and legacy material.
Business	A wide range of roles that include sales; managing talent; public relations; negotiating contracts; deploying crews; securing the rights to property; and setting up and running a business.

Source: Author's own, extracted from terms used by Creative Skillset (2013b) and the supplement from Broadcast Magazine (Parker, 2013).

Respondents – ‘hot shots’

My respondents — the ‘hot shots’ — are a representative sample of successful media workers in the BTI.

Skills and skills policy

The skills debate focuses on two matters: its definition or current meaning and the implications it has for policy. Understanding what ‘skill’ means in the UK labour market is key to understanding the role of the creative industries' sector skills councils and their terms of trade. The current definition applied by the UK government, as defined by UKCES is ‘a skill is the ability to perform tasks and solve problems’ (UKCES, 2010).

The European Qualification Framework offers a more explicit definition, as 'the ability to apply knowledge and use knowhow to complete tasks and solve problems' (Brockmann, Clarke and Winch, 2011). In the UK, skills are generally seen as something specific and task-orientated. Leitch, for example, talks about a 'particular occupation or activity' (Leitch 2005, (DIUS Committee, 2008, DIUS Committee, 2009).

Industrial policy

An industrial policy is a state's active approach towards support for, and the development of, the economy. It is embodied in a coherent economic strategy that supports innovation and industry; something that has been explicitly lacking in the UK for more than 10 years.⁴⁵ The UK's industrial policy fell into disrepute when it failed to support its ailing heavy industry in the 1970s. In the decades that followed, successive UK government positions were characterised by the absence of intervention and a *laissez-faire* approach, letting the market identify optimum industrial outcomes.

The media company or firm

The 'media company' is at the centre of the BTI. The word 'firm' was used in much early literature on management, as an open expression of an organisation with a defined business purpose. The term 'company' usually has a legal definition of limited liability entity and in the UK, registered at Companies House.

Skills and skills policy

The skills debate focuses on two matters: definition or current meaning and implications for policy. Understanding what 'skill' means in the UK labour market is key to understanding the role of the creative industries' SSCs and terms of trade. The UK government's definition is '*the ability to perform tasks and solve problems*' (UKCES, 2010).

The European Qualification Framework offers a more explicit definition as '*the ability to apply knowledge and use knowhow to complete tasks and solve problems*' (Brockman et al., 2011 p85).

⁴⁵ Mariana Mazzucato, professor of economics and chair in science and technology policy at the University of Sussex, told the Today programme's Evan Davis (5/5/2013) that a coherent industry strategy, supporting innovation and productivity, has been "lacking in the UK" in the last ten years. She said it is not about the government "picking winners", but rather following in the footsteps of countries like China, Finland, South Korea and Germany, investing huge amounts in new sectors like new energy cars, IT and energy-saving technology. The lesson from Silicon Valley, she said, was that "courageous, bold government funding" led the way when the private sector was too cautious to invest.

In the UK, skills are generally seen as something specific and task orientated. Leitch, for example, talks about a '*particular occupation or activity*' (DIUS Committee, 2008, 2009). The European definition is seen by common consent as a higher order level of skill.

Appendix 1B: Creative occupations and creative intensity

SIC				Employment		
Code	Description			Sector (000s)	Creative (000s)	% creative
58.1	Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing activities, to include			177	91	51.3
	58.11	Book publishing				
	58.12	Publishing of directories and mailing lists				
	58.13	Publishing of newspapers				
	58.14	Publishing of journals & periodicals				
	58.19	Other publishing activities				
58.2	Software publishing, to include			18	8	42.9
	58.21	Publishing of computer games				
	58.29	Other software publishing				
59.1	Motion picture, video and television programme activities, to include			98	55	56.6
	59.11	Motion picture, video & TV programme production activities				
	59.12	Motion picture, video & TV programme post-production activities				
	59.13	Motion picture, video & TV programme distribution activities				
	59.14	Motion picture projection activities				
59.2	Sound recording & music publishing activities			13	5	43.1
60	Programming and broadcasting activities, to include			60	34	57.4
	60.1	Radio broadcasting				
	60.2	TV programming & broadcasting activities				
62.01	Computer programming activities			215	118	54.9
62.02	Computer consultancy activities			255	80	31.4
70.21	PR & communication activities			22	14	63.3
71.11	Architectural activities			99	62	63.0
73.1	Advertising, to include			123	56	45.5
	73.11	Advertising agencies				
	73.12	Media representation				
74.1	Specialised design activities			103	61	59.0
74.2	Photographic activities			47	35	73.9
74.30	Translation and interpretation activities			20	16	83.6
85.52	Cultural education			28	12	43.9
90.0	Creative, arts and entertainment activities, to include			140	101	72.5
	90.01	Performing arts				
	90.02	Support activities to performing arts				
	90.03	Artistic creation				
	90.04	Operation of arts facilities				
All				1,415	749	52.9

Source: Labour Force Survey, March 2013 - April 2014

Appendix 1C: Two responses to DCMS creative intensity consultation

Here I replicate the response by two communities of creative people who were marginalised by the proposed creative intensity process. I do so because it says much about the policy process that has been 'captured' by NESTA and put in place almost before the 'sham' (a comment made to me in private) consultation was concluded.

It is a curious situation that these communities have to argue that they are creative.

Defining and measuring craft: a review for the Crafts Council (Dodd, 2013b)

Summary of the report:

Craft's current position in the definition proposed by DCMS

In the DCMS consultation document craft is present in the proposed definition and measurement of the creative industries, to the extent that the design element of making any item is clearly captured but not explicitly recognised. It could reasonably be argued that this is merely a question of product. Designer fashion is now covered purely from a design perspective, any elements for the actual making of clothing have been removed; as such the activity included is the same for craft, i.e. the process up to the point of making an item. Therefore, without any change to the method and simply some changes in terminology or description, craft (or rather the design aspect of being a designer/maker) could be recognised in the definition as it stands.

However, we also feel there is scope for craft to be explicitly included, classified and measured.

The approach proposed is driven by the creative intensity of Standard Industrial Classifications (SICs). The creative intensity is the percentage of workers in an SIC code that are employed within SOCs that have been designated as creative. Any SIC that employs in excess of 30% of people in the designated SOCs is recognised as being a creative industry. As such, the intensities (and therefore the identification of creative industries) are driven by the SOCs that have been designated as creative. With this in mind, it is vital to ensure that the list of SOCs designated as creative fully reflects creative practice.

The DCMS recognises that this is challenging⁸:

'...the selection of creative occupations is a matter for professional judgement, based on what is known about the occupational group in question, allied to the definition of that occupation in the SOC classification. It is not a data-based analysis [...] Although the Nesta report does set out a transparent framework within which this professional judgement of creativity can be brought to bear on the different occupations in the economy.'

We believe that the GRID scoring approach suggested by Nesta, which considers how many of five criteria an occupation complies with⁹ and flags as creative those scoring four or more, is a useful and logical system to put in place to guide the selection of SOCs. However, it is vital to ensure sufficient objectivity, sectoral/occupational knowledge and understanding of the SOC system in the scoring process.

In looking across the Nesta and Creative Skillset reports, Craft is inconsistently covered. The Nesta report provides GRID scores for all but two of the SOCs that were used by the DCMS between 2002 and 2011 to describe Craft. For some reason SOC 5492 and 5494 were excluded and SOC 5496 was included¹⁰. Only two

codes scored 4 or higher and were included: SOCs 5491 and 549511. Subsequently the SICs 2341 and 321212 were also included throughout the Nesta analysis, although volatility is noted as an issue with the SICs.

Craft is not taken forward at all in the Creative Skillset report.

'There are no craft roles included here – whilst it is clear that some elements of these craft occupations contain a creative element, the view is that in the main, these roles are more concerned with the manufacturing process, rather than the creative process. The removal of a number of craft roles from the 2010 SOC listing (Goldsmiths, Silversmiths, Precious Stone workers, for example) into the more generic 'Other skilled trades' occupational group has exacerbated this;'

Creative & Cultural Skills response (2013).

This is a more measured responses to the creative intensity proposal. It captures how the new model carves up the system to fit a policy narrative that promotes the creative industries as a flagship sector in the UK. It hides a deep distrust of the new model.

Response starts:

Measuring the Creative Industries – A Discussion Piece

You can know the name of a bird in all the languages of the world, but when you're finished, you'll know absolutely nothing whatever about the bird... So let's look at the bird and see what it's doing -- that's what counts. I learned very early the difference between knowing the name of something and knowing something.

Richard Feynman

What's in a name?

It may seem odd to begin a thought piece on the challenge of assessing just how large the creative industries are with a quote from a Nobel prize winning physicist. But the central problem Richard Feynman came to understand early on in his life – the difference between knowing the names of things and understanding how those things actually work – is right at the heart of the challenge we want to describe. Work and occupations are ways of organising complex social worlds. At an individual level they may be all about paying the bills, but aggregated and analysed at scale they allow governments to understand aspects of class, influence, wealth and productivity. They are a common denominator, linking workforces the world over, making possible comparisons that set nation alongside nation in a global league table of competitiveness.

The jobs we do, and the ways those jobs have been grouped together to form families of activity we can measure and compare is not so very different from the process of categorising anything. How alike are things? How different are they? When are things sufficiently alike to be considered part of one group as opposed to another?

To create a typology of almost anything you have to first decide on these key questions of similarity and difference and begin to form your groupings accordingly. In this way we have come to understand - or at least 'label' - the world around us, from flora and fauna, as Feynman wryly noted, right through to the ways we earn a living and contribute to the economy.

This thought-piece describes recent work undertaken that underpins proposed changes to the way we conceive of and measure the creative industries. It also points to some of the tensions and challenges that

arise when we seek to develop a more robust methodology based on a classificatory system that carries within it inherent limitations.

The past month has seen the publication of a number of papers on classifying and measuring the creative industries, ahead of a consultation on how the Department for Culture, Media and Sport classifies and measures that sector in order to review its own economic estimates.¹ Creative & Cultural Skills have been involved on a partnership basis with Creative Skillset, Nesta and the DCMS to create a more robust system of measurement, and the process of is set out below.

The project has taken a data-driven approach to measuring the creative industries, and essentially takes a three-part process to creating the estimate. The process:

- 1. Identifies occupations from Standard Occupational Classifications that it classifies as creative*
- 2. Identifies industrial (Standard Industrial Classifications) areas in which there are high employment figures for creative occupations (in these cases, over 30%)*
- 3. Groups those broad industrial groupings into identifiable sectors.*

The process has been illuminating, both from a policy perspective on how different stakeholders view these industries, and on the ultimate limitations of these economic estimates, no matter how rigorous the methodology underpinning it is. There is no doubt that the three-part method, which has a significant track record, is more robust than the previous DCMS definition. It removes many inconsistencies that underpinned the estimates before, and provides a more coherent rationale as to the inclusion and exclusion of certain occupations and industrial areas. So far, so good.

There are significant problems with it though, some based on the tools which can be used to get the data, and some to do with broader conceptions of what makes up the creative industries in the UK.

Firstly, there are fundamental problems with 'finding' niche occupations which few would argue are creative, but may be buried within other occupational classifications. Craft designer-maker occupations cannot be found within the codes as they are often lost in larger manufacturing groupings. This goes the other way though, 'marketing and sales directors' may include a large number of individuals engaged in creative activities, but the sheer size of the group suggests this will also contain large numbers of people engaged in fairly mundane and non-creative activities. By not using proportions of these codes (which amounts to educated guesswork) the industrial classifications are more robust, but lack nuance.

Secondly, there are also real limitations within the industrial classifications, which mean that grouping sectors in logical ways from the ground up are impossible. The music industry is recognisable to almost everyone in the UK as a discrete area of the economy, yet measuring it as a separate entity through industrial classifications is a struggle. The grouping of 'artistic creation' means there is no separation across say, visual arts creation and music creation. This can lead to real frustration in attempting to accurately quantify and classify areas of the economy which are taken as real in the wider policy debate.

Creative intensity and the wider creative economy

Nesta's paper on mapping the creative industries backdates their estimates, showing how employment growth in these sectors has increased dramatically in the period 2004-2010. While this (and previous studies) undoubtedly helps to focus political attention onto the creative industries, leading to various policy interventions, it also perhaps serves to create more of a divide between the wider cultural economy and the commercial creative industries.

In classifying the only component of a creative industry as its workforce, the creative intensities measure really strips away some of the cultural components of what we would argue are the vital infrastructural aspect for the creative sector to thrive. A key example here is the museum. Both Creative Skillset and Nesta's papers (in our view) correctly define museum curators as creative occupations, yet their occupational intensity within the museums, archives and libraries sector is not large enough to push them over the threshold to turn those occupations into separately defined industry.

Herein lies the problem - a museum has creative workers at its core, but it has apparently diluted them with enough administration staff, security staff, cleaners and other personnel to apparently create institutions which are less creative than, for example, a tech-start-up company, which only employs developers, hires a temporary workspace and outsources its office management, HR, cleaning and associated 'support' jobs.

The approach therefore gives prominence to newer methods of working, where products and services are created and delivered by businesses and organisations that do not utilise a range of

'support' staff to make them happen. This is fine up to a point, but it perhaps underestimates the institutional and ingrained cultural economy in the UK, which fuels the creative industries. Creativity does not exist in a vacuum, and it is therefore no surprise that creative industries clusters form in close proximity to arts institutions. Of course, there are a myriad of other factors at play. In East London, for example, cheap rent and opportunities to take on leases in warehouses may well have been the primary driver of the creative revival of the area in the 1990's, above its proximity to cultural institutions, but the wider factors also do not obscure the influence of the cultural economy.

Next steps for Creative & Cultural Skills

Classification and measurement of the employment of creative workers and their financial contributions to the creative and cultural industries is not the only way to accurately assess where policy makers should intervene in the economy. While the set of industries which these measurements point to have a powerful story of employment growth over the last ten years, they are allowed to flourish due to a much wider ecology, which cannot be measured in the same way. There are interesting developments in this area though. The Arts and Humanities Research Council are currently funding a two-year programme of research on understanding the value of arts and culture. It is hoped that some of the findings may lead to a broader conception of the value of the arts, rather than one solely based on a classifying system of Standard Industrial and Occupational Classification. Nesta are also focussing efforts to further understand the phenomena of creativity in the economy, pointing at the need to look at more spatial work, and work looking at the value chains of the creative industries.

While this is on-going, Creative & Cultural Skills are also committed to try and change the system to best reflect the underexposed occupations that are intrinsic to the creative sector. We are working with Creative Skillset to write a paper on redefining the industrial and occupational classifications, with a goal of creating stand-alone classifications for areas like music and visual arts, and to separate creative occupations in fields such as craft from more generic classifiers.

Response ends

Appendix 2A: Legislation and the BTI

Channel 4 archive (2019a)

Pre 1982

The 1980 Broadcast Act outlined the formation of a new public service Broadcaster. Channel Four was established as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Independent Broadcasting Authority. Jeremy Isaacs was appointed as the Channel's first Chief Executive. The first Channel Controller was Paul Bonner and its Chairman was Edmund Dell.

1982

Channel Four goes on air 2nd November. The original on-air logo was an animated multi-coloured Four. The first programme was Countdown with Richard Whitely presenting. Early programmes included: Brookside and Comic Strip Presents. The Snowman premiered on December 26th. Right to Reply gave viewers the chance to take the broadcasters to task. Later the Video Box would allow them to do so on air in booths all over the UK.

1983

Audience share of 4.4 percent. Programmes included Friday evening music programme The Tube and No Problem! which was the first black produced comedy sitcom created for British Television. Controversy surrounded Eleventh Hour: Veronica 4 Rose which featured two schoolgirls discussing lesbianism. US comedy drama St Elsewhere was aired.

1984

Channel Four took over coverage of Horse Racing from ITV. Programme output increased by 25 percent. C4 won 2 International Emmys. Diverse Reports was aired for the first time.

1985

Woman of Substance gained a new audience high of 13.8 Million. Other significant programmes included Saturday Live, Bandung File, The Max Headroom Show and the film My Beautiful Laundrette. US series Hill Street Blues was aired.

1986

Peacock Report recommended that Channel Four should sell its own airtime. Audience share hit 10.7 percent. Channel's turnover reached £131 Million. Programmes included Club Mix and the acclaimed drama by Anthony Minghella What If It's Raining

1987

Richard Attenborough became the new Chairman. For the first time advertising revenue exceeded costs providing a £20m profit. Channel Four International and Film Four International were established. Significant programmes and films included Porterhouse Blue, The Last Resort,

Equinox, Dispatches, Letter to Brezhnev, Hope and Glory and Baka: People of the Rainforest. US childrens' series Sesame Street debuted.

1988

Michael Grade replaced Jeremy Isaacs as Chief Executive. Liz Forgan became Director of Programmes. Notable programmes and films included A Very British Coup, Mona Lisa. The long running US Oprah Winfrey Show went on air.

1989

Turnover £192 Million. Programmes include Traffik, The Crystal Maze, Out on Tuesday, Big World Café. American imports Thirtysomething and Roseanne began.

1990

The 1990 Broadcasting Act preserves Channel Four as publicly owned. The Channel Four Television Corporation is founded, to be established in 1993. Programmes include Drop the Dead Donkey, Cutting Edge, Hollywood Legends and a new youth programme The Word.

1990 Broadcasting Act

From Screenonline: <http://www.screenonline.org.uk/tv/id/1107541/>

The Broadcasting Act 1990 established a new framework for the regulation of independent television and radio services, and the satellite and cable television under the act, the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and the Cable Authority were dissolved and replaced by the Independent Television Commission. The Radio Authority was established in respect of independent radio services. The Broadcasting Standards Council was made a statutory body and the Act also contains provisions relating to the Broadcasting Complaints Commission. Besides reorganising Independent broadcasting, the Act provided for the formation of a separate company with responsibility for affecting the technical arrangements relating to independent television broadcasting - National Transcommunications Ltd - as a first step towards the privatisation of the former IBA's transmission functions.

The Act repealed the Broadcasting Act 1981 and the Cable and Broadcasting Act 1984, amended the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1967, the Marine [& c] Broadcasting (Offences) Act 1967, and the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and also implements legislative provisions required pursuant to Directive 89/552.

The Broadcasting Act 1990 required the British Broadcasting Corporation, all Channel 3 Licensees, the Channel 4 Television Corporation, S4C (the Welsh Fourth Channel Authority) and the future Channel 5 Licensee to procure but not less than 25% of total amount of time allocated by those services to broadcasting "qualifying programming" is allocated to the broadcasting of arrangement adversity of "independent productions". The expressions "qualifying programming" and "independent productions" defined in the Broadcasting (Independent Productions) Order 1991

1996 Broadcasting Act

From Screenonline: <http://www.screenonline.org.uk/tv/id/1107504/index.html>

The Broadcasting Act 1996 made provision for digital terrestrial television broadcasting and contains provisions relating to the award of multiplex licences. It also provided for the introduction of radio multiplex services and regulated digital terrestrial sound broadcasting. In addition, the act amended a number of provisions contained in the Broadcasting Act 1990 relating to the funding of Channel 4 Television Corporation, the funding of Sianel Pedwar Cymru (S4C), and the operation of the Comataidh Craolidh Gaialig (the Gaelic Broadcasting Committee). The Act also dissolved The Broadcasting Complaints Commission and Broadcasting Standards Council and replaced these with the Broadcasting Standards Commission. The Act also contained other provisions relating to the transmission network of the BBC and television coverage of listed events.

2003 Communications Act

From Screenonline: <http://www.screenonline.org.uk/tv/id/995949/index.html>

The Communications Act 2003 dissolves the Independent Television Commission, Broadcasting Standards Commission, Radio Authority, Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) and the Radiocommunications Agency, and replaces these with a new body, the Office of Communications (OFCOM). OFCOM is charged with the regulation of the UK communications industries, with responsibilities across television, radio, telecommunications and wireless communications services, and with furthering the interests of citizens and consumers in relation to communications matters. The Act also liberalises UK media ownership rules and allows for the formation of a single ITV company, subject to existing competition in merger regulations. Further provisions related to licensing of the broadcasting spectrum.

Section 27 relates to training and equality

See: <http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/part/1/crossheading/employment-in-broadcasting>

27 Training and equality of opportunity

(1) It shall be the duty of OFCOM to take all such steps as they consider appropriate for promoting the development of opportunities for the training and retraining of persons—

(a) for employment by persons providing television and radio services; and

(b) for work in connection with the provision of such services otherwise than as an employee.

(2) It shall be the duty of OFCOM to take all such steps as they consider appropriate for promoting equality of opportunity in relation to both—

(a) employment by those providing television and radio services; and

(b) the training and retraining of persons for such employment.

(3) It shall also be the duty of OFCOM, in relation to such employment, training and retraining, to take all such steps as they consider appropriate for promoting the equalisation of opportunities for disabled persons.

(4) The reference in subsection (2) to equality of opportunity is a reference to equality of opportunity—

(a) between men and women; and

(b) between persons of different racial groups.


(5) In this section—

- “disabled” has the same meaning as in [the Equality Act 2010 or, in Northern Ireland,] the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (c. 50);
- “racial group” has the same meaning as in the [Race Relations Act 1976 (c. 74)] [Equality Act 2010] or, in Northern Ireland, the Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order 1997 (S.I. 1997/869 (N.I. 6)).

(6) The Secretary of State may by order amend subsection (4) by adding any other form of equality of opportunity that he considers appropriate.

(7) No order is to be made containing provision authorised by subsection (6) unless a draft of the order has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.

Appendix 2B: Education timeline 1872 – 2019



In detail

Pre 1980s

1872	Education Act: first education specific act
1902	The Balfour Act: national secondary education
	Education Act: local education authorities (LEA) established
1944	The Butler Act: Universal free education primary, secondary and further education
1963	The Robbins Report: committee on higher education
1974	Manpower Services Commission (MSC) set up by Conservative government – abolished in 1988 by Norman Fowler
1978	youth opportunities programme (YOP) replaced by YTS in 1983

1980s

1980	White paper: A new training initiative: a programme for action
	Education Act: Parents able to choose school
1981	Employment and Training Act: abolished employment service agency and training service agency
1982	Employment and Training Act: removed trade unions from decisions relating to costs of training on employers
	Industrial Training Act: set up regulatory framework for industrial training boards
	Technical and Vocational Educational Initiative (TVEI): launched by MSC to stimulate TVE for 14 to 18-year-olds
1983	MSC sets up youth training scheme (YTS)
1985	Green Paper: Education and training for young people – expansion of YTS “a major step forward towards ensuring that unemployment among young people is a thing of the past”
1986	National Vocational Qualifications announced: The NVQ was a popular form of work-based qualification under the NQF system, which was replaced by the QCF in 2010. The QCF was replaced by the RQF in 2015.
1987	White paper on HE announced
1988	Education Reform Act (ERA): national curriculum, school opt out, new governing bodies for FE to become corporate bodies in 1989
1988	Manpower Services Commission (MSC) abolished in 1988 by Norman Fowler
1989	Employment Act: dissolved training commission

1990s

1990	Education (student loans) Act: Top up loans for HE
	YTS renamed Youth Training
1992	Further and Higher Education Act
1995	Modern Apprenticeship Scheme
1997	The Dearing Report on higher education
1998	Student grant replaced by means tested loan
	Means tested tuition fee (£1000) introduced
1999	Education Maintenance Allowances (EMA)

2000s

2001	Department for Education and Skills (DfES) created (disbanded 2007)
2003	Fees increase – up to £3000
2006	The Leitch Review
2006	Sector Skills Councils (SSCs) established replacing National Training Organisations (NTOs)
	Skillset and Creative & Cultural Skills SSCs established to cover the creative industries
2008	UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES) set up – closed March 2017
	Education and Skills Act: full-time education to the age of 18

How people successfully get in and get on in UK television industry: implications for skills policymakers
 Appendices and citations

2009	Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Act
	The Office of Qualifications and Examinations Regulation (Ofqual) regulates qualifications, exams and tests and vocational qualifications - the exam "watchdog"
	Department for Business, Innovation and Skills established – disbanded July 2016

2010s

2010	Browne Report: higher education funding and student Finance
	Department for Education (DfE) formed (reformed) by Cameron government
2011	The Wolfe Report: review of vocational education
	Education Act 2011. Extended Ofqual's remit
2012	The Wilson Review: business – university collaboration
	Skillset rebranded Creative Skillset
	Core funding for SSCs of £12m stopped
2016	DfE took over HE and FE and responsibility for apprenticeships
2017	Higher Education and Research Act – office for students (OFS) created
	Federation for Industry (FISSS) took over the role of UKCES and Alliance of sector skills councils. Research into labour market intelligence (LMI) moved to DfE
2018	Creative Skillset rebranded Screen Skills
	Sector Skills Council People 1 st goes into administration of
2019	The Auger Review: examines post-18 education

Appendix 2C: Position statements on creative industries from DCMS, CBI and NESTA

'Our creative industries are a real success story. They are worth more than £36 billion a year; they generate £70,000 every minute for the UK economy; and they employ 1.5 million people in the UK. According to industry figures, the creative industries account for around £1 in every £10 of the UK's exports. With the right support, they have the potential to bring even more benefits to our culture and economy. We support these industries through financial incentives, promotion at home and abroad, and reducing unnecessary regulations. We are very proud of the UK's media industry: it is a powerful symbol of an open and free society, as well as an important part of the economy. At the same time, we want to make sure that appropriate regulations are in place so that everyone's rights are protected, and so that we have a plurality (or mix) of owners in the media industry' (DCMS, 2013d).

'The creative industries — ranging from advertising to architecture and fashion to film — constitute one of the fastest-growing sectors in the UK. The creative industries contribute 6% of GDP and employ over 2 million people. The sector is forecast to play a bigger role in coming years. If the UK is to achieve a balanced, high-growth economy, it is vital that the key strengths of businesses in the creative sector are nurtured. The CBI is developing policies on a range of issues to show what needs to be done to deliver the conditions under which our creative industries can thrive' (CBI, 2013).

'The UK's creative economy is one of its great national strengths, historically deeply rooted and accounting for around one-tenth of the whole economy. It provides jobs for 2.5 million people — more than in financial services, advanced manufacturing or construction — and in recent years, this creative workforce has grown four times faster than the workforce as a whole' (NESTA, 2013a).

Appendix 5A: Informants and respondents interview format

The interview process – the fieldwork approach to both informants and respondents

- Call
- Email
- agreement to discuss
- letter of date of meeting with confidentiality of interview and confirm that it will be recorded
- meeting
- transcription
- if needed follow up questions (by phone)
- letter of thanks with reminder of use,
- Respondents to contact me if role or career changes (Links to LinkedIn, Facebook etc)
- Database and coding of interviews
- Request for in depth case study (if helpful)

Interview structure for informants

Themes explored included, but were not limited to: -

Recruiting for new joiners

1. Do you have a view on the government's education and skills policy?
 - a. Follow up: If I set out the main terms – have they been effective – see (b) below
 - b. Skills and growth (provide the skills there will be growth) Is this the right model for the creative industries
2. From your perspective does the UK provide high quality, relevant education, training and development
3. If the people you are interviewing have the right skills, do you see it as a consequence of Government policy?
4. Are we improving skills levels?
5. Is there a match for demand by supply?
6. How do you short list, do you look for industry specific skills? If not, what are the key criteria?

Inclusion and diversity

1. How do you ensure you recruit fairly - is there transparency and inclusion in the selection

process?

2. In your view has participation widened over the last 1, 3 or 5 years
3. What is your view on positive action?

Developing the capabilities

4. People development
5. Succession planning
6. Is the skills match (essential qualifications to perform role) the prime determinant in selection?
7. Do you look to external agencies to support the learning & development of your staff?
 - a. If not why not (knowledge of offer, cost, relevance, other –‘not made here’)

The government skills agenda and your own employment policies & procedures

8. Do you have a view on government skills policy and action (past and present)?
 - a. For example, the apprenticeship scheme
9. If you do not seek external support; is this a reflection government policy to skills and training?
10. What responsibility should government take in skills, is there a point at which this should end?
11. What do you see as the top issues for the skills of the broadcast industry workforce?
12. Have you every responded to industry surveys from Skillset or other accredited sources?

Interview structure for respondents

Process for informants and respondents is broadly with the following information sent to all respondents for them to approve and sign off.

Letter starts: -

You have been invited to take part in a research study. Before you confirm to take part it is important for you to understand why the research is being conducted and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully.

Study title: An Investigation into how people get in and get on in the UK television industry.

What is the purpose of the study? This research examines the professional development of people early on in their career in the UK television industry. It examines the impact government skills policies have on opportunities to progress in the industry. It is a study that considers whether the current processes are effective in delivering and evaluating the objectives of skills policies.

Why have I been invited to participate? I am asking you to participate because as a worker in the television industry your personal experiences should provide me with insights into the skills and diversity agenda.

What happens next? I would like to interview you for about an hour. It will be in a public space but in private. It will be a mixture of formal questions and a general discussion about your thoughts, insights and recommendations on this matter. This called a semi-structured interview. You are under no obligation to answer my questions but as far as I can tell they should not give you any cause for concern.

There is no cost to you other than some of your time. If you are agreeable I would like to make an audio recording of the interview. It will only be used to transcribe to text, and it will then be erased. I will check before we start if this is acceptable.

What are the possible benefits of taking part? The direct benefits to you are minimal – but I will share with you my findings before I publish. I hope with your help we will gain a better understanding of how people transition and progress from school, college or university to the workplace. The implications could be how we might improve the opportunities for those who wish to join the industry from all sectors of society.

Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? All information collected will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations) and all data will be confidential to the research. Your privacy and anonymity will be ensured in the collection, storage and publication of the research material. Data generated by the study will be retained in accordance with the University of Westminster's policy on Academic Integrity and Ethical protocols and in accordance with the Data Protection Act. Full details are available should you wish to see them.

What should I do if I want to discuss this matter before the interview? Just contact me peter@mediaops.net or call me 07850 347 435.

What will happen to the results of the research study? The results of the research will be used in my PhD thesis. Interim and final reports will be published. I will send you copies of any works published as a consequence of this research.

Who is organising and funding the research? I am conducting the research as a post graduate research student in the School of Media, Art & Design of the University of Westminster.

Who has reviewed the study? The research has been approved by the University Research Committee.

Contact for Further Information

If before or after your interview you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, I hope you will contact me. But you can also contact my supervisor Professor Jeanette Steemers j.steemers@westminster.ac.uk

Thank you for taking time to read this information sheet.

Interview prompts for me

My themes are about attitude, behaviour and skills needed to survive and thrive in the broadcast industry.

The working assumption for the response categories are: -

- background
- education, qualifications and experience
- entry into the industry
- work, employment and progression
- development needs
- Career: aspirations, goals and the barriers to achieve those goals
- Do you know of support services and organisations in the Industry?
 - Skillset and what they offer
 - Other Organisations – PACT / WFTV / Sound Women / RTS / BECTU

These will be semi structured interviews; part questionnaire, part in-depth interview to gather survey data along with more probing open questions that will explore

I also want to explore what creativity means to them and whether they consider themselves as creative.

What advice would you give to a 16-year-old – get a qualification?

Finally, complete career analysis questionnaire

Do you know the other Hot Shots?

If you change job can we talk again – a quick catch up?

Appendix 5B: On-line self-evaluation form – using Google

Your career: a self assessment tool

This relatively short questionnaire is to get a snapshot of the your career pathway to date.

This version is aimed at people in the creative industries, other versions are available.

It asks you to think about the strength of the factors that have influenced your personal development.

As you answer the questions we hope it will be valuable for you to reflect on your career.

***Required**

Some basic details about you

Please tell us your given / first name

Please tell us your family name

Your age group

What is your ethnic group?

This is just a guide for this research based on UK government groupings and looks at very broad categories.
There is NO need to answer this question

Your gender

Your highest qualification

Please select

If you have a degree what was the subject?

Please tell us the title of the degree

Which University?
where did you study your undergraduate degree?

What grade do you get?
Please select

What grade do you get?
Please select

Where are you in your career?
Can you give us an overview of your career to date

Which sector of the creative industries do you hope to work in or already work in?
Pick the sector that matches or is the prime sector in which you work or hope to work

In the question above - which sector of the creative industries do you hope to work in or already work in?
If you answered 'other' what is it?

How far have you progressed in your career -
Overall where do you think you have got to in your working life. Growth - is an early stage - at school. Explore - this is during higher education, you may have some experience of the sector in which you would like to work. Establish - you are in your first or second job in industry that you want to stay in. Maintain - a more senior role with experience. Decline - you may have taken a step back from a front line role or no longer promotion material

Growth
 Explore
 Establish
 Maintain
 Decline

Personal determinants
Personal determinants consist of four sets of attributes: motivation, competence or skill, experience and social skills. This is about your view of how far you have progressed along this pathway

Motivation
What motivates you? Does it arise from externally (extrinsic) through items such as salary, working conditions, stability of the company, or internally (intrinsic) to the individual, its personally rewarding. On the scale 1 to 10 what motivates you? Is it external (10) or internal (1) or a combination of both?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Internal External

Your skill level in your chosen field

For this work the definition is: to possess a skill is to have mastered a technique for carrying out a type of task within a work situation

- Novice
- Advanced beginner
- Competent
- Proficient
- Expert

Your experience in your field

You may be skilled but how much experience do you have?

- none
- Intern / work experience roles only
- junior post - supervised (first year full time)
- unsupervised (two to four years)
- five or more years

Social capital

Do you network and make use of events or work situations to develop new work relationships? How easy do you find this to do, very easy / comfortable (10) or very uncomfortable (1) or quite neutral (5).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Very uncomfortable Very comfortable

External socioeconomic factors

This set of factors concern an individual's familial systems that support them in their career aspirations.

Family

How important are your family in influencing, supporting and encouraging you at this stage of your career.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not important Very important

Finances

How dependent are you on external financial support? To pay university fees, help you through Internships, help subsidise your current job etc.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not dependent Very dependent

Do you have someone who gives you advice about working in your chosen sector

Is there someone that you turn to for career guidance. Maybe your previous boss, someone who acts as your mentor, which whom you might discuss your career options.

If you answered yes to the above question, can you tell us a little more how this works?

Employment factors

Employment factors are those that impact the individual in their occupation and role. This is about your role in the creative industries. The sort of role you favour.

What kind of working environment do you think you will be able to do your best work, or what has been called 'good work'?

Is being able to act autonomously (a sense of independence) key, or is being creative key or finally is a commercial driven environment your preferred choice?

- Autonomy
 Creativity
 Commercial

What is your prime driver or focus to your career goal / aspiration: Artisan, Professional or Entrepreneur

People join the creative industries as one of three, possibly quite loose career aspirations, as an Artisan, a Professional or potential Entrepreneur. Which of these do you feel most closely match your goal.

- Artisan
 Professional
 Entrepreneur

Your chosen occupational group

How well do you think you understand the occupational group you hope to join, or are already engaged in. Are you just aware of the occupation and like the idea of the sorts of jobs / roles involved or are you very clear on the roles and tasks of the occupational group you intend to join or already have some working experience.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

basic awareness very clear on the role and type of job

Employment factors - the working environment

Below is a list of possible factors that could encourage a creative environment. Please select from the scale of 1 to 5 the importance, in your view, of each factor.

Working as a team

1 2 3 4 5

not important very important

High energy

1 2 3 4 5
not important very important

Backup

1 2 3 4 5
not important very important

Effective leadership

1 2 3 4 5
not important very important

Competitiveness

1 2 3 4 5
not important very important

Staff stability

1 2 3 4 5
not important very important

Exchange of Ideas

1 2 3 4 5
not important very important

Adaptability to change

1 2 3 4 5
not important very important

Diversity of expertise available

1 2 3 4 5
not important very important

Responsiveness to ideas

1 2 3 4 5

not important very important

Working with talented individuals

1 2 3 4 5

not important very important

Trust between colleagues

1 2 3 4 5

not important very important

Effective management

1 2 3 4 5

not important very important

Good rates of pay

1 2 3 4 5

not important very important

Flexible working conditions

1 2 3 4 5

not important very important

Sufficient time

1 2 3 4 5

not important very important

Large company/department

1 2 3 4 5

not important very important

Small company/department

1 2 3 4 5

not important very important

Employment factors – your work values

Thinking about your most recent job what factors do you like or dislike in the working environment. If you haven't worked in the industry tell us what factors in your view will matter to you in any job you might do.

Status

Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not important very important

Money

Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Not important Very important

Achievement

Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not important very important

Recognition

Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not important very important

Responsibility

Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not important very important

Conditions of Work

Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
not important very important

Relationship with peers and associates
Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
not important very important

Relationship with management
Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
not important very important

Independence
Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
not important very important

Creativity
Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
not important very important

Uncertainty
Some guidance on scoring 1= dislike 5 = neither like or dislike 10 = can cope with uncertainty
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dislike Can cope (like)

Intellectual Stimulation
Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
not important very important

Excitement
Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not important very important

Personal Growth
Some guidance on scoring 1= not important 5 = neither unimportant or important 10 = very important

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not important very important

Overall, how would you rate the three sets of factors and their importance to your career and development today

Personal determinants

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not significant highly significant

Socioeconomic factors

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not significant highly significant

Employment factors

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

not significant highly significant

Organisations in the creative industries
Several organisations exist to help individuals and companies in the UK television industry. Below I list them. Two questions for each. Do you know them? Have you used their services?

Have you come across?
Tick each one that you know

- Creative Skillset
- BBC Academy
- Indie Training Fund (ITF)
- Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre Union (BECTU)
- Producers Alliance in Cinema & Television (PACT)
- Royal Television Society (RTS)

Have you used their services?
Tick each one that you have been assisted by or attended a course they have organised

- Creative Skillset
- BBC Academy
- Indie Training Fund (ITF)
- Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematograph and Theatre Union (BECTU)
- Producers Alliance in Cinema & Television (PACT)
- Royal Television Society (RTS)

What support did you get? What course did you attend?
Please tell us a little more...

Any final thoughts about your career?
Are there any issues about your media career we have missed?

Do tell us more...

If you would like the summary of this profile sent to you please put your email in the box below

Never submit passwords through Google Forms.

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Appendix 5C: Pilot study sample summary data (n=118 to 122)

24/04/2019 Your career skills assessment tool 2019 - Google Forms



If you have been in employment in the creative industries, how many years have you worked?

122 responses



In the question above - which sector of the creative industries do you hope to work in or already work in?

54 responses

- Film
- Newspaper
- Also Film?
- management department
- Reporter

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24/04/2019 Your career skills assessment tool 2019 - Google Forms

- Internet Advertising
- Documentary
- Artist/Agent
- Producer, Government, NGOs, Private Company, etc.
- Management consulting in the media and entertainment industry
- ?
- Director, Media Institute
- Editorial
- Magazines and advertisement
- MUSIC INDUSTRY
- Internet
- Education
- TV programs and film production
- Digital Marketing
- TV
- Corporate Communication
- Publishing
- Film Festival, Sales and Marketing and/or Events Organization and Management
- Public Relations
- TV and New Media
- Video
- digital marketing
- London, Beijing, Shanghai
- Sports Industry
- Scriptwriter of Film
- Social Media
- print media and its social media
- Film Studio
- Journalism
- graphics
- marketing

https://www.google.com/forms/d/14m004.../view_qr?redir_esc_qr=false#q=24

24/04/2019 Your career skills assessment tool 2019 - Google Forms

- tech platform
- MEDIA PRODUCTION
- Tier 1 TV and Art Co. Ltd
- Film
- P
- Film Industry
- Business Development and/or Strategy Consulting
- I used to work in the producing of online programs. I hope to continue my career related to program producing or entertainment industry
- news
- News media
- production program
- Consulting
- Marketing
- advertisement company
- Advertisement Subbing
- career

How far have you progressed in your career

122 responses




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24/04/2019 Your career skills assessment tool 2019 - Google Forms

Personal drivers


Motivation

120 responses



Your skill level in your chosen field

120 responses



Your experience in your field


118 responses

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
2047



Finances
 118 responses



Do you have someone who gives you advice about working in your chosen sector?
 118 responses




Social capital
 133 responses





Sociodemographic factors
 133 responses


Family
 133 responses













How people successfully get in and get on in UK television industry: implications for skills policymakers
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


Social capital




Socioeconomic factors


Family




Backup



Effective leadership




Finances



Do you have someone who gives you advice about working in your chosen sector?









Competitiveness







Staff stability



How people successfully get in and get on in UK television industry: implications for skills policymakers
 Appendices and citations



How people successfully get in and get on in UK television industry: implications for skills policymakers
 Appendices and citations



Overall, how would you rate the three sets of factors and their importance to your career and development today



Appendix 5D: Shanghai Media Group (SMG) questionnaire and returns

This appendix presents material from a pilot study of a cohort of young media workers within the Shanghai Media Group compared to a cohort drawn from the UK production sector. The research applied the on-line career development questionnaire to a cohort of young workers in the SMG.

It helped validate the applicability of the tool to an international cohort. The results reported at the emma conference 2017.

An extract from the on-line form created for the SMG study

自我职业评价调查

您好，感谢您参与我们的调查。本调查是由中国传媒大学经管学部与英国威斯敏斯特大学传播、艺术与设计学院共同承担的课题《媒体从业人员自我职业评价工具研究》的一部分，此次问卷调查采集的所有数据将被严格限定在研究的用途范畴，作为量化的结构性分布研究的依据，绝不会泄漏您的任何个人信息。

This relatively short questionnaire is to get a snapshot of the your career pathway to date. This version is aimed at people in the creative industries, other versions are available. It asks you to think about the strength of the factors that have influenced your personal development. As you answer the questions we hope it will be valuable for you to reflect on your career.

这份简短问卷的目的是想对您的职业道路做一个快拍。本版问卷主要针对创意产业的从业人员，请您对曾经影响您个人发展的诸多因素的影响作用做一些思考。我们也期待您填写问卷的同时也实现一次对您自身职业生涯的映射，为您提供职业参考。

第一部分 您的职业经历概况(Where are you in your career)?

1.1您目前在创意产业的哪个领域里面工作？请选择最符合您工作性质的一项。Which sector of the creative industries do you hope to work in or already work in?

Pick the sector that matches or is the prime sector in which you work or hope to work

A.电影业 (film)

b.电视业 (TV)

C 广播业(Radio)

D 音乐产业 (music)

E新闻记者(journalist)

F动画产业(amination)

G游戏产业(game)

H广告业(Advertisement)

I影像业(photo imaging)

J出版业(publishing)

K互联网业(on-line)

L其他(other) : (请注明)

1.2如果您曾在创意产业就职，您在创意产业工作了（包括实习）多长时间？

If you have been in employment in the creative industries, how many years have you worked? Select the number of years. If you have been an unpaid intern or had work experience please let us know.

见习（没有酬劳）3个月以下Work experience (less than 3 months),

见习（没有酬劳）3个月以上Work experience (more than 3 months),

实习（有酬劳）3个月以下Intern (less than 3 months)

实习（有酬劳）3个月以上Intern (more than 3 months),

工作少于1年Less than 1 year

工作1-3年（不含3年） 1 - 3 years

工作3-5年（不含5年） 3 - 5 years

工作5-7年（不含7年） 5 - 7 years,

工作7-10年（不含10年） 7 - 10 years

工作10-20年（不含20年） 10- 20 years

工作20年及以上More than 20 years

1.3总体来看，您认为您的职业生涯发展到了哪一阶段？ How far have you progressed in your career? Overall where do you think you have got to in your working life.

培养(Growth)阶段：基础教育阶段，主要是学习

探索(Explore)阶段：接受更高等的专业教育；或者刚开始实习；

建立(Establish)阶段：在所希望加入产业中的第一份或者第二份工作

持续(Maintain)阶段：已经获得了一个比较高的职位

下降(Decline)阶段：已经从一线退出，或者职位已经很难再有提升

第二部分 个体驱动力因素 (Personal drivers)

个体因素包括以下四个方面：动机、竞争力或者技能、工作经验和社交技能。接下来的问题是想了解您对自身在这方面所取得进展的看法。(Personal determinants consist of four sets of attributes: motivation, competence or skill, experience and social skills. This is about your view of how far you have progressed along this pathway.)

2.1 动机(Motivation)

哪些因素激励您？这些因素有外来因素例如薪水、工作条件、公司稳定性，也有内在因素例如个人回报、个人满意度。对您来说，是外来因素对您激励更大，还是内在因素更大？如果1表示内在因素作用最大，外在因素作用最小；10表示外在因素作用最大，内在因素作用最小，请您选择下表中最适合您的数字程度。What motivates you? Does it arise from externally (extrinsic) through items such as salary, working conditions, stability of the company, or internally (intrinsic) to the individual, its personally rewarding. On the scale 1 to 10 what motivates you? Is it external (10) or internal (1) or a combination of both?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

个人因素 /
内在因素 /
艺术满足度
(Internal)

○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○

外在因素 / 经济回报
(External)

工作技能(Your skill level in your chosen field)

End of extract

The key points from the Chinese study that resonate and contrast with media workers in the UK with this thesis are:

- Formal routes remain: CV/resume and interviews are paramount
- To join the main national Chinese broadcaster, CCTV (中央电视台), there are national exams administered by the Communication University of China: thousands enter for as few as 10 posts – these are considered civil service posts and are in theory paid by the state, though CCTV now has to balance the books and be economically independent
- Candidates can apply for jobs — for example, at Hunan Satellite Television (湖南卫视) and Dragon TV (东方卫视) — online
- There is organisational monoculture, compared to Western companies
- A first degree is essential: who you know is becoming less important as more transparent systems are put in place

- The formal entry tournament has reduced actual if not perceived nepotism as firms are more economically independent from state control. They have to meet budgets, so how they hire, who they hire and whether they are worth the salary all become more important
- Informal routes are very rare, and non-traditional routes to encourage diversity are limited
- There are consultant teams across industries and advisory panels to help with new ideas or staffing needs; some have college professors and other well-established people on the panel
- Runners, interns and work experience are not done, apart from some post-graduate interns
- The idea of joining as secretary/scene shifter and leaving as CEO is very unlikely
- Family connections are the network, but qualifications are the entry ticket
- Networking at media organisation meetings as a non-conventional route is not considered
- In the old employment model, all Chinese media organisations were part of the state; employees did move, but it was more akin to moving department within the civil service: it was possible, but bureaucratic and slow
- In the new employment model, there is a marketplace for talented people, who are head-hunted (translated from: 'dig for talent'); companies need to work to keep their talent as workers can choose to go, but there are constraints such as needed a license to work in another city.

Appendix 6A: DCMS GVA Economic Estimates 2010-17

Creative industries

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Table 1: Gross value added (GVA) expressed in current prices, for Creative Industries sub-sectors
 Unit: £m
 Years: 2010 - 2017
 Coverage: UK

Sub-sector	2010'	2011'	2012'	2013'	2014'	2015'	2016'	2017 ^p	% change 2016 - 2017	% change 2010 - 2017	% of UK GVA 2017
Advertising and marketing	6,220	6,755	7,799	9,253	10,775	11,814	12,570	13,302	5.8	113.9	0.7
Architecture	2,298	2,858	3,040	3,006	3,534	3,962	3,839	3,898	1.5	69.6	0.2
Crafts	265	261	265	198	405	364	288	298	3.5	12.6	0.0
Design and designer fashion	1,968	2,293	2,536	2,706	2,636	3,239	3,666	3,949	7.7	100.6	0.2
Film, TV, video, radio and photography	12,807	13,276	13,688	13,760	14,635	15,291	15,345	16,709	8.9	30.5	0.9
IT, software and computer services	25,402	27,937	28,876	30,855	33,240	34,899	37,248	40,620	9.1	59.9	2.2
Publishing	10,366	10,006	10,278	10,366	10,361	10,765	11,473	11,751	2.4	13.4	0.6
Museums, galleries and libraries	1,342	1,205	1,272	1,296	1,394	1,553	1,482	1,451	-2.1	8.1	0.1
Music, performing and visual arts	5,664	6,247	6,599	7,581	7,441	8,399	8,898	9,547	7.3	68.6	0.5
Creative Industries	66,333	70,838	74,353	79,021	84,419	90,286	94,809	101,526	7.1	53.1	5.5
UK	1,429,621	1,468,323	1,514,910	1,573,223	1,645,955	1,692,039	1,756,045	1,839,924	4.8	28.7	100.0

Digital sector

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Table 2: Gross value added (GVA) expressed in current prices, for Digital sub-sectors
 Unit: £m
 Years: 2010 - 2017
 Coverage: UK

Sub-sector	2010'	2011'	2012'	2013'	2014'	2015'	2016'	2017 ^p	% change 2016 - 2017	% change 2010 - 2017	% of UK GVA 2017
Manufacturing of electronics and computers	4,015	3,643	3,753	3,600	3,094	2,968	3,470	3,760	8.4	-6.4	0.2
Wholesale of computers and electronics	5,696	6,342	6,832	7,412	4,470	3,724	5,123	5,707	11.4	0.4	0.3
Publishing (excluding translation and interpretation activities)	10,289	9,907	10,152	10,228	10,212	10,582	11,271	11,534	2.3	12.1	0.6
Software publishing	832	1,084	1,172	1,135	1,349	1,390	1,596	1,633	2.3	96.4	0.1
Film, TV, video, radio and music	12,915	13,402	14,250	14,906	15,419	15,926	16,402	17,929	9.3	38.8	1.0
Telecoms	24,750	25,457	26,014	28,077	30,010	30,373	31,433	32,560	3.6	31.6	1.8
Computer programming, consultancy and related activities	33,551	37,483	37,269	38,749	40,958	42,180	44,248	48,387	9.4	44.2	2.6
Information service activities	4,676	4,855	5,062	5,466	5,483	5,582	5,414	5,826	7.6	24.6	0.3
Repair of computers and communication equipment	1,456	1,684	1,612	1,804	2,082	2,231	2,579	3,126	21.2	114.7	0.2
Digital Sector	98,170	103,857	106,116	111,377	113,078	114,956	121,536	130,462	7.3	32.9	7.1
UK	1,429,621	1,468,323	1,514,910	1,573,223	1,645,955	1,692,039	1,756,045	1,839,924	4.8	28.7	100.0

Cultural sector

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Table 3: Gross value added (GVA) expressed in current prices, for Cultural sub-sectors
 Unit: £m
 Years: 2010 - 2017
 Coverage: UK

Sub-sector	2010'	2011'	2012'	2013'	2014'	2015'	2016'	2017 ^p	% change 2016 - 2017	% change 2010 - 2017	% of UK GVA 2017
Arts	4,493	4,790	4,989	5,220	5,773	6,210	6,878	7,305	6.2	62.6	0.4
Film, TV and music	12,776	13,261	13,895	14,817	15,524	15,739	16,238	17,760	9.4	39.0	1.0
Radio	552	454	570	468	279	498	447	460	2.9	-16.8	0.0
Photography	698	750	779	884	750	832	617	665	7.7	-4.7	0.0
Crafts	265	261	265	198	405	364	288	298	3.5	12.6	0.0
Museums and galleries	876	953	1,016	1,026	1,125	1,250	1,136	1,112	-2.1	26.9	0.1
Library and archives	466	252	256	270	269	303	346	339	-2.1	-27.3	0.0
Cultural education	366	582	269	332	134	722	345	358	3.6	-2.3	0.0
Operation of historical site and similar visitor attractions	792	881	999	754	1,062	1,094	1,210	1,185	-2.1	49.6	0.1
Cultural Sector	21,283	22,184	23,038	23,968	25,321	27,012	27,506	29,481	7.2	38.5	1.6
UK	1,429,621	1,468,323	1,514,910	1,573,223	1,645,955	1,692,039	1,756,045	1,839,924	4.8	28.7	100.0

Source: (ONS, 2018b)

Audiovisual sector

'These tables have been produced as an ad hoc release following a request for estimates relating to the Audio-Visual sector' (DCMS, 2018).

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Table 3a: Gross value added (GVA) expressed in current prices, for audio visual sector
 Unit: £m
 Years: 2010 - 2017
 Coverage: UK

Sector	2010'	2011'	2012'	2013'	2014'	2015'	2016'	2017 ^P	% change		% of UK GVA	
									2016 - 2017	2017	2016 - 2017	2017
GVA (£m)	13,854	14,409	14,828	15,634	16,525	17,460	18,515	20,126	8.7	45.3	1.1	1.1
GVA index (2010 = 100)	100	104	107	113	119	126	134	145	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
% of UK GVA	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
UK GVA (£m)	1,429,621	1,468,323	1,514,910	1,573,223	1,645,955	1,692,039	1,756,045	1,839,924	4.8	28.7	100.0	100.0

Appendix 6B: Workforce numbers

Collated data from ONS Nomis search of Business Register and Employment Survey (BRES)

Audiovisual Sector EU Mapping	2017		2016		2015	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
5911 : Motion picture, video and television programme production activities	60,000	0.2	57,000	0.2	56,500	0.2
5912 : Motion picture, video and television programme post-production activities	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0
5913 : Motion picture, video and television programme distribution activities	7,500	0.0	6,000	0.0	6,500	0.0
5920 : Sound recording and music publishing activities	9,500	0.0	9,500	0.0	9,000	0.0
6010 : Radio broadcasting	13,000	0.0	14,000	0.0	11,000	0.0
6020 : Television programming and broadcasting activities	24,000	0.1	29,000	0.1	25,500	0.1
6391 : News agency activities	9,000	0.0	9,500	0.0	11,000	0.0
6399 : Other information service activities n.e.c.	12,000	0.0	9,500	0.0	10,500	0.0
7722 : Renting of video tapes and disks	325	0.0	375	0.0	1,875	0.0
7740 : Leasing of intellectual property and similar products, except copyrighted works	3,000	0.0	3,250	0.0	3,000	0.0
Column Total	150,500	0.5	150,500	0.5	146,500	0.5

Film & TV - with sound	2017		2016		2015	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
59111 : Motion picture production activities	21,500	0.1	21,000	0.1	22,000	0.1
59112 : Video production activities	6,000	0.0	5,500	0.0	5,000	0.0
59113 : Television programme production activities	32,500	0.1	31,000	0.1	29,500	0.1
59120 : Motion picture, video and television programme post-production activities	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0
59131 : Motion picture distribution activities	4,750	0.0	4,750	0.0	5,000	0.0
59132 : Video distribution activities	550	0.0	650	0.0	650	0.0
59133 : Television programme distribution activities	1,875	0.0	700	0.0	650	0.0
59140 : Motion picture projection activities	21,000	0.1	20,500	0.1	19,500	0.1
59200 : Sound recording and music publishing activities	9,500	0.0	9,500	0.0	9,000	0.0
60200 : Television programming and broadcasting activities	24,000	0.1	29,000	0.1	25,500	0.1
Column Total	134,500	0.5	134,500	0.5	129,000	0.4

Film	2017		2016		2015	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
59111 : Motion picture production activities	21,500	0.1	21,000	0.1	22,000	0.1
59112 : Video production activities	6,000	0.0	5,500	0.0	5,000	0.0
59120 : Motion picture, video and television programme post-production activities	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0
59131 : Motion picture distribution activities	4,750	0.0	4,750	0.0	5,000	0.0
59132 : Video distribution activities	550	0.0	650	0.0	650	0.0
59140 : Motion picture projection activities	21,000	0.1	20,500	0.1	19,500	0.1
Column Total - with post production (cross sector function)	66,300	0.2	64,900	0.2	64,650	0.2
Column Total - without post production Film only	53,800	0.2	52,400	0.2	52,150	0.2

TV	2017		2016		2015	
	number	%	number	%	number	%
59112 : Video production activities	6,000	0.0	5,500	0.0	5,000	0.0
59113 : Television programme production activities	32,500	0.1	31,000	0.1	29,500	0.1
59120 : Motion picture, video and television programme post-production activities	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0	12,500	0.0
59132 : Video distribution activities	550	0.0	650	0.0	650	0.0
59133 : Television programme distribution activities	1,875	0.0	700	0.0	650	0.0
60200 : Television programming and broadcasting activities	24,000	0.1	29,000	0.1	25,500	0.1
Column Total - with post production (cross sector function)	77,425	0.2	79,350	0.2	73,800	0.2
Column Total - without post production TV only	64,925	0.2	66,850	0.2	61,300	0.2

Author's data search, modelled on DCMS methodology for group segmentation (DCMS, 2014)

Appendix 7A: Informants (n=25)

Informant ID	
	Educator / Trainer
Y	BBC Trainer (Freelance / Contract)
E	Staff Training Managers for Journalists Bloomberg TV
	Human Resources
B	HR Director ITV (at time of interview)
Q	BBC HR Director & HR Project Director for the Olympics 2012
	Business manager / business owner
C	Owner London Post-Production studio NATS
D	CEO Women in Film & TV (WFTV)
	Regulation / Policy
I	Chair BETR
R	Diversity Manager Channel 4 TV
L	CEO Steering Body Sector Skills Councils
A	Senior Civil Servant, BIS (at time of interview)
W	Director of Policy, The Federation for Industry Sector Skills & Standards (FISSS)
U	ONS Data manager
V	DCMS statistician
	Academics
J	Professor of European Industrial Relations University of Westminster
S	Creativity in the British Television Comedy Industry
N	Emeritus professor of management and marketing at LBS
	Recruitment
M	Managing Director of Searchlight Recruitment
H	Broadcast Magazine
	Industry managers
X	Warner Bros. UK
T	CCTV China was Editor Current affairs, BBC Scotland
P	HR Manager BBC, was Channel 4, then Nickelodeon
G	BBC News Traffic Production Manager
K	Contract Line Producer factual programmes BBC
	Independent consultants
O	Creative People
F	TV Collective

Appendix 7C: Respondents (n=31)

Initiators (n=15)

ID	Hot Shots Year	Age group	ethnic group	Gender	Highest qualification	Subject	University	Grade	Job family
1	2015	25 - 29	Asian / British Asian	Male	Degree (post-graduate)	English	Edinburgh	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Producer
2	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Eng Lit and Drame	Royal Holloway, University of London	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Producer
3	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (post-graduate)	Natural Sciences	Cambridge	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Director
4	2012	20 - 24	Asian / British Asian	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	History	Manchester	Lower 2nd (2.2)	Writer
5	2012	25 - 29	Asian / British Asian	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	History	Cambridge	First	Producer
6	2012	25 - 29	Black / African / Caribbean	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Content Creation in broadcast	Ravensbourne	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Producer
7	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Media Professional Studies	Liverpool John Moore	First	Producer
8	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Archeology	Durham	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Producer
9	2011	30 - 34	Asian / British Asian	Female	PhD	Nanotechnology	Imperial College London		Director
10	2011	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	English Literature and Film	Exeter	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Producer
13	2012	20 - 24	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	English Literature	Manchester	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Director
14	2013	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Psychology	Manchester	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Director
15	2012	20 - 24	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Media studies and Film	National University of Ireland	First	Writer
18	2015	25 - 29	Asian / British Asian	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Broadcast Journalism	Exeter	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Producer
19	2015	25 - 29	Asian / British Asian	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	English Literature	Kent	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Producer

Developers (n=16)

ID	Hot Shots Year	Age group	ethnic group	Gender	Highest qualification	Subject	University	Grade	Job family
11	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Media Production	Lincoln	Lower 2nd (2.2)	Craft & post business
12	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Drama	Birmingham	Upper 2nd (2.1)	business
16	2015	30 - 34	Mixed / Multiple	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Media Studies, Drama	Buckingham New University	Lower 2nd (2.2)	Craft & post
17	2015	20 - 24	Black / African / Caribbean	Male	Degree (post-graduate)	Social media	Kingston		Digital / multi-platform
20	2017	30 - 34	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Government	LSE	First	business
21	2017	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	BA Film & Moving Image	Norwich School of Art & Design	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Craft & post
22	2017	30 - 34	White (British, Irish)	Male	Other	BTEC National Diploma	Northbrook College	Other	Craft & post
23	2017	30 - 34	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Film Studies	Southampton	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Digital / multi-platform
24	2017	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Business management	Aston	Upper 2nd (2.1)	business
25	2017	30 - 34	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Television production	Bournemouth	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Craft & post
26	2017	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Drama and theatre studies	Kent	First	business
27	2018	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	The visualisation of music	Aberdeen	First	Craft & post
28	2017	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)		Warwick		Digital / multi-platform
29	2018	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (post-graduate)	MA World Cinema	Birkbeck	Upper 2nd (2.1)	business
30	2018	25 - 29	Asian / British Asian	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Applied design digital	Billy Blue College of Design	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Craft & post
31	2018	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	English Literature	Southampton	Upper 2nd (2.1)	Craft & post

Appendix 7D: Respondents collated data of career development factors

Personal, socioeconomic, employment and motivation

	Not important								most important		N=31	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
All													
Personal determinants	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	4	7	18	31	9.26	1.15
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.0	3.2	12.9	22.6	58.1	100.0		
Socioeconomic factors	0	0	0	0	0	2	16	9	1	3	31	7.58	1.03
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.5	51.6	29.0	3.2	9.7	100.0		
Employment factors	0	1	2	5	10	3	3	4	1	2	31	5.74	2.02
%	0.0	3.2	6.5	16.1	32.3	9.7	9.7	12.9	3.2	6.5	100.0		

	Not important								most important		N=31	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
All													
Social capital	2	1	0	2	0	0	2	4	8	12	31	8.06	2.76
%	6.5	3.2	0.0	6.5	0.0	0.0	6.5	12.9	25.8	38.7	100.0		
Family	0	0	1	2	2	4	5	8	2	7	31	7.48	1.95
%	0.0	0.0	3.2	6.5	6.5	12.9	16.1	25.8	6.5	22.6	100.0		
Finances	3	0	7	4	4	5	3	2	1	2	31	5.03	2.30
%	9.7	0.0	22.6	12.9	12.9	16.1	9.7	6.5	3.2	6.5	100.0		

	Not important								most important		N=15	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Initiators													
Personal determinants									4	11	15	9.73	0.46
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	26.7	73.3	100.0		
Socioeconomic factors							10	2	0	3	15	7.73	1.22
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	66.7	13.3	0.0	20.0	100.0		
Employment factors		1	1	4	7	2	0	0	0	0	15	4.53	1.06
%	0.0	6.7	6.7	26.7	46.7	13.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0		

	Not important								most important		N=15	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Initiators													
Social capital	2			0	0	0	1	1	3	8	15	8.27	3.08
%	13.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.7	6.7	20.0	53.3	100.0		
Family				1	1	2	1	4	0	6	15	8.00	2.04
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.7	6.7	13.3	6.7	26.7	0.0	40.0	100.0		
Finances			3	3	0	3	2	1	1	2	15	6.00	2.48
%	0.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	0.0	20.0	13.3	6.7	6.7	13.3	100.0		

	Not important								most important		N=16	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Developers													
Personal determinants	0				1		1	4	3	7	16	8.81	1.42
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	0.0	6.3	25.0	18.8	43.8	100.0		
Socioeconomic factors							2	6	7	1	16	7.44	0.81
%	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.5	37.5	43.8	6.3	0.0	100.0		
Employment factors			1	1	3	1	3	4	1	2	16	6.88	2.06
%	0.0	0.0	6.3	6.3	18.8	6.3	18.8	25.0	6.3	12.5	100.0		

	Not important								most important		N=16	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Developers													
Social capital		1		2			1	3	5	4	16	7.88	2.45
%	0.0	6.3	0.0	12.5	0.0	0.0	6.3	18.8	31.3	25.0	100.0		
Family			1	1	1	2	4	4	2	1	16	7.00	1.86
%	0.0	0.0	6.3	6.3	6.3	12.5	25.0	25.0	12.5	6.3	100.0		
Finances	3		4	1	4	2	1	1	0	0	16	4.13	2.13
%	18.8	0.0	25.0	6.3	25.0	12.5	6.3	6.3	0.0	0.0	100.0		

All	Intrinsic								Extrinsic		Total	Av	SD
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10			
Motivation (Int vs Ex)	15	4	4	2	3	0	1	1	1	0	31	2.65	1.68
%	48.39	12.90	12.90	6.45	9.68	0.00	3.23	3.23	3.23	0			
Initiators													
Motivation (Int vs Ex)	11	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	1.40	0.83
%	73.3	20.0	0.0	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0			
Developers													
Motivation (Int vs Ex)	4	1	4	1	3	0	1	1	1	0	16	3.81	2.54
%	25.0	6.3	25.0	6.3	18.8	0.0	6.3	6.3	6.3	0.0			

Appendix 7E: Respondents - work values

All respondents

	Not important			1			2			3			4			5			6			7			8			9			most important			Total N=31			
	1			2			3			4			5			6			7			8			9			10			Total N=31						
	n	%		n	%		n	%		n	%		n	%		n	%		n	%		n	%		n	%		n	%		N	%	SD				
All	0	0.00		2	6.45		1	3.23		1	3.23		1	3.23		2	6.45		1	3.23		8	25.81		4	12.90		9	29.03		3	9.68		31	100.00	7.00	2.27
Status	0	0.00		2	6.45		1	3.23		1	3.23		1	3.23		2	6.45		1	3.23		7	22.58		9	29.03		3	9.68		0	0.00		31	100.00	6.52	1.98
Money	0	0.00		2	6.45		2	6.45		2	6.45		2	6.45		0	0.00		1	3.23		1	3.23		7	22.58		16	51.61		6	19.35		31	100.00	8.81	0.91
Achievement	0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		1	3.23		2	6.45		4	12.90		2	6.45		12	38.71		10	32.26		31	100.00	8.68	1.40
Recognition	0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		1	3.23		1	3.23		5	16.13		14	45.16		10	32.26		31	100.00	9.00	0.97
Responsibility	0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		1	3.23		3	9.68		8	25.81		2	6.45		4	12.90		31	100.00	6.68	2.33
Conditions of Work	1	3.23		0	0.00		3	9.68		1	3.23		4	12.90		0	0.00		1	3.23		6	19.35		9	29.03		11	35.48		4	12.90		31	100.00	8.35	1.05
Relationship with peers and associates	0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		1	3.23		2	6.45		10	32.26		10	32.26		7	22.58		31	100.00	8.58	1.12
Relationship with management	0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		2	6.45		3	9.68		2	6.45		9	29.03		12	38.71		31	100.00	8.35	2.11
Independence	0	0.00		0	0.00		1	3.23		3	9.68		0	0.00		0	0.00		1	3.23		5	16.13		5	16.13		10	32.26		5	16.13		31	100.00	7.65	2.27
Creativity	0	0.00		1	3.23		3	9.68		0	0.00		1	3.23		1	3.23		3	9.68		3	9.68		0	0.00		0	0.00		2	6.45		31	100.00	4.10	2.15
Uncertainty	2	6.45		5	16.13		8	25.81		2	6.45		9	29.03		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		4	12.90		31	100.00	7.74	1.98
Intellectual Stimulation	0	0.00		0	0.00		2	6.45		2	6.45		1	3.23		1	3.23		0	0.00		4	12.90		9	29.03		9	29.03		4	12.90		31	100.00	8.35	1.11
Excitement	0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		1	3.23		6	19.35		11	35.48		7	22.58		6	19.35		31	100.00	8.35	1.11
Personal Growth	0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		0	0.00		1	3.23		1	3.23		4	12.90		13	41.94		12	38.71		31	100.00	9.10	0.98

Initiators

Initiators	Not important		1		2		3		4		5		6		7		8		9		most important		Total N=15		M	SD
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	N	%		
	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n	%		
Status	0	0.00	2	13.33	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	13.33	2	13.33	1	6.67	6	40.00	2	13.33	15	100.00	7.13	2.56		
Money	0	0.00	2	13.33	1	6.67	0	0.00	3	20.00	1	6.67	3	20.00	3	20.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	15	100.00	6.20	2.48		
Achievement	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	6.67	9	60.00	5	33.33	15	100.00	9.27	0.59		
Recognition	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	6.67	1	6.67	8	53.33	5	33.33	15	100.00	9.13	0.83		
Responsibility	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	6.67	2	13.33	5	33.33	7	46.67	15	100.00	9.20	0.94		
Conditions of Work	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	6.67	1	6.67	3	20.00	2	13.33	3	20.00	3	20.00	0	0.00	2	13.33	15	100.00	6.53	2.03		
Relationship with peers and associates	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	6.67	2	13.33	4	26.67	6	40.00	2	13.33	15	100.00	8.40	1.12
Relationship with management	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	13.33	1	6.67	5	33.33	3	20.00	4	26.67	15	100.00	8.40	1.35
Independence	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	6.67	0	0.00	0	0.00	7	46.67	7	46.67	15	100.00	9.27	1.03
Creativity	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	6.67	3	20.00	7	46.67	4	26.67	15	100.00	8.93	0.88
Uncertainty	1	6.67	2	13.33	2	13.33	1	6.67	6	40.00	1	6.67	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	13.33	15	100.00	4.73	2.58		
Intellectual Stimulation	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	6.67	1	6.67	0	0.00	0	0.00	5	33.33	5	33.33	3	20.00	15	100.00	8.27	1.71
Excitement	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	6.67	1	6.67	5	33.33	5	33.33	3	20.00	15	100.00	8.53	1.13
Personal Growth	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	6.67	8	53.33	6	40.00	15	100.00	9.33	0.62

Initiators

Initiators BTI	Not important		2		3		4		most important		Total N		M	SD
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%		
Working as a team	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	6.7	7	46.7	7	46.7	15	46.7	4.4	0.6
High energy	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	6.7	9	60.0	5	33.3	15	33.3	4.2	0.8
Backup	1	6.7	3	20.0	6	40.0	3	20.0	2	13.3	15	13.3	3.2	1.0
Effective leadership	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	26.7	5	33.3	6	40.0	15	40.0	4.1	0.8
Competitiveness	0	0.0	2	13.3	5	33.3	2	13.3	6	40.0	15	40.0	3.8	1.1
Staff stability	0	0.0	8	53.3	3	20.0	2	13.3	2	13.3	15	13.3	2.9	1.1
Exchange of ideas	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	26.7	2	13.3	9	60.0	15	60.0	4.3	0.9
Adaptability to change	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	13.3	7	46.7	6	40.0	15	40.0	4.3	0.7
Diversity of expertise available	0	0.0	2	13.3	0	0.0	6	40.0	7	46.7	15	46.7	4.2	1.0
Responsiveness to ideas	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	6.7	7	46.7	7	46.7	15	46.7	4.4	0.6
Working with talented individuals	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	6.7	1	6.7	13	86.7	15	86.7	4.8	0.6
Trust between colleagues	0	0.0	1	6.7	1	6.7	7	46.7	6	40.0	15	40.0	4.2	0.9
Effective management	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	26.7	7	46.7	4	26.7	15	26.7	4.0	0.8
Good rates of pay	0	0.0	3	20.0	5	33.3	6	40.0	1	6.7	15	6.7	3.3	0.9
Flexible working conditions	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	20.0	9	60.0	3	20.0	15	20.0	4.0	0.7
Sufficient time	0	0.0	2	13.3	9	60.0	2	13.3	2	13.3	15	13.3	3.2	0.9
Large company/departement	9	60.0	3	20.0	3	20.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	15	0.0	1.6	0.8
Small company/departement	8	53.3	1	6.7	4	26.7	1	6.7	1	6.7	15	6.7	2.1	1.3

Developers

Developers BTI	Not important			2			3			4			most important			Total N		
	1												5					
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	M	SD
Working a as a team	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	12.5	8	50.0	6	37.5	16		4.3	0.7				
High energy	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	18.8	6	37.5	7	43.8	16		4.3	0.8				
Backup	3	18.8	6	37.5	3	18.8	2	12.5	2	12.5	16		2.6	1.3				
Effective leadership	0	0.0	1	6.3	1	6.3	9	56.3	5	31.3	16		4.1	0.8				
Competitiveness	1	6.3	3	18.8	7	43.8	5	31.3	0	0.0	16		3.0	0.9				
Staff stability	2	12.5	2	12.5	2	12.5	7	43.8	3	18.8	16		3.4	1.3				
Exchange of ideas	0	0.0	2	12.5	2	12.5	7	43.8	5	31.3	16		3.9	1.0				
Adaptability to change	1	6.3	4	25.0	1	6.3	3	18.8	7	43.8	16		3.7	1.4				
Diversity of expertise available	1	6.3	2	12.5	1	6.3	6	37.5	6	37.5	16		3.9	1.3				
Responsiveness to ideas	0	0.0	3	18.8	2	12.5	4	25.0	7	43.8	16		3.9	1.2				
Working with talented individuals	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	6.3	7	43.8	8	50.0	16		4.4	0.6				
Trust between colleagues	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	10	62.5	6	37.5	16		4.4	0.5				
Effective management	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	12.5	9	56.3	5	31.3	16		4.2	0.7				
Good rates of pay	0	0.0	4	25.0	1	6.3	10	62.5	1	6.3	16		3.5	1.0				
Flexible working conditions	2	12.5	3	18.8	4	25.0	6	37.5	1	6.3	16		3.1	1.2				
Sufficient time	2	12.5	2	12.5	9	56.3	3	18.8	0	0.0	16		2.8	0.9				
Large company/department	10	62.5	2	12.5	1	6.3	1	6.3	2	12.5	16		1.9	1.5				
Small company/department	11	68.8	3	18.8	2	12.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	16		1.4	0.7				

Appendix 7G: Respondents raw data sorted by initiator or developer role

To note: University type / ranking / ScreenSkills Select or Tick added by researcher. The blue cells show the first pass on data analysis of mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) for the initiator and developer groups. Outputs from the more detailed analysis are shown in Chapter Seven.

Respondent ID	Hot Shots Year	Age group	ethnic group	Gender	Your highest qualification	If you have a degree what was the subject?	University / College	University Type	Guardian League table	ScreenSkills or Select	Tick	What grade do you get?
1	2015	25 - 29	Asian / British Asian	Male	Degree (post-graduate)	English	Edinburgh	Russell Group	26	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
2	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Eng Lit and Drama	Royal Holloway, University of London	Russell Group	42	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
3	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (post-graduate)	Natural Sciences	Cambridge	Russell Group	1	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
4	2012	20 - 24	Asian / British Asian	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	History	Manchester	Russell Group	40	not applicable		Lower 2nd (2.2) USA 50-54
5	2012	25 - 29	Asian / British Asian	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	History	Cambridge	Russell Group	1	not applicable		First / USA 70% or more /
6	2012	25 - 29	Black / African / Caribbean	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Content Creation in broadcast	Ravensbourne		48	not listed but accredited		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
7	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Media Professional Studies	Liverpool John Moore		63	no - 1 other listed		First / USA 70% or more /
8	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Archaeology	Durham	Russell Group	5	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
9	2011	30 - 34	Asian / British Asian	Female	PhD	Nanotechnology	Imperial College London	Russell Group	7	not applicable		unclassified
10	2011	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	English Literature and Creative Writing	Exeter	Russell Group	10	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
13	2012	20 - 24	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	English Literature	Manchester	Russell Group	40	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
14	2013	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Psychology	Manchester	Russell Group	40	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
15	2012	20 - 24	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Media studies and Film Studies	National University of Ireland		n/a	not applicable		First / USA 70% or more /
18	2015	25 - 29	Asian / British Asian	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Broadcast Journalism		Russell Group	10	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
19	2015	25 - 29	Asian / British Asian	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	English Literature	Kent		65	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
11	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Media Production	Lincoln		17	no		Lower 2nd (2.2) USA 50-54
12	2012	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Drama	Birmingham	Russell Group	16	no		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
16	2015	30 - 34	Mixed / Multiple	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Media Studies, Drama, Social media	Buckingham New University		120	no - BA Film / TV listed		Lower 2nd (2.2) USA 50-54
17	2015	20 - 24	Black / African / Caribbean	Male	Degree (post-graduate)		Kingston		48	not applicable		unclassified
20	2017	30 - 34	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Government	LSE	Russell Group	19	not applicable		First / USA 70% or more /
21	2017	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	BA Film & Moving Image	Norwich School of Art & Design		n/a	Tick		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
22	2017	30 - 34	White (British, Irish)	Male	Other	BTEC National Diploma	Northbrook College		n/a	not applicable		Other
23	2017	30 - 34	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Film Studies	Southampton	Russell Group	24	no - 1 other listed		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
24	2017	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Business management	Aston		36	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
25	2017	30 - 34	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)	Television production	Bournemouth		73	no - other programmes listed		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
26	2017	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Drama and theatre student			65	not applicable		First / USA 70% or more /
27	2015	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	The visualisation of multimedia	Aberdeen		34	not applicable		First / USA 70% or more /
28	2017	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Male	Degree (undergraduate)		Warwick	Russell Group	9	not applicable		unclassified
29	2018	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (post-graduate)	MA World Cinema	Birkbeck		withdrawn	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
30	2018	25 - 29	Asian / British Asian	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	Applied design digital media	Billy Blue College of Design		n/a	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64
31	2018	25 - 29	White (British, Irish)	Female	Degree (undergraduate)	English Literature	Southampton	Russell Group	24	not applicable		Upper 2nd (2.1) USA 60-64

Job family	Job role	Job title	Company	Which sector of the creative industries do you work in?	If you have been in employment in the creative industries, how many years have you worked?	In the question above - which sector of the creative industries do you hope to work in or specialise in?	How far have you progressed in your career	Your skill level in your chosen field	Your experience in your field
Producer (scripted / non-scripted)	scripted producer for Alan Carr	Entertainment producer	A Joy Media	TV	3 - 5 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Producer (scripted / non-scripted)	Overseeing travel show	Assistant development producer	TwoFour	TV	5 - 7 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Director	Documentary writer	Producer Director	New Black Films	TV	5 - 7 years	TV and Film	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Writer	Assistant producer	Assistant producer	Keo Films	TV	3 - 5 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Advanced beginner	junior post - supervised (five or more years)
Producer (scripted / non-scripted)	Programme development	Editor	Random Acts	TV	3 - 5 years	TV and on-line	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Producer (scripted / non-scripted)	special factual	Production Exec	Fresh One	TV	3 - 5 years	TV & on-line	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Producer (scripted / non-scripted)	Series Producer	Producer Director	Wall to Wall	TV	5 - 7 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Proficient	unsupervised (two to four years)
Producer (scripted / non-scripted)	Actual entertainment	Creative Director	Keo Films	TV	5 - 7 years	TV Factual	Establish - experiencing in	Proficient	unsupervised (two to four years)
Director	Freelance	Science Producer	BBC World Service	TV	7 - 10 years	Radio	Establish - experiencing in	Proficient	unsupervised (two to four years)
Producer (scripted / non-scripted)	Development of factual for	Development producer	TV Studios	TV	5 - 7 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Proficient	unsupervised (two to four years)
Director	Research and self shoot	Researcher	ITV	TV	1 - 3 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Director	Director non-scripted	Director	Firecracker Films	TV	5 - 7 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Writer	Creator	Director and writer	Mavenck	Film	1 - 3 years	Film	Explore - in Higher Education	Competent	junior post - supervised (five or more years)
Producer (scripted / non-scripted)	Short form factual content	Development Producer	Flate	TV	5 - 7 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Producer (scripted / non-scripted)	Shooting researcher and	Researcher	Renegade Pictures	TV	5 - 7 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Craft & post business	supervising the tech ops	Head of VFX support	Envy	TV	3 - 5 years	TV Post Production	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Craft & post business	Channel exec reporting to Finance	Channels Executive	ITV	TV	5 - 7 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Proficient	unsupervised (two to four years)
Craft & post business	Post house data-one dept	Post Producer	Splice	TV	3 - 5 years	TV Post	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Digital / multi-platform business	Shorts for YouTube Channel	Video editor	Barcroft Media	On-line	1 - 3 years	TV	Explore - in Higher Education	Advanced beginner	junior post - supervised (five or more years)
Craft & post business	Business development	Head of Business development	Avalon	TV	5 - 7 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Proficient	unsupervised (two to four years)
Craft & post business	Post Producer	Post Producer	The Farm Group	TV	5 - 7 years	Film	Establish - experiencing in	Proficient	unsupervised (two to four years)
Craft & post business	Dubbing mixer	Dubbing mixer	The Farm Group	TV	10- 20 years	TV Post Production	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	five or more years
Digital / multi-platform business	Freelance Multiplatform Producer	Multiplatform Producer	Banjay	TV	7 - 10 years	TV	Maintain - more senior and	Proficient	five or more years
Digital / multi-platform business	Digital Insight Manager	Research and Insight Executive	UKTV	TV	5 - 7 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Craft & post business	Pre-titles for Firecracker's	Editor	Firecracker	TV	7 - 10 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	five or more years
Craft & post business	To represent a wide range of	Agent	CKP Ltd	Other	5 - 7 years	Business	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Craft & post business	Off-line editor	Freelance off-line editor	Alaska TV	TV	3 - 5 years	TV Post	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Digital / multi-platform business	Content producer BBC 3	Content producer	BBC	TV	5 - 7 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Craft & post business	Post Production coordinator	Post Production coordinator	Molinare	TV	5 - 7 years	Film & TV	Establish - experiencing in	Proficient	unsupervised (two to four years)
Craft & post business	Editor	VFX Editor	MPC	TV	3 - 5 years	TV	Establish - experiencing in	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)
Craft & post business	Freelance	Editor	Whisper Films	TV	5 - 7 years	TV	Maintain - more senior and	Competent	unsupervised (two to four years)

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Motivation	Social capital	Family	Finances	Mentor	If you answered yes to the above question, can you tell us a little more how this works?	What kind of working environment do you think you will be able to do your best work in or what has been called 'mood'?	If you answered 'not applicable' to the above question with not applicable, can you tell us a little more about what is the key?	What is your prime order of focus to your career goal / aspiration: Artisan, Professional or Entrepreneur?
2	10	5	9	Yes	Muamy Coulter	Autonomy		Artisan (creating content)
2	9	6	7	Yes		Autonomy		Artisan (creating content)
1	10	4	4	Yes		Autonomy		Artisan (creating content)
1	10	10	10	No		Creativity		Entrepreneur (starting a business)
1	7	8	4	Yes		Commercial		Entrepreneur (starting a business)
2	10	10	7	Yes		Commercial		Professional (being a manager)
1	10	10	6	Yes		Autonomy		Artisan (creating content)
1	9	8	6	no		Commercial		Artisan (creating content)
1	1	7	3	no		Autonomy		Artisan (creating content)
4	9	6	4	no		Commercial		Entrepreneur (starting a business)
1	10	8	3	Yes		Autonomy		Entrepreneur (starting a business)
1	10	8	3	no		Autonomy		Artisan (creating content)
1	8	10	10	no		Creativity		Artisan (creating content)
1	1	10	6	Yes		Autonomy		Professional (being a manager)
1	10	10	8	Yes		Autonomy		Artisan (creating content)
1.40	8.27	8.00	6.00	9		A=9 C=2 Com=3		
0.83	3.08	2.04	2.48					
5	7	8	8			Commercial		Professional (being a manager)
3	10	7	5	Yes		Commercial		Professional (being a manager)
3	9	7	6	Yes		Commercial		Entrepreneur (starting a business)
1	8	6	6	Yes		Autonomy		Artisan (creating content)
5	4	3	1	Yes	I often speak to my father	Not applicable	To be honest all three are	Professional (being a manager)
3	2	8	1	No		Autonomy		Artisan (creating content)
4	8	8	1	Yes	More senior Dublin Mixer	Creativity		Professional (being a manager)
2	10	8	7	Yes		Autonomy		Entrepreneur (starting a business)
7	9	6	5	No		Commercial	a	Professional (being a manager)
8	4	4	4	Yes		Commercial		Professional (being a manager)
9	9	7	5	Yes		Commercial		Professional (being a manager)
3	8	10	3	Yes		Autonomy		Artisan (creating content)
1	10	9	5	Yes		Creativity		Artisan (creating content)
5	9	5	3	Yes		Commercial		Professional (being a manager)
1	10	9	3	Yes		Creativity		Artisan (creating content)
1	9	7	3	Yes	through Ed TV Festival	Autonomy		Artisan (creating content)
3.81	7.88	7.00	4.13	13		A=6 C=2 Com=8		
2.54	2.45	1.86	2.13					

Your chosen occupational group	Working as a team	High energy	Backup	Effective leadership	Competitiveness	Staff stability	Exchange of ideas	Adaptability to change	Diversity of expertise available	Responsiveness to ideas	Working with talented individuals	Trust between colleagues	Effective management	Good rates of pay	Flexible working conditions	Sufficient time	Large company/department	Small company/department
10	5	5	2	4	3	4	5	4	5	5	5	5	3	2	5	3	1	1
8	4	4	2	3	3	2	4	5	5	5	5	3	4	2	4	3	1	1
10	3	4	2	3	2	2	5	5	5	5	5	4	3	2	4	4	1	1
8	4	4	2	4	5	2	3	4	2	4	5	4	4	5	5	2	3	3
9	4	4	3	4	5	2	5	4	4	3	4	4	4	3	3	3	2	3
9	4	4	3	5	3	5	3	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	3	1	1
10	4	4	3	5	2	2	5	3	4	4	5	4	3	3	4	2	1	4
9	5	4	3	3	5	5	3	4	4	4	5	2	4	4	4	4	3	3
9	4	2	4	5	5	3	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	2	3
8	5	5	5	5	5	2	5	5	4	4	6	4	5	4	4	3	3	5
5	4	4	4	3	4	2	3	3	2	4	3	4	3	3	3	2	2	2
7	5	5	4	5	5	4	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	4	4	5	1	1
10	5	4	4	5	3	3	5	4	5	4	5	4	4	4	4	3	1	1
9	5	5	3	4	4	3	5	5	5	4	5	5	4	3	3	3	1	1
9	5	5	3	4	3	2	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	3	4	3	1	1
8.67	4.40	4.20	3.20	4.13	3.80	2.87	4.33	4.27	4.20	4.40	4.80	4.20	4.00	3.33	4.00	3.20	1.60	2.07
1.35	0.83	0.77	1.01	0.83	1.15	1.13	0.90	0.70	1.01	0.63	0.96	0.86	0.78	0.90	0.65	0.94	0.83	1.33
9	4	4	3	3	4	3	5	4	4	4	5	4	4	4	3	2	2	2
9	4	4	4	4	4	2	3	3	2	3	4	5	4	4	4	2	5	2
6	5	5	5	4	3	4	4	4	4	3	5	5	5	4	4	3	1	1
7	4	5	2	4	4	3	4	4	5	5	5	4	3	3	4	3	1	1
9	3	4	3	5	3	4	5	4	4	4	5	4	4	3	3	3	1	1
9	5	5	5	5	3	5	5	5	5	5	4	5	4	4	2	4	2	1
8	4	3	4	5	3	4	3	5	4	4	4	5	4	4	3	3	3	3
5	5	4	1	4	3	2	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	2	4	4	1	1
7	5	4	3	5	4	5	5	5	5	4	4	4	5	4	3	3	1	1
3	4	3	1	4	2	4	2	2	2	2	3	4	4	4	2	4	1	1
4	5	5	2	4	1	4	4	2	3	2	4	4	5	4	2	1	1	1
2	3	5	1	4	3	1	4	5	4	5	4	5	4	4	1	3	1	3
8	4	4	2	4	3	4	4	2	4	5	5	4	3	2	4	3	5	1
1	5	3	2	4	2	5	2	1	1	2	5	5	5	5	1	1	4	2
1	4	5	2	5	4	1	5	5	5	4	4	4	4	2	5	2	1	1
8	4	5	2	2	2	4	4	2	5	5	5	4	4	2	4	3	1	1
6.00	4.25	4.25	2.63	4.13	3.00	3.44	3.94	3.99	3.88	3.94	4.44	4.38	4.19	3.50	3.08	2.81	1.88	1.44
2.94	0.68	0.77	1.31	0.81	0.89	1.31	1.00	1.45	1.28	1.18	0.63	0.50	0.68	0.97	1.18	0.91	1.51	0.73
7.29	4.32	4.23	2.90	4.13	3.39	3.16	4.13	3.97	4.03	4.18	4.61	4.29	4.10	3.42	3.52	3.00	1.74	1.74
2.85	0.65	0.76	1.19	0.81	1.09	1.24	0.96	1.17	1.14	0.97	0.62	0.69	0.70	0.92	1.08	0.93	1.21	1.09

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Status	Money	Achievement	Recognition	Responsibility	Conditions of Work	Relationship with peers and associates	Relationship with management	Independence	Creativity	Uncertainty	Intellectual Stimulation	Excitement	Personal Growth	Personal determinants	Socioeconomic factors	Employment factors
2	2	9	9	9	8	8	6	9	8	10	9	8	9	10	8	5
2	2	9	9	10	5	9	6	9	9	5	4	8	9	9	7	4
5	3	9	9	9	4	7	8	9	9	5	9	7	9	10	8	5
9	9	9	9	9	7	7	9	9	7	2	5	9	9	9	7	2
7	6	9	7	7	6	6	7	9	9	5	9	8	9	10	7	4
9	9	9	10	10	8	8	9	10	9	5	9	9	10	10	7	5
7	7	8	8	8	3	9	8	9	9	6	8	9	9	9	7	3
10	8	10	10	10	5	8	10	6	9	1	8	10	10	10	7	4
7	6	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	5	10	6	10	10	7	5
9	8	9	9	9	6	9	9	10	10	2	10	10	10	10	7	4
9	8	10	10	8	8	9	8	9	9	3	9	8	9	9	7	6
5	5	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	7	5
9	9	10	9	9	7	8	8	10	10	3	8	8	9	10	10	5
8	6	9	9	10	6	9	8	10	8	5	8	9	10	10	10	5
9	5	9	9	10	5	9	10	10	8	4	8	9	9	10	10	6
7.13	6.20	9.27	9.13	9.20	6.53	8.40	8.40	9.27	8.93	4.73	8.27	8.53	9.33	9.73	7.73	4.53
2.56	2.43	0.59	0.83	0.94	2.03	1.12	1.35	1.03	0.88	2.58	1.71	1.13	0.62	0.46	1.22	1.06
6	7	9	9	9	8	9	9	9	6	5	7	8	10	8	8	7
9	6	9	10	9	8	9	9	7	7	2	9	8	8	9	7	8
8	7	9	9	10	5	9	9	8	7	4	8	7	10	9	7	7
8	7	8	8	9	6	8	8	10	8	5	8	7	9	10	6	6
7	7	9	7	9	7	7	9	7	7	6	9	9	9	5	7	9
3	8	6	5	8	10	10	10	10	3	6	9	10	10	8	7	8
7	8	8	6	6	8	9	8	8	8	5	7	8	9	8	8	8
7	3	9	9	10	3	7	7	10	9	3	9	8	10	9	8	4
8	8	8	6	9	9	7	10	7	5	2	4	7	9	10	7	10
4	7	7	7	9	8	7	8	4	3	3	3	7	7	7	6	8
9	8	8	10	9	3	8	9	3	2	3	7	9	8	10	8	7
3	6	8	9	9	1	8	10	10	9	2	8	10	6	8	9	3
10	6	9	10	8	6	8	9	4	7	3	7	7	9	10	8	5
7	7	8	7	10	10	10	9	4	3	1	3	8	8	10	8	10
7	8	9	10	9	9	9	8	9	10	3	10	10	10	10	8	5
7	4	10	10	8	8	8	8	10	9	3	8	8	10	10	7	5
6.88	6.81	8.38	8.25	8.81	6.81	8.31	8.75	7.50	6.44	3.50	7.25	8.19	8.88	8.81	7.44	6.88
2.03	1.47	0.96	1.69	0.98	2.64	1.01	0.86	2.50	2.53	1.51	2.14	1.11	1.20	1.42	0.81	2.06
7.00	6.52	8.81	8.68	9.00	6.68	8.35	8.58	8.35	7.65	4.10	7.74	8.35	9.10	9.26	7.58	5.74
2.27	1.98	0.91	1.40	0.97	2.33	1.05	1.12	2.11	2.27	2.15	1.98	1.11	0.98	1.15	1.03	2.02

Appendix 7H: Industry comparators Higher Education and Leisure

Higher Education

Data search based on SIC2007 codes set out below

85.4 Higher education

85.41 Post-secondary non-tertiary education

85.42 Tertiary education

85.42/1 First-degree level higher education

85.42/2 Post-graduate level higher education

Total number of staff 2017 (ONS audited data) 494,000 1.6% of working population

Data summary extracted from Advance HE (2018) report

Employment

Overall staff: 2003/4 to 2016/17 staff increased by 24.1%

Approximately 50% of staff are professional and support staff

Academic roles: 2003/4 to 2016/17 staff increased by 37.7%

Of the 50% staff who are academics 67% are on full time contracts – so 33% are not

More than 50% of under 35-year olds are on fixed term contracts

Equality

Professors 92.2% white

Male 70.5% Female 21.8%

Professors 7.1% BAME

Male 6.1% Female 1.6%

Less than 1% of senior academics are BAME

Pay gap male to female – 18.3%. More male academics earned over £50k than female 35.8% vs 21.7%

The Leisure industry

Leisure industry data - SIC2007 codes 79 & 55

Employment

Total number of staff 2017 (ONS audited data) 2.6million, 9% of working population

GVA contribution

£200B of which £117B is direct and £102 indirect

Equality

Management

Women 44%

Part time contracts 46%

New jobs 41,000 each year

People 1st the now closed SSC stated that there was a need for 1.3M new staff by 2024. Based on an increase in workforce of 13% to 2M between 2011 and 2015

Commentary

Both HE and Leisure show greater growth than the creative industries and the audiovisual sector in particular.

Appendix 8A: A snapshot of some of the initiatives to support the media worker between 2005 – 17



These initiatives include:-

2005: Ofcom: Equal opportunities: a toolkit for broadcasters

2009: CDN and Pact: Diversity Pledge

2009: EU: Media 4 Diversity

2010: Skillset: Encouraging diversity in Film

2011: BETR: Training case study portfolio

2015: Channel 4: 360 Diversity Charter

2017: EHRC and Ofcom: Thinking outside the box

2017 to date: Ofcom diversity hub <https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/information-for-industry/guidance/diversity>

2017 to date: Project Diamond – although boycotted by BECTU the ‘Second Cut Report’ was issued December 2018

Appendix 8B: Creative Skillset survey data analysis 2014

The data returns to Creative Skillset are suspect in both the demographics and the sampling technique. The fact is, there isn't one. Workers across the creative industries are alerted to the various surveys from Creative Skillset via Broadcast Magazine (the weekly paper), BECTU, PACT, the BBC (through its in-house magazine Aerial) and other points of contact such as its own website. There is no structured sampling at all. Creative Skillset take what data they can get. This has the following implications: -

- a. Sample size varies greatly between subsectors
- b. Numerically in several subsectors the data set falls below that which can provide useful and measurable data for industry trends.
- c. In the television sector the returns are so low that the interpretation that Creative Skillset put on the data in the published reports are highly suspect. For example; they claimed that BAME worker numbers had suffered during the recession years post 2007 (Creative Skillset, 2015a). Industry gossip and anecdotal evidence had already reached that conclusion (Snoddy, 2010b, Holgate, 2009, Dowell and Block, 2011). The list is endless and each week another article will highlight this matter. The trouble is that many academic and industry paper base their work on the Creative Skillset summary data.

	Estimated employment total ¹⁹	Final response	Response as % of estimated employment
• Animation	4,600	362	7.9
• Digital	43,050	345	0.8
• Facilities	36,950	137	0.4
• Post Production	8,900	73	0.8
• Other Facilities	28,050	64	0.2
• All Film	30,200	1,056	3.6
Cinema Exhibition	17,700	339	1.9
Film Production	11,350	626	5.5
Other Film	1,200	91	7.6
• Games	10,000	562	5.6
• Radio	17,150	304	1.8
• All Television	50,600	1,325	2.6
Cable & Satellite TV	12,300	103	0.8
Independent TV Production	21,650	433	2.0
Terrestrial TV	16,650	780	4.7
• VFX	5,300	332	6.3
• Other Creative Media	8,250	386	4.7
Total Creative Media	206,150	4,826	2.3

Source: Creative Skillset Workforce Survey 2014

The numbers for the television sector in the 2014 survey published in 2015 (Creative Skillset, 2015a).

1. In the sector there were 1,325 responses to the survey from a total population of 50,600 (based on estimates by Skillset in 2012 this represents 2.6 %)
2. This reduces to 2% of the 21,650 working in TV production.
3. Creative Skillset do not make their more detailed data available but using their own model of demographic spread across the industry 20% fall (242) within of if include the under 24 age group 29% or 352. The % of those surveyed in production was 16%
4. If consider the 56 roles that CS consider. This would mean 21 people responded from across the occupational groups.

My survey of 31 respondents is in touching distance of the CS data. These are main grade roles 16% fall in this group in the CS survey. If we take this breakdown it gives 194 workers. Then overlay by age group demographics then skillset surveyed 56 workers in the same. In summary the data can only provide broad sweep indicators. The numbers are statistically suspect for Creative Skillset to make robust claims from training needs in the industry.

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