The Iraq crisis of 2003 and press-state relations: an analysis of press coverage in Finland, Ireland and the UK.

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The Iraq Crisis of 2003 and Press-State Relations:
An Analysis of Press Coverage in Finland, Ireland and
the UK

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of
Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

July 2010
**Abstract**

Janne Halttu: ‘The Iraq Crisis of 2003 and Press-State Relations: An Analysis of Press Coverage in Finland, Ireland and the UK’

The dissensus over Iraq on both international and national levels offers a rich setting for a cross-national research to test some assumptions about media-foreign policy relationship originating mainly from American political communication literature. This line of research suggests that the government policy line and national elite opinion (consensus/dissensus) are the most important factors in explaining how the media cover international politics.

This study focuses on three European states which adopted different policies with regard to Iraq: Finland (anti-war), Ireland (neutral) and the UK (pro-war). The study employs both quantitative and qualitative content analysis in order to determine the range of sources, selection of topics and the tone of the press coverage of the Iraq crisis and controversial national Iraq policies. Data consist of two daily quality newspapers from each country from different ends of the political spectrum. However, in the absence of another national daily, a regional quality newspaper and the biggest national tabloid newspaper were included from Finland. Main periods of analysis cover four weeks at critical phases of the crisis between February and May 2003.

The analysis indicated that governments' foreign policy line did not explain the differences in press coverage very well. In the case of Finland, opinion items were sympathetic to anti-war views but news articles often reproduced the US/UK case for war. Meanwhile, the national political elite had little interest in engaging into a public debate on such issues as US motivations, the war's legal repercussions or potential consequences for the fragile Middle Eastern security system. With national elite unwilling to publicly challenge the US/UK claims, the Finnish press coverage did not stand out as particularly critical of the invasion although the US claims did not go uncontested in the Finnish newspapers either.

In Ireland and the UK, clear differences between newspapers operating in the same political system indicated that government policy was not the most significant factor in explaining how the press covered the Iraq crisis. In both countries, the elites were divided over the issue of Iraq and the newspapers reflected these divisions. The *Independent* and the *Irish Times*...
were more sympathetic to the political opposition's anti-war views than the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Irish Independent*. The *Telegraph* was the most consistent in its support for the war but the analysis also indicated that in the post-war situation the press coverage became less uniform both within the newspapers and countries. Overall, the opinions were much more polarised than in the Finnish newspapers clearly indicating that the elite dissensus had brought the Iraq policy in 'the sphere of legitimate controversy'.


Acknowledgements

There are many people who have supported me in one way or the other during this research project. First of all, I am thankful for the advice and encouragement of my supervisory team, Professors Daya Thussu and Jean Seaton. I am indebted for the three-year scholarship to Communication and Media Research Institute (CAMRI). I am in gratitude to Minister (Hon) Jaakko Iloniemi and Mr Martti Setälä at Unifin Ltd for granting me study leave from work at my request. I owe a debt of gratitude to Mrs Maja Turnšek Hančič for her advice on content analysis and Mr Luigi Rodriguez Rocha for double coding. I would also like to thank Professor Hannu Nieminen for his advice and support in the last ten years. Finally, I thank my friends and family for providing all-important distractions from this research project.
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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 THE IRAQ CRISIS

Soon after 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., the invasion of Iraq became a viable policy option within President George W. Bush's administration although it was decided that Taliban had to be removed from power in Afghanistan first. By early 2002, the planning of military and communications strategies for the invasion of Iraq was in full progress (Woodward 2004, Doig et al 2007, 28). In January 2002, the Bush administration's first major step was to argue that Iraq, Iran and North Korea formed an "Axis of Evil" and that the US could take preventive action against these states that were seeking weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and supporting terror (Bush 2002a).

Britain became involved in the planning early on and both the Bush administration and the Blair government used intelligence information selectively to exaggerate the alleged Iraqi threat (Pfiffner 2004, Doig & Phythian 2005). In the absence of the 'smoking gun' (conclusive evidence of Iraq being in breach of UN Security Council resolutions), the case for war was built on dubious intelligence on Iraqi threat allegedly manifested in its WMD capability and links to terrorism which were never substantiated. Part of the US/UK strategy was to restart the UN weapons inspections in Iraq to "wrongfoot" the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on the inspections and United Nations Security Council resolutions (Meyer 2002). British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw saw that either Saddam's refusal to cooperate with the UN weapons inspectors or new evidence of Iraqi WMD would produce a legal pretext for military action (Smith 2005). The UN inspectors led by Hans Blix returned to Iraq in late 2002 but failed to produce conclusive evidence against Iraq. Nevertheless, the Bush administration appeared even more committed to the use of

1 'Iraq Crisis' is used in this study to refer to not only to the US/UK invasion of Iraq in March-April 2003 but also to the lead-up to the war and the immediate aftermath of the invasion. As this study also covers periods of analysis in February and May, Iraq Crisis was considered more accurate than 'Iraq War' which is how the US/UK invasion of Iraq has become commonly known.

2 At the beginning of the war, the "Public Affairs General Strategic Themes" of the US Department of Defense (2003) argued that "The threat posed by the Iraqi regime, its WMD, and its long-standing ties to terrorism is a threat to the safety and security of the American people, and peace and stability in the region and the world".
force in early 2003. Robin Cook (2004), British Labour politician who opposed the war, later suggested that "for Bush and Blair, the real reason why invasion was urgent was the growing realisation that Hans Blix was to remove their principal pretext for war”.

By early 2003, the war had proved to be a tough sell. Massive anti-war demonstrations took place around the world in the run-up to the war. On 15 February, various non-governmental organizations behind the global protest managed to mobilize millions of people to voice their opposition against the looming war and, in some cases, against their own governments who supported the US policy on Iraq. The UN Security Council, including three of its veto powers – France, Russia and China – together with Germany, which held the presidency of the council, refused to sanction the use of force and called for continuation of the weapons inspections. Moreover, some of the non-permanent members of the UN Security Council such as Mexico, Chile and Pakistan refused to give in under heavy pressure from the Bush administration. Consequently, the UN route did not provide the US-led coalition a formal authorisation to invade Iraq and, eventually, the US/UK forces attacked Iraq with rather limited international support and questionable legal mandate on 20 March (Goldsmith 2006, 24).

The war became an unprecedented media event with thousands of reporters and other media staff gathering in the Gulf region to cover the war from Coalition press centres and neighbouring countries. In contrast to the Gulf War of 1991, several international television news channels remained in Baghdad. These included Al-Jazeera and other Arab television news channels which did not exist during the 1991 war. Moreover, hundreds of journalists entered Iraq with the UK/US forces enabled by the Pentagon's new media strategy of 'embedding' reporters in military units. Pentagon's new media strategy relied on the concept of 'Information dominance' strategy which required that the media were kept on message by carefully coordinating the press briefings in Doha, Washington and London (Miller 2004c). The Commander of the US forces, General Tommy Franks called the media the “fourth front” (WMD: Weapons of Mass Deception 2004) and the fact that the media was closely monitored by the Rendon Group, a Public Relations firm working for the Pentagon, is indicative of the importance attached to the image of war. Nevertheless, the Bush administration may have won the “public relations war” at its home front “but probably lost it abroad” (Hiebert 2003, 245).
Soon after the invasion, the failure to find evidence to substantiate the pre-war allegations about Iraqi WMD capability led to a debate about the failure of the intelligence agencies and whether the US and UK governments deliberately deceived their citizens and the wider world in the run-up to war. This debate was further fuelled by a number of leaked official documents which revealed details about the discussions between the Blair government and the Bush administration. Inevitably, the debate about media's failure to challenge the US/UK case for war followed. Especially the US media were complicit in the Bush administration's efforts to sell the war to the American public which may not have come as a surprise to American political communication scholars.

1.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH

Large bulk of the research on the relationship between foreign policy and the media has emerged from the US. Several studies suggest that, in the US, the range of debate is set by the executive branch of the government (Herman & Chomsky 1988, Herman 1993, Entman 1991) or a wider foreign policy elite (Hallin 1986, Bennett 1990, Mermin 1999). These notions are known as executive and elite versions of the manufacturing consent paradigm (Robinson 2001b, 525-526).

Especially in foreign policy domain, the government has an advantageous position in its relations with the media because “strong domestic constituencies contesting government propaganda campaigns are rare, and [...] the government can employ ideological weapons like anti-communism, a demonized enemy or alleged national security threats to keep the media compliant” (Herman 1993, 23). Herman's (1993, 45) argument reflects the executive view of top-down model of media-state relations:

“Both structural analysis and empirical evidence of media performance support the view that the mainstream media tend to follow a state agenda in reporting on foreign policy [...] The real problem, however, is the already high level of subservience to government agendas and the media's consistent failure to provide context, and to encourage or even to allow debates extending to fundamental criticism. These failings are incompatible with the media's acknowledged obligation to serve the informational needs of a democracy.”

W. Lance Bennett's influential 'indexing hypothesis' suggests that wider elite opinion, not just the executive branch of the government, plays an important role in how the media cover issues. He argues that “mass media news is indexed implicitly to the dynamics of governmental debate” (Bennett 1990, 108). In effect, this rule implies that the views expressed in mainstream news are limited to those present in the elite debate. Therefore,
media coverage only becomes critical of the government policy when there is elite dissensus.

There are several studies that suggest that the national foreign policy and elite opinion also explain how the media cover wars in countries such as Britain (Glasgow University Media Group 1985, Riegert 1998), Sweden (Riegert 1998), Germany (Eilders & Lüter 2000) and Canada (Kim et al 2007, Hibbard & Keenleyside 1995). However, there are two main problems with applying US-originated theories of media-state relations to other localities. First, some scholars argue that there may be significant differences in journalistic cultures, political systems and other national characteristics that give the media a different kind of role than they have in the US (Archetti 2008a). Secondly, states and news organisations are part of hierarchical international system in which the US has a unique position. Accordingly, a number of studies have emphasised the ability of the US to influence media worldwide especially during international crises (Tunstall & Machin 1999, Soderlund et al 1994, Thussu 2005). In accordance with such a view, some scholars argue that there is homogenisation of news leading to a situation where the media provide the same content to everyone anywhere – rather than adopting national perspectives on international news (Ruigrok & van Atteveldt 2007, 69).

There is already considerable amount of research on how the media covered the Iraq War in different countries (e.g. Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005, Tumber & Palmer 2004, Nikolaev & Hakanen 2005). However, only a few cross-national studies have emerged on the Iraq crisis coverage (Dimitrova & Strömback 2008, 204). A few anthologies on the international coverage of the war have been published but different methodological choices by different authors often make the comparison between countries rather difficult (see e.g. Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005, Nikolaev & Hakanen 2005). Moreover, many studies have remained mainly descriptive with no explicit aim to find inferences in the media coverage of international conflicts. Among the few exceptions are Stolle and Hooghe's (2005) cross-national research on television news coverage, Dimitrova and Strömback's (2008) comparison of Swedish and US press coverage and Lehmann's (2005) analysis of German and US media coverage of the UN weapons inspections in the lead-up to the war. All three studies support the notion that national foreign policy stance and political elite opinion explained the differences between media outlets. These findings are congruent with previous research on war coverage across countries. However, other studies have put more emphasis on the

1.3 DESIGN FOR A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY

The purpose of this study is to improve our understanding of the extent to which mainstream news are constrained by the national political environment in different countries by examining the press coverage of the 2003 Iraq Crisis in Finland, Ireland and the UK. Unlike the Gulf War of 1991 or Kosovo War in 1999, the international community was divided on Iraq creating a more fruitful research setting. Stolle and Hooghe (2005) argue that the invasion of Iraq "offers us a unique test, not just to examine the mass media's role in the war but also to understand whether national media indeed tend to follow their governmental arguments and positions in framing the Iraq question." This study focuses on three European countries which adopted different policies with regard to Iraq in the run-up to the invasion: Finland (anti-war), Ireland (neutral) and the UK (pro-war). If the media tend to reflect the positions of the government and political elites of their host country, the media coverage of the invasion of Iraq should be different in countries participating in the invasion and in countries that adopted neutral or critical positions on the war (Dimitrova & Strömbäck 2008, 203). Thus, the principal hypothesis is that the government and elite opinion would be reflected in the selection of sources and topics as well as the salience given to pro-war and anti-war arguments in newspaper coverage in the respective countries.

This study employs both qualitative and quantitative content analysis to detect differences in the press coverage of the Iraq crisis. The coding protocol was designed to detect the sources and topics in the press coverage. Moreover, it recorded not only the incidence at which some of the most important arguments about the war appeared but also the manner in which they appeared (invoked/questioned).

Four key events – before, during and after the invasion – were identified:

- Colin Powell's presentation at the UN 5 February 2003,
- Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein 17 March,
- the fall of Baghdad 9 April,
- the end of "major combat operations" 1 May.
The periods of analysis consist of seven days following each of these four events. Thus, the total sample consists of 28 days of press coverage which amounted to 2960 items. In Britain, the conservative *Daily Telegraph* (DT) and the left-leaning *Independent* (I) represent different ends of the political spectrum and should provide an indicative sample of the range of debate in the mainstream press. From Ireland, the *Irish Times* (IT) and the *Irish Independent* (II) were chosen for analysis.² They are the two biggest quality dailies and represent different political affiliations. In Finland, party parallelism in the press system has significantly weakened over the last few decades leaving the remaining party press marginalised. Moreover, the Finnish press system is characterised by a strong regional press. Therefore, the choice of Finnish newspapers was less obvious. The Finnish sample consists of the only national quality daily, *Helsingin Sanomat* (HS), the second largest regional quality daily, *Turun Sanomat* (TS), and *Ilta-Sanomat* (IS) which is the largest tabloid newspaper.

1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

Chapter 2 provides a historical overview on media-foreign policy relationship from the Crimean War to the War on Terror in which the media is an important battleground. Chapter 3 discusses theoretical approaches to that relationship. Chapter 4 provides a rather detailed account on the run-up to the invasion of Iraq and US/UK efforts to persuade the international community to support military action against Iraq. Chapter 5 presents the design of the study by discussing selection of countries, newspapers and methods. The chapter also discusses the national Iraq policies of Finland, Ireland and the UK in the context of their foreign policy traditions.

Chapters 6-9 deal with one week of press coverage each. Chapter 6 focuses on the pre-war debate which heated up after Colin Powell's representation at the UN Security Council on 5 February. Chapter 7 analyses the press coverage at the very beginning of the invasion. Chapter 8 discusses how the selected newspapers covered the fall of Baghdad and lawlessness that followed. Chapter 9 analyses the newspaper coverage during the week that followed President Bush's announcement of the end of major combat operations in Iraq. Finally, chapter 10 discusses the theoretical implications of the findings.

² The sample includes their Sunday editions where applicable. Both news and commentary items were analysed while financial news was excluded from the sample.
Chapter 2

PERSUASION, FOREIGN POLICY AND MEDIA

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In a normative sense, the role of the media in a democracy is to inform the public, debate policies and scrutinize the government (Curran & Seaton 2003, 346). However, fulfilling these tasks is particularly challenging in the area of foreign and security policy. Transparency that one might expect in domestic policy may not apply as “for foreign affairs officials secrecy is the normal mode” (Newsom 1996, 25). When information is provided by the government – or when officials working in the state apparatus leak information to the public domain – journalists often lack the means to verify that information from other sources. At the same time, the public has only limited first-hand experiences in matters relevant to foreign policy issues leaving the media in a crucial position in informing people about the wider world (Soroka 2003, 42-43; Cohen 1995, 100).

International conflicts have often provided fuel for the debate on the relationship between foreign policy and the media. Democracies have tended to set restrictions on the freedom of the press during crises but the media have also willingly engaged in self-censorship when national interests have been at stake. Occasionally, reporters have objected to excessive secrecy around foreign policy issues while governments have also criticized the press for irresponsible reporting.

Wars pose the ultimate challenge to the freedom of the press and have often strained the government-media relationship. Robert Harris (1983, 152), who was a British reporter in the Falklands War, argues that the crisis “exposed habitual abuses by the armed forces, Government, Whitehall and the media; it did not create them.” This view is shared by Bart Cammaerts and Nico Carpentier (2006, 159) who argue that “certain (media and communication) processes become very visible and apparent” in armed conflicts. Hence,

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4 Italics in the original.
an overview of media-government relations with an emphasis on international crises could point to some major tensions and dynamics of this relationship with regard to foreign and security policy issues.

This chapter provides an historical overview of the role of the media in foreign policy especially during international crises. It attempts to identify factors that have historically influenced reporting on foreign and security policy issues. In addition, the chapter addresses the changing nature of conflicts in the post-WWII world and its implications on media’s role in conflicts. The chapter discusses media’s role in foreign policy in democracies in general but the emphasis is on American military operations as the Iraq War was essentially a US-led operation. However, the chapter also attempts to provide background for the countries that are the focus of this study (Finland, Ireland and the UK).

2.2 EARLY WAR REPORTING AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE GLOBAL MEDIA SYSTEM

“Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than ten thousand bayonets” - Napoleon Bonaparte

The global media system emerged between 1850 and late 1920s (Pike & Winseck 2004, 644). News gathering from different parts of the world became possible with submarine telegraph cables which connected Britain and France in 1851, Britain and the US in 1866 (by 1892 there were ten transatlantic cables) and Canada and Australasia in 1902 (Willmore 2002, 92). The global cable network was dominated by two companies: the British Eastern Telegraph Company and the American Western Union Telegraph Company (Thussu 2006, 7). News agencies – French Havas (est. 1835), American Associated Press (AP, 1846), German Wolff (1849) British Reuters (1851) – soon began to operate in global news-gathering business to satisfy the growing demand for commercial information which was crucial in the emerging global economy (Pike & Winseck 2004, 651; Thussu 2006, 9).

This period also marked the beginning of professional war reporting which immediately had political ramifications. William Howard Russell’s (1820-1907) reporting of the Crimean War (1853-56) included the famous article “The Charge of the Light Brigade” depicting disastrous British military tactics in the Battle of Balaclava in 1854. Despite the fact that the battle as a whole was a victory for the British-French troops, the British public

5 Quoted in Laity 2005, 292.
may not have seen it that way when *The Times of London* revealed that the light brigade had charged combined Russian artillery, cavalry and infantry resulting in heavy casualties. Eventually this blunder led to the resignation of the Lord Aberdeen's government in Britain. Shortly before the war ended, commander in chief Sir William Codrington’s general order established regulations for war correspondents so that a similar incident could not take place in the future. In effect, this order served as a precedent for censorship in the Boer War (1899-1902) and the First World War (Knightley 2003, 1-15).

Another often cited early example of media influence on international politics is the Spanish-American War in 1898. It is also known as the “War of the Press” suggesting that it was a result of Joseph Pulitzer (1847-1911) and William Randolph Hearst’s (1863-1951) newspaper rivalry (Donald 1998). Mott (1962, 527) argues that

”… there seems to be great probability in the frequently reiterated statement that if Hearst had not challenged Pulitzer to a circulation contest at the time of the Cuban insurrection, there would have been no Spanish-American War. Certainly the most powerful and persistent jingo propaganda ever carried on by newspapers was led by the New York *Journal* and *World* in 1896-98, and the result was an irresistible popular fervor for war which at length overcame the long unwillingness of President McKinley and even swept blindly over the last-minute capitulation by Spain on the points at issue.”

So, according to the conventional wisdom, the jingoistic press generated war fever that US President McKinley could not go against (Neuman 1996, 43). Yet, more recent research rejects this notion arguing that “[a]t most, the press reenforced attitudes shaped by other influences” (Paterson 1996, 351).

6 Neither the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’ nor the notion of media-driven foreign policy was invented in 1990s. The Spanish-American War was an interesting precedent to the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s for two reasons: 1) It became popularly known as the “War of the Press” suggesting a media-driven intervention – almost a century before CNN was founded and the debate about the CNN effect; 2) It was argued at the time that the US government intervened in Cuba for humanitarian reasons – to free the Cubans from the horrors of the Spanish policies (Offner 2004, p. 57) and to give them democratic institutions. Of course, just like in the 1990s, the reality might have been a little more complex: “US intervention hastened Spain’s departure and robbed the Cubans of their independence. It was as if France, having intervened in the American war of independence, had demanded a naval base on Long Island and the right to send in troops whenever it deemed it necessary. Had this happened, the US people would hardly be grateful to the French for hastening the departure of the British. What is puzzling, and yet so consistent with the fantasy of the City on the Hill, is that so many Americans believed, and still believe, that the United States fought for Cuba’s independence and kept its promise” (Gleijeses, 2003: 718-719).

7 Auxier (1939) suggests that the “propaganda activities” of the Cuban Junta in the US might have contributed to the eventual intervention. Auxier (1940) argues that Middle Western newspapers were less enthusiastic about war than the yellow press.
2.3 MEDIA IN THE TOTAL WAR

While the reporting of the Crimean and the Spanish-American wars was seen to have a direct impact on politics, the period that followed tells a different story. Total industrial war – which has its roots in the Napoleonic Wars (1799-1815) – was introduced in its full and horrendous scale in the early 20th century (Smith 2006, 60). The World Wars (1914-1918 and 1939-1945) required not only the mobilization of regular armies but of entire populations. This development put the mass media in a crucial role in organizing the will of the people – and all the existing resources with them – towards one single purpose, annihilation or unconditional surrender of the enemy (Brown 2002; Hallin 1997, 208; Taylor 1981). Soon after the Napoleonic Wars, Carl von Clausewitz (1831/1998), a Prussian officer and military theorist, emphasised the importance of the unity of the state, military and people in this new type of war. Sir General Rupert Smith (2006, 58) argues that “this trinity is crucial to all forms of wars, to this very day.” This had major implications for the role of the media in wartime. Harold D. Lasswell (1971, 10) argued in his classic 1927 study Propaganda Technique in World War that

“International war propaganda rose to such amazing dimensions in the last war [the First World War], because the communization of warfare necessitated the mobilization of the civilian mind. No government could hope to win without a united nation behind it unless it controlled the minds of its people. The civilians had to be dependent upon to supply recruits for the front and the war industries. The sacrifices of war had to be borne without complaints that spread dissension at home and discouragement in the trenches.”

The head of the British Military Intelligence spelled out what was expected of the war correspondents by saying that ideal reporter is someone “who writes what he is told is true, or even what he thinks is true, but never what he knows to be true” (Rai 2000). War reporting was censored on all sides because news had become “a strategic commodity, building morale at home and at the front” (Pinsdorf 1999, 319-320). Furthermore, photographing was not permitted and penalty for violation of this rule was death (Neuman 1996, 206). The press quickly adapted to the new realities of total war. On 5 August 1914, an editorial in Manchester Guardian, which had earlier conveyed pacifist sentiments,8 said:

“England declared war on Germany at 11 o’clock last night. All controversy is therefore at an end. Our front is united. Now there is nothing for Englishmen to do but to stand together and help by every means in their power to the attainment of our common object, an early and decisive victory over Germany.”

8 In 1901, the paper had also published stories on the appalling conditions in the concentration camps, in which the British had gathered Boer women and children during the Boer War, having a considerable impact on the public opinion (Morgan 2002, 11). However, it should be noted that “the overwhelming majority of British newspapers were imperialist and pro-war to the very end” of the Boer War (Morgan 2002, 5).

9 Quoted in The Great War (1964) BBC documentary series, episode 2.
In this total war, the uses of propaganda exceeded the control of information available at the home front. Soon, Britain responded to German propaganda in foreign countries (Taylor 1980, 876) and both sides put considerable effort in persuading the US to join their side in the war. In the beginning of the war, Britain had cut the transatlantic telegraph cables connecting Germany and North America in order to control the American perception of the war (Putnis & McCallum 2005, 2). Furthermore, Britain created a mailing list of 200,000 opinion leaders and provided English newspapers to 360 US newspapers (Sproule 1996, 7-10). The British strategy was to influence foreign press so that the information would not be dismissed as a British propaganda (Putnis & McCallum 2005, 2).

Since 1911, Reuters with its private international news network had cooperated with the British government and distributed British government statements as news. Similarly during the Boer War (1899-1902) Reuters's "reports supported the British cause and the British troops" (Thussu 2006, 11). When the First World War broke out in 1914 Reuters became an important element in overseas propaganda operations as it provided the cover of impartiality to British war propaganda. Reuters’s General Manager Roderick Jones even worked for the government as a Head of the News Section of the Department of Information and as a Director of Propaganda in the Ministry of Information after it was established in 1918 (Putnis & McCallum 2005).

In addition, Britain produced a so-called Bryce Report (Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages) cataloguing alleged German atrocities in Belgium which had a considerable impact on US public opinion despite the fact that many of the stories were unverified and dubious (Carruthers 2000, 34). While Lord Bryce did “not seem to have been acting with conscious intention to deceive”, the context should not be forgotten: Britain had entered the war to guard Belgian neutrality and the mobilization of support against Germany might prove crucial for the outcome of the war (Wilson 1979, 379). In later wars similar atrocity stories have played a role in swaying the public behind military action.

When the US President Woodrow Wilson decided to join the war in 1917, Committee for Public Information (CPI) began convincing the masses of the rationale for war by distributing fifty million pamphlets which were accompanied with a poster campaign (Sproule 1996, 7-10). The Committee was chaired by a former journalist George Creel who
was in charge of propaganda on both domestic and international levels censoring and controlling information (Lasswell 1971, 18; Pinsdorf 1999, 321).

The First World War did not only rewrite the map of Europe but also had other far-reaching ramifications. Ross (2006a, 184) argues that the war propaganda

“marked a significant shift away from nineteenth century panoptical and disciplinary forms of governance towards new mechanisms of persuasion and seduction. […] In the process, the understanding of political leadership changed, as the ability to sustain a popular following, not merely to govern effectively in the interests of the state, became the hallmark of modern political power. In the years immediately after the war, these tendencies were powerfully reinforced by the introduction of new democratic constitutions and the doubling of the electorate with women’s suffrage, all of which together constituted a fundamental structural transformation of the ‘public sphere’. The convergence of these interrelated trends—democratic suffrage, a new appreciation of public opinion in the era of ‘total war’ saw, throughout much of Europe, the advent of a new political form: the modern media democracy.”

What was the role of journalism in this new governance? Schudson (1978, 164) argues that, when the war ended, “editors and reporters found themselves not partners to government, but instruments of government. They were valued—and feared—not for their capacity to represent public opinion, but for their power to control it.” Clearly, the First World War period did not result in “a democratically oriented global communication system, and especially not one where the press and public had readily available and affordable access to information, either domestically or internationally” (Pike & Winseck 2004, 666). In fact, propaganda gained notoriety as some of the Allied propaganda activities were gradually revealed to the public in 1920s creating a sense that democratic governments had fooled their citizens (Miller 2005a, 28).

The first Propaganda State emerged in Soviet-Russia in 1917 and was followed by the Fascist regime in Italy and Nazi Germany. The trend towards increasing opinion management could also be seen in democracies during the inter-war period. In Britain, several issues contributed to increasing interest in opinion control within the polity between the world wars. These included the increasing international tension with the rise of fascist and communist regimes, democratization of the British society and the development of both new communications technologies and scientific techniques to measure and manipulate public opinion (L’Etang 1998, 419).

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10 According to Paul Rutherford (2004, 184), “[a] propaganda state refers to a regime in which the governors, whether official or unofficial, employ a constant stream of messages to propel the population toward some desired condition of right thinking and right acting.”
In 1922, Walter Lippmann (2004, 136), who had worked for the CPI during the war, argued that

“The creation of consent is not a new art. It is a very old one which was supposed to have died out with the appearance of democracy. But it has not died out. It has, in fact, improved enormously in technic, because it is now based on analysis rather than rule of thumb. And so, as a result of psychological research, coupled with the modern means of communication, the practice of democracy has turned a corner. A revolution is taking place, infinitely more significant than any shifting of economic power.

Within the life of the generation now in control of affairs, persuasion has become a self-conscious art and a regular organ of popular government. None of us begins to understand the consequences, but it is no daring prophecy to say that the knowledge how to create consent will alter every political calculation and modify every political premise.”

In the following decades, professional opinion management and public relations developed into a significant industry while electronic media, radio and television, entered the arena. The Roosevelt administration engaged in growing public relations activities resulting in allegations of obstructing the system during 1930s (Schudson 1978, 166). Hadley Cantril, one of the early public opinion experts, provided his guidance to President Roosevelt (Holsti 1992, 441), who was the first US president to start polling (Eisinger & Brown 1998). The US government supported propaganda research facilitating the establishment of social psychology and political communication as disciplines on their own right (Manheim 1994, 4). Publicity organizations and campaigns were not only inspired by the success of war propaganda but also built on the wartime experiences (Schudson 1978, 142-143). Advertising, ‘commercial propaganda’, increased significantly and proved successful which only added to the perception that people in mass societies are easily swayed (Curran & Seaton 2003, 127).

The Second World War saw further refinement of manipulation techniques of the public opinion through the mass media. All the practical experiences and theoretical understanding gathered during the last couple of decades were put into practice (Luostarinen 2006). Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945), the German minister of Information and Propaganda from 1933 to 1945, wrote down “19 principles of propaganda” which are still valid today. The importance of opinion control was understood on all sides. Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower said that “public opinion wins wars, and I have always considered as quasi-staff officers [the] correspondents accredited to my headquarters” (quoted in Katovsky 2003, x). War correspondents couldn’t challenge the official accounts of fighting due to their dependence on Allied armies to provide them access to the battlefields (Knightley 2003, 352). In addition, Code of Wartime practices...
required that correspondents’ reports were checked by censors before publishing (Neuman 1996, 220).

On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the US media, including the news agencies, made a wartime agreement with the US government and disseminated anti-fascist propaganda (Tunstall 2008, 77). Hollywood also pulled its weight as directors such as Frank Capra, George Stevens and John Huston offered their film-making skills to the service of the US Army during the Second World War. Feature films were produced in Hollywood to contribute to the war effort. For instance, films such as Michael Curtiz’s Mission to Moscow (Warner Bros, 1943), Lewis Milestone’s The North Star (The Samuel Goldwin Company, 1943), Gregory Ratoff’s Song of Russia (Loew’s, 1944) and Jacques Tourneur’s Days of Glory (RKO, 1944) tried to improve the image of Soviet Union which now fought alongside the Western Allies (McNair 1999, 182). Similarly to the First World War, propaganda targeted also foreign audiences and ‘psychological warfare’ became a widely used concept. For example, ‘paper bullets’, as leaflets were sometimes referred to, were used in an attempt to break the resolve and morale of the enemy (Davison 1963, 30). Britain dropped six million leaflets in Germany as soon as war had been declared (Taylor 1981, 27). As Germany invaded Western Europe, the BBC engaged in promoting resistance in occupied Europe (Davison 1963, 34-35) and the US started radio broadcasts to Asia soon after Japan had attacked Pearl Harbour (Zaharna 2004, 220). Similarly to the First World War, the British tried to bring the US into the war. Michael Powell directed 49th Parallel (1941) after the Ministry of Information had requested him to direct a flag-waver. The film was designed to influence the American public opinion and to bring the US isolationist policy to an end (Taylor 1999, 187).

11 However, it should be noted that John Huston's documentary San Pietro (1945) was so graphic in its depiction of a battle in Italy that it was shelved for many years (Combs 1993, 269).

12 Mission to Moscow was even Oscar nominated for best art direction but the screenwriters were blacklisted by the House of Un-American Committee (HUAC) when the Cold War began. Some had become increasingly concerned about Communist infiltration in American institutions and HUAC investigated and blacklisted many Hollywood script writers and directors (McNair 1999, 183).

13 This practice was first adopted by Germany in September 1914 (Taylor 1999, 53).

14 It has been argued that novelist George Orwell resigned from the BBC having grown disgusted with the propaganda and that this experience inspired him to write Nineteen Eighty-Four (L’Etang 1998, 431).

15 However, the film premiered in the US only in March 1942 when the US was already at
Britain’s war efforts were facilitated by the fact that, even though news agencies had emerged to challenge government control over news, the cable lines within the British empire allowed censorship and intelligence-gathering and, in effect, the British could “control news-flow” (L’Etang 1998, 427). However, it has been argued that, in the post-war period, the news agencies focused on supplying ”objective factual information and were no longer the servants of officialdom that they once were” (Humphreys 1996, 35). Nevertheless, in Britain, the Second World War resulted in institutionalization of opinion management with the establishment of the Ministry of Information which was deemed necessary for the morale. After the war, the Labour government turned it into a permanent institution (Jacobs 1992a).16

Ireland was one of the only five European states that remained neutral in the Second World War giving the Allies concern due to its strategically important position in the Atlantic. Nazi occupation of Ireland would have provided a springboard for the invasion of Britain (Cole 2006, ix). While, Switzerland, another neutral state, allowed a rather open public exchange of views on the war, even the Portuguese press under a fascist regime enjoyed more freedom than Irish journalists (Ó Drisceoil 1996, 288-289). John Horgan (2001, 42) argues that

“[b]oth the Emergency Powers Act and the 1939 Offences Against the State Act, which proscribed the IRA (some of whose elements were pro-German) gave the state an extraordinary armoury of emergency powers under which many civil liberties, including the freedom of the press, could be subject to more or less arbitrary limitation.”

After the outbreak of the war, the Irish government used these powers to both enforce the notion of Irish neutrality, which was supported by all parties, and suppress sensitive information which could play in the hands of the warring parties (Horgan 2001, 42). Hence, “[r]eferences to any of the numerous Irishmen serving in the Allied forces were invariably deleted by the censor” and the Irish Times was even subjected to pre-censorship (Horgan 2001, 44-45). Meanwhile, the Irish Independent occasionally published editorials leaving empty space where they had been censored (Horgan 2001, 45). The Irish Press17 promoted the government’s neutrality policy (Cole 2006, 3). The censorship was crucial in

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17 A national newspaper published between 1931-1995. It was controlled by Éamon de Valera – a founder of the Fianna Fáil political party.
“hiding the extent of Irish partiality and presenting a picture of correct neutrality to the Irish people and the outside world” (Ó Drisceoil 1996, 292). When the war ended, the “extensive and pervasive” censorship was lifted (Ó Drisceoil 1996, 284-285).

It is worth noting that Dublin-based newspapers did not send correspondents to the European war theatre making the Irish press dependent on other sources (Horgan 2001, 43). Hence, the information available to the Irish public was filtered by several censors and, for instance, Dresden bombings were covered along the lines of the official Allied point of view (Ó Drisceoil 1996, 298-299).

2.4 THE COLD WAR ERA

In the US, the Congress formalized propaganda as a legitimate tool in the conduct of US foreign relations in 1948 (Block 1948, 678). Yet, President Truman did not revive the Office of War Information (OWI) when the Korean War (1950-1953) broke out partly because of hostile attitudes towards propaganda in the Congress (Casey 2005, 705). However, in 1951, Truman established Psychological Strategy Board which was responsible for ‘psychological operations’ which the US Joint Chief of Staff defined as “operations designed to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals” (Nelles 2004, 68). The US government adopted a position which maintained that only the enemy’s communications is propaganda and the US is engaged in providing accurate and impartial information that has nothing to do with propaganda. Hence, propaganda as a term was replaced with concepts such as ‘advertising’, ‘marketing’, ‘public relations’ and ‘psychological operations’ (Luostarinen 2006).

In 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower established US Information Agency, USIA, to communicate US policies to foreign audiences in the midst of the ideological confrontation of the Cold War (Blinken 2002, 104). By mid-1960s, USIA supplied television programmes to “over eighty per cent of the nations of the world which have television service” (Browne 1967, 199). At best, the Voice of America, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe’s weekly audience reached 70 to 80 per cent of Eastern European populace and 50

18 Germany had a radio broadcast service specifically targeting Ireland during the war (Ó Drisceoil 1996, 143).
Towards the end of the Cold War, development of mass communications technologies and infrastructures provided ever increasing access to domestic and foreign populations. The BBC, Radio Moscow, Voice of America, Radio Peking and Deutsche Welle all began broadcasts in Africa in short succession in late 1950s (Taylor 1997, 43). Finally, the communications satellites resulted in proliferation of cross-border flows of information and the CNN – the first 24/7 news channel – was launched in 1978.

The BBC played an important role throughout the Cold War as Tony Shaw (2006, 1353) argues:

“...The cold war was, after all, as much of a propaganda conflict – a battle of words, sounds and pictures – as one fought between diplomats, soldiers and politicians. The BBC, as a broadcaster of news, comment and entertainment in Britain and large parts of the world throughout the cold war, stood at the very centre of this propaganda conflict. Indeed, its role was arguably unique – no other media organisation combined such a powerful domestic and external reach, with a reputation for independence, impartiality and accuracy.”

It could be argued that the legacy of the first half of the century was institutionalized opinion control and the expansion of government public relations finessed to mobilize the population for a total war but increasingly used also for more short-term political and commercial gain. For instance, Britain’s Prime Minister Eden conducted an extensive propaganda campaign to secure the support of the British public and the US for his policy of employing military force in response to Egypt's decision to nationalise the Suez Company in 1956 (Shaw 1995). Consequently, there were notable “pro-government bias” in the BBC's coverage of the crisis although it was “on the whole straight and objective” (Shaw 1995, 342).

2.4.1 Finland and the Cold War
Finland, having fought against the Soviet Union alongside with the German forces, fell into the sphere of influence of the USSR in the aftermath of the Second World War. The so-called Allied Control Commission led by Chairman Andrei Zhdanov resided in Helsinki and some worried that a socialist system would be imposed on Finland. Finland maintained its neutral status between east and west as well as its market economy throughout the Cold War years. However, the circumstances were a challenge to the freedom of the press. With

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19 Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) were covert operations secretly funded by the US government via CIA till 1971 (Thussu 2006, 19). After the Cold War RFE/RL moved on to start broadcasting to former Yugoslavia (1994) and Iraq (1998) (Thussu 2006, 22).
the Allied Control Commission in the country, the Finnish government warned journalists of making comments about the USSR which ran against the official line (Salminen 1999, 6-7). President Paasikivi's remark reflects the tension between the state and the press: “The government and the nation always have to pay for the window glasses that the press breaks” (quoted in Rahkonen 2006, 106).

The Paasikivi-Kekkonen's doctrine of neutrality was based on four pillars: 1) the neutrality is acknowledged by foreign governments, 2) that they trust in Finnish neutrality, 3) that the Finns as a nation support neutrality, and 4) that Finland is capable of countering all violations of its neutral status. Rahkonen (2006, 106) notes that the second and third pillars were important for the media because they were related to public perceptions. Salminen (1999, 7) argues that “[b]etween 1944 and 1991, the image of the USSR in the Finnish press was tinted by self-censorship, and this concept became the subject of much attention abroad”. The press had become very sensitive about publishing criticism of the Soviet Union due to difficult geopolitical position in the Cold War confrontation between the Socialist East and Capitalist West though the Finnish press “constant[y] maintained its criticism of the Soviet Union's totalitarian system – at least in a veiled form” (Salminen 1998, 248). Simultaneously, the reporting on the US was “of markedly critical tone” (Salminen 1999, 7). In other words, “[i]n spite of all the political disputes and various degrees of criticism towards the Soviet Union, the press was mainly loyal to the state and protected its efforts to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union and at the same time get credibility to the Finnish neutrality” (Luostarinen & Suikkkanen 2004, 5).

In the 1970s, some Western observers started to talk about 'Finlandization' and “took the view that Finnish journalists followed Moscow’s lead to an unnecessary extent, at the expense of democracy and freedom of speech” (Salminen 1998, 239). The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was covered by the Finnish media similarly to Western press but when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979 the tone of the Finnish media was less condemning (Salminen 1999, 174). Gorbachov’s glasnost policy, fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union gradually freed Finnish media

20 Salminen (1999, 7) restricts the concept of self-censorship to ”Finland’s relations and policies concerning the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, and the silence that reigned around them”
21 It should be noted that in the 1960s and 1970s there was wide consensus on foreign and security policy issues (Rahkonen 2006, 112).
of Cold War constraints. Consequently, there have been heated debates on foreign and security issues at times – especially with regard to possible NATO membership (Rahkonen 2007). Since early 1990s it has not been a patriotic duty to support the official foreign policy line (Rahkonen 2006, 136). While public opinion is against the membership and the foreign policy elite remains divided on the issue, “the media that are against Finland's NATO membership represent a minority in the Finnish public sphere” (Rahkonen 2007, 88). For instance, an editorial in *Helsingin Sanomat* (10 November 2005) argued that “the opinion of the majority of the people cannot be a guideline for foreign policy wisdom. […] The government has to trust its own wisdom, but in big issues it should be able to turn the citizens to its side” (quoted in Rahkonen 2007, 84). So far, it seems that at least the media have failed to convince the public that Finland to should seek membership in NATO (Rahkonen 2007, 91).

**2.4.2 The Vietnam War**

> “Every newspaper asks itself, with respect to every story, ‘Is this news?’ All I suggest is that you add the question: ‘Is it in the interest of the national security?’”

John F. Kennedy in a speech to American Newspaper Publishers Association, 27 April 1961

Conflicts that followed the World Wars were of limited and “non-industrial nature”. They did not require the same level of mobilization of populations even though the Cold War meant that readiness for a full-scale industrial war had to be maintained (Smith 2006, 152; Luostarinen 2006). Before the growing US involvement in Vietnam, the Korean War had shown that selling a limited war to the population was not without problems (Casey 2005, 704).

For a short moment it seemed that the press was given more freedom in reporting foreign and security policy issues as the Vietnam War (1964-75) – “the first television war” – was seen to tip the scale in favour of the media again. In accordance with the idea of free press, journalists had free access to the battlefield and they were not subjected to censorship. This was also meant to send the signal to the home front that the US was winning the war (Shpiro 2002, 78). Reporting of the war likened regular political reporting as the Johnson administration started to treat the Vietnam War as just one issue instead of a total war which would have required mass mobilization (Hallin 1997, 209). Similarly in New Zealand, which was also militarily engaged in Vietnam, the war and government policy

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23 Quoted in Dadge 2006, 91.
received considerable criticism in the media (Rafeeq 2007, 43-45). It has also been suggested that Agence France-Presse contributed to the critical tone of the international news coverage of the Vietnam War (Tunstall & Machin 1999, 79).

The Viet Cong strategy was to avoid military defeat – rather than to beat the US forces – and to create conditions in which US political victory would be impossible (Smith 2006, 235). The popularity of the war had been declining in 1967 and a poll showed that the American public did not understand what the war was about (Knightley 2003, 441). President Johnson was concerned about the public perception of the war and he urged General Westmoreland to travel across the US trying to convince the public of the rationale of the war in the fall of 1967 (Culbert 1988, 254). While the American troops became associated with atrocities on a few occasions such as burning of villages and killing of civilians in places like Cam Ne and My Lai, it was the Tet offensive in 1968 that proved to be a turning point in terms of domestic support for the war. Despite being a disaster for the North Vietnamese forces, the offensive indicated that the US was nowhere near winning the war. Renowned CBS news anchor, Walter Cronkite, said that he no longer believed the war was winnable which eroded the support for the war even further (Hammond 1989, 312; Herman & Chomsky 1988, 201). Years of fighting had taken its toll on the will of the Americans to continue fighting while the Viet Cong appeared as resolute as ever (Bishop 1978). The foreign policy elite grew more critical of the war and the Nixon administration, which followed Lyndon B. Johnson’s presidency, opted for ‘Vietnamization’ strategy reducing the number of US troops while increasing the use of air power. Eventually, US troops were withdrawn and South Vietnam was run over by the North Vietnamese troops in 1975 (Smith 2006, 236-237). Cameras witnessed the embarrassing evacuation of the remaining Americans from the roof of the US embassy into a helicopter in Saigon on 29 April 1975.

The conservative circles and the military became convinced that the war was lost because television consistently undermined the public support for the war by bringing the horrors of the battle into people’s living rooms (Kinnard 1975, 452; Hallin 1984; Knightley 2003, 470; MacArthur 1993, 113). General William C. Westmoreland, the Commander of US

24 In Britain, a protest at the US embassy in London resulted in clashes between the demonstrators and the police on 17 March 1968. Tet offensive had dominated the news for weeks prior to the demonstrations. Vietnam also divided political parties as the opposition wanted PM Harold Wilson to express Britain's support for the US fight in Vietnam while the Labour MPs wanted the Prime Minister to distance himself and Britain from the war (Whittaker 2005).
forces in South Vietnam, argued that “we in this country cannot send men to the battlefield unless the public is going to be behind them, and it is up to the politicians to ensure that such is the case” (quoted in Neuman 1996, 173). There were concerns whether the US – or any other democracy – would be able to sustain popular support for a war in the age of television. According to President Richard Nixon, television

“showed the terrible human suffering and sacrifice of war. Whatever the intention behind such relentless and literal reporting of the war, the result was a serious demoralization of the home front, raising the question whether America would ever again be able to fight an enemy abroad with unity and strength of purpose at home” (quoted in Hallin 1986, 3).

However, there are plenty of examples of how the media had engaged in self-censorship during the Vietnam War. For instance, CBS, ABC and NBC all had an editorial policy of shielding their viewers from graphic images which would have shown the true nature of war (Herman & Chomsky 1988, 200-201; Neuman 1996, 205; Williams 1993, 325-326). In another example of media’s readiness to self-censor, two Newsweek journalists found about 1971 “Operation Speedy Express” in which the US 9th Division killed 11,000 people – almost half of them were civilians. A toned down version of their story was published only six months later (Rai 2000).

In fact, Nixon’s concerns seem surprising if one considers the extent to which news has been managed by democratic governments in the post-Vietnam era. The reluctance of the US to commit military force in future conflicts without a clear national interest and public support – known as the “Vietnam Syndrome” – was remedied by adopting strict limitations on the freedom of the press in later military conflicts. Restrictions that had been in place in American war reporting from the Spanish-American War to the Korean War in early 1950s, were reintroduced (Lansner 2006, 5). This strategy had proven to be successful in the Falklands/Malvinas War between Britain and Argentina in 1982.

2.4.3 The Falklands War
In the Falklands War, reporters were dependant on the military for transport and communications in the remote South Atlantic. This forced them to accept Ministry of Defence rules in return to access to the battlefield enabling the MoD to control information flows (Knightley 2003, 478; Neuman 1996, 203-204). For instance, five weeks after the British task force was sent toward the Falklands with 29 reporters onboard, television was still lacking footage which is almost unimaginable in the present real-time news environment (Harris 1983, 77; MacArthur 1993, 138). Harris (1983, 92) argues that
“[i]t is clear that in many respects the British people were not given the facts during the Falklands war. Information was handed out slowly and often reluctantly by the Ministry of Defence; rumours were allowed to circulate unchecked; and the British authorities frequently used the media as an instrument with which to confuse the enemy.”

However, the lack of pictures was not BBC’s only concern as its coverage was blamed for lack of patriotism. The row over BBC’s war reporting started with Panorama program ‘Can We Avoid War?’ which, according to Glasgow University Media Group (1985, 128), was mostly supportive of the government policy despite the fact that some critical MPs were interviewed. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher found BBC’s use of ‘British troops’ instead of ‘our troops’ “chilling” and one MP considered it almost a treason that BBC had attempted to compare the accounts coming from Buenos Aires and British sources (Neuman 1996, 204). Thatcher and other Conservatives’ attack on BBC led the BBC’s chairman to say in a press release that “BBC is not neutral” (Glasgow University Media Group 1985, 127). Moreover, it was later revealed that privately some senior broadcasters in the BBC deemed it more important to cater for “the emotional sensibilities” of the audience than to provide objective and impartial reporting which in a BBC Weekly Review Board meeting was considered “an unnecessary irritant” (Rai 2000). And yet, BBC’s Richard Francis, a managing editor, argued that “[o]ur contribution to the national morale relies on telling the truth. We are not in game of patriotism. We are dealing with the job of finding out facts” (Glasgow University Media Group 1985, 125).

The Falklands War merely set a precedent of what was to become a common practice of strict limitations on press freedom in American interventions in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989) and most notably the Gulf War in 1991. Discouraged by the Vietnam experience, the US military “excluded the press from the invasion” of Grenada and established press pools in Panama (Newsom 1996, 86). In the former case, not only the press but also Larry Speakes, spokesman to the Reagan administration, was kept in the dark and he had no prior knowledge of the invasion other than rumours (Newsom 1996, 25). Yet, ABC had managed to retrieve information about the invasion but withheld it in order to avoid endangering the lives of the US troops (Dadge 2006, 91). In Panama, press pools were deployed only after the invasion was practically over (Thrall 2000, 235). It was an important testing ground for US military’s media management strategy before the Gulf War (Knightley 2003, 485). While the military developed ever more sophisticated media management strategies, the media also went through significant developments driven by technological innovations.

25 Italics in the original.
2.5 THE AGE OF CNN WARS

It is easy to forget how drastic the development of information and communications technology has been. For example, during the Vietnam War technology was so primitive that “footage was generally shot on film, not video, then shipped to a laboratory in Tokyo for development, and to New York for final editing” (Culbert 1998, 421). Moreover, actual combat footage from Vietnam was rare because the shooting team included a reporter, a cameraman and a soundman and the required equipment was considerable (Hammond 1989, 315). The first significant direct communication earth satellites and the Apple II computer were not introduced until 1970s. The Lebanon crisis, in June 1982, was the first international incident that was handled with satellite telephone system which enabled adequate contacts between Washington and US officials in the field (LaFeber 2000, 13). Finally, the emergence of global real-time all-news television channels reshaped news business in 1980s and 1990s; portable satellite dishes enabled transmission from distant places and by the end of this period over 120 communication satellites provided instant images to some 1.2 billion TV viewers (Bowdish 1998, 32).

In late 1980s, some predicted that the free flow of information will have “profound foreign policy implications” (Wriston 1988, 69-70). The photographs of the Chernobyl nuclear accident – taken by a private satellite – had forced the Soviet superpower to admit the scale of the disaster as the pictures had been published on the front pages all over the world. As a result of developments in communications technology, the Soviet bloc also lost the ability to control information available for its own citizens contributing to the fall of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites (Wriston 1988; Barber 1992, Blinken 2002, 104-105; Hiebert 2005, 2; Hachten & Scotton 2007, 181). In the words of Lech Walesa, trade unionist who became the President of Poland in 1990, “[w]hen it came to radio waves the iron curtain was helpless. Nothing could stop the news from coming through—neither sputniks nor minefields, high walls, nor barbed wire. The frontiers could be closed, words could not” (quoted in Hachten & Scotton 2007, p. 163). Similarly, by mid 1990s, 60 per cent of educated Chinese received their news primarily from the Voice of America (VOA) – i.e. US Information Agency (USIA) (Nye & Owens 1996). The international information flows became increasingly impossible to regulate (Wriston 1997, 174).

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26 Some use the concept of information revolution to “refer to rapid technological advances in computers, communications, and software that have lead to dramatic decreases in the cost of processing and transmitting information” (Keohane & Nye 2002, 164). For instance, the computerization of word treatment immediately significantly increased the volume of news produced and transmitted (Moisy 1996, 6).
27 Israeli forces attacked Lebanon in order to end PLO presence in its Northern border.
A number of scholars argue that international news channels such as CNN and BBC World have gained a position where they are used as messengers between foreign ministries (Rosenstiel 1994; Stech 1994; Hoge 1994; Louw 2003, 219; Wriston 1997, 174; Gilboa 2002b, 18-19; Larson 1986). Rosenstiel (1994) describes several incidents where real-time television replaced traditional diplomatic channels. For instance, CNN gave voice to the outcasts of the world diplomacy such as Ferdinand Marcos, the President of Philippines, and Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi while it also broadcast Soviet protest for the US invasion of Panama in 1989. By the late 1980s, CNN had provided the means to communicate “to the entire diplomatic community – if not the public – simultaneously” (Gilboa 2002a, 737). However, some have argued that the trend toward real-time reporting was accompanied by the decline of professional standards of journalism (Rosenstiel 1994; Gowing 1994a; Hoge 1994; Gilboa 2002a, 738; Gilboa 2002b, 22-24; Seib 2000, 2001).

2.5.1 The Gulf War
The Gulf War of 1991 was the first true ‘CNN war’ in which live coverage played a significant part. The war proved to be a success for the format of 24/7 news channel. Yet, according to Lawrence Grossman, former President of NBC News, the real-time coverage, rather than helping the viewer to understand what was going on, “served to mask the reality” (quoted in Seib 2001, 61). This was partly due to the fact that most journalists were far from the battlefields in their hotels in Saudi Arabia (Keeble 2000, 92). Only CNN’s Peter Arnett was in Baghdad reporting via satellite phone (Reese 2004, 261).

Following Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the fall of 1990, the US government and a public relations firm working for a Kuwaiti government group conducted highly skilful information campaigns to mobilize support for military action against Iraq. The priority of the US-led coalition was to win the war on the home front before the actual combat phase (Mallet 1997, 280). In the lead-up to the war, the CIA estimated that it would take at least two years before Iraq would be able to produce a nuclear bomb but the official estimates dropped to as less as two months when the war became evident (Keeble 2000, 93). Moreover, on the same day as President Bush announced that he would send troops to the Gulf, the Washington Post ran a story which claimed that Saddam Hussein had been uncooperative and aggressive in the negotiations with the US threatening to invade Saudi Arabia. Yet, the transcript of the meeting between Saddam and the US representative later
showed that the Iraqi President had been open to a diplomatic solution and he had assured that he did not intend to invade Saudi Arabia (Kellner 2004a, 138).

Similarly to the First World War Bryce report, false atrocity stories were circulated. This time these stories were professionally manufactured with the expertise of Hill & Knowlton, a public relations firm with links to the Republican Party representing Citizens for Free Kuwait. The most notorious atrocity story, which was widely reported and used by the Bush administration to justify war, alleged that Iraqi soldiers had taken 312 premature babies out of incubators leaving them to die on the floors of a Kuwaiti hospital. Despite the fact that the story was fabricated it played an important role in mobilizing support for military action against Iraq (MacArthur 1993; Kellner 2004a, 142). In fact, Hill & Knowlton had conducted a focus group survey to find out that this incubator story was highly effective in angering people. In addition, the firm organised a photograph exhibition portraying Iraqi atrocities and provided both print and video material for the media (Kellner 2004a, 142).

After the Falklands War, Robert Harris (1983, 150) had predicted that due to the development of new technologies the military would not be able to control information to the extent it did in the Falklands. Yet, once again, the journalists felt that their access to information had been severely and unduly limited (Hachten & Scotton 2007, 151; Fialka 1992; cf. MacArthur 1993, 199-200, Sharkey 2001, 23). In fact, it has been argued that the restrictions for the Gulf War reporting were more substantial than in any previous war (Jacobs 1992b, 675; Kellner 2004a, 137). The so-called pool system allowed only some journalists, often selected by the army, to access locations which the military saw appropriate. War reporting was organized in a way that reporters’ ability to obtain information and interpret events independently was limited. Access to official information was conditioned to good behaviour while the military provided material such as footage, concepts, slogans and frames of reference for journalistic use (Luostarinen 1991, 101). The aim of the military was sanitized and bloodless war reporting (Newsom 1996, 87) and it was largely successful in achieving this (Winter 1992).28 The war was portrayed as a videogame with ‘surgical’ strikes and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was demonized and equated with Hitler (Philo & McLaughlin 1995). This analogy “offered the military-industrial complex and the Department of Defense a demon to replace the Soviet menace

28 For instance, an Associated Press photo editor noted that there were no photographs of dead Iraqi soldiers (Fialka 1992, 5).
in the post-Cold War period” (Yetiv 2004, 85). According to Dorman and Livingstone (1994, 74), “the press merely replayed the highly personalized Saddam-as-Hitler analogy that was so thoroughly tested and refined by Hill and Knowlton research”.

The beginning of the ground war provides an illustrative example of the military’s approach to the media. Shortly before the beginning of the ground war, US Marines were exercising amphibious assault in the Gulf area. While reporters were hardly allowed to the other fronts, news media was invited to follow the exercise making it a major news story. Apparently this news media transmitted information played a role in the Iraqi High Command decision to move six divisions to the coast from inland as they assumed that the US forces might attempt to land on the Kuwaiti shore. However, the US troops never intended to land on the shore but attack from the west (Neuman 1996, 209; Luostarinen & Ottosen 2000, 42). General Norman Schwartzkopf seemed to be aware of the possibilities real time news media offered. He said that “an estimated hundred million people worldwide (including the Iraqi High Command) watches the broadcast live, as well as six hundred million who see the highlights on the evening news” (Taylor 1998, 145). The media supplemented – if not replaced – Iraqi intelligence gathering and captured Iraqi soldiers even acknowledged that they used radio as a source of information when they reported to their commanders.

As a result of manipulation and disinformation, not only the Iraqis but also the world audience was deceived. For instance, the media portrayed the American Patriot missiles as highly successful in intercepting Iraqi Scud missiles which were intended to hit Israeli targets. While President Bush claimed that 41 out of 42 Patriots had hit the target (Stech 1994), in reality, Patriots rather contributed to civilian suffering and destruction of property than prevented it (Winter 1992, 23). However, the illusion of effective cover was important for the morale, cohesion of the Coalition and demoralization of the Iraqis (Stech 1994).

While the US controlled the information to a considerable extent in the Gulf War and the effective media management strategies ensured that the coverage favoured the Coalition, a more radical notion of media’s power and independence emerged from the post-Cold War experiences. This notion claimed that “in international crisis situations global television has become the dominating actor in the conduct of foreign policy, replacing elected and

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appointed policy makers” (Gilboa 2002a, 732). The debate on growing media power in the international arena was particularly driven by advances in real time news technology, proliferation of 24/7 news channels and a popular perception that some of the ‘humanitarian interventions’ of 1990s resulted from the so-called CNN effect which can be summed up as follows: Media coverage of human suffering and atrocities force Western governments to “do something” after public pressure has become unbearable (Jakobsen 2000, 132). Often cited examples include Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992 (Cohen 1994, 9-10; Hachten & Scotton 2007, 182; cf. Mermin 1999; Robinson 2001a) and Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia in 1995 (Robinson 2001c; 2002, 80-82). The CNN effect debate was further fuelled by policymakers' remarks such as UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s reference to CNN as “the sixteenth member of the UN Security Council” (cited in Gilboa 2002a, 734).

While the jury is still out on whether the media influence actual policy outcomes, it seems that real-time media has put pressure on policy-makers to react faster to international events. If policy-makers refrain from instant reaction in order to wait for the complex intelligence gathering, evaluation and, finally, reporting they may come out as weak and hesitant (Gilboa 2002b, 19-20; Livingston 1997; Strobel 1997, 34; Seib 2000).

2.5.2 The Balkan Wars

The Gulf War was soon followed by a civil war in Yugoslavia. In general, Western audiences knew very little about Yugoslavia and its people prior to the dissolution. In this sense, news media played a pivotal role in identifying and depicting the warring parties of the conflict which eventually escalated into a tripartite civil war between the Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims.

The war broke out in Croatia in August 1991 and western journalists entered the country adopting the Croat perspective on the events simply because the fighting took place there. At this point, local Serbian and – especially – Croatian television stations provided footage for international distribution. Consequently, Swedish television news, for example, depended for the most part on Croatian footage. At the same time, the Serbs were identified as aggressors and the Croats as victims (Sommelius 1996, 78). Furthermore, very few correspondents knew Serbo-Croatian making them dependent on local interpreters or ‘stringers’ who may have had other loyalties as well.
The Croatian information ministry quickly hired English-speaking publicists (Brock 1993). The reception of international journalists in Belgrade was somewhat different. The Yugoslav federal information ministry had very few publicists and the regime was rather reserved with Western journalists. This attitude was reinforced by the coverage they received. Reporters moved to Zagreb and Sarajevo after the UN imposed sanctions against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 30 May 1992 – in the aftermath of the so-called Breadline Massacre. As a result, the Serbs lacked resources to hire a western PR firm to present its case internationally. At this point, Serb failure to get its message across via international media was evident and it derived from “official negligence, international sanctions, and a lack of media professionalism” (Brock 1993).

One of the peculiarities of media coverage on the dissolution of Yugoslavia is that Croatian President Franjo Tudjman was often seen “as a spiritual cousin of the German Christian Democrats” and the Croat regime as a democracy. The western media depicted the conflict as a struggle between democratic ideals and totalitarian Communism of the Milosevic

30 It should be noted that Sabrina Ramet has referred to Peter Brock (under the heading ‘Belgrade’s Friends in the West’) by stating that “[o]ther writers accused U.S. media of bias and one-sided reporting because the media devoted more time to reporting Serbian atrocities against non-Serbs than vice versa. No doubt there were those who, in World War II, considered it ‘biased’ that the American media devoted so little attention to discussing the ‘atrocities’ perpetrated by the Polish resistance against Nazi occupation forces.” (Ramet 2002, 220.) The point to note is that the information warfare over the story of Bosnia continues. Ramet equates the Serbs with the Nazis which is exactly what Ruder Finn – a public relations firm working for the Bosnian government – was trying to do. Ramet’s analogy is rather inappropriate to be presented in a scholarly study and – perhaps more importantly – she misses Brock’s point.

31 An explosion took place in a breadline in Vase Miskina Street in Sarajevo on 27 May 1992. Bosnian government blamed the Serbs and used the incident to put pressure on the UN Security Council, which was preparing to vote for sanctions against Serbia. Horrific footage of the incident had been shown on CNN and other news channels (Gjelten 2002). The UN set sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (UN Security Council resolution 757) on 30 May in spite of the fact that UN sources later acknowledged that Bosnian Muslims had themselves “set off explosives that killed 22 civilians outside a Sarajevo Bakery” (Brock 1993). Some eyewitnesses claimed that the street had been blocked off before the explosion while TV crews waited at a safe distance enabling them to be instantly on the spot (Thomas 1998, 134-135). However, Tom Gjelten (2002), a correspondent and the author of Sarajevo Daily: A City and Its Newspaper Under Siege, argues that the Sarajevo TV crew happened to be making an interview in an office building nearby and was alarmed by the explosion. The controversy remains because the UN did not do any investigation, interviewed eyewitnesses nor analysed the craters. Nevertheless, Generals Lewis MacKenzie and Satish Nambier of the UN peacekeeping force, UNPROFOR, were convinced that Muslims had staged the event.
regime even though neither of them was democratic but rather nationalistic and totalitarian (Sommelius 1996, 79-80; Hammond 2000a, 25; Hammond 2004, 184).  

Wolfsfeld (1997, 23) argues that stories from Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital under siege, were “the only way for the Muslims to mobilize external support” they desperately needed against a more powerful enemy who would have preferred to keep the conflict as an internal affair. The Bosnian government strategy was to ensure Western military support by manipulating the international media (Badsey 2000, 5). The Bosnian government had hired Ruder Finn, a Washington-based public relations firm, to run a successful information campaign to mobilize Western support (Brock 1994; Binder 1994, 1995; Binder & Roberts 1998; Seaton 1999, 267; Sommelius 1996; Thomas 1997; Thomas 1998). The strategy of this public relations campaign was to portray the civil war as ‘ethnic cleansing’ and equate the Serbs with Nazis. In an interview with Jacques Merlino in April 1993, director of Ruder Finn Global Public Affairs, James Harff, stated that

“At the beginning of August 1992, New York Newsday came out with the affair of [Serb] concentration camps. We jumped at the opportunity immediately. We outwitted three big Jewish organizations - B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Committee, and the American Jewish Congress. We suggested to them to publish an advertisement in the "New York Times" and to organize demonstrations outside the United Nations. That was a tremendous coup. When the Jewish organizations entered the game on the side of the [Muslim] Bosnians, we could promptly equate the Serbs with the Nazis in the public mind. Nobody understood what was happening in Yugoslavia. The great majority of Americans were probably asking themselves in which African country Bosnia was situated. But by a single move we were able to present a simple story of good guys and bad guys, which would hereafter play itself. We won by targeting Jewish audience. Almost immediately there was a clear change of language in the press, with the use of words with high emotional content, such as "ethnic cleansing", "concentration camps", etc., which evoked images of Nazi Germany and the gas chambers of Auschwitz. The emotional charge was so powerful that nobody could go against it.” (Quoted in SourceWatch 2004)

John Simpson of the BBC seems to support Harff's analysis: “a climate was created in which it was very hard to understand what was really going on, because everything came to be seen through the filter of the Holocaust” (quoted in Hammond 2004, 183). Ruder Finn was awarded a silver medal in crisis communication for their work in Bosnia by the Public Relations Society of America (Kempf 2002b, 228).

Hundreds of journalists were trapped in the besieged Sarajevo – where satellite dishes enabled transmissions (Gowing 1994b, 43) – not knowing what was going on in the rest of

32 In 1993, Council of Europe had criticized the Tudjman government for taking over the media enterprises and enforcing conformity in media views. According to Ramet (2000, 166), “Tudjman’s treatment of media contributed to the impression that he was an old-fashioned authoritarian without much tolerance for diversity.”
the country (Binder & Roberts 1998, 40). The Bosnian government spokesmen were always ready to present their views via satellite links to international audience but the journalists were unable to check the ‘facts’ Bosnian officials provided them (Binder & Roberts 1998, 44). On occasion, some tried to reach places like Mostar, a town in Western Bosnia, which was under siege by the Croats, but not all survived (Gowing 1994a). For example, an Italian TV crew lost three of its members in an attempt to cover the Mostar story in February 1994. The plight of this western Bosnian city went “virtually unreported” (Gowing 1994b, 26).

Because it was too dangerous to move in Bosnia and Herzegovina, reporting was heavily concentrated on Sarajevo resulting in rather one-sided coverage and dissemination of unverified information. For instance, the numbers of killed and raped were highly exaggerated in news media because the estimates were based on Bosnian and Croatian government propaganda (Brock 1993; Thomas 1998, 135-36; Binder & Roberts 1998, 42-43). Significant media organizations used the numbers given by the Bosnian government estimates of 200,000-250,000 killed in the conflict while Stockholm Peace Research Institute estimated in 1996 that 30,000-50,000 had been killed by the end of the war. Similarly, there were allegations of 60,000 rapes but organizations such as Amnesty International and the Red Cross agreed on 20,000 (Thomas 1998, 136-37). Bosnian Serbs provided information for the European Parliament and the UN that contained accusations of raping and killing Serb women but the media showed only minimal interest to alleged atrocities against Serbs while many of the stories of Serb aggression were based on similar unverified information (Brock 1993).

The journalism norms worked in the favour of the Bosnian government: the more negative information you give, the more newsworthy it is. Also the fact that the news industry is a highly competitive market influences the way far-away conflicts are covered – if they are covered at all (Seaton 1999, 257). This may have resulted in biased coverage as editors found the realities of the conflict too confusing and preferred a simple narrative of Good and Evil (Seaton 1999, 266-67). Correspondents complained that their reports had been revised by editors while a UN official said that “[t]he American press has become very partisan and anti-Serbian. They are very selective and manipulative with the information they use.” Furthermore, even respected news organisations such as Time, New York Times, BBC, Newsweek and CNN made blatant mistakes. A common error was the identification
of the victims of atrocities in pictures or footage as Muslims even when they were Serbs (Brock 1993).

Some journalists voluntarily gave up objectivity as a journalistic ideal and replaced it with “journalism of attachment” which insists that journalists cannot remain neutral in violent conflicts. Instead, reporters “have to take the side of the victims and demand that something must be done” (Kempf 2002a, 59). Martin Bell (1997), who coined the phrase, argued that

“In place of the dispassionate practices of the past I now believe in what I call the journalism of attachment. By this I mean a journalism that cares as well as knows; that is aware of its responsibilities; and will not stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the oppressor. This is not to back one side or faction or people against another; it is to make the point that we in the press, and especially in television which is its most powerful division, do not stand apart from the world. We are a part of it. The influence may be for better or for worse, and we have to know that too.”

According to Stephen Badsey (2000, 4), “journalists more than once told senior officers in confidence that they had chosen their side, and their personal objective was to promote even greater and more violent Western military intervention.” According to BBC’s Nik Gowing, journalists “empathized with the Bosnian government because of personal outrage at Serb aggression” and that “this partiality distorted the reporting” (quoted in Binder & Roberts 1998, 45). In September 1992, Roy Gutman, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, chose not to report about the massacre of 17 Serbs in the vicinity of Banja Luka later acknowledging this abandonment of objectivity in favour of the attempt to pressure Western governments to take action (Brock 1993).33

Kempf (2002a, 59) argues that journalism of attachment lacks analysis and vision as it merely depicts the conflict as a struggle between Good and Evil while reporters take the role of judges deciding on what is right and wrong. Put in practice, journalism of attachment led to situation where

“[j]ournalists faked empirical evidence by producing television images that did not show what they were claimed to show, but which put on show clichés and stereotypes which propaganda had already implemented in the minds of the audiences. And – which is perhaps even more symptomatic – journalists openly justified such forgery by claiming that it did not matter whether the pictures were faked since they served the goal of opening the eyes of the public” (Kempf 2002a, 60).

33 Yet, Gutman has warned about the danger of choosing sides: “Our job is to supply the facts so other people can make the judgments. The worst thing is to step across the line and recommend what should be done” (Gjelten 2001, 73).
However, Christiane Amanpour, an award-winning senior international correspondent for CNN, seems to reject this notion. She sees that the clear identification of “aggressor (Serb) and victims (Muslims)” by the international media was justified and that accusations of partisanship resulted from the nuisance and pressure journalists caused for Western leaders who were reluctant to get involved in the Balkan conflict.

“Bosnia was a just cause. The victims, the Bosnian Muslims, after all were upholding all the ideals we who belong to democracies consider sacred: multi-ethnicity, multiculturalism, tolerance. If Bosnia lost, we all would lose” (Amanpour 1996).

It has also been argued that the journalists were incompetent to understand what was going on in Bosnia because there were very few permanent correspondents in the area prior to the war (Binder & Roberts 1998, 35-36).

The presence of journalists seems to have influenced how the war was fought. According to Brock (1993, 154-155), several credible sources have confirmed that Bosnian forces “frequently fired on their own positions and people in Sarajevo and manipulated artillery attacks elsewhere in Bosnia for public relations and other purposes.” Canadian Major-General MacKenzie said at a press conference that he was unable to guarantee ceasefire “because I can’t keep the two sides from firing their own positions for the benefit of CNN” (Badsey 1997).

These public relations stunts were part of the media coverage which also served as source of information for world leaders. Based on interviews with policymakers, Gowing (1994b, 36) argues that the creation of UN safe areas was heavily influenced by news media because the non-aligned countries of the UN Security Council acted upon the information they received from television coverage. Venezuelan ambassador Diego Arria acknowledges that “[i]t was the knowledge [from TV images] that drove me because they gave me information” Furthermore, a senior UN official has stated that “TV images were fundamental. The non-aligned relied on television rather than the UN. If TV had not existed then the non-aligned would not have had the basis to pressure.” These are only few examples of how deeply the media, and public relations firms, became involved in the Bosnian War.

When the NATO intervened in the Balkans to stop the alleged ‘ethnic cleansing’ of Albanian Kosovars in 1999, NATO conducted an astonishing information campaign. NATO spokesman Jamie Shea has told that
“One thing we did well during the Kosovo crisis was to occupy the media space… We created a situation in which nobody in the world who was a regular TV watcher could escape the NATO message. It was essential to keep the media permanently occupied and supplied with fresh information to report on. That way, they [were] less inclined to go in search of critical stories.” (quoted in Kitfield 2001, 39).

In the absence of UN Security Council mandate, Serbian refusal to sign the Rambouillet accord was used as a justification for war. What went unreported is that the Rambouillet Accord’s Appendix B (United Nations 1999) on the “status of multi-national military implementation force” stated that “NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters” and that “NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, or criminal”. These are terms that NATO hardly could have expected any sovereign state to agree with. Only a year later, the BBC reported that the Rambouillet talks had been “designed to fail” (Hammond 2000a, 22).

The NATO information strategy was to portray the war as moral imperative and a humanitarian intervention (Hammond 2000a, Thussu 2000a). For instance, Blair stated that the war was between “Good and Evil; between civilisation and barbarity; democracy and dictatorship” (quoted in Hammond 2000a, 20). Milosevic was demonized in a similar fashion as the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. On 19 April, a picture of Milosevic was on Newsweek’s cover accompanied with a headline “The Face of Evil” (Lansner 2006, 7). As PM Blair’s public relations aide Alastair Campbell (1999, 36) noted, NATO was hardly in the risk of being defeated in military terms, but losing the “battle for hearts and minds” was still a possibility. In order to avoid this, Blair and Campbell campaigned for the Kosovo War using political marketing techniques more commonly used in domestic political communications and election campaigning (Vickers 2000). Meanwhile, geopolitical realities often went unreported because Western television news channels “tended to repeat uncritically the Western position” and provide moral justification of ‘humanitarian intervention’ rather than report on Western strategic and economic interests in the Balkan region (Thussu 2002, 205).

It has been argued that “most journalists covering the war were highly critical” (Hachten & Scottin 2007, 153) but empirical research does not seem to support this view (cf. McLaughlin 2002). For instance, the legality of the war was a marginal issue in editorial commentary on the Kosovo War in the German press (Eiders & Lüter 2000). The Flemish
press, in turn, heavily favoured NATO’s point of view and the coverage was dominated by “black-and-white reporting devoid of any critical reflection and without any knowledge of the complex context of the Balkan” (De Bens et al 2002, 255). Nelles (2004, 73) argues that the

“Western media offered little serious investigative journalism, largely reporting and reinforcing American and NATO propaganda efforts without questioning ‘facts’ presented. The United States and NATO immediately and effectively became judge, jury and executioner, demonizing Milosevic and the Serbs, even ignoring its own earlier allegations of Albanian ‘terrorism’, as well as OSCE mechanisms in place to prevent or de-escalate violent conflict or outright war. This is a complicated story, which became a simplified American-led NATO show and Pentagon-choreographed media event simply, and inaccurately, depicted the fight as one of ‘good’ prevailing over ‘evil’.”

NATO strategy was to prevent news and pictures coming out of Serbia and also to control information within the country (Hammond 2000b). In line with this strategy, NATO considered Serbian Television station as a legitimate target. The subsequent bombing, in which 16 media workers were killed, was a sign of a change in Western news management strategies (Paterson 2006). In the following Western military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, war reporting became increasingly dangerous and US forces were involved on a number of occasions in which media workers lost their lives.

2.6 THE WAR ON TERROR

In 2001, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington D.C. laid the ground for a greater government control of the frames of reference in the American media (Zelizer & Allen 2002). For instance, Michael Ryan's (2004) study shows that not a single editorial of ten largest US newspapers challenged the war in Afghanistan in the time period between 9/11 2001 and the start of the war on 7 October. Some have even argued that the global War on Terror has marked the “revival of the propaganda state” (Snow & Taylor 2006; Rutherford 2004).

Soon after the military operation in Afghanistan was launched, Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor to President Bush, publicly asked the US media not to carry terrorist ‘propaganda’. The media complied with the request and engaged in self-censorship (Louw 2003, 225; Hoffman 2002). CNN specifically instructed its workers to remind the TV viewers that the murdering of American civilians in New York and Washington was the reason for the war in Afghanistan (Luostarinen 2001, 29). In fact, CNN staff was also instructed that “showing the misery of Afghans ran the risk of promoting enemy
propaganda” (Louw 2003, 225). For example, as Voice of America (VOA) broadcast an interview with a Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar the “acting chief was quickly replaced” (Hoffman 2002). Meanwhile, Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, accused correspondents of being the enemy’s advocates in Afghanistan promoting Taliban and al-Qaeda propaganda. He claimed that the Taliban “would lie and drag people out of hospital over to a neighbouring building and claim we hit the hospital or killed innocent civilians, when we didn’t, and the press would carry it as though it were true” (quoted in Media Under Fire, 11).

It has been even argued that “winning modern wars is as much dependent on carrying domestic and international public opinion as it is on defeating the enemy on the battlefield” (Payne 2005, 81). The global war on terror is a case in point since the objective is the will of the people rather then beating enemy forces in the field. Media has become a major factor for both the terrorists and the Pentagon in planning their strategies (Louw 2003, 211). For instance, the events of 9/11 2001 were specifically designed for the news media (Sphiro 2002, 80; Louw 2003; see also Rampton & Stauber 2003, 132-133).

After 9/11 2001, it became evident that the US image problem in the Middle East could have serious repercussions. In an effort to tackle anti-American sentiments in the region, Charlotte Beers, who is famous for branding products such as American Express, was appointed Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to brand the US in October 2001 (van Ham 2002, 249). Moreover, in 26 February 2002, the Pentagon revealed that it was planning a new propaganda office called the Office of Strategic Information, which would seek to feed news items to the foreign media in an effort to manipulate public opinion. The New York Times reported on these plans and the office was disbanded due to a controversy that followed from the possibility that American media might pick up these false stories from foreign media (Rampton & Stauber 2003, 49).

In the aftermath of 9/11, the US government established Arabic-language Radio Sawa (“Together”) to counter the predominant anti-Americanism in the Middle East region. The radio station, broadcasting a combination of pop music and news, was later followed by a satellite television station al-Hurra (“The Free One”) as a response to the emergence of pan-Arab news organisations such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya. Despite the first-year budget of $62 million, various experts doubted that the effort would pay off because it is the American policies that cause discontent and until the policies change there will be no
significant changes in opinions. In addition, Al-Hurra lacks credibility because Arabs may see it merely as a vessel promoting American interests and policies (Borchgrave 2004; el-Nawawy 2006).

The centrality of the news media in the war on terror is also reflected in the considerable efforts of the Bush administration to discredit Arabic television news channel Al-Jazeera during the Afghan campaign (2001) and the War on Iraq (2003) (Figenschou 2006). According to a 10 Downing Street memo that was leaked to the Daily Mirror (22 November 2005), President Bush even considered bombing Al-Jazeera Headquarters in Doha, the capital of Qatar, in the spring of 2004 when the battle of Fallujah was raging in Iraq – despite the fact that Qatar is an important ally for the US in the Middle East.34

President Bush’s (2001, 20 September) remark “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” also sent a message to international news media. Kate Adie, BBC correspondent, has claimed that the Pentagon threatened to “bomb areas in which war correspondents are attempting to report from the Iraqi side” during the Iraq War (quoted in Media Under Fire: Reporting Conflict in Iraq, 3). In fact, the US has destroyed several news media bureaus in Afghanistan (both in Kabul and Kandahar) and Iraq since the bombing of the Serbian television during the Kosovo campaign (Sreberny & Paterson 2004, 19-20; Seppälä 2002, 60; Gowing 2003; Paterson 2006). The Pentagon has been very reluctant to even investigate incidents in which US forces seem to have killed media workers (Gowing 2003). It seems that the US forces do not make any distinction between legitimate news media satellite uplinks and those belonging to the enemy in the war zone (Paterson 2006, 25; Bell 2008).

34 Regular columnist with the New York Post Ralph Peters argued that “The [US] Marines in Fallujah weren’t beaten by the terrorists and insurgents, who were being eliminated effectively and accurately. They were beaten by al-Jazeera. . . . The media [are] often referred to off-handedly as a strategic factor. But we still don’t fully appreciate [their] fatal power. . . . In Fallujah, we allowed a bonanza of hundreds of terrorists and insurgents to escape us—despite promising that we would bring them to justice. We stopped because we were worried about what already hostile populations might think of us. The global media disrupted the US and Coalition chains of command. . . . We could have won militarily. Instead, we surrendered politically and called it a success. Our enemies won the information war. We literally didn’t know what hit us” (quoted in Payne 2005, 82).
2.7 DISCUSSION

Ever since the global media system emerged, it has provided an additional front in the struggle to extend one’s influence to both domestic and foreign mass media audiences. These efforts have been particularly intense in the lead-up and during international conflicts. Past conflicts have shown that “[e]very single nation, whether totalitarian or democratic, uses different types of propaganda before the war (to prepare and mobilize), during the war (to confuse and encourage) and after the war (to justify and ‘write history’)” (Nord & Strömbäck 2006, 86). As a logical consequence from the fact that the commercial news media infrastructure as well as its audiences are beyond comparison to information infrastructures that any government possesses (Bowdish 1998) global media continue to provide the battleground for the conceptual level of international conflicts. Accordingly, media management strategies have become central in modern warfare (Louw 2003, 218; Badsey 2000, 2000b; Seppälä 2002, 49). “Knowledge weapons” and information warfare (IW) manifest the fact that considerations of media have indeed influenced military strategies (Taylor 1997, 16).

The rapid development of information technology has contributed to transformation of social, economic and political structures which have, at least to some extent, eroded the basis of the modern international system such as state sovereignty, national economies and military power (Wriston 1997). It has been argued that this transformation has also reconfigured the sources of power and influence in the international system (Mowlana 1993, 59; Nye 1990a, 1990b) and that the exercise of power rests more and more on images and persuasion which are often linked with the so-called soft power (Keohane & Nye 2002; Metzl 1999, 17; van Ham 2002; Nye 1990, 2004; Gilboa 2002a, 731; Nye & Owens 1996). Metzl (1999, 13) argues that

“[m]ilitary action alone will not be effective without a sustained information campaign targeted at foreign populations explaining and justifying anti-terrorist activities in ways local populations will understand and appreciate. [...] [T]he essential engagement is not just physical but also conceptual. Success in specific geographic areas will only be successful if it is parlayed into success in conceptual spheres. Achieving this will require a fundamental change in the way governments behave in carrying out their foreign affairs”

35 On the same tone, Luostarinen & Ottosen (2002, 44) divide war propaganda in four stages. ‘Preliminary stage’ introduces the “target country to the news agenda”. At ‘justification stage’, this country becomes major news theme allegedly requiring urgent action. During the ‘implementation stage’ different methods are used in order to control war reporting. And finally, at the ‘aftermath justification phase’ sees the target country gradually fading from the news agenda.
The changing nature of conflicts themselves has contributed to the growing importance of the media. Sir General Rupert Smith (2006), who has served in the Gulf War, Bosnia and Northern Ireland, argues that, after the Second World War, industrial wars have been replaced by ‘wars amongst people’ which cannot be solved merely by applying military force. Since the objective in these wars is the will of the people, they extend to people’s living rooms via media. Smith (2006, 284-285) characterizes the role of the media in these new wars in the following way:

“Television and the internet in particular have brought conflict into the homes of the worlds – the homes of both leaders and electorates. Leaders are influenced by what they see and by their understanding of the mood of the audience, their electorate. And they act on these perceptions, often for reason to do with their own political purpose rather than the one at issue in the fight itself. Indeed, confrontations may end up crossing into conflicts, or escalating in levels of fighting, or indeed crossing the other way and de-escalating owing to perceptions formed from the media. Whoever coined the phrase ‘the theatre of operations’ was very prescient. We are conducting operations now as through we were on a stage, in an amphitheatre or Roman arena. There are two or more seats of players – both with a producer, the commander, each of whom has his own idea of the script. On the ground, in the actual theatre, they are all on the stage and mixed up with people trying to get to their seats, the stage hands, the ticket collectors and the ice-cream vendors. At the same time they are being viewed by a partial and factional audience, comfortably seated, its attention focused on that part of the auditorium where it is noisiest, watching the events by peering down the drinking straws of their soft drink packs – for that is the extent of the vision of a camera.”

The recent developments in military-media relationship have led Martin Bell (2008, 202) to argue that “We live in a new and more dangerous world, in which the journalists are no longer peripheral observers but influential players in the theatre of war”. Bell argues that while the nature of the war has changed, ”war reporting as we have known it no longer exists” (2008, 203):

"It is hard to escape the conclusion that in the absence of the independent journalism that has been driven from the field, embedded reporting is by its nature deeply and dangerously misleading.... I would hazard a guess that readers of The Times in 1854 were better informed about the Crimean war than the readers of any newspaper, or the viewers of any TV network, about the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2008.”

At the same time, the concentration of media ownership has left a few huge companies responsible for a large bulk of media content and distribution – many of which have economic interests in a wide range of industries. For example, the American NBC television network is owned by General Electric which is also heavily involved in arms industry and bids for Pentagon contracts in places like Afghanistan. Some observers hold the view that these links are so extensive that it is justified to talk about “Military-Industrial-Media Complex” in reference to Eisenhower's warning of growing influence of

36 "By 2002, ten gigantic multinational corporations, including AOL Time Warner, Disney-ABC, General Electric-NBC, Viacom-CBS, News Corporation, Viviendi, Sony, Bertelsmann, AT&T, and Liberty Media controlled most of the production of information and entertainment throughout the globe” (Kellner 2004b, 6).
arms industry at the height of the Cold War in 1961 (Solomon 2005, Reel 2004). For instance, Danny Schechter (2004, 30) argues that the media complacency is partly due to "the avid cooperation of the corporate sector, which owns and controls most media outlets. Some of those companies, such as NBC parent General Electric, have long been a core component of that nexus of shared interests that President Eisenhower called the 'military-industrial complex.' Now the media is part of the complex."

Moreover, global news flows are essentially dominated by Anglo-American news organizations to such a degree that some have claimed that there is, in effect, a “world news duopoly” (Tunstall & Machin 1999, 77). Especially important elements of this dominance are the two largest news agencies: the American Associated Press (AP) and the British Reuters. Hamid Mowlana (1993, 69) argues that “[t]ransnationalization of information distribution through media conglomerates is a particularly disturbing trend, for it allows one cultural and/or national perspective – mostly American – to expand its influence over the global cultural industries and the distribution of information.” This hegemonic position in the global news industry gives the US “a permanent strategic advantage” (Luostarinen & Ottosen 2002, 56) and this is reinforced by the fact that media has become an increasingly important element in modern warfare.

Armed conflicts pose the ultimate challenge for journalism. Governments have grown increasingly sophisticated and ruthless in their information campaigns and news management while, after the Cold War, the number of foreign correspondents has decreased especially in American media organizations and the pressures of real-time coverage may have lowered journalistic standards. New portable technology which allows reporters to transmit via satellite links has not freed journalists from their dependence on official sources (Livingston & Bennett 2003).

Tony Blair’s (2007) speech “Defence of the United Kingdom and Its Interests” indicates that the fears about the implications of “a completely new world of modern communication and media” for foreign policy have become a constant concern for policy-makers. While Nixon raised concern about television – a relatively new medium at that time – Blair was also concerned about an Internet website where military personnel can send gruesome images from the battlefields. Yet, post-Vietnam conflicts showed that the media could still be used as an instrument in manufacturing consent by democratic governments. Des Freedman (2004, 68) argues that

“while there have been many moments of tension between media and government in the reporting of war, their interests are not fundamentally opposed. Governments need sympathetic me-
dia coverage to legitimise and sustain war while, with very few honourable exceptions, editors and journalists share many of their government's ideological assumptions about war and are anxious not to undermine the 'national interest'.

Indeed, McLane (2004, 78) argues that there is “a trend toward greater media-military cooperation” while surveys suggest there is public support for taking measures to limit the freedom of the press in foreign policy crisis situations in the US (*Media Under Fire*, 6; McLane 2004, 80). At the same time, it has been argued that warfare has become increasingly secretive and the media, while providing the illusion of “openness and transparency”, are complicit in keeping the public in the dark of what is really happening. For instance, the US/UK bombing of Iraq throughout 1990s went virtually unreported (Keeble 2000, 93).

The role that propaganda, well-organised and systematic persuasive communication, plays in democracies is often dismissed with three different arguments: Western democracies are open and there is a multiplicity of voices, journalism is guided by a set of norms that should guarantee independent reporting and that eventually audiences make their own interpretations of the contents that they consume. Yet, journalism norms, news criteria and practical conventions of news production make journalism predictable and enable skilful actors to influence the attitudes and actions of their target audiences (Luostarinen 2002, 19-21).

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37 Not all agree. Some argue that “the press wants freedom, and the military wants control. Those are fundamental differences that will never change” (Aukofer & Lawrence 1995, vii)
Chapter 3

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO MEDIA AND FOREIGN POLICY

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Over the years, a considerable amount of predominantly American academic research has addressed the relationship between media and foreign policy (e.g. Cohen 1967, Entman 2004, Nacos et al. 2000, Gilboa 2002d) especially during international crises (e.g. Hallin 1986, Bennett & Paletz 1994, Mermin 1999, Thussu & Freedman 2003). Some scholars have explored military-media relationship in conflicts (Aukofer & Lawrence 1995, Carruthers 2000, Martin 2006) while others have looked more specifically at some other aspects of the wartime reporting such as the coverage of anti-war demonstrations and dissent (Hackett & Zhao 1994, Reese & Buckalew 1995, Reese 2004, Such et al 2005, Dardis 2006, Bishop 2006). The role of the media in peace negotiations and international diplomacy has also been explored (Ramaprasad 1983; Seib 1997; Wolfsfeld 2001; Shinar 2000; Gilboa 1998, 2000, 2002c, 2005) and especially the literature on public diplomacy has been growing fast since 9/11 2001 (Nelles 2004, Zaharna 2004, Hoffman 2002, Ross 2002, van Ham 2003, Price 2003, Wang 2007). Moreover, there is a growing body of literature on the so-called peace journalism which seeks to explore how the media could take up a more constructive role in conflicts (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005; Hackett 2006, 2007; Kempf 2007; Tehranian 2002; Peleg 2006). Finally, Philip Taylor (1994, 1997) has


39 Reese and Buckalew (1995) argue that dissent with regard to the Gulf War was portrayed as an opposite to patriotic which reflected the general level of approval of the military operation in the media.
put forward a view in which the media are an integral part of the history of the international relations.

Yet, Hanson (1998) argues that few efforts have been made to develop generalisations or theories about the role of news media in foreign policy-making and that the literature has consisted mainly of single case studies and has, therefore, remained rather fragmented (see also Malek & Wiegand 1997). While there is cumulative and theoretically informed research on media—foreign policy relationship in the field of political communication with a heavy focus on the US, the research agendas of International Relations theory and Foreign Policy Analysis have expressed rather marginal interest in the role of news media and information technology in the conduct of foreign policy.  

Less than 2 per cent of the articles published in six leading Anglo-American international relations journals dealt with some aspect of media which lead Martin Shaw (2000, 29) to conclude that “no systematic, general rethinking of the media has appeared in the critical debates over international relations.” Consequently, Abbas Malek (1997a, xii) points out that the media-foreign policy nexus “is one of the least systematically explored areas in the field of international relations and international communication” and the foreign policy—public opinion—media conundrum remains, what Seaver (1997, 79) has called, “the most overlooked area in the current foreign policy literature”. However, it should be noted that there are also some studies that have specifically focused on the triangle of foreign policy, media and public opinion (Nacos et al 2000, Seaver 1997, Soroka 2003, Bloch-Elkon 2007).  

For example, a text book (Neack et al 1995) about the so-called ‘second generation of foreign policy analysis’ pays no attention to phenomena such as the ‘CNN effect’ and ‘media diplomacy’ or any other media-related issue. Welcome exceptions are Naveh’s study (2002) integrating foreign policy analysis and media management theories, LaFeber’s study (2000) on technology and US foreign policy, Anthonsen’s (2003) study on Danish and Swedish policies with regard to UN operations and the media as well as Mor’s (2006) study on Public Diplomacy in the new communications environment. According to Mette Anthonsen (2003, 300), “[r]esearch on the relation between media and foreign policy suffers from lack of synthesis between communication studies and Foreign Policy Analysis.” Very few studies on the subject are genuinely interdisciplinary in their approach even though several scholars acknowledge the importance of interdisciplinary research (see e.g. Badsey 1997; Robinson 2000b, esp. 227, 230; Gilboa 2002b, 8; Naveh 2002). For a discussion of lack of interdisciplinary approach see Gilboa 2002a, 732; Robinson 2000b.

Yet, Peter van Ham (2002) claims that the shift from Industrial Age to Information Age poses a major challenge for IR theory which, therefore, should be reconsidered.

This negligence is all the more surprising if one considers the fact that during the Cold War period it was widely recognised that that “coercive facilities are one among a number of foreign policy instrumentalities. Diplomatic negotiation is another, economic means are another, and mass communication is a fourth. These four means—military, diplomatic, economic, and symbolic—are the major instruments of foreign policy”
Many closely-related studies have focused on topics such as foreign policy rhetoric (Bostdorff 1994; Bostdorff & Goldzwig 1994; Kuusisto 1998a, 1998b, 1999; Shimko 1995; Wander 1984) and there is also considerable amount of literature on public opinion and foreign policy in the United States (see e.g. Almond 1956, Gamson & Modigliani 1966, Caspary 1970, Jentleson 1992, Jentleson & Britton 1998, Powlick & Katz 1998, Holsti 1999, Baum 2004b, Knopf 1998, Oneal et al 1996).43 Existing research indicates that public opinion matters in foreign policy formulation (Powlick & Katz 1998, 30; Baum 2004b; Foyle 2004) but much of the literature on foreign policy opinions fails to address seriously the question of the role of the media in opinion formation and some studies have deemed media coverage rather irrelevant. For instance, Mueller (1971, 373-374) argues that television’s impact on the level of public support for the war in Vietnam was insignificant in comparison to other factors. Meanwhile, other studies indicate that media influence on public opinion in foreign policy issues is significant (Iyengar & Simon 1993, 381; Jordan & Page 1992; Oneal & Bryan 1995) and public opinion only becomes activated when a foreign policy issue is widely covered by the media (Powlick &Katz 1998, 39-40).

However, there is no agreement on how significantly the media influence the formation of public opinion. Some argue that the control of the media makes it possible “to limit what people know” (Hague, Harrop & Breslin 1992, 173) while other scholars suggest that news media is also able to affect how to think and, consequently, what to think (Kellow & Steeves 1998, 110; Entman 1989). Bernard Cohen (1967, 13) is a bit more cautious in his seminal study The Press and Foreign Policy in which he argues that “the press is significantly more than a purveyor of information and opinion. It may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its

43 After the Second World War, American research suggested that the public opinion is volatile, incoherent and has little influence on foreign policy (Almond 1956). However, many studies have challenged these notions after the Vietnam War and there is a growing body of research indicating that public opinion in foreign policy issues is rather stable and rational in the US (Shapiro & Page 1988, Jordan & Page 1992, Jentleson 1992, Nincic 1992, Jentleson & Britton 1998, Drezner 2006, Oneal et al 1996, Page & Bouton 2006). Moreover, research emerging from other countries also indicates that public opinion on foreign policy issues is not as erratic as the early studies in the US have suggested (Forsberg et al 2001, Risse-Kappen 1991). For instance, Isernia et al (2002) tested the thesis of rational public in Italy, Germany and France and concluded that public opinion is not significantly more volatile in these European countries than in the US.

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readers what to think about (his emphasis). After all, it is through media that people learn about the foreign policy and the wider world (Soroka 2003, 42-43; Malek & Wiegand 1997, 18). Consequently, public opinion studies, like studies in foreign policy rhetoric, remain rather shallow insofar as they do not consider the media as the potential source of public opinion and as the conveyor of foreign policy messages.

This chapter reviews theories of media-state relations which have emerged from American political communication literature and constitute the most advanced and empirically tested body of literature on media-foreign policy relationship in a democracy. This chapter first reviews the theoretical and empirical findings of theories of media-state relations in the US and then moves on to consider the prospect of this literature providing a theory of media-foreign policy relationship in democracies in more general terms while also identifying potential problems for this approach. The presumptions of theories of media-state relations come into conflict with some of the findings in the field of international communication. This chapter concludes that comparative research is crucial in order to investigate whether theories of media-state relations predict with greater accuracy how media covers international politics than the international communication literature on the coverage of international politics.

3.2 MANUFACTURING CONSENT OR DRIVING FOREIGN POLICY?
THEORIES OF MEDIA-STATE RELATIONS ASSESSED

“The media of mass communication have the primary function of communicating the foreign policy and security issues as formulated by the Executive, and as reformulated by the Congress to different parts of the public. But this function is not simply a matter of neutral communication. It involves selection, interpretation, in other words decisions about the salience of issues, and the importance of information” (Almond 1956, 373-374).

Albeit Almond might consider the press as a necessary evil between the executive and the citizenry, this extract touches upon an issue which has been paramount in subsequent academic debates on the relationship between media and foreign policy: the level of press independence from the government frames of reference in covering foreign and security policy issues. From a normative point of view, the functions of the media far exceed the mere communicating of elite opinion in democratic decision-making. After all, “[t]he job of an independent press is not just to report the words and deeds of official actors, but to...”

44 In a UK study, Yoel Cohen (1986, 66) argues that the “media create a climate of opinion on international matters” and “this climate limits the opinions available to policy-makers”.

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offer a perspective based ‘outside the government’” (Mermin 1999, 144; see also Mermin 2004). This is essential if the media intends to fulfil its responsibilities in informing citizenry, encouraging policy debate and holding governments to account. Yet, decades of political communication literature shows that there is a discrepancy between the normative assumptions about democratic decision-making and actual media performance in the foreign policy area. Bennett and Manheim (1993) argue that “[a]s a practical matter, news organizations routinely leave policy framing and issue emphasis to political elites”. According to this view, the media “manufactures consent” for official policy line by relying heavily on official sources in their reporting. However, a competing view can be distinguished from the debate on media’s role in foreign policy. The notion of the so-called CNN effect encapsulates the notion that the news media may play an independent role driving policy.

However, as Bennett and Livingston (2003, 359) point out, the media performance should rather be seen on a continuum between compliance and autonomy:

“rather than advocate one extreme or the other regarding press-government autonomy or dependence, it makes sense to think of journalists as semi-independent players in the news game. There is no inherent contradiction in the idea that press-government relations are characterized by potentially extreme variations from independence to dependence. Rather than continuing to debate the extremes of autonomy or dependence, it makes more sense to explore the uneasy and often disjointed combinations of the two.”

3.2.1 CNN Effect Thesis

The notion of growing media influence on foreign policy emerged from the debate on the role of real-time news media in the humanitarian interventions of 1990s. This so-called CNN effect – sometimes referred to as the CNN factor or the CNN curve – claims that real-time news media have started to drive foreign policy. While no conclusive evidence has emerged to support the thesis (Gowing 1994b, Jakobsen 1996, Strobel 1997, Mermin 45 Schudson (2002, 263) points out with regard to informing citizens that “it is not a very good approximation of the role that the news media have historically played—anywhere”. Indeed, audience research on knowledge about the Israeli-Palestine conflict, for instance, indicates that the media do not perform very well in educating people about the wider world (Philo & Berry 2004). Similarly, Kull et al (2003) argue that misperceptions among the American people were common with regard to Iraq War at least partly because many major media organisations did not question the Bush administration claims.

46 Piers Robinson (2002) has developed a policy-media interaction model to explain the dynamics of media influence/non-influence. His model is quite impressively build on existing research integrating these apparently contradicting theses of the CNN effect and manufacturing consent paradigms.
1997, cf. Robinson 2002), several policy-makers have given support to the CNN effect thesis. For instance, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater commented US policy formation on the violent suppression of student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in Chicago Tribune in 1991:

“We were the first government to respond, labeling it an outrage and so forth, and it was based almost entirely on what we were seeing on television. We were getting reporting cables from Beijing, but they did not have the sting, the demand for a government response that the television pictures had” (quoted in Hoge 1994).

George Bush senior has also said that “I learn more from CNN than I do from the CIA” (quoted in Moorcraft & Taylor 2007, 40). Moreover, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has said that “CNN is the sixteenth member of UN Security Council” (quoted in Gilboa 2002a, 734) and continued:

“The member states never take action on a problem unless the media take up the case. When the media gets involved, public opinion is aroused. Public emotion is so intense that United Nations work is undermined and constructive statesmanship is almost impossible” (quoted in Cate 2002, 5).

Despite policy-makers’ numerous testimonies, the findings of academic research on the subject remain controversial to say the least. One problem has been the fact that the CNN effect has remained ill-defined. In one of the few attempts to dissect the CNN effect thesis, Livingston (1997) distinguishes three media effects on policy-making: agenda-setting, impediment and accelerant. Table 3.1 summarizes the content of these media effects.

However, Livingston’s definition of the CNN effect is problematic. Anthonsen (2003, 30) points out that agenda-setting is a prerequisite of impediment and accelerant effects: “Putting an issue on the agenda is a prerequisite for affecting policy outcome” However, it is noteworthy that the existence of free media may affect decision-making as policy-makers adapt to this media environment. Hence, it should be possible that some policy

47 Even the definition of the CNN effect is still a subject of debate even though, in general, the definitions are rather similar albeit vague. Margaret H. Belknap (2002) defines the CNN effect as “the collective impact of all real-time news coverage.” According to Eytan Gilboa (2002a, 732), CNN effect theory “claims that in international crisis situations global television has become the dominating actor in the conduct of foreign policy, replacing elected and appointed policy makers.” Piers Robinson (1999, 301) argues that “CNN effect encapsulated the idea that real-time communications technology could provoke major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global events.” According to Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2000, 132) the causal mechanism of CNN effect is usually conceived in the following way: “Media coverage (printed and televised) of suffering and atrocities → journalists and opinion leaders demand that Western governments ‘do something’ → the public pressure becomes unbearable → Western governments do something.”
alternatives are rejected in the fear of negative media coverage whether or not the issue is on the news agenda. What matters is the policy-maker’s belief that some actions are likely to lead in negative media coverage. They may also consider the possibility that reporters might jeopardize the successful implementation of the policy by publicizing pieces of strategic information.  

Table 3.1. Conceptual variations of CNN effect (Livingston 1997, 2).

| Accelerant | Media shortens decision-making response time. Television diplomacy evident. During time of war, live, global television offer potential security-intelligence risks. But media may also be a force multiplier, method of sending signals. Evident in most foreign policy issues to receive media attention. |
| Impediment | Two types: 1. Emotional, grisly coverage may undermine morale. Government attempts to sanitize war (emphasis on video game war), limit access to the battlefield. 2. Global, real-time media constitute a threat to operational security. |
| Agenda Setting Agency | Emotional, compelling coverage of atrocities or humanitarian crises reorder foreign policy priorities. Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti said to be examples. |

Moorcraft and Taylor (2007, 40) also question the motives of the policy-makers to promote the notion of growing media power. They argue that, in order to “shift responsibility away from themselves, politicians often pretended that the media were all-conquering”. They claim that

“[t]o argue in the 1990s that graphic pictures prompted government reaction was implausible then; it is almost laughable now […] there is still little or no scientific evidence to prove that violence on television – factual or fictional – affects the behaviour of individuals or governments.”

While Somalia is often used as an example of the CNN effect (Cohen 1994, 9–10), Mermin’s (1999, 137) study concluded that it was rather a demonstration of “the power of governments to move television” than vice versa. Other studies have reached similar conclusions (Robinson 2001a, Graybill 2004, Strobel 1997). Similarly, the claim that the media ‘lost’ the Vietnam War has been rather painstakingly rejected by arguing that the media coverage was a mere reflection of, rather than an active player in, the breakdown of consensus on Vietnam policy in Washington (Hallin 1986; cf. Culbert 1998)⁴⁹. In fact, the

⁴⁸ However, Piers Robinson’s policy-media interaction model gives the concept a very specific use. He points out that CNN effect and accelerant effects should be kept “conceptually distinct” because accelerating policy-making does not per se result in media influencing policy outcomes (Robinson 2002, 39).

⁴⁹ Culbert’s analysis of the dramatic Loan footage, showing an execution of a Vietcong suspect in Saigon during the 1968 Tet Offensive, takes a different position on the role of the media during the Vietnam War emphasizing television’s visual impact on policy-making. He suggests that “[t]he Loan footage and photograph legitimized the moral
main bulk of studies suggest that the media tend to serve the interests of the government by ‘manufacturing consent’ behind the official policy. For this reason Zaller and Chiu (1999) have even called the media ‘government’s little helper’.

3.2.2 Manufacturing Consent Paradigm
While only a few well-tested theories on the nature of this relationship between media and foreign policy have emerged, rather convincing amount of evidence suggests that the range of debate is set by the executive branch of the government (Herman and Chomsky 1988; Herman 1993; Entman 1991; Malek 1997b, 244) or wider elite (Hallin 1986, Bennett 1990, Mermin 1999) in the US. These notions are known as executive and elite versions of the manufacturing consent paradigm. The executive version “emphasizes the extent to which news media content conforms with the agendas and frames of reference of government officials,” while the elite version “holds that news media coverage conforms to the interests of political elites in general whether they are in the executive, legislative or any other politically powerful position in society” (Robinson 2001b, 525-526).

Herman (1993, 45), drawing on the executive version, argues that “[b]oth structural analysis and empirical evidence of media performance support the view that the mainstream media tend to follow a state agenda in reporting on foreign policy”. Herman and Chomsky (1988, 306) analysed media coverage of several international crises in their famous study Manufacturing Consent concluding that

“the mass media of the United States are effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda function by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions, and self-censorship, and without significant overt coercion. This propaganda system has become even more efficient in recent decades with the rise of the national television networks, greater mass-media concentration, right-wing pressures on public radio and television, and the growth in scope and sophistication of public relations and news management.”

In Herman and Chomsky's (1988) view, there are several 'filters' that limit the scope of news content such as media ownership, its concentration and the commercial profit-seeking nature of news organizations. Moreover, news organizations’ reliance on arguments of the anti-war movement” and “became a part of the foreign policy-making process for the average person, for the politician looking for dramatic images with which to clothe his election-year promises, and for policy-makers, both military and civilian” (Culbert 1998, 437).

50 It should be noted that Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model is often criticised for failing to take account that different elite groups may have different interests which, allegedly, would lead to less uniform journalistic output than Herman and Chomsky admit (Hallin 1994, 13; Klaehn 2002, 154; Lang & Lang 2004, 196-197).
advertisers as the main source of income and dependence on powerful newsworthy sources jeopardize the prospect of independent reporting. Indeed, there is an abundance of evidence to support the argument of media's heavy reliance on government sources in news production (Gans 1979, Sigal 1973). Luostarinen (2002, 274) argues that “journalism tends to prefer official, powerful sources which have arranged easy access to information and professional personnel to serve the needs of the journalists.” This results in “a systematically structured over-accessing to the media of those in powerful and privileged institutional positions” (Hall et al 1978, 57). Hall et al call these influential sources ‘primary definers’ who are able to set the tone of the news. For example, in the case of the Gulf War of 1991, it has been argued that the reliance on official sources “ensured that the public’s and the President’s understanding of this international crisis would be congruent” (Iyengar & Simon 1993, 382). It is noteworthy that not only textual content but also news photography tends to reinforce the official interpretation of a foreign policy issue (Griffin 2004).

Bennett (1996, 376) argues that the first rule of political reporting is “the imperative to build a story line—whenever possible—upon official or at least authoritative viewpoints”.51 As Sigal (1973, 69) notes, “[e]ven when the journalist is in a position to observe an event directly, he remains reluctant to offer interpretations of his own, preferring instead to rely on his news sources. For the reporter, in short, most news is not what has happened, but what someone says has happened”.52 Reliance on authoritative sources also protects reporters from accusations of partisanship and possible lawsuits (Tuchman 1972). According to BBC/freelance reporter Jake Lynch,

"If say, for example, you cease to base your news agenda on the words and deeds of official sources, of the Prime Minister, of the government and start to base it instead on gathering alternative perspectives, on gathering news from unconventional sources. Then you will be somehow exposing yourself to the risk that you will be accused of being biased.” 53

In addition, governments have become increasingly skilled in manipulating the media employing their specialist spin doctors to handle the media. This trend is not limited to

51 Bennett (1990, 103) lists three reasons why the news media mostly uses official sources when covering daily news: 1. supporting the status quo also maintains the economically favourable conditions in which news media operates, 2. symbiotic relationship between the government sources and journalists, and 3. by giving the elected actors voice serves democracy.

52 For example, a Sky News reporter happened to witness a London bus exploding on 7/7 but was told by the editors that they would not go live on the spot until the reporter had a statement from authorities (Allan 2008).

foreign policy issues and the US. Barnett and Gaber (2001, 1) argue that “the vital function of independent and critical reporting is being progressively undermined to the ultimate benefit of those in power” in the UK. They argue that the sophistication of political PR and pressures on reporters make it increasingly difficult for journalism to fulfil its roles in the service of the democracy. According to Manheim (1991, 5):

“[p]oliticians, governments, and others have become increasingly sophisticated in their ability to anticipate how the news media will report their words and deeds, and how public will respond to those reports. They have developed increasingly effective strategies for managing or circumventing the news, shaping their images, and channeling public perceptions. This has reduced the role of journalists and the so-called free press almost to the point of complicity, and it has deprived the public—never highly motivated toward politics to begin with—of the tools it needs to make informed judgments about world and national affairs. The result is a democracy of the uninformed, one that is ever more vulnerable to the wispiest breezes of political expediency.”

Manheim’s argument is supported by Lawrence Jacobs (1992a, 199) who argues that the sophistication of public opinion polling and public relations techniques have contributed to the fact that “[i]nstead of exerting outright administrative domination, liberal democratic governments have developed the capacity during the twentieth century to manipulate the public in order to create consent and even enthusiastic support for their actions.” This trend has also influenced the foreign policy making. Bennett (1994, 37) argues that “[w]hat is clear about the contemporary world of foreign policy is that policy process includes public information management as an integral political calculation.” Clearly, governments have expertise and access to information which allows them to interpret reality for the public and mould attitudes (Anthonsen 2003, 15). After the Cold War, the number of foreign correspondents has decreased in American news organisations (Miller 2005c) which has increased the government's ability to set the agenda of foreign news.

“With low budgets for newsgathering, news corporations often interview government officials as a cheap alternative to actually travelling to the field. Using government officials as sources also adds perceived reliability of information, and protection against inaccurate reports. As such, a great deal of reporting on ‘foreign affairs’ is conducted from the domestic capitals. The

54 Barnett and Gaber (2001) identify four different factors that change the balance between reporters and sources. First, sophistication and wide use of political PR have given an advantage to news sources. Second, they argue that there is a growing willingness of the owners to interfere with journalistic output and their closer connections with the political power. Third, there is increasingly tough competition due to multiplicity of news outlets. Finally, there are structural changes within news organization which challenge the ability to provide independent and critical political reporting.

55 According to Bennett and Manheim (2001, 282), the rise of 'strategic communication', “the scientific engineering and targeting of messages that subordinate the ideals of deliberation and transparency to the achievement of narrow political goals”, undermine democratic decision-making.
result is an increase in the power of the government in choosing what will or will not become news, and a dominance of the government spin on the news” (Hawkins 2002, 227).

However, several studies maintain that the government is able to control the news frames only under certain conditions, e.g. when the government has a clear policy line (Robinson 2002), when elites agree on the policy (Hallin 1986) or when policy is successfully implemented (Mermin 1996). For instance, with regard to the Vietnam War, Daniel Hallin (1986, 213) concluded that “the behavior of media [...] is intimately related to the unity and clarity of the government itself, as well as to the degree of consensus in the society at large.” Accordingly, W. Lance Bennett’s (1990, 108) influential ‘indexing hypothesis’, which was formulated in a study on the *New York Times*'s coverage of the US policy on Nicaragua, suggests that “mass media news is indexed implicitly to the dynamics of governmental debate”. Bennett (1990, 106) argues that

“[m]ass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given topic.”

In effect, this rule implies that views that are not expressed in elite debate would not be found in the news coverage while conflict among the officials “serves as a signal for journalists to expand a story to encompass the views of experts, social groups, opinion polls, and other sources that reflect the observed differences among powerful politicians” (Bennett, 1996, 376).

A number of case studies support the theory while they have also added further nuances to the theory (Bennett 1990; Hallin, 1986; Livingston and Eachus 1996; Mermin 1996, 1999; Zaller & Chiu 1999; Bennett et al. 2006). For example, in accordance with the indexing hypothesis, Lewis and Rose (2002, 569) argue that the discussion whether George Bush (senior) had the power to take the US to war with Iraq was largely absent from media coverage during the build-up to the war due to lack of conflict among the elites.56

In a case study on the Panama invasion and the Gulf War, Jonathan Mermin (1996) concluded that the contradiction between the indexing hypothesis and critical journalistic identity can be explained. Criticism of decision itself is transformed into criticism of the ability to execute the policy when there is elite consensus on a given policy. Consequently, there are no critical voices when policy is successfully implemented in the sphere of consensus. Mermin’s argument is consistent with Hoge’s perception of media-state

56 According to Peer and Chestnut (1995) newspaper coverage was less supportive of the government than television news.
relations during the Cold War: “[t]he press was often critical, but of the execution of the policy more than the aims” (Hoge 1994).

Althaus (2003, 387) points out that some previous studies in the US, including Bennett’s (1990) and Mermin’s (1999) studies, have omitted international actors from the analysis. Meanwhile, Althaus et al. (1996, 418) argue that when elite consensus prevails, journalists turn to foreign news sources to provide the ‘other opinion’ in order “to satisfy the norms of conflict and balance” which implies that coverage is indexed to international elite opinion. Yet, Zaller and Chiu (1999, 24) suggest that journalists evaluate the newsworthiness of sources by their “capacity to foretell or affect future events”. Hence, Bennett (1996, 378) added a further nuance to indexing theory claiming that “[t]he development of a story beyond normal institutions and newsbeats suggests a third representation rule for journalists pursuing a complex developing story: follow the trail of power.” This ‘mechanism’ which may give foreign sources greater access is sometimes referred to as ‘power indexing’ (Zaller & Chiu, 1999; Billeaudeau et al., 2003).

It has been argued that the level of independence of the American media from official frames of reference has increased after the end of Cold War (Entman & Page 1994, 83; Althaus et al. 1996; Entman 2000; Zaller & Chiu 1999; Rojecki 2002). For instance, Entman (2003, 416) sees that the changes in both media and the international system since the end of the Cold War have left the indexing hypothesis outdated – at least to some degree. However, some argue that the post-Cold War press independence may have been eroded after 9/11 2001 (Sreberny and Paterson 2004, 18–19). Bennett et al (2006) investigate the media frames of the Abu Ghraib scandal in the US arguing that “the arc of news framing and public opinion during the Iraq war suggests that indexing still cues opinion” (p. 469).

From a normative point of view, media should be more than just a propaganda arm of the government, elites or other already powerful domestic or foreign actors as suggested by the executive, elite versions and power indexing respectively. Circulation of views at odds with the official foreign policy is crucial for democratic processes (Entman & Page 1994). To remedy the situation, Mermin (1999) has suggested that journalists should give more prominence to expert views as well as opinions of citizens who have genuine interest in foreign policy.
However, Cristina Archetti (2008a) has argued that the indexing hypothesis is rather problematic paradigm especially when applied outside the US. Firstly, she argues that there are other factors in play that explain why the journalists tend to “reproduce the official line”. Secondly, she claims that there are problems with regard to operationalisation of “indexing” and the findings might result from methodological choices rather than “an objective reality”. Thirdly, due to various operationalisations of indexing in different studies the literature does not provide as cumulative findings as is often assumed. Fourthly, indexing cannot explain media-government relations outside the US context due to differing notions of journalism across countries. Fifthly, changes in the media system driven by technological innovations may have left the indexing hypothesis outdated.

3.2.3 Policy-media interaction model

Robinson (2002) integrates the CNN effect thesis with the elite version of manufacturing consent paradigm by building the policy-media interaction model on two main arguments in his policy-media interaction model:

- Media influence occurs in the absence of a clear, well-articulated policy line. CNN effect research indicates that policy certainty decreases news media influence while policy uncertainty tends to increase this influence. This is consistent with policy studies literature which indicates that external efforts to influence policy are more likely to succeed during elite dissensus. Therefore, the degree of policy certainty

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57 Archetti (2007, 53-54) points out, “[t]he difficulty in understanding what being 'indexed' to the political debate actually means relates to several aspects. The first is defining what the nature of 'indexing' is: it could be either a correlation, a compatibility or a reproduction of contents. Depending on the definition of what indexing is, the data analysis could lean to different assessments of the levels of indexing within media coverage: 'reproduction' of political messages—i.e. Contents detected within coverage should be exactly the same as those in the political discourse—could be stricter criterion than 'compatibility'. In the latter case, the contents would not have to be the same. They could be just 'similar', although, in turn, a new definition would be needed about how similar contents should be in order to be coded as 'compatible'. And even when such clarification is made, what would the nature of such 'contents' be?"

58 This point is also supported by interview-based research. Nik Gowing (1994a, 1998) and Warren Strobel (1996, 1997), both prominent journalists, have conducted numerous interviews with policy-makers, officials and journalists in order to investigate policy-media interplay during humanitarian crisis and armed conflicts. They are sceptical of the CNN effect thesis and conclude that the government may lose control of the media only if it lacks a clear policy line. However, it should be noted that interview-based research lacks a systematic treatment of the subject as well as a solid theoretical approach. In this regard, interview-based provides more of a collection of anecdotes than a theoretically informed framework for analysis. On the limitations of interview-based research see Robinson 2002, 16-18.
is an essential element in assessing potential news media influence on government policy line (Robinson 2002, 25).\textsuperscript{59}

- Another key factor in determining news media potential to influence policy is the way news coverage is framed. Robinson (2002, 25) assumes that, during humanitarian crises, “news media influence is greatest when coverage is framed so as to criticise existing government policy and empathise with the plight of suffering people.” However, media coverage may also create emotional distance and support government policy of non-intervention.

Basically, the model is designed to detect when policy uncertainty and critical empathy-framed news media coverage coincide with humanitarian intervention. If they do not coincide he interprets the direction of influence from government to media and vice versa. The policy-media interaction model argues, in accordance with manufacturing consent literature, that critical coverage is unlikely when elite consensus exists. Hence, media influence on policy requires policy uncertainty and elite dissensus that enables critical and empathy-framed media coverage. In this scenario policy-makers are forced to consider 1) how this coverage influences public opinion, 2) how this influence affects government image and credibility and 3) how functional the existing policy line is.

Robinson (2002, 37) distinguishes two basic forms of influence: a “strong CNN effect” occurs when “media coverage is a significant influence on the policy process and might operate as either a necessary or even sufficient factor in producing a particular policy outcome.” The “weak CNN effect,” in turn, hypothesizes “that a media effect might occur when policy makers are personally affected by random media reports that highlight a particular crisis” (Robinson 2001a, 942).\textsuperscript{60} Furthermore, “media coverage is not so much creating a political imperative for policy-makers to act, but rather serves to cause a

\textsuperscript{59} Governmental sub-systems such as the White House, the State Department, the National Security Council and Pentagon formulate policies after “a complex bargaining process.” Hence, Robinson (2002, 26) defines policy uncertainty as “a function of the degree of consensus and co-ordination between the sub-systems of the executive with respect to an issue”.

\textsuperscript{60} His emphasis.
politician to be inclined to take a particular course of action." Table 3.2 summarises the findings of US-originated theories of media-state relations.

Table 3.2. The policy-media interaction model and theories of media-state relations (Robinson 2002, 31).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of elite consensus</th>
<th>Media-state relationship</th>
<th>Role of the media</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elite consensus</td>
<td>The media operate within ‘sphere of consensus’ and coverage reflects elite consensus on policy (Hallin 1986)</td>
<td>Executive manufacturing consent: the media remain uncritical and help build support for official policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite dissensus</td>
<td>The media operate within ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’ (Hallin 1986) but overall coverage does not favor any side of the elite debate</td>
<td>The media reflect elite dissensus as predicted by Hallin (1986) and Bennett (1990) but remain non-influential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite dissensus but policy certainty within executive</td>
<td>The media operate within ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’ (Hallin 1986) but coverage, overall, becomes critical of government policy</td>
<td>Although coverage pressures government to change policy, policy certainty within executive means that media influence is resisted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elite dissensus plus policy uncertainty within government</td>
<td>The media take sides in political debate and coverage becomes critical of government. The media are now active participants influencing elite debate</td>
<td>The ‘CNN effect’: in condition of policy uncertainty, critical media coverage provides bargaining power for those seeking a change in policy or makes policy-makers feel pressured to respond with a policy or else face a public relations disaster. Here the media can influence policy outcomes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.4 Cascading activation and political contest models

While the policy-media interaction focuses on the influential relations between actual policy decisions and media coverage, there are two models which have sought to explain how the government's framing of events might become under a challenge.

Robert Entman’s (2003) cascading activation model provides further nuances to theoretical literature on foreign policy-media relationship. In his model there is a competition over media frames “along a continuum of total dominance by one frame to a completely even-

61 Robinson (2002, 4) encounters some rather awkward difficulties in explaining the meaning of ‘influence’: “In this study I occasionally use the term cause (without assuming the phenomenon is overly deterministic) and, more often influence. When I argue that ‘A’ influenced/ caused ‘B’ to occur I am saying no more and no less than that if ‘A’ had not been present, ‘B’ would have been unlikely to occur. [...] Also, to say that the media influenced or caused intervention is not to claim that it was the only factor, only a necessary one” (my emphasis). Since Robinson gives two contrasting definitions, it remains unclear whether cause/influence refers to the necessity of ‘A’ on the occurrence of ‘B’ or merely to statistical (positive) correlation between phenomena.
handed standoff between competing frames” (Entman 2003, 418). Ideally, free press provides diverse coverage with different interpretations even if these would challenge the government’s frame. Yet, Entman (2003, 418) argues that frame parity, in which the news provides a ‘counterframe’, “is the exception, not the rule”. For example, Entman argues that President Bush’s framing of the 9/11 terrorist attacks prevailed in the media coverage despite the fact that there was also a counterframe which emphasised the role of Saudi Arabia in international terrorism while the Bush administration was focusing on Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. According to Entman (2003, 429), elite dissensus is essential for the emergence of counterframes and their ability to challenge government frame. Consequently, the model does not contradict indexing theory. Rather Entman sees his model supplementing indexing theory by explaining how contesting frames emerge.

Entman (2008) has further developed his cascading activation model to theorize US government public diplomacy efforts to influence foreign media. He defines 'mediated public diplomacy' as “mass communication (including the internet) to increase support for a country's specific foreign policies among audiences beyond that country's borders” (Entman 2008, 88). Entman argues that the success of this process depends largely on cultural congruency while other important factors include the stance of the political elite of the targeted country as well as their skills and power to influence the media coverage either to accept or reject the US framing of events. Entman (2008, 95) illustrates the significance of the cultural congruency by comparing European responses to the Gulf War and the Iraq War. While the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait helped to identify Iraq as the aggressor and therefore a threat to be countered, the pre-emptive war by the US met considerable resentment. Cultural congruence also explains Entman's (1991) findings on the KAL and Iran Air incidents, in which the Soviets and the Americans shot down commercial airliners, indicating that similar events are covered very differently. However, the success of the government to control the news coverage is due to the fact that their framing was culturally congruent. He concludes that the framing “coincided closely with the administration's interests, and much of the congruence appears traceable to the rhetoric and media strategies employed by the Reagan administration” (p. 25). Moreover, despite some similarities between the Chinese Tiananmen movement and Kwangju movement in South Korea, the US media covered them in drastically different terms as a result of differing government responses (Kim 2000).

62 His emphasis. In more specific terms, Entman (2008, 89) defines 'mediated U.S. public diplomacy' as "the organized attempts by a president and his foreign policy apparatus to exert as much control as possible over the framing of U.S. policy in foreign media."
Gadi Wolfsfeld’s *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East* (1997) provides a ‘political contest model’ of media-state relations. In this study the competition of actors over the access to media and the media frames is viewed as a part of a larger political struggle. Wolfsfeld (1997, 3) argues that political power can usually be translated into power over news media because political culture has a major influence on how media cover conflicts, news media is rather reactive than initiative, political realities determine how actors use the media, and because political decisions regulate who owns the media and how it operates. However, media coverage may occasionally conform to the perceptions of marginalised groups. Wolfsfeld identifies the conditions under which non-elite groups can challenge government control of news media coverage. He argues that, during the 1987 Palestinian Intifada, the news media frame of “injustice and defiance” served the interests of the Palestinians as the Israeli government had lost the control of media agenda. Robinson (2001b, 539-541) sees that political contest model is an important supplement to our understanding of policy-media interplay as it theorizes when non-elite groups can employ news media as a vehicle of influence.

### 3.3 EXPORTING THEORIES OF MEDIA-STATE RELATIONS

The main bulk of research on media and foreign policy focuses on the United States while no extensive theoretical and cumulative literature exists on any other country with regard to the relationship between foreign policy and the media. At the same time, theories of media-state relations have tended to treat the media entirely as a domestic factor having little significance on the international level. Moreover, cross-national research on media-state relations has remained rare (Stolle & Hooghe 2005) even though ‘[r]ecent research has demonstrated the importance of the comparative method in testing media theory across national borders’ (Dardis 2006, 410). Daniel Hallin (1997) has also emphasized that the study of war and media would greatly benefit from comparative studies. There are two main concerns when exporting American theories of media-state relations to Europe or other regions. The first has to do with states’ differing positions in the international system and the second with national characteristics, such as the journalistic culture or political system, which may significantly differ from those of the US.
3.3.1 Hierarchical international system

States and news organisations are part of hierarchical international system. Hence, some studies emphasise the American influence on national media during international crises through the dominant position of both the US government and news organisations as sources of information (Mucunguzi 2005; Nohrstedt 2005; Nord and Strömbäck 2006; Ottosen 2005b; Thussu 2000a, 2000b). Daya Thussu (2005, 271) has argued that “[t]he general pattern of media ownership indicates that the west, led by the US dominates the international flow of information and entertainment in all major media sectors”. This dominance is particularly strong in the news sector leading Tunstall and Machin (1999) to argue that there is, in effect, a US/UK “world news duopoly” of which AP and Reuters are an essential part. The major news agencies tend to set the agenda also for smaller news agencies and nations, which have insufficient resources to cover international events independently, rely heavily on their wire copy (Rafeeq 2007, 152). This has led a number of scholars to argue that there has been globalisation of news with increasing harmonisation of news content across the world. It has been argued that the global media infrastructure is an essential part of globalisation (Rafeeq 2007, 6).

Several studies on the international coverage of international conflicts seem to support the notion of US/UK dominance in international news. For instance, Ali Rafeeq's (2007) study on the press coverage of the Iraq War in New Zealand emphasises the ability of the US government and military sources to dominate the news agenda due to newspapers' dependence on few Anglo-American news agencies and media outlets. Similarly, Kupe and Hyde-Clarke’s (2005) study on South African media during the Iraq War points out that national media may have insufficient resources to cover international conflicts independently. Instead, they rely on Western news agencies which, according to some scholars, conform to the interests of Western governments. Studies (Maslog et al 2006, Lee et al 2006) based on data from five South East Asian countries indicates that stories relying on news agencies were more supportive of the Iraq War than stories produced by newspapers' own correspondents.

63 For instance, Lee and Yang (1996) showed that AP’s coverage of the Tiananmen movement reflected US foreign policy concerns while Japanese Kyodo news agency was reluctant to challenge the Chinese government due to Japanese economic interests in China. Yet, even though the Anglo-American news media are well-positioned to influence national media, Skurnik’s (1981) study concluded that African newspapers tended to choose from the foreign media those that suited the national interests of their country.

64 However, Horvit (2004) did not find support for the argument that, despite differing government policies, the French AFP would portray the US in more negative terms than
A cross-national study (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000b) of media coverage of the Gulf War in Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the US concluded that the coverage overall tended to focus on the US and conveyed the US political agenda. However, variations remained between media outlets and different national contexts (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000b, 255-256). Meanwhile, the Iraqi propaganda had very limited influence on media coverage for a simple reason: “all Iraqi information, whether it came directly from the authorities or via the media, was labelled and treated as propaganda by media in the West” (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000b, 259). Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2000b, 270) conclude that “[t]he same ethical principles and rules of balanced and independent journalism are not usually applied in international as in national conflicts.”

Thussu (2002, 205) suggests that, in the case of Kosovo, geopolitical realities went unreported because Western television news channels “tended to repeat uncritically the Western position” and provide moral justification of “humanitarian intervention” rather than report on Western strategic and economic interests in the Balkan region. Empirical research suggests that the NATO propaganda campaign was very effective (De Bens et al 2002, Vickers 2000). These findings suggest that the media, rather than ‘manufacturing consent’ for the views of national foreign policy elites, reflect the viewpoints of major powers in the international system. This is also suggested by power indexing discussed earlier.

Soderlund et al. (1994) compared the TV news coverage of the Panama invasion in the US and Canada, concluding that, in both countries, sources favourable to the invasion had greater access to media and, consequently, the US point of view prevailed in the coverage.

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65 AP in the lead-up to the Iraq War.
67 With regard to Kosovo, it has been argued that the Western objective was to secure a safe route for oil and natural gas transport from Caspian Sea area to Central Europe (Gokay 2002, 8). Similarly, Thussu (2004, 51) has argued that the media missed “the real story” behind the invasion of Afghanistan whose central location in the midst of world’s energy resources makes it a potential route for oil and natural gas transit (for more detailed analysis of the region’s energy resources and Western policy see Gokay 2002).
“set of common news sources, which tended to be supportive of American initiatives, dominated access to the news media in both the United States and Canada […] this study has demonstrated the remarkable extent to which the American government, through a variety of news sources, can get its viewpoint expressed in the news.”

It has to be noted, though, that there was no significant Canadian opposition to the US invasion of Panama and other studies have found evidence of the independence of the Canadian media from the US. Kim et al. (2007) concluded that despite the traditionally strong influence of the US media on the Canadian news coverage, the Canadian press coverage of the Darfur crisis reflected the view of Canadian foreign policy and the influence of the US media was limited. In addition, Hibbard and Keenleyside (1995) draw a similar conclusion with respect to Canadian coverage of the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990–91. They argued that

“The case of the Persian Gulf crisis thus seems to be a heartening example of the capacity of the Canadian public, aided by its media, to resist the powerful attraction of attitudes and perspectives from south of the border. The explanation for this independence of thought would seem to rest in differences in political culture between Canada and the United States. This country's less militaristic history; its penchant for compromise in contrast to America's seeking of unambiguous solutions, its greater patience (and hence readiness to give sanctions time to work), and its preference for peacekeeping over peace enforcement were doubtless all at work in shaping press and public attitudes in Canada distinctly different from those in the United States.”

Meanwhile, in the field of international communication, some argue that the media are operating above the nation states providing the same content to everyone anywhere. According to this line of argument, national public spheres are replaced by a global public sphere. On the other side of the argument are those who claim that people learn about the world mainly from national news outlets and from national perspectives (Ruigrok & van Atteveldt 2007, 69). They argue that the homogenization of global news thesis is far-fetched (Clausen 2003, Ruigrok & van Atteveldt). For instance, a study conducted by Cohen et al (1996) on Eurovision news exchange indicated that news is ‘domesticated’ to suit the local audiences.

In addition, a comparative study of the Gulf War coverage on seven television news channel worldwide concludes that “each service's overall narrative construction of the meaning of the war and the abilities and motivations of the antagonists” significantly differed across countries (Swanson & Smith 1993, 189). Hence, “media globalization did not produce a global narrative. On the contrary, the global television environment provided ample resources by which nationally relevant and distinctive narratives were produced. Viewers of each service saw a coherent narrative of the beginning of the Gulf War, what was happening, why and what it had to do with them” (Swanson & Smith 1993, 191).
These findings indicate that national characteristics might play a significant role in explaining how national news organizations cover international events.

3.3.2 National media systems
It has been noted that American media theories may not work outside its borders because ‘other democracies organize press coverage on the basis of different normative understandings about power, citizen information, and the role of the press in political communication’ (Bennett 1996, 376; see also Cohen 1995, Anthonsen 2003, Archetti 2008a, Corner 2003). For example, among the most noticeable differences between the US and European media systems is the weight placed on Public Service Broadcasting and higher level of competition between newspapers in the latter (Sparks 2007a, 77). Moreover, Gadi Wolfsfeld (2008, 199) has suggested that “in multiparty systems characterized by a wider range of political parties, one will find a much larger range of views in the national press.” Kazuhiro Maeshima (2007) argues that national media coverage of international events is influenced by several factors such as state's political culture, public opinion, government policy line and organizational characteristics such as newspaper's political orientation. Maeshima argues that national political communication cultures are heavily influenced by history.

Despite national differences, some studies suggest that the executive version (Lehmann 2005, Glasgow University Media Group 1985) and elite version (Tumber & Palmer 2004, Eilders & Lüter, 2000) might have wider relevance across countries. Riegert (1998, 293) argues that “despite similarities between national media systems, an international media culture and heavy dependence on international news agencies, television news tends to 'nationalise' foreign conflicts to domestic frameworks of understanding about the world outside.” Her analysis of British and Swedish media coverage of foreign policy crises identifies government policy as an explaining factor (see also Vilanilam 1983). Stolle and Hooghe (2005) analysed television news coverage in nine countries and the pan-Arab Al-Jazeera, suggesting that government policy line was a crucial factor in determining coverage of the Iraq War. Dimitrova et al (2005) analysed 246 news sites concluding that a third of the stories on the Iraq War were negative in countries that opposed the war compared to 15 per cent in countries that supported the war. Lehmann's (2005) analysis of US and German media coverage of UN Weapons Inspections prior to the Iraq War suggests that government policy line is a major factor in determining the range of media coverage. Meanwhile, Yang (2003, 245) drew similar conclusions on a study on American and
Chinese media coverage of the Kosovo War by arguing that “national interest would have a powerful role in framing the international media content because of its decisive role in making government policies and subsequent actions.” Finally, Dimitrova and Strömbäck's (2008, 216) study concludes that “the elite newspapers in Sweden and the USA framed the war in ways congruent with the national foreign policy and the positions of the political elites in each country”. In sum, there is a vast amount of empirical research literature which suggests that government position might be the single most important factor explaining media frames regardless of regime type (cf. Chan 1994).

Some studies lend support to the elite version of manufacturing consent thesis indicating that the elite opinion is an important factor in explaining how international events are covered. Tumber and Palmer (2004, 164–65) concluded that their findings on British media-state relations during the Iraq Crisis are consistent with Hallin’s (1986) findings on Vietnam War coverage in the US. Eilders and Lüter (2000) analyse editorials of the German press during the Kosovo War arguing that there was wide political consensus supporting the use of military force across the political field. Only a small leftist party opposed which was reflected at the left end of the spectrum of newspapers. The study shows that the breach of international law was not a significant issue in the debate. Only a fraction of editorials “fundamentally disapproved of the war” while most of the criticism focused on “procedural aspects of the war”. Eilders and Lüter conclude that the editorials failed to provide perspectives that were not already present in parliamentary debate. This indicates that the indexing hypothesis might explain media-state relations also in a multiparty system (cf. Otopalik and Schaefer 2006). However, some studies suggest that the press-government relations vary across countries due to different political systems. Mikhail Alexseev and Lance Bennett (1995) investigated press-government relations in the US, the UK and Russia. They argue that there were three “different patterns of press-government relations” although the debate was elite-driven in all three countries. With regard to the UK, they conclude that “the party in power is given considerable room to articulate its policy preferences” while the party debate is also cued (Alexseev & Bennett 1995, 409). Timothy Cook (1994) compared US and French television news coverage of the Persian Gulf War concluding that while the American journalists relied on the White House, the Pentagon and the State Department, French journalists turned to political party leaders.
The most recent and serious challenge for the generality of theories of media-state relations is Archetti's (2007) 'Global News Model'. She conducted a cross-national research testing the validity of theories from the field of political communication, international communication and news sociology concluding that

“[t]he news framing of 9/11, as the study of its coverage in eight newspapers across four different countries [US, France, Italy, Pakistan] suggests, can effectively be explained by the selection of newsworthy sources within the news. It is the range of sources, their variety of origin (foreign rather than national) and identity (politicians/intellectuals/social actors/religious leaders etc.) that determines the scope and variety of the news discourse. The choice by journalists and editors of which sources are newsworthy is guided by national interest, journalistic culture, and editorial policy. These variables act as multiple and progressive filters on the media professionals' judgements of newsworthiness: they shape their news values.” (p. 12)

On the other hand, Liebes et al (2008) argue that nationalisation of news is no longer possible with the domestic audience exposed to international media and that journalists act more independently regardless of public and/or government resentment.

3.4 CONCLUSION

To summarise, this chapter argues that the US-originated theories of media-state relations are the most sophisticated line of research on media-foreign policy relationship despite the shortcomings. Yet, they have not been widely tested outside the US. Some of the problems with exporting these theories to other areas were also identified. For instance, drawing from international communication literature, one could arrive at almost opposite hypotheses of how media coverage of the Iraq War should differ across countries – if at all. On one side of the argument are those who argue that the US and American media play such an important role that they can, in effect, influence news coverage worldwide. On the other side of the argument are those who argue that international news are adapted to national setting and typically portray the views of the national government and/or national elites.

It is fair to say that it is still unclear to what degree country characteristics, such as differences in national media systems, political systems and position in the international system, affect the generality of the theories of media-state relations but, eventually, ‘[r]eal advances in theoretical development with respect to the media and foreign policy will ultimately depend on our looking at more countries, rather than just at more cases’ (Cohen 1994, 11).
Chapter 4

THE IRAQ CRISIS, 2002-2003

4.1 INTRODUCTION


As the Iraq War of 2003 became the “most covered war in history” (Katovsky & Carlson 2003, xi), communication scholars have added to this growing body of literature by tackling different aspects of the media performance in covering the Iraq crisis and the war that followed (e.g. Artz & Kamalipour 2005, Nikolaev & Hakanen 2006, Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005, Lewis 2004, Kull et al 2003, McChesney 2005, Rojekci 2008). Some studies have explored issues such as the role of the news agencies (Horvit 2006, Rantanen 2004), news photography (Männistö 2004, Tomanic 2004, Schwalbe 2006, Griffin 2004, Fahmy...
This chapter draws from this vast literature discussing the events leading up to the Iraq War with an emphasis on Bush administration and Blair government’s case for war and media management strategies in order to provide the context for the analysis of press coverage in the subsequent chapters. Other issues, such as the motives of the Bush administration and Blair government to invade Iraq, are not the subject of this study although the substance of their strategic communications and how the media covered these issues are relevant for this study.

4.2 THE RUN-UP TO THE US/UK INVASION OF IRAQ

In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration took several measures to tackle America’s image problem. Charlotte Beers, better known for branding Uncle Ben’s rice, was appointed as Under-secretary of State for Public Diplomacy to (re)brand America (Snow 2003). The PR-minded Bush administration established ‘instant response’ offices in Washington, London and Islamabad in Pakistan to influence media coverage. In addition, the Pentagon set up Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) for overseas propaganda and worked closely with Hollywood producers to ensure patriotic television programming (Paterson 2005, 53-54; Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005). However, OSI had to be aborted after the New York Times (Dao & Schmitt 2002) published a story in February 2002 that the office would plant false stories in foreign media that might be picked up by the American media. Despite the nominal disbanding of the OSI, its functions have still been carried out (Shanker & Schmitt 2004). In fact, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that, while “OSI” might be history, he is going to “keep doing every single thing that needs to be done and I have” (Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting 2002).
Unlike in the Gulf War of 1991, there were several Arabic real-time news channels such as Al-Jazeera which challenged the US narrative in Afghanistan which became the first target of the American “War on Terror”. According to one official, the US wanted “to combat hate media” in the region (Snow 2004, 54). The US accelerated its public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East by establishing radio al-Sawa, which begun broadcasting in March 2002. It was followed by television channel al-Hurra which went on air in February 2004. These efforts to communicate directly to Arab audiences could be seen in the context of Bush administration’s changing foreign policy objectives in the Middle East – or, in other words, its plans to invade Iraq.

Saddam Hussein's Iraq had gone from a Western ally against Iran in the 1980s to a villain after invading Kuwait in 1990. This aggression was met by President George Bush’s (sr.) decision to go to a war against Iraq. A wide international coalition drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait but Saddam was allowed to stay in power. However, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions and weapons inspections on Iraq. Some elements of the George H.W. Bush administration felt that the Iraqi regime should have been toppled in the Gulf War. When they re-entered the office with George Bush Jr., they seized the opportunity to push their policies in the favourable circumstances that the 9/11 terrorist attacks had created (Kramer & Michalowski 2005; Gilpin 2005, 11; Magstadt 2004, 204; Dueck 2006, 156). Several key positions in the Bush administration were held by signatories of a letter that had demanded President Clinton to take a more forceful stance on Iraq in January 1998. 

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67 For Bush administration’s troubled relations with Al-Jazeera see Figenschou 2006.
68 According to William Kristol, editor of a conservative weekly magazine The Weekly Standard, before 9/11 it was not clear President Bush would adopt the neoconservative agenda in foreign policy (Magstadt 2004, 203).
69 The letter (Project for the New American Century 1998) stated: “It hardly needs to be added that if Saddam does acquire the capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction, as he is almost certain to do if we continue along the present course, the safety of American troops in the region, of our friends and allies like Israel and the moderate Arab states, and a significant portion of the world’s supply of oil will all be put at hazard.” The signatories included US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and Richard Perle (a member of Defense Policy Board which is an advisory board for the Secretary of Defense). PNAC also prepared a “blueprint for maintaining global US pre-eminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests” (Project for the New American Century 2000, ii).
There is evidence to suggest that the Bush administration considered invasion of Iraq as a viable policy option soon after 9/11 2001 even though the US decided to attack Afghanistan first (Woodward 2004, Beaumont et al 2001). Consequently, soon after the Taliban regime was toppled in Afghanistan in November-December 2001, the Bush administration turned its focus on Iraq. According to one administration official, Bush decided to pursue regime change in Iraq in early 2002 (Dueck 2006, 157). The planning for invasion of Iraq was in full progress during the first half of 2002 (Woodward 2004) and General Tommy Franks presented operational war plans to Rumsfeld and Bush in as early as February 2002 (Doig et al 2007, 28).

According to the British Ambassador to Washington, President Bush requested Britain’s support for ousting of Saddam only days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Phythian 2005, 129). Leaked Downing Street memos indicate that Britain got involved in the planning of the invasion of Iraq early on. For instance, Blair’s chief foreign policy advisor David Manning, who discussed Iraq with National Security Advisor to President Bush, Condoleezza Rice, wrote a memo to PM Blair on 14 March 2002. The memo states that

“We spent a long time at dinner on IRAQ. It is clear that Bush is grateful for your support and has registered that you are getting flak. I said that you would not budge in your support for regime change but you had to manage a press, a Parliament and a public opinion that very different than anything in the States. And you would not budge either in your insistence that, if we pursued regime change, it must be very carefully done and produce the right result.”

The memorandum also points out that President Bush had not yet figured out “how to persuade international opinion that military action against Iraq is necessary and justified” (UK Government 2002a).

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70 Suskind (2006, 22) argues that regime change in Iraq was discussed in the first National Security Council meeting of the Bush presidency already in January 2001 – several months before 9/11. According to a former Treasury Secretary O’Neill, "It was all about finding a way to do it. That was the tone of it. The president saying ‘Go find me a way to do this,’” (CBS News 2004). Richard Clarke, former advisor to Bush, has also argued that the administration took the office “with Iraq on its agenda” (quoted in Doig et al 2007, 27). According Packer (2005, 41), Bush said that “I believe Iraq was involved” within days after 9/11. In Britain, the Foreign Office also reviewed the policy options with regard to Iraq well before 9/11. In late 2000, Blair was informed that "Such a policy [regime overthrow] would command no useful international support. An overt attempt to be successful would require a massive military effort, probably including a land invasion: this would risk considerable casualties and, possibly, extreme last-ditch acts of deterrence or defiance by Saddam." Moreover, the document added that the policy would be "illegal" (Savage 2010).

71 Yet, the leadership in Australia, Britain and the US kept insisting in public that no decisions had been made for another year (Doig et al 2007).
In the absence of evidence to link Iraq to 9/11 or other signs of Iraqi aggression, it was clear that the removal of the Ba’ath regime posed more of a public relations than military challenge (Calabrese 2005). Therefore, the US and its closest ally in the enterprise, the UK, put considerable effort into selling the war to their constituencies and the international community. Political marketing played a pivotal role in Bush administration efforts to mobilize both domestic and international support for the invasion (Rampton & Stauber 2003; Rutherford 2004; Snow 2003; Jowett & O’Donnell 2006, 317). Dubious pieces of intelligence on Iraqi unconventional weapons programs and links to terrorism were often “cherry-picked” to suit the needs of the public relations effort (Pillar 2008). The evidence seems to suggest that the Bush administration was well aware of the fact that the intelligence did not support a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda (Kramer & Michalowski 2005, 449), yet the chief counter-terrorism adviser Richard Clarke was asked three times to find a link between 9/11 and Iraq by President Bush (Doig et al 2007, 27-28).

On 29 January, President Bush (2002a) coined the term “Axis of Evil” in his State of the Union Address in which Iraq was especially targeted. Bush also implied that the US might take preventive action against countries it considered to be her enemies.

“Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens -- leaving the bodies of mothers huddled over their dead children. This is a regime that agreed to international inspections -- then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to hide from the civilized world.

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match

72 Danny Schechter (2004, 25-26) argues that “[w]hat was new in the 2003 Iraq War was the sophisticated way in which corporate public relations techniques were adapted by the Bush administration to create the rationale for the war, orchestrate support for it, bring media on board, and then sell it to politicians and then the public.”

73 A study by Cirincione et al (2004, 8) concludes that the Bush administration “officials systematically misrepresented the threat from Iraq’s WMD and ballistic missile programs.” An online database recording and analyzing the Bush administration claims can be found at www.publicintegrity.org. Another study that focuses on the the issue is Iraq on the Record: The Bush Administrations Public Statements on Iraq by Special Investigations Division of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Government Reform (US House of Representatives 2004).

74 Of course, Iraq had been developing WMD much longer than a decade but in the 1980s this was done with secret US assistance (Magstadt 2004, 207). According to US Senate Committee reports in 1994, the US had provided Iraq with materials and agents for chemical weapons until 1989 (Blum 2002, 122). In 1996, Scott Inquiry revealed that Britain had also played a role in the build-up of the Iraqi weapons arsenal (Phythian 2005).
their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic. [...] We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons. (Applause.)"

In effect, the war on terror had been extended to the so-called rogue states. A memorandum prepared by British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw on 25 March 2002, which provides a rather detailed account on how these problems were seen inside the British government and how they were to be solved, argued that it was difficult to make a convincing case why Iraq should be attacked and not Iran or North Korea which kept making threats while the US prepared to go to war with Iraq (Straw 2002). Straw saw that the concept of Axis of Evil only added to this problem. According to a close adviser to Blair, even the PM was first and foremost concerned about North Korea followed by Iran. Iraq was third on Blair’s list of dangerous rogue states (Woodward 2004, 177). The apparent contradiction of the Bush doctrine, pre-emptive use of force, with international law only added to the difficulties in mobilizing international support for military action against Iraq.

The difficulties of selling the war were acknowledged in discussions between the UK and US. On 17 March 2002, the British Ambassador to the United States, Sir Christopher Meyer, discussed the main selling points with US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz over a “Sunday lunch” in Washington. On the following day, Meyer (2002) wrote a memo addressed to Sir David Manning, PM Tony Blair's chief foreign policy advisor:

“On Iraq I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used with Condi [Condoleezza] Rice last week. We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever and failure was not an option. It would be a tough sell for us domestically and probably elsewhere in Europe. The US could go it alone if it wanted to. But if it wanted to act with partners, there had to be a strategy for building support for military action against Saddam. I then went on

75 Coates and Krieger (2004, 94) also point out that, in terms of unconventional weapons capability, North Korea was the most advanced of the “Axis of Evil” followed by Iran while “Iraq was the least developed”.
76 According to Hakanen and Nikolaev (2005, 1): “For the first time since 1945, the doctrine of preemptive war was not only openly proclaimed by the United States but actually put to practical use, encountering stiff political resistance even from its traditional allies and neighbors—France, Germany, Canada, Mexico, and others. It is not an exaggeration to say that the entire security system was tested by this event. The future and the relevance of the United Nations—as a cornerstone of this system—were challenged by this war. Therefore, this event is being and will be thoroughly studied by scholars from different fields to assess the effects and future political consequences of this war.”
through the need to wrongfoot Saddam on the inspections and the UN SCRs [Security Council Resolutions] and the critical importance of the MEPP [Middle East Peace Process] as an integral part of the anti-Saddam strategy. If all this could be accomplished skilfully, we were fairly confident that a number of countries would come on board.”

The memo also notes that “[t]he WMD danger was of course crucial to the public case against Saddam, particularly the potential linkage to terrorism.” In effect, the main themes for a public relations campaign had been laid out. Meanwhile, the CIA held the view that “Saddam is not a threat to the United States right now, but that the easiest way for him to become an immediate threat is to give him no options. Bush could well provoke the use of the very weapons he is trying to prevent” (quoted in Hakanen & Nikolaev 2006, 2; see also Pillar 2008, 237).

Leaked British documents reveal that Blair had promised Bush that “the UK would support military action to bring about a regime change” during his visit to Crawford, President’s Texas ranch, in April 2002 (Smith 2005). Apparently Blair’s decision was based on his analysis that the war was inevitable and that, in his own words, “[i]t would be more damaging to long-term world peace and security if the Americans alone defeated Saddam Hussein than if they had international support to do so” (quoted in Coates & Krieger 2004, 96). According to Bluth (2004, 871), the British decision was based not on the imminence of the Iraqi threat but on the prospect that Iraq might develop missiles with wider range or cooperate with terrorists. Bluth (2004, 890) argues that Blair “consistently” referred to three reasons for war: threat posed by Iraqi WMD, containment had not worked and merely affected the Iraqi people, and the cruelty of the Iraqi regime.

In a meeting on July 23, in which Blair and his senior ministers and advisers devised a plan to justify the invasion, the British Attorney-General pointed out that “regime change was not a legal base for military action” (Smith 2005). While pointing out that the case against Iraq was “thin”, Foreign Minister Jack Straw suggested that Britain should work towards reinvigorating the weapons inspections in which case either Saddam’s refusal to let the

77 In February 2006, Channel Four News (2006) reported on another attempt to ‘wrongfoot’ Iraq’s relations with the UN. Bush and Blair discussed disguising a US plane in UN colours and using it to lure Iraq to take a shot at it creating a pretext for war. This discussion, which also set March 10th as the start of the invasion regardless of UN Security Council position, took place in January 2003.

78 Yet, it should be mentioned that in December 1998, Blair told the House of Commons that “we reject claims that the Iraqi people are suffering because of the sanctions” (quoted in Williams 2005, 191). In Williams’s (2005, 193) view, the reasons for UK’s endorsement of the use of military force were Blair’s atlanticism, the post-9/11 security environment and Saddam’s intransigence.
inspectors in Iraq or evidence of WMD programmes would provide the justification and a legal pretext for military action (Smith 2005). In August 2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell managed to convince President Bush to take the Iraq issue to the UN rather than act unilaterally (Dueck 2006, 157).

The six-month-long campaign to mobilize an international coalition against Iraq was launched in September 2002 to coincide with the first anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attack in an effort to create an association between 9/11 and the Iraqi regime in the public mind. From the beginning, information was used very selectively to conceal the lack of hard evidence. Hastedt (2005, 430) provides an illuminating example of the techniques of the US/UK propaganda campaign:

“President Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair met at Camp David on 7 September and each made public pronouncements regarding the seriousness of the threat. Blair cited a report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) showing ‘what’s been going on at the former weapons sites’ and Bush said an IAEA report placed Iraq ‘six months away from developing a [nuclear] weapon. I don’t know what more evidence we need’. Neither reference was to a contemporary IAEA report. In Blair’s case he was referencing news reports. President Bush was citing an IAEA report written in 1996 and updated in 1998 and 1999. It stated that ‘based on all credible information to date, the IAEA has found no indication of Iraq having achieved its program goal of producing nuclear weapons or of Iraq having retained a physical capacity for the production of weapon usable nuclear material or having clandestinely obtained such material.’ The report did say that before the Gulf War Iraq was six months to a year away from having a nuclear capacity.”

In his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 12 September 2002, President Bush (2002b) presented the case against Iraq which was repeatedly invoked in the following months. In addition, Bush implied that if the UN does not act according to his will, the US would go-it-alone if necessary:

“We must choose between a world of fear and a world of progress. We cannot stand by and do nothing while dangers gather. We must stand up for our security, and for the permanent rights and the hopes of mankind. By heritage and by choice, the United States of America will make that stand. And, delegates to the United Nations, you have the power to make that stand, as well.”

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79 August was also considered to be bad time to introduce any new policies. White House Chief of Staff said that “[f]rom a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new products in August” (Rampton & Stauber 2003, 37).

80 On this meeting, on 7 September 2002, PM Blair also told President Bush that Britain would follow the US even if force was needed (Woodward 2004, 178).

81 As Knudsen (2004, 52) notes, “Bush's address looked more like an ultimatum to the UN than an invitation to negotiation and diplomacy, the message being that earlier resolutions of the Security Council would now be enforced with or without the UN which could either take action against Iraq or become irrelevant.”

82 According to Bob Woodward (2004, 161), Bush instructed his speechwriter Mike Gerson on the preparation of his UN speech in the following way: “We're going to tell the U.N. that it's going to confront this problem or condemn itself to irrelevance, okay?” Condoleezza Rice’s proposition to issue an ultimatum demanding disarmament within
According to Bush, Iraq was not only in breach of several UN Security Council Resolutions by continuing to develop weapons of mass destruction but also harbouring terrorists. However, it was the combination of these two that posed the greatest threat: “the greatest fear is that terrorists will find a shortcut to their mad ambitions when an outlaw regime supplies them with technologies to kill on a massive scale.” In effect, the argument about terrorism was based on preventing the “smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud” as Condoleezza Rice put it in September 2002 (quoted in Mral 2006, 51).83 Moreover, Saddam's history of aggression against his own people and neighbouring countries called for immediate action from the UN. Bush saw in Iraq a “grave and gathering danger” and “exactly the kind of aggressive threat the United Nations was born to confront.”

President Bush's address was coordinated with Blair government's campaign which was launched with the release of an intelligence document called “Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessment of the British Government” on 24 September (Sharp 2004, 63). John Scarlett, Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), worked closely with the No 10 Downing Street aides who suggested plenty of amendments and wanted to “heighten the sense of threat beyond the level supported by the original intelligence” (Phythian 2005, 130). Downing Street Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell, warned Alistair Campbell that the original JIC draft did not suggest Iraq posed a threat to its neighbours or the international community (Sharp 2004, 63). Yet, this so-called ‘Iraq dossier’, ‘September dossier’ or ‘British dossier’ (UK Government 2002b, 5) argued that

“[a]s a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has: continued to produce chemical and biological agents; military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them.”84

The dossier also claimed that Iraq had obtained uranium from Niger – an allegation which was later dismissed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Phythian 2005, 30 days or face military conflict had been ruled out and Bush had agreed to attempt to get UN authorization (Woodward 2004, 181).

83 This expression was also used by President Bush in Cincinnati on 6 October 2002 (Payne 2005, 4; Rid 2006, 14). This argument played an important part in marketing campaign but could not provide the legal basis for the war as the 'pre-emptive strike' is in breach with international law. Yet, pre-emption, also known as the 'Bush doctrine', is part of the National Security Strategy of the United States, which was released in September 2002.

84 In December, it was accompanied by another dossier focusing on Iraq's human rights record (Foreign & Commonwealth Office 2002) and in February by perhaps the most controversial Iraq dossier which was based on a dated post-graduate study rather than new intelligence (UK Government 2003).
The following week, the Bush administration released its National Security Strategy which included the doctrine of pre-emptive use of force and, on 28 September 2002, Bush used the British dossier as an evidence of Iraqi unconventional weapons capability:

"The Iraqi regime possesses biological and chemical weapons, is rebuilding the facilities to make more and, according to the British government, could launch a biological or chemical attack in as little as 45 minutes after the order is given. The regime has long-standing and continuing ties to terrorist groups, and there are al Qaeda terrorists inside Iraq. This regime is seeking a nuclear bomb, and with fissile material could build one within a year."

As a consequence of this US/UK initiative, UN weapons inspections were soon reinvigorated and, on 8 November 2002, the UN Security Council passed the resolution 1441 granting Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations”. Yet, the Iraqi cooperation with weapons inspections could be characterized more passive than active. For instance, only when the inspectors found missiles which exceeded to range-limit set by the Security Council, Iraq destroyed the missiles (Wall 2004).

As diplomats and weapons inspectors worked to avoid war, the military build-up of US, UK and Australian forces took place in the Gulf region. In early 2003, the UN Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix briefed the UN Security Council on three occasions (27 January, 14 February and 7 March). In January, he argued that “the results to date have been consistent with Iraq's declarations”. Blix restated UN weapons inspection team's position on 14 February:

“In my 27 January update to the council, I said that it seemed from our experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation on process, most importantly prompt access to all sites and assistance to UNMOVIC [United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission] in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure. This impression remains, and we note that access to sites has so far been without problems, including those that had never been declared or inspected, as well as to Presidential sites and private residences.”(United Nations 2003)

Yet, the US determination to employ military force grew despite the fact that the UN weapons inspectors had not been able to find evidence of active weapons programs. By early 2003, the war seemed inevitable regardless of the positions of the UN Weapons Inspectors, the Security Council or hostile world opinion. Many European governments were torn between their loyalties to the US and the UN (Mouritzen 2006, 138). Moreover, the crisis had mobilized their domestic constituencies. While there was public support for the Afghan campaign to oust the Taliban regime – which was allegedly harbouring Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda – in the aftermath of 9/11, the global public opinion was

85 Australian forces never amounted to more than 2,100 which is only a fraction of the Coalition military build-up in the area (Bromley 2004, 225).
vehemently against the use of military force against Iraq (Gallup International 2003, Kritzinger 2003). According to some estimates, one million people in London alone protested against the looming war on a worldwide anti-war rally on 15 February (Pickerell & Webster 2006, 407).  

France was hoping for successful inspections and an end to sanctions while the US was hoping for a clear sign of Iraqi non-compliance which would lead the UN Security Council to authorize the use of military force. According to French foreign ministry sources, President Jacques Chirac worried that the war would destabilize the region even further, incite terrorist attacks and cause considerable harm to Western relations with the Muslim world. In addition, the doctrine of pre-emption could open a Pandora’s Box (Wall 2004, 131). President Chirac said it was an “extraordinarily dangerous doctrine” (quoted in Miller 2005b, 166). As the US determination intensified, European Parliament took a strong stance against pre-emptive use of force declaring such action would be in breach of international law (Miller 2005b, 168).

By early January, French diplomats became increasingly convinced that the war was inevitable and, on 13 January 2003, Condoleezza Rice told a French special envoy that the decision has been already made in December. However, French Foreign Minister Dominic de Villepin decided to do everything in his power to avert the war (Wall 2004, 132). Pauly and Lansford (2005, 55) argue that the most important reasons for French opposition to the use of force were diplomatic and economic relations with Iraq, large Muslim minority in France and an opportunity to challenge US hegemony.

In Germany, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had promised during the election campaign that he would not support a war against Iraq (Wall 2004) while the German position could also be seen as a protest against increasingly unilateral US policies which excluded Germany from the decision-making process (Forsberg 2005). Meanwhile, Russia was concerned about her economic interests in Iraq and potential destabilization of her southern borders as a consequence of war (Golan 2004, 430). These three countries formed the core of the international opposition to the use of force against Iraq.  

86 Estimations vary as Couldry and Downey (2004, 267) refer to 1.5 million.  
87 Ever since France re-established its relations with Iraq in mid-1990s, the French position with regard to Iraq has differed from that of the US and the UK (Styan 2004, 372).  
88 However, Styan (2004) argues that they played only a minor role in French decision-making in the run-up to the war.
On 31 January, President Bush and PM Blair met in Washington. Bush told Blair that the war was inevitable even without a second UN Security Council resolution. The war would begin on 10 March. According to a leaked memo of the meeting, Blair pushed for a second resolution because it would give them “international cover” if anything went wrong. The leaders discussed the invasion and its aftermath in some detail while Bush also talked about ways to provoke a confrontation with Iraq to justify the invasion or assassinating Saddam Hussein ('Bush Was Set on Path to War, British Memo Says', New York Times, 27 March 2006).

Meanwhile, the US “apparently co-orchestrated” two declarations which were signed by, what the press called, Gang of Eight, and Vilnius Ten (Mouritzen 2006, 140). The first declaration was published on 30 January and it was signed by the UK, Italy, Spain, Czech, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Denmark. It argued that the UN Security Council resolution 1441 recognised Iraq as a threat and insisted that they “would rid the world of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction”. Failing to do so would rid the Security Council of its credibility and “world peace will suffer as a result” (Gang of Eight 2003). The Vilnius Ten statement, signed by the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, followed on 5 February and was accompanied with Powell’s presentation at the UN Security Council the same day. The statement called “upon the U.N. Security Council to take the necessary and appropriate action in response to Iraq’s continuing threat to international peace and security” (Vilnius Ten 2003).

On 5 February 2003, only some days before Blix's second briefing for the UN Security Council, US Secretary of State, Colin Powell addressed the Security Council arguing that Iraq had failed to disarm. Powell’s speech has been described as “a pivotal moment in the run-up to the war” which resulted in 30 per cent rise in American public’s belief that there was a link between al-Qaeda and Iraq (Dorman 2006, 16). It was also “covered live by much of the world’s media” (Dadge 2006, 56). The timing was specifically designed to undermine the UN weapons inspector's report which was due the following week (Mral

89 According to Mouritzen (2006, 158, n7), ”[t]he Statement of the Vilnius Group Countries had actually been written by Bruce Jackson, a former military intelligence officer and a ‘freelance US envoy’ to Central and Eastern Europe. It was non-negotiable: ‘Take it or (do not) leave it’, according to his e-mail to the Lithuanian embassy in Washington, which coordinated the operation.”
It became clear that even the failure to “wrongfoot” the UNMOVIC and Iraq did not stop the Bush administration from executing the invasion as planned. On the same day, the British intelligence agency, MI6, leaked a report which denounced the link between Iraq and al-Qaeda (Calabrese 2005, 155-156).

Colin Powell failed to convince the members of the UN Security Council as only the UK gave its unconditional support while the others preferred giving more time to diplomacy and UN weapons inspections. This left the Blair government in a difficult position as the attempts to secure a UN Security Council authorization grew desperate. Public opinion surveys, which were conducted in February 2003, showed that 91 per cent of Britons considered UN authorization crucial for the justification of the use of force while 45 per cent opposed the war in any case (Kritzinger 2003). The Blair government was fighting this sentiment and published its second Iraq dossier on January 30, which become commonly known as the ‘dodgy dossier’ when it was revealed that the ‘intelligence’ was based on previously published academic material.\(^\text{90}\) Despite the difficulties, Blair was fully committed to the use of force and had promised President Bush on January 31, that he was “solidly with the president and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam” (Norton-Taylor 2006).\(^\text{91}\) According to the Leader of the House of Commons, Robin Cook (25 Feb 2003), “Tony’s attempt to wrap himself in the UN flag is fatally hobbled by his inability to say that the UN will have the last word” (quoted in Dumbrell, 212).

On March 7, Attorney-General Lord Goldsmith still held the view that second UN Security Council resolution would be needed to legalise military action. However, he seems to have changed his mind few days later (O’Malley 2007, 14). Similarly to the Operation Desert Fox in 1998, the legal case rested on UN Security Council resolutions dating back to early 1990s and proved controversial. For instance, experts on International Law from Oxford and Cambridge Universities along with 13 UN Security Council members denounced the legal argument for the use of force (Williams 2005, 198-200).

On March 10, President Chirac told that France would veto the proposal for second UN Security Council Resolution. The Bush administration and the Blair government put the

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\(^{91}\) It is often taken for granted that the invasion of Iraq was a US-led policy to which the Blair government “merely adapted” (Hallenberg 2005, 21).
blame on France for the failure of diplomacy by deliberately misinterpreting Chirac’s reference “whatever the circumstances”. By this reference, Chirac meant that France would vote ‘no’ to the proposal endorsed by Spain, the UK and the US regardless of how other countries voted in the next meeting but he did not mean that France would never under any circumstances authorise the use of force against Iraq (Vaïsse 2003, 8). Although the US and the UK preferred to make France the scapegoat, in reality, they were nowhere near securing sufficient support in the Security Council for the authorisation of the war (Williams 2005, 193). As the US/UK failed to secure a second UNSC resolution giving a UN mandate for the use of force, former Foreign Secretary and the leader of the House of Commons, Robin Cook (2003) resigned as a protest to “a war that has neither international agreement nor domestic support” on 17 March. While Labour Party was divided on the issue and Liberal Democrats against the war, Blair took the country into the war with the support of the Conservative Party.

4.3 THE INVASION

Exactly a year after Meyer—Wolfowitz meeting in Washington, the Iraq crisis culminated in President George W. Bush's ultimatum to President Saddam Hussein to flee Iraq within 48 hours or find himself “in a military conflict” (Bush 2003a). In the absence of the second UN Security Council resolution, less than 50 governments supported American-British military action against Iraq (White House Press Release 27 March 2003). Clearly, the kind of support America had for ousting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the 9/11 2001 terrorist attack was missing as both the UN Security Council and Nato were divided on Iraq. 99 per cent of the invading forces consisted of US and UK troops and out of all other European states only Denmark and Poland participated in the war with modest contributions (Mouritzen 2006, 141). Zbigniew Brzezinski (2007, 158-159), former national security adviser to the Carter administration, points out that

“the military campaign in 2003 was largely a solitary and unilateral undertaking. Except for the British, other national forces’ participation in combat was minimal, even though the White House misleadingly claimed in a March 2003 press release that forty-nine states were committed to a coalition ‘that has already begun military operations to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction’ The facts on the ground were quite otherwise and stood in sharp contrast to the Gulf War of 1991.”

92 The draft resolution has been published in Sifry & Cerf (2003), pp. 499-500.
93 Many countries in the Iraq Coalition were insignificant small states and in some cases their support was bought (see White House 2003).

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The war began on 20 March 2003. 17 states either participated or gave strong or moderate support for the US-led intervention. Ireland was among Croatia, Czech Republic and Slovenia whose position on Iraq could be characterised either vague or contradictory (Mouritzen 2006, 142). Eleven European states were against the war and Sweden, for instance, declared the war illegal. Finland stated that the use of force was “unacceptable”. In the absence of the UN authorisation, the public opinion in Ireland and Finland was equally opposed to the war at 77 and 78 per cent respectively. Opposition to national governments' participation in the operation was over 80 per cent in both countries. Even in Britain 68 per cent opposed the use of force against Iraq and the same percentage opposed Britain's involvement in the invasion (Mouritzen 2006, 141-142).

The Coalition forces reached Baghdad by early April. The Iraqi army was outdated and demoralised in the face of superior military power. Even the much feared Republican Guard, Saddam's elite forces, evaporated and it began to seem as if there was not going to be "another Stalingrad" – fierce and bloody street-by-street fighting – promised by Tariq Aziz close to the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad in February (Roberts 2003). Baghdad fell on 9 April as only Saddam Fedayeen and foreign volunteers put up fierce resistance (Bowen 2004, 164).

The toppling of the Saddam Statue provided the most iconic images of the Iraq War, at least until the pictures of torture in Abu Ghraib were published a year later, but some argue that the event was especially stage-managed for international journalists residing in the near-by Palestine Hotel. David D. Perlmutter (2005, 120) points out that what happened on Firdos Square "was in essence a photo-op by the U.S. military, with participants invited in and the area closed off." Among approximately hundred Iraqis there were about a dozen of journalists and US army personnel were also present closing the square from outsiders and helping to bring down the statue. According to a Daily Mirror journalist “there were very few people in that square when it happened. There were 30 or 40 people in the beginning” (quoted in Baines & Worcester 2005, 8). Some have alleged that the Iraqis were specifically transported to the site by the Americans. In another media stunt, US forces ‘rescued’ young female soldier Jessica Lynch from an Iraqi hospital where she was being treated. Reporters widely reproduced the official story according to which she had killed several Iraqis before she ran out of ammunition and had been shot and stabbed. BBC documentary challenged the official narrative and eventually Washington Post, for
example, acknowledged that it may have seriously misreported the events leading to Lynch's capture and rescue (Rafeeq 2007, 96-97).

Meanwhile, the real Saddam had disappeared and would only be found several months later. The death toll of American soldiers continued to rise despite Bush had declared the “mission accomplished” and an end to “major combat operations” on May 1. The Pentagon had only begun planning for the post-invasion phase in late January 2003 and was ill-prepared for the aftermath (Williams 2005, 201). Essentially, the Operation Iraqi Freedom was merely designed to topple the Iraqi regime and lacked elements that would have been crucial for the political reconstruction of the country in the immediate aftermath of the invasion (Ricks 2006, 115-116). Consequently, the US failed to establish security and restore essential infrastructure that had suffered from years of sanctions, bombing and widespread looting that followed the fall of the Ba’ath regime. Consequently, the US was slowly but surely losing the good will the Iraqi people might have had towards the Americans (Magstadt 2004, 210). According to al-Marashi and al-Khalili (2006), incidents in which American forces killed innocent civilians only added to the hostility towards the occupier. The Iraqi people did not welcome the occupation and the country descended into a spiral of violence with increasing sectarian violence and roadside bombs targeting Coalition forces. On August 19, the UN headquarters in Baghdad was bombed and a suicide attack at Red Cross headquarters followed in October. In the spring of 2004, there was a Shia uprising and four US contractors were killed in Fallujah leading to a US crackdown on the city. To make matters worse for the occupier, images of abuse and torture at Abu Ghraib emerged to the public domain. As Rutherford (2004, 198) put it

“Washington had hoped, if not promised, that its 'war of liberation' would deliver a grateful country, similar in spirit to a newly freed France in the aftermath of the Second World War...the invasion had produced yet another quagmire, all too reminiscent of Vietnam, an unstable Iraq where American soldiers were bogged down in constant combat”.

Moreover, a survey report by Pew Research Center for the People & the Press (2004) indicates that a year after Iraq War mistrust of America has increased and discontent with its policies has intensified in European and Muslim countries.

94 According to a Special Forces veteran in Iraq, “[w]e are without allies amongst the Iraqi populace, including those who have benefited from the ouster of Saddam....Across Baghdad, Latifiyah, Mahmudiya, Salman Pak, Baqubah, Balad, Taji, Baiji, Ramadi, and just about everywhere else you can name, the people absolutely hate us.... The Iraqi people have not bought into what the Americans are selling, and no amount of military activity is going to change this fact” (quoted in Ford 2005, 51).
4.4 THE FALLOUT

The publicly announced rationale for war evaporated soon after the invasion as the US-led Coalition failed to produce the “smoking gun” to substantiate their allegations about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. While the US/UK had provided a barrage of moral justifications in the run-up to the war, in legal terms, the case for war rested on weapons of mass destruction. Possession of WMD would have put Iraq in breach of UN Security Council resolutions which would have given the legal pretext for the use of force (Humphreys 2005, 157).

In the lead-up to the war, the Bush administration had been able to exaggerate the Iraqi threat because the access to the intelligence data was strictly limited and critics working for CIA, FBI or NSA did not want to go on record with journalists even though anonymity undermined the credibility of their arguments (Dadge 2006, 21). However, as the security situation worsened in Iraq, US intelligence and State Department officials started to point out that it was clear to them that the case for war was weak all along and that the occupation would face severe difficulties (Stacks 2003, 20). Bush and Blair “found themselves under heavy and regular pressure to justify the war they had won” and faced “repeated calls to explain why they had taken their countries to war” (Coates & Krieger 2004, 1). The US sent its own weapons inspectors to Iraq but, eventually, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) had to conclude that there was “no evidence to suggest concerted efforts to restart the [nuclear] program” (Iraq Survey Group 2004, Key Findings, 11). Nor did they find evidence of operational chemical and biological weapons programs. In 2004,  

On 17 August 2003, a terrorist attack on UN Headquarters in Baghdad was a clear indication that the shift to democracy would not be easy and the subsequently attacks on religious landmarks have fuelled a sectarian conflict. Many of the difficulties of the occupation had been predicted in the so-called Crane-Terrill report in February 2003. For instance, former defense minister Peter Kilfoyle said that “[i]t seems to me that, at very least, evidence was used selectively from intelligence reports to fit the case” (quoted in Lyall 2003).

In a press conference on talks with visiting British PM Tony Blair at the end of April 2003, Putin seemed to suspect that the desperate search for WMD would drive the Coalition to fabricate their evidence which, in the light of the run-up to the war, might have been a valid concern. He said that “if something is found, there's no need to just show empty barrels on television. UN inspectors could be immediately summoned to draw their professional conclusions.” Putin also said scornfully that “Where is Saddam? Where is this arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, if it ever existed? Maybe Saddam is sitting somewhere in a secret bunker with weapons of mass destruction, preparing to explode all this stuff and threaten thousands of human lives. Or maybe he transfer it, or plans to transfer it, to terrorist organizations. We need answers to these questions.”
Saddam acknowledged that Iraq let the world to believe that it could possess WMD because it did not want to appear weak to its neighbours, least of all Iran. Consequently, it did not allow the UN inspectors to observe the destruction of its non-conventional weapons arsenal after the Gulf War in 1991, something he later regretted ([*The Times*], 2 July 2009).

Similarly, even though the Bush administration frequently implied a link between Iraq and al-Qaeda and Rumsfeld even described the evidence “bulletproof” (Pfiffner 2004, 26), the argument was never fully substantiated. On 7 October 2002, President Bush said that “[w]e know that Iraq and al-Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade”. In addition, the Bush administration frequently implied a link with 9/11 and Iraq but when asked directly in a press conference on 31 January 2003, Bush and Blair acknowledged that they had no evidence to directly link Saddam Hussein to 9/11. Despite the shortcomings of evidence, in his “Mission Accomplished” speech on 1 May 2003, President Bush still insisted that there was a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda: “We've removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding”. Justin Lewis (2004, 297) argues that, very much like in advertising, association was an important tool in legitimizing the Iraq War and the Bush administration frequently associated Iraq crisis with the War on Terror with vague accusations (see also Robinson & Livingston 2006, 26).

Eventually, the Pentagon admitted that there was no link between Iraq and al-Qaeda (Schor 2008) while US Senate Intelligence Select Committee had reached the same conclusion in 2006 and 9/11 Commission had denounced any Iraqi involvement in 9/11. Before being transferred to Iraqi custody and hanged in December 2006, Saddam Hussein told the FBI that he did not share “the same belief or vision” with bin Laden and had never met him ([*The Times*], 2 July 2009). A source at the heart of the CIA points out that the “intelligence community never offered any analysis that supported the notion of an alliance between Saddam and al-Qaeda” (Pillar 2008, 239). 89 Paul L. Pillar (2008, 235), CIA’s National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005, argues that

“it has become clear that official intelligence analysis was not relied on in making even the most significant national security decisions, that intelligence was misused publicly to justify decisions already made, that damaging ill will developed between policymakers and intelligence officers, and that the intelligence community’s own work was politicized.”

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89 The publicly available information on al-Qaeda—Iraq relationship has even convinced some scholars to believe that connection existed ignoring all the information to the contrary (see e.g. Pauly & Lansford 2005, 31).
According to the Center for Public Integrity (2008) study, the key Bush administration figures made 935 false statements in the lead-up to the war. While it remains highly controversial who knew what and when, it is likely that historians and International Relations scholars will argue for years to come what exactly motivated the Bush administration and the British government to invade Iraq. In addition to publicly declared motives for the invasion, reasons, which are more in line with realistic tradition, include setting a warning to other ‘rogue states’, securing Western access to Iraqi oil and reinforcement of US-led world order (Doig 2005, 111). In “Petrodollar Warfare”, William R. Clark (2005, 3) makes the case for yet another explanation. He argues that the Iraq war

“was a war to gain control over Iraq’s hydrocarbon reserves and, in doing so, maintain the US dollar as the monopoly currency for the critical international oil market. It was, and is, about retaining the dollar as a mechanism for effortless US credit expansion and global supremacy. It is also about the installation of numerous US military bases in Iraq to gain strategic dominance of the region with the largest remaining hydrocarbon reserves on the planet.”

There are two factors that make it rather difficult to single out the motive. First, the Bush administration provided all kinds of reasons and emphasised them differently at different stages of the conflict (Hakanen & Nikolaev 2006, 1). For instance, more emphasis was put on the cruelty of the Saddam regime and on the moral obligation to free the Iraqi people from his rule as the weapons inspections did not produce the much needed evidence of Iraqi WMD programs (Lewis 2004, 298-299; Baines & Worcester 2005, 5). Second, the publicly announced rationale is part of strategic communications which is motivated by the need to mobilize support or at minimum demobilize resistance. Consequently, the real motives for war may not be found in public statements (Hallenberg 2005, 22-23). In fact,

99 Not all agree on oil as an explanatory factor. For instance, Russell (2005, 290-291) argues that considerations of oil played an insignificant role in Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq.

100 “The year leading up to the Iraq war witnessed a barrage of reasons to go to war given by the U.S. Administration, some reasonable, some unreasonable, some valid, some invalid, some factual, and some fictional. Reasons given for war changed almost daily. Americans and people around the world were undoubtedly confused. And the media clearly contributed to the confusion.” Nikolaev & Hakanen 2006, 1. Kerton-Johnson's (2008) analysis of President Bush's statements between August 2002 and May 2003 shows that the justifications were a bit more consistent than Nikolaev and Hakanen suggest. Yet, it is true that there were several lines of arguments to justify the use of force with WMD accounting only 24%, terrorism 9%, national interest/security/pre-emption 23%, egoist morality/freedom-democratic peace civilization 34%, human rights 6% and international law/norms/international peace and security 3%.

101 Hallenberg (2005, 22-23) notes that “for the decision-makers speaking publicly on the subject it has presumably been more important to receive political support for the decision already taken to invade than to give completely truthful account of what the real goals were that led to the decision in the first place. It is reasonable to assume that the striving to get support has influenced both what goals have been presented and how these goals have been characterized.”
in May 2003, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz acknowledged that the emphasis on WMD was merely a tactical choice which guaranteed wider political support for the use of force: “The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy, we settled on one issue that everyone could agree on – which was weapons of mass destruction – as the core reason” (quoted in Tannenhaus 2003). Accordingly, a former British government official, Carne Ross (2006b), has argued that the Blair government never considered Iraq’s unconventional weapons capability to be a threat to the British interests.

By summer 2003, Blair was facing charges of hampering intelligence while MI5 and MI6 demanded that the government should never again publish an intelligence document that was not cleared by them (Norton-Taylor & White 2003). On 8 June 2003, The Sunday Times revealed that the government had shelved a six-page intelligence document prepared by the Ministry of Defence and MI6 in March 2002. The dossier is believed to have argued that Iraq was not a growing threat and, consequently, it was shelved by the Downing Street despite the fact that Alistair Campbell had told reporters earlier that a document on Iraq would be published shortly. It is also known now that Blair ignored the MI5 stance which argued that Iraq was not a serious threat but that invading Iraq would fuel terrorism in the UK (Siddique 2010).

There were three official inquiries into government’s use of intelligence – the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, Intelligence and Security Committee and the Butler Report on Intelligence and Iraq. In addition, the death of WMD expert David Kelly, who was found dead after he had been revealed to be the source to a controversial Today programme report by Andrew Gilligan, launched the Hutton Inquiry. Relying on Kelly’s remarks, Gilligan’s report made the allegation that the Downing Street had “sexed up” intelligence for the September dossier. While these inquiries have cleared the government of deliberate deceit, inquiry chairman Lord Robin Butler said in July 2004 that "[l]anguage in the [September] dossier and used by the prime minister may have left readers with the impression that there was fuller and firmer intelligence than was the case. It was a serious weakness" (quoted in Oakley 2005).102

102 O’Malley (2007) argues that this withholding and releasing of information very selectively enabled Blair to mobilize support within the political system.
Yet, a few leaked British government memos suggest that the Bush administration and the Blair government knowingly deceived the public. The so-called Downing Street memo dated 23 July 2002, which was leaked to the *Sunday Times* on May 1 2005, states that “it seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran.” The document reveals that the head of the MI6 Sir Richard Dearlove warned the government that “intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” in the US. Some argue that rather than cynically misleading the public, Blair was “self-deceiving” (Hoggett 2005, 418). Unfortunately, the limited nature of the inquiries did not enable them to produce definite answers.

Meanwhile, some have even argued that not only the press but also decision-makers themselves fell victim to the propaganda campaign against Iraq. Rampton and Stauber (2006, 208) see a connection between the propaganda and the failure to address some of the challenges of post-invasion Iraq:

“Repeatedly, when faced with predictions of problems, White House officials dismissed the warnings of Iraq experts and adopted plans that were unrealistic because of their optimism—too few troops on the ground to maintain security; failure to anticipate insurgency; oblivious disregard, even disdain, for those who attempted to assess the human and economic costs of war. These warnings went unheeded because giving them credence would have undermined the public relations effort to sell the war to the American people.”

Yet, it was not only the political leadership and intelligence community that faced criticism; the media was also held culpable. A leading article in the *Independent* (*Iraq: Doomed from the start*, 16 March 2008), while pointing out that their editorial policy has consistently opposed the war from the beginning, read that

“among the guilty people that we would name as responsible for the disaster of Iraq, we would include journalists collectively, in Britain and America. In our assessment of the winners and losers from the war we include the media among the latter. Partly, this was because journalists and opponents of the war focused too much on the distraction and legal device of weapons of mass destruction, on which, before the war, little could be proved.

Instead, we should have been asking much more searching questions about what would happen after the invasion.”

**4.5 COALITION PRESS POLICY IN THE IRAQ WAR**

“We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.”

-Bush administration official

103Quoted in Bennett et al 2007, 131.
Journalists were losers also in another sense. They were ten times more likely to get killed than the Coalition soldiers during the invasion phase (Katovsky 2003, xi).104 Kate Adie, a former BBC reporter, has claimed that the US military threatened to target any satellite uplinks transmitting from Baghdad (Paterson 2005, 55). In fact, the US has targeted news media bureaus in Afghanistan (both in Kabul and Kandahar) and Iraq since the bombing of the Serbian television during the Kosovo campaign (Sreberny & Paterson 2004, 19-20; Seppälä 2002, 60). The treatment of journalists, particularly those working for Al-Jazeera, has been brutal and some have seriously started to discuss whether there has been a significant shift toward much more aggressive media management strategy by the US (Gowing 2003; Paterson 2005, 2006; Gopsill 2004; Herman 2005; Sparks 2007b, 228; Knightley 2003).105 “[D]oes a journalist and camera operator’s presence now constitute ‘military significance’ and therefore a possible military threat or danger which military commanders can remove with impunity?”, Nik Gowing (2003, 189), the main presenter on BBC World, asks and says that the answer may well be “a deeply worrying ‘yes’”.

While independent, or “unilateral”, reporting from Iraq was very dangerous, reporters were offered access to the battlefield with Coalition forces.106 The so-called embedded reporters, who were attached to military units, relied on the military for protection, transportation and maintenance (Pfau et al 2004). While journalists had been embedded in earlier conflicts, the scale was unprecedented in the Iraq War with some 700 journalists experiencing the conflict with servicemen (Tatham 2006, 97). Embedded reporters had to sign a contract agreeing on Pentagon guidelines (see US Department of Defense 2003) or comply with the regulations of so-called Green Guide in the British case. In addition, the Pentagon programme involved a boot camp in which the Department of Defense prepared the reporters to combat conditions (Miracle 2003). This change in the Pentagon media management strategy marks a major shift in the US press policy. In the Gulf War of 1991

104 Katovsky (2003, xv) also points out that while four journalists died in the Gulf War, 13 were dead by the end of the first three weeks of the Iraq War.
105 Investigative journalist Ron Suskind (2006, 138), who conducted interviews with senior officials, states that, “[i]nside the CIA, and White House, there was satisfaction that a message had been sent to Al Jazeera” after the bombing of Al Jazeera’s Kabul office on 13 November 2001. This suggests that the US targeted media deliberately (Sparks 2007b, 228).
106 Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman warned the media that “We are going to control the media space. Reporters that are not embedded are going to be treated like any other civilian, approached with a certain amount of caution. For many journalists, proving their identity can sometimes be problematic” (quoted in Seib 2004, 53).
and Afghanistan in 2001 access to the front line was very limited.\footnote{107}{For instance, John McWethy from ABC News, has said about Afghanistan that the “war was over by the time the press got close enough to actually cover it” (Hess & Kalb 2003, 286).} Basically, “the news organizations had two main options: either to stick with the Alliance, or to have no footage on any significant events” (Lundsten & Stocchetti 2005, 28).

A British Ministry of Defence spokesman said that the embedding program has three benefits. Firstly, the public is better informed on the developments, secondly, the media get images from the war zone and, thirdly, the government gets good PR (Baines & Worcester 2005, 8). Meanwhile, the Pentagon publicly declared that the embedding was designed to counter possible Saddam Hussein propaganda stunts that the independent observers would be able to prove wrong (Aday, Livingston & Hebert 2005, 7). Another reason was “putting a human face on the American effort” (Aday Livingston & Hebert 2005, 15). Indeed, US Army Lieutenant Colonel Tammy Miracle (2003, 45) argues that “embedding journalists into Army units provides an opportunity for the world to see the American soldier’s capability and dedication to the mission.”

In the military circles embedding was deemed a success and a formula for future wars. Lieutenant-Colonel Steven Collins (2003) sees that embedding worked because the boot-camp, that the participating reporters had to go through, gave them an idea and appreciation for what is required from a soldier. Furthermore, embedded reporters were almost bound to bond with the military unit they lived with.\footnote{108}{However, Maeshima (2007) argues that Japanese embeds did not identify with the soldiers to the same degree as US reporters.} And finally he argues that the system provided the news networks with unforeseen war coverage without risking the lives of the reporters unnecessarily.

Many journalists have also welcomed embedding as a model for the future of war reporting because it gives greater access to the battlefield in comparison to pooling which was preferred by the Pentagon in the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, embedded reporters secure a constant supply of footage for 24/7 news channels. While acknowledging some of the limitations of embedded reporting, one journalist noted that “[t]here is no going back” (Smith 2003).
Nevertheless, David Miller (2004b, 90) argues that “[t]he PR genius of the embed system was that it allowed unprecedented access to the fighting and, also, unprecedented identification by the reporters with the military.” Some argue that this, together with the dependence on the military, compromised reporters’ ability to provide objective coverage (Haigh et al 2006). One research (Haigh et al 2006) analysed the print coverage of Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times and Chicago Tribune in order to compare the reports of embedded and non-embedded reporters. This study indicated that embedded reporters portrayed the army in more positive terms and “convey greater trust toward military personnel”.

The Independent's Patrick Cockburn says that “it's a great mistake to go with American units and report on any Iraqi city because I think it's in the nature of things that you're not actually meeting local people, and if you are, you aren't meeting them in circumstances in which they can actually speak” (quoted in Hoyt et al 2005, 98). Justin Lewis (2004, 308), in turn, argues that while embedded journalists may not have been “cheerleaders for the USA”, embedding shifted the parameters of debate. Instead of focusing on a bigger picture British television coverage was reduced to tactical level. Lewis et al (2006, 193) maintain that

“[w]hat embed system did do, however, was to help bind the journalists in to a focus on the progress of the war, at the expense of broader contextual issues. The fact that there were no embeds with Iraqi forces (for obvious reasons) combined with traditions of taste and decency to humanize the U.S.-led forces and dehumanize the Iraqis. This war narrative, then, created its own momentum, making 'liberated' Iraqis more newsworthy than the many who had, at best, mixed feelings about the war.”

To the same effect, Rid (2007, 150) argues that

“[m]ost reporters only had the very limited view from a unit's perspective, the soda-straw view, rich in human and tactical detail but poor in abstract and strategic oversight. And the embedded journalists often lacked the military knowledge to put their eye-witness accounts into perspective: only 19 percent had served in the military.”

However, embedding was only one part of Pentagon's media operations which began well before the invasion. It has been argued that Western audiences, especially the Americans, were subjected to psychological operations (PSYOPS) which have usually been reserved for demoralizing the enemy (Schechter 2004, 27-28).109 For instance, favourable coverage was assured by secretly briefing ‘military analysts’ used by network television channels.

According to the New York Times (20 April 2008),

109The psychological operations such as dropping leaflets over Iraq attempted to “dissuade and deter adversial groups, for instance officers within the Iraqi Army, from taking up arms against the coalition” (Rid 2007, 155).
In the fall and winter leading up to the invasion, the Pentagon armed its analysts with talking points portraying Iraq as an urgent threat. The basic case became a familiar mantra: Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons, was developing nuclear weapons, and might one day slip some to Al Qaeda; an invasion would be a relatively quick and inexpensive ‘war of liberation’.\[110\]

In fact, CNN was so keen on conforming to the official frames of reference that its executive Eason Jordan had their military analysts cleared by the Pentagon on its own initiative (Solomon 2005).

The scale of the event posed a challenge to Coalition media management. Over 3000 journalists were sent the region (Tumber & Palmer 2004, 1-2). The Pentagon media strategy was planned to provide a constant supply of news 24 hours a day in order to secure control over news frames. A multi-million dollar briefing centre was set up in Doha, Qatar, and two others in Kuwait and Bahrain (Tatham 2006, 99). Every morning, President Bush's spokesman Ari Fleischer coordinated the day's message with Alastair Campbell and a few communications directors at relevant branches of the Bush administration (Tumber & Palmer 2004, 64). Tatham (2006, 99), who headed one of the Press Information Centres (PIC) in Bahrain, argues that the British considered the PICs to be much more important than the Americans whose view was that the embeds provide the coverage and Press Centres only supplement it. This US press policy frustrated some journalists such as Michael Wolff of New York Magazine who asked US military spokesman some inconvenient questions in a press conference: “Why are we here? Why should we stay? What's the value of what we are learning at this multi-million dollar press centre?” (quoted in Tatham 2006, 111). Meanwhile, Washington Post's Alan Sipress pointed out that “[a]t daily news conferences and private briefings, senior Central Command officials have been more determined to paint Iraqi forces in the darkest light possible than to shed light on the embattled progress of the military campaign” (quoted in Tumber and Palmer 2004, 68).

According to Rid (2007, 151-152),

“[i]nformation to the public was principally provided through three channels: a strategic, an operational, and a tactical channel. The strategic picture of the war was presented to the international press corps in briefings in Washington, mostly in the Pentagon's press room and sometimes in the White House; the operational briefings were held at Central Command's headquarters in Doha, Qatar; and the tactical view from the ground was provided by reporters

110This may not be very surprising if one considers the fact that in the 1970s Senate and House investigations revealed that CIA had penetrated the media and even “owned dozens of newspapers and magazines worldwide” (Boyd-Barrett 2004, 38). Moreover, almost “every major US news organization had been penetrated, usually with the cooperation of top management” (Boyd-Barrett 2004, 38).
embedded with troops. On all three levels communication and media were – just as planned – deliberately used as a channel to address an entire bundle of audiences at the same time: the US public, the enemy leadership, the Iraqi population, the coalition troops, allied publics, and potential future adversaries. On each level, the media cooperation was motivated by specific operational intentions. The communication, in short, was tied to strategy.

The Coalition media operations focused heavily on securing the domestic support for the invasion in the US. Similarly, the head of the British Ministry of Defence Communications Planning Unit, David Howard, was focused on the UK media which was far less compliant than American journalists (Tatham 2006, 101). In total, 55 journalists were embedded with the UK forces (Rafeeq 2007, 74). The British military prioritised UK media in allocation of embed slots and, for instance, no Arab journalists were embedded with the British forces (Tatham 2006, 98). According to Steve Tatham (2006, 10-11), the Coalition media strategy with regard to Arab media could hardly be described as a success. Indeed, Arab press, such as pan-Arab newspaper al-Hayat, was very critical of the US/UK policy and their motives (El-Bendary 2005). Meanwhile, Iraq tried to challenge the US frame by “issuing statements, providing images of civilian deaths, and conducting foreign media to places where civilians were killed in the American and British military action” (Ravi 2005, 61). Iraq also changed the times of their press briefings to counter the Central Command's version of events presented in Doha (Rid 2007, 158). It is noteworthy that there were 200-300 foreign journalists in Baghdad when the war begun (Rafeeq 2007, 74).

4.6 THE MEDIA COVERAGE OF THE IRAQ CRISIS

According to John Rendon, a Pentagon adviser and a public relations specialist, the Coalition success in influencing media frames varied across regions:

"There were five wars in Iraq. There really was the reality of combat operations from the air, on the ground and from the sea. The second war was the war the United States saw, the third war was the war that Europe saw. The fourth war was the war that Arab audiences saw. And the fifth war was the war the rest of the world saw. And as we monitored that in real time, we found that none of them were ever in alignment."

Comparative research on worldwide media coverage lends support to the notion that there were notable differences in how the war was covered (Gladney 2004, Tajima et al 2006). Yet, the European political elite were divided on Iraq which presumably would have contributed to varying media coverage within Europe.

“It is almost commonplace that the determination to go to war is perhaps the most critical decision a nation can make. The news media should play a vital role in the decision-making process. As a nation prepares for war, the news media should offer sites in which rationales for war are identified and verified; official claims are solicited and evaluated; alternate views are sought and assessed; costs, both human and material, are weighed; legalities are established; possible outcomes and aftereffects are considered, and wide-ranging debates given voice” (Lule, 2004: 180).

9/11 had laid the ground for a greater government control of the frames of reference in the American media (Zelizer & Allan 2002) and no such deliberation took place as Lule describes above. Moreover, Entman (2004, 2) argues that 9/11 “may have ‘changed everything,’ as a cliché of the time had it, but at least on first impression, one thing it did not change was the news media's traditional promotion of patriotic rallies around presidents when America appears under attack. Reflecting the surge of outrage and nationalistic fervor, the news made little room for any but official, government-sanctioned interpretations. Even the mildest dissent was immediately condemned.”

CNN’s President Walter Isaacson instructed journalists working for CNN’s American edition that when critical views of the war in Afghanistan were expressed, the audience should be reminded that the war on terror is a worthy war. CNN International was allowed more latitude as foreign audiences might have deserted the channel if it appeared too biased (McChesney 2002, 94).

With regard to the Iraq War, Lance Bennett (2003) argues that “[t]he capacity of the administration to so successfully push deceptions and mispresentations through a docile press to an emotionally volatile public may stand as the most ruthless press control operation in history.” In addition, some news editors were apprehensive about expressing critical views in the post-9/11 opinion climate. Some journalists, who refused to play along with their editors’ emphasis on patriotic coverage, were either fired, moved to other tasks within the organizations or they resigned as a protest to their editors’ decision not to publish critical articles that might alienate the readership (Dadge 2006, 64-65; Rampton & Stauber 2003, 169). Other news outlets such as Fox News Channel also played a role in silencing critical debate by attacking journalists who expressed dissent (Miller 2005c, Rampton & Stauber 2003, 161-173). Images of casualties were also absent from American television news which conveyed a sanitized picture of the war (Aday 2004). In fact, the

112 Some have even argued that the global War on Terror has marked the “revival of the propaganda state” (Snow & Taylor 2006, Rutherford 2004). According to Paul Rutherford (2004, 184), “[a] propaganda state refers to a regime in which the governors, whether official or unofficial, employ a constant stream of messages to propel the population toward some desired condition of right thinking and right acting.”
Pentagon had asked the US media not to carry images of American casualties or prisoners of war (POW) (Tumber & Palmer 2004, 70).

Empirical studies indicate that the American media coverage seems to have failed to challenge Bush administrations allegations to a significant extent. David Dadge (2006, 19) argues that

“Although it is difficult to say with absolute authority that the American public reached the conclusion that the war in Iraq was justified on the basis of news reports in the media, it can be said that the Bush administration’s most coercive arguments—WMD including the threat of a nuclear bomb—were communicated directly to the public with little or no assessment of the worth of these statements.”

Other studies have drawn similar conclusions. For instance, David Domke’s (2004) analysis of US media coverage concludes that

“the mainstream press consistently echoed the administration’s communications from September 11 to Saddam and Iraq—thereby disseminating, reinforcing, and embedding the administration’s fundamentalist worldview and helping keep at bay Congress and any serious questioning among much of the public. Even in press criticisms of the administration, which were present during this period, the administration’s communication emphases resounded.”

With regard to television news coverage, Aday, Livingston and Hebert (2005) analysed the nightly news on ABS, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News and Al-Jazeera during the major combat operations in the spring of 2003 in order to investigate whether there were bias and how they might be explained if they existed. While these news networks claim to operate in the objective Western fashion, the study indicates “that the administration had a privileged role—and dissent was largely absent—across virtually all American news programs” (Aday, Livingston & Hebert 2005, 7). As a consequence, misperceptions were common in the audience's mind clearly indicating that the media had failed to provide accurate information (Kull et al 2003). Especially widespread were misperceptions with regard to Iraq’s links to 9/11 and al-Qaeda as well as Iraqi WMD capability. Poll data indicates that these misconceptions remained common before, during and after the invasion (Dadge 2006, 2).

Terence Smith (2003), senior producer for PBS’s The News Hour with Jim Lehrer, points out that several mistakes were also made during the war:

“The strategic southern city of Basra was reported taken on March 23, when in fact it took British troops another two weeks to subdue the resistance there. Scud missiles were said to be striking in Kuwait that same day, when in fact they were not. An entire Iraqi division was reported to have laid down its arms and surrendered, when in fact it had not. A fast-moving convoy of Republican Guards in 1,000 armored vehicles was repeatedly reported to be moving
south from Baghdad on March 26 to confront U.S. forces, when in fact it was busy scattering under relentless U.S. air strikes.”

After the invasion, the two most prominent US quality newspapers have acknowledged that they failed to subject many Bush administration and Blair government claims to scrutiny in the lead-up to the war. On 26 May 2004, *The New York Times* published an editorial (‘The Times and Iraq’) acknowledging that

> “we have found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have been. In some cases, information that was controversial then, and seems questionable now, was insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged. Looking back, we wish we had been more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence emerged — or failed to emerge.”

According to Executive Editor of *The Washington Post* Leonard Downie Jr. (quoted in Kurtz 2004),

> "we were so focused on trying to figure out what the administration was doing that we were not giving the same play to people who said it wouldn't be a good idea to go to war and were questioning the administration's rationale. Not enough of those stories were put on the front page. That was a mistake on my part.” 113

However, it should be mentioned that there were critical responses to the Bush administration’s case against Iraq even in the US. For instance, *Chicago Daily Tribune* ran a news story headlined “Bush uses fears, not evidence, to justify Iraq War” in September 2002 (Dadge 2006, 14). According to Ravi (2005, 60), the *New York Times* remained critical of the use of military use until the war began. Meanwhile, the *Washington Post* adopted a pro-war stance (Lehmann 2005, 84).

4.6.2 The UK

While part of the British press was clearly more sympathetic towards the use of force against Iraq with the *Daily Telegraph* running a headlines such as “Saddam is months away from a nuclear bomb” (Dadge 2006, 15), a study by Goddard et al (2008) argues that there was a wide range of views expressed in the British press coverage of the war and the coverage did not merely reflect government’s point of view. For instance, *Daily Mirror* adopted a vehemently antiwar position while conservative *Daily Telegraph* expressed more support for the war (Palmer 2004). Similarly, Ravi (2005) observes a polarization in the UK press as the *Guardian* was against the war while the *Times* was more likely to express views in support of military action. Couldry and Downey's (2004) analysis of opinion

113 However, he continues: "People who were opposed to the war from the beginning and have been critical of the media's coverage in the period before the war have this belief that somehow the media should have crusaded against the war” adding that “[t]hey have the mistaken impression that somehow if the media's coverage had been different, there wouldn't have been a war” (quoted in Kurtz 2004).
items in the British press at the end of January 2003 supports the notion of polarized press. Research has also detected that the UK press did not marginalise dissent to the same extent as the US press coverage in their coverage of antiwar protests (Dardis 2006).

Palmer (2004, 3) argues that “the overall pattern of coverage to be found in the UK press gives approximately equal emphasis to positive and negative presentation of Anglo-US policy.” Yet, Robertson's (2004) analysis of Scottish broadsheets indicates that Iraqis were rarely used as a source in reporting and that the humanitarian cost of the war attracted only minor attention in the coverage which was predominantly focused on military tactics and troop movements.

The Daily Mirror's coverage of the Iraq Crisis was quite extraordinary. The Mirror had opposed the Suez invasion in 1956 and the Falklands War in 1982 but it had supported Gulf War in 1991 and the Kosovo War in 1999. It had never opposed war plans of a labour government until Piers Morgan, the Mirror's editor, begun to emphasise international coverage at the expense of celebrity gossip in the aftermath of 9/11 2001. The Mirror adopted a rather critical position to the bombing of Afghanistan and particularly to the US/UK plans to invade Iraq. The new emphasis was largely due to declining circulation while its main competitor, the Sun, had managed to increase its circulation. Moreover, feedback from the readers encouraged the Mirror to criticise the US/UK war plans. Indeed, the Mirror campaigned fiercely against the looming war on Iraq and, on 21 January, it even launched a petition which collected 220,000 signatures opposing Blair's Iraq policy. Therefore, the Mirror not only publicly questioned the government policy but also played an active part in mobilising the anti-war movement (Freedman 2009).

However, when the war began, Mirror's coverage became more moderate and the emphasis shifted from the opposition to the war on the heroism of the British troops. On 11 April, it was revealed that the Mirror's circulation had continued to decline and had dropped below two million copies a day. The next day, the war was dropped from the front page for the first time since the beginning of March. The extraordinary circumstances, significant public scepticism of the government policy and elite dissensus, during the run-up to the Iraq War enabled the Mirror's radical coverage but, eventually, the newspapers exist to make profit. (Freedman 2009)
With regard to television coverage, Lewis (2004, 302) argues that “while British broadcasters were generally committed to maintaining impartiality in their coverage of the war, in certain key areas they tended to favour assumptions that were central to the pro-war case.” For instance, they “were eight times more likely to make references indicating the presence of chemical and biological weapons then to suggest their absence” (Lewis 2004, 303). According to Tumber and Palmer (2004, 91-92) this was not true with regard to press coverage of Iraq's alleged links to al-Qaeda which were widely denounced in the UK press. Moreover, Kodrich and Law's (2004) analysis concludes that the Guardian and to a bit lesser degree the Times questioned the WMD claim of the British government during the war.

Nick Couldry and John Dowey (2004, 269) single out the Murdoch's Times for “[t]he most unambiguous support for the UK/USA position” among the British press as it “supported both policy and rhetoric”. Hafez (2003, 4) argues that the Times “published many heroic images of British and US soldiers: soldiers in action, soldiers receiving flowers from Iraqis, soldiers handing food to children and the like” on its front page. Rupert Murdoch's global media empire seemed to have reflected his support for the invasion of Iraq with the Fox News Channel (FNC) being the most obvious example (Thussu 2004). For instance, The Australian, the only daily with national circulation, endorsed Australian military participation in the invasion (Hirst & Schütze 2004). In fact, all 175 Murdoch-owned Australian newspapers adopted an editorial policy which was in line with his personal stance on the war (Bromley 2004, 227). However, the concentration of media ownership has been counterbalanced by the Internet and audiences could find an abundance of alternative views and eye witness accounts online (Allan 2004).

It is worth noting, however, that several factors protect the hegemony of the traditional media. Herman and Chomsky argue that “(1) the traditional media themselves have occupied the internet and are dominant news providers there; (2) they have the resources and pre-existing audiences to give them a huge advantage over alternative media potential rivals; (3) the alternative operators on the internet seek advertising revenue to fund their operations, compromising their alternative character, and the biggest, like Google and Yahoo, are heavily dependent on advertising revenue (and they are not inclined to put resources into original news origination); (4) much of the new media on the internet is oriented toward facilitating social connections, with politics secondary at best, and the best of the new alternative media have limited resources and outreach and specialize in critical analysis rather than news-making.” (Mullen 2009, 20).
4.6.3 Europe
While the American-British public relations campaign posed a challenge to media organizations world wide, European media were rather critical of the invasion in countries such as Germany (Lehmann 2005, Ates et al 2005), France (Palmer 2004), Sweden (Dimitrova & Strömbäck 2005), and Turkey (Ates et al 2005). However, it should be noted that, in many countries, the media were divided by the Iraq War with different outlets expressing varying degrees of support to the Anglo-American policy. This seems to have been the case in many European countries such as Norway (Ottosen 2005b), Slovenia (Erjavec 2005), Spain (Gunnarson 2005), Ireland (Phelan 2005) and Austria (Carfora et al 2005). Hafez (2003, 8-9) argues that

“in militarily non-involved countries all three sectors – government, media and public opinion – mainly develop according to their own specific dynamics: governments have a political target that they follow; the media work according to their own, inborn ideological and professional or commercial orientation; and the public decides on matters of war and peace according to their own values and attitudes that are rooted in the political culture and history of the relevant country. This, of course, does not mean that governments do not influence the media and public opinion or that the media and public opinion are not influenced by information and disinformation strategies of the governments at war. But it shows that there is no mechanism 'manufacturing consent' about the facts – whether they are right or wrong – that are debated.”

Yet, Stolle and Hooghe's (2005) cross national analysis of television news coverage of the Iraq War indicates a strong correlation between government policy and media output. French press coverage was supportive of the French government view which maintained that only explicit UN Security Council Resolution could authorise use of force and condemned the subsequent invasion (Palmer 2004, 3-4). Lehmann (2005) investigates how American and German media covered the weapons inspections in the lead-up to the war and concludes that, generally speaking, the German coverage reflects strong antiwar public sentiment even though Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung also carried articles that were critical of the German Iraq policy. The US motives were challenged and, for instance, Der Spiegel (No 3, 2003) carried a front page with a headline "Blood For Oil: What Iraq Is Really About". In Denmark, which was part of the Coalition, the media were rather supportive of the war even though there were also some critical tones (Kristensen & Ørsten 2007).

4.6.4 Arab World
Al-Jazeera provided much more critical coverage than its Western counterparts by putting more emphasis on civilian casualties and destruction of Iraqi infrastructure. Unlike the Western news channels, Al-Jazeera did not rely on embedded journalists for footage but
had several 'unilaterals' in Iraq (Iskandar & el-Nawawy 2004, 323). Ahmed el-Gody's (2005) analysis of the major Arab broadcasters, indicates that Abu Dhabi TV, Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera indeed provided an alternative to Western coverage of the war. The credibility of Western news in the region suffered when Arab audiences contrasted CNN and BBC's coverage with what they could see on Arab channels. A study by Lars Lundsten and Matteo Stocchetti (2005) indicates that both the CNN and the BBC World presented the conflict as a zero-sum game and failed to "formulate alternative narrative patterns for the description of the war against Iraq as a war against 'evil'” to resist the view on the conflict that the Pentagon was promoting. Despite the fact that the USA and the UK were allies in this conflict and they share the language and some basic values, the coverage of BBC World and CNN differed to some extent.115

4.6.5 The Rest of the World

With regard to the rest of the world, existing research indicates that the media coverage of the war expressed some degree of criticism of the invasion in many African countries (Alozie 2006, Mucunguzi 2005, Kupe & Hyde-Clarke 2005) and even in Australia which was part of the Coalition (Jacubowics & Jacka 2006). Analysis of press coverage in Sub-Saharan Africa in the lead-up to the war indicates that the Bush administration was not able to dominate the frames of reference and, instead, the press adopted a rather critical stance towards the use of force and raised concerns of destabilization of the Middle East and its implications for African countries (Alozie 2006). Meanwhile, Indian and Pakistani newspapers paid more attention to Iraqi perspectives and casualties than US and UK newspapers reflecting the antiwar stance of the elites in each country (Ravi 2005).

Ali Rafeeq's (2007) study on the press coverage of the Iraq War in New Zealand emphasises the ability of the US government and military sources to dominate the news agenda due to newspapers' dependence on few Anglo-American news agencies and media

115They argue that they were "able to identify conceptual patterns according to which scattered reports from the war were understood and presented by these agencies, and we chose to call these two patterns 'crusade' and 'soccer game'” (Lundsten & Stocchetti 2005, 2). CNN International portrayed the conflict as a crusade while the BBC World approach was that of a soccer match. These patterns are similar in significant ways: they are both adversary situations where two factions meet in a zero-sum game while soccer game "does not imply ideological or religious superiority”. Crusade pattern, in turn, implies stronger polarization and success is "a sign of moral superiority” while soccer game merely implies better trained, coached etc. Lundsten and Stocchetti (2005, 2) argue that "the communicative point of a significant part of the television news reports could be identified only within the logical framework of either of these metaphors".
outlets. Similarly, Kupe and Hyde-Clarke’s (2005) study on South African media during the Iraq War points out that national media may have insufficient resources to cover international conflicts independently. Instead, they rely on Western news agencies which, according to some scholars, conform to the interests of Western governments. Studies based on data from five South East Asian countries indicates that stories relying on news agencies were more supportive of the Iraq War than stories produced by newspapers' own correspondents (Maslog et al 2006, Lee et al 2006).

Existing research suggests that some East Asian media organisations adopted rather critical position to the war. Japanese newspaper Asahi portrayed the US as the "evil doer" (Maeshima 2007) and the Chinese government even saw fit to censor Hong Kong media “so as not to offend Washington and London” (Shimatsu 2004, 212). Overall, the existing literature provides a somewhat mixed picture of the media performance in the Iraq War.

4.7 CONCLUSION

To sum up, selling the war to the domestic and international audiences by controlling media content was a crucial part of the preparations for the invasion from the beginning. The Bush administration and the Labour government in the UK went into lengths in securing favourable coverage and communicating their point of view mainly to domestic constituencies but also to foreign audiences. The Coalition media strategy was carefully planned to control media frames and to limit prospects for critical topics. To that effect, messages were carefully coordinated at different levels of political and military leadership and embedding programme was launched to ensure supportive media coverage.

National media coverage of the war seems to have varied considerably across countries and regions as well as outlets. The global information system had gone through major changes since the first Gulf War. Alternative information was now readily available online.

116For instance, Lee and Yang (1996) showed that AP’s coverage of the Tiananmen movement reflected US foreign policy concerns while Japanese Kyodo news agency was reluctant to challenge the Chinese government due to Japanese economic interests in China. Yet, even though the Anglo-American news media are well-positioned to influence national media, Skurnik’s (1981) study concluded that African newspapers tended to choose from the foreign media those that suited the national interests of their country.

117Horvitz (2004) did not find support for the argument that, despite differing government policies, the French AFP would portray the US in more negative terms than AP in the lead-up to Iraq War.
and several Arabic and other non-Western news channels such as China's English language news channel CCTV9 had emerged to challenge the Coalition framing. It seems very plausible that the Coalition deliberately targeted news organisations that operated unilaterally in Iraq and focused on the plight of the civilian population.

Several years later, the future of Iraq is still in doubt despite the fact that the focus of the media has shifted back to Afghanistan. Yet, the Iraq War has not completely disappeared from the news agenda, thanks to continuing violence on the ground and inquiries which have been set up in the Netherlands and the UK. In the Netherlands, an inquiry looking into the government's decision-making process on the political support for the invasion concluded, among other things, that “the military action had no sound mandate under international law” (Dutch inquiry 2009, 530). Now that the British troops have withdrawn from Iraq, yet another inquiry has been launched to investigate the run-up to the war as well as its conduct in 2003-2009. The so-called Chilcot inquiry has held public hearings of people who were directly involved in policy-making and implementation including former Foreign Minister Jack Straw and Tony Blair. The hearings have provided new insights. For instance, former security and intelligence coordinator, Sir David Omand, has told the inquiry that the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) repeatedly warned the Blair government that invasion of Iraq would radicalise British Muslims and Britain would become a priority target for al-Qaeda (Guardian, 20 January 2010). JIC's concerns proved legitimate on 7 July 2005 when home-grown terrorist hit London. The Blair government never acknowledged a link between the terrorist attack and its participation in the invasion of Iraq.
Chapter 5

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Over the years, a considerable amount of predominantly American academic research has addressed the relationship between media and foreign policy (e.g. Cohen, 1967; Entman, 2004; Nacos et al., 2000), especially during international crises (e.g. Hallin, 1986; Bennett and Paletz, 1994; Mermin, 1999, Baum & Groeling 2010), but cross-national research on the subject has remained relatively rare (Stolle & Hooghe 2005). Consequently, it is still unclear to what degree country characteristics, such as differences in national media systems, political systems and position in the international system, affect the generality of the US-originated theories of media-state relations. In order to avoid developing as many theories as there are states in the international system, it is necessary to test whether the American literature could provide the basis for a theory of press-state relations in foreign policy domain in more general terms. Accordingly, the purpose of this study is to contribute to widening our understanding of media-foreign policy nexus across countries and to investigate whether these US-originated theories have explanatory power in European democracies.

First, this chapter discusses the comparative research design and the Iraq crisis as a case study. Second, this chapter describes the foreign policy traditions of the three states involved in this study in order to put their Iraq policies in a historical context. Moreover, it deals with the controversies that surrounded Iraq policies in Finland, Ireland and Britain. Third, this chapter explains the rationale of data selection: the choice of press coverage as the object of this study, the choice of newspapers, the choice of periods of analysis and how the data was retrieved (together with the limitations of using electronic databases in retrieving of the data). Fourth, this chapter presents the hypotheses tested in this study while also referring to previous research from which they are derived. Fifth, this chapter explains in great detail how the data was analysed: why content analysis was determined to be the appropriate method for the purposes of this study, how the categories were created, and – more generally – how the content analysis procedure was executed.
5.2 THE IRAQ CRISIS AS A CASE FOR A COMPARATIVE STUDY

The international debate was very much reactive to US initiatives and claims. Consequently, the debate focused on WMD and, to a lesser extent in Europe, terrorism. Few governments publicly questioned the existence of these weapons while many insisted – especially France, Germany and Russia – that Iraq could have been disarmed by peaceful means. Unlike in the Persian Gulf War (1991) or Kosovo War (1999), the international community was divided on Iraq creating a more fruitful research setting (Mouritzen 2006). Stolle and Hooghe (2005, 2) argue that the Iraq War of 2003 “offers us a unique test, not just to examine the mass media's role in the war but also to understand whether national media indeed tend to follow their governmental arguments and positions in framing the Iraq question.” In order to test this assumption, three states with different policies were chosen. It was necessary to produce comparable data on national media coverage in each country to be able to draw conclusions about how government policy line might have affected media coverage. Due to the various different research methods adopted in previous research, it was determined that they rarely produced directly comparable findings.

If government policy line is the single most important factor explaining media frames, the coverage of Iraq crisis should have differed significantly in Finland (anti-war), Ireland (neutral) and the UK (pro-war). In Britain, PM Blair had committed himself to the US-led invasion of Iraq early on (Woodward 2004, 178; cf. Meyer 2005, 238). In line with British post-WWII foreign policy tradition, Tony Blair said in the Parliament on 24 September 2002 that “it is an article of faith with me that the American relationship and our ability to partner [with] America in these difficult issues is of fundamental importance, not just to this country but to the wider world” (cited in Jervis 2003, 385). Meanwhile, Finland put greater emphasis on the role of the UN Security Council in the disarmament of Iraq (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003b) and, on 31 March, Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja (2003b) stated that “to wage war without a UN mandate was not acceptable nor justified”. It is worth noting that, even though Finland's position was “anti-war”, Finland was not among the harshest critics of the US/UK invasion. The Irish government, in turn, tried to balance very carefully between the US and anti-war sentiments within its constituency. As the war began, Foreign Minister Cowen (Dáil Éireann 2003b) stated that a second resolution should have been adopted and the US and UK are acting on the belief that previous resolutions have already given them UN mandate even though there is not
general consensus on the issue. Consequently, the position of the Irish government could be characterised as neutral.

The executive version of the manufacturing consent paradigm suggests that a) the British press was largely supportive of the war, b) the Finnish press adopted a critical stance on the US case for war while c) the Irish press provided a more balanced view. In addition to the government policy line, the elite version of the manufacturing consent paradigm is concerned with elite opinions. Consequently, it is important to consider the level of elite consensus on Iraq policies in each of these three countries.

5.3 FOREIGN POLICY CONTROVERSIES IN THE UK, IRELAND AND FINLAND

Like in many European countries, the national policies in the UK, Finland and Ireland were as controversial as the US Iraq policy. These national policies are discussed below in the context of national foreign policy traditions. In the case of Britain, the Iraq issue was already covered in some length in the previous chapter and, hence, only a short reminder is included here.

5.3.1 Britain: Blair's unpopular commitment to military operation against Iraq

Britain has a long tradition of a “special bilateral relationship” with the US on “multiple levels” (Nibblett 2007, 627; see also e.g. Wallace 1992). Despite the argument over Suez in 1956, which resulted from Franco-British military venture to capture the Suez Canal following its nationalisation by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the transatlantic relationship has been the “bedrock of British security policy” after the Second World War. For instance, President Reagan supported PM Margaret Thatcher in the 1982 Falklands War and Thatcher returned the favour when the US bombed Libya in 1986 (Kennedy-Pipe & Vickers 2007, 209). In 1991, the US and the British forces drove Iraqi troops out of Kuwait as a part of a larger coalition.

Part of the modernisation of the Labour Party in late 1980s and early 1990s was to rethink its foreign and security policy because the Conservatives had successfully labelled them weak in this area. Blair's “New Labour” put greater emphasis on the Anglo-American relationship. He also established close relationships with US Presidents and he readily took

118It is worth noting that some consider this special relationship “dead” (Wallace 2005).
credit for convincing President Bill Clinton to take military action in Kosovo in 1999. He
gave a speech on the 'Doctrine of the International Community' in Chicago in April 1999
which redefined New Labour's foreign and security policy. Blair (1999) argued that “the
principle of non-interference must be qualified in some respects. Acts of genocide can
never be a purely internal matter.” This argument was used to justify the Kosovo War
which was unlawful under international law. It is often assumed that Blair's experience of
the Kosovo War encouraged him take military action in dealing with Iraq later (Kennedy-
Pipe & Vickers 2007, 210). To some, “it seems clear that rather than being a reluctant
partner in the invasion of Iraq, Blair was determined that Britain would be engaged and
involved in a central way in the military action to overthrow Saddam Hussein” (Kennedy-
Pipe & Vickers 2007, 208). This view is supported by Blair's own testimony to the Chilcot
inquiry in January 2010. The inquiry was announced by PM Gordon Brown on 15 June
2009 to identify the lessons that can be learned from the Iraq conflict.119

Blair thought that Britain could act as a bridge between the US and continental Europe
(Kennedy-Pipe & Vickers 2007, 209; Wallace 2005, 55).120 However, this task had become
increasingly difficult after the republican Bush administration took office in 2001. At the
latest, this became evident when Iraq entered the agenda and the EU member states could
not agree on a common position. PM Blair's emphasis on the relationship with the US and
especially his alliance with George W. Bush outraged not only some Labour MPs but also
the British electorate. Blair government's Iraq policy proved unpopular with the public and
the government's public relations campaign ran into further difficulties when it was
revealed that parts of a government dossier on Iraqi threat was plagiarised from a
postgraduate study. However, the most severe blow to Blair was the failure to secure a
second UN Security Council resolution giving a UN mandate for the use of force which
left the legality of the war dubious. Lawyers in the Foreign Office held the view that a war
without the second resolution would be “unlawful” (Guardian, 25 January 2010).

According to a Gallup International poll conducted in mid-January 2003, 39% of British
respondents were ready to support military action against Iraq only if sanctioned by the UN
while 41% were against military action under all circumstances. On 15 February, global

119 More detailed information on the inquiry can be found on its website
www.iraqinquiry.org.uk.
120 Like his predecessor John Major, Blair left Britain in the margins of European politics
despite entering the office promising to put Britain 'at the heart of Europe' (Wallace
2005, 54).
anti-war rally mobilised 1.5 million people to march against the US/UK Iraq policy in London alone – at least according to the organisers. The London protest was organised by the Stop the War Coalition, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and the Muslim Association of Great Britain but over 450 other organisations affiliated themselves with the protest – including the Liberal Democratic Party and the Scottish National Party (SNP) (Guardian, 15 February 2003). Shortly before the war, former Foreign Minister and the leader of the House of Commons, Robin Cook (2003) resigned as a protest to “a war that has neither international agreement nor domestic support.” Eventually, Britain went to war with the support of the Blair loyalists within the Labour party and the Conservatives – the main opposition party. In the absence of a UN sanction Liberal Democrats unanimously opposed the war in the crucial House of Commons vote on 18 March. The government motion was passed with a majority of 263 but more than 140 MPs voted against the war – including a fifth of the Parliamentary Labour Party (House of Commons 2003a). While Blair had pushed President Bush to give the UN a 'vital' role in Iraq after the invasion as well as move the Middle East peace process forward, the UN was sidelined in the aftermath of the invasion and the Bush administration made no significant effort to settle the Israeli/Palestine conflict (Hoggett 2005, 421).

5.3.2 Ireland: Controversy over the stop-over policy

Although the cornerstone of Irish foreign policy has been neutral status, Irish neutrality in the Second World War is debatable and in the post-war period Ireland joined several Western European organizations (Rees 2006, 174). According to Robert McNamara (2003), "idealistic and radical elements" of the Irish foreign policy in the late 1950s were replaced with "conservative and cautious" approach by Fianna Fáil governments of Seán Lemass and Jack Lynch in 1960s. This change was clearly visible in the Irish stance on the Vietnam War. In this regard, Irish policy was closer to those of America's NATO allies such as the UK and West Germany than neutral countries such as Sweden.

In 1990s, Ireland clung on to the neutrality while also committed itself to the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the EU (Rees 2006, 175). Both Finland and Ireland have engaged in deepening cooperation with NATO through the Partnership for Peace ( PfP) program (Rees 2006, 175). In 1999, Kosovo put the Irish neutrality to yet another test. Support for the Kosovo War was not very strong in Ireland with only 46% supporting and 42% opposing while there was also some degree of mobilization in anti-war protests. Initially, the government neither supported or condemned
the NATO intervention but later, after a meeting with other EU leaders, Taoiseach (the Irish Prime Minister) Bertie Ahern gave his support for the continuation of bombing (Rees 2006, 182). Editorial in the *Irish Times* argued that “Ireland has stepped off the neutrality fence” (quoted in Rees 2006, 182).

**Table 5.1. Public opinion on Iraq (Gallup International 2003)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are you in favour of military action in Iraq?</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Under no circumstances</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Only if sanctioned by the UN</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Unilaterally by America and its allies</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Don't know/no opinion</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If military action goes ahead, do you think &lt;your country&gt; should support this action?</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Should support</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Should not support</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Don't know/no opinion</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Irish government offered assistance to the US shortly after the events of 9/11 2001 and within a fortnight over 2,000 US troops had travelled through the Shannon airport (Newby & Titley 2003, 485). As Iraq returned to the top of the international agenda shortly after the toppling of the Taliban government in Afghanistan, the Fianna Fáil and Progressive Democrat coalition government tried to remain neutral in the issue. However, the stop-over policy begun to fuel considerable domestic resentment towards the end of 2002. In September, the Green Party criticised government's stop-over policy for eroding Irish neutrality and, in October, ten anti-war activists were arrested after over 50 people attempted to breach the security at Shannon (Miller 2005b, 167). By January 2003, anti-war protests in Shannon became more frequent and the political opposition to the stop-over policy also intensified. The anti-war movement established “a peace camp” at Shannon as a site for permanent protest and to enable constant monitoring of the activity at the airport (Newby & Titley 2003, 486). Opposition parties requested a Dáil debate on Shannon which took place on 29 January. The debate did not go without drama as the Green Party protested by raising a banner “No to War” and marched out in protest to the stop-over policy (Miller 2005b, 169).

121 Poll conducted in mid-January 2003 by Gallup International. UK data excludes Northern Ireland.
In a Gallup International survey (mid-January 2003), 69% of Irish respondents said that Ireland should not support military action against Iraq. According to some estimates, 100,000 people attended the anti-war rally in Dublin on 15 February. Commonly expressed view within the anti-war movement was that the government was willing to compromise Irish neutrality and put moral issues aside to secure economic ties with the US. The Irish economy was largely dependent on US investments\(^{122}\) and the government feared that changing its policy on stop-over flights could harm economic relations (Miller 2005b, 170-171). Another concern with regard to the stop-over policy was that it could make Ireland a target for terrorists.\(^{123}\)

On 13 March, Taoiseach Ahern met President Bush in the White House where he emphasised the importance of UN sanction for the legality of war. Yet, the Irish government avoided taking a stance on whether it would allow the use of Shannon if the US commenced military action against Iraq.\(^{124}\) Eventually, the government decided to continue the stop-over policy which granted the US “access to Shannon for troop, equipment and maintenance stop-overs following the outbreak of hostilities in Iraq” (Miller 2005b, 173). The Irish government insisted that this did not constitute participation in the war and did not give statements which could have harmed Irish-US relations. In fact, on 20 March, Ahern wrote an article ('Saddam, not Bush or Blair, is responsible for the crisis') for the *Irish Independent* which blamed Saddam for the war emphasising Ireland's “deep bonds of democratic values and of political as well as historic ties” with the US and the UK.

The stop-over policy led to a challenge in the High Court. The plaintiff argued that the stopover policy constituted “participation” in the war and was, in effect, unconstitutional. Finally, on April 28, High Court ruled that the government policy did not violate the Constitution but also questioned whether the government policy was “compatible with the status of neutrality in international law” (High Court of Ireland 2003).

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\(^{122}\)Rory Miller (2005b, 171) notes that, in February 2003, “it was estimated that foreign direct investment by US firms was worth US$34 billion and accounted for 90,000 jobs in Ireland.”

\(^{123}\)For instance, Robert Fisk speculated on this prospect in the *Irish Independent* on 14 October 2002.

\(^{124}\)It is worth noting that both Germany and France granted the US over-flight rights despite their anti-war stance (Miller 2005b, 172).
5.3.3 Finland: Foreign policy takes centre-stage ahead of general elections

As discussed in chapter 2, Finland found herself in a difficult position at the end of the Second World War and especially at the beginning of the Cold War. Although Finland aspired a neutral status during the Cold War, it was contested due to Finland's Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) with the Soviet Union. Despite military clauses in the treaty, Finland “was prepared to fight against all possible foreign troops on Finland's soil” (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 70).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Finland's EU membership (1995) have meant that Finland feels less threatened by its Eastern neighbour (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 70). Finland and Sweden pushed towards adopting the so-called Petersberg tasks into the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU. There has also been increasingly close relationship with NATO. For instance, Finland joined NATO's Partnership for Peace Program in 1994 and has later participated in NATO-led peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 74-75). In fact, Defence Minister Anneli Taina (1995-1999) even commented on Finland's relationship with NATO by arguing that “Finland is engaged to NATO but the wedding day has not been decided yet” (quoted in Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 75). At the same time, 'neutrality' has been replaced in political speeches. Instead, it is argued that Finland is 'militarily non-aligned' (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 77).

Traditionally, the UN Charter has provided the cornerstone of the Finnish foreign policy. According to Luostarinen and Suikkanen (2004, 4), “Finland has had various reasons to emphasize the role of the UN; multilateral international co-operation has been seen important as a counter-force for super power domination, as well as Finland's visibility in the struggle for its neutral and sovereign status.” Commitment to UN-led international system has also been reflected in the media. An analysis of press coverage during the Cold War era shows that the coverage of the UN was very positive (Luostarinen & Suikkanen 2004). Some argue that the experiences of the Cold War era still influence foreign policy-making. According to Vaahtoranta and Forsberg (2001, 80) there is an “old tendency in Finland to have respect for authority in foreign and security policy” which may hinder substantial public debate on foreign and security policy issues. They argue that, with the exception of EU membership, “major foreign policy decisions” have been made “without much public debate” (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 84).
The Kosovo War had posed a somewhat similar challenge to Finland as Iraq Crisis of 2002-2003. In the case of Kosovo, Finland supported NATO military action against Yugoslavia despite the lack of UN Security Council authorization (Forsberg 2000). Both Finland and Sweden felt rather uneasy about supporting the bombing without a UN mandate but eventually supported the statement by the EU according to which the air strikes were “necessary and warranted” (Vaahtoranta & Forsberg 2001, 77).

The Finnish public opinion was very much against the US policy on Iraq. In January 2003, only 5% of respondents in the Gallup International study held the view that Finland should support military action against Iraq. None of the political parties endorsed military action. As an indication of the consensus on the Iraq issue, one could refer to a survey among the Finnish elite (politicians, cultural elite, soldiers, researchers and public servants) conducted by the biggest tabloid newspaper *Ilta-Sanomat* in mid-February 2003. Only four out of fifty respondents approved of the looming invasion (Hämäläinen 2003). Despite this apparent consensus within the political elite and the public, Finland's Iraq policy became the most prominent issue in the run-up to the parliamentary election which took place in March 2003.

In November 2002, the Bush administration made inquiries with 50 countries whether they would be willing to participate in the rebuilding and re-stabilizing Iraq after the potential war. The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy (UTVA) formulated response to the US request on 4 December 2002 which put emphasis on the authority of the UN Security Council and its resolution 1441 (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002). In other words, Finland would participate in such activities only as a part of UN authorised operations. Five days after the UTVA meeting, Social Democratic Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen held meetings with President Bush and Vice President Cheney in Washington. A memo drafted on these meetings states that PM Lipponen thanked President Bush for his leadership in the war on terror. Bush, in turn, praised Finland's cooperation and thanked the Finnish government for its statements on Iraq and for joining the Coalition.

PM Lipponen's discussions in Washington raised questions already in December when three MPs (Anni Sinnemäki of the Green Party, Mikko Elo of the Social Democratic Party and Jaakko Laakso of the Left Alliance) posted a public question on Lipponen statements. They expressed concern that Finland could appear to be giving green light to the invasion (*Kaleva*, 19 December 2002). On 7 January, a national daily newspaper, *Helsingin*
Sanomat, reported that Yrjö Hakanen, the chairman of the marginal Communist Party of Finland, criticized the government for not taking a firmer stance against the war. Moreover, he argued that the government had in praxis given its support for the war by promising the US to take part in the rebuilding process. On 10 January, Lipponen gave his response to the public question at the Parliament (Eduskunta) emphasising that the policy adopted by the UTVA has been communicated to the US. Nevertheless, opposition leader, Anneli Jäätteenmäki of the Centre Party, launched her offensive in a regional newspaper, Kaleva, on the following day. Jäätteenmäki argued that Lipponen had prematurely promised assistance in reconstruction noting that Finland had never before decided on such matter prior to the UN request for assistance (Kaleva, 27 January 2007). Social Democratic Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja (2003a) responded to Jäätteenmäki by arguing that “the fact that the Finnish government is prepared to discuss humanitarian assistance and reconstruction in a post-war Iraq does not imply Finnish support for military action.”

Jäätteenmäki intended to replicate what Gerhard Schröder had done in the German elections – exploit the electorate's opposition toward a war in Iraq. Consequently, she hammered down her points in the televised electoral debate on 29 January 2003: she criticised Finland's stance on Iraq, the disagreements within the social democratic foreign policy leadership and, finally, she emphasised that the Iraq crisis should be solved peacefully through the United Nations (Ervasti 2004, 63). Her strategy also sidelined the conservative National Coalition Party dropping their leader Ville Itälä from the race to the Office of Prime Minister (Anttila 2006, 176).

Two days later, the UTVA held another meeting and released the following statement (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003a):

“On Friday 31 January 2003, the meeting between the President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy discussed the current situation in Iraq. Finland supports, in a coherent manner, the UN's efforts to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. The UN Security Council has unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 on the matter. Finland considers it important that the resolution be implemented in a manner consistent with the Security Council's intention.

Finland has already previously expressed its readiness to reply to inquiries by the UN and its special bodies concerning humanitarian and other assistance after a possible conflict.”

On 14 February, the UTVA met again. This time the statement included expression of support to the “Greek Presidency in its endeavours to secure the broadest possible understanding” on Iraq. More importantly, however, the statement stressed that “[a]ny use
of military force will require authorization from the UN Security Council” (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003b).

On 28 February 2003, the US Under Secretary for Political Affairs Marc Grossman held a briefing for “countries that had promised cooperation and assistance to the US with regard to Iraq”. Finland was invited to the 'coalition briefing' among some 30 other countries while other European non-aligned countries Sweden and Austria were not invited. Ervasti (2004, 38) explains the invitation to the briefing by Bush administration's need to present the US policy as popular as possible.

Between the end of January and early March, Jäätteenmäki received 24 classified documents on Iraq from President Tarja Halonen's advisor Martti Manninen (Ervasti 2004, 64). Among them was a memorandum on the Grossman briefing which Jäätteenmäki exploited in another election debate on March 6 – only ten days before the elections. Quoting the documents almost word to word at times, she argued that the “US sees that Finland is part of their Coalition. And PM Lipponen has generated this perception by promising President Bush that Finland will participate in peacekeeping activities, reconstruction and humanitarian aid on 9 December 2002” (quoted in Salminen 2006, 201). Journalists asked about the source of her information in the election debate and Jäätteenmäki simply replied that she is entitled to see some documents as an opposition leader. She had broken with a decades long tradition by turning foreign policy into an election theme. The social democrats now knew that someone had leaked classified documents to the Centre Party leader (Salminen 2006, 201).

When UTVA met to discuss Iraq the following day, the new statement gave Jäätteenmäki an opportunity to say that the confusion is finally over now that Finland has clarified its position by regarding military action “unacceptable”:

“The crisis can be brought to a peaceful conclusion provided that Iraq fulfils its obligations regarding disarmament and fully collaborates with the UN weapons inspectors and that all countries commit themselves not to act without UN authorization. The time, as well as the human and technical resources used for the arms inspections, can be increased in consultation with the inspection leadership and in accordance with the Security Council's decisions. The inspections cannot, however, be continued endlessly if Iraq fails to fully cooperate and, consequently, the possibility of using military force cannot be ruled out entirely.

Meanwhile, Centre Party MPs Juha Korkeaoja and Mauri Pekkarinen did not see a real difference between the Social Democrat and Centre Party stance on Iraq (Ervasti 2004, 74).
Any use of military force will require the authorization of the UN Security Council and all unauthorized use of military force is unacceptable.”

Again, mixed messages from the social democratic foreign policy leadership lent some credibility to Jäätteenmäki's argument. Foreign Minister Tuomioja said that the US had misinterpreted the Finnish position and that Finland is not a part of the coalition (Ervasti 2004, 88).

On March 10, both national tabloids Ilta-Sanomat and Ilta-lehti received two documents. They were Ministry of Foreign Affairs secret documents on PM Lipponen's Washington visit and the Grossman briefing (Ervasti 2004, 92). According to Pekka Ervasti, a political reporter with Ilta-Sanomat, they decided to check the authenticity of the documents and get an expert view on them as soon as possible. Ilta-Sanomat relied on Max Jakobson, a former ambassador, who confirmed the authenticity of the documents but did not agree with Jäätteenmäki's analysis (Ervasti 2004, 94). President Halonen also gave a statement arguing that Finland's Iraq policy has been clear all along and tied to the UN (Ervasti 2004, 98). The Finnish government insisted that “coalition” referred to coalition against terror. Although this explanation seemed to satisfy many, the fact that coalition is mentioned in the context of Iraq (under the heading “Iraq” and in the same sentence) in the classified memo contradicts with this argument.126 The memorandum on the Bush-Lipponen meeting was written by Matti Anttonen from the Finnish Embassy in Washington (Ervasti 2004, 32). According to Ervasti (2004, 34), the Finnish delegation present in the meeting held the view that Bush had thanked Finland for the position that UTV A adopted with regard to Iraq just prior to Lipponen's visit to Washington on 4 December 2002. As for the “coalition”, Ervasti (2004, 34) argues that it referred to the “Coalition Against Terror”.

On 16 March, the parliamentary elections were held and the Centre Party secured a narrow victory with 55 seats against 53 seats of the Social Democrats. The Social Democratic Party gained two seats but the Centre Party gained seven new seats. Having been sidelined by the Iraq debate in the run-up to the elections, the National Coalition Party lost six seats and had to settle for 40 seats in the parliament. In April, Jäätteenmäki’s coalition government took office. The government consisted of eight Centre Party ministers, eight Social Democratic Party ministers and two National Swedish Party (RKP) ministers.

126The document can be found as an appendix in Pekka Ervasti’s book “Irakgate” (2004).
Whether or not PM Lipponen exceeded his authority by promising more than UTVA's guidance allowed, or whether there was an innocent (or deliberate) misinterpretation of the Finnish policy by President Bush is not the object of this study. What is relevant here, is that Jäätteenmäki's accusations – together with the classified memos which were also leaked to tabloid newspapers in early March – provided legitimate grounds for journalists to investigate what exactly PM Lipponen had promised to Bush.

Jäätteenmäki, who had received the classified Ministry of Foreign Affairs memos, had to resign in late June having served only a couple of months as a Prime Minister. Centre Party's coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, adopted a position that Jäätteenmäki could not continue in PM's office after it was revealed that she had received the classified documents from President's advisor Martti Manninen. Her credibility was also damaged by her evasive answers to questions regarding her source of information. Some of her statements on the matter became famous. Among them was “Puhun niin totta kuin osaan” which roughly translates to “I am speaking as truthfully as I can.” Both Jäätteenmäki and Manninen faced trial in 2004. Eventually, Jäätteenmäki was acquitted and she was elected to the European Parliament.

5.3.4 In sum

It is safe to conclude that the national Iraq policies created considerable controversy in each of the three countries. In Britain, the political elite were divided on the issue of whether UK troops should join the US invasion of Iraq. In Ireland, the Fianna Fáil and Progressive Democrat coalition government was harshly criticised by the opposition parties for the stop-over policy. In Finland, the political elite seemed to agree on anti-war stance. However, opposition leader Anneli Jäätteenmäki argued that PM Paavo Lipponen had exceeded his mandate in promising Finnish assistance in the aftermath of the invasion to President Bush before the UN had made a request of assistance. Eventually, she received very little support for her view from the rest of the political elite albeit she might have secured the victory in the general elections by challenging PM Lipponen in the field of foreign policy.

The US was keen on interpreting as many states as possible to be supportive of its Iraq policy to give international legitimacy to its attack. For instance, Croatia protested against being attached to the list of states supportive of invasion merely because it had opened its airspace to US planes.
National foreign policy formulation with regard to Iraq attracted considerable media interest in these countries allowing the investigation of whether the coverage favoured government or reflected wider elite opinion – and to what degree the public was allowed to participate in the foreign policy debate. Interestingly, the press had grounds to investigate the legality of government policies in all three countries that are subject of this study.

5.4 SELECTING THE SAMPLE
Newspapers were chosen not only because of the relative ease in accessing the material in comparison to television coverage but also because national quality press is often expected to have higher standards than other media and to act as the critical ‘watchdog’ scrutinizing the power (Robertson 2004). Moreover, newspapers are still widely read in Ireland, Finland and the UK which are among the top newspaper reading nations. In fact, 50% of the British said that they read a newspaper every day, 10% at least 4 times a week and 14% at least twice a week. Only 16% said they hardly ever read a newspaper (Sancho & Glover 2003, 20). On average, the British spent about 38 minutes a day reading newspapers (Elvestad & Blekesaune 2008, 432).

According to the National Newspapers of Ireland (2004), “more than a 3 million adults” read a newspaper in a typical week between July 2003 and June 2004. The level of daily newspaper reading by adults was 59% in Ireland in 2003/2004 and, in the case of Sunday newspapers, notably higher 78% (McPartlin 2009). A study suggests that the Irish spent approximately 53 minutes on reading a newspaper on an average day (Elvestad & Blekesaune 2008). The Finns, in turn, are among the leading newspaper readers in the world (Sauri 2007) and only Japan and Norway have higher newspaper circulation per 1,000 persons (Moring 2008, 52). The share of the whole Finnish population reading a daily newspaper on an average day was 86% in 2000 (Moring, 2008, 55). According to a 2003 poll, nearly 90% of respondents said they trusted the newspaper of their choice either very much or quite a lot (Finnish Newspapers' Association 2008). Only 4% of Finns read newspapers online in 2002 (Sauri 2007).

5.4.1 Selecting the newspapers
Selecting two quality dailies from different ends of the political spectrum has two major benefits: they are likely to cover the most extreme views present in mainstream news, while also, given the situation that both dailies seem to have adopted a similar stance with

128Elvestad and Blekesaune use the data from European Social Survey 2004.
129The population of Ireland was little less than 4 million in 2003.
regard to some issues, one would assume that this reflects what was common to journalism rather than just the political stance of the daily (see Aday, Cluverius & Livingston 2005, 319).

In the case of the UK, which has a number of national quality dailies, the conservative *Daily Telegraph* and the liberal *Independent* were chosen for these purposes. The decision between the *Independent* and the *Guardian* was based on the *Independent*'s supposedly more critical approach to the Iraq War and on the fact that previous research has often neglected the *Independent* while the *Guardian*’s war coverage has been analysed in several studies (e.g. Tumber & Palmer 2004, Ravi 2004, Fahmy & Kim 2008, Dardis 2006). In January 2003, the circulation of the *Daily Telegraph* was 947,000 (including bulks) and the *Independent* had the smallest circulation of the national quality dailies with a circulation of 222,000 (Audit Bureau of Circulations 2003a). Their Sunday editions were also included in the study. *Independent on Sunday* had a circulation of 220,000 and the *Sunday Telegraph* considerably higher 751,000 (Audit Bureau of Circulations 2003b). In 2003, the *Daily Telegraph* was controlled by a Canadian businessman Conrad Black but was sold to the Barclays brothers the following year.

Britain's newspaper market is very competitive. The two above-mentioned newspapers compete with the *Guardian/Observer, The Times* and the *Financial Times*. In addition, there is the middle-market *Daily Mail* and *Daily Express* and tabloid newspapers such as the *Sun* and the *Daily Mirror*. According to Hallin and Mancini (2004, 208) the British press “has always mirrored the divisions of party politics fairly closely” despite having a commercial press (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 208). Consequently, “within the limits of British political spectrum, strong, distinct political orientations are clearly manifested in news content” (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 211). However, in the post-war period, British newspapers' support for particular political parties has become less consistent than it was in the past (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 210) and despite a degree of partisanship in the British press, the newspapers remain largely independent of political parties (Hampton 2003). Nevertheless, the British dailies have quite different readerships. According to a MORI poll in 2004, 39% of *Independent* readers were Liberal Democrat voters and 36% Labour Party supporters. The *Guardian*, which competes for the same readers, had more Labour Party voters than Liberal Democrat supporters in its readership. According to the 2004 MORI poll, nearly two thirds of *Telegraph* readers were supporters of the Conservative Party (Duffy & Rowden 2005).
Ireland’s two biggest national quality dailies have different political orientations which made the selection rather easy. The *Irish Times*, which is popular among urban professionals, is “liberal and progressive in character” (Phelan 2004, 178) while the *Irish Independent*, which is read by conservative rural population, could be characterized as centre-right. The *Irish Independent* supported Fine Gaeal party until 1979 (Hallin & Mancini 2004, 209-210) and openly supported Fianna Fáil party in 1997 elections (Horgan 2000, 258). The *Irish Times* is often considered to be Ireland's most influential newspaper, 'newspaper of the record', although the *Irish Independent* is the sales leader. According to Joint National Readership Survey (2003), the readership of the *Irish Independent* was 532,000 in 2003 while the *Irish Times*' readership was 319,000. The *Irish Independent* had 17% share of the market while the *Irish Times* had little over 10% share. The *Irish Independent*'s Sunday edition, the *Sunday Independent* had a readership of 1,064,000 – more than a third of the Sunday newspaper market. The second most popular Sunday broadsheet is the *Sunday Tribune* with less than a third of the *Sunday Independent*'s sales (Ferre 2003). Irish newspapers compete with British newspapers in their domestic media market as a result of geographical proximity and a shared language. Consequently, some British newspapers publish an Irish edition. For example, the popular tabloid the *Star* is an Irish edition of the British *Daily Star* (Ferre 2003).

The Irish newspaper market is highly concentrated. The Independent News and Media PLC sells 80% of newspapers in the country. The company owns the *Irish Independent* together with its Sunday edition, national *Evening Herald* and eleven regional newspapers. Independent News and Media also owned London's *Independent* in 2003 (which is the focus of this study) and operates, for example, in the Australian and South African media markets (Ferre 2003). Since 1974, the *Irish Times* has been run by the Irish Times Trust with an objective to secure it as "an independent newspaper primarily concerned with serious issues for the benefit of the community throughout the whole of Ireland, free from any form of personal or party political, commercial, religious or other sectional control” (Irishtimes.com 2010). In addition to the *Irish Independent*, the *Irish Times* and the *Sunday Independent*, the *Sunday Tribune* was included for the sample but only for qualitative analysis. O'Regan (2007, 13) has argued that these newspapers play "opinion leader" roles "in Irish public and political life and are well-positioned in the Irish media market".

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130Most newspaper readers prefer Irish titles and very few settle for reading only a British title (Ferre 2003).
Moreover, she argues, that it is often assumed that they are widely read by both other media and the elites.

Unlike the other newspapers mentioned above, the *Sunday Tribune* adopted a harshly critical position on the Iraq War. Meanwhile, Phelan (2004, 185-186) argues that the *Irish Times* was largely approving of the US operation in Afghanistan and also took the view that Ireland cannot remain neutral in the war on terror. An editorial (25 Sept 2001) argued that the stopover policy, which allows US military aircraft to refuel at Shannon airport, “deserves the support of the Irish people” only regretting that the decision was not subjected to parliamentary approval (quoted in Phelan 2004, 184). On the whole, the editorial policy of the *Irish Times* was in line with the government position at the time (Phelan 2004, 187).

The selection of the Finnish newspapers was less clear-cut for three main reasons. First of all, Finland has only one national quality daily newspaper *Helsingin Sanomat*¹³¹ (HS) which was, consequently, included in the sample. In 2003, the circulation of *Helsingin Sanomat* was nearly 440,000¹³² making it the biggest newspaper in Scandinavia and it could be characterised as “liberal quality daily” (Rahkonen 2007, 86).

Secondly, the heyday of the political press was from 1910 to early 1930s (Salokangas 1999) when Finnish newspapers were closely affiliated to political parties. However, party affiliated press has been in the decline for decades and “the party press is almost totally marginalized” today (Moring 2008, 54)¹³³. Nieminen et al (2005, 38) argue that the demise of the political press led to a situation in which alternative and conflictual voices have diminished access to the public domain.

Thirdly, the Finnish press seems to hold quite uniform views on foreign policy issues. Since independence, Finnish geopolitical thinking among the governing elite has been dominated by two schools of thought: nationalist-realists who emphasise neutrality and

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¹³¹Salokangas (1999, 103) notes that Helsingin Sanomat is first and foremost regional newspaper of the Helsinki area and only secondarily national.

¹³²All circulation figures for Finnish newspapers are based on the Finnish Audit Bureau of Circulations data from www.levikintarkastus.fi.

¹³³By 1997, out of 214 Finnish newspapers only 18 had a “formal party affiliation” (Salokangas 1999, 97). By early 2001, the party press had a combined circulation of 145,000 or little more than 4% of the total newspaper circulation (Jyrkiäinen & Savisaari 2003, 70).
non-alignment and western-liberalists who emphasise “cultural difference and the threat posed by Russia/Soviet Union” (Moisio 2008). The latter are well-presented in the mainstream media. With regard to Finland's decision to become a member of the European Union in 1990s, Sami Moisio (2008) argues that

“The national media clearly supported the westernisers [western-liberalists], while some of the provincial media with their base in the agricultural regions wholeheartedly campaigned against the membership. The leading daily newspapers published in major cities, Helsingin Sanomat (Helsinki), Aamulehti (Tampere) and Turun Sanomat (Turku), were all in favour and became important players in the EU debate, along with some influential weekly magazines (e.g. Suomen Kuvalehti), as they added publicity to the westernisers' attempts to persuade the people to support their 'new foreign policy' aimed at relocating Finland on the mental map of Europe.”

According to Rahkonen's analysis of editorials in 36 major newspapers and weekly magazines published in 2003, the Finnish print media would seem to be largely supportive of Finland's membership in NATO. Both national tabloids, HS, and the largest regional newspapers were in favour of military alignment through NATO. Apart from the marginal Green Party and Communist Party weekly newspapers (Vihreä Lanka and Tiedonantaja respectively), only three regional newspapers (Jyväskylä-based Keskisuomalainen, Seinäjoki-based Ilkka and Helsinki- and Oulu-based Suomenmaa) close to the Centre Party did not want to see Finland ally herself with NATO (Rahkonen 2007, 88; 2006, 221). However, these small and medium-size regional newspapers have limited resources and rely heavily on Finnish news agency STT even in their national coverage (Rahkonen 2006, 239). Moreover, they have little influence beyond their region. These factors limited the choice to the largest regional newspapers which are Tampere-based Aamulehti and Turku-based Turun Sanomat. The second largest regional newspaper Turun Sanomat had the circulation of nearly 112,000 and reached approximately 70% of Turku residents. Turun Sanomat was chosen over Tampere-based Aamulehti (circulation 136,000) because Aamulehti's Iraq coverage has already been studied by Männistö (2004) while the candidate is not aware of any research done on Turun Sanomat's Iraq coverage even at a graduate level.

Turun Sanomat, which was established in 1905, is part of the family-owned TS-Group. Helsingin Sanomat, in turn, is owned by Finland's largest multimedia house Sanoma-WSOY which also owns the biggest national tabloid Ilta-Sanomat (IS), with a circulation of nearly 199,000. Ilta-Sanomat, which was founded in 1932, was also included in the sample because it played a significant role in the controversy regarding Finnish Iraq policy in the lead-up to the general election (Virkkunen 2004). Finland also has another national tabloid, Iltalehti, but its circulation was (121,000) well behind Ilta-Sanomat. It also lacks a
proper online archive and it played a less prominent role in the controversy regarding the national foreign policy on Iraq. Another reason for selecting a third newspaper is that the Finnish sample would have remained rather small without it.

*Helsingin Sanomat* declared free from party political alignments in 1932 and *Turun Sanomat* followed in early 1960s (Rand & Savisaari 1995, 53). Both newspapers have ideological background in the Young Finnish Party which was based on international liberalism (Rahkonen 2006, 118). According to Olli Kivinen, who worked for *Helsingin Sanomat* for 44 years, the HS always maintained the view that Finland is a Western democracy and shares the values with Western Europe rather than its Eastern neighbour which has different ideals (Rahkonen 2006, 117). The orientation towards west is also reflected in the fact that, during the Cold War era, the Finnish press did not rely on the Soviet news agency TASS which had only marginal role in most Finnish newspapers (Rahkonen 2006, 116). While in 1950 70% of foreign news stories published in *Helsingin Sanomat* originated from news agencies and newspapers in NATO countries, in 2000, this percentage had dropped to less than 10%. During the same time period the output of the newspaper's own reporters and correspondents increased from little over 10% to over 70% (Rahkonen 2006, 115).

The fact that *Helsingin Sanomat* has not had a party political alignment since 1932 does not mean that it would not press its own political agenda. During the recent years it has openly campaigned for NATO membership and the newspaper sees that Finland should be part of every organisation in which other Western liberal democracies participate (Rahkonen 2007, 86). *Helsingin Sanomat* also supported the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo in its editorials in 1999 (Forsberg 2000, 45). Despite its stance on NATO, Rahkonen (2007, 86) argues that *Helsingin Sanomat* did “not fully support” Bush administration's foreign policy and “Republican ideology” as they contradicted with some of the principles of liberal tradition with regard to religion for example.

According to critics, *Helsingin Sanomat'*s partisanship is also illustrated by its treatment of some Centre Party politicians. Especially in the run-up to the Presidential election in 2000, *Helsingin Sanomat* made significant efforts to discredit the Centre Party nominee Esko

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134However, from 1951 to 1961, *Turun Sanomat* was affiliated to a liberal party, Finnish People's Party (Suomen Kansanpuolue), at least nominally. It differed from its predecessor party (National Progressive Party/Edistyspuolue) by prioritising middle class interests (Steinby 1963, 114; Mickelsson 2007, 151, 179).
Aho (Salminen 2006, 180-183). In the 1994 Presidential election, the Social Democrat nominee Martti Ahtisaari was the preferred candidate with the HS journalists (Salminen 2006, 182). Both Helsingin Sanomat and Turun Sanomat supported Finnish membership in the European Union (Moisio 2008)

The Irish Times articles were retrieved from Factiva database while the British newspapers were retrieved from Lexis/Nexis. The Finnish newspapers together with the Irish Independent and the Sunday Tribune were retrieved from their own online archives. All databases and archives were simply searched with specific dates (see below) and a search word “Iraq” or “Irak” in the case of Finnish newspapers. Items that had only minor references to the Iraq crisis were excluded from the sample as well as duplicates. Based on a preliminary analysis, business sections dealt mainly with the war's impact on oil prices, stock markets, effects on tourism industry and other issues which were deemed somewhat irrelevant to the political aspects of the war. As a result, business news were excluded from the sample together with sports, TV/radio programming, culture and obituaries. Hence, the sample consists of news articles (both national and international sections), editorials, commentaries and letters-to-the-editor.

As opposed to using hard copies, the electronic databases have some disadvantages. As Philip Hammond (2007) has noted the “problem with electronic versions of newspapers is that they do not include layout, photographs or other illustrations.” Electronic archives “can be unreliable and incomplete, and discrepancies can arise when different newspapers' data are recorded differently” (Hammond 2007). This was a challenge particularly in this research project because there were multiple sources of content. For instance, Lexis/Nexis database records the page number where the item appeared. However, this information was not available for all newspapers analysed in this study and, consequently, it was determined that page numbers will not be recorded for any of the items. The point of the research was to produce comparable data and because this information was lacking in too many cases (including all Finnish newspapers) recording page numbers was deemed futile.

Electronic databases often include different versions of the same article. However, this is also true of the actual newspapers. Different versions of the articles may go to print at different times. For example, in Finland, where distances are very long, the first copies have to be shipped to the northern parts of the country. Meanwhile, Helsinki residents get the latest version of the newspaper. In other words, a researcher might get slightly different
results depending on where he or she retrieves the newspapers. In cases where duplicates –
different versions of the same article – were found in the databases, the longer one (or the
longest one in some cases) was chosen for analysis while the rest were disregarded as
duplicates.

With regard to news photographs, they were excluded from this study because news
photography is not readily available via electronic databases. As mentioned above, a
further limitation imposed by the use of electronic databases is that they do not allow the
analysis of the manner in which the stories were positioned in the pages of the newspapers.
While all of these factors are clear drawbacks in comparison to analysing actual
newspapers, it was determined that retrieving copies of seven newspapers in three different
countries would have been too costly and time-consuming in relation to the potential
benefits of such effort. Consequently, such endeavour will be left to future research.

5.4.2 Selecting the periods of analysis

In order to make the sample manageable, it was necessary to reduce the number of days
subjected to analysis. Hence, four key events were identified at different stages of the crisis
which supposedly were followed by particular intense framing contests – which occur
when “political actors compete by sponsoring their preferred definitions of issues”
(Carragee & Roefs 2004, 216) – on both international and national levels:

- Colin Powell's presentation at the UN on 5 Feb,
- Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein on 17 March,
- the fall of Baghdad on 9 April,
- the end of "major combat operations" on 1 May.

Analysis periods cover a week after each event. This was considered to be sufficiently long
period for other actors to put forward competing interpretation of events/issues and
journalists to investigate the implications of the initial events and statements. Indeed, the
policy debate was particularly intense during the chosen weeks and many relevant events
in foreign policy formulation in each country coincided with these periods as national
governments reacted to these stimuli. For example, during the first period of analysis,

135Due to the delay in newspaper reporting, the periods of analysis begin only the next
day after the major event. Hence, for example, the third period of analysis following the
fall of Baghdad on 9 April covers the newspaper coverage of the period from 10 to 16
April.
parliamentary debates on Iraq took place in all three countries and an EU summit put pressure especially on Ireland to adopt a clear policy instead of continuing the fence-sitting. Another possibility for a pre-war period of analysis was the week following the February 15 global anti-war demonstration. However, the fact that Powell's presentation, unlike the global protests, seemed to have pushed the policy formulation forward in all three countries tipped the scale in favour of early February. Moreover, the global anti-war movement made another effort to influence events or at least public perception of them by organising the second round of global demonstrations as the war began. These demonstrations coincided with the second period of analysis (18–24 March). As in the pre-war situation, it was the US statements and actions that drove things forward – including foreign policy formulation in Europe. Bush's ultimatum to Saddam Hussein on 17 March was a clear sign that the war would be not only inevitable but also imminent. Consequently, in Britain, the Blair government faced a vote in the House of Commons on the war. The Leader of the House, Robin Cook, resigned as a protest to Blair's policy on Iraq which divided the Labour Party in the vote. Similarly, Bush's ultimatum forced the Finnish and Irish governments to formulate their positions on the war. The Irish government found itself in especially difficult circumstances due to the opposition toward the stop-over policy which allowed US planes access to Shannon airport. Clearly, President Bush's ultimatum launched a chain of events and the few days that followed his statements witnessed a particularly intense period in the Iraq debate. This period also covers the first days of actual combat operations from the attempt to “capitulate” the Iraqi President on 20 March to the killing of ITV reporter Terry Lloyd near Basra on 23 March (which made the newspapers on 24 March).

The third period of analysis covers the period from the fall of Baghdad on April 9 to the meeting of US officials and Iraqi opposition in Southern Iraq on 15 April. The picture of a falling statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad on April 9 became perhaps the most iconic image of the invasion. However, the fighting continued and Saddam's hometown Tikrit only fell a few days later. At this point of the invasion, it was still unclear who would be in charge of reconstruction. Russia, France and Germany, which held a summit in St. Petersburg on 11–12 April, demanded that the UN should be given the task of organising reconstruction and the political transition in Iraq. At the end of this period of analysis, however, it became clear that the US did not intend to include the UN in the negotiations with Iraqi opposition and religious groups on an interim government. The week following
the fall of Baghdad was, therefore, a crucial period in determining which course the political reconstruction would take.

On 1 May, President Bush gave his “Mission Accomplished” speech on the deck of USS Abraham Lincoln, an aircraft carrier, in a carefully staged media event which was widely covered in the world media. In his speech, Bush justified the military action with the removal of a brutal dictator, bringing freedom to the Iraqi people and ensuring that “no terrorist network” would “gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime”. Yet, there still was no evidence of active unconventional weapons programmes in Iraq which had begun to raise suspicions about potential undeclared motives for the invasion. Another important event also took place during the fourth and last period of analysis. EU foreign ministers met in Rhodes on 2 May to discuss EU's role in reconstruction of Iraq. The debate over UN's role in the reconstruction also continued with the US and UK drafting a UN Security Council Resolution which would give the US authority over Iraqi economy for a year.

While the latter two events (the fall of Baghdad and Bush's declaration of end of combat operations) chosen for analysis did not create similar urgency of policy formulation in European capitals as the first two events, they were the two most prominent events in the aftermath of the invasion in terms of fuelling debate on Iraq. They also implied an end to the initial invasion albeit views on the future of Iraq may have significantly differed among supporters and critics of the invasion. In any case, these two events fuelled debate on the meaning of the invasion and especially its justifications since the invaders failed to produce evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the major powers continued to fight over who would determine the political and economic future of Iraq during these latter two periods of analysis.

To appropriate comparison, time periods had to be identical for all the countries but this created some problems especially when important national debates did not coincide with the four periods of analysis which were discussed above. Consequently, an additional period on national foreign policy debate was included when the events were deemed critical for foreign policy debate in a country. In the Finnish case, early March was a critical period when the opposition leader challenged government's Iraq policy in a televised election debate. Qualitative analysis was applied to this additional content. Unfortunately, covering the whole period from mid-February to early May was not
possible as the sample would have grown way too large to be handled in this study due to the exhaustive and time-consuming process of qualitative content analysis.

Table 5.2. The number of items published on Iraq during the four weeks of particularly intense policy debate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6-12</td>
<td>18-24</td>
<td>10-16</td>
<td>2-8</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>May</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>446</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FINLAND</strong></td>
<td><strong>144</strong></td>
<td><strong>363</strong></td>
<td><strong>203</strong></td>
<td><strong>87</strong></td>
<td><strong>797</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>745</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>613</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td><strong>218</strong></td>
<td><strong>543</strong></td>
<td><strong>461</strong></td>
<td><strong>139</strong></td>
<td><strong>1358</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Independent</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>430</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Times</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRELAND</strong></td>
<td><strong>156</strong></td>
<td><strong>388</strong></td>
<td><strong>201</strong></td>
<td><strong>60</strong></td>
<td><strong>805</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>1294</td>
<td>865</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>2960</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To summarise, the time span for this study covers 28 days of coverage between 6 February and 8 May 2003. This period covers the first clear sign of the inevitability of the war (that is, Colin Powell's presentation at the UN Security Council meeting), the final ultimatum to Saddam and the beginning of the invasion, the fall of Baghdad and the conclusion of the first phase of the conflict culminating in President Bush's declaration of end of major combat operations. With hindsight, however, it was only the beginning of a bloody conflict in Iraq and the later stages of the occupation and/or civil war should be an object of another study. Nevertheless, selecting four different periods of analysis enables comparison of how the press covered the crisis before, during and after the actual invasion stage of the Iraq crisis. It is worth noting that different types of communication strategies are employed at different stages of the conflict. In the lead-up to a conflict, the participating governments seek to prepare the nation to the war and mobilize support whereas governments attempt to confuse the enemy and encourage its domestic audience. After the war, the emphasis is on justifying the taken course of action and writing history (Nord & Strömbäck 2006). The time span for this study should cover both the immediate and more reasoned reactions to events and statements through the phases of mobilisation, confusion and justification.

Clearly, the validity of the findings would have been enhanced by including more days and media outlets. Nevertheless, it was necessary to strike a balance between what is
practically feasible and a sufficiently large sample. A sample of nearly 3,000 items was
demed sufficient enough to produce valid findings. As can be seen in table 5.2, the sample
consisted of about 800 items from both Finnish and Irish newspapers and considerably
more from the UK press (over 1,350).136

5.5 HYPOTHESES
As discussed in chapter 3, previous research has produced somewhat contradictory
assumptions about how the media in different countries cover international events. The
executive version of the manufacturing consent paradigm argues that the government sets
the range of views present in the national media. While the manufacturing consent thesis
emerges from the US context, other studies have produced similar result in other locales.
There is a bulk of literature that has found evidence to suggest that the news about
international events are 'domesticated', 'nationalised' or 'localised' (depending on one's
choice of word) to reflect the national foreign policy line (Cohen et al 1996, Riegert 1998,
hypotheses can be drawn from this line of research:

H1. The media in countries with pro-war governments (i.e. the UK)
   a) prefer sources that share this position,
   b) avoid topics that deal with human suffering while focusing on tactical aspects
      of the invasion (i.e. troop movements),
   c) cover the pro-war arguments extensively without much criticism while
   d) underpresenting and/or heavily criticising the arguments used to discredit the
      war.

H2. The media in countries with anti-war governments (i.e. Finland)
   a) prefer sources that share this position,
   b) focus on topics that deal with human suffering,

136Since the Sunday editions (the Sunday Telegraph, the Independent on Sunday and the
Sunday Independent) seemed to adopt similar editorial positions as their daily editions
(the Daily Telegraph, the Independent and the Irish Independent) they were treated in
the tables as one outlet. In other words, the Daily Telegraph figures, for example,
include the findings of the Sunday Telegraph. Of the Finnish newspapers, Helsingin
Sanomat and Turun Sanomat are published seven days a week Ilta-Sanomat being the
only Finnish newspaper included in this sample which is not published on Sundays. The
Irish Times is also published six times per week and lacks a Sunday edition.
c) cover the anti-war arguments extensively without much criticism while 
d) underpresenting and/or heavily criticising the arguments used to credit the 
war.

There are also studies (elite version of the manufacturing consent paradigm) that suggest 
that domestic elite opinion is a crucial factor in determining the nature of media coverage. 
The elite version of the manufacturing consent paradigm argues that the media conrorm 
“to the interests of political elites in general whether they are in the executive, legislative 
or any other politically powerful position in society” (Robinson 2001a, 525-526). When 
there is no disagreement within the elite, the media operate within the “sphere of 
consensus” and media coverage remains uncritical helping to build support for official 
policy. When there is elite dissensus, the media coverage reflects the divisions and may 
become critical of the government policy (Robinson 2002, 31).

H3. In Finland, the elite and the public shared the anti-war position. Therefore, the 
coverage should have been uniformly and unambiguously anti-war and also 
reflect the opposition's criticism of the government.

H4. If media coverage reflects ”the range of views expressed in mainstream 
government debate” in accordance with Bennett's indexing hypothesis (Bennett 
1990, 106), the Irish and British press coverage should convey a wide range of 
opinion on the US/UK invasion and Ireland's stop-over policy.

Another line of research emphasises the ability of the US government to get its message 
across in the global media especially in countries which lack resources to cover 
international events independently and, therefore, mainly rely on Anglo-American media 
as sources of information (e.g. Soderlund et al 1994, Rafeeq 2007, Kupe & Hyde-Clarke 
2005). The following hypotheses can be drawn from these studies:

H5. US government and military sources are the main sources of information 
regardless of national foreign policy line.

H6. US views are widely reproduced in media coverage regardless of national 
foreign policies.

H7. Finnish and Irish newspapers that depended on Anglo-American news agencies 
or organisations for original material for their articles are more favourable to US 
views than newspapers that relied on their own foreign correspondents.
5.6 METHODOLOGY

The presumption, on which the analysis is based on, is that there are competing interpretations of reality which “are linked to interests and these competing interests will seek to explain the world in ways which justify their own position” (Philo & Berry 2004, 95). Some of these interpretations gain greater visibility in media coverage while others are marginalised. Walter Lippmann (2004, 192) has noted that

“[e]very newspaper when it reaches the reader is the result of a whole series of selections as to what items shall be printed, in what position they shall be printed, how much space each shall occupy, what emphasis each shall have. There are no objective standards here. There are conventions.”

Bennett (1994) suggests that these conventions translate into patterns in media coverage. These, in turn, can be best studied with the method of content analysis (Wilkinson & Birmingham 2003, 68) which is “a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context” (Krippendorff 1980, 21). It is a “systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics” (Neuendorf 2002, 1).

5.6.1 Content analysis as a method

Content analysis is perhaps the most widely used research method in the field of political communication and there is a large number of studies on war coverage that have employed content analysis as the main method of investigation. The scope of these studies on media coverage of international conflicts range from the American Civil War to the Korean War, the Algerian Civil War and the 2003 Iraq War (Rafeeq 2007, 206). For instance, Daniel Hallin employed content analysis in his famous study of the Vietnam War coverage. Hallin (1986, 112-113) pointed out some of the strengths and weaknesses of the method:

“Content analysis lends an aura of scientific authority to media research. And in fact quantification does, if done properly, impose a useful measure of discipline. It requires the analyst to define clearly the criteria for assigning stories or other units of content to fit the different categories of the analysis. And it requires dealing with all the content sampled, not just those parts of it that fit the story line the analyst starts out with. Nevertheless, at the risk of undermining scientific authority, it is important to point out that the data produced by content analysis are always a result of many choices and sometimes conceal a good deal of ambiguity or subjectivity in coding procedures.”

Other notable studies that have employed content analysis to investigate media coverage of foreign policy issues include Mermin (1999), who investigated television news' breadth of information and foreign policy debate on several US military interventions in the post-Vietnam era, and Zaller and Chiu (1996) who covered a longer period (1945-1991) in their
analysis of news magazines (*Time* and *Newsweek*) of US military interventions. Media coverage of the Iraq War of 2003 has also been studied by the means of content analysis (see e.g. Rafeeq 2007 and Maeshima 2007). These above mentioned examples are sufficient to highlight some of the major advantages of the method. Content analysis is a flexible method in a sense that it can be applied to radio and television programmes and both textual and visual content of newspapers (Bryman 2001, 179). It also enables the analysis of very large samples. Content analysis provides the required tools when “the ambition is to analyse thousands of communication units in a meaningful way” (Anthonsen 2003, 189). Meanwhile, “other types of communication analysis are neither practically applicable, nor consistent” with such ambition (Anthonsen 2003, 189).

Quantitative content analysis is an especially helpful tool in revealing patterns in media coverage and displaying these patterns in numbers (Maeshima 2007, 16). Another advantage of quantitative content analysis is that it is a very transparent research method enabling replication and follow-up studies. Content analysis is carried out by developing content categories through a set of explicit rules of coding. The categories are created to produce relevant information vis-à-vis the research questions at hand. The rules of coding are then systematically applied to the material being analysed. It is due to this transparency in procedures that content analysis is often described as an objective research method (Bryman 2001, 189). The purpose of the transparent and systematic research method is to disable any personal biases from influencing the findings (Bryman 2001, 178).

Quantitative content analysis as a research method suffers from some limitations. One has to do with the fact that it is nearly impossible to devise a codebook which does not entail some degree of interpretation by the coders. Coders rely on their own knowledge of the culture in making interpretations of the meanings of the material being coded (Bryman 2001, 191). In this regard, the notion of objectivity should be taken with little caution. Another limitation of content analysis is that while it may reveal certain patterns in media coverage, it rarely answers the question of *why* such patterns occur (Bryman 2001, 191). Consequently, other methods are often required to explain the actual news-making process (Rafeeq 2007, 207) which can be studied more thoroughly in ethnographic newsroom studies. Moreover, analysis of the content does not in itself allow conclusions about the effects of the messages on an audience. Making statements about media effects would

137Frankly, the use of content analysis is so commonly employed in this particular field of research that there is an abundance of examples in the bibliography of this thesis.
require audience studies which could be supplemented by content analysis (Rafeeq 2007, 207).

Another problem associated with quantitative content analysis is that it typically reduces rich and complex content into quantifiable categories risking to miss the real meanings of the data. Traditional quantitative content analysis aims to "quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner" (Bryman 2001, 177). It has also been seen as “a strictly quantitative technique, which aims to give an objective description of the manifest content of communication” (Anthonsen 2003, 189). Traditional quantitative content analysis has focused on counting words, sentences, measurement of column inches or other such easily quantifiable matter. In other words, there has been an attempt to avoid engaging in any kind of interpretative readings of text. While such method produces highly reliable and replicable results, the critics have argued that the method fails to deal with the nuances and meanings of the text. Critics of this approach argue that "counting numbers so dilutes the quality of information collected as to make it of little use" arguing instead that "themes and issues can be determined more readily through a qualitative, more holistic, approach rather than employing advanced statistical and analytical techniques" (Wilkinson & Birmingham 2003, 76). Nowadays, however, the lines of quantitative and qualitative approaches have blurred and counting and interpreting are not seen as mutually exclusive methods (Anthonsen 2003, 189-190). The type of content analysis carried out in this study combines both quantitative and qualitative elements. In other words, it involves systematic registration of easily quantifiable manifest content as well as interpretations of various elements in the press coverage of the Iraq crisis. A clearly qualitative approach – without the intention to quantify – was well-suited especially for the analysis of editorials and commentary pieces which often discussed issues in much greater depth than news stories. Therefore, qualitative content analysis supplemented the analysis of opinion content.

Both quantitative and qualitative content analyses are empirical methods of analysing recorded human communication – be it television programmes, newspaper articles, photographs or transcripts of interviews. According to one definition, the main difference between these approaches is that quantitative content analysis "decomposes text material into different parts and assigns numeric codes to these elements or parts" which "are not just words, but rather issues, statements, arguments, or bundles of meaning" (Scheufele 2008). Qualitative content analysis, in turn, "works inductively by summarizing and
classifying elements or parts of the text material and assigning labels or categories to them” (Scheufele 2008). Maeshima (2007, 68) defines qualitative content analysis in slightly different terms by arguing that it does not attempt to quantify anything. In practice, the line between quantitative and qualitative content analysis is often blurred.

5.6.2 The coding procedure

While content analysis has been a widely used method in a large number of the studies cited in this thesis, many previous studies have indeed reduced complicated foreign policy debates in mainstream media into very simple categories. For instance, US studies on media-state relations have often adopted rather simplistic coding protocols such as hawkish/dovish (Zaller & Chiu 1996, 2000) and critical/uncritical (Mermin 1999, 43) which often fail to reveal the actual substance of foreign policy debates (cf. Althaus 2003). Althaus (2003, 386-387) argues that many studies in the field have failed to take into account subtle ways of criticism (for instance, procedural rather than fundamental criticism of government policy), have used proxy data instead of full-text news articles or have simply omitted foreign voices from the analysis of coverage (see e.g. Bennett 1990 and Mermin 1999). These methodological choices have contributed to the notion of “lapdog press” which argues that newspaper coverage fails to provide criticism of the government. Studies which have analysed full-text news articles and considered also subtle forms of oppositional argumentation have typically found more evidence of press independence from the government positions (Althaus 2003, 387). These were all issues that had to be addressed in making the methodological choices for this research project.

Two of the problems that have affected previous research, were easily eliminated: this study analysed full-text news articles and recorded also foreign actors from the content. However, capturing the substance of the foreign policy debate was a more difficult task. The complexity of the Iraq crisis posed a challenge for developing a coding protocol which would take into account also subtle criticism while also providing numerical information about the substance of the Iraq debate in the press coverage. It was evident that a simple pro-war/anti-war coding of the sample would have provided only a very limited picture of how the press covered the Iraq crisis in the three countries.

138Mermin (1996, 1999) has excluded foreign actors from his analysis because they are unlikely to have an influence on an American audience.
As discussed above in the previous chapter, the Iraq debate had many dimensions ranging from security to humanitarian concerns. At least in part, this is explained by the multiplicity of justifications given by the Bush administration and the Blair government. Ian Taylor (2008) argues that the Iraq debate was mainly concerned with issues pertaining to legality, morality, strategy and security. He identifies both pro-war and anti-war arguments on all of these levels. For instance, the pro-war arguments from the security point of view included Iraqi WMD and potential links to al-Qaeda as too great a risk for Western security. Security concerns were also used to oppose the invasion by arguing that the war would only incite more terrorism and potentially further destabilise the Middle East. From this point of view, the respect for international law and the multilateral UN-led international system were seen as the best guarantee of peace and stability in the world. Hence, a “pre-emptive strike” could create a dangerous precedent which could lead to international anarchy. Similarly, the arguments considering the legality of the war ranged from seeing the war as an attempt to uphold the UN authority to rather seeing the war eroding the UN.  

How to analyse such a complex foreign policy debate? In order to produce nuanced data on how the press coverage might have differed between countries and outlets, the coding protocol was developed to cover a wide range of issues. While it was neither practical nor possible to capture all the aspects of the Iraq debate, a number of categories were created reducing the debate into fewer and manageable categories which were identified as the key elements of the debate. The categories were developed after a preliminary review of part of the sample and analysis of a few key statements of political leaders at different sides of the argument on Iraq. This stage included going through a few dozen randomly selected articles from the total sample of nearly 3000 articles. Although Neuendorf (2002, 139) identifies six school of thoughts which employed different combinations of arguments. 'Neoconservatism', the 'official line' and 'liberal hawks' supported the war for different reasons while 'Antiwar Realists', 'Liberal Doves' and 'Antiwar Radicals' opposed the invasion.  

139 Taylor (2008) identifies six school of thoughts which employed different combinations of arguments. 'Neoconservatism', the 'official line' and 'liberal hawks' supported the war for different reasons while 'Antiwar Realists', 'Liberal Doves' and 'Antiwar Radicals' opposed the invasion.  

140With regard to the creation of categories, the substance of the debate was of more interest than what some might call "frames". As Archetti (2007, 348-349) notes, news rarely employ systematic, logical and consistent frames. So, instead of trying to impose "frames" on something that is often little more than a collection of quotes from different actors – processed and put together by journalists – this study focuses on the occurrence of certain themes and arguments pertinent to the crisis at hand. Nevertheless, the codebook includes many of the elements of frames as defined by Robert Entman (1993): problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment recommendation.  

141In other words, the effort to quantify the characteristics of the analysed content also had some qualitative elements.
11) argues that “an a priori (i.e. 'before the fact') design is actually a part of the task of meeting the requirement of objectivity-intersubjectivity” and that the “inductive approach violates the guidelines of scientific endeavor”, this exercise was helpful in determining some specific issues which were discussed during the analysed weeks. For instance, the Franco-German peace initiative had little significance in retrospect and very little is written about it afterwards. In such cases, the pre-analysis of the sample was helpful in the identification of issues that could be developed into coding categories for the measurement of the newspapers coverage of the Iraq crisis. Arguably, subjecting part of the data to pre-analysis to establish key issues, themes or arguments in the content leads to a more accurate and thorough analysis than imposing predefined categories on the data (Wilkinson & Birmingham 2003, 76).

In the second phase, a pilot study was conducted to put the codebook to a test. About 350 items (nearly 12% of the sample) were coded to assess the coding protocol. As a result, the codebook was further modified to produce relevant and reliable results before proceeding to the coding of the entire sample (and re-coding of the 350 items used in the pilot study). For instance, it was discovered at this stage that press coverage often included references to 'casualties of war' without specifying whether they are military or civilian – let alone their nationality. Consequently, a category for 'unspecified casualties' was created and used in cases where it was impossible to determine whether the item referred to civilian, military or journalist casualties.

The codebook was build on the premise that the newspapers' coverage of the Iraq crisis could differ in terms of news sources, salience of certain issues/themes (that is, the selection of topics) or the direction of arguments. The last one requires some clarification and will be discussed later in greater detail. Coding unit was an item (news, editorials, commentaries and letters-to-the-editor). SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences)

142As a result of the pre-analysis two categories were created to measure how the Franco-German peace initiative was covered in the respective newspapers. Positive/neutral references to the initiative were counted together with negative references. The following was recorded as positive/neutral reference:

"The Franco-German plan would effectively turn Iraq into a protectorate of the UN, and sideline President Saddam Hussein."

The following was recorded as negative reference:

"Reflecting Britain's forward march to decision-time for the UN, the Foreign Secretary, Mr Jack Straw, warned that Franco/German proposals for the deployment of more weapons inspectors in Iraq were simply 'a recipe for procrastination and delay'."
was used to assist in the analysis of the findings. The complete codebook can be found as an appendix.

5.6.3 Creating the categories

The aim of the preliminary analysis was to identify a number of arguments that were contested. There were competing perspectives in the area of **policy options** (primarily the dividing line was between the continuation or re-enforcement of the UN weapons inspections and the employment of military force), **rationale for military action** (e.g. disarmament of Iraq or expansion of the US sphere of influence), and **implications of the invasion** (e.g. fuels more terrorism or brings democracy to Iraq).

While some of the categories were rather straight-forward and did not require much interpretation from the coder, other categories were more challenging in this respect. The simpler categories included such as the day of publication and the name of the newspaper in which the item appeared. In addition, the type of the text was recorded. Each item was labelled either news story, editorial, commentary, letter-to-the-editor, 'quotes of the day' or 'other'. News story was applied to all items that did not violate the rule of objectivity (or any other characteristics of a news story) in news reporting. Editorials/leading articles were explicitly stated as such in vast majority of cases and, when in doubt, the type of text was often an easy matter to verify – thanks to the newspapers' online databases. All items that departed from objectivity were recorded as 'commentaries'. For instance, all items that declared themselves columns fell into this category. Letters to the editor were also quite easy to identify and, usually, they were also clearly labelled such in the databases. Finally, many of the newspapers that were analysed for this study regularly published ”quotes of the day” or ”quotes of the week” sections. It was determined that if they dealt with the Iraq crisis, they should be coded just like other types of items. After all, it was interesting to see who got to present their views in their own terms in these types of items. Finally, category 'other' was applied when the item did not fit any of the text type categories discussed above or when it was impossible to determine its type with satisfactory certainty.

Recording the origin of the text was a little bit more challenging task. There were eight options in this category. All items that were filed from Iraq by a reporter, whose name was not on the UK Ministry of Defence (2004) list of embedded reporters, were coded as 'unilateral correspondent in Iraq'. 'Embedded correspondent' was applied when the item was written by a reporter who, in turn, was on the above-mentioned list. These items were
often quite easily identifiable. However, it is worth noting that naturally there were no embedded reporters in Iraq during the first week of analysis and that embedded reporters started to leave their units after Baghdad fell. The origin of items that were filed from abroad (excluding Iraq) was recorded as 'other foreign correspondent'. Items that only acknowledged Associated Press, Reuters or some other Anglo-American news agency/outlet as their origin, were recorded as such. Similarly, items that acknowledged only non-Anglo-American news agencies such as Finnish STT or French AFP were recorded. An additional category was created for items that acknowledged both of the above. Mainly due to the *Irish Independent*, which heavily relied on British quality dailies in its international news coverage, a separate category was applied to items that explicitly originated from another newspaper. Finally, items that did not fit any of the above-mentioned categories, or it was impossible to determine with satisfactory certainty which code to apply, were recorded as 'other'.

It was impossible to analyse the actual substance of the Iraq debate by restricting the analysis merely to easily quantifiable categories and, hence, it has to be noted that all the following categories involved more interpretation. The main challenge was to capture not only how often certain themes or arguments appeared in the press coverage but also the manner in which they were presented ('tone of the coverage' or the 'direction of the argument'). For instance, the overall tone of the coverage could be reflected in issues such as the coverage of the nature of the Iraqi regime, anti-war movement and the Franco-German peace initiative. For instance, discussing how the West supported Saddam Hussein in 1980s puts the events of 2003 in a completely different context than choosing to run an article on the atrocities of the Iraqi government since the beginning of Saddam's presidency. What follows is not an exhaustive explanation of the codebook. The aim here is to explain the coding procedure and provide a few examples of not only how the quantitative analysis was conducted but also of various categories that were recorded in the process. The reader who is interested in the full list of categories should see the appendix at the end of this thesis.

What is meant by the 'direction of argument' then? For instance, the US/UK arguments about the Iraqi threat, its possession of WMD and links to terrorism were among the contested arguments at the heart of the debate. Rather than coding 'WMD theme' on a presence/absence basis, it was important to record the direction of argument in the press coverage: i.e. whether the item invoked the argument that Iraq has WMD or questioned the
argument in some way. For instance, the following sentence merely invokes the WMD argument:

"The urgency comes with the reality that every week and month that goes by, Saddam's chemical and biological weapons programmes are more advanced and the risk of their use becomes greater."

Meanwhile, the following extract was coded “questioned”: “Mr Blix told BBC Radio 4's Today that he was not sure Iraq had weapons of mass destruction.” Arguments concerning other contested areas were coded in a similar invoked/questioned basis. For instance, the argument about Iraqi links to terrorists was included in the codebook. The following sentence was coded "invoked": "Mr Powell completed his presentation by claiming, 'Iraq harbours a deadly terrorist network headed by Abu Musab Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenant.'” Meanwhile, the following was coded “questioned”: “I don't believe any assertion that is made without the evidence being provided that there are linkages between him [Saddam] and al-Qa'ida.” Previously, Althaus (2003) has employed a similar device in his study on the media coverage of the Persian Gulf War (1991) producing reliable results despite the apparent complexity of this method (p. 389).

The case for or against rested on several arguments many of which were recorded in the content analysis. The following arguments for and against the war were recorded on invoked/questioned basis:
01 Iraq has links to terrorism,
02 Iraq has weapons of mass destruction,
03 Iraqi people will welcome regime change,
04 Iraq has missiles exceeding UN imposed range limit,
05 Iraq is a threat to its neighbours and/or wider international community,
06 War against Iraq is/would be legal,
07 War against Iraq is/would be justified (morally)
08 Iraq is cooperating with the weapons inspections,
09 Evidence against Iraq is solid and sufficient.
10 Situation with Iraq should be solved through the UN.

Similarly, the views on the rationale for military action were polarised and recorded accordingly in the same way (invoked/questioned):
01 Disarmament of Iraq (preventing Iraq from developing and employing WMDs),
02 Hurt terrorists (deny al-Qaeda a friendly harbour, WMDs, or other type of support),
03 Exporting democracy (the objective is to introduce democracy in Iraq/the Middle East)
04 Enforcement of UN Security Council Resolutions and/or setting a warning example of
non-compliance of UN Security Council Resolutions,
05 Oil-related objectives,
06 Expansion of the US sphere of influence,
07 Supporting Israel,
08 Regime change (removal of Saddam Hussein from power),
09 Free Iraqi's from Saddam's rule

In addition, there was a range of arguments about the possible consequences of the
invasion. Critics of the invasion emphasised, for example, that military action against Iraq
would incite terrorism and/or could destabilise the fragile Middle Eastern. Supporters of
the military action argued, among other things, that the end result of the US/UK invasion
of Iraq would be a democratic Iraq. The full list of recorded implications of the use of force
can be found in codebook at the end of this thesis.

It was also important to consider the salience and/or absence of certain issues in reporting.
To this effect, references to certain themes were recorded not on the 'invoked'/"questioned'
basis but on 'presence'/'absence' basis. For instance, references to casualties,
looting/anarchy, humanitarian aid, military advancement and the US/UK use of depleted
uranium (DU) ammunition were recorded.

As Gadi Wolfsfeld (1997) has noted, the struggle over media coverage is twofold: on the
one hand it is structural struggle over access to the media and, on the other hand, it is a
cultural struggle over meaning. So, this study also investigated sourcing patterns in order
to determine what level of access the government, opposition, foreign governments, the
UN and non-elite actors had to the news media, and whether the selection of sources
differed across countries and newspapers. Only sources that were directly quoted were
recorded. There were two reasons for this. First, this made coding simpler and more
reliable. Second, it was deemed important to investigate which sources were able to define
the situation in their own choice of words. There was one minor drawback related to this
choice. The Finnish newspapers did not seem to use direct quotations to the same extent as
British and Irish newspapers. This may have been due to the language barrier. In other
words, Finnish journalists may have preferred to paraphrase English language statements
rather than attempting to accurately translate them to enable the use of quotation marks. However, there may be other factors in play that may have to do with journalistic cultures. This possibility is indicated by the fact that the Irish newspapers were more likely to use direct quotations than the British newspapers.

5.6.4 Qualitative analysis

Being aware of the hazards of quantitative approach, this study analysed especially commentaries and editorials in greater detail. It became clear in the process that opinion content presented more complicated argumentation than news articles and, consequently, they lost more of their meaning in an attempt to simply quantifying the occurrence of certain themes and arguments that were chosen for the codebook. The findings chapters attempt to – within reasonable limits – to present extracts from opinion pieces in order to convey the nuance and richness of their content to the readers. It has to be noted, however, that this qualitative analysis of commentaries is not rigidly systematic or comprehensive as its purpose was first and foremost to give the reader a sense of what the public debate on Iraq was like in the three countries and also to address some of the issues that could not be taken into account in the codebook (i.e. quantitative analysis). Typically, qualitative content analysis explores the tone and impressions of the text without attempting to quantify them. Maeshima (2007, 69) argues that it “is common with qualitative content analysis to examine themes, main ideas and major storylines of a text”. Comparing the leading articles of the newspapers in this manner was especially helpful in identifying similarities and differences in their editorial positions.

5.6.5 Intercoder reliability

The whole sample was coded by the candidate himself which arguably leads to higher coding consistency (Rafeeq 2007, 212). Nevertheless, an inter-coder reliability test was required “to establish whether data obtained in the course of research can provide a trustworthy basis for drawing inferences” (Krippendorff 1980, 146). For this purpose, Mr. Luigi Rodriguez Rocha coded 100 items which included 25 items from each English-language newspaper selected for this study. Unfortunately, Finnish newspapers could not be included in this process due to a language barrier. The double-coder had previous experience in content analysis as he is the Founder/Director of the Centre for Social and Media Research (CISC) in Puno and holds a MA degree in Communications from University of Westminster, London. He was not aware of the hypotheses related to the research project. The coder was provided specific examples of each category during
training. After the training, the coder was able to independently apply the codebook to the newspaper articles with satisfactory reliability as measured with Holsti’s formula\textsuperscript{143} with each category included in the analysis reaching at least .71.

5.7 CONCLUSION
This study focuses on the press coverage of the Iraq crisis in three European states which adopted different policies with regard to Iraq and in which the national Iraq policy created controversy. The purpose of the study is to test whether the press coverage reflects the national foreign policy line and/or elite opinion in the newspapers' host country. The study employs both qualitative and quantitative content analysis in order to determine the range of sources, topic selection and tone of the press coverage of the Iraq crisis and national Iraq policy. The analysed content consists of two daily quality newspapers from each country from different ends of the political spectrum in Ireland and the UK. The Finnish sample includes the only national quality daily, the second largest regional newspaper and the biggest tabloid, \textit{Ilta-Sanomat}, which played a significant role in the controversial debate on national Iraq policy. Four week-long periods (28 days) were chosen for analysis at critical phases of the crisis between February and May 2003.

The content analysis was designed to produce nuanced data on the characteristics of the press coverage. The codebook was built on analysis of key political statements and a pre-analysis of a small part of the sample. The codebook was also influenced by the way Scott Althaus (2003) devised his content analysis in an earlier study. The aim was to take into account subtle ways of criticism in the press coverage while also capturing the actual substance of the foreign policy debate which is something that many earlier studies have failed to do due their simplistic coding categories.

The empirical contribution of the study shows not only how the invasion of Iraq was covered by selected European press and but also how the coverage differed across countries and dailies. Existing research on Finnish and Irish media coverage of the Iraq War of 2003 is very limited for the time being.\textsuperscript{144} However, the literature on British

\textsuperscript{143}Holsti’s intercoder reliability (IR) formula was used as follows: IR = $2M/(N1 + N2)$, where $M$ equals the number of agreements between the coders, $N1$ is the total number of coding decisions made by coder 1, and $N2$ is the total number of coding decisions made by coder 2.

\textsuperscript{144}Phelan's (2005) article on Irish media coverage and Männistö's (2004) analysis of news photography in \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} and \textit{Aamulehti} are exceptions in this regard.
coverage is much more extensive including both print and electronic media but the *Independent* has often been excluded from the analysis (see e.g. Ravi 2005, Tumber & Palmer 2004, Robertson 2004).

With regard to the theoretical contribution, the study addresses the issue of the generality of the theories of media-state relations by investigating whether the US-originated theories of media-state relations have explanatory power in European context and whether they could serve as a basis for providing accurate predictions on how the media covers international events across countries. Characteristically many previous studies on conflict coverage have remained rather descriptive outside the US as the studies have not set themselves an explicit objective to theorize the media-foreign policy relations and to make predictions of media behavior in covering future conflicts and foreign and security policy issues in general (e.g. Tumber & Palmer 2004, Nikolaev & Hakanen 2006, Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005, cf. Riegert 1998, Stolle & Hooghe 2005).
Chapter 6

THE CASE FOR WAR IN THE PRESS, 6-12 FEBRUARY

6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the press coverage of the Iraq crisis during the following Colin Powell's presentation at the UN Security Council on 5 February, 2003. Before presenting the findings based on both qualitative and quantitative content analysis, it is worth shortly reviewing the major developments in the crisis during the analysed week as well as national policy responses to the events.

The United Nations' replica of Picasso's Guernica, which is among the most famous anti-war statements in modern art, was covered in a blue cloth when US Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003. His task was to convince the Council, wider international community and the American public that Iraq was in ‘material breach’ of UN Security Council resolutions and it was necessary to impose ‘serious consequences’ – a diplomatic code for military action – on Iraq. According to Powell (2003), Iraq continued to develop weapons of mass destruction – biological, chemical and nuclear – while also experimenting on new missiles whose range exceeded the UN-imposed limit of 150 km. In effect, Powell insisted that Iraq had failed to disarm and continued to deceive the UN weapons inspectors. In addition, he argued that Iraq had links to al-Qaeda and might provide the terrorists weapons of mass destruction.

While even Powell himself acknowledged that there was no ‘smoking gun’, i.e. conclusive evidence, he provided satellite pictures and recordings of Iraqi communications allegedly depicting secret WMD facilities and deception of UN weapons inspectors.145 UN Security

145It is noteworthy that Powell misrepresented the content of intercepted Iraqi communications and intelligence information was used selectively and without caveats (Hanley 2003; Woodward 2004, esp. 310). None of the seven newspapers analysed in this study questioned Powell’s translation from Arabic when he referred to the secretly recorded conversations between Iraqi officials. The British public was divided on the
Council members greeted his presentation with great scepticism and only Britain backed the US. Meanwhile, Iraq dismissed the ‘evidence’ as “pure fantasy”. Whatever the merits of the presentation, it received considerable media coverage world wide varying from appraisals to scorn. ‘In the end, all the evidence Mr Powell presented was circumstantial’, declared the Irish Times (6 February 2003).

In effect, Powell made the case for war. From that point on, it was almost certain that the US would go to war regardless of the world opinion.\textsuperscript{146} Shortly after Powell’s presentation, Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor to President Bush, said that ‘we clearly don’t believe a second resolution is necessary’ (Cornwell 2003). Couple of days later, the US pulled out its diplomats from the region and sent further reinforcements, a fifth carrier group, to the Gulf which were further signs that non-military options were now off the table. This forced European governments to react and formulate their Iraq policies under the pressure from their constituencies, the US and loyalty to the UN (Mouritzen 2006). The Finnish Parliament and the British House of Commons debated Iraq on 6 February and the Irish Dáil followed on 11 February. Some European states joined the bandwagon and expressed their support for the US. Following a joint declaration by the so-called gang of 8, ten Eastern European states – known as the Vilnius Ten – gave their support to the US position in a joint declaration shortly after Powell’s presentation.\textsuperscript{147} In fact, these declarations were drafted by the US (Wall 2004, 173).

Meanwhile, the ‘Old Europe’ wanted to express its strong resentment to American policy if not try to reverse it. France and Germany, chairman of the UN Security Council in the spring of 2003, made a proposal which would have enforced the UN weapons inspections in an attempt to avert the war. The US dismissed the Franco-German peace plan as a ‘distraction’. The row over Iraq escalated into rather nasty sabre-rattling especially between Germany and the US. US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld said that

\textsuperscript{146} For example, a Kuwaiti daily al-Watan wrote that “[t]he decision for war has been taken and the speech was merely a memorandum of explanation” (cited in the Daily Telegraph 7 February 2003).

\textsuperscript{147} On 30 January, the “Gang of Eight” (2003) had already expressed their support for the US in another joint declaration signed by Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Denmark. The Vilnius Ten countries are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia and Albania.
Germany is in the same group with Libya and Cuba which, according to Rumsfeld, ‘did not want to help in any way’ in tackling Iraq.  

The transatlantic rift spilled into NATO as the US tried to pressure NATO to re-enforce Turkey’s defence in case of war. Germany, France and Belgium maintained that such decision should only be taken in the case the UN Security Council has come to the conclusion that disarming Iraq requires military force. Accordingly, they vetoed the action arguing that it would have signalled that the war was inevitable while asserting that they would assist Turkey if it came under any threat. The unity, which had prevailed after 9/11 leading to the invocation of the article 5 to oust Taliban from Afghanistan, was gone.

This crisis in NATO probably suited Russia which decided to back Franco-German position declaring that it would veto any UN Security Council resolution that would authorize what President Putin called ‘unreasonable use of force’ in Paris on 11 February. France, Germany and Russia agreed on a joint declaration which called for continuation of the weapons inspections (Golan 2004, 437). On 11 February, China joined Russia, France and Germany in their demands to give the weapons inspections more time. Moreover, the Arab League joined the opposition by issuing demands to the US and pleading for a peaceful solution and a wide range of non-governmental organizations with various interests worked on a coordinated campaign against the war. The date for a global anti-war rally was set for 15 February 2003 and it began to receive media coverage several days in advance especially in Britain where the leader of the Liberal Democrats, Charles Kennedy, announced that he would join the anti-war march.

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148 Differences between German and US approach to the Middle East remain. On 31 July 2007, the US announced a new arms deals with sunni-Arab states in order to counterbalance Iranian and Syrian influence who had benefited from the power vacuum created by the removal of the Iraqi Ba’ath regime. Meanwhile military support for Israel had to be significantly increased in order to counterbalance growth of military power of its sunni-Arab neighbours. Germany, even under the leadership of the Christian Democrat Angela Merkel, who as an opposition leader had questioned Chancellor Schröder's Iraq policy in 2003 and argued that "[i]f it is impossible to solve the situation peacefully then Germany has to take part in a military operation" (Daily Telegraph, 9 February 2003), criticized this plan saying that the region does not need more weapons but more stability.
6.2 GOVERNMENT POSITIONS

Both Ireland and Finland emphasised the role of the UN Security Council and weapons inspections team in dealing with the Iraq issue. On 31 January, Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy (UTVA) stated that (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003a):

“Finland supports, in a coherent manner, the UN’s efforts to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. The UN Security Council has unanimously adopted Resolution 1441 on the matter. Finland considers it important that the resolution be implemented in a manner consistent with the Security Council’s intention.”

On 14 February, UTVA confirmed that Finland maintained that “[a]ny use of force will require authorization from the UN Security Council” (Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003b).

On 29 January, Ireland’s Foreign Minister Brian Cowen (2003) harshly criticised Iraq for its non-compliance with regard to UN Security Council Resolutions and continued:

“The result is that we now stand on the brink of a third Gulf War. The consequences of this war, if it takes place against all our wishes, could be very grave. Quite apart from the horrific human suffering likely accompany the outbreak of war, there is, of course, the risk of destabilising an already volatile region., support for terrorism could grow, and economies could suffer.

The Irish Government does not want to see the war take place. We have raised our voice and used our influence in every forum available to us to urge the need for a peaceful solution. We are determined to discharge our international obligations, both in trying to avert conflict and in carrying out the decisions of the Security Council.

Ireland’s approach to this crisis is based on our long-standing commitment to international peace, justice, security and stability upheld by the rule of law, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for human rights. These are the principles which have informed Irish foreign policy under successive Governments ever since the foundation of the State.”

After the 9/11 2001 terrorist attacks, Taoiseach Bertie Ahern had announced that US aircraft would be allowed to use the facilities of the Shannon airport in the pursuit of UN Security Council Resolution 1368 which defined the terrorist attacks as a threat to international peace and security. Consequently, US aircraft continued to exercise their overflight and landing rights although some conditions, such as being unarmed and carried no ammunition or explosives, applied. The Irish government was hoping that the war could

149Foreign Minister Cowen (2003) also emphasised the role of the UN: “Ireland is a strong supporter of the system of collective international security set forth in the United Nations Charter. We regard the United Nations as the centre of this system of collective security. We attach particular importance to the role of the Security Council as having primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In carrying out its duties under this responsibility, the Council is acting on behalf of the entire membership of the United Nations. Under Article 25 all Members agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council. This is a clear obligation on all States.”

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be avoided and, consequently, Cowen (2003) settled to stating that "in the event of military action being initiated against Iraq, either with or without further UN sanction, the Government, having reviewed the situation, will initiate a debate in this House [Lower House of the Parliament, Dáil Éireann] on the position to be adopted by Ireland.” On 11 February, Cowen gave a further statement to Dáil Éireann (2003a) which did not address the stop-over per se but, instead, argued that

"Ireland has repeatedly stated the view that if Iraq continues in its non-compliance, a second Security Council resolution should be adopted. The arguments to whether a second resolution is a legal necessity are a distraction from the real point. The compelling political reality is that a second resolution would signal the unity and resolve of the international community, and the clear legitimacy of any subsequent military action.”

Arguably, Cowen tried to downplay the significance of the second resolution although resolution 1368 had been the cover for the stop-over policy with regard to the Afghan operation. However, Powell’s presentation had failed to convince opposition parties. Fine Gael’s (the main opposition party) foreign affairs spokesman, Gay Mitchell, argued that unilateral military action by the US would not comply with international law and the Labour Party and Green Party regarded Powell’s evidence insufficient to justify war.

Meanwhile, Britain backed the US position. Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (2003) stated in the UN Security Council meeting on 5 February that

“we have just heard a most powerful and authoritative case against the Iraqi regime set out by Secretary Powell. The international community owes him its thanks for laying bare the deceit practised by the regime of Saddam Hussein, and worse, the great danger it represents . . . This is a moment of choice for Saddam and for the Iraqi regime. But it is also a moment of choice for this institution, the United Nations. The UN’s pre-war predecessor, the League of Nations, had the same fine ideals as the UN. But the League failed because it could not create actions from its words; it could not back diplomacy with the credible threat and where necessary the use of force; so small evils went unchecked, tyrants became emboldened, then greater evils were unleashed. At each stage good men said wait; the evil is not big enough to challenge: then before their eyes, the evil became too big to challenge. We had slipped slowly down a slope, never noticing how far we had gone until it was too late. We owe it to our history as well as to our future not to make the same mistake again.”

However, the British public was reluctant to support a military campaign without a second resolution which would give explicit UN Security Council authorisation to the use of force. Eventually, efforts to get that second resolution became desperate as France and Russia kept on insisting on weapons inspections as a peaceful means to disarm Iraq. Prime Minister Tony Blair had committed himself into an unpopular campaign and agreed to be interviewed by Jeremy Paxman on Newsnight and a quite hostile audience in an effort to mobilize support for his policy on 6 February. He told that Britain would bypass the UN
Security Council decision if it considered a veto from one of the permanent members to be ‘unreasonable’ (Newsnight 2003).

Blair’s campaign ran into further difficulties when the government document on the Iraqi threat, which soon became famous as the ‘dodgy dossier’, was revealed to be based on outdated publicly available information rather than intelligence (Rampton & Stauber 2003, 96-99). Moreover, while the dossier (UK Government 2003, 1) promised to provide ‘up to date’ information on Iraqi intelligence organisations, large chunks were lifted from an academic research focusing on pre-Gulf War situation. In a YouGov (2003) survey, 65% of the British people said this weakens the case while 28% said it made no difference. In addition, MI6 leaked a document rejecting any prospect of Iraqi cooperation with al-Qaeda. YouGov (2003) poll also indicated that four out of ten believed that Powell had distorted the evidence against Iraq in his presentation at the UN.

6.3 ANALYSIS OF PRESS COVERAGE
A total of 518 items – published between 6–12 February – were included in the sample. The Independent published 120 items on the Iraq crisis during the week followed by the Daily Telegraph with 98 items. The Irish newspapers published between 71–85 items while the variation between the Finnish newspapers was much greater. Helsingin Sanomat published 84 items while the tabloid Ilta-Sanomat published 37 and the regional newspaper, Turun Sanomat, only 23 items.

If the media reflects governmental positions as suggested by a number of studies (e.g. Stolle & Hooghe 2005, Herman & Chomsky 1988, Riegert 1998, Lehmann 2005), the coverage of Iraq crisis should differ across the three countries chosen for the study. This chapter attempts to answer the following questions based on content analysis of Finnish, Irish and British press 6-12 February 2003:

- Does the coverage reflect the policy line of the newspapers’ host governments?
- Are there notable differences in the use of foreign sources?
- Do the Finnish and Irish newspapers question the sincerity of the US/UK motives to a greater degree than their British counterparts?
6.3.1 Sourcing

Two different hypotheses have emerged from the literature with regard to the selection of foreign sources. One study argues that foreign sources gain access to the US media if they are in a position to influence the course of events. This is known as ‘power indexing’ (Zaller & Chiu 1999, Billeaudeaux et al 2003). Yet, another study looking at television news in nine countries and the pan-Arab Al-Jazeera news network suggests that news organizations prefer foreign sources that are supportive of their government’s position. For instance, French television news preferred foreign sources that shared the French anti-war position over countries that supported the US stance on Iraq (Stolle and Hooghe 2005, 18).

In order to test these hypotheses, the analysis of sources focused on the access of the UN, the most vocal anti-war states (France, Germany and Russia), the US and Iraq to the press coverage.\textsuperscript{150}

Table 6.1. Number of items quoting different sources, 6-12 February 2003 (percentage in brackets).\textsuperscript{151}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US govt</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Iraqi govt</th>
<th>Anti-war states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat</td>
<td>19 (22.6)</td>
<td>7 (8.3)</td>
<td>4 (4.8)</td>
<td>4 (4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat</td>
<td>5 (21.7)</td>
<td>4 (17.4)</td>
<td>3 (13.0)</td>
<td>3 (13.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat</td>
<td>7 (18.9)</td>
<td>2 (5.4)</td>
<td>3 (8.1)</td>
<td>1 (2.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>31 (21.5)</td>
<td>13 (9.0)</td>
<td>10 (6.9)</td>
<td>8 (5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>29 (24.2)</td>
<td>10 (8.3)</td>
<td>6 (5.0)</td>
<td>9 (7.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>29 (29.6)</td>
<td>5 (5.1)</td>
<td>3 (3.1)</td>
<td>10 (10.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>58 (25.7)</td>
<td>15 (9.0)</td>
<td>9 (4.1)</td>
<td>19 (8.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent</td>
<td>33 (39.8)</td>
<td>9 (10.6)</td>
<td>7 (8.2)</td>
<td>6 (7.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times</td>
<td>26 (36.7)</td>
<td>8 (11.3)</td>
<td>6 (8.5)</td>
<td>8 (11.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>59 (37.8)</td>
<td>17 (10.9)</td>
<td>13 (8.3)</td>
<td>14 (9.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>148 (28.6)</td>
<td>45 (8.7)</td>
<td>32 (6.2)</td>
<td>41 (7.9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1 shows how the newspapers sourced their items, or to be more precise, the number of items quoting each source (and the percentage of items quoting each source of the total in brackets). The analysis here with regard to the use of foreign sources does not give clear support to Stolle and Hooghe’s (2005) suggestion that the media would select only governmental sources, were included in the analysis since, for example, a British journalist might look for members of the public and opposition sources in Germany that conform to the position of the UK government rather than to that of the German government.

\textsuperscript{150}Only governmental sources, were included in the analysis since, for example, a British journalist might look for members of the public and opposition sources in Germany that conform to the position of the UK government rather than to that of the German government.

\textsuperscript{151}France, Germany and Russia adopted a joint statement on 11 February and, it was read out by the French President, Jacques Chirac, in the press conference. Consequently, quotations of the joint statement were recorded as French governmental source.
foreign sources that support their government’s policy. If this was the case, the UK newspapers should have quoted US government sources more often than the Finnish and Irish newspapers while the Finnish newspapers should have quoted other anti-war states the most. It is true that the UK newspapers, especially the *Daily Telegraph*, used US sources more often than the Finnish newspapers. However, while 30 per cent of *Telegraph* items quoted US sources, nearly 38 per cent of items in the Irish newspapers quoted US government sources. The corresponding percentages for Finnish and British newspapers were 22 and 27 respectively. It should be noted that the Irish newspapers also quoted UN, Iraqi, French, German and Russian government sources more often than the Finnish and the British press.

The Finnish press quoted French and German governmental sources the least although they shared an anti-war stance with both the Finnish government and the Finnish newspapers. This finding directly contradicts with the argument that the media choose sources that hold similar views to those of the media’s host country (see Stolle and Hooghe 2005).

The high number of items quoting US government sources (nearly 29 per cent of the total sample) could be explained by power indexing. The US government was on the driving seat and ultimately it was the Bush administration policy which mattered – especially since it had declared that it would act with or without the UN. Even though Iraq was the centre of the international crisis, all newspapers quoted US and UN sources more often than Iraqi government sources. Only 4 per cent of British news and opinion items quoted Iraqi government sources. The Finnish and Irish newspapers did so in 8–9 per cent of the analysed items. At the same time, the latter also quoted UN sources more often than the UK newspapers. The proportion of items citing UN sources in the British newspapers was 7 per cent while the figure was 11 and 9 per cent for Irish and Finnish press respectively. Interestingly, there were differences within the countries which raises the question whether editorial policy might influence the selection of foreign sources. For instance, the *Independent* quoted the UN, Iraqi government and anti-war countries more often than the *Telegraph*.

Overall, the data indicates that the government policy line alone may not explain the selection of foreign sources. If a larger sample turns out similar results it would seem that the most important factor in manufacturing consent literature – government policy line – might not have a clear connection with the selection of foreign sources. Instead, this
selection of sources would seem to be influenced by the perceived power of the sources while notable differences within countries would suggest that editorial position of the newspaper might also be a factor.

6.3.2 Responses to Powell’s presentation and the case for war

The assumption here is that the editorial responses to Powell’s presentation reflect newspapers’ attitudes towards the use of force against Iraq in general and that these attitudes would reflect elite opinion in the respective states if not the government position. In addition, other commentary is discussed where appropriate.

An editorial in Turun Sanomat (7 February) basically restated the position of the Finnish government by arguing for more time for weapons inspections and warning about the use of force without specific UN authorization (see Finnish Parliament 2003). Helsingin Sanomat (7 February) stated that “if the UN Security Council sticks to its unanimous decision [resolution 1441] and interprets ‘serious consequences’ as war, there is a legal justification for war”. However, the editorial argues that Powell failed to make the moral and political case for war. Both TS and HS were unconvinced of Iraqi links to terrorism and similar views had been expressed by the Finnish Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja the previous day (Finnish Parliament 2003). With regard to possible continuation of weapons inspections, HS called for a final deadline since the US was getting impatient. In general, both editorials conformed to the views expressed by the government with HS more in line with PM Lipponen’s view which tended to place the burden of proof on Iraq. Meanwhile, TS reflected the slightly softer tone expressed by Foreign Minister Tuomioja. During the analysed period IS did not publish an editorial which would have revealed its position on the use of force but summarised Powell’s presentation in six short articles and ran a story on Iraqi response to Powell on February 6.

Editorial in the Irish Independent (6 February) argued for continuation of weapons inspections if the UN Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix was to request for it while also commenting on the Iraqi President by arguing that “Saddam Hussein ranks among the worst tyrants. He is a mass murderer and a destroyer. He oppresses his own people and threatens his neighbours. It is easy to believe him capable of any evil deed.”

The Irish Times (6 February) was sceptical of the US case for war and raised questions about the Bush administration’s cooperation with the UN weapons inspections since the

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intelligence, presented by Powell, apparently had not been made available to them earlier. The editorial called for reinforcement of inspections and insisted that “the US must fully respect the UN’s role in coming weeks”. The *Irish Times* also ran stories on Arab perspectives on the US war plans (e.g. ‘Arab commentators accuse US of fabricating evidence’, 7 February, and ‘Kuwait welcomes decision to send Gulf Force’, 10 February).

Ireland’s second biggest Sunday newspaper, the *Sunday Tribune*, adopted a similar position to that of the *Irish Independent*. On 9 February, its editorial (‘Military neutrality does not mean political neutrality’) argued that

“In the coming weeks, the members of the UN security council will have to balance the evils of war against the evils of allowing Saddam to continue to out its authority. The UN has allowed him to make a mockery of its resolutions on weapons of mass destruction since 1991. It is only in the shadow of war that he has made even a token effort to allow Hans Blix and his inspectors back in to Iraq to carry out the UN mandate. War will only be avoided if Saddam finally complies, even at this late hour, and fully cooperates with the inspectors.”

In the UK, there was a higher degree of disagreement on the use of force against Iraq since the Liberal Democrats and a faction of Labour Party were not persuaded by the case for war. While the *Independent* (7 February) called Powell’s presentation a “bravura performance”, it preferred the old policy of sanctions in containing the threat posed by the “tyrant”. A war “would virtually guarantee an upsurge in global terrorism”. In effect, the editorial denounced the position held by the government and the Conservatives – the largest opposition party.

Leading article in the *Daily Telegraph*, in turn, adopted a clearly pro-war position: “Saddam is a madman who is equipped with weapons of mass destruction. We cannot rely on rational judgment preventing him from using them. If we continue with this current combination of deterrence and containment, he will not disarm, and he may use them.”

As suggested by the manufacturing consent literature, the editorial positions of the newspapers were in line with their government policies with the exception of the *Independent* which adopted a clearly anti-war position. This can be explained with manufacturing consent literature (elite version) by arguing that the *Independent* was

152 Strangely, the *Irish Times* and the *Irish Independent* reported quite differently on Hillary Clinton’s views on the Iraq Crisis. The former headlined “Hillary Clinton tells Irish TV she is against war with Iraq” (8 February) while a headline in the latter read “Back US against Iraq, says Hillary” (9 February). The *Irish Times* emphasised that Hillary Clinton “would prefer to see more time given to the UN weapons inspections” but the *Irish Independent* argued that she “calls on Ireland's support for military action to disarm Saddam Hussein in 'a war that involves all of us'”.
reflecting the dissensus among elites. It is worth noting that while the Irish newspapers had slightly different emphasis, they did not contradict the largely vague government policy.

In other commentaries, journalists made an effort to find historical parallels. Most common was Adlai Stevenson’s presentation at the UN during the Cuban missile crisis though often this incident was mentioned in order to make the point that Powell’s presentation did not have an ‘Adlai Stevenson moment’ and that he was not Stevenson (Robert Fisk in the Independent 6 February). Similarly, an editorial in the Irish Independent (6.2.) rejected the comparison by arguing that “[a]cross the world, comparisons have been made with the famous occasion in 1962 when Ambassador Adlai Stevenson showed the United Nations incontrovertible proof of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. It was very different yesterday”. Yet, many of the correspondents were clearly impressed with Colin Powell’s performance. Conor O’Cleary, correspondent to the Irish Times, wrote that

“Colin Powell did not disappoint. With the atmosphere in the chamber like that of a courtroom, he gave a compelling presentation of the US case against Iraq... When Powell, immaculate in dark power suit and pink tie, sat down at 10.30 a.m. to begin his delivery, the atmosphere changed abruptly to that of a courtroom about to hear a capital case. It was as if Mr Powell had been sent to state the case for the prosecution and to call for the death sentence, and to warn that if he did not get the verdict he wanted, then the court of world opinion might itself have no future.”

The Irish Independent (6 February), in turn, ran a short story with a headline ‘Ghosts of Cuban Missile Crisis Hang over UN’ arguing that “Colin Powell evoked an inevitable historical comparison when he went public with classified satellite photos and intercepts to make the US case.” The Daily Telegraph had found a little more modest point of comparison – the UN Security Council meeting on the KLA incident in which the Soviet Union shot down a commercial airliner in early 1980s. Instead, Daily Telegraph’s diplomatic editor Anton La Guardia (‘Powell lands some heavy blows on the “nexus” of terror’, 6.2.) argued that “[t]here was no 'Adlai Stevenson’ moment - no single picture of an Iraqi nuclear missile or nuclear facility to compare to America’s photographs in 1962 clearly showing Soviet missiles being transported to Cuba.” The same story referred to Colin Powell as the teacher and another story portrayed him as a prosecutor lending him the authority that goes with these occupations. Although some of the evidence was “hearsay”, “given the weight and variety of information, any reasonable jury would condemn Saddam – at least for consistently lying to the court – rather than assume that the US prosecution was fixing the evidence”, La Guardia argued.153

153In Finland, Aamulehti also made a reference to Stevenson’s performance in the Cuban crisis (‘Cuban missile crisis sprang to mind’, 6 February),

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The *Daily Telegraph*'s reaction to Powell's presentation was quite extraordinary. In addition to the news stories, it published six long edited extracts of the speech focusing on biological and chemical weapons, nuclear weapons, Iraqi deception of UN weapons inspectors by hiding scientists and weapons, links to terrorism and missile capacity. Considering the fact that Powell’s presentation lasted for 76 minutes the extracts accounted for more than half of the entire presentation. *Telegraph*'s Washington correspondent Toby Harnden (11 February) wrote that Colin Powell had received “almost universal praise for his UN speech last week” and Ambrose Evans-Pritchard added that “[v]irtually the whole eastern and central Europe, much of the Balkans, the Mediterranean belt of Italy, Spain and Portugal, as well as Britain and Denmark, are now firmly in the American camp.”

However, other dailies expressed reservations about the success of Powell’s presentation and the Finnish and Irish quality dailies did not publish any extracts of the presentation. The *Independent* published one extract of Powell’s presentation but expressed criticism of the US policy. For instance, on 10 February, the *Independent* noted that ‘[w]hat the US Defence Secretary’s finger-wagging in Munich made clear was that Secretary of State Powell's slideshow at the UN was a failure. It did not change many hearts and minds, except possibly in America.’ Meanwhile, Ireland's *Sunday Tribune* reported from Baghdad (‘Calmly waiting for the wail of war sirens’, 9 April):

“The real fear of many people here was that the US would have unveiled some genuinely damaging evidence that would have made the case for war inconvertible. They manifestly failed to do this in the view of Baghdad's public with the idea of mobile biological weapons laboratories being a touch too Ian Fleming even for them.”

The reporter also interviewed Ali Jassem who ran one of the facilities which Powell accused of illegitimate activities. Jassem explained that the weapons inspectors had been to the site several times already and had not found anything suspicious. On the same day *Turun Sanomat* reported on Powell’s speech at the UN Security Council meeting, it published an article (6 February) on expert views on Powell's evidence casting doubts about the case for war. Similarly, *Helsingin Sanomat* (6 February) ran a story with a headline ‘Researchers: Iraq is not cooperating with al-Qaeda’ in which two international experts stressed that there is no common ideology that would allow them to cooperate.\[154\]

\[154\]Powell's evidence was closely scrutinized by an AP journalist Charles J. Hanley some six months later exposing the half-truths (Hanley 2003; Rampton & Stauber 2006, 70).
In fact, there were notable differences in terms of portraying the justifications for war (see table 2 below). For instance, the *Daily Telegraph* had 13 news and opinion items with a reference to Iraq being a threat either to its neighbours or wider international community in a total of 98 analysed items. Only once the threat posed by Iraq was questioned in a reference to PM Blair’s acknowledgement that Iraq is not a direct threat to the UK when he faced a hostile public in the BBC’s *Newsnight* special on 6 February. The *Independent*, in turn, portrayed Iraq as a threat in ten items but this was balanced with ten instances in which the Iraqi threat was questioned in some way.

The Finnish newspapers expressed more doubt about the seriousness of the Iraqi threat. HS, TS and IS, put together, had six references to Iraq as a threat while this threat was questioned on five occasions. The figures for the Irish newspapers were seven against eleven items questioning the claim.

Table 6.2. Coverage of the US/UK case for war, 6-12 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argument that Iraq is a threat</th>
<th>Argument that Iraq has WMD capability</th>
<th>Argument that Iraq has links to terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invoked</td>
<td>Questioned</td>
<td>Invoked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=144)</td>
<td>6 (4.3%)</td>
<td>5 (3.6%)</td>
<td>24 (17.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=218)</td>
<td>23 (11.0%)</td>
<td>11 (5.1%)</td>
<td>55 (26.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Independent</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Times</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=156)</td>
<td>7 (4.7%)</td>
<td>11 (7.1%)</td>
<td>26 (17.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=518)</td>
<td>36 (7.2%)</td>
<td>27 (5.3%)</td>
<td>105 (21.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The *Daily Telegraph*’s pro-war stance was also reflected in its coverage on Iraqi WMD. 29 news and opinion items out of a sample of 98 implied that Iraq has WMD. In contrast, only four items raised doubts about their existence or employability. The *Independent* was more sceptical with 26 items implying the existence of Iraqi WMD against ten items questioning this assumption. With regard to Iraqi links to terrorism, the *Daily Telegraph* was more cautious than with the WMD issue. Yet, again there were twice as many references implying a link than questioning it. The *Independent* was much more critical about the links to terrorism. In sum, the *Daily Telegraph* strikes as clearly the most enthusiastic...
advocate of the pro-war claims and rarely questioned US/UK case for war and, similarly to sourcing, there were clear differences between the Telegraph and the Independent reflecting the elite dissensus within the UK.

There was a slight difference between the Irish Independent and the Irish Times with regard to the WMD claim. The Irish Times was rather critical in this respect whereas the Irish Independent had 14 items implying Iraq has WMD and only five raising doubts of their existence or employability. The Finnish press was slightly more sceptical and had 24 items supporting US/UK claims about Iraqi WMD while 19 items questioned the allegation.155

The Finnish newspapers were much more sceptical about the terrorism link. TS, clearly the most critical of the US/UK case of war, rejected the terrorism claim in five items against three. Even the tabloid, Ilta-Sanomat, provided criticism of the alleged link. In Ireland, especially the Irish Independent challenged the alleged terrorism link raising doubts in nearly as many items as the link was implied.

President Bush decided to raise the terror alert level on 7 February. The possibility of the Anglo-American Iraq policy inciting terrorism was hardly implied in the Independent: ‘There is also concern about terrorists trying to take advantage of America’s preparation for a military operation against Iraq’. At the end of the period of analysis, PM Blair sent tanks to Heathrow allegedly to counter a terrorist threat. Similarly, this incident was not really discussed in the context of the Iraq Crisis and journalists especially avoided any causal arguments which might have suggested that the looming war might increase the risk of terrorist attacks against the UK and the US. This is how close The Daily Telegraph came to acknowledge a possible connection between the terrorist threat and the British Iraq policy: “Police and security sources gave few details of the specific intelligence that led to the operations at a time when preparations for war in Iraq are at an advanced stage.” The British press quite readily accepted Scotland Yard’s analysis that the increased threat had to do with a Muslim holiday Eid al-Adha. Similarly, Helsingin Sanomat wrote that sending soldiers to Heathrow was just another “sign that the war against Iraq is close.”156

155Quite often news articles and commentaries presented both the US view while later referring to sources that doubted the allegation.
156The original Finnish wording as follows: ”Asepukuisten sotilaiden lähettäminen vilkkaalle lentoasemalle oli tiistaisten arvioiden mukaan myös yksi merkki siitä, että Irakin vastainen sota on lähellä. “ HS 12.2.2003.
Meanwhile, the *Irish Independent* (12.2.) ran an article from the *Times* (of London) which stated that the PM Blair’s spokesperson ‘denied that the Government was happy to see the country in a state of alert at a time when it was trying to convince the public of the need to go to war against Iraq’.

*Chart 6.1. Number of items presenting pro-war case (Iraqi threat, WMD and links to terrorism) by country.*

![Chart 6.1](chart.png)

Chart 1 shows that the Finnish press expressed most doubt about the claims about Iraqi threat followed by Ireland. Meanwhile, the UK presented the pro-war arguments more frequently without questioning their validity. There seems to be some correlation with the government policy line and the way the case for war was covered. However, it has to be noted that, overall, the US/UK information campaign seems to have been rather successful\(^\text{157}\) – especially in retrospect when the weakness of the evidence has been well-documented (Hanley 2003).

Analysis of press coverage on issues that challenged the rationale for war suggests that while the newspapers frequently reproduced many US/UK arguments for war, the

\(^{157}\) YouGov (2003) survey for the Mail On Sunday showed that 44% believed that Saddam Hussein was helping al-Qaeda while 31% said they didn’t know. Only 26% of the British public said not to believe in the Iraqi terrorist link.
credibility of the evidence against Iraq was often assessed to be unconvincing for one reason or the other. References to the evidence were predominantly negative in all countries and newspapers although the *Telegraph* stands out as the least critical of the war once again (see table 3 below). These negative references to the evidence can be partly explained with the criticism of Powell’s presentation but also by the coverage of ‘dodgy dossier’. For instance, a leader in the *Daily Telegraph* (8 February) argued that “[o]nce again, the Number 10 culture of spin is undermining a perfectly good case.” In a YouGov Survey, 65 per cent of the British people said this weakens the case while 28 per cent said it made no difference.

Another argument against the war, in addition to insufficient evidence, claimed that the weapons inspections are working or could work if the inspectors were given more time and/or resources for successful disarmament of Iraq. The Franco-German peace plan was based on the idea that the inspections provided an alternative to the war. Rumours of a Franco-German peace plan started to circulate couple of days after Powell’s presentation. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw rejected Franco-German peace plan and argued that “[t]he descent into war in the 1930s is a searing reminder of the dangers of turning a blind eye whilst international law is subverted by the law of the jungle.” Accordingly, in the British newspapers critical references to the peace plan outnumbered positive/neutral ones. The *Telegraph* was particularly hostile towards the plan. The peace plan was described as the “Franco-German rescue package for Saddam Hussein” or “apparent Franco-German ambush” on the US (10 February). Janet Daley (*Daily Telegraph*, 12 February) dismissed the Franco-German peace plan as “attention-seeking behavior”. On 10 February, the *Telegraph* argued that ‘Hans Blix resisted American demands for more monitors over many months and eventually held them down to a total of 300. If a few inspectors were so hard to deploy, imagine the problems with inserting soldiers’ (*Practical Putin*). While the *Daily Telegraph* used this argument to reject the Franco-German peace plan, it did not acknowledge the difficulties of employing well over 100,000 soldiers for a significantly harder task – not to look for WMD but to occupy the country until a democracy has been established.

While the Finnish and Irish governments did not actively support the Franco-German peace plan especially Finnish coverage of the initiative was supportive. Unlike the *Irish Independent*, the *Irish Times* covered the issue with greater criticism.
Table 6.3. Coverage of issues questioning the rationale for war (percentage in brackets).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argument that the evidence against Iraq is solid</th>
<th>References to Franco-German peace plan</th>
<th>Endorsement of weapons inspections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invoked</td>
<td>Questioned</td>
<td>Positive/neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FINLAND (n=144)</strong></td>
<td>6 (4.2%)</td>
<td>25 (17.5%)</td>
<td>12 (8.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK (n=218)</strong></td>
<td>22 (10.1%)</td>
<td>44 (20.7%)</td>
<td>14 (6.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Independent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Times</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>8 (5.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=518)</td>
<td>37 (7.3%)</td>
<td>95 (18.7%)</td>
<td>34 (6.6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The *Independent* expressed more scepticism of the prospect of weapons inspections working than the *Daily Telegraph* but also covered them more extensively. The British newspapers clearly differed from Irish and Finnish newspapers with regard to the coverage of the UN weapons inspections as the latter covered the issue in clearly favourable terms. Ireland’s *Sunday Tribune* (‘US knows how easy it will be to buy its way into war’, 9 February) argued that ‘Powell’s presentation at the United Nations on Wednesday was as devastating an indictment of the effectiveness of weapons inspectors as it was of Saddam Hussein.’ Again, IS differed notably from the quality newspapers having only one reference to the Franco-German peace plan and to the weapons inspections.

Chart 6.1 shows that the Finnish press was the most sceptical of the case for war (Iraq is a threat which is manifested in its possession of WMD and links to terrorism) followed by Ireland. Meanwhile, the UK sample expressed doubts of these three claims less frequently when covering the issues. Similar pattern can be observed in the salience and framing of the anti-war case (see table 6.3): the Finnish press was largely supportive of the weapons inspections and the peace initiative while framing negatively the evidence against Iraq. The Irish newspapers, in turn, were slightly more critical of the anti-war case than their Finnish counterparts while the UK was by far the most critical of the three.

Especially, the *Daily Telegraph* frequently expressed its disgust with the anti-war movement whose members it called ‘sandal-wearing peaceniks’ (11 February). A leading

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158 Calls for reinforcement or continuation of the weapons inspections were counted as positive references as well as comments implying that the inspections are working.
article in the *Daily Telegraph* (9 February) argued that ‘[m]any of the most vocal groups organising protests against forcing Saddam to comply with UN Resolution 1441 are the remnants of communist and socialist political parties, united by nothing except a common detestation of the leading economy in the capitalist world.’ The article concluded that:

"Hundreds of thousands of people will be on the march next Saturday because they are repelled by the awful horrors that any war must bring. They will ignore the much worse terrors that will follow if the decision to disarm him is not taken now. The plausibility of the anti-war stance depends on the deluded but comforting hope that if we don't confront evil, we'll manage to escape being overwhelmed by it. That is a profound mistake, as the history of the last century has taught us. We know that Saddam has, over many years, been in touch with terrorist groups, and that such groups are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. They will use them on our cities if they get them. When that happens, children will die on a far, far greater scale than in the course of a war to topple the Butcher of Baghdad."

6.3.3 Possible oil-related motives

John S. Duffield (2005) has argued that any debate on possible oil-related motives was absent and the Bush administration hardly mentioned oil. When it did, it bluntly denied that oil had anything to do with the administration's policy on Iraq. He continues

“This silence on the question of oil is puzzling in view of what is arguably most distinct about Iraq’s circumstances. Other rogue states have been much closer to acquiring nuclear weapons than was Iraq in early 2003, and others have had more extensive ties to anti-American terrorists. Likewise, a number of other states around the world have fallen equally short of adhering to democratic principles or have engaged in massive human rights abuses. But of all the states where the United States has considered regime change, Iraq is one of only a few to possess substantial amounts of oil, and it sits squarely in the middle of nearly two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves.”

Alan Greenspan, former US Federal Reserve Chairman, said more recently that he is “saddened that it is politically inconvenient to acknowledge what everyone knows: the Iraq War is largely about oil” (Paterson 2007). Many Europeans had suspected this from the beginning with 44 per cent of the British public agreeing with the argument that US policy can be better explained with Iraq’s oil resources than Iraqi threat (Pew, 2002). It is not

159 This argument was put to PM Blair on a *Newsnight* (2003) special by a member of the audience: “The difference between Korea and Iraq is it purely based on oil, because Iraq’s an oil-producing country and Korea isn’t.” Tony Blair replied: “No, let me just deal with the oil thing because this is one of the … we may be right or we may be wrong, I mean people have their different views about why we’re doing this thing. But the oil conspiracy theory is honestly one of the most absurd when you analyse it. The fact is that, if the oil that Iraq has were our concern I mean we could probably cut a deal with Saddam tomorrow in relation to the oil. It’s not the oil that is the issue, it is the weapons, which is why the UN Resolutions have gone over 12 years in relation to the weapons and why we’ve actually allowed Iraq to export oil but we’ve had to try to keep it in an account used for food and medicine because of our worry that otherwise it would be used to buy arms.”

160 “Large percentages in each country polled think that the U.S. desire to control Iraqi oil
relevant for this study whether oil played a role in the US and UK decision-making process. What is relevant here is that it would have been reasonable to assume that this vital energy resource might be a factor in the crisis and that this view was widely held by the public. However, during the analysed period, oil as a possible motive for invasion attracted only few references which were often confined to one sentence or a citation.

Since the Finnish foreign policy elite emphasised peaceful solution through the UN, investigation of possible oil-related motives for invasion would not have brought journalists into a direct conflict with the government policy line. In fact, such views were expressed in the Parliament. While Cabinet ministers avoided discussion on oil, that might have harmed relations with the US, two Left Alliance MPs, Jaakko Laakso and Outi Ojala, suggested in a parliamentary debate on 6 February that the “control of Iraqi oil resources” is among the US objectives and that the war might be about “redistribution of oil resources” (The Finnish Parliament, 2003). However, this did not seem to have encouraged the press to investigate possible undeclared motives for the invasion. The above mentioned quote from Jaakko Laakso was the only reference to the issue in HS during the whole week. The only reference to Iraq’s oil resources in IS during the week examined was a comment by a reader: “The USA wants oil and that is why they will attack.” All references to possible oil-related motives in the Finnish newspapers were confined to one sentence.

Some Irish politicians also expressed views on the significance of the Iraqi oil when the Dail, the Irish Parliament, debated Iraq on 11 February. Mr. Connolly expressed views which put the question of oil at the heart of the matter:

‘Iraq is one of the world’s biggest oil producers. The Saudi tycoons made billions of dollars a year while Iraq’s oil was blocked and President Bush made his millions as an oil magnate. The politics of the region are the politics of oil; billions are there to be made and lost by winners or losers. The US and the British wished the embargo to continue while the Russians and French, who wished to profit from buying and selling oil, wanted it lifted. In the late 1990s the international front against Iraq crumbled; each country in the coalition adopted positions to gain the greatest oil profits. Iraq and the US constantly claimed the other was lying, with Iraq periodically blocking inspection teams from certain sites, declaring them to be fake excuses to

is the principal reason that Washington is considering a war against Iraq. In Russia 76% subscribe to a war-for-oil view; so too do 75% of the French, 54% of Germans, and 44% of the British. In sharp contrast, just 22% of Americans see U.S. policy toward Iraq driven by oil interests. Two-thirds think the United States is motivated by a concern about the security threat posed by Saddam Hussein.”

161 *Ilta-Sanomat* does a poll every day on some question and invites people to vote by sending SMSs and raise their opinions – selection of which are printed the following day.
continue sanctions. The US periodically threatened to restart the war if teams were not allowed widespread access, declaring some weapons were still hidden in the country.’

At times the tone was quite different from the debates in the House of Commons and the Finnish Parliament on 6 February. For instance, Joe Higgins (Labour Party TD) argued that

“The ordinary people of Europe know that a war would not be to institute democratic rights in Iraq since the United States and Britain, the primary belligerents, continue to support and arm with weapons of mass destruction some of the most vile regimes that still besmirch the face of our globe, more than George Bush could possibly count up to. They know that the imminent war is to corral the second largest oil reserves for the future of US capitalism and to send a message to the huddled masses on our globe, particularly the poor of the Third World, that the 21st century will be the century of the United States empire and that it will set the terms in trade, military might and international politics.”

Moreover, Irish Minister for Defense Willie O'Dea was exceptionally frank in a televised debate on RTE on Monday 27 January 2003:

“I think it is a bit disingenuous to say that oil has nothing to do with it. I mean oil has a lot to do with it. Oil has quite a lot to do with it because as has been said, by 2025 America will be importing 70%... 70% of American imports will consist of oil. Now the reality... this is vital... a vital strategic interest and America shouldn't be ashamed or afraid... and the Bush administration shouldn't be ashamed or afraid to admit that. But the mistake I think a lot of people are making is that when you say that it's all about oil people conjure up an image of a few cigar chomping Texans sitting around in Dallas-style ranch houses who support George Bush and that they're going to be the only beneficiaries. The price of oil and the control of the oil supply has a vital impact on the economies of all the western world. It has a vital impact on your jobs... on my job. [...] There are supplementary reasons, of course, for a military adventure in Iraq.”

Bennett (1996, 376) suggests that an elite debate “serves as a signal for journalists to expand a story to encompass the views of experts, social groups, opinion polls, and other sources that reflect the observed differences among powerful politicians”. It was perhaps for this reason that the Irish Times provided the most comprehensive coverage of the possible oil-related motives. For instance, Irish Times (10 Feb) published an article discussing in detail the significance of Iraqi oil reserves though the by-line of the article said that “control of Iraq’s oil” would be “a by-product” of the war rather than a real motive for invasion. The newspaper also quoted Belgium’s Foreign Minister Louis Michel in two articles (10 and 11 February): “They did not succeed in catching bin Laden and now they have to find an enemy they can beat. I think it has to do with power, probably also very likely with oil and the humiliation they suffered.”

162 However, the Irish Independent, which was more sympathetic to the US views and dependent on British newspapers for international coverage, made only one reference to possible oil-related motives.

Table 6.4. References to possible oil-related motives for invasion.

162This quote also appeared in the Daily Telegraph where it was characterized as the one of the most anti-American statements from Western leaders.
The argument that the invasion has possible oil-related motives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Invoked</th>
<th>Questioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=84)</td>
<td>3 (3.6%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=23)</td>
<td>2 (8.7%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=37)</td>
<td>1 (2.7%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=144)</td>
<td>6 (4.2%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent (n=120)</td>
<td>2 (1.7%)</td>
<td>2 (1.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph (n=98)</td>
<td>3 (3.1%)</td>
<td>1 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=218)</td>
<td>5 (2.3%)</td>
<td>3 (1.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Independent (n=85)</td>
<td>1 (1.2%)</td>
<td>1 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Times (n=71)</td>
<td>6 (8.5%)</td>
<td>1 (1.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=156)</td>
<td>7 (4.5%)</td>
<td>2 (1.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=518)</td>
<td>18 (3.5%)</td>
<td>5 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the British newspapers, references to oil-related motives were countered almost as often as invoked by raising the argument that the coming war is not about oil or questioning the evidence to the contrary. Some of the few references on the issue were so cryptic that they posed a particular challenge for coding. This is how close The Independent’s Johann Hari came in acknowledging that oil might be among, what he called, the “wrong reasons” for war: “Of course, the US is morally compromised. I wish there were a pristine, perfect state with no oil interests and the military power to help the people of Iraq, but there isn't one.”

For anti-war movement oil seemed to have been an obvious motive for the invasion. Their slogans included ‘No war for oil’, ‘Oil is the fuel for war’ etc. Quite often citations of their banners in demonstrations were the only references to alternative motives in the press coverage.

In sum, serious debate on the strategic significance of Iraq’s oil resources and the role they might have played in the current crisis was lacking in all three countries. In this regard, the media hardly fulfilled two of its roles in society: scrutinizing the power and reflecting the public opinion (Curran and Seaton 2003, 346). This finding supports the notion of alternative motives of Western interventions going unreported (Thussu 2000a). McChesney (2005, 119) provides one explanation why journalists might avoid certain topics: “If people in power agree on an issue, presuppose it, or do not seriously debate it, it is almost impossible for a journalist to raise it without being accused of partisanship and pushing an

163Code 99, “Not possible to determine”, was used in these cases.
ideological agenda. So it is rarely done, and when it is done it is dismissed as bad journalism.” Clearly, official sources were reluctant to discuss Iraqi oil (Duffield 2005) and, for example, in the House of Commons Iraq debate on February 6, oil was mentioned only once by an anti-war Labour MP Jeremy Corbyn.

Another explanation is that newspapers have separate sections for financial and international news – as well as domestic politics. Arguably this format prevents journalists from properly tackling complicated issues in which economics and both national and international politics are intertwined. Finance sections typically approach the economy from a corporate point of view rather than adopting a social or political perspective on the economy. Similarly, both domestic and international politics are treated in their own sections often without an economic perspective (Kivimäki 2005, 106).

6.4 CONCLUSION
The editorial policy of the Independent seems to suggest that the press in Britain does not simply follow the government policy line as the executive version of manufacturing consent literature would suggest. Elite version, however, suggests that the Independent was only able to assume the anti-war position due to the conflict among the elite. In the absence of substantial disagreement among the Finnish elite, the editorials of the Finnish quality dailies reflected the government view and, in this regard, the findings are in accordance with the manufacturing consent literature.

The three most prominent anti-war countries and the UN were outnumbered by the US sources in all three countries. Analysis of sourcing supported the power indexing thesis. Further analysis is needed in order to investigate whether the selection of foreign sources is influenced by the editorial policy of the newspaper.

While there were differences between newspapers within countries, there was a pattern indicating that the Finnish press as a whole was the most critical of the invasion and the least critical of the weapons inspections as an alternative to a war. The UK press, in turn, was least critical of the invasion and the most critical of the weapons inspections leaving the Irish newspapers somewhere in the middle. To some extent, the press coverage correlated with the policy line of their host government in the run-up to the war.
Meanwhile, possible oil-related motives for the invasion and the geopolitical significance of the second largest oil reserves in the world received only few references as journalists hardly pursued this topic independently in the absence of real governmental debate. This negligence did not seem to directly relate to government policy line and the *Irish Times* and *Turun Sanomat* differed from their national competitors with more extensive coverage of the issue.
THE WAR BEGINS, 18 – 24 MARCH

7.1 INTRODUCTION

After a brief review of how the Iraq crisis evolved into a war and national governments adapted to the events during this period of analysis (18-24 March), this chapter will provide analysis of press coverage using both quantitative and qualitative content analysis. The analysis will focus on how the newspapers reacted to the military action in their leading articles and other opinion material and whether the newspapers had differing sourcing patterns in their coverage. Finally, the chapter will discuss whether the newspapers differed in their presentation of some of the most common arguments about the war – e.g. with regard to the legality of the military action, the objectives of war or the consequences of the war.

On 7 March, the UN Security Council met to discuss Iraq once again. According to Chief Weapons Inspector Hans Blix, the British ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, tried to rally the UN Security Council members behind a resolution which would have required Saddam Hussein to give a televised speech pronouncing a strategic decision to give up all WMD. Moreover, there would have been requirements to provide evidence that the decision was “real and genuine”. Blix discussed this plan on 10 March with Tony Blair but eventually, by 14 March, it became clear that the Security Council members could not agree on another resolution. Six of the elected members insisted that it is the task of the Security Council to assess whether Iraq has met the benchmarks while the US position was that it had the right to act unilaterally if necessary (Blix 2005, 244-50). The US, Britain

164According to Blix (2005, 253), the statement was “less of an ultimatum to Saddam than one to the members of the Security Council—support the resolution or be bypassed.” The draft resolution proposed by the US, UK and Spain read that the UN Security Council “[d]ecides that Iraq will have failed to take the final opportunity afforded by resolution 1441 (2002) unless, on or before 17 March 2003, the Council concludes that Iraq has demonstrated full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation in accordance with its disarmament obligations under 1441 (2002) and previous relevant resolutions, and is yielding possession to UNMOVIC prohibited by resolution 687 (1991) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and all information regarding prior destruction of such items”. Had the draft resolution been accepted, avoiding the war would have required the US and Britain to abstain from using their veto in a vote on Iraqi compliance.
and Spain held a meeting at Azores on 16 March and issued Azore's Summit Statement (2003) which read:

“For 12 years, the international community has tried to persuade him [Saddam Hussein] to disarm and thereby avoid military conflict, most recently through the unanimous adoption of UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution] 1441. The responsibility is his. If Saddam refuses even now to cooperate fully with the United Nations, he brings on himself the serious consequences foreseen in UNSCR 1441 and previous resolutions.”

The next day (17 March), President Bush (2003a) issued an ultimatum to President Saddam Hussein to flee Iraq within 48 hours:

“All the decades of deceit and cruelty have now reached an end. Saddam Hussein and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours. Their refusal to do so will result in military conflict, commenced at a time of our choosing. For their own safety, all foreign nationals - including journalists and inspectors - should leave Iraq immediately.”

Once again, Bush took the opportunity to repeat his arguments for war:

“The Iraqi regime has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage. It has uniformly defied Security Council resolutions demanding full disarmament. Over the years, U.N. weapon inspectors have been threatened by Iraqi officials, electronically bugged, and systematically deceived. Peaceful efforts to disarm the Iraqi regime have failed again and again -- because we are not dealing with peaceful men.

Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. This regime has already used weapons of mass destruction against Iraq's neighbors and against Iraq's people.

The regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East. It has a deep hatred of America and our friends. And it has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda.

The danger is clear: using chemical, biological or, one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, the terrorists could fulfill their stated ambitions and kill thousands or hundreds of thousands of innocent people in our country, or any other.”

Meanwhile, the Iraqi leadership was meeting in Baghdad. Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Al-Sabri gave Iraq's defiant response to President Bush's ultimatum saying that the war could be avoided "if Mr Bush went into exile” (quoted in the Irish Times, 19 March). On 15 March, Germany, France and Russia had requested UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) to present its work program on 18 March and, eventually, Blix presented it on 19 March – a day after the UN staff had been pulled out from Iraq (Blix 2005, 249-250). While Russian and French foreign ministers attended the meeting in New York, US Secretary of State Colin Powell stayed in Washington as the US had already made its decision.

165The ultimatum made the Finnish newspapers on 19 March while due to time difference the Irish press reported the statement on 18th.

166Hence, the Irish Times headlined its story “A final report from Blix falls on deaf ears”.

170
On the night of March 19, the war began with an attempt to “decapitate” President Saddam Hussein with an air strike after the Coalition had received information on his possible whereabouts. Richard Perle, Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee to the US Department of Defense, later acknowledged to the House Armed Service Committee that Iraqi intelligence had outwitted the US government by using double agents to provide false information on Saddam's whereabouts (Ricks 2006, 117). The press had already been informally told that the bombardment would not begin on that night but the perceived opportunity to kill Iraqi leadership changed the original war plans. The main attacks begun on 20 March and US/UK forces advanced deep into Iraq in the following few days. However, some military analysts became concerned about Iraq's creative use of asymmetric warfare, the reserved response of the population in Southern Iraq to the 'liberation' while major water-crossings and urban areas posed further challenges to the invading forces (Cordesman 2003, 59-62). The start of the military hostilities ignited yet another global wave of demonstrations against the war.

7.2 GOVERNMENT POSITIONS
The European Commission broke with tradition and criticised the position the UK and Spain had adopted in the Iraq crisis. As the war became imminent, Ireland and Finland also had to decide on the final formulation of their policies while the UK government faced a House of Commons vote on British participation in military action against Iraq.

The Finnish government (2003a) formulated its position in the following way in early March:

"The crisis can be brought to a peaceful conclusion provided that Iraq fulfils its obligations regarding disarmament and fully collaborates with the UN weapons inspectors and that all countries commit themselves not to act without UN authorization. The time, as well as the human and technical resources used for the arms inspections, can be increased in consultation with the inspection leadership and in accordance with the Security Council's decisions. The inspections cannot, however, be continued endlessly if Iraq fails to fully cooperate and, consequently, the possibility of using military force cannot be ruled out entirely. Any use of military force will require the authorization of the UN Security Council and all unauthorized use of military force is unacceptable."

As the war begun, the Finnish government (2003b) emphasised the role of the UN in international relations and adopted the following statement on 20 March 2003:

167It should be noted, however, that US/UK air forces had consistently attacked Iraqi air defences since late 2002 (Cordesman 2003, 58).
“Finland laments that the US and its allies have begun military action against Iraq.

Use of military force without the UN Security Council's specific authorisation is not acceptable.

The ongoing war must not result in the marginalisation of the UN. It is obligatory that the role and responsibility of the UN and its organisations remain central in the drafting and implementation of the forthcoming decisions and measures.”

While disapproving of the use of force, the Finnish response was cautious in comparison to its neighbour Sweden which regarded the attack as a violation of the international law (Dimitrova & Strömbäck 2005, 405; Vogt 2004).168

The Irish government had avoided taking sides in the run-up to the war. On 20 March, Irish Foreign Minister Brian Cowen continued on this path and gave the following statement to the Dáil Éireann (2003b):

“Ireland has repeatedly stated its view that if Iraq continued in its non-compliance, a second Security Council resolution should be adopted. We believe that this is what should have been done. The United States and Britain have long held the view that earlier Security Council Resolutions already mandate the use of force, and that no further authorisation is required. They are now acting on this belief. It is clear that there is no generally accepted view on the validity of the different interpretations and it is unlikely that agreement on this point can be reached.”

Like his Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, Cowen held the Iraqi President responsible for the situation. With regard to US military access to Ireland's Shannon airport, Cowen announced that

“For us now to withdraw facilities at Shannon would not only be in direct contrast to what we have done in previous occasions, but would antagonize two of our most important friends and partners. The core of our neutrality, as I have said, lies in independence of judgement – in being able to make up our minds about what is right for Ireland.”

After heavy criticism from the opposition parties including Fine Gael, Labour, Green party and Sinn Fein, the government motion for continued overflight and landing rights for the US military was carried by 77 votes against 60.

On 18 March, before the House of Commons voted on the British participation in the military action to disarm Iraq, Tony Blair appealed to the Members of Parliament arguing that (House of Commons 2003b, col. 761):

168It is worth noting that between these two statements, the Centre Party had secured a very narrow victory in the general elections and was preparing for negotiations to form a coalition government.
“the outcome of this issue will now determine more than the fate of the Iraqi regime and more than the fate of the Iraqi people who have been brutalised by Saddam for so long, important though these issues are. It will determine the way in which Britain and the world confront the central security threat of the 21st century, the development of the United Nations, the relationship between Europe and the United States, the relations within the European Union and the way in which the United States engages with the rest of the world. So it could hardly be more important. It will determine the pattern of international politics for the next generation.”

With the help of the Conservative party, Blair won the support of the House of Commons although the Labour Party was split on the issue. The clearest sign of the divisions within the Labour party was the resignation of the Leader of the House of Commons, Robin Cook, a day earlier. In his resignation speech, Cook (2003) argued that Britain's interest is in multilateral agreement rather than unilateral action which could break the coalition against terrorism. Cook also questioned the claim that Iraq posed a threat: “Iraq probably has no weapons of mass destruction in the commonly understood sense of the term – namely a credible device capable of being delivered against a strategic city target.” He also raised the question of why Iraq's alleged weapons could not be stripped by giving more time to the weapons inspections. The government's Iraq policy resulted in several resignations. For instance, Tory junior whip John Randall and Andy Reed, a labour ministerial aide, had resigned from their posts earlier over concerns about the Iraq war. Moreover, International Development Secretary Clare Short had threatened to resign if Britain participated in the war without a second UN Security Council resolution but eventually decided to stay in the office.169

7.3 THE SAMPLE

During the week following Bush's ultimatum to the Iraqi president, 1293 opinion and news articles on Iraq were published in the analysed newspapers. The British newspapers accounted for 542 items, the Irish newspapers for 388 while the Finnish newspapers published 363 items.

The Irish newspapers had very different strategies in how to provide international coverage. The *Irish Independent* relied heavily on British newspapers in its international coverage. 88 out of 112 items originated from the *Times* (27), *Daily Telegraph* (30) and the *Independent* / Independent News Service (31). Meanwhile, its main competition, the *Irish Times*, relied on its extensive network of foreign correspondents. The *Irish Times* was well-

169This invited very harsh criticism in the press and very little sympathy apart from Johann Hari’s column in the *Independent* on 19 March.
equipped to cover the war as it had correspondents in Iran/Northern Iraq (Lynne O'Donnell), Jordan (Michael Jansen) and Baghdad (Lara Marlowe). \(^{170}\) Moreover, the *Irish Times* regularly ran reports from Jack Fairweather who was embedded with the British army. Consequently, on 18 March alone, the *Irish Times* ran reports from Baghdad, Tehran, Amman, Jerusalem, Moscow, New York, London, Brussels and Kuwait.

The Finnish newspapers depended on news agencies to supplement their own international coverage or to make up for the lack of correspondents abroad. *Turun Sanomat* had correspondents in many Western countries which allowed it to cover the diplomatic feud rather independently. However, dependence on news agencies increased when the war started because the newspaper lacked presence in Iraq. *Helsingin Sanomat* (20 March) declared that its goal was to provide “comprehensive, fast and accurate picture of actions of all actors involved in the crisis, war and the situation that follows.” *Helsingin Sanomat* was better equipped to reach this target than any other Finnish newspaper as it had several correspondents in the region including Jordan (Tanja Vasama and Hannes Heikura), Israel (Susanna Niinivaara) and Turkey (Minna Nalbantoglu). Moreover, HS had Sami Sillanpää embedded with the American 101\(^{st}\) Airborne division but it did not have a correspondent reporting from the Iraqi side. *Ilta-Sanomat* was largely dependent on Anglo-American news agencies but also ran articles by a Norwegian unilateral reporter, Åsne Seierstad. She provided the perspective of ordinary civilians in Baghdad. Seierstad's four articles, which appeared in *Ilta-Sanomat*, were the only reports from the Iraqi side in the three Finnish newspapers during the analysed week.

Together with the *Irish Times*, the *Independent* provided the most extensive coverage from the Iraqi side. The *Independent* had Robert Fisk in Baghdad and his reports were also published in Ireland by the *Irish Independent* and the *Sunday Tribune*. While the *Independent* only had Terri Judd embedded with the British troops, *Daily Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph* had several embedded reporters who provided more than 30 reports during the week. In addition to having several reporters with the UK forces, \(^{171}\) the *Daily Telegraph*’s Oliver Poole was the only British daily newspaper journalist embedded with the US forces.

\(^{170}\)According to Lara Marlowe (2003), her reports were never censored by the Iraqis and the editors in Ireland only cut three of the most gruesome depictions from her reports. 

7.4 ANALYSIS OF COVERAGE

As discussed in the previous chapters, previous research suggests that the media follow rather closely governmental positions on international issues. Therefore, the hypothesis is that the editorial positions of the newspapers would reflect the official policies of their host countries. Previous research suggests that the media select sources that hold similar views as their national government (Stolle & Hooghe 2005). Therefore, the Finnish newspapers are expected to quote other anti-war governments and UN sources more often than the British newspapers. Finally, the selection and/or avoidance of certain topics or arguments could reflect bias in favour of national foreign policy line.

7.4.1 Editorial responses to the beginning of the war

An editorial in Turun Sanomat ('One has to avoid inciting unnecessary hysteria on the brink of war', 20 March) refrained from condemning the military action. Instead, the editorial focussed on calling for calm in the midst of the crisis. However, a day later, another editorial headlined 'USA has taken a dangerous path by attacking Iraq' (21 March). The article argued that

“In Bush's view, he is now applying the National Security Strategy which was adopted last year. According to the strategy, pre-emptive attack is justified against a country which is striking the US. The investigations of the UN weapons inspectors have made it clear that Iraq does not have this kind of capability. There is no evidence to suggest that Iraq has provided terrorists with weapons to strike the US. The fear now is that America's doctrine is applied in other conflict areas.”

In effect, the editorial questioned the existence of Iraqi threat, which was at the heart of US/UK case for war, and expressed concern about the possibility that the invasion would create a potentially dangerous precedent for pre-emptive strikes. Helsingin Sanomat adopted a rather similar position. Its editorial ('Bush decided to go on war path regardless of the UN', 19 March) argued that

“Ideology and strong conviction in its [US's] own superiority has fatally won the patience and sense of reality. Bush demanded much more than an approval for toppling Saddam Hussein from the international community. In his new strategic doctrine he effectively demanded the US to be exempt from international norms. His inner circle made it clear that Iraq will be made a precedent. As other states now oppose the war, they do not defend Saddam Hussein but institutionalised rules and their right to distinguish themselves from US dictation. Washington does not seem to get this simple fact.”

Ilta-Sanomat was perhaps a little more understanding of US policy – or at least less condemning. Under the headline 'It is impossible to prevent the war any more' (19 March) it wrote:
“There were no good options available. The anti-war countries would have needed to accept
the war because otherwise sufficient consensus would have been lacking. The US and its
closest allies would not have retreated from their position. On the contrary, the US had planned
to solve the matter with military force in any case. In Washington's view, UN blessing would
have been desirable but not necessary icing on the already decided policy line.

It is reasonable to ask whether the inflexible UN Security Council is the best forum to deal
with questions of war and peace as it is coming out of this situation with a severe failure. Five
countries have a veto in the Security Council. They are the winners of the Second World War.
However, the world has been transformed several times over since 1945.”

In this editorial, IS implies that the US intentionally misinterprets the UNSC resolution
1441 as de facto authorizing the use of force. However, the editorial does not take a clear
position either for or against the use of force. The following extract illustrates the
ambiguity:

“There was no question that Saddam Hussein is a tyrant who seized the power in a coup and
has hundreds of thousands of innocent lives on his conscience. In addition, there is a lot of oil
in the land he rules which makes it very attractive for the Americans to intervene in the matters
of this criminally run state.”

However, another commentary on the same day was highly sceptical of US claims
('Toward Liberation, But at What Cost?').

The editorial policies of the Finnish newspapers varied from rather harsh criticism of the
US to a slightly less condemning approach adopted by Ilta-Sanomat. It is worth noting
that, while Ilta-Sanomat was perhaps less judgemental in its approach than TS and HS,
some commentary pieces shared their scepticism of the US/UK case for war. For instance,
Jouko Juonala argued that creating a democracy in 22-million clan society would be a
difficult task and runs the risk that Iraq disintegrates ('Toward liberation but at what cost?').

172Aamulehti discussed the views of the US and its critics on 18 and 19 March ('Last
moments in Saddam Hussein's countdown' and 'USA put an end to the appeasement').
On the former date, it wrote that "[v]ery few want Saddam to stay in power. However,
most people settle for twisting arms and hope that the dictator of Iraq would mend his
ways sometime.[...] His place is not in head of any country". On the latter date,
Aamulehti just repeated the views of the US and its critics but did not seem to choose
sides. Although the newspaper's editor-in-chief Matti Apunen may have personally
supported the invasion of Iraq and the editorials may have been more sympathetic to the
US views than in other Finnish newspapers, this did not seem to translate into generally
supportive coverage of the war. The news coverage seemed to emphasise humanitarian
aspects of the war. In fact, Aamulehti ran a series of reports which approached the
closing war from the perspective of an ordinary Iraqi family and, on 21 March alone,
Aamulehti ran several news articles which focused on humanitarian concerns and anti-
war protests together with a column that warned about the potentially very difficult
post-invasion situation due to tribal, ethnic and religious divisions within the Iraqi
society ('The hardest challenge comes after the war'). This interpretation is further
supported by an analysis of news photographs: Aamulehti emphasised the Iraqi civilian
view on the war as half of all the photographs depicted civilians. In comparison, about
40% of photographs in Helsingin Sanomat depicted civilians (Männistö 2004, 165).
20 March). In sum, the opinion items in the Finnish newspapers largely reflected the anti-war position of the government as well as the anti-war sentiment in the society at large.

Opinion items in the Irish newspapers presented wider range of views than the rather uniform Finnish press. The editorials and commentaries in the *Irish Independent/Sunday Independent* included both quite passionate endorsements of the military action as well as, to a lesser degree, its criticism. For instance, Eoghan Harris defended the war in the *Sunday Independent* ('Comments of mass distraction buried in bodybags of bluster', 23 March): “No war is a good war, but this necessary war comes close to being a noble war. It is a great thing to free a people from a tyrant. And it is a tragedy that the Irish republic is either standing sullenly on the sidelines, or, even worse, on the wrong side.” Clearly, Harris would not have liked to see Shannon closed for the US military. Other pro-war opinion items included, for instance, 'Move against Saddam not just a war but a just war' (*Sunday Independent*, 23 March), 'The bigger the crisis, the more we opt to duck it' (*Sunday Independent*, 23 March) and 'Why it is time to stand by our friends'. Moreover, the *Irish Independent* ran Taoiseach Bertie Ahern's article which blamed the Iraqi President for the situation and defended the stop-over policy ('Saddam, not Bush or Blair, is responsible for this crisis', 20 March).

Simon Jenkins's commentary piece ('Bin Laden's laughter echoes across the battlefield', 19 March), which was also published in the *Times* (of London), was among those few articles published in the *Irish Independent* that were unequivocally critical of the war.\(^\text{173}\) He dissected the US/UK case for war and argued that “[i]t is a poor comment on the civilised West in the 21st century that its chief means of retaliation against terrorism is a declaration of war on whole peoples.” Jenkins saw the war playing into the hands of al-Qaeda: “Nothing can be giving bin Laden greater pleasure than the spectacle of the West going to war to topple his hated foe, the 'atheist Satan,' Saddam Hussein.”

In contrast to the *Irish Independent*, the *Irish Times* and the *Sunday Tribune* were largely critical of the US/UK invasion of Iraq as well as Ireland's stop-over policy. On 18 March, the *Irish Times* ('On the brink of an unacceptable war') argued that

“All the aims of this war are changed by the circumstances of its pronouncement. Disarming Iraq is secondary now to overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime and reordering Middle East politics. Such objectives are emphatically not covered by existing UN resolutions, however

\(^{173}\)It should be noted, however, that outright condemnations of the US/UK invasion as well as Irish government's stop-over policy were common in letters-to-the-editor.
abstractly desirable. The price paid in terms of legality and legitimacy is too high. We must hope for a short war. But the subsequent peace remains deeply problematic and contested because of these unacceptable decisions by the United States, Britain and their allies."

The *Irish Times* also took a critical stance on the government's continuation of the stop-over policy ('Decision time on Shannon', 20 March):

“If military neutrality is to mean anything in these circumstances, it should involve refusing the movement of troops or munitions of war across our territory, as other European neutrals have done. The use of Shannon Airport should be refused. But if our political alignments are greater than the avowed principle of neutrality, perhaps this is the time to confront and implement a new foreign policy. We are politically aligned towards the US and UK, neutral in the cop-out sense, and demonstrably political passengers in the first march in international affairs of the 21st century.”

*Irish Times*’s Fintan O’Toole harshly criticised the stop-over policy in his opinion piece ‘Throwing principle to the wind’ (22 March):

“The Government contends, of course, that the use of Shannon does not really amount to participation in the war. Even if this were true, it certainly amounts to something even more momentous: support for the replacement of the UN by US-led 'coalitions of the willing'.

By choosing Boston rather than Berlin, we have tied ourselves to the agenda of a confident, aggressive right-wing faction in the US. Seldom in Irish history can so profound a choice have been made with such little thought, either for the sacrifices of the past or the dangers of the future.”

Nevertheless, the *Irish Times* also published Taoiseach Bertie Ahern's article, 'We stand by neutrality and support for UN'. While acknowledging that the legality of the use of military force against Iraq was disputed, he defended the stop-over policy: “We have been making such facilities available for half a century, throughout many wars and crises. We have pursued our policy of military neutrality throughout that period. Maintaining these facilities does not mean we are participating in a war.” There were also a few other opinion pieces which could be characterised as pro-war.

A leading article in the *Sunday Tribune* ('Victory would not make Bush's war legitimate', 23 March) adopted a clear anti-war editorial stance:

“The removal of Saddam Hussein will not justify the death and destruction so far wreaked by the allies. It will not justify our government's lapdog attitude to the Americans, an attitude...

174Typically to the Finnish and Irish newspapers included in this study, the article was also concerned with the role of the United Nations in the international system: “we are reduced to a United States led war against Iraq. It is a great failure of politics and diplomacy. It flies in the face of the majority on the United Nations Security Council. That majority does not accept a war is the only means available to ensure Iraq complies with UN demands that it disarm its weapons of mass destruction. This is, therefore, an unacceptable war of highly doubtful legality and legitimacy. It will endanger the international order which the United Nations was created to protect.”

175These included e.g. John Waters's 'Bush and Blair doing right thing' (24 March).
clearly demonstrated when Ireland became the only country in Europe to hold a national day of mourning for the victims of the World Trade Centre attack. Will we hold a similar day of mourning for the dead in Iraq?

[...] Some will say that opposing the war, that protesting for peace, is futile. It may well be. But it is also right, moral, decent, civilised and Christian.

We will continue to oppose it.”

*Sunday Tribune*'s Iraq coverage was quite consistently critical of the invasion. For instance, Special Correspondent Harry McGee wrote ('A wretched war, started on lies, reliant on lies', 23 March):

“US president George Bush said that the war had been launched to protect the American people from the threat of Saddam's weapons of mass destruction, to enforce the Security Council's long-standing demands. America and its allies, he said, had the 'resolve to meet this threat to peace'. Blair's justification focuses on so-called asymmetrical threats. 'This new world faces a new threat of disorder and chaos born either of brutal states like Iraq, armed with weapons of mass destruction, or extreme terrorist groups. Both hate our way of life, our freedom and democracy. My fear, deeply held, based in part on the intelligence that I see, is that these threats come together and deliver catastrophe to our country and world.' But did Iraq ever pose such a threat? Was it really capable of bringing the entire world to its knees so much so that it justified an attack of such a calamitous nature? What happens if no weapons of mass destruction are unearthed when the regime is eventually over-run? Where does the campaign against terrorism stop? How do you describe the extraordinary arsenal of uranium-enriched warheads, daisy cutters, cluster bombs, the new super-bomb that can zap everything within 600m. As conventional weapons?

He continued by arguing that the war “has a dubious legal basis, was started in contradiction of the will of the international community, and will give a legitimacy to a very dangerous and very scary doctrine, that of pre-emption.”

The Irish newspapers reflected the divisions within the political elite on the Iraq War and Ireland's decision on Shannon. As suggested by the elite version of the manufacturing consent literature, elite dissensus brought the Shannon issue in the sphere of legitimate controversy.

In Britain, the *Independent* took a somewhat conformist stance on the war on 19 March. While retaining reservations about the Prime Minister's Iraq policy, the leading article argued that "Mr Blair has shown himself in the past few days to be at once the most formidable politician in the country and the right national leader for these deeply uncertain times" ('Whatever the anxieties over this conflict, Mr Blair has shown himself to be a leader for troubled times'). However, on March 21, the leader of the *Independent* argued that there had been “a marked shift in emphasis in the weeks leading up to this moment, from the need to confront the threat Saddam Hussein posed to the rest of the world to giving at least equal billing to the need to liberate the Iraqi people from a pitiless dictator”
'After all the doubts, only one aim can justify this war: freedom for the Iraqi people'). The leader suggested that this was due to doubts that the WMD did not exist after all. Nevertheless, the editorial concluded that “[f]or all the spin, for all Mr Bush's disastrous diplomacy and his dubious motives, however, the restoration of freedom and democracy to the Iraqi people is a noble aim.”

Another leading article in the *Independent* ('A war in the name of democracy must tolerate some dissent at home', 22 March), read:

“The *Independent* takes the view that the case for or against the war is no longer the issue. We accept that Parliament has decided that question for now. Anyway, it would make no sense to withdraw British forces from an operation that is going to continue regardless, and certainly not while there is hope that Saddam Hussein's regime will collapse and the Iraqi people be liberated with minimal casualties.”

The leading article also included a message to the anti-war movement:

“we urge rhetorical restraint on both sides. Equally, we would urge the peace marchers to avoid accusing people of war crimes. Careless use of such words cheapens the currency and undermines the anti-war argument. For those reasons, yesterday's stunt in a Belgian court, where peace protesters lodged war crimes charges against George Bush and Dick Cheney, was foolish.”

In a similar fashion, a leading article in the *Independent on Sunday* ('This war is wrong, but unstoppable. So we must fight for the peace', 23 March) distanced itself from the anti-war movement: “What we cannot do is share the wish of some protesters that the war is suddenly stopped without a resolution of any sort, an absurdly unrealistic and therefore meaningless aspiration.” It seems safe to conclude that the *Independent* abandoned its earlier unambiguously anti-war editorial policy and reconciled itself to the government policy.

Nevertheless, in general, the opinion items published in the *Independent* were critical of the invasion. For instance, Andrew Lansley, a conservative MP, argues that the “justification for this conflict is built on sand” (19 March) in a commentary in the *Independent*. He continued:

“Of course, inspection without Iraqi co-operation would never produce the full disarmament required. But there is a perversity in the approach taken by Britain and the US, which has failed to recognise that the enhanced weapons inspection since last November has given substantial evidence of the extent of Iraqi non-compliance, gone a considerable way to destroying equipment, especially missile technology, and defined the disarmament tasks which remain.”

176 Philip Hammond (2003) argues the British press has been largely supportive of Western military interventions for humanitarian reasons and ”from Somalia in 1992 to Iraq in 2003, the loudest complaint voiced in the press has been that the West does not do enough to reorganise other societies” (Hammond 2008).
However, the Independent's regular commentator on world affairs, Johann Hari, adopted a pro-war position. He believed in the prospect of “honourable, democratic and – at last – peaceful Iraq” (‘Clare Short has given lead for all those who oppose the war’, 19 March). Therefore, he argued

“This if you are going to march, ditch the old, cheap slogans to 'stop the war'. Call instead for democracy in Iraq. The Bush administration and its allies are divided on this issue. There are big players calling for post-war democracy, like Paul Wolfowitz, Tony Blair and Clare Short, and others like Dick Cheney and Colin Powell calling for another dictatorship, albeit a less horrific one.”

The Daily Telegraph's editorial supported Blair’s military adventure wholeheartedly (‘Beyond debate’, 18 March):

“From 1940 to the present day, we have continuously recognised that we must be strenuous for peace and freedom, and that this sometimes means fighting for them. In this, we have sustained with the United States the most important alliance of modern times. If we slink away now, we will suffer much more than the relatively minor catastrophe of losing a prime minister: we will be weak and friendless, and we ought to be ashamed.”

Moreover, on the following day, another editorial argued that “any fair-minded person who listened to yesterday's debate, having been genuinely unable to make up his mind about military action against Saddam, must surely have concluded that Mr Blair was right, and his opponents were wrong” (‘Master of the House’, 19 March). The editorial provided further praise for Blair's speech at the House of Commons by arguing that he “made the speech that he should have made months ago, marshalling all his arguments for action - moral, legal, geopolitical and humanitarian - and putting them with such patent conviction and force that his performance deserves to be remembered as one of the finest in recent history.” The Daily Telegraph also published edited extracts of Blair's speech (‘The world must unite against chaos', 19 March).

Yet, some of the opinion items published in the Daily Telegraph questioned the rationale for invasion. For instance, Robert Harris (‘Despite everything, we must dare back Blair and this war’, 18 March) argued (quoting his own article from previous year) that

“[w]e are being whipped into a war psychosis about 'weapons of mass destruction' which are, practically, often no more destructive than high explosive, and which can, in any case, be manufactured in the middle of a city or stolen from a laboratory.

We are considering acting pre-emptively against a state which has not actually sponsored a terrorist threat against us. We are likely, in the process, to fracture the united international front against al-Qa'eda, split public opinion in this country, and make bio-terrorism more likely. All in all: a strange way to go about making the world a safer place.”
However, Harris suggested that “the dangers of stopping now exceed the risks of seeing the thing through” and, therefore, he backed the government. In fact, opinion items were largely supportive of the invasion and opinion items taking an unambiguous anti-war stance were virtually limited to few letters-to-the-editor and David Pryce-Jones's commentary which discussed the potential consequences of the war for the stability of Iraq, the Middle East and the wider world. He argued that there could be a civil war between the ethnic factions and that, if the US military does not manage to prevent this, the US runs the risk of turning Iraq “into a fanatically anti-American country generating terrorists faster than the West Bank” ('For Sunnis, Shias, Kurds and Turks, when war stops, the trouble starts', *Sunday Telegraph*, 23 March).

While their editorial positions on the war differed significantly, both British newspapers published both pro- and anti-war opinion items. However, the *Independent* was largely critical of the invasion apart from Johann Hari who, together with other “liberal hawks”, emphasised the prospect of democratic Iraq (Taylor 2008). Rally round the flag effect was also visible in the *Independent*'s softened editorial position once the war begun. The *Daily Telegraph*, in turn, ran very few anti-war opinion items and its leading articles and commentary pieces were largely supportive of the US/UK invasion of Iraq. Similarly to the situation in Ireland, the press reflected the range of elite opinion in the country.

### 7.4.2 Sourcing

Stolle and Hooghe's (2005) analysis of television coverage of the Iraq crisis found that in countries, which had anti-war governments, the television channels tended to choose anti-war actors as on-screen actors. Data presented in table 7.1 indicates that the newspapers analysed for this study did not choose their sources in a similar fashion. The Finnish and the British press quoted US governmental and military sources to similar extent while the Irish press quoted US government sources slightly more frequently. However, the Finnish press quoted Iraqi government/military sources less frequently than the Irish and UK newspapers.\(^{177}\) So, the anti-war editorial policies of the Finnish newspapers did not

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\(^{177}\)There were two incidents in the early days of the war that were widely misreported. The first was the allegation that Iraq had fired Scud missiles to Kuwait and the second was the claim that an entire Iraqi division, the 51\(^{st}\) infantry, had surrendered to the US forces. Even newspapers with a clear anti-war editorial policy failed to question the US military allegations of mass surrenders (e.g. see 'Iraqi soldiers surrender in droves', *Sunday Tribune*, 23 March). Meanwhile, the *Independent* was more cautious in reporting the alleged Scud strikes stating that “[i]t was not clear whether some of the weapons were prohibited Scuds.”
translate into giving more voice to the Iraqi point of view in the conflict – or even those of
other anti-war states (see table 2).

Table 7.1. Items quoting US and Iraqi governmental and military sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat</td>
<td>17 (8.5%)</td>
<td>17 (8.5%)</td>
<td>13 (6.5%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat</td>
<td>9 (13.8%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (1.5%)</td>
<td>2 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat</td>
<td>18 (18.4%)</td>
<td>16 (16.3%)</td>
<td>10 (10.2%)</td>
<td>1 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=363)</td>
<td>44 (12.1%)</td>
<td>33 (9.1%)</td>
<td>24 (6.6%)</td>
<td>3 (0.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>42 (13.9%)</td>
<td>28 (9.3%)</td>
<td>27 (8.9%)</td>
<td>3 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>29 (12.1%)</td>
<td>24 (10.0%)</td>
<td>9 (3.8%)</td>
<td>3 (1.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=542)</td>
<td>71 (13.1%)</td>
<td>52 (9.6%)</td>
<td>36 (6.6%)</td>
<td>6 (1.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent</td>
<td>36 (17.8%)</td>
<td>20 (10.0%)</td>
<td>21 (10.4%)</td>
<td>2 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times</td>
<td>30 (16.1%)</td>
<td>14 (7.5%)</td>
<td>23 (12.4%)</td>
<td>4 (2.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=388)</td>
<td>66 (17.0%)</td>
<td>34 (8.8%)</td>
<td>44 (11.3%)</td>
<td>6 (1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=1293)</td>
<td>181 (14.0%)</td>
<td>109 (8.4%)</td>
<td>104 (8.0%)</td>
<td>15 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2. major anti-war countries and international organisations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-war countries</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Aid agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat</td>
<td>2 (1.0%)</td>
<td>2 (1.0%)</td>
<td>3 (1.5%)</td>
<td>4 (2.0%)</td>
<td>4 (2.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat</td>
<td>2 (3.1%)</td>
<td>2 (3.1%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 (3.1%)</td>
<td>2 (3.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 (2.0%)</td>
<td>1 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=363)</td>
<td>4 (1.1%)</td>
<td>4 (1.1%)</td>
<td>3 (0.8%)</td>
<td>8 (2.2%)</td>
<td>7 (1.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>10 (3.3%)</td>
<td>4 (1.3%)</td>
<td>4 (1.3%)</td>
<td>16 (5.3%)</td>
<td>3 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>8 (3.3%)</td>
<td>3 (1.3%)</td>
<td>3 (1.3%)</td>
<td>9 (3.8%)</td>
<td>1 (0.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=542)</td>
<td>18 (3.3%)</td>
<td>7 (1.3%)</td>
<td>7 (1.3%)</td>
<td>25 (4.6%)</td>
<td>4 (0.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent</td>
<td>6 (3.0%)</td>
<td>3 (1.5%)</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
<td>6 (3.0%)</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times</td>
<td>10 (5.4%)</td>
<td>9 (4.8%)</td>
<td>9 (4.8%)</td>
<td>14 (7.5%)</td>
<td>3 (1.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=388)</td>
<td>16 (4.1%)</td>
<td>12 (3.1%)</td>
<td>10 (2.6%)</td>
<td>20 (5.2%)</td>
<td>4 (1.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=1293)</td>
<td>38 (2.9%)</td>
<td>23 (1.8%)</td>
<td>20 (1.5%)</td>
<td>53 (4.1%)</td>
<td>15 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A cross-national study on the 1991 Gulf War argued that Finnish and Swedish media put
more emphasis on the UN than the US media (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000b, 258). However,
the data indicates that the Finnish press quoted UN sources in only about 2% of the items
dealing with the Iraq crisis. Meanwhile, over 5% of the items in the Irish sample quoted
UN sources and even the British sample cited UN sources more frequently than the Finnish
newspapers. Nevertheless, the Finnish press quoted humanitarian aid organisations more
frequently than the Irish and British press. The fact that the Irish sample quoted French,
German and Russian sources the most frequently is largely due to the Irish Times' active
network of foreign correspondents.

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7.4.3 Selection of topics

Quantitative analysis of press coverage does not seem to support the view that the government policy line would explain how media select topics. Regardless of the Finnish government's anti-war stance and Finnish newspapers' editorial policies, which were critical of the invasion, the coverage as a whole did not put greater emphasis on casualties than the Irish and British newspapers. In fact, the data indicates that the British press covered casualties most extensively.

Table 7.3. Number of items with a reference to casualties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>References to casualties</th>
<th>US/UK</th>
<th>Iraqi military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Journalists</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=201)</td>
<td>17 (8.5%)</td>
<td>3 (1.5%)</td>
<td>12 (6.0%)</td>
<td>3 (1.5%)</td>
<td>7 (3.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=65)</td>
<td>3 (4.6%)</td>
<td>1 (1.5%)</td>
<td>9 (13.8%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6 (9.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=98)</td>
<td>12 (12.2%)</td>
<td>3 (3.1%)</td>
<td>9 (9.2%)</td>
<td>2 (2.0%)</td>
<td>2 (2.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=363)</td>
<td>32 (8.8%)</td>
<td>7 (1.9%)</td>
<td>30 (8.3%)</td>
<td>5 (1.4%)</td>
<td>15 (4.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (n=302)</td>
<td>48 (15.9%)</td>
<td>15 (5.0%)</td>
<td>46 (15.2%)</td>
<td>7 (2.3%)</td>
<td>27 (8.9%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (n=240)</td>
<td>34 (14.2%)</td>
<td>9 (3.8%)</td>
<td>25 (10.4%)</td>
<td>6 (2.5%)</td>
<td>14 (5.8%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK (n=542)</td>
<td>82 (15.2%)</td>
<td>24 (4.4%)</td>
<td>71 (13.1%)</td>
<td>13 (2.4%)</td>
<td>41 (7.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent (n=202)</td>
<td>24 (11.9%)</td>
<td>7 (3.5%)</td>
<td>30 (14.9%)</td>
<td>3 (1.5%)</td>
<td>13 (6.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times (n=186)</td>
<td>19 (10.2%)</td>
<td>5 (2.7%)</td>
<td>13 (7.0%)</td>
<td>5 (2.7%)</td>
<td>10 (5.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=388)</td>
<td>43 (11.1%)</td>
<td>13 (3.4%)</td>
<td>43 (11.1%)</td>
<td>6 (1.5%)</td>
<td>23 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=1293)</td>
<td>158 (12.2%)</td>
<td>44 (8.2%)</td>
<td>144 (11.1%)</td>
<td>24 (1.9%)</td>
<td>79 (6.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were a large number of references to unspecified casualties (in other words, it was impossible to determine whether the article, for instance, referred to military or civilian casualties). These cases were also recorded. However, as can be seen in the table 7.4, this data also suggests that the Finnish press emphasised the loss of life the least although humanitarian crisis (refugee problems, lack of clean water, epidemics and other such issues were recorded under this category) was the most widely covered in the Finnish sample. In this regard, the Irish newspapers differed from each other. The *Irish Times* made 16 references to humanitarian crisis against *Irish Independent*'s two and humanitarian aid was also covered more frequently in the *Irish Times* (23 items against 14). The *Irish Times* also questioned the argument that the war would lead to a safer international system in 11 items while the *Irish Independent* did this in just 3 times. A similar difference in emphasis could be seen in the British sample. The *Independent* was much more concerned about civilian casualties than the *Daily Telegraph* (25 against 46). Similarly, items with references to humanitarian aid totalled 39 in the *Independent* against *Telegraph*'s 12.
None of the three Finnish newspapers, which were analysed for this study, made a reference to US/UK use of depleted uranium (DU) in US/UK armour-piercing projectiles which leave behind radioactive dust that has been linked to birth defects and cancer (Solomon 2004, 160-161). Meanwhile, the *Independent* mentioned the issue in six items, the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Irish Independent* in three items and the *Irish Times* in two items.

7.4.4 Justifications, objectives and consequences of war

The Irish press provided the most extensive coverage of the question whether the war is justified with nearly 8% of items questioning its justification and over 9% questioning its legality. The issue had implications for Ireland's decision on whether to continue the stopover policy and the opposition parties and the government had differing interpretations. Understandably, the argument attracted media coverage. The Finnish press, in turn, paid less attention to the legal and moral justification of the war. This may have been due to lack of domestic controversy on this issue. A very small number of Finnish items included the argument that the war is legal and/or morally justified. Meanwhile, this argument was much more frequently questioned. *Ilta-Sanomat* did not cover the issue of legality at all. The *Independent* and the *Irish Times* paid notably more attention to the legality of the war than their pro-war counterparts – the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Irish Independent*.\(^{178}\)

The Irish press mentioned the disarmament of Iraq most frequently as the objective of the war (table 7.5). Meanwhile, the Finnish and the UK press regarded regime change or “ridding Saddam” as the most important objective. The third most often given objective in the UK press was to “free Iraqis” from the tyranny they had suffered under for decades while the Finnish and the Irish press mentioned oil-related objectives – a less noble and sincere aim.

\(^{178}\)The *Independent* questioned the legality of the war in 31 items against *Telegraph*'s 14. Similarly, the *Irish Times* questioned the legality in 25 items and the *Irish Independent* in 11. Similar pattern was evident in in the number of items questioning the moral justification of the war.
Table 7.4. Legality and moral justification of the war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argument that the war is legal</th>
<th>Argument that the war is justified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invoked</td>
<td>Questioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=201)</td>
<td>1 (0.5%)</td>
<td>11 (5.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=65)</td>
<td>1 (1.5%)</td>
<td>9 (13.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=98)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=363)</td>
<td>2 (0.6%)</td>
<td>21 (5.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (n=302)</td>
<td>8 (2.6%)</td>
<td>32 (10.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (n=240)</td>
<td>5 (2.1%)</td>
<td>14 (5.9%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK (n=542)</td>
<td>13 (2.4%)</td>
<td>46 (8.6%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irish Independent (n=202)</td>
<td>2 (1.0%)</td>
<td>11 (5.5%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irish Times (n=186)</td>
<td>4 (2.2%)</td>
<td>25 (13.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=388)</td>
<td>6 (1.6%)</td>
<td>36 (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=1293)</td>
<td>21 (1.6%)</td>
<td>102 (8.0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.5. Three most commonly mentioned objectives of the war by country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FINLAND (n=363)</th>
<th>IRELAND (n=388)</th>
<th>UK (n=542)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regime change</td>
<td>Disarmament of Iraq</td>
<td>Regime change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 (3.9%)</td>
<td>26 (6.7%)</td>
<td>33 (6.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament of Iraq</td>
<td>13 (3.6%)</td>
<td>Regime change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil-related objectives</td>
<td>9 (2.5%)</td>
<td>Disarmament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 (2.5%)</td>
<td>32 (5.9%)</td>
<td>32 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Iraqis</td>
<td>21 (3.9%)</td>
<td>21 (3.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.6. Number of items referring to the argument that the war incites more terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Argument invoked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=98)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=363)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (n=302)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (n=240)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=542)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent (n=202)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times (n=186)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=388)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=1293)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In all three countries, the most commonly mentioned consequence of the war was that it would incite more terrorism (table 7.6). The Finnish press appears the least pessimistic about the potential consequences of the war. In fact, it seems that the Finnish elite consensus did not encourage substantial debate about possible consequences of the war.
7.5 CONCLUSION

Stolle and Hooghe's (2005) cross-national analysis of television coverage of the Iraq War concluded that national Iraq policies were crucial in determining how the war was covered in a country. However, the findings presented here seem to suggest that newspaper coverage could be better explained by other factors.

At least two factors contributed to the fact that the Finnish government did not exert its influence on the press. First of all, there was a considerably wide consensus on Finland's anti-war position and, consequently, there was no need to persuade the public to support this policy. On the contrary, there was more public pressure on the government to use tougher rhetoric against the war – a step the government had not chosen in order to maintain good relations with the US. Secondly, the general elections took place just a few days before the beginning of the war and, therefore, the government was preoccupied and Iraq was low on the national agenda – the heated debate on Finland's Iraq policy had virtually died out after the general election on 16 March. Therefore, unlike in Ireland and the UK, there was no vocal opposition harshly criticising the government for participating or facilitating the war.

Indeed, the situation in the UK and Ireland was drastically different. The question of how to respond to the fact that the Iraq crisis was escalating into a war divided political elites in both countries and public debate heated up ahead of crucial votes in the House of Commons and the Dail. The divisiveness of the issue is reflected in the fact that press was also divided in both countries. The Irish Times and the Independent opposed the war although the latter softened its tone once the decision to participate in the invasion had been made. The Daily Telegraph and the Irish Independent were more pro-war in their approach – the former especially.

Another important factor contributing to differences in the coverage was the resources available to the newspaper in covering the war. The influence of the US/UK “news duopoly” (Tunstall & Machin 1999) varied from one outlet to the other. Turun Sanomat depended on its few foreign correspondents and non-Anglo-American news agencies such

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179 However, they conclude that the “convergence between government positions and media framing” was particularly strong in countries “in which governments hold strong and firm government positions such as in France and in the United States” (Stolle & Hooghe 2005, 23).

180 This is clearly indicated by the fact that only about 6% of items quoted Finnish government sources (including political parties).
as Finnish STT and German DPA. Meanwhile, *Ilta-Sanomat* relied on Anglo-American news agencies (AP, Reuters), news channels (CNN) and newspapers (e.g. the *Sun*). *Helsingin Sanomat* also used wire copy (a mix of Anglo-American and non-American news agencies) but its own correspondents, including one reporter embedded with the US forces, allowed it greater autonomy than the other Finnish newspapers had.

Like the UK newspapers, the *Irish Times* had adequate resources to cover the war quite independently. However, the *Irish Independent* largely depended on UK newspapers to provide international coverage of the war. It should be mentioned, however, that since the war divided the UK press, a mixture of articles from the *Independent/Independent News Service, Times* and *Daily Telegraph* did not provide uniformly pro-war views.
Chapter 8

THE FALL OF BAGHDAD AND THE RISE OF ANARCHY, 10 – 16 APRIL

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter will analyse how the newspapers covered the fall of the Iraqi polity as the US forces penetrated into Baghdad. This chapter will follow the familiar pattern by analysing editorial responses to the fall of Baghdad, sourcing, and direction of arguments pertinent to the situation.

By early April, the Coalition forces had reached the outskirts of Baghdad. The much feared Republican Guard, Saddam's elite forces, had evaporated and it began to seem that there was not going to be "another Stalingrad" – fierce and bloody street-by-street fighting – promised by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz close to the 60th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad's in February. On 8 April, the US forces penetrated into the heart of Baghdad and an American Abrams main battle tank shelled the Palestine Hotel killing two journalists and seriously injuring three others. According to the US army, the tank responded to sniper fire from the building which the journalists have denied. A French camera team happened to be shooting during the incident and it did not record anything that indicates sniper fire. Since it was widely known that international journalists were staying in the Palestine Hotel, the shelling raised suspicions that the attack was deliberate. Earlier on the same day, Abu Dhabi TV facilities and Al-Jazeera's Baghdad office were bombed killing an Al-Jazeera journalist and wounding another (Herman 2005, 10-11). This was reminiscent of what happened in Kabul during the Afghan campaign just year and a half before. Al-Jazeera's Kabul office was bombed by the US even though the building was well-known to host Al-Jazeera's office. Having interviewed top US officials for his book (The One Percent Doctrine), investigative journalist Ron Suskind concluded that the attacks on Al-Jazeera had been deliberate (Sparks 2007b, 228).
In the morning of April 9th, the Iraqi minders of international journalists did not show up to work indicating that the Iraqi polity had ceased to exist (Seierstad 2004, 262). Later that day, the toppling of the Saddam statue at Firdos Square in Baghdad provided perhaps the most iconic images of the Iraq War. Having failed to topple the statue themselves, jubilant Iraqis watched as the US soldiers brought down the statue consolidating the Coalition claims that the Iraqi people would welcome regime change and greet coalition forces as liberators rather than occupiers. It has been suggested that the toppling of the Saddam statue was a stage-managed event for international journalists residing in the near-by Palestine Hotel. David Perlmutter (2005, 120) claims that what happened on Firdos Square “was in essence a photo-op by the U.S. military, with participants invited in and the area closed off.” Some have even argued that reporters and photographers accounted for one third of the crowd in the square (Major & Perlmutter 2005, 42). According to Knightley (2003, 544), at least some of the Iraqis in the square were members of controversial exiled opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi’s Free Iraqi Forces. This suggests that it might have not been a spontaneous celebration of ‘liberation’ but that these members of Iraqi opposition were transported there by US forces for the display in front of the international media residing in the near-by Palestine Hotel (Major & Perlmutter 2005, 42).

Previous research would suggest that the media responded enthusiastically to the images of the falling statue. Larry Kaplow of Cox Newspapers argues that the Iraqis were not exactly welcoming the American troops as they entered Baghdad on 9 April and that many of the reporters in the city “picked up on the first day a lot of very ambivalent feelings, and those feelings were basically completely overwhelmed by the images and, most important, the superficial event that took place that day—the statue being taken down, the Americans taking over the city” (Hoyt et al 2007, 24). Aday, Cluverius and Livingston (2005, 327) argue that television news networks’ “continued replaying of close-up images of the statue falling gave the false impression that masses of Iraqis participated, that such scenes were typical and representative of the state of the war, and that the Iraqi people unflinchingly welcomed the Americans as liberators.” Their study also shows that the Fox News Channel and the CNN adopted a “victory” frame after the toppling of the statue and the number of stories focusing on combat dropped dramatically despite the fact that the fighting still continued and Saddam's home town Tikrit fell only a few days later.

Major and Perlmutter (2005, 43) argue that the media helped to legitimise the war by conveying a pictures of jubilant Iraqis welcoming the regime change while ignoring other
aspects of the fragile situation in the country. While the Saddam statue was toppled on the eastern side of the Tigris River, fighting still continued on the western side (Rampton & Stauber 2006, 165). However, the media tended to ignore this side of the event even though in retrospect it would have given the audiences a better understanding of what was to come. Major and Perlmutter (2005, 42) argue that as a result of several US attacks on journalists “many journalists not embedded with the U.S. military were pinned down under fire and were not present when the statue was taken down.” They also question whether the toppling of the statue had any real news value and point out that few days later 20,000 Iraqis protested against the US occupation in Nasiriyah in southern Iraq but this did not receive extensive media coverage.

Nevertheless, the looting that followed the fall of the Iraqi polity was widely covered. In fact, it was covered so extensively that, in a press conference on 11 April, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (2003) argued that:

“I picked up a newspaper and I couldn’t believe it. I read eight headlines that talked about chaos, violence, unrest. And it was just Henny Penny -’The sky is falling.’ I have never seen anything like it! And here is a country that is being liberated, here are people who are going from being repressed and held under thumb of a vicious dictator, and they're free.”

Clearly, Rumsfeld was not pleased with the media coverage. Rumsfeld gave examples of what kind of journalism he would prefer: pictures with captions portraying Iraqis welcoming the US troops. He ridiculed the media by arguing that the same footage of a looter carrying a stolen vase was aired so many times that there weren't even that many vases in the whole of Baghdad. He implied that the media gave a wrong impression of the magnitude of the looting and disorder (Woodward 2007, 164-165).

Although the anti-war countries had failed to stop the US/UK from attacking Iraq, the stakes remained high. It was still unclear who would eventually benefit from the war, decide who would govern in Iraq and who would have access to lucrative reconstruction deals and oil resources. On 11-12 April, Vladimir Putin, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder held a two-day summit in St Petersburg to discuss how to best guard their interests in Iraq. Kremlin, for instance, had considerable interests in Baghdad as Iraq owed $8 billion to Russia. The leaders of the three anti-war countries demanded that the UN Security Council should be given the responsibility to organise the reconstruction and political transition. In effect, surrendering the issue to the UN would have meant that France, China and Russia could veto significant decisions and the US would not be able to control Iraq's political future and hand out reconstruction deals to American firms and
reward its allies. On 9 April, Rumsfeld announced that retired US General Jay Garner, who had been appointed as the head of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in January 2003, would lead the reconstruction effort. Few days later (15 April), Garner chaired the negotiations on an interim government with Iraqi opposition and religious groups outside Nasiriyah and the political reconstruction of Iraq began under US control – and without UN participation.

On 17 April, EU member states issued a statement in Athens which “called for increased involvement in post-war Iraq by the United Nations, a central UN role in the transitional process toward self-government by the Iraqi people” (European Union 2003). However, the cautiousness of the statement indicated that France and Germany were not willing to strain their relations with Washington any further.

8.2 ANALYSIS OF THE COVERAGE

A total of 864 items, which were published between 10 and 16 April, were included in the sample. The Finnish newspapers published a total of 203 items, Irish newspapers 201 and the UK newspapers 460. It is worth noting that the Irish Independent published 23 items from the Times (of London), 22 from the Daily Telegraph and 26 from the Independent News Service.

8.2.1 Editorial responses to the fall of Baghdad

In a commentary piece ('Conquered people are not free', 16 April), Helsingin Sanomat's Sami Sillanpää argued that the "US has assured that the Iraq War is by no means about oil. If the Iraqis were allowed to decide on their natural resources from the beginning, it would lend credibility to this claim." He also argued that the occupiers have an obligation to withdraw as soon as possible noting that, if the aggressors were any other states than the US and Britain, the UN Security Council would be in the process of passing a resolution against the illegal occupation. In response to Rumsfeld's statement that the US is not responsible for the looting of the National Museum in Baghdad, an editorial in Helsingin Sanomat ('The US is responsible', 15.4.) insisted that the invaders are responsible for all the events in the country. In an earlier editorial HS also stated that the invaders were responsible for any civilian casualties since they chose to go to war in the absence of a compelling reason. At the same time, HS defended the French position and expressed doubts about Bush administration's real motives:
The Americans and the Brits have attempted to label France as the guilty party for the whole war because it did not stick with them. This accusation is absurd. Countries that wanted the war have changed the justifications and goals of the war all the time in a way that shows that the decision to go to war had been made long time ago.

While *Helsingin Sanomat*'s opinion items were largely critical of the invasion, an unusually pro-US letter-to-the-editor was published on 16 April. It was written by Jutta Ziliacus, a former MP of the Swedish National Party (RKP), who defended the US position on Iraq by referring to the cruelty of the Iraqi leader and the inefficiency of the UN weapons inspections. She suggested that the anti-war stance of Russia, France and Germany is due to their selfish interests in Iraq.

*Turun Sanomat* adopted perhaps even a firmer stance than *Helsingin Sanomat*. On 12 April, an editorial in *Turun Sanomat* argued that 'Anarchy and chaos have replaced Saddam's dictatorship in Iraq':

> "The US attempt to unilaterally decide on Iraq's governance and reconstruction has created resentment elsewhere in the world. Especially Germany, France and Russia – which opposed the war – have demanded a dominating role for the UN in the Iraqi reconstruction. The demand is well-founded and would probably lead to the best result with regard to Iraq's future even though it would not be solely based on consideration of Iraqi interests. Each country has its own interests to safeguard and, in the above-mentioned countries, a UN-led reconstruction is best seen to secure them."

This editorial was perhaps more moderate than the ones TS had ran in the past few days. On 9 April, an editorial demanded a strong role for the UN in the reconstruction effort. On 5 April, *Turun Sanomat* editor-in-chief Aimo Massinen argued that the US had lost the media war in Europe. He argued that the justifications for the war have no grounds and that George W. Bush, Tony Blair and the Danish Prime Minister should be tried for crimes against humanity. At the same time, he characterised the Finnish Iraq policy as “cautious complaining” but acknowledged that it could be a “wise” approach. TS also published an opinion piece by Pirkka Kivenheimo under the heading 'The worst fears of the Iraq War did not materialise'. He implies that the US might have known that Iraq did not possess WMD anymore and, hence, dared to launch the invasion. It would be safe to conclude that *Turun Sanomat*'s editorial policy on the Iraq War was highly critical but it accepted the Finnish government's policy which regarded the war "regrettable".

*Ilta-Sanomat* also carried critical tones in its opinion items. A letter-to-the-editor ('USA and the Great Britain apart from the UN', 11 April) argued that the UN should sanction the

181On 2 April, TS published yet another editorial ('The Iraq War is not accepted') on Iraq discussing fresh survey data which indicated that ¾ of Finns disapproved of the war.
aggressors who invaded another country without UN authorisation. On 12 April, an editorial ('Iraq is a test to the UN') demanded UN participation in the political reconstruction of Iraq. Ilta-Sanomat ran a commentary by Jouko Juonala ('Peace is yet to be won', 10 April) who argued that there is no point in arguing about the justification of the invasion any more. The humanitarian situation and anarchy are more urgent problems before the unprecedented challenge of rebuilding the country. Ilta-Sanomat also presented the views of a university professor, Jaakko Hämeeen-Anttila, who warned that the war is likely to continue as separate attacks against the coalition forces. He argued that these attacks could continue as long as the troops stay in Iraq. Ruben Stiller, a well-known Finnish journalist, expressed very rare views in the Finnish press coverage of the war. He implied that the popular anti-war sentiment was due to the fact that “a wrong country chose to defend the oppressed”. In other words, he claimed that anti-Americanism was to blame for the Finns' disapproval of the war.

The opinion material published by the Finnish newspapers was largely critical of the invasion and how it was executed. Moreover, apart from Helsingin Sanomat, the Finnish newspapers demanded that the UN should be given a central role in Iraq. The Finnish foreign policy with regard to Iraq was hardly discussed at all although it was – arguably – the deciding factor in the general elections less than a month before. Only one letter-to-the-editor openly criticised Finland's foreign policy line for being too cautious.

The Irish Times published an editorial on Iraq on 12 April ('Bringing peace and order to Iraq'). The editorial argued that the "legitimation of the new Iraqi regime must come through the United Nations. [...] Mr Tony Blair's call for a post-war United Nations conference on Iraq's future is the best way to secure their support and establish regional and global legitimacy for a new Iraqi government.” The Irish Times' also ran an opinion piece by Noel Dorr, a former Secretary-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, who argued for a reform of the UN (’Yes, we do need the UN, but a reformed UN’, 15 April).

In a commentary piece ('Selective symbolism', Irish Times 12 April), Eddie Holt contrasted the pictures of the falling statue and Ali Ismaeel Abbas – a 12-year-old who lost both his arms and his family to “US-British weapons of mass destruction”. Holt ends his highly critical commentary by arguing that

“Millions of Arabs, even those who opposed Saddam Hussein's regime, did not see Wednesday's spectacle of symbolically toppling the tyrant as it was reported in the West. This
is a new colonialism,’ one Palestinian told Britain's *Independent* newspaper. 'The Americans
did not come as liberators but to take control of Iraq's oil.' We will see. Perhaps the Iraqis, once
they stop looting, lynching or barricading themselves in their homes, will be 'given back their
country'. But bombing Iraq to get rid of a dictator they backed in the first place, while
shamelessly awarding lucrative rebuilding contracts to pals, doesn't inspire much confidence in
US-British intentions - real or even symbolic.”

Vincent Browne's opinion piece in the *Irish Times*, 'A selective attitude to suffering' (16
April), questioned the sincerity of the US/UK motives to attack Iraq:

“How is it that the humanitarian crusaders of our day, the Americans and the British, who have
waged war on Iraq for the humanitarian objective of liberating the people of Iraq, don't seem a
little bit bothered about humanitarian causes elsewhere in the world? The disarmament alibi for
the war on Iraq is now irrelevant, apparently. Iraq either had no weapons of mass destruction
or, if it had, was not prepared to use them, even in the most dire of circumstances. That is the
same as having no weapons of mass destruction.

So the war has got to have been about humanitarianism. Touching. Even if it involved the
slaughter of thousands of Iraqis, the devastation of its society and infrastructure, mass
starvation and lawlessness. Even if the majority of Iraqis did not want to be liberated by the
Americans. Even if it destablises what passes for a world order, terrifies people around the
globe - the Syrians in the first instance - and breeds a new and more cynical colonialism.”

Although the opinion pieces were mostly critical of the war in the *Irish Times*, Kevin
Myers's regular column, 'An Irishman's Diary', expressed very pro-war views or, more
specifically, views that were against the anti-war movement. On 11 April, Myers demanded
an apology from the anti-war movement together with an acknowledgement that they were
wrong.

“So no rejoicing from them that freedom has come to the people of Iraq, courtesy of the
greatest democracies in the world. No rejoicing that Saddam's torture chambers are closing. No
rejoicing that murder and rape have been banished as instruments of state. No rejoicing that
just 15,000 American soldiers liberated a city of 5 million people, and a couple of thousand
British (and Irish) troops freed the million people of Basra. NIMNs [Not In My Name] are
pathetic people, about a pathetic purpose, one that survives in Ireland because of the
extraordinary numbers of NIMNs and NWFOs [No War For Oil] in the Irish media. They were
wrong on the first Gulf War, wrong on Afghanistan, wrong on this war. They'll be wrong on the
next one. You see.”

On 15 April, Myers targeted film-maker Michael Moore and,182 a day later, his column
followed the usual pattern of critisising and ridiculing the anti-war movement by picking
on a nude protest by female anti-war activists.

182Myers argued: “He belongs to that spectrum of opinion in the US, in Britain and here
which dominates the media, which hails Noam Chomsky as an intellectual guru, and
which gets everything wrong. Why are such people so popular? They got it wrong on
the first Gulf War, they got it wrong on Bosnia, they got it wrong on Kosovo, they got it
wrong on Afghanistan. And they never say oops, sorry.”

195
Like the *Irish Times*, the *Irish Independent/Sunday Independent* presented a range of views in its opinion pieces. An editorial in the *Sunday Independent*, 'A good week in terrorism' (13 April), was a condemning critique of the invasion:

“It's not about liberation. And it's not about statues. And it's not over. It's about strategic interests, oil and blood. Always has been, always will be. Iraq is one bloody link in a long bloody chain. [...] On April 7, four 2,000lb missiles were dropped on the Al-Mansour residential area of Baghdad, on a restaurant where Saddam was expected. I have no idea if he was killed, nor do I care. It's hard to know who or how many you kill in such circumstances, but it's believed that between nine and 14 civilians were turned to mush on that occasion. Whatever you call it, that's terrorism. Whether the missiles dropped on the Al-Shaab and Al-Nasser markets were similar efforts, I don't know, but I do know that dozens of civilians were shredded. I know there were countless similar 'strikes'.

Some may choose to believe that Bush, Rumsfeld and Cheney set out to 'liberate' Iraq. There is no history of such laudable crusades. What there is, is a history of installing, supporting or removing local thugs, as required to protect the West's commercial and strategic interests. This history takes in Chile, Iran, South Africa etc - throw a dart at a map of the world and whatever you hit will leak blood.

[...] The USA and Britain want to get out of Iraq as soon as they can establish a dependable regime. That regime will if necessary be defended from the vile designs of democratic tendencies that threaten our interests. [...] That defence may involve propping up local thugs who torture their citizens, or it may require a form of terrorism that pulps thousands of people in the course of putting manners on the local thug. [...] Right now, angered people are researching likely targets, consulting airline schedules and assuring themselves that what they are about is not terrorism but liberation. It was a good week for terrorism. Unfortunately, it ensures that there will be a great many more such weeks. ”

These critical views were balanced by other commentary pieces in the *Sunday Independent* which expressed contempt toward the anti-war movement and France. For instance, Eilis O'Hanlon and Jody Corcoran ('Lefty gloom-mongers who had a bad war') ridiculed some predictions by “trendy liberal lefties”.

"'The disaster is unmitigated,' proclaimed Tin Tin [Fintan] O'Toole in *The Irish Times*. 'We owe them the truth that the quick, clean war they wanted to fight has already been lost and the slow, brutal one they are now fighting cannot be won, even when Saddam is dead and Baghdad is occupied.' Tell that to the thousands who celebrated his removal.”

Instead of glorifying the coalition war effort, Robert Fisk's reports from Baghdad typically focused on the human suffering resulting from the US/UK invasion. In a report headlined 'Joy as the statue comes down but Saddam remains elusive' (*Irish Independent* 10 April) he wrote that “[i]t was a day that began with shellfire and air strikes and blood-battered hospitals”.¹⁸³ The next day (11 April), Robert Fisk continued his critical coverage with a story headlined 'Tank fire massacre on road to capital'. In addition to Robert Fisk, Rupert Cornwell expressed concern about the fragile regional stability ('It's only the end of the beginning of Iraqi agony', the *Irish Independent* 14 April):

¹⁸³ According to the Red Cross, only three of Baghdad's 35 hospitals remained operational despite the looting and violence that followed the fall of Baghdad (Edwards & Cromwell 2006, 53).
“Many of us who opposed the war did so because we believed the risks to regional stability outweighed the potential gains. Nothing so far has changed that judgment; indeed Turkey’s behaviour, the current chaos in Iraq and the American sabre-rattling against Syria only confirm it.”

Both Irish newspapers expressed both pro-war and anti-war views in their opinion items. The most notable difference to the Finnish press seemed to be the strong polarisation of opinion. Especially commentators/columnists holding pro-war views expressed very hostile attitudes toward those who had opposed the invasion. Moreover, some of them targeted the Irish public broadcasting company RTE for the way it covered the war\textsuperscript{184} – an issue which also drew considerable attention in the \textit{Daily Telegraph} which harshly criticised the BBC’s war coverage. This discussion was lacking in the Finnish press coverage.

A leading article in the \textit{Independent}, 'Now the war is over, the world must put aside its differences and work to help Iraq' (April 12), adopted a rather neutral position which is best reflected in the final paragraph:

“the anti-war countries are asked to accept whatever role for the UN in Iraq the US is prepared to grant it. However undesirable, that is the reality. It is pointless to quibble, if the US now wants to define the UN’s ‘vital role’ as an advisory one. What matters is that as many countries as possible work together to help the Iraqi people, and then to help them take control of their own destiny.”

In another leading article, 'It may be years before the US and Britain know what they have unleashed in Iraq', the \textit{Independent} called for restrain from premature triumphalism. On 15 April, the Independent published yet another leading article on Iraq ('Justice should be meted out by the Iraqi people, not by the victors') which focussed on the issue of how to deal with people who had served Saddam's dictatorship.

\textit{Independent}'s Johann Hari continued to defend the invasion on 11 April ('The lesson of this conflict: America can be a force for good in the world'). Moreover, a few days later, Hari

\textsuperscript{184}An American diplomat, Patrick Dempsey, blamed sections of Irish press and broadcasters for anti-Americanism singling out RTE and the \textit{Irish Times} for their coverage of the Gulf War. With regard to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the diplomat argued that "Irish attention seemed preoccupied with questions of Ireland's neutrality, as though there was a moral case to be made in support of Saddam's contention that Western 'imperialism' was behind it all" (quoted in McDonald 2004). Sean Phelan (2005, 182), who has analysed Irish media (RTE 9 pm news bulletin and the front pages of the \textit{Irish Times} and the \textit{Sunday Independent}) coverage of the Iraq War, has also argued that ”some high-profile Irish media are disposed towards anti-American stances".
downplayed the looting ('The looting is ugly, but it's better than torture', 15 April) arguing that

"much of what we have been seeing is a spontaneous redistribution of wealth from the disgusting, corrupt elite who thrived under Saddam towards the wider population. Very few of the people with riches in Iraq today possess them because they have worked hard, or have any skill or talent. They have comfortable houses and stocked fridges because they were especially willing to point out the 'disloyalty' of their fellow Iraqis.

[...]The attempt, however, to interpret the current troubles as a sign that Iraq is about to descend into civil war reveals an absurd negativism on the part of people who always opposed removing Saddam by US force. Some people (and I accept they are a minority among those who opposed the war) would rather the Iraqi people suffered again than be forced to rethink their own prejudices about American power."

Most of the other commentaries in the Independent did not share Hari's enthusiasm of the 'liberation'. Deborah Orr wrote that "there is no more agreement on how to win the peace than there was on whether to wage war. The US may have believed that it wanted to spread democracy. Instead it has spread dissent and resentment, in a world fractured by three weeks of folly" ('The chilling metaphor of Saddam's statue', 11 April). Adrian Hamilton continued in the same tone and laid out his analysis of the situation ('The obscenity of bickering over death and torture', 11 April):

"America's security interests, at least as interpreted by Bush, Rumsfeld and Cheney, require an Iraq not so much run by the US as obedient to its interests. The Pentagon needs military bases in the centre of the Arab world, Cheney wants to break the power over oil of OPEC and Saudi Arabia and Rumsfeld wants an Arab world that is no longer a threat to Israel or to America. Iraq can provide the bases, the oil flow (including a pipeline to Israel) and the pressure points against Iran and Syria."

In addition, the Independent published a transcription of Tony Blair's televised speech to the Iraqi people ('Tony Blair: We did not want this war', 11 April). It is safe to conclude that the Independent continued to express both and pro-war and anti-war views in its opinion pieces.

The Daily Telegraph's opinion items were largely supportive of the war, i.e. they emphasised the depravity of the Ba'ath government and downplayed the humanitarian cost of the invasion and its potential to destabilise the region. For instance, a leading article in

| 185 Hari, who was the Independent's pro-war voice later did a U-turn. In 2006, Hari ('After three years, after 150,000 dead, why I was wrong about Iraq', 18 March 2006, Independent) wrote that “the truth is that there was no pure Platonic ideal of The Perfect Invasion to support, no abstract idea we lent our names to. There was only Bush, with his cluster bombs, depleted uranium, IMF-ed up economic model, bogus rationale and unmistakable stench of petrol, offering his war, his way. [...] The evidence should have been clear to me all along: the Bush administration would produce a disaster. [...] The Bush administration was primarily motivated by a desire to secure strategic access to one of the world's major sources of oil.” |
the *Daily Telegraph* ('A grateful world', 16 April) argued that “the war to rid the world of a dictator who threatened the security of free peoples everywhere is at an end. Our first duty now is to give thanks to those who brought that victory about.” After expressing gratitude to the men and women in uniform, the article noted that

”[w]e should also remember the scientists and arms manufacturers who developed the smart weapons that made victory so certain. They were the ones who gave us our technological edge and so ensured that civilian casualties could be kept to the minimum. The British public are entitled to congratulate themselves, too. At first they were reluctant to go to war, as peace-lovers always are. But as the case was properly made to them, they rallied behind our troops.”

John Keegan's commentary piece ('The allies got it so right: how did the pundits get it so wrong?', *Daily Telegraph* 11 April) downplayed the potential risks of the invasion and seemed to assume that the conflict was over:

“perfectly sensible people, who surely know better, clutter up their minds with such irrelevant factors as 'the Arab street', 'international opinion', the anti-war movement at home, votes in the UN and so on. They then predict that 'American success is not certain', 'this could be a long and bitter war' and 'the spectre of Vietnam looms over George W Bush'.”

8.2.2 Sourcing

What is perhaps surprising in the data presented in the table 8.2, is that Iraqi sources were quoted in 1/3 of the items and much more frequently than US government or US military sources. While the Finnish and Irish governments had argued all along that the Iraq issue should be solved through the UN and the Blair government tried to persuade the Bush administration to grant the UN "a central role" in the reconstruction of the country, the data also indicates that the UN had been sidelined by the events. UN sources were quoted only in 3% of the items included in the sample.

The data indicates that the Finnish press did not emphasise Iraqi or UN views although the Finnish foreign policy had all along been based on the centrality of the UN in dealing with Iraq. On the other hand, the Finnish newspapers also quoted the US government (13% of items) and US military sources (12%) less frequently than the British and the Irish press. Ilta-Sanomat and *Turun Sanomat* did not have their own correspondents in Iraq and this affected their ability to present Iraqi views. The other newspapers quoted regularly Iraqi sources ranging from randomly picked civilians on the streets to religious leaders and Kurdish fighters in the north of the country. For instance, the *Irish Times* published 18

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186 *Turun Sanomat* was the only newspaper which did not quote US/UK military sources at all. TS cited Iraqi sources in four items (two of which quoted government sources, one military and one cited an Iraqi exile).
articles which were filed from Iraq. Lara Marlowe in Baghdad, Jack Fairweather in Basra and Lynne O'Donnell in Northern Iraq provided extensive coverage from the ground.

Table 8.1. Quoted sources by newspaper, 10-16 April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Iraqi sources</th>
<th>UN sources</th>
<th>Aid agencies</th>
<th>US govt</th>
<th>US military</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat</td>
<td>38 (33%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
<td>5 (4%)</td>
<td>12 (10%)</td>
<td>15 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat</td>
<td>2 (9%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 (17%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat</td>
<td>14 (22%)</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>10 (16%)</td>
<td>10 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td><strong>54 (27%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 (1%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 (3%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>26 (13%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>25 (12%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>98 (39%)</td>
<td>7 (3%)</td>
<td>13 (5%)</td>
<td>39 (16%)</td>
<td>37 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>58 (27%)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
<td>5 (2%)</td>
<td>41 (19%)</td>
<td>37 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td><strong>156 (34%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>12 (3%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>18 (4%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>80 (17%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>74 (16%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent</td>
<td>39 (36%)</td>
<td>4 (4%)</td>
<td>3 (3%)</td>
<td>28 (26%)</td>
<td>27 (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times</td>
<td>36 (38%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 (1%)</td>
<td>16 (17%)</td>
<td>10 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td><strong>75 (37%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 (3%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 (2%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>44 (22%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>37 (18%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>285 (33%)</td>
<td>22 (3%)</td>
<td>29 (3%)</td>
<td>150 (17%)</td>
<td>136 (16%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8.2.3 Salience of critical topics in press coverage

Were there national differences in the salience given to different aspects of the Iraq War? Was the Finnish press more sensitive to anarchy and looting or civilian casualties in comparison to the British press? Quantitative content analysis does not validate the hypothesis that the government's foreign policy line would be directly reflected in the selection (or avoidance) of topics that highlight the negative aspects of the invasion.

Table 8.2. Number of items with references to lawlessness and humanitarian concerns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>looting and anarchy</th>
<th>humanitarian crisis</th>
<th>humanitarian aid</th>
<th>civilian casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=116)</td>
<td>38 (33.0%)</td>
<td>12 (10.4%)</td>
<td>15 (12.9%)</td>
<td>13 (11.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=23)</td>
<td>2 (8.7%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (26.1%)</td>
<td>3 (13.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=64)</td>
<td>14 (21.9%)</td>
<td>5 (7.9%)</td>
<td>4 (6.3%)</td>
<td>8 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=203)</td>
<td><strong>54 (26.7%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>17 (8.5%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>25 (12.3%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>24 (11.9%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (n=245)</td>
<td>98 (40.2%)</td>
<td>21 (8.6%)</td>
<td>25 (10.2%)</td>
<td>50 (20.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (n=216)</td>
<td>59 (27.6%)</td>
<td>18 (8.3%)</td>
<td>13 (6.0%)</td>
<td>29 (13.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=461)</td>
<td><strong>157 (34.3%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>39 (8.5%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>38 (8.3%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>79 (17.2%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent (n=107)</td>
<td>39 (36.4%)</td>
<td>14 (13.2%)</td>
<td>7 (6.5%)</td>
<td>20 (18.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times (n=97)</td>
<td>36 (37.1%)</td>
<td>13 (13.5%)</td>
<td>12 (12.5%)</td>
<td>19 (19.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=201)</td>
<td><strong>75 (37.3%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>27 (13.5%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>19 (9.5%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>39 (19.4%)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=865)</td>
<td>286 (33.2%)</td>
<td>83 (9.7%)</td>
<td>82 (9.5%)</td>
<td>142 (16.5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data presented in table 8.3 does not seem to support the hypothesis that the Finnish press would have covered critical themes more extensively than its British and Irish
counterparts although humanitarian aid featured slightly more frequently. In fact, the Irish press paid the most attention to looting/anarchy, the humanitarian situation and civilian casualties.\textsuperscript{187} If the \textit{Sunday Tribune} had been included in the quantitative analysis, the difference would have been even more prominent. On 13 April, the \textit{Sunday Tribune} ran the following headlines which illustrate well the newspaper's stance on the war: 'Saddam falls but anarchy rules the day', "'We can easily win the fight but lose the war'", 'Horrors of war replaced by the nightmare of a nation starving', 'Iraq has become a nation humiliated, not liberated' and 'The end justifies the means? Tell that to the maimed and the dead'.

These results of the quantitative analysis cannot be explained with the manufacturing consent paradigm as there does not seem to be a clear correlation between the government policy line and the selection of topics in the press coverage. The UK newspapers clearly differed from each other again. The \textit{Daily Telegraph} paid much less attention to looting and anarchy and civilian casualties than the \textit{Independent} reflecting their editorial positions on the war. The notable difference between \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} in comparison to \textit{Turun Sanomat} and \textit{Ilta-Sanomat} could be explained by the fact that, on average, the latter publish shorter articles and, therefore, cover fewer topics per item. \textit{Ilta-Sanomat} is a tabloid newspaper and \textit{Turun Sanomat} is a regional newspaper which is a full-service newspaper but lacks the kind of resources that \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} has for international coverage. Consequently, \textit{Turun Sanomat} did not file any reports from the country but \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} filed 17 reports from Iraq. \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} was the only Finnish medium which had an embedded journalist, Petteri Tuohinen, with the US troops.\textsuperscript{188} His reports carried headlines such as 'Destruction and death in Baghdad' (11 April), 'Looting spiralled out of control even in Baghdad's hospitals' (12 April), 'Baghdad struggles to survive on canned food stock' (15 April) and 'Tikrit still vows in the name of Saddam' (16 April).

Meanwhile, \textit{Ilta-Sanomat} continued to rely heavily on Anglo-American news agencies (AP, Reuters) and Åsne Seierstad – a Norwegian journalist whose reports were widely published by Scandinavian newspapers. Åsne Seierstad's report from Baghdad ('At last one can speak freely', \textit{Ilta-Sanomat} 10 April) included views of several Iraqi civilians who

\textsuperscript{187}Iraqi civilian casualties entered the national political agenda in Ireland when the Labour Party demanded that the government should pressure the EU take up the task of investigating how many civilians had lost their lives in the war. This partly explains the high number of items on civilian casualties.

\textsuperscript{188}Tuohinen replaced Sami Sillanpää as \textit{Helsingin Sanomat}'s embedded journalist in early April (see \textit{Helsingin Sanomat} 5 April).
were glad that Saddam's rule had come to an end.\textsuperscript{189} Out of 49 items that \textit{Ilta-Sanomat} published on Iraq, 17 acknowledged solely Anglo-American news agencies as sources. In comparison, French AFP was only acknowledged in one item. Previous research indicates that the criticism of the US/UK invasion could be more prominent in editorials and opinion pieces than actual news coverage because the latter often rely on Anglo-American sources and media organisations (Mucungunzi 2005, Kupe & Hyde-Clarke 2005). Therefore, the low number of opinion items on the Iraq War in \textit{Ilta-Sanomat} (only three during the week following the fall of Baghdad) explains why some of the critical themes did not receive as extensive coverage as they did in some of the other newspapers.

Finally, it should be noted that, although references to looting/anarchy were considered as negative aspects of the war in the development of the coding protocol, some journalists saw the looting in a rather positive light – as did Rumsfeld. For instance, Andrew Buncombe's report from Baghdad ('Few mourn loss of leader in the poorer Shia quarter', the \textit{Independent} 10 April) argued:

"While the looting is something the US and British forces are keen to stop as soon as possible, there appears to be nothing menacing about it. It seems people are looting almost as a form of celebration, making the most of a power vacuum which they have never before experienced. The looting has been almost entirely from military and government premises rather than private homes."

\textbf{8.2.4 Direction of arguments}

Another way in which differences in press coverage could be measured is the incidence in which certain arguments appeared in the coverage. However, counting the number of times certain arguments, such as the Bush administration's claim that the Iraqi people would welcome the regime change, does not tell anything about the manner in which they appeared. Consequently, the coding protocol differentiated between the cases in which the argument was challenged in some way from the ones that merely invoked the claim.

As can be seen in table 8.3, the \textit{Irish Times} and \textit{Turun Sanomat} keenly endorsed stronger UN role in Iraq. (At this stage of the conflict, the discussion about the role of the UN in Iraq related to political and economic reconstruction and, to a lesser degree, the return of the UN weapons inspections to finish their work in Iraq.) Equally striking is the low

\textsuperscript{189}\textit{Ilta-Sanomat} also ran an article ('The toppler of the statue became a hero') on a US soldier who climbed on the statue to help bring it down. Critical tones were expressed in articles headlined 'Little Ali's hospital was looted', 'The Finnish embassy was looted in Baghdad' and 'The number of victims will remain a mystery'.

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number of items in which the Daily Telegraph and Ilta-Sanomat dealt with the role of the UN. Although it was becoming increasingly clear that the alleged casus belli, i.e. WMD, would never be found, Ilta-Sanomat made only one reference to the issue. The newspapers to question the existence of Iraqi WMD most frequently were the Independent and the Irish Times.

Table 8.3. The role of the UN and Iraqi WMD in press coverage, 10-16 April

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argument that there should be a UN solution in Iraq</th>
<th>Argument that Iraq has WMD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invoked</td>
<td>Questioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat</td>
<td>12 (10%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat</td>
<td>7 (30%)</td>
<td>3 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND</td>
<td>21 (10%)</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>22 (9%)</td>
<td>8 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>8 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>30 (7%)</td>
<td>10 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent</td>
<td>4 (4%)</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times</td>
<td>25 (27%)</td>
<td>5 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND</td>
<td>29 (15%)</td>
<td>7 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80 (9%)</td>
<td>20 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Finnish press seemed the least concerned about the Iraqi opinions on the desirability of the regime change through foreign invasion while the Irish newspapers dealt with the issue by far the most frequently (table 8.4). All newspapers invoked the argument that the Iraqi people will welcome regime change more frequently than they questioned it.

One of the arguments to justify the war was that it would spread democracy and this was the most commonly invoked implication of the invasion in the press coverage during this period of analysis (table 8.4). However, this argument did not feature very prominently in the press coverage although the obstacles to creating a stable democracy in Iraq were acknowledged in several articles such as Hamish McRae's ('Massive oil wealth factor fuels race to rebuild Iraq', Irish Independent 16 April): “the region is unstable and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Whatever view you take about the balance of blame, the fact remains that external instability makes the creation of a viable, orderly, enduring state vastly more difficult.”

The Finnish press put the least emphasis on the depravity of the Iraqi regime while making positive references to it more frequently than the British and the Irish press (table 8.5).
Meanwhile the nature of the Iraqi government featured the most prominently in the *Irish Times* where nearly one third of the analysed items made a reference to the cruelty and/or aggression of the Iraqi government.

Table 8.4. *Iraqi views on the regime change and democratisation of Iraq/Middle East in the press*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>The argument that the Iraqis will welcome regime change</th>
<th>The argument that the war will lead to a democratisation of Iraq/Middle East</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>invoked</td>
<td>questioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat</td>
<td>16 (14%)</td>
<td>7 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat</td>
<td>2 (9%)</td>
<td>2 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat</td>
<td>8 (13%)</td>
<td>2 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FINLAND</strong></td>
<td>26 (13%)</td>
<td>11 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>37 (15%)</td>
<td>19 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>37 (18%)</td>
<td>13 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td>74 (16%)</td>
<td>32 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent</td>
<td>26 (25%)</td>
<td>10 (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times</td>
<td>23 (25%)</td>
<td>7 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRELAND</strong></td>
<td>49 (25%)</td>
<td>17 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>149 (18%)</td>
<td>60 (7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.5. *Number of items with references to the cruelty/aggression of the Iraqi regime and positive references to the regime*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>References to the Iraqi regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>cruelty/aggression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turun Sanomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FINLAND</strong></td>
<td>36 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent</td>
<td>65 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>60 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td>125 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Independent</td>
<td>28 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Times</td>
<td>34 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRELAND</strong></td>
<td>62 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>223 (26%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No clear national patterns emerge from the data to validate the argument that the medium's host country's foreign policy line is the single most important factor in determining how the media cover international politics. Instead, the differences with regard to the direction of arguments seem to be more closely related to the newspapers' editorial policies.

190References to issues such as the regime being a former Western ally and constructing a well-functioning national health system were coded as 'positive'.

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8.3 CONCLUSION

As suggested in the previous chapters which dealt with earlier stages of the conflict, there were notable differences between newspapers which operated in the same political system. In the case of Britain, the differences were very distinctive and seemed to derive from the newspapers' editorial positions on the war although some of the commentary pieces provided more varied range of opinions. With regard to the Irish newspapers, the opinion pieces were equally diverse and opinions often polarised into pro-war and anti-war camps. Such range of opinions in the press suggests that the coverage does not merely follow the official foreign policy line of the medium's host country as is suggested by the executive version of the manufacturing consent paradigm. Rather, the Irish and British newspapers reflected the divisions within the political elites in their respective countries.

The Finnish press, in turn, expressed pro-war views in its opinion items on very few occasions reflecting the level of national consensus on the war. However, regardless of the united anti-war stance of the government, political elite and the public, the quantitative content analysis does not suggest that the Finnish newspapers would have emphasised Iraqi views, civilian casualties or some of the other critical topics to a greater extent than the British and Irish newspapers. To some extent this could be explained by the fact that neither Ilta-Sanomat nor Turun Sanomat had their own correspondents in Iraq to provide extensive coverage on general lawlessness, casualties, the state of medical care and to interview Iraqi people. Yet, Helsingin Sanomat had presence in Iraq but, according to the qualitative content analysis, it did not strike as being more critical than the British Independent or the Irish Times which operated in a notably different political situation than the Finnish press.191

191Nevertheless, according to Anssi Männistö (2004) 40% of pictures in Helsingin Sanomat depicted civilians and even half of the pictures in the largest regional newspaper Aamulehti.
Chapter 9

THE AFTERMATH, 2 – 8 MAY

9.1 INTRODUCTION

On 1 May, President Bush had his ”Top Gun moment” when he landed on the deck of USS Abraham Lincoln, an aircraft carrier, on the coast of California. He changed from his flight suit and declared the end of ”major combat operations” in Iraq. The carefully staged media event was geared for re-election in 2004. A huge banner with the text ”Mission Accomplished” was waving behind Bush when he praised the US forces who had brought ”freedom” to the Iraqi people (Bush 2003b):

”In this battle, we have fought for the cause of liberty, and for the peace of the world. Our nation and our coalition are proud of this accomplishment -- yet, it is you, the members of the United States military, who achieved it. Your courage, your willingness to face danger for your country and for each other, made this day possible. Because of you, our nation is more secure. Because of you, the tyrant has fallen, and Iraq is free.

In the images of celebrating Iraqis, we have also seen the ageless appeal of human freedom. Decades of lies and intimidation could not make the Iraqi people love their oppressors or desire their own enslavement. Men and women in every culture need liberty like they need food and water and air. Everywhere that freedom arrives, humanity rejoices; and everywhere that freedom stirs, let tyrants fear.”

In the absence of the smoking gun, liberation of the Iraqi people as a justification for the invasion begun to overshadow the WMD issue. Yet, the earlier justifications were not abandoned:

”The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001 -- and still goes on. [...] The liberation of Iraq is a crucial advance in the campaign against terror. We've removed an ally of al Qaeda, and cut off a source of terrorist funding. And this much is certain: No terrorist network will gain weapons of mass destruction from the Iraqi regime, because the regime is no more.”

Despite the lack of evidence on the alleged link between Iraq and al-Qaeda, President Bush kept on insisting that the invasion of Iraq was part of the War on Terror. He also countered claims that the invasion was essentially an imperial war: ”Other nations in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit. Americans, following a battle, want nothing more than to return home.” Indeed, the absence of WMD had begun to fuel the suspicions that the US had other motives to invade Iraq.
During the week following Bush’s speech, it was also reported that Washington was planning to send a former diplomat, Paul Bremer, to take over the US-led Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) from Jay Garner, a former three-star general.\textsuperscript{192} This was part of the infighting within the Bush administration. Similarly on the international level, the major powers continued to twist arms over the future of Iraq and what kind of roles the UN and possibly NATO could play in the country. In addition, on 2 May, EU foreign ministers gathered in Rhodes to discuss EU's role in humanitarian aid efforts as well as UN role in the reconstruction. According to Bush administration plans, Iraq's massive oil reserves were supposed to finance the reconstruction.\textsuperscript{193} The US demanded that all sanctions against Iraq are lifted and, together with the UK, the Bush administration drafted a proposal for the UN Security Council which would give them authority to run the Iraqi economy for a year. To complicate matters further, both French and Russian oil companies had made significant deals with the Iraqi government which the US invasion put in jeopardy. On 8 May, the last day included in the sample, President Bush declared that the US, together with the UK and Spain, were preparing a draft resolution for the UN Security Council to lift the sanctions on Iraq.

Eventually, on 22 May, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1483 which allowed the US to spend Iraq's oil revenue on reconstruction and effectively legalised the occupation. As a concession to France and Russia, the resolution also encouraged the US to "work with" the UN. The role of the UN in Iraq did not become "vital" as Bush and Blair had promised in April. For example, despite Russia's insistence, the US did not allow UN weapons inspectors to return to Iraq to finish their job (Williams 2003). In late May, newly appointed top US envoy Bremer disbanded the Iraqi military forces together with the defence and information ministries leaving hundreds of thousands soldiers and public sector employees unemployed. This contributed to the increasing violence in Iraq later on as many former soldiers joined the insurgency.

\textsuperscript{192}The British newspapers gave a little conflicting reports on Bremer's loyalties. The \textit{Daily Telegraph} wrote: "Mr Bremer is viewed as an ally by several prominent neo-conservatives, the idealistic advocates of enlarging America's role in the world and spreading democracy in the Middle East by military means if necessary" ("Former diplomat to be Iraq ruler", May 3). However, the \textit{Independent} (2 May) took a different view: "The choice, if confirmed, would represent a significant victory for Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, and his embattled department in the running skirmishes with Mr Rumsfeld's Pentagon which has tried - usually successfully - to get its own men into influential posts."

\textsuperscript{193}However, the production has remained at low levels for years after the invasion.
It is worth noting that Irish Times' correspondent Lara Marlowe later argued that “[d]uring the bombardment it was obviously pretty grim, with explosions happening all the time, but in May 2003 when George Bush declared 'Mission Accomplished', things were chaotic, there was looting and arson and those sorts of things going on.”

9.2 THE SAMPLE

Because the number of items during this last period of analysis was rather small, a slightly more qualitative approach has been adopted than in the previous chapters. 283 items published between 2–8 May were included in the sample. The newspapers published between 77 (Independent/Independent on Sunday) and 16 (Turun Sanomat') items on Iraq. The UK newspapers totalled 136 items, Finnish newspapers 87 items and the Irish newspapers 60 items. 213 were categorised as news stories, 31 as letters-to-the-editor and 23 as other opinion pieces. As for the origin of the stories, the UK newspapers had their own correspondents in Iraq who filed about a dozen reports for both newspapers (inclusive of their Sunday editions) within the week period.

The Irish newspapers had very different strategies in international coverage. The Irish Independent relies heavily on UK newspapers. It published 13 stories from the Times, four from the Daily Telegraph and 3 from the Independent News Service. In comparison, the Irish Times ran one story by the Los Angeles Times, which was filed from Baghdad, but mainly relied on its own correspondents Denis Staunton, Conor O'Clery, and others. They contributed nine stories during the week against just three by the Irish Independent's correspondents.

Helsingin Sanomat's superior resources in relation to Turun Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat was reflected in the fact that its foreign correspondents provided 11 reports while IS and TS put together published only one report on Iraq from a foreign correspondent. Therefore, the 194'Iraq' produced 20 hits between 2-8 May in Turun Sanomat's online search engine. After excluding duplicates and stories with only minor references to Iraq, 16 stories were selected for coding. With regard to Turun Sanomat's coverage of the war, it has to be noted that the small number of stories on Iraq is partly explained by the fact that it preferred to publish one long article on Iraq rather than several short stories. For instance, on 8 May, it ran an article ('The post-Saddam chaos prevents Iraq's return to normalcy') which had three subheadlines ('Soldiers are accused of encouraging the looters', 'WHO expects a cholera epidemic', 'A Newspaper: Saddam on a new tape'). Other newspapers tended to deal with these issues in separate articles. Ultimately, the lowest number of stories among all newspapers included in the study is explained by the fact that, as a regional newspaper, its output cannot compete with the larger national newspapers.

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Finnish press depended on news agencies to a greater extent than the British or Irish newspapers. Unlike *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Ilta-Sanomat*, *Turun Sanomat* did not rely on Anglo-American news agencies or other news organisations. TS only referred to Finnish STT and French AFP. In contrast, *Helsingin Sanomat* acknowledged Anglo-American news agencies (AP and Reuters) and newspapers (The *Washington Post*, the *New York Times*) in 15 items. Only 4 items acknowledged either STT, AFP and/or DPA. *Ilta-Sanomat* also used AP, Reuters and other Anglo-American media more than its own correspondents and non-Anglo-American media.

9.3 ANALYSIS OF THE COVERAGE

As discussed in the previous chapters, existing research would suggest that the media tend to cover wars and other foreign policy issues from a national point of view reflecting national foreign policy line and elite opinion (e.g. Dimitrova & Strömbäck 2008). On the other hand, previous research also suggests that media coverage of wars becomes more critical when the fighting is over. The argument goes that it is easier for journalists to pursue critical topics and investigate the events without the constraints imposed on them during the actual war. For instance, David McQueen's (2008, 64) study on BBC's Panorama coverage of the Iraq War supports the “view that it is in the ‘post-war’ phase that ‘critical’ investigative journalism is most likely to take place.” Using Daniel Hallin's (1986) concepts, the war moves from the “sphere of consensus” to the “sphere of legitimate controversy”.\(^{195}\) So, the question is whether the newspapers began to include critical sources and issues to greater extent than during the earlier periods of analysis. Clearly, by early May, it was possible to reflect on the war in a new light. The absence of WMD provided reasonable grounds to re-evaluate how solid the evidence against Iraq was and raise questions on whether the US/UK governments deliberately misled the public. Doubts regarding these issues also lead to the question whether the war was about the weapons of mass destruction in the first place. The differences between the countries and

\(^{195}\)Hallin (1986, 116-117) defines the sphere of consensus in the following way: ”it encompasses those social objects not regarded by the journalists and most of the society as controversial. Within this region journalists do not feel compelled either to present opposing views or to remain disinterested observers. On the contrary, the journalist's role is to serve as an advocate or celebrant of consensus values.” Sphere of legitimate controversy, in turn, is ”the region of electoral contests and legislative debates, of issues recognized as such by the major establishment factors”. Finally, there is the sphere of deviance: ”the realm of those political actors and views which journalists and the political mainstream of the society reject as unworthy of being heard”
media outlets could also be reflected in the salience of topics such as civilian casualties, humanitarian situation and the general lawlessness in Iraq.

9.3.1 Coverage of President Bush's declaration of the "end of combat missions"

President Bush's speech provided several controversial claims which investigative reporters could easily have challenged if they chose to do so. An editorial in Turun Sanomat ("Iraq is moving from the war to the age of reconstruction", 3 May), in accordance with its anti-war editorial policy, took a highly critical stance on Bush's "Mission Accomplished" speech:

"Bush's pompous speech was inflated with words such as freedom, democracy, tyranny and fight against evil, which he likes to use. To large extent, the speech praised the US forces that had took part in the war. Bush stated that the nation and the coalition were proud of what had been accomplished in Iraq.

It is certainly true that very few will miss Saddam Hussein's dictatorship which was based on the violence of the rulers and the fear of the ruled. However, some of the things that happened during the war give no reason for pride including killing of civilians and the looting of priceless museum collections which will remain on American conscience.

The toppling of the Saddam regime as a goal of the war surfaced in a rather late stage. Earlier, the US had emphasised the removal of WMD as a reason. Now that the war has practically come to an end, there is still no sign of the WMD. Many are ready to believe that these weapons do not even exist. In his speech, Bush assured that the Americans will continue to search for them. The justification of the war is highly questionable if the weapons are not eventually found."

Neither Helsingin Sanomat nor Ilta-Sanomat published an editorial directly addressing the speech and their coverage of the speech was far less critical than TS's. HS's Washington correspondent Jyri Raivio failed to question Bush's claims about Iraq's alleged links with terrorists: "The US has fought its war [on terror] on many fronts after the strikes in the autumn of 2001. Two countries harbouring terrorists have been beaten in victorious wars" ('Bush: Iraq War was only one victory in a campaign', 3 May). Ilta-Sanomat ('Top Gun President is aiming at electoral victory in 2004', 3 May) analysed Bush's speech as a spectacle aiming at re-election. At the same time, the story did not discuss the actual content of the speech. In contrast, a news story in Turun Sanomat ("Bush continues his battle against terrorism"), accompanying the editorial, questioned Bush's main points. The story argued that no WMD had been found and some Iraqis were already revolting against the presence of the US forces. Moreover, it argued that President Bush "attempted to weave a connection between the hated al-Qaeda organisation and Iraq” and interprets the speech as a warning to Syria and other states which Bush labelled as a part of axis of evil in his 2002 State of the Union address.
Conor O'Clery, North America Editor of the *Irish Times*, commented on the Bush's speech in the following way (“Bush gives war speech on carrier”, 2 May):

"The theatrical setting symbolised victory, though that word was carefully omitted from Mr Bush's text.

The mission of the US-led forces in Iraq has yet to be fully achieved. No unconventional weapons have been found and Mr Hussein has not been captured. A declaration of the end of the war would require the US, under the Geneva Convention, to release the thousands of Iraqi prisoners captured in the last six weeks and designate the US as the occupying power. It would impose international-law obligations on the American military.

The speech was a way to formally proclaim that the military operation had improved the security of the United States and brought freedom to the Iraqi people after three decades of a dictatorship under Saddam Hussein, officials said. Mr Bush wanted to underline the striking US-British military success in toppling the regime in four weeks, and to give Americans a sense of finality to the air and ground war and prepare for the next phase of reconstruction.”

O'Clery distanced himself from the most controversial arguments by adding "officials said” but did not go any further in analysing the future prospects of Iraq or Bush's claims. For example, O'Clery made no reference to terrorism despite Bush's heavy emphasis on Iraq being part of the larger war on terror.

In the *Irish Independent*, Roland Watson's report from Washington, reminded the readers of the fragility of the situation in Iraq ('Welcome to US new world order', 2 May):

"The political dangers of the declaration were highlighted yesterday when a grenade attack left seven Americans injured. It happened in Fallujah, a Sunni Muslim city west of Baghdad, in apparent revenge for the deaths of 15 residents when US troops fired into angry crowds in two incidents this week.

In another indication of the fragility in Iraq, at least seven people were killed and dozens burned when Iraqis celebrating the return of electricity in Baghdad shot at a petrol tanker, sparking a fire that engulfed a petrol station. As US troops tried to hold back crowds, residents blamed them for failing to keep order.”

The following day, *Irish Independent* ran another story by Watson on Bush's speech. The report (”'Top Gun” Bush lands ace publicity stunt for poll', 3 May) emphasised the event as a public relations stunt.

While another Irish Sunday newspaper, the *Sunday Tribune*, was not included in the quantitative analysis, the way it covered the Bush speech would indicate that the newspaper retained its critical editorial policy with regard to the war. Marion McKeone, US editor of the *Sunday Tribune*, expressed severe scepticism on the prospect of Iraqi democracy which "would effectively lead to an Islamic fundamentalist theocracy”:

"There are three main ethnic groups in Iraq. The Kurds in the northern region, the Shi'ites in the south and the Sunnis in the middle. The Shi'ites, who resisted the US army most vigorously
are also the majority group in Iraq. Saddam Hussein and most of his leadership were members of the Sunni minority. If the US allows democracy to take root, the results would likely prove unpalatable. There is little doubt that unbridled democracy would produce a theocracy in Iraq similar to that in Iran, which would be anathema to US interests in the region. The Ba'ath Party was a secular party with a Stalinist bent, but a new government that proportionally represented the Shi'ite majority would move towards a fundamentalist state that would likely prove hostile to US interests.

This week, Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer flatly ruled out any prospect of allowing the Iraqi people to elect a theocracy, arguing with some irony considering the ever more blurred lines between church and state in the US that the separation of church and state in a new Iraq cannot be breached.

What is in the US national interest, however, may not coincide with what the Iraqi people decide is in their best interest, and if that is the case there could be plenty more blood spilled in the region.

[...] the US wants to keep the peace in the newly liberated Iraq but at the moment, with suspicion and enmity deepening among sectors of the Iraqi population, more trouble certainly lies ahead.” (“Bush's real battle has only begun”, 4 May)

It seems that the coverage of Bush's speech varied in Irish newspapers. The Irish Times' report retained an objective approach and neither endorsed Bush's claims nor questions them. Meanwhile, the Irish Independent's coverage of the speech contrasted Bush's arguments with the reality in Iraq and the Sunday Tribune provided very critical analysis of the chances of democracy taking root in Iraq.

With regard to the British newspapers, neither the Daily Telegraph nor the Sunday Telegraph published a leading article focusing on Bush's speech or the future of Iraq. In fact, the Daily Telegraph did not pay much attention to Bush's speech and more words were devoted to a story which dealt with the growing anger against the occupiers in Iraq ('Iraqis vow revenge as hatred of the US grows', May 2). A relatively short report from Washington correspondent Toby Harnden focused on the highlights of Bush's speech with several direct quotations presenting Bush's take on the war. None of the controversial claims were questioned in this story.

The Independent did not respond to ”the end of major combat operations” with a leading article either. However, Independent's Washington correspondent Rupert Cornwell saw Bush's declaration as a launching of reconstruction:

“Because both Saddam Hussein and Iraq's alleged chemical and biological weapons have yet to be found - and for the sake of diplomatic convenience - Mr Bush is stopping short of claiming definitive victory in his primetime address to the nation. But the thrust will be the same as that of Mr Rumsfeld in Afghanistan: only mopping-up remains, and the task now is to rebuild a country devastated by decades of misrule and oppression.

[...] A 15-man US Treasury team is now in the Gulf region, examining how to redesign the Iraqi central bank, finance ministry, commercial banking system and stock markets. The US is
also working on devising a new national currency to replace the US dollars, pre-Saddam Swiss dinars' and Saddam dinars now in circulation.

But these measures are only part of a far more sweeping overhaul, aimed at giving Iraq a US-style economic system. This would see wholesale privatisation (perhaps even of state-owned Iraqi oil concerns), the training of Iraqis in the ways of Western capitalism, and a new tax code covering both direct and indirect taxes.

[...] Critics say that if the US persists in a narrow, ideologically driven approach, rebuilding Iraq could run into even worse problems than the sweeping privatisation foisted on Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.” ("Iraq: The Aftermath: Bush launches reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan", 2 May)

The Independent was the only newspaper included in the sample which dealt with the reconstruction in this much detail. Other articles investigating the reconstruction in depth appeared in the Independent ('Oil deals for Halliburton's subsidiary are wider than first declared', 8 May) and the Irish Times ('US oil subsidiary to operate Iraqi fields', 8 May). Conor O'Clery reported in the latter that “the US army has revealed for the first time that a government contract given to the giant oil company, Halliburton, will allow a Halliburton subsidiary to operate the Iraqi oil fields for a time and distribute petroleum, rather than just extinguish oil well fires and carry out repairs as initially reported". Helsingin Sanomat only reported this on 16 May at the very end of an article focusing on the forthcoming UN Security Council meeting ('US plans to have a vote on its draft proposal on Iraq as early as next week').

9.3.2 Range of views, topics and sources

It is noteworthy that the number of opinion items was rather small at this stage of the Iraq conflict. This was especially the case with Finnish and Irish newspapers. Nevertheless, the Independent still published 32 opinion items followed by the Daily Telegraph with 13 items. In comparison, the Finnish newspapers together published only 10 opinion items and the Irish newspapers even less with 7 opinion items. Inevitably, this limited the range of views presented in the coverage – at least to some extent.

With regard to Finnish and Irish press coverage, the relatively low number of critical themes, such as the humanitarian situation in Iraq, general lawlessness and civilian casualties, can be best explained by the fact that they had very limited presence in Iraq – if at all. Even though both HS and the Irish Times had their own correspondents covering the EU foreign minister meeting in Rhodes, which resulted in rather comprehensive coverage of EU policies, their coverage of the situation on the ground in Iraq was rather limited. Nevertheless, Helsingin Sanomat published stories which were critical of the US. For instance, it ran a story (4 May) on a report by Medicines sans frontiers which criticised the
US for the chaotic state of health care system under the US occupation. Other critical reports included 'Red Cross demands access to Iraqi prisoners of war' (5 May), 'US does not allow UN weapons inspectors in Iraq' (7 May), 'Cholera outbreak feared in Basra' (8 May), and 'USA fears Iranian influence in Iraq'. The latter raised questions about a US deal with an Iranian militant group MEK which the State Department has labelled a terrorist organisation. Finally, Helsingin Sanomat published a long story 'Nation does not approve the war' (8 May) which dealt with new poll findings. 18% of Finns approved of the war while 69% disapproved.

The survey also provided data on opinions on media coverage of the war. More than half of the respondents said the coverage was balanced but nearly one in four thought that the coverage favoured the US. With regard to different outlets, the Finnish Public Broadcasting Company was considered the most balanced followed by national newspapers. Nelonen, a commercial television channel, and the tabloids were considered the least balanced in their coverage. 40% of the respondents said that the tabloids favoured the US. However, the analysis of the coverage does not give strong support that Ilta-Sanomat's coverage would have significantly differed from Helsingin Sanomat in this respect at this stage. Nevertheless, there were some differences. Unlike Helsingin Sanomat and Turun Sanomat, Ilta-Sanomat ran a story on the brutality of the Iraqi government, "Mass graves reveal Saddam's horrific deeds" (5 May). On the other hand, another story (5 May) pointed out that the Iraqi women enjoyed many liberties and, for instance, received the same pay for the same work with men. Overall, it is noteworthy that much of Ilta-Sanomat's Iraq coverage dealt with the Finnish foreign policy controversy (7 items out of 25) and, therefore, the international coverage was not extensive enough to draw far-reaching conclusions merely based on the last period of analysis.

According to Couldry and Downey (2004, 271) "the Daily Telegraph's discourse position was consistently adopted across genres (news reports, comment columns, and editorials)" in the run-up to the war. However, they argue that this position had not been entirely in harmony with the government position. The Daily Telegraph had supported the war from a different point of view than the Blair government as the official line had been constrained by the desire to secure a UN sanction for the invasion. In an editorial on 27 January, the Daily Telegraph called for making a case for war from the point of view of national interest in not having a dictator in control of significant share of world's oil resources (Couldry & Downey 2004, 271). However, during the fourth period of analysis, the Daily
Telegraph published couple of commentary pieces which were uncharacteristically critical of the Bush administration. Irvin Welsh's article, 'Fratboy Dim and his buddies are told lies' (5 May), was very critical of how the Bush administration and the media sold the war to the American public:

“George W Bush graduated with an MBA in management. It seems almost certain that he is aware of the 'mushroom theory' of management: 'Keep them in the dark and feed them shit.' It's just a pity that so much of our 'free' television news media seem to agree with him.”

Margaret Drabble's comment piece, “I loathe America, and what it has done to the rest of the world” (8 May), was an equally harsh condemnation of the US policy: “America uses the word 'democracy' as its battle cry, and its nervous soldiers gun down Iraqi civilians when they try to hold street demonstrations to protest against the invasion of their country. So much for democracy.” Daily Telegraph's enthusiasm of the war may have waned with the frustrating search for the WMD and the blatant mismanagement of the occupation which had led to widespread looting and general lawlessness.

The Independent published some commentary pieces on the future of Iraq. Fergal Keane, special correspondent at the BBC, expressed scepticism about the introduction of democracy in Iraq:

“Nobody has any idea of how to deal with the looming possibility of an Islamic state. Have democratic elections and the religious parties will likely win. Have no democratic elections and you will have a guerrilla war some time soon.” (When the Americans go home, what will they leave behind in Iraq?, 3 May)

In stark contrast to these views, Johann Hari ('Rejoice, Rejoice - There Has Been an Explosion of Democracy in Iraq', the Independent, 7 May) argued that democracy is taking hold in the Middle East:

"Le Monde (hardly a font of pro-US propaganda) reported last week that Iranian officials are worried about the 'solid pro-Americanism' of the Iranian people, and that - with a new pro-American neighbour - they might enact revolutionary change. This is heartening evidence that the second Gulf War is already helping to spread democracy throughout the region - exactly the kind of 'destabilisation' that we should all hope for. Let's hope Egypt is next.”

Hari even suggests that the opponents of the war should repent now that Iraqis are celebrating the fall of Saddam:

“Of a representative sample of Iraqis, asked last week, "Was the US-led war to remove Saddam correct?", 54 per cent said yes; only 32 per cent said no. So if you opposed the war, no matter how benevolent your motives, you opposed the Iraqi people and their clear will. Why are so few of you repenting?”

The next day the Independent published a letter to the editor criticising Hari's view: "it's about five years too soon to say whether the invasion of Iraq will benefit anybody, starting
with the Iraqi people - or whether in the long term it will prove to be an utter catastrophe for the Middle East and the world in general.” Another letter to the editor argued that

“In his glowing report on the current progress of democracy in Iraq, Johann Hari chooses to ignore one significant detail: that if you protest at the occupation of your kids' school by an invading army you may well end up being shot dead as happened in the town of Falluja. Fifteen dead and over 50 wounded in two separate incidents does not bode well for the newly regained freedom to protest in Iraq.

Some 30 years ago British troops opened fire on demonstrators in Ireland killing 13 and fuelling a war against occupation which was to last another 20 odd years, the original circumstances of which an independent enquiry has still yet to establish.

What hope for real democracy in Iraq when such outrages are buried by such condescending liberalism?”

Robert Fisk was highly sceptical of President Bush's announcement of the end of the combat operations in the Independent on Sunday ('So he thinks it's all over... George Bush has announced the end of the war. But try telling that to the Shias and the Badr Brigade', 4 May):

“The Americans, he [Rumsfeld] said, still had 'to root out the terrorist networks operating in this country'. What? What terrorist networks? And who, one may ask, are behind these mysterious terrorist networks 'operating' in Iraq? I have a pretty good idea. They may not actually exist yet. But Donald Rumsfeld knows (and he has been told by US intelligence) that a growing resistance movement to America's occupation is gestating in Iraq. The Shia Muslim community, now supported by thousands of Badr Brigade Iraqis trained in Iran, believes the US is in Iraq for its oil. It is furious at America's treatment of Iraq's citizens; in three days last week at least 17 Sunni demonstrators were killed, two of them less than 11 years old. And it is not impressed by Washington's attempts to cobble together an 'interim' pro-American government.

Overall, the Independent on Sunday (4 May) continued to take a critical stance on the invasion which becomes evident even by looking at the headlines: “Iraqi rage grows after Fallujah massacre”, 'More false leads, but no smoking gun”, “Security; Baghdad still restless as Bush claims victory”. Similarly, the Independent ran headlines such as 'Children of Sadr City bear brunt of crisis made worse by war' (2 May), 'American denials enrage Fallujah' (2 May), 'Boy, 14, is shot dead by British soldier' (5 May), and 'Protests over health chief as cholera hits Basra' (8 May).

The Daily Telegraph, in turn, took a more positive take on the situation in Iraq with headlines such as 'Return of the exiles as hope flows again Saddam's efforts to eradicate the Marsh Arabs and destroy their land have failed, reports Kate Connolly in Al-Islah' (2 May). Moreover, the Daily Telegraph kept on justifying the invasion by putting emphasis on the cruelty of the toppled Iraqi government ('City cries for victims of Mohammed the Shovel – Kate Connolly in Nasiriyah sees Saddam's political enemies laid to rest', 3 May)
and ridiculing the anti-war movement (Judge tells "silly" anti-war girl to go back to school – Suspended pupil urged to put on uniform and return to studies', 3 May).

Generally speaking, it seems that a wide range of opinions appeared in both UK newspapers although they emphasised different issues. Hari was rather alone in defending the invasion in the *Independent* and, so too, were Margaret Drabble and Irvin Welsh's opinion pieces clear deviations from the mainstream of *Daily Telegraph's* coverage. Especially in the case of *Independent*, the range of views was guaranteed by the fact that it published the highest number of opinion items on Iraq (2 leading articles, 12 commentaries and 18 letters-to-the-editor). Even without the significant contribution from the readership, Robert Fisk and Johann Hari alone guaranteed some level of diversity in the points of view throughout the Iraq crisis. Ian Taylor (2008), who has applied frame analysis to develop multidimensional reading of foreign policy debates, labels Hari as a liberal hawk together with Nick Cohen (*Observer*), David Aaronovitch (*Guardian*) and Thomas Friedman (*New York Times*). They justified the use of military force with Saddam Hussein's "appalling human rights record". While they may have had some reservations with regard to Bush administration and its case for war, the suffering of the Iraqi people under Saddam's rule outweighed all other arguments for liberal hawks (Taylor 2008, 83).

The UK newspapers were keener on making references to the cruelty and aggression of the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein. This was clearly an issue which the US and the UK governments wanted to feature prominently in the media coverage because the most important justification for the war, Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, had not been found.

*Table 9.1. Number of items with references to the nature of the Iraqi government and Iraqi opinion of regime change.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference to Iraqi govt</th>
<th>Cruelty/aggression</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Welcoming</th>
<th>Welcoming questioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=46)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=16)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=25)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=87)</td>
<td>7 (8.0%)</td>
<td>4 (4.6%)</td>
<td>1 (1.2%)</td>
<td>1 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent (n=77)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph (n=59)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=136)</td>
<td>23 (16.9%)</td>
<td>1 (0.7%)</td>
<td>10 (7.4%)</td>
<td>8 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Independent (n=36)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Times (n=24)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=60)</td>
<td>6 (10.0%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=283)</td>
<td>36 (12.7%)</td>
<td>5 (1.8%)</td>
<td>11 (3.9%)</td>
<td>9 (3.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.3.3 Iraqi views

On 7 May, an Australian newspaper *Sydney Morning Herald* said that it had retrieved a tape of Saddam Hussein who was still missing and would keep on hiding for another six months only to be trialled and hanged. The voice on the tape urged Iraqis to resist the occupation (Hussein 2003):

"The Zionists are baffled how to fight the Palestinian people and you the Iraqi people, men and women, stand together against the invasion and show your stance as much as you can by writing on walls, or making positive demonstrations or not selling them anything or buying anything from them, or by shooting them with your rifles and trying to destroy their cannons and tanks."

While Saddam preferred to emphasise the Iraqi resistance against the occupiers, Bush argued that the Iraqi people were welcoming the Americans. Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that the Iraqis had mixed feelings about the regime change and occupiers. In September 2003, a poll indicated that the majority thought that getting rid of Saddam was worth the hardship they had experienced since the invasion. However, 44% of Baghdad residents held a negative view of the Americans and nearly half of Iraqis said that they were worse off after the invasion (Rampton & Stauber 2006, 22). The interviews that the correspondents conducted in early May are congruent with the poll findings. In a typical quote from the sample, Iraqis said they were happy to see Saddam gone while simultaneously rejecting the presence of occupying forces.

The British newspapers, in turn, dealt with Iraqi views on several occasions. The *Independent* presented the argument that the Iraqis were welcoming the regime change in six articles and the *Daily Telegraph* in four articles. The *Independent* questioned this argument in five articles and the *Daily Telegraph* in three articles. Johann Hari's pro-war views explain to some extent the salience of this issue. After all, his pro-war stance was largely built on the Iraqi opinion. On the other hand, Robert Fisk's reports from Iraq balanced Hari's views. For instance, Fisk argued that "When Iraqi civilians look into the faces of American troops, President Bush famously told the world on Thursday, 'they see strength and kindness and goodwill'. Untrue, Mr Bush. They see occupation" (So he thinks it's all over... George Bush has announced the end of the war. But try telling that to the Shias and the Badr Brigade', 4 May). He argued that several incidents in which the US forces killed civilians were already forming a familiar pattern not too dissimilar to other occupations in places like West Bank and Gaza.
Both UK newspapers published about a dozen articles filed from Iraq and Iraqi sources were quoted frequently especially in the *Daily Telegraph*. On occasion, the only quoted Iraqi sources in *Daily Telegraph*'s coverage were either living in exile or presenting the Iraqi National Congress (INC). Overall, 13 items in the *Daily Telegraph* quoted Iraqi sources while the *Independent* quoted Iraqis in only seven items.

The Iraqi opinions on the regime change and the occupying forces did not receive much attention in the Irish and Finnish newspapers. Only *Turun Sanomat* once questioned the Bush administration claims that the Iraqis were welcoming the change but otherwise the whole issue was ignored. This can be explained by the lack of presence in Iraq which would have allowed the newspapers to explore what the Iraqis were thinking about the war. For example, *Turun Sanomat* and the *Irish Times* published only one item each which quoted Iraqi sources. The *Irish Independent*, in turn, published 11 items quoting Iraqi sources. This is explained by the large number of stories it published from British newspapers, especially the *Times* (13 items). On another occasion, a commentary piece in the *Irish Independent* ('They're dancing in the streets of Karbala', May 4), which some might find racist, expressed complete disregard of Iraqi views:

"Personally, I had favoured the original notion of General Tommy Franks running Iraq for the foreseeable future. I'm sure that Iraq and Iran and Saudi Arabia and Syria and Yemen would all be infinitely better off if they were run by Tommy, if only the locals could get their heads around that. Alas, they have other ideas, and a bunch of famously mad religions to support."

Nevertheless, the US military rule in Iraq had a rough start because of Rumsfeld's insistence on employing a rather small but mobile force which failed to restore the order when Saddam's rule crumbled. The newspapers which had correspondents in Iraq had more references to looting and anarchy. In the case of the *Irish Independent*, the relatively high number of references to this issue is due to its reliance on correspondents of the UK newspapers. Again, there is no clear pattern to indicate national differences.

### 9.3.4 Terrorism

As discussed in the previous chapters, the Bush administration insisted that the Iraq War was part of the war on terror. Although Blair's rhetoric on the subject may have been a bit more toned down, the British case for war also relied very much on Iraq's links with terrorists – or at least the possibility of such links materialising. On 20 March, Tony Blair (2003) argued that

"this new world faces a new threat: of disorder and chaos born either of brutal states like Iraq, armed with weapons of mass destruction; or of extreme terrorist groups. Both hate our way of
life, our freedom, our democracy.

My fear, deeply held, based in part on the intelligence that I see, is that these threats come together and deliver catastrophe to our country and world. These tyrannical states do not care for the sanctity of human life. The terrorists delight in destroying it.

Some say if we act, we become a target. The truth is, all nations are targets. Bali was never in the front line of action against terrorism. America didn’t attack Al Qaida. They attacked America.”

Overall, it has to be said that the issue of Iraq's links to terrorism did not feature very prominently in any of the analysed newspapers in early May. For example, the Irish Times neither suggested that the links existed nor did it question the claim which, after all, had played an important role in justifying the war. The British newspapers differed in their coverage of the alleged Iraqi links with terrorism. The Daily Telegraph referred to these links three times but failed to question them. Meanwhile, the Independent presented the argument that Iraq has links to terrorism only once and questioned the claim on three occasions. The Finnish newspapers, in turn, may not have felt the need to question the terrorism claim yet again when reporting on the Bush's speech. After all, the Finnish press had widely contested this view already in the run-up to the war.

Table 9.2. Number of items presenting the argument that Iraq has links to terrorism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Terror links</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>invoked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=46)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=16)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=25)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=87)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent (n=77)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph (n=59)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=136)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Independent (n=36)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Times (n=24)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=60)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=283)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was another aspect to terrorism with regard to the Iraq War. A leading article in the Independent on Sunday ('The real war on terror', 4 May) criticised the UK and US governments for how they were tackling terrorism and alienation of Muslim communities against the background of the revelation that a British suicide bomber had been responsible for a terrorist attack in Tel Aviv:

"The 'war against terrorism', rather than the destructive war against Iraq, should have been at the top of George W Bush and Tony Blair's agenda. One of the more potent arguments against
the attack on Iraq was that, rather than diminishing terrorism, the pre-emptive strike would fuel it. The war divided governments and alienated large communities when co-operation and co-ordination were essential. In spite of Saddam's removal the world seems no safer.

[...] If terrorism is the problem, illegally removing regimes is not the answer. As well as improving security and international intelligence, the main objective for President Bush and Mr Blair, both internationally and domestically, must be to confront alienation by working to bring communities together."

It is noteworthy that the *Daily Telegraph*’s report on British suicide bombers only makes one passing reference to Iraq. Hence the story was not coded unlike the articles on the issue in the *Independent* which was more explicit about the possibility that the Iraq War might incite terrorism.196

**9.3.5 Elusive weapons of mass destruction**

On 7 May, the US military reported that it had found two mobile biological warfare laboratories in Iraq but these later turned out to be atmospheric hydrogen balloon laboratories for artillery aiming purposes (Clark 2004, 30). In this regard, the finding fitted the pattern in which the US army reported suspicions findings none of which turned out to be the smoking gun. For example, on 4 April the US troops reached an explosives plant south of Baghdad and reported of boxes of white powder which were "suspicious". Nevertheless, chemical analysis showed that the powder was merely conventional explosive. In another case, the alleged chemical agent turned out to be farm pesticide (Rampton & Stauber 2006, 75-77). In the US, the media, especially the Fox News Channel, were so keen on reporting these alleged findings that, around mid-April, one third of Americans believed that the WMD had been found (Rampton & Stauber 2006, 82). Despite the lack of hard evidence the Bush administration kept on pushing the issue. As late as 30 May, President Bush insisted that "those who say we haven't found the banned

196The impact of the Iraq War on terrorism remained debatable in May 2003 but, by 2005, it had become clear that Iraq had become a training ground for terrorists and new techniques to build improvised explosive devices (IED) spread from Iraq to Afghanistan. According to the former chief of CIA’s Osama bin Laden unit, the US invasion and occupation of Iraq was a gift to al-Qaeda. (Rampton & Stauber 2006, 156-157). In fact, al-Qaeda had rejoiced when the war begun: "The enemy is now spread out, close at hand, and easy to target" (quoted in Anonymous 2004, 96). Terrorists hit public transport systems in Madrid (11 March 2004) and London (7 July 2005) and there was also an attempted bombing in London on 21 July 2005. Spain withdrew its troops from Iraq after the conservative Spanish government lost the election which took place shortly after the terrorist attack. The British government has vehemently denied any allegations that the Iraq War could have played a part in radicalising Muslim population home and abroad. According to a MORI poll, more than half of British Muslims thought that the Iraq War was the main reason for the London bombing on 7 July 2005 (MORI 2005).
manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong. We found them.” (quoted in Rampton & Stauber 2006, 85).

Table 9.3. Number of items presenting the argument that Iraq has WMD.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Invoked</th>
<th>Questioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=46)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=16)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=25)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=87)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent (n=77)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph (n=59)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=136)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Independent (n=36)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Times (n=24)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=60)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=283)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Iraq's elusive weapons of mass destruction received fair amount of coverage. As expected, the Daily Telegraph came first in suggesting that Iraq has WMD with seven items making the claim while only questioning this assumption in four items. In comparison, the Independent implied the existence of the weapons in four articles and questioned their existence in 11 articles. For instance, a letter to the editor published in the Irish Independent ("Show us the weapons", 2 May) mocked the US/UK hunt for WMD: “Curious how not one grateful liberated Iraqi has led any of the coalition forces in Iraq to the sites where the weapons of mass destruction are stored. You would almost think such weapons didn't exist.”

On 7 May, the Independent ran a news article ('Blame game erupts over failure to uncover weapons') which reported that some members of the US intelligence community had claimed that “a small number of powerful neo-conservative ideologues in the Pentagon were so determined to prove the existence of a banned weapons programme and links to al-Qaeda that they manipulated intelligence.”

Overall, the coverage of the WMD issue did not indicate clear national patterns. All newspapers, with the exception of the Daily Telegraph, questioned the claim more frequently than suggesting the existence of the Iraqi WMD.
9.3.6 Coverage of casualties

By 1 May, 140 Americans and 33 British had died in Iraq. The Bush administration strategy was to minimize coverage of the casualties and, hence, no ceremonies were held upon their arrival on the US soil. No pictures of coffins coming from the Gulf were allowed and, unlike many previous presidents, Bush did not attend funerals of fallen soldiers (Rampton & Stauber 2006, 166-167). The US military did not keep records on Iraqi casualties either. As a result, the only systematically collected data was provided by US and UK volunteers established Iraq Body Count (IBC) which has recorded violent civilian deaths since the invasion. Their data, which is mainly based on cross-checked media reports, suggests that 545 civilians died violently in May 2003 – down from about 3,500 the previous month. This drop was also reflected in the newspaper coverage as civilian casualties did not receive extensive coverage in any of the analysed newspapers. Quantitative analysis indicates that, in accordance with their editorial policies, the Independent was more concerned with the negative side of the conflict than the Daily Telegraph. For example, Independent's correspondent Phil Reeves tracked down an uncle of a teenage boy who was shot by American soldiers in a demonstration for his report from Fallujah on 2 May ('American denials enrage Fallujah').

Clearly, the European press was not interested in the fate of the Iraqi soldiers and the extent of the casualties of the Iraqi army is still not known. Despite Finland's anti-war policy, the Finnish press was no more concerned about the Iraqi deaths than British or Irish newspapers. However, the Daily Telegraph stood out in the number of items referring to US/UK casualties. It was the only newspaper which referred more frequently to coalition casualties than to Iraqi casualties.

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Available at [www.iraqbodycount.org](http://www.iraqbodycount.org). In 2004, the Lancet researchers employed statistical sampling methods which suggested that the invasion could have contributed to over 100,000 excess deaths. In 2006, the Lancet researchers estimated that the Iraq's 'excess' death toll had reached 655,000 (Brown 2006). Indymedia has criticised the Irish Times for downplaying Iraqi casualties. They searched articles between June 2005 and June 2006 with the search term ”Iraq” and ”Lancet”. This produced only three hits. In comparison, they found that US casualties were reported 8 times in less than a two months. Indymedia also argued that the Irish Times consistently preferred to refer to Iraq Body Count figures which only include violent civilian deaths which have been verified by two independent media reports. Due to this methodology, IBA's own estimate is that their figure includes only about half of violent deaths in Iraq (Indymedia 2006).
9.3.7 Coverage of the UN

The UN and the respect for international law are the cornerstones of the foreign policies of small non-aligned countries such as Finland and Ireland. In the case of the UK, it is not as clear cut. Blair had emphasised the importance of the second UN Security Council resolution but joined the US forces in the invasion despite having failed to secure UN sanction in the run-up to the war. After the fall of Baghdad, Blair was ready to return to UN. According to the *Daily Telegraph* ('Peace force for Iraq may take half the army', 5 May), a British official said that "It is up to the UN to decide whether it wants to play a vital role or stand on the sidelines. We do not need it in terms of legality." However, the official acknowledged that Britain “would love to have UN endorsement, but if it is not available at this stage that is unfortunate”.

The *Independent* quoted UN sources in 5 items while the other newspapers used UN sources only in one item each – apart from *Ilta-Sanomat* which did not quote UN sources at all. However, quantitative analysis of the press coverage did not reveal significant differences in how the newspapers emphasised the role of the UN in Iraq.

*Ilta-Sanomat* (3 May) commented on the state of the UN by presenting views of two professors (British and American) under the headline, “UN was a cripple even before the Iraq War”. On 8 May, *Helsingin Sanomat* published an opinion piece by a former UN weapons inspector Jonathan B. Tucker who demanded that UNMOVIC should be allowed to return to Iraq.
Table 9.5. Number of items presenting the argument that there should be a UN solution in Iraq.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argument that there should be some kind of UN solution in Iraq</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>invoked</td>
<td>questioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=46)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=16)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=25)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=87)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Independent (n=77)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph (n=59)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=136)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Independent (n=36)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Irish Times (n=24)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=60)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=283)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Irish Times also expressed views on the UN. Paul Gillespie wrote in the Irish Times ('Blair needs to take bold measures to preserve his influence in Europe', 3 May): “Chirac's refusal to give UN endorsement to the war was the UN's - and the EU's - Abyssinian moment, after which nothing will ever be the same again in world politics. France must bear the costs of Chirac's historic error and deserves to do so.” On another instance, Kevin Myers wrote on his Irishman's Diary on 2 May that

“The UN is no longer the sole authoriser of force. The world has had its Abyssinian moment yet again: henceforth states will pursue their own self-interests, with the occasional visit to the big building in New York to see if they've changed the coffee there. The UN, meanwhile, will simply become a large aid agency, with the difference that its officials will still all fly first class, and retire at 50.”

Myers's also participated in the French bashing which had become popular among conservative commentators in the lead-up to the war. Astonishingly, Myers suggested that, instead of killing a duck to make pressed duck, “bumbling, conceited criminal Chirac should have been strangled, half roasted, his liver removed, his carcass pressed, and the entire President Presse fed to the bird”. He continues:

“The EU is lying on the canvas, wondering what hit it, and NATO might as well be our own National Association of Tenants Organisations for all its military value. And the Rapid Reaction Force should now be renamed Don't Do Anything Rash Until We've Made Up Our Minds No-Reaction Force.

This farce has directly proceeded from Chirac's decision to veto any UN amendment justifying US force against Iraq regardless of the circumstances.”
Myers repeats the very simplistic US/UK argument of the French veto either deliberately or out of ignorance. Truth is that the majority of the UN Security Council members would not have backed a resolution which would have authorised the use of force by the US-led forces. Unlike the British and Irish newspapers, the Finnish press did not have a similar resentment of the French and their policies in the Iraq crisis.

9.4 CONCLUSION

Overall, the newspapers expressed a wide range of views. The variation in the commentary pieces was especially noticeable in the Independent, the Daily Telegraph and the Irish Times. Moreover, the large number of letters-to-the-editor, particularly in the Independent, ensured that a wide spectrum of views were present in the coverage. On the other hand, the debate about possible coalition motives to attack Iraq were hardly mentioned in the coverage even though it had become increasingly likely that the alleged stocks of weapons of mass destruction would never be found.

Overall, the analysis would suggest that in the post-war situation the press coverage became less uniform both within the newspapers and countries. For instance, it would be difficult to clearly identify the Finnish newspapers presenting more critical views on the war and the occupation than the UK newspapers taken as a whole. And yet, a bulk of previous research would argue that the national foreign policy stance would be clearly reflected in the press coverage. For example, with regard to the views on the UN were not always in line with official foreign policy line. What is noteworthy is that the Daily Telegraph began to express very critical views on the how the war was sold and conducted. Even Johann Hari noted that “The gung-ho conservative press is now only interested in the Iraqi people as bad news: either they are mutating into evil, money-grabbing asylum-seekers as they cross the Channel, or they stay at home and become looting thugs.” Even though this was not a fair assessment of Daily Telegraph's coverage, there was a trend toward expressing more views and issues which were critical of the war. Nevertheless, the Daily Telegraph still stood out from the other newspapers as the most pro-war in its approach.
Chapter 10

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

10.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this final chapter is to summarise the findings of the previous chapters while also reviewing the data as a whole with greater focus on theoretical reflection. Similar to previous chapters, the use of sources, topic selection and direction of arguments will be discussed with regard to issues such as the US/UK case for war and legality of the invasion.

10.2 PRESS COVERAGE REFLECTS THE GOVERNMENT POLICY LINE?
This section will deal with hypotheses 1 and 2. It discusses the use of sources, selection of topics and direction of arguments.

10.2.1 Use of sources
Previous research indicates that it is the range of sources that largely determine what and how is covered by the media (Rantanen 2004, 302; Archetti 2007, 12). Two contradictory hypotheses on the selection of sources were outlined above. Hypothesis 1a argued that the UK press would use US governmental sources more than the Irish and the Finnish press as the US government held very similar views to those of the Blair government. This was not the case, however, as the Irish press quoted US government sources in nearly one fourth of the items (23%) leaving the UK newspapers far behind with about 17-18% of items quoting US government sources. Of the Finnish newspapers Helsingin Sanomat quoted US government sources the least (less than 13% of items) and Ilta-Sanomat the most (over 18% of the items).

The Iraqi government sources were quoted much less than the US sources – 9–10% of the items at most (Irish Times and the Irish Independent). Only the Finnish press used Iraqi sources more than UK sources. Although it was at the heart of the crisis, the Iraqi government had rather limited control over the events and its 'newsworthiness' may have
been further eroded by its lack of credibility. In fact, the statements of the Iraqi Information Minister were widely mocked in the press coverage. In this regard the findings are similar to Nohrstedt and Ottosen's cross-national analysis of Gulf War coverage. They argued that the Western media treated all Iraqi information as propaganda (Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2000b, 259).

Table 10.1. Use of the warring parties as sources (percentage in brackets).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Iraq</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Govt</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Govt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=446)</td>
<td>56 (12.6)</td>
<td>33 (7.4)</td>
<td>24 (5.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=127)</td>
<td>19 (15.0)</td>
<td>1 (0.8)</td>
<td>7 (5.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=224)</td>
<td>41 (18.3)</td>
<td>28 (12.5)</td>
<td>18 (8.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=797)</td>
<td>116 (14.6)</td>
<td>62 (7.8)</td>
<td>49 (6.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (n=745)</td>
<td>126 (16.9)</td>
<td>73 (9.8)</td>
<td>42 (5.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (n=613)</td>
<td>109 (17.8)</td>
<td>66 (10.8)</td>
<td>26 (4.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=1358)</td>
<td>235 (17.3)</td>
<td>139 (10.2)</td>
<td>68 (5.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent (n=430)</td>
<td>105 (24.4)</td>
<td>50 (11.6)</td>
<td>43 (10.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times (n=375)</td>
<td>80 (21.3)</td>
<td>27 (7.2)</td>
<td>35 (9.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=805)</td>
<td>185 (23.0)</td>
<td>77 (9.6)</td>
<td>78 (9.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=2960)</td>
<td>536 (18.1)</td>
<td>278 (9.4)</td>
<td>195 (6.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The notion that the media prefer foreign sources that support the views of their host government was presented in hypothesis 2a. However, the data presented in table 10.2 indicates that the Finnish press did not prefer anti-war states as sources any more than the British press. Overall, the most vocal anti-war states were not very widely quoted in any of the newspapers perhaps apart from France in the case of the Irish Times. While France was quoted in nearly four per cent of the total number of items, Germany and Russia had to settle for just two per cent and China and Belgium even much less.

Both Finnish and Irish governments emphasised the role of the UN in the process of disarming Iraq. However, in the Finnish case, this did not translate into frequent use of UN sources in the press coverage – little over three per cent of the Finnish items quoted UN sources (table 10.2). Meanwhile, the Irish press did so in nearly six per cent of the items and even the UK press quoted the UN more often than the Finnish press. In fact, the pro-war Telegraph and supposedly anti-war Helsingin Sanomat quoted UN sources equally.

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198 It is worth noting, however, that the Iraqi government did not exist after mid-April which, in part, explain the relatively low percentage of items quoting it.
199 'Governmental' sources include the executive branch of the government (leading politicians, ministry spokesmen and so on) and political parties and, therefore, include also opposition sources.
often. Perhaps surprisingly, the pro-war Telegraph seemed keener on quoting the anti-war states than the Independent which opposed the war. However, the differences were rather small. Yet, it is safe to argue that Independent's anti-war editorial stance did not translate into frequent use of anti-war countries as sources. Perhaps the difference of approach between the Independent and the Telegraph was reflected more clearly in the use of the UN and humanitarian aid agencies as sources.

Table 10.2. Use of anti-war state, UN and aid organisation sources (percentage in brackets).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Belgium</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Aid agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=446)</td>
<td>9 (2.0)</td>
<td>6 (1.3)</td>
<td>9 (2.0)</td>
<td>4 (0.9)</td>
<td>1 (0.2)</td>
<td>14 (3.1)</td>
<td>10 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=127)</td>
<td>6 (4.7)</td>
<td>4 (3.1)</td>
<td>2 (1.6)</td>
<td>1 (0.8)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 (5.5)</td>
<td>3 (2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=224)</td>
<td>1 (0.4)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5 (2.2)</td>
<td>5 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FINLAND (n=797)</strong></td>
<td><strong>16 (2.0)</strong></td>
<td><strong>10 (1.3)</strong></td>
<td><strong>11 (1.4)</strong></td>
<td><strong>5 (0.6)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 (0.1)</strong></td>
<td><strong>26 (3.3)</strong></td>
<td><strong>18 (2.3)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (n=745)</td>
<td>9 (1.2)</td>
<td>12 (1.6)</td>
<td>10 (1.3)</td>
<td>2 (0.3)</td>
<td>1 (0.1)</td>
<td>38 (5.1)</td>
<td>17 (2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (n=613)</td>
<td>10 (1.6)</td>
<td>12 (2.0)</td>
<td>11 (1.8)</td>
<td>1 (0.2)</td>
<td>1 (0.2)</td>
<td>19 (3.1)</td>
<td>7 (1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK (n=1358)</strong></td>
<td><strong>19 (1.4)</strong></td>
<td><strong>24 (1.8)</strong></td>
<td><strong>21 (1.5)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 (0.2)</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 (0.1)</strong></td>
<td><strong>57 (4.2)</strong></td>
<td><strong>24 (1.8)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent (n=430)</td>
<td>16 (3.7)</td>
<td>10 (2.3)</td>
<td>7 (1.6)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (0.7)</td>
<td>20 (4.7)</td>
<td>4 (0.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times (n=375)</td>
<td>26 (6.9)</td>
<td>16 (4.3)</td>
<td>17 (4.5)</td>
<td>2 (0.5)</td>
<td>4 (1.1)</td>
<td>25 (6.7)</td>
<td>5 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRELAND (n=805)</strong></td>
<td><strong>42 (5.2)</strong></td>
<td><strong>26 (3.2)</strong></td>
<td><strong>24 (3.0)</strong></td>
<td><strong>2 (0.2)</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 (0.9)</strong></td>
<td><strong>45 (5.6)</strong></td>
<td><strong>9 (1.1)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=2960)</td>
<td>111 (3.8)</td>
<td>60 (2.0)</td>
<td>56 (1.9)</td>
<td>10 (0.3)</td>
<td>10 (0.3)</td>
<td>128 (4.3)</td>
<td>51 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To summarise, the analysis of sources does not seem to support the notion that the government policy line of the newspapers' host government would explain the selection of sources. This is evident if one considers how notable differences there were between the Finnish newspapers for instance (see e.g. the use of US military sources in table 1). Consequently, hypotheses 1a and 2a are not confirmed.

10.2.2 Topic selection

It was hypothesised above that the UK press would avoid topics that dealt with uncomfortable aspects of the war (H1b) while the Finnish press would cover them more extensively (H2b). However, it was the UK press that paid most attention to looting/anarchy as well as the US/UK use of depleted uranium ammunition – although references to this issue were very few in the entire sample. The Irish press, in turn, made references to humanitarian crisis, humanitarian aid and reconstruction most frequently. Of all the topics included in the coding protocol, the Finnish press topped only in making references to US/UK troops advancing (7.3% of the Finnish items). Helsingin Sanomat's coverage especially seemed to have focused on the tactical aspects of the war.
Table 10.3. Selection of topics (percentage in brackets).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Looting / anarchy</th>
<th>Humanitarian crisis</th>
<th>Humanitarian aid</th>
<th>Reconstruction</th>
<th>US/UK advance</th>
<th>Use of DU ammunition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=446)</td>
<td>43 (9.7)</td>
<td>34 (7.7)</td>
<td>36 (8.1)</td>
<td>41 (9.2)</td>
<td>36 (8.1)</td>
<td>1 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=127)</td>
<td>5 (3.9)</td>
<td>7 (5.6)</td>
<td>14 (11.1)</td>
<td>19 (15.0)</td>
<td>8 (6.4)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=224)</td>
<td>14 (6.3)</td>
<td>9 (4.1)</td>
<td>9 (4.0)</td>
<td>10 (4.5)</td>
<td>14 (6.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FINLAND (n=797)</strong></td>
<td><strong>62 (7.8)</strong></td>
<td><strong>50 (6.3)</strong></td>
<td><strong>59 (7.4)</strong></td>
<td><strong>70 (8.8)</strong></td>
<td><strong>58 (7.3)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 (0.1)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (n=745)</td>
<td>113 (15.2)</td>
<td>46 (6.2)</td>
<td>73 (9.8)</td>
<td>83 (11.2)</td>
<td>47 (6.3)</td>
<td>8 (1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (n=613)</td>
<td>70 (11.5)</td>
<td>30 (4.9)</td>
<td>29 (4.8)</td>
<td>43 (7.0)</td>
<td>40 (6.6)</td>
<td>5 (0.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK (n=1358)</strong></td>
<td><strong>183 (13.5)</strong></td>
<td><strong>76 (5.6)</strong></td>
<td><strong>102 (7.5)</strong></td>
<td><strong>126 (9.3)</strong></td>
<td><strong>87 (6.5)</strong></td>
<td><strong>13 (1.0)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent (n=430)</td>
<td>50 (11.6)</td>
<td>17 (4.0)</td>
<td>24 (5.6)</td>
<td>27 (6.3)</td>
<td>33 (7.7)</td>
<td>3 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times (n=375)</td>
<td>44 (11.7)</td>
<td>38 (10.2)</td>
<td>39 (10.4)</td>
<td>51 (13.6)</td>
<td>22 (5.9)</td>
<td>3 (0.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRELAND (n=805)</strong></td>
<td><strong>94 (11.7)</strong></td>
<td><strong>55 (6.9)</strong></td>
<td><strong>63 (7.8)</strong></td>
<td><strong>78 (9.7)</strong></td>
<td><strong>55 (6.8)</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 (0.7)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=2960)</td>
<td>339 (11.5)</td>
<td>181 (6.2)</td>
<td>224 (7.6)</td>
<td>274 (9.3)</td>
<td>200 (6.8)</td>
<td>20 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to the topics covered in the news articles and opinion items, it is striking how similar the figures for national coverage are. At the same time, the data clearly indicates that there were bigger differences between newspapers which operated in the same political system with each other. For instance, the Independent covered topics that showed the undesired consequences of the invasion (looting/anarchy and humanitarian crisis) notably more frequently than the Telegraph. Similarly, the Independent emphasised reconstruction and humanitarian aid efforts to a greater extent than its competitor. With regard to the Irish newspapers, the Irish Independent showed more interested in troop movements while the Irish Times focused more on the humanitarian aspects of the conflict. Over ten per cent of its coverage dealt with issues such as displacement or lack of clean water or food supply. In Finland, the tabloid Ilta-Sanomat was the least concerned with humanitarian issues which affected the results for Finland. Turun Sanomat stood out from other newspapers with its coverage of humanitarian aspects of the conflict. However, although there seems to be an emphasis on these issues, the data indicates that its lack of presence in Iraq directed its coverage in humanitarian aid and reconstruction while it was ill-equipped to cover the looting, anarchy and human suffering on the ground.

Contrary to expectations, the UK press provided the most extensive coverage of casualties and the Finnish press paid the least attention to this topic. Again, national differences were quite prominent in Finnish and British cases. While Helsingin Sanomat and Ilta-Sanomat gave almost equal coverage to US/UK military casualties and civilian casualties, Turun Sanomat heavily emphasised civilian casualties. In Britain, the Telegraph covered US/UK military casualties more frequently than the Independent but the latter paid the most attention to Iraqi military and civilian casualties.
Table 10.4. Coverage of casualties of war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US/UK</th>
<th>Iraqi military</th>
<th>Civilian</th>
<th>Journalists</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=446)</td>
<td>27 (6.1%)</td>
<td>11 (2.5%)</td>
<td>32 (7.2%)</td>
<td>6 (1.3%)</td>
<td>8 (1.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=127)</td>
<td>3 (2.4%)</td>
<td>1 (0.8%)</td>
<td>16 (12.6%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6 (4.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=224)</td>
<td>19 (8.5%)</td>
<td>6 (2.7%)</td>
<td>21 (9.4%)</td>
<td>3 (1.3%)</td>
<td>3 (1.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=797)</td>
<td>49 (6.1%)</td>
<td>18 (2.3%)</td>
<td>69 (8.7%)</td>
<td>9 (1.15)</td>
<td>17 (2.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (n=745)</td>
<td>83 (11.2%)</td>
<td>30 (4.0%)</td>
<td>116 (15.6%)</td>
<td>22 (3.05)</td>
<td>53 (7.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (n=613)</td>
<td>72 (11.8%)</td>
<td>17 (2.8%)</td>
<td>61 (10.0%)</td>
<td>10 (1.6%)</td>
<td>27 (4.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=1358)</td>
<td>155 (11.4%)</td>
<td>47 (3.5%)</td>
<td>177 (13.1%)</td>
<td>32 (2.4%)</td>
<td>80 (5.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent (n=430)</td>
<td>39 (9.1%)</td>
<td>13 (3.0%)</td>
<td>57 (13.3%)</td>
<td>6 (1.4%)</td>
<td>24 (5.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times (n=375)</td>
<td>37 (9.9%)</td>
<td>11 (2.9%)</td>
<td>39 (10.4%)</td>
<td>9 (2.4%)</td>
<td>24 (6.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRELAND (n=805)</td>
<td>76 (9.5%)</td>
<td>24 (3.0%)</td>
<td>96 (11.9%)</td>
<td>15 (1.9%)</td>
<td>48 (6.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=2960)</td>
<td>280 (9.5%)</td>
<td>89 (3.0%)</td>
<td>342 (11.6%)</td>
<td>56 (1.9%)</td>
<td>145 (4.9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10.2.3 Direction of arguments

Hypothesis 1c argued that the UK press would widely reproduce the pro-war arguments without much criticism. As can be seen in table 10.5, some of the main arguments for war were most frequently invoked in the UK press. Yet, they did not go without criticism. Thanks to the Independent, the US/UK case for war was challenged in the British press especially with regard to Iraq's alleged links to international terrorism. In fact, the arguments about Iraqi threat, its WMD capability and links to terrorism were widely questioned in all newspapers with the exception of the Telegraph.

There is no conclusive evidence to support hypothesis 2d, which argued that the Finnish press would underpresent and/or heavily criticise the arguments to credit the war, either. While the Finnish press frequently questioned the arguments for war, only the argument about Iraqi links to terrorism was challenged more often than merely invoked and, in fact, the Irish press was more critical of the claim that Iraq is a threat.

However, the analysis would not be complete without looking at how the arguments of proponents of the anti-war position were covered by the press. Often the anti-war stance was based on legal or moral considerations or commitment to multilateral cooperation within the UN framework. The hypotheses 1c and 2d argued that the UK press would pay least attention to anti-war arguments and that the Finnish press would present them without much criticism.
The Finnish press appeared the least concerned about the issue of legality. The Finnish position on the war was that it was "unacceptable" and the government fell short of declaring the war illegal. As the table 10.6 shows, the Finnish press did not press the issue of legality either. Ilta-Sanomat dealt with the issue in only two items during the four analysed weeks. Over three per cent of items in Helsingin Sanomat cast doubt on the legality of the invasion but this was less than the UK press (nearly five per cent) and about the same level as the relatively pro-war Irish Independent. Together with the Irish Times, Turun Sanomat stood out once again as the most critical. 8–9% of the items in these two newspapers questioned the legality of the military action.

When one considers the political situation in Ireland and the UK, it is perhaps not surprising at all that the issue of legality and moral considerations received more press coverage in these countries. After all, the UK participated in the invasion after a very divisive public debate in the run-up to the war. Ireland, in turn, was also more directly involved in the war than Finland because the US military had fly-over and landing rights in Ireland – an issue which fuelled debate on the legal and moral aspects of the war.

On the issue of moral case for war, both the Irish and the British press were divided with the Independent and the Irish Times questioning the moral justification more frequently than their national competitors. In Finland, in turn, Ilta-Sanomat hardly touched upon the argument while Turun Sanomat was the most doubtful of the moral case for war.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argument that the war is legal</th>
<th>Argument that the war is justified</th>
<th>Argument that there should be a UN solution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invoked (n=2960)</td>
<td>Questioned (n=2960)</td>
<td>Invoked (n=2960) Questioned (n=2960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=446)</td>
<td>2 (0.4)</td>
<td>15 (3.4)</td>
<td>3 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=127)</td>
<td>1 (0.8)</td>
<td>10 (7.9)</td>
<td>1 (0.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=224)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 (0.9)</td>
<td>1 (0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FINLAND (n=797)</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 (0.4)</strong></td>
<td><strong>27 (3.4)</strong></td>
<td><strong>5 (0.6)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (n=745)</td>
<td>10 (1.3)</td>
<td>46 (6.2)</td>
<td>14 (1.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (n=613)</td>
<td>5 (0.8)</td>
<td>17 (2.8)</td>
<td>14 (2.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK (n=1358)</strong></td>
<td><strong>15 (1.1)</strong></td>
<td><strong>63 (4.6)</strong></td>
<td><strong>28 (2.1)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent (n=430)</td>
<td>2 (0.5)</td>
<td>14 (3.3)</td>
<td>3 (0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times (n=375)</td>
<td>5 (1.3)</td>
<td>34 (9.2)</td>
<td>8 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRELAND (n=805)</strong></td>
<td><strong>7 (0.9)</strong></td>
<td><strong>48 (6.0)</strong></td>
<td><strong>11 (1.4)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=2960)</td>
<td>25 (0.8)</td>
<td>138 (4.7)</td>
<td>44 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Many actors, the Finnish and Irish governments included, emphasised the role of the UN in dealing with the Iraq crisis. Yet, the Finnish press did not feature the argument more frequently than the UK press. Once again, *Ilta-Sanomat* had a different approach than the other Finnish newspapers and it hardly dealt with the demands for a UN-led process. Yet again, the *Irish Times* and *Turun Sanomat* appeared to be most critical of unilateral military action and differences especially between the Irish newspapers were significant.

Finally, table 10.7 presents how the potential consequences of the invasion were covered. The UK press dealt with the prospect of democratic Iraq and heightened threat of terrorism most frequently. Again, the different editorial policies on the war are reflected in the results. The *Independent* made far more references to the possibility that the invasion will incite more terrorism than the *Telegraph* which focused mainly on the positive effects of the invasion. In addition, although the *Independent* was enthusiastic about the possibility of democracy taking root in Iraq, it was more sceptical than the *Telegraph*. Meanwhile, the *Irish Times* discussed the possibility of a civil war in Iraq more often than the other newspapers. For instance, Lara Marlowe's report, 'Bloody reprisals may follow Saddam's end' (19 March), from Baghdad discussed the violence that could follow the invasion. Overall, however, the prospect of civil war was only mentioned in less than one per cent of the items. Once again the government policy line does not seem to predict the results as the Finnish press did not focus on the possible negative consequences of the war more than the Irish and the British press.
Table 10.7. References to possible consequences of the war (percentage in brackets).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic Iraq</th>
<th>Increased threat of terrorism</th>
<th>Civil war</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Invoked</td>
<td>Questioned</td>
<td>Invoked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=446)</td>
<td>6 (1.4)</td>
<td>6 (1.3)</td>
<td>7 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=127)</td>
<td>2 (1.6)</td>
<td>4 (3.1)</td>
<td>3 (2.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=224)</td>
<td>4 (1.8)</td>
<td>1 (0.4)</td>
<td>2 (0.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FINLAND (n=797)</strong></td>
<td>12 (1.5)</td>
<td>11 (1.4)</td>
<td>12 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (n=745)</td>
<td>26 (3.5)</td>
<td>16 (2.2)</td>
<td>38 (5.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (n=613)</td>
<td>18 (3.0)</td>
<td>6 (1.0)</td>
<td>9 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK (n=1358)</strong></td>
<td>44 (3.3)</td>
<td>22 (1.6)</td>
<td>47 (3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent (n=430)</td>
<td>12 (2.8)</td>
<td>5 (1.2)</td>
<td>12 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times (n=375)</td>
<td>8 (2.2)</td>
<td>5 (1.3)</td>
<td>12 (3.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IRELAND (n=805)</strong></td>
<td>20 (2.5)</td>
<td>10 (1.2)</td>
<td>24 (3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (n=2960)</td>
<td>76 (2.6)</td>
<td>43 (1.5)</td>
<td>83 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10.3 PRESS COVERAGE REFLECTS ELITE OPINION?

H3. In Finland, the elite and the public shared the anti-war position. Therefore, the coverage should have been uniformly and unambiguously anti-war and also reflect the opposition's criticism of the government.

The Finnish case clearly indicates that a national consensus on a foreign policy issue is not necessarily enough to guarantee media coverage which unambiguously reflects the uniformity of views between domestic foreign policy elite and the public. Regardless of the Finnish government's anti-war stance, the Finnish press coverage of the war did not strike as particularly critical of the invasion in comparison to the Irish Times or Britain's Independent which operated in a very different and polarised political environments. Yet, Turun Sanomat's coverage of the crisis was sympathetic to anti-war views and none of the Finnish newspapers adopted a pro-war editorial policy.

What clearly sets Finland apart from Ireland and the UK is that the Finnish foreign policy elite hardly engaged in a debate over Iraq. The executive branch of the government said very little of the crisis. Statements adopted by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy were very short and avoided choosing sides between the US and European anti-war states. This was not surprising considering that (at least) since President Urho Kekkonen's famous speech in the United Nations in 1961, caution has been the foundation of Finnish foreign policy. He argued that "[r]ather than as judges we see ourselves here as
physicians: it is not for us to pass judgement nor to condemn, it is rather to diagnose and try to cure” (quoted in Vogt 2004, 63).

Table 10.8. Use of domestic political elite sources in the Finnish press (percentage in brackets).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Executive branch</th>
<th>Centre Party Leader</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President Halonen</td>
<td>PM Lipponen</td>
<td>Centre Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingin Sanomat (n=446)</td>
<td>1 (0.2)</td>
<td>7 (1.6)</td>
<td>5 (1.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turun Sanomat (n=127)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (0.8)</td>
<td>4 (3.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilta-Sanomat (n=240)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 (1.3)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINLAND (n=797)</td>
<td>1 (0.1)</td>
<td>11 (1.4)</td>
<td>9 (1.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In accordance with the Finnish foreign policy tradition, the emphasis of the Finnish policy in the Iraq crisis was on the United Nations. For example, Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja said in mid-February that “journalists came to ask whether we support Tony Blair or the French-German proposals [about strengthening the arms inspections]. The answer one must give, of course, that we support the United Nations” (quoted in Vogt 2004, 65). In fact, Henri Vogt argued in the *Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy* 2004 (p. 66) that

"Apart from this emphasis on the desired leadership of the United Nations, and the argument that Iraq had to comply unconditionally with the resolutions of the Security Council, it is strikingly difficult to find any general pattern of argumentation in the pre-war Finnish official debate. In fact, leading Finnish politicians seemed none too willing to engage in public intellectual debate about the pros and cons of the possible war against Iraq. Surprisingly seldom did they, and those in government in particular, try to argue in terms of international law, ponder what the war might mean to the international order or take any strong normative positions either in favour of or against the war; these tasks were left to a few intellectuals.”

The analysis of newspaper coverage for this study supports Vogt's observation. In effect, the Finnish political elite let foreign actors, of which the US was the most important, to define the situation to great extent. Only about 5% of Finnish items quoted domestic governmental sources (executive branch of the government and representatives of political parties). Finnish anti-war activists/demonstrators/human shields did not have much say either. They were quoted in only six items (0.8% of items) and religious leaders in five

200 Although Lipponen and Tuomioja are in the executive branch in the table, they resigned from their post on 17 April 2003 and, therefore, did not continue in their posts during the final week of analysis (2-8 May 2003). By then, Centre Party Leader Anneli Jääteemäki had taken up the duties of the prime minister. Of the eleven items that quoted Lipponen, four were published in May when his government had already resigned. In the case of Tuomioja two out of nine items quoting him were published in May. Half of the items quoting Jääteemäki were published in May when she had already taken up the premiership.
items. Less than two per cent of the items quoted Finnish expert sources such as university professors although they did write several articles for the newspapers. For instance, Juha-Antero Puistola from the Finnish National Defence University wrote in *Ilta-Sanomat* regularly during the war.

Nevertheless, with regard to the controversy over the Finnish Iraq policy, the media did seem to side with the executive branch of the government rather than with opposition leader Anneli Jäätteenmäki. Centre Party leader Jäätteenmäki was alone in challenging the government's Iraq policy and did not receive much support for her views even from the senior figures of her own party. Her views lacked support from the rest of the political elite and, consequently, she lost the argument. 'Iraqgate' did not become a story of PM Lipponen promising President Bush support in the US campaign against Iraq but a story of her own lack of judgment in using an advisor to the President as a source of classified information in an effort to politicise a serious foreign policy issue ahead of general elections.

The coverage of the Finnish 'Iraqgate' was sporadic and the issue did not attract much attention during the four periods of analysis. A clear indication of this is that Jäätteenmäki was quoted in only five items in the entire Finnish sample. The critical period in this argument was in early March when Jäätteenmäki openly criticised PM Lipponen in a televised election debate (6 March) for aligning Finland with US-led coalition against Iraq in his trip to Washington – against the instructions of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy which emphasised that Finland would participate in any potential post-war activities only under the UN framework. Jäätteenmäki also argued that the fact that Finland was invited to a so-called coalition briefing by US Under Secretary State Marc Grossman in February was further evidence in support of her argument. Grossman had said that countries that had promised some kind support for the US against Iraq had been invited to the briefing. For instance, Germany, France and Sweden had not been invited.

An editorial in *Helsingin Sanomat* (8 March) argued that "despite repeated attempts Jäätteenmäki has failed to show where the beef is” in her criticism of PM Lipponen's Iraq policy. It concluded that Jäätteenmäki's accusations miss the target and only jeopardize her credibility as a PM candidate. Strangely, on the same day, another story in the newspaper headlined “Finnish government took a more critical stance on the Iraq War – The US interpreted Finland as her supporter till last week”. Foreign Minister Tuomioja confirmed that the US had misinterpreted the Finnish Iraq policy which was consequently revised.
Previously it had only stated that military action requires a UN mandate but now it was added that unilateral use of force is “unacceptable”. Former Prime Minister Harri Holkeri defended Lipponen in *Helsingin Sanomat* on 7 March and Max Jakobson, a former ambassador, discredited Jääätteenmäki’s argument in *Ilta-Sanomat* on 11 March. *Ilta-Sanomat* quoted Jakobson who argued that it is ”completely foolish to think that an invitation to the briefing would mean joining the US-led coalition”. On 8 March, Tampere-based *Aamulehti* published a column (‘Brave, but not wise’) which also took the position that Jääätteenmäki’s argument did not make any sense. On 9 March, *Helsingin Sanomat* shortly reviewed the editorials of other Finnish newspapers. It published extracts from *Ilta-Sanomat* and *Turun Sanomat* both of which criticised Jääätteenmäki for playing with foreign policy in a way that harms Finland's relations with the US. *Turun Sanomat* went as far as stating that the pieces of information that Jääätteenmäki presented in the televised election debate are ”most likely false”. *Ilta-Sanomat* was equally harsh arguing that ”Jääätteenmäki’s statements are not based on facts”.

On 10 March, classified documents were leaked to national tabloid newspapers *Ilta-Sanomat* and *Iltalehti* which published extracts of them on the following day. *Ilta-Sanomat* (‘Bush thanked Finland for ”joining the coalition”’, 11 March) reported on the secret memorandum but was careful not to interpret the content in any way. Instead, the report settled to interviewing the Finnish diplomat in Washington who had drafted the leaked memorandum on the Grossman briefing. On the same day, *Helsingin Sanomat* published another editorial (‘The Iraq Crisis requires a careful handling also in Finland’, 11 March) with softened criticism of Jääätteenmäki. It merely repeated Jääätteenmäki's allegations and continued by stating that ”whatever one thinks of Jääätteenmäki's criticism it targets a sensitive issue at a sensitive time.” *Helsingin Sanomat* argued that slight adjustment of Finnish policy line was welcomed but the domestic row over relations with the US was not.

Meanwhile, Lipponen insisted that the situation was different in December 2002 and the “coalition” refers to the international coalition behind the UN Security Council Resolution 1441 and the coalition against terror (‘Lipponen criticises the Centre Party for deliberate confusion’, *Helsingin Sanomat*, 12 March).

Seppo Huiku (2004) has analysed how regional newspapers covered the argument over Finland's Iraq policy between 7–18 March. He argues that the editors-in-chief of regional
newspapers were exercising caution in commenting on the argument between Jääätteenmäki and Lipponen. For instance, *Pohjolan Sanomat* and *Keskipohjanmaa*, both of which used to be affiliated with the Centre Party until declaring to be free from party political affiliations, adopted quite neutral positions (Huiku 2004, 57). However, *Turun Sanomat* continued to criticise Jääätteenmäki even after the tabloids had published extracts from the classified memos which arguably lent some credibility for her allegations. In its editorial on 13 March, *Turun Sanomat* basically argued that Jääätteenmäki had made a mountain out of a molehill in the Iraq policy dispute. Nevertheless, Jääätteenmäki received sporadic support in the media. For instance, a radio column on YLE1 by Jaana Airaksinen (2003) on 11 March argued that “we know for certain that Prime Minister Lipponen has given the impression in December that Finland has joined the US-led coalition that supports a war against Iraq”. Also an editorial in *Ilkka* (8 March), a regional newspaper based in Seinäjoki, argued that Jääätteenmäki's criticism led to the adjustment of the government policy.

While Jääätteenmäki's allegations about PM Paavo Lipponen's promises to President Bush in December 2002 might have secured the victory for the Centre Party in very closely contested general elections in March 2003 (e.g. Vogt 2004), the strategy soon backfired. With rest of the media following *Ilta-Sanomat*'s lead, the attention soon turned to the question of who had given Jääätteenmäki access to secret Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents. Eventually, her political credibility eroded with evasive answers to reporters' questions.

201 The Centre Party got 6,300 votes – and two parliamentary seats – more than the Social Democratic Party (Downs & Riutta 2005, 424).

202 During the final period of analysis (2-8 May), *Ilta-Sanomat* continued to investigate whether Jääätteenmäki had received classified Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents on the Finnish Iraq policy. In fact, 7 out of the 25 items included for analysis in May dealt with the Finnish foreign policy controversy over Iraq. Meanwhile, *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Turun Sanomat* were not aggressively pursuing this story.

On 5 May, one of the articles in *Ilta-Sanomat* (“The Iraq debate has not weakened Finland's relations with the US”) defended Jääätteenmäki. Two prominent foreign policy experts were interviewed for the article for their response to former PM Paavo Lipponen's claims in a television interview that the row over Finland's Iraq policy has severely harmed relations with the US. Both experts rejected this claim. Moreover, Ulla Appelsin's opinion piece (“No more Iraq dispute, thank you!”, *Ilta-Sanomat*, 5 May) argued that the debate on the controversy over Finland's Iraq policy is getting tiresome. She asked why the former Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen continues the Iraq debate which he finds so harmful to Finnish-US relations and suggested that “Paavo” should stop whining about how Jääätteenmäki challenged him during the election campaign and “change the record”. These were among the few articles that were supportive of Jääätteenmäki.

On 8 May, Pekka Ervasti wrote an article ('Secret Iraq memo was first leaked to Jääätteenmäki?') which argued that the police has to consider hearing Jääätteenmäki in
questions and the realisation that she had received the classified document from Martti Manninen – an advisor to President Halonen. Consequently, Jääätteenmäki resigned on 24 June. Henna Virkkunen (2004), who has analysed media coverage of the Iraqgate in June 2003, argues that the media played a central role in the events that led to Jääätteenmäki's resignation – especially Ilta-Sanomat which seemed determined to prove that she was a liar. Ilta-Sanomat ran a headline "Resign, Anneli [Jääätteenmäki]!" on 10 June and a week later it revealed that President's advisor had leaked classified memos to her (Virkkunen 2004). Virkkunen (2004, 18) argues that “the most central question, the disagreements within the political elite over Iraq policy and coalitions in general, were ignored by the media which were focussed on tracking who had leaked the memos to Jääätteenmäki”.

The tabloid newspapers (Ilta-Sanomat and Ilta-lehti), which had the classified memos in their possession, failed to challenge the government on another but related issue. When Hymy magazine published the leaked memos unedited in 2004, it was revealed that the memo on Lipponen's Washington meetings also dealt with plans to sell AMOS-mortars to the US. Ilta-Sanomat's journalist Pekka Ervasti (2004) later argued that the newspaper did not see a point in writing about the AMOS-mortar sales because the issue had received wide media coverage already. However, a search in the Ilta-Sanomat database did not produce any hits for “AMOS” mortars between December 2002 and March 2003. A search in the Helsingin Sanomat database produced only three hits with search words “AMOS” and “mortar” between the 1 December 2002 and 31 June 2003. The first two articles were published in the business section of the newspaper on 23 January and 21 February. Neither story discussed the potential moral and legal implications of selling weapons to a country which was clearly preparing to invade another country. In the first story ('Vilén sells mortars in the US') the Minister of Foreign Trade mentions that PM Lipponen had also

order to find out who leaked the classified documents. The article does not discuss the actual policy controversy and bypasses the issue merely by noting that Jääätteenmäki used the documents to accuse Lipponen for attaching Finland to the war coalition or, at minimum, giving such an expression. The headline of the story is also strange as it carried no new information. In fact, Ilta-Sanomat had ran almost identical headline already in March. The same day Ilta-Sanomat ran another story on what eventually become known as the Iraqgate. Mika Lehto reported from Tallinn where PM Jääätteenmäki was preparing for a meeting with Lennart Meri – former President of Estonia. Lehto asked her how it was possible that she had published exact quotes from classified documents in her blog in the run-up to the election. She insisted that she did not possess any classified documents and that the information was based on hearsay: “I have two ears.” The third story explained date by date how the dispute over the Iraq policy had evolved. On 14 May, Ilta-Sanomat reported on its front page that the police wanted to question Jääätteenmäki. She resigned little over a month later.
talked about the mortars with the Bush administration during his Washington visit. The second story was about the government granting a permission to Patria, the manufacturer of the weapons systems, to sell the license of the AMOS mortar to a US company. The third article was published in the national section on 15 March. It focused on a deal between the manufacturer Patria and the Finnish Defence Forces and made no reference to the US. So, Ervasti's argument about wide coverage of the issue seems rather strange considering that the biggest tabloid newspaper (IS) had not mentioned the issue at all and the nation's leading newspaper (HS) had barely mentioned the mortar sales. The guiding principle in Finnish arms sales is that Finland does not sell weapons to conflict areas or countries that are engaged in a war (Niskasaari 2004) and Lipponen's conduct in Washington is questionable in this regard. After all, the US was clearly engaged in Afghanistan, it seemed determined to attack Iraq and, in fact, had secretly stepped up bombing campaign in Iraq's no-fly zones in August 2002 – several months before the actual invasion begun (Tiedonantaja 2004; Curtis 2003, 41). Nevertheless, the tabloids ignored this issue.

In sum, the national consensus – which seemed to include the political elite, the media and the public – did not lead to one-sided anti-war reporting. This was largely because the political elite were unwilling to engage in a substantial debate over Iraq. The media seemed largely willing to retain same kind of caution as the government. With regard to the national controversy, there was no genuine elite dissensus as Jäätteenmäki was left alone with her criticism of PM Lipponen. The media was largely dismissive of her criticism and soon became more interested in her source of information rather than in Lipponen's promises to the Bush administration. The media's subservience to the official policy was further demonstrated in Ilta-Sanomat's decision not to write about the mortar sales – let alone to investigate the issue with similar enthusiasm as its reporters were working on finding out who had leaked the classified documents to Jäätteenmäki.

**H4. If media coverage reflects "the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate" in accordance with Bennett's indexing hypothesis (Bennett 1990, 106), the Irish and British press coverage should convey a wide range of opinion on the US/UK invasion and Ireland's stop-over policy.**

The results of the content analysis clearly showed that Iraq was an issue which divided both the Irish and the British press. The Telegraph was largely supportive of the war while
the *Independent* heavily criticised the invasion especially in the run-up to the war. Although the contrast between the Irish newspapers was not as dramatic as in the UK, a similar difference in approach can be seen between them. For instance, the *Irish Times* emphasised humanitarian concerns to a much greater extent than its competitor the *Irish Independent*. Yet, all newspapers included both pro-war and anti-war opinion pieces although the *Telegraph* tended to run critical commentaries mostly in April and May rather than in the run-up to the war.

The *Irish Times* and the *Independent*, which were critical of the war, tended to quote oppositional sources slightly more than their national competitors. On the other hand, the *Independent* also quoted executive branch sources more frequently than the *Telegraph*. The *Independent* quoted Conservative party sources in 2.6% of the items while the corresponding number for the *Telegraph* was 3.6%. Labour party sources were quoted in 3.4% in the *Independent* and in 3.9% of the items in the *Telegraph*. With regard to quoting the views of anti-war activists or protesters, 2.1% of *Independent* items quoted them and 1.8% of *Telegraph* items. So, the newspapers did not differ very much in terms of the use of domestic sources apart from the *Independent*'s reliance on Blair and the relevant cabinet ministers. Overall, domestic elite sources were used a lot more than in the Finnish press.

Table 10.9. Use of domestic political elite sources in the UK newspapers (percentage in brackets).  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Executive branch</th>
<th>The critics of the invasion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PM Blair</td>
<td>Foreign Minister Straw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (n=745)</td>
<td>60 (8.1)</td>
<td>21 (2.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily Telegraph (n=613)</td>
<td>38 (6.2)</td>
<td>12 (2.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK (n=1358)</td>
<td>98 (7.2)</td>
<td>33 (2.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to the Shannon issue in Ireland, the *Irish Independent* avoided picking sides in its editorial on 23 March ('Cracks appear in Dail argument for use of Shannon airport') following the Dáil debate. Instead it presented the government and opposition views and pointed out some problems with both points of view.

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203The Labour party members which were coded separately can be seen in the table above and they were not included in these figures.

204Although Clare Short was a part of the executive branch as a Secretary of State for International Development, she mostly appeared in the news as a critic of Blair's Iraq policy.
“Originally, the Government had defended the Shannon arrangement largely on the grounds that the facility bolstered the credible threat of force that underpinned Resolution 1441. This warned of "serious consequences" (military action) if Iraq failed to disarm.

This, however, now raises an obvious question for the Government. If the overflight and landing facilities for the US military were justified on that basis of that UN authority, then how are the continuance of those arrangements now justified, given the lack of any UN authority for US military action.

Irish military neutrality, never a very meaningful concept, has become increasingly meaningless.”

Similarly, the Irish Times presented views for and against the stop-over policy. For instance, ahead of an anti-war protest at Shannon airport, the newspaper ran two commentary pieces with the headline 'Are the Shannon protesters right?' (17 January) and with different answers to the question. Richard Boyd Barrett, Chair of the Irish Anti-War Movement, was among those who defended the protest together with one participant in the Shannon peace camp who argued that:

"In our democratic society peace activists have been thrown out of the airport, had camera film taken and have even been arrested for merely watching military planes. We believe that larger weapons such as hand-held anti-aircraft weapons are on board the chartered cargo planes. The police will not inspect these planes even though it is required by law. We must wait for Mr Cowen's [Foreign Minister] next admission to find out what they are carrying. ”

Fine Gael TD (member of the Irish parliament) John Deasy, in turn, adopted completely different approach:

"Let's not forget who stopped Hitler, Milosevic and the Communist dictatorships that murdered millions and deprived millions of others their basic freedoms. It wasn't our home-grown, left-leaning smug intellectuals who revel in portraying American policy-makers as trigger-happy land-grabbers. The people who have done more to promote global democracy and stability are the ones going through Shannon right now. They are our best hope of combating fundamentalist Islamic terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons into the hands of madmen. We need them more than they need us. Our neutrality will not protect us from religious extremism and despots. I am not a warmonger but I believe that action may need to be taken against a man who has engaged in genocide against his own people and has consistently threatened chaos in the Middle East.”

In an editorial on 5 February ('Complacency over Shannon airport'), the Irish Times defended the right to protest but supported the government policy by arguing that

"The movement of US troops through Shannon is taking place under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1441 which, under threat of troop deployment and other measures, gave Iraq a final opportunity to comply with arms inspections and to destroy any weapons of mass destruction. Ireland supported that resolution and it passed unanimously. Some weeks ago, in order to facilitate the United States, long-standing regulations which prohibited the passage of armed foreign troops through our airports were amended.”

205 Fine Gael leadership criticised the government policy but the party was divided over the stop-over policy.
However, as discussed in chapter 7, by the time the war begun, the *Irish Times* expressed more critical views on the Shannon decision than the *Irish Independent*.

Table 10.10. Use of domestic political elite sources in the Irish newspapers (percentage in brackets).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Executive branch</th>
<th>Opposition parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taoiseach Ahern</td>
<td>Foreign Minister Cowen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Independent</td>
<td>15 (3.5)</td>
<td>6 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish Times</td>
<td>16 (4.3)</td>
<td>8 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>IRELAND</em> (n=805)</td>
<td>28 (3.5)</td>
<td>14 (1.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10.4 PRESS COVERAGE REFLECTS THE US GOVERNMENT VIEW?

H5. *US government and military sources are the main sources of information regardless of national foreign policies.*

Hypothesis 5 argued that the media rely heavily on US government and military sources regardless of their foreign policy orientation. As can be seen in table 10.1, the US government was the most important foreign news source for all seven newspapers. The confirmation of this hypothesis points to a major difference between the US and smaller nations in the world. According to previous research, foreign sources only play a role if there is a consensus within the national foreign policy elite in the US (Althaus et al 1996). When looking at other countries, however, the US is a major source of information for the world media as its power over the events is translated into newsworthiness. As Zaller and Chiu (1999, 24) have argued, the “capacity to foretell or affect future events” increases the newsworthiness of the source. Consequently, the governments of smaller nations cannot expect to have such dominance over their domestic media as the US government has. Only in the UK, which took part in the military invasion thus being able to control information flows, the domestic elite and military was on equal footing with US sources.

H6. *US views are widely reproduced in media coverage regardless of national foreign policies.*

Another hypothesis considering the case for war assumed that the US/UK allegations would be widely reproduced regardless of the government policy of the medium's host.
government. They did receive moderate coverage but only the argument about Iraqi WMD capability was very widely covered. It was very high on the agenda in the first two weeks of analysis (in early February and in mid-March) and became increasingly challenged in April and May as the US/UK forces were unable to find forbidden weapons in Iraq. The arguments about the Iraqi threat and links to terrorism did not stay on the agenda in Iraq. April and May which explains fewer references to these issues. To conclude, H6 is confirmed in a sense that the US/UK arguments were widely reproduced in the run-up to the war and the first few days of the invasion but, as the arguments did not serve a similar purpose in April and May, they received much less coverage. However, the argument about Iraqi WMD stayed on the surface but mainly in the context of the US/UK ability to deliver the evidence of their existence. Moreover, the UK press reproduced the arguments for war more often than the Finnish and the Irish press indicating that government policy line may have been a factor.

H7. Finnish and Irish newspapers that depended on Anglo-American news agencies or organisations as the origin of their articles are more sympathetic to US/UK views than newspapers that relied on their own foreign correspondents.

Studies that analysed media coverage of the Iraq War in South East Asian countries suggested that articles relying on news agency copy tended to be more supportive of the war than stories provided by newspapers' own correspondents (Maslog et al 2006, Lee et al 2006). This study produced similar results.

Ilta-Sanomat was the least critical of the Finnish newspapers. In part, this resulted from the small number of opinion pieces on Iraq: over 80% of the items dealing with Iraq were news articles. Another reason for the apparent lack of critical coverage was that its coverage in general was more superficial than the coverage of quality dailies. Besides the few reports from the Norwegian unilateral journalist in Baghdad, Ilta-Sanomat relied on Anglo-American news organisations in its Iraq coverage. Nearly one fifth of its coverage – 18% of its items – acknowledged only Anglo-American news agencies or other news organisations such as the CNN and the British tabloid the Sun. Helsingin Sanomat also largely depended on its own network of foreign correspondents. Nearly 8% of the items were filed from Iraq (including those that an embed reporter filed from the Kuwaiti border) and other foreign correspondents provided another 24% of the
items. Yet, Anglo-American news agencies were acknowledged in 17.5% of the articles. Meanwhile, only 5.4% of the items acknowledged other than Anglo-American news agencies and little over one per cent acknowledged both Anglo-American and non-Anglo-American news agencies. In contrast, *Turun Sanomat* tended to favour the Finnish STT and French AFP over Anglo-American AP or Reuters. 11% of articles in *Turun Sanomat* acknowledged only non-Anglo-American news agencies and nearly 16% acknowledged both. None of the articles in *Turun Sanomat* acknowledged an Anglo-American news agency as a sole source. As shown in this and previous chapters, *Turun Sanomat* was more critical of the war than its competitors.

The *Irish Times* published 132 (35.2%) items which were filed by its own foreign correspondents. The corresponding number for the *Irish Independent* was just 25 (5.8%). However, unlike the Finnish newspapers, the *Irish Independent* did not rely on news agencies. Instead it published a total of 77 items from the *Times* (of London), 65 from the *Telegraph* and 71 from the *Independent*/*Independent News Service*. While these articles did not provide uniformly pro-war views (due to the divisions in the UK press over Iraq), the high number of *Telegraph* articles alone ensured that the *Irish Independent*'s coverage of the war was more sympathetic to the invasion than that of the *Irish Times*.206

To conclude, there seemed to be a connection between the dependence on Anglo-American news organisations and the coverage being sympathetic to the US/UK views – or at least being less critical of the war.

**10.5 CONCLUSION**

Empirical analysis of Irish, Finnish and British newspaper coverage seems to suggest that there are several factors besides the government policy line that influence the way in which the media covers international politics. Government policy alone did not explain the findings on the use of sources, selection of topics or how some of the main arguments concerning the war were covered. Consequently, the analysis fell well short of validating the executive version of the manufacturing consent paradigm.

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206One of the most striking differences between the *Telegraph* and the *Independent* is also worth noting. Embedded reporters provided nearly seven per cent of *Telegraph*'s Iraq coverage. The *Independent* had not embraced the embedding programme to the same degree. Less than one per cent of the its Iraq coverage was provided by embeds.
This chapter also discussed the US ability to influence media coverage in European countries. The analysis indicated that the US government was the most important foreign source for all newspapers. Moreover, the Bush administration was able to set the agenda but its arguments did not go without criticism. For instance, the argument about Iraqi links to terrorism was widely questioned while the WMD claim was more successful – at least initially.

The findings were largely consistent with the elite version of the manufacturing consent paradigm in the Irish and British cases. Elite dissensus in both countries led to criticism of the government policies in the press. Especially in Britain, the newspapers chose sides in the argument. In Ireland, the *Irish Independent* tended to side with the government on the Shannon issue and be more sympathetic toward US/UK views than the *Irish Times* which adopted an anti-war editorial policy.
CONCLUSION

11.1 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH SETTING

From the beginning, it was clear that Iraq posed more of a public relations than military challenge for the US-led coalition. While the US struggled to mobilize support for military action, European governments had to determine their positions. The dissensus over Iraq on both international and national levels offered a rich setting for a cross-national research to test some assumptions about media-foreign policy relationship originating mainly from American political communication literature. This line of research suggests that the government policy line and national elite opinion are the most important factors in explaining how the media cover international politics. The aim was to investigate whether they have explanatory power in democracies in more general terms.

This study focused on three European states which adopted different policies with regard to Iraq: Finland (anti-war), Ireland (neutral) and the UK (pro-war). The study employed both quantitative and qualitative content analysis in order to determine the range of sources, selection of topics and the tone of the press coverage of the Iraq crisis and controversial national Iraq policies. The content analysis procedure was designed to capture the actual substance of the foreign policy debates rather than adopting a somewhat simple content categories along the lines of 'critical'/uncritical' or 'hawkish'/dovish' which have been used in some earlier studies. The sample consisted of two daily quality newspapers from different ends of the political spectrum in Ireland and the UK. In the case of Finland, the only national quality daily Helsingin Sanomat was selected for the study. However, in the absence of another national daily, a regional quality newspaper Turun Sanomat and the biggest national tabloid newspaper Ilta-Sanomat were included from Finland. Main periods of analysis covered four weeks at critical phases of the Iraq crisis between February and May 2003.
11.2 SUMMATION OF FINDINGS

Based on previous research, it was assumed that the government policy together with elite opinion would explain how the Iraq crisis and controversies relating to national Iraq policies were covered by the press. The analysis of nearly 3000 news and opinion items showed, however, that governments' foreign policy line did not explain the differences in press coverage very well as there were clear differences between newspapers operating in the same political system in Ireland and the UK. In those two countries, elite dissensus had both a polarising and stimulating effect on the press coverage of controversial foreign policies.

The UK was America's junior partner in the invasion of Iraq. Nevertheless, PM Tony Blair faced considerable opposition to his policy from the Liberal Democrats and sections of his own Labour Party. As predicted by US-originating political communication research, elite dissensus brought the issue into a 'sphere of legitimate controversy'. This study confirmed the notion that the British press was polarised on the use of military force. There were quite striking differences between the Independent and the Telegraph's coverage of the Iraq crisis in terms of topic selection, sourcing and direction of arguments. Overall, the Independent adopted a critical position toward the invasion although, with the commencement of the invasion, it moderated its views in its leading articles. Ravi (2005, 57) made a similar observation in his analysis of the Guardian's coverage of the war. In fact, the Independent's editorial on 22 March was reminiscent of the extract from the Manchester Guardian at the beginning of the First World War (quoted on page 18 of this study). Yet, the Independent continued to publish critical views even during the war.

The Daily Telegraph, in turn, was quite unambiguously pro-war and its criticism of the government, when it appeared, dealt with the way it was selling the war to the British people in the pre-war stage. However, towards the later stages of the invasion, the Telegraph begun to include more critical voices in its commentary pieces which mostly expressed dissatisfaction with the way that the aftermath of the invasion was handled. Although this research indicates that the Telegraph largely failed to challenge controversial Blair government claims, the judges of the British Press Awards granted a Team of the Year award to the Telegraph journalists that covered the invasion (Daily Telegraph, 18 March 2004). Unlike the Independent, the Telegraph had fully embraced the embedding programme and the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Telegraph both had embedded reporters.
The Irish government avoided taking a clear position on the US/UK invasion of Iraq. While it neither officially supported nor disapproved of the use of military force, it allowed US military aircraft to refuel at Shannon airport despite harsh criticism from several opposition parties and public protest. The Irish press reflected these divisions. Both the *Irish Times* and the *Irish Independent* presented pro-war and anti-war views in their opinion items although the former was more likely to present critical views while the latter tended to adopt positions which were sympathetic to the US/UK case for war. The Irish press also presented both supportive and hostile views on the Irish government's stop-over policy although the *Irish Independent* tended to be more supportive of the government policy. Meanwhile, the *Irish Times* was sympathetic to the opposition views on the Shannon issue. Overall, the fact that the Shannon airport linked Ireland to the invasion had a stimulating effect on public debate. In contrast to Finland, the controversy over national foreign policy on Shannon airport fuelled debate about the legal and moral aspects of not only the stop-over policy but also the US/UK invasion.

In Finland, the government, the political elite and the public opinion were against the use of force. Accordingly, the Finnish newspapers adopted anti-war editorial policies and expressed scepticism on the US/UK case for war especially in the run-up to the war. However, the news stories in the Finnish press did not seem to prioritise anti-war voices, topics or arguments to the same extent as the *Independent* and the *Irish Times* which operated in very different political environments. Although Professor Heikki Luostarinen (2004, 157) from University of Tampere has complimented *Helsingin Sanomat*’s coverage of the invasion for the variety of views and critical judgement, it was the second largest regional newspaper *Turun Sanomat* that stood out as the most critical of the three Finnish newspapers analysed in this study. However, it did not seem to have the resources to independently report on the situation on the ground and, therefore, its coverage put little emphasis on issues such as looting that followed the fall of Baghdad. At the same time, *Helsingin Sanomat* focused on troop movements more than any of the other newspapers analysed here which indicates that it frequently approached the war from a tactical point of view once the attack was launched. *Helsingin Sanomat* was also the only Finnish media outlet that had an embedded reporter with the US troops which might, in part, explain the focus on troop movements.

*Ilta-Sanomat*, in turn, largely avoided such issues as legal and moral justification of the invasion. Perhaps one should expect a tabloid newspaper to focus on the spectacle of war.
rather than more complex issues but, interestingly, a number of European tabloids adopted a different approach. For instance, an Austrian tabloid *Neue Kronen Zeitung* voiced pacifist and anti-American sentiments (although it shifted its focus toward sensational journalism when the war began) (Carfora et al 2005) and Britain's *Daily Mirror* also adopted an aggressive anti-war position (Freedman 2009). Certainly, the Finnish public opinion, which was highly critical of the invasion, would have enabled *Ilta-Sanomat* to adopt a more critical approach.

It is also worth noting that although the Finnish government considered the use of force "unacceptable", the policy was eventually very cautious in accordance with the Finnish foreign policy tradition. For example, the Finnish government refrained from declaring the war illegal as the Swedish government did.\(^{207}\) The newspapers voiced anti-war views in their editorials and commentaries albeit with almost a similar restraint as the Finnish government.

This study shows that national governments are not necessarily important sources for the national press in times of international conflict. This assumption has been an essential element of the notion of the indexing hypothesis (Bennett 1990). Instead, states (and their political elites) that do not directly participate in the hostilities could choose to say very little about an international conflict. In Finland, the national political elite had little interest in engaging into a public debate on such issues as US motivations, the war's legal repercussions or potential consequences for the fragile Middle Eastern security system let alone publicly challenge US/UK claims. With the public opinion strongly against the war and none of the political parties defending the US/UK decision to invade Iraq, the Finnish government had no need to persuade the public behind the official moderate anti-war policy. Consequently, it was largely left to foreign news sources to define the situation and the Finnish press coverage did not stand out as particularly critical of the invasion – although the US/UK claims did not go uncontested in the Finnish newspapers either. In fact, if there had not been general elections in Finland just couple of days before the US/UK launched their attack on Iraq, there probably would not have been the controversy over Finnish Iraq policy and, consequently, there would have been even less public debate on Iraq. Overall, the findings of this study on Finnish press coverage are in line with

\(^{207}\)Over a year later, however, President Tarja Halonen (2004) delivered a speech at the UN General Assembly in which she stated that "Before the war in Iraq, the international community failed, however. Conflicting national interests prevailed over common will. There was not enough commitment to act within the boundaries of Security Council resolutions. Some nations resorted to use of force, which was not compatible with international law.”
Kristensen and Ørsten's (2007, 340) analysis of Danish media coverage of the Iraq War which concluded that "the use of sources and the thematic priorities in the Danish media coverage, particularly after the invasion had begun, can be seen as yet another illustration of the difficulty and rarity of genuinely independent media performance in times of war".

In general, the findings of this study also point out once again that one should be cautious in making generalisations about media coverage of international affairs. There were significant differences between newspapers especially in the UK and Ireland where elite consensus was lacking. Yet, elite opinion did not seem to explain all of the differences between news outlets. To some extent, this study validates Cristina Archetti's (2008b) argument that much of the variation in the news is due to factors at organisational (or even individual) level such as editorial decisions. The sample used in this study indicated that many journalists seemed to have the freedom to express their views even when they were at odds with the editorial line of the newspaper or other staff writers. For instance, the *Independent* adopted an anti-war stance in its editorials, ran Robert Fisk's highly critical articles while also allowing Johann Hari to defend the US/UK decision to use military force against Iraq. Similarly, Kevin Myers's regular column may not have been representative of the *Irish Times*' editorial position on Iraq and neither were Robert Fisk's reports from Iraq in line with the *Irish Independent*'s editorial statements. Consequently, the views of independent journalists seem to explain the range of opinion in the coverage to some extent. Yet, one should keep in mind that the findings also clearly indicate that newspapers operating in the same political system may opt for very different editorial positions along the divisions within the elite. Especially in the case of the *Daily Telegraph*, the editorial position was reflected in much of the news and opinion content. It is worth noting that both the *Independent* and the *Irish Independent* were owned by Independent News & Media but they adopted different editorial positions on the war. So, at least in this case, ownership did not seem to dictate editorial positions let alone news making.

There seems to be another factor that needs to be taken into account in explaining the differences between media outlets' coverage of the conflict. The newspapers had different levels of resources available to them and had adopted different strategies in how to acquire the content for publication. For instance, the *Irish Times* had quite extensive network of

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208Her analysis of international news coverage of 9/11 found little evidence to support the media flows ('Americanization' of news) localisation (newspapers within a country present the same news) and globalisation (newspapers across different countries present all the same news) hypotheses.
correspondents around the world and could, therefore, report on international diplomacy rather independently – especially in comparison to the *Irish Independent* which heavily relied on British quality dailies to provide international coverage. The Finnish newspapers, in turn, were quite dependent on news agencies.

The interesting question, however, is whether the Irish and British newspapers would have expressed their critical views without the elite dissensus that brought the issue in the ‘sphere of legitimate controversy’? Analysis of the Finnish press coverage would suggest that they probably would not have. There were hardly any opinion pieces in the Finnish newspapers that unambiguously supported the invasion although the critical view on the war was not always reflected in the actual news coverage. Unlike wire copy, opinion content is produced locally with the local audience in mind. Apart from *Helsingin Sanomat*, the Finnish newspapers had quite limited resources to cover the crisis independently of Anglo-American content provides. This holds true also with regard to the *Irish Independent* which heavily relied on British quality dailies in its international coverage. Thus, these newspapers (*Turun Sanomat*, *Ilta-Sanomat* and the *Irish Independent*) were dependent on content that was filtered through the news judgements of external actors. The other reason for the Finnish press not standing out more critical of the invasion than the *Independent* or the *Irish Times* is that the kind of heated debate that took place in Britain and Ireland was lacking in Finland due to the high level of elite consensus on the issue. Consequently, the Finnish journalists could not rely on constant supply of critical comments by elite sources.

**11.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE**

With regard to the theoretical contribution, this study addressed the issue of the generality of the theories of media-state relations by investigating whether the US-originated theories of media-state relations have explanatory power in European context and whether they could serve as a basis for providing accurate predictions on how the media covers international conflicts across countries. Apart from American political communication research, the problem with many previous studies in the field is that they have been rather descriptive not having set themselves an explicit objective to theorize the media-foreign policy relationship and make predictions about media behaviour in future conflicts or other foreign and security policy issues (see e.g. Tumber & Palmer 2004, Nikolaev & Hakanen 2006, Nohrstedt & Ottosen 2005, cf. Riegert 1998, Stolle & Hooghe 2005, Archetti 2008).
Another problem with much of previous academic work in this field is that there has been a lack of emphasis on comparative research.

The findings of this study indicate that the states that participate in a conflict can control the information flows. In this particular case, the match was uneven because the Iraqi strategic communications lacked credibility to begin with and the Iraqis did not have the resources and skills that the US-led coalition had. Indeed, the US/UK coalition was rather successful in getting its message across especially after the invasion begun. This was, at least in part, due to the fact that many newspapers relied on Anglo-American news organisations as content providers. Meanwhile, locally produced content, especially opinion content, tended to be more critical of the invasion in Finland. This study also indicated that states that participate in the hostilities are more motivated to control perceptions than non-participating states which might choose to say very little about the conflict. To some extent, this explains why the Finnish press coverage did not stand out as particularly critical of the invasion in comparison to Britain's *Independent*, for example.

What we can also learn from this study, is that when methodological choices aim to capture the actual substance of the foreign policy debate, the findings could be less clear-cut than in studies that adopt simple critical/uncritical dichotomies. There is more variation and nuance in the media coverage than such studies would suggest. Nevertheless, in some respects the coverage was quite similar across countries and outlets. For instance, many critical issues that were not raised by elite sources tended to remain in the margins of the debate. This was the case with the question of oil in the invasion of Iraq. By and large, references to possible oil-related motives for the invasion were confined to one obscure sentence with very little in-depth analysis of the issue. Meanwhile, opinion polls indicated that the public believed oil was an important factor in the events. In this regard, this study gives support to Thussu's claim that the geopolitical interests of the West often go unreported in war coverage (see Thussu 2002 and 2004).

The empirical contribution of the study shows how the invasion of Iraq was covered by selected European press and how the coverage might have differed across countries and dailies. The empirical research done on the Finnish and Irish media coverage of foreign policy issues, let alone the Iraq War, is very limited for the time being.\footnote{Phelan's (2005) article on Irish media coverage and Männistö's (2004) analysis of news photography in *Helsingin Sanomat* and *Aamulehti* are exceptions in this regard.} In this regard, this
study is an important step towards cumulative knowledge of press-state relations during international crisis in these countries. Clearly, the literature on British coverage of the Iraq War is much more extensive including both print and electronic media but the *Independent* has often been excluded from the analysis (see e.g. Ravi 2005, Tumber & Palmer 2004, Robertson 2004). Moreover, much of the existing research done on the subject in Britain has been descriptive rather than theoretically informed.

11.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

It is important to bear in mind the limitations of this study. First of all, this study is not an audience study and, consequently, it does not really make a direct contribution to the understanding of the relationship between media coverage and public opinion. Undoubtedly, research that deals with the foreign policy–media–public opinion triangle is in great demand but such ambition is beyond this research project. Another important limitation is that this thesis is not a newsroom study either. In other words, it does not make a direct contribution toward understanding how choices are made in the newsrooms.

Instead, this study focuses on the journalistic output and identifies patterns in the press coverage of the Iraq crisis in the spring of 2003. However, even in this regard, there are some caveats. The analysis is largely limited to two quality dailies in the UK and Ireland (although the *Sunday Tribune* was included in the qualitative analysis) and three Finnish newspapers during four seven-day periods. Although analysis of electronic media – television and radio – during the same period could produce similar results, this is by no means certain. Previous research seems to indicate that, by and large, television coverage tends to take a less critical approach to wars than print media in the US (Peer & Chestnut 1995). However, it is worth noting that European media systems significantly differ from the US media system in this regard. The three European countries that were the subject of this study have strong public broadcasting traditions.

A further limitation is that this study did not include analysis of news photography. Photographs were excluded because they are not readily available via electronic databases and retrieving hard copies of seven newspapers in three different countries would have been too costly and time-consuming in relation to the potential benefits of such effort. Finally, the validity of the findings could always be enhanced by including more media outlets and extending the periods of analysis.
11.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES

Three steps need to be taken to improve our understanding of media-foreign policy relationship across countries. First, looking at more cases would be helpful. For instance, an analysis of how the press in these three countries has covered the Afghanistan conflict at its different stages would be interesting for several reasons. This would eliminate one of the major differences that existed in the Iraq Crisis between Finland and the UK especially. While the UK participated in the Iraq invasion, Finland did not. In the case of Afghanistan, however, Finland has sent troops to assist the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). In turn, Ireland's contribution to ISAF has been minimal but a contribution nevertheless. Has the Afghanistan coverage differed across countries? How the participation in the international operation has been justified to domestic audiences? Who have participated in the public debate (if there has been one)? Has there been criticism of government policy in the media coverage?

Secondly, looking at more countries would give clearer indications of the similarities and differences of media-foreign policy relationship across countries. This would also be helpful in identifying the factors that determine the nature of this relationship. With regard to the example in the previous paragraph, Denmark, for instance, would be an interesting case because it has suffered heavy casualties in Afghanistan and, yet, public support for participation in ISAF has remained high until very recently. At the same time, it is not too dissimilar to the countries analysed in this study.

Finally, looking at other foreign policy fields such as environmental policy is needed. As Mette Anthonsen (2003, 301) notes drawing general conclusions about media foreign policy relationship would ultimately require looking also other foreign policy fields than military conflict. So far, cross-national research on other policy areas in this field of research is rather thin.
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Appendix A: Codebook

Instruction: Code only stories about the Iraq crisis/war and national Iraq policies in Finland, Ireland and the UK.

Use the codes specified for each category, but in cases of severe doubt or where it is not possible to determine the right code, use:

99. Not possible to determine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V1 Story identification number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V2 Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V2a Day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V2b Month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V3 Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Helsingin Sanomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Turun Sanomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Ilta-Sanomat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 The Independent/Independent on Sunday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 The Daily Telegraph/Sunday Telegraph</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 The Irish Independent/Sunday Independent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 The Irish Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V4 Type of text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Editorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Commentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Letter to the editor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 'Quotes of the Day'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V5 Origin of the text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Unilateral correspondent in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Embedded correspondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 Other foreign correspondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04 Anglo-American news agency (e.g. AP, Reuters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 Other news agency (e.g. AFP, STT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06 Mixed news agency (both Anglo-American and non-Anglo-American)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 Other newspaper, which ____________?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>08 Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V6 Is there a reference to the cruelty and aggression of the Saddam regime?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes   No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V7 Is there positive reference to the Saddam regime (for instance being a former Western ally)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes   No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V8 Are anti-war protests/movement mentioned in neutral or positive way?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes   No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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V9 Are anti-war protests/movement portrayed negatively (e.g. as a threat to public order)?
   Yes    No

V10 Is the Franco-German peace plan mentioned in neutral or positive way?
   Yes    No

V11 Is the Franco-German peace plan portrayed negatively?
   Yes    No

V12 Which of the arguments are mentioned (multiple answers possible)
   01 Iraq has links to terrorism mentioned
   02 Iraq has weapons of mass destruction
   03 Iraqi people will welcome regime change
   04 Iraq has missiles exceeding UN imposed range limit
   05 Iraq is a threat to its neighbours and/or wider international community
   06 War against Iraq is legal
   07 War against Iraq is justified (not in a legal sense)
   08 Iraq is cooperating with the UN weapons inspectors
   09 Evidence against Iraq is solid and sufficient
   10 Situation with Iraq should be solved through the UN

V13 Which of the following arguments are questioned (multiple answers possible)
   01 Iraq has links to terrorism mentioned
   02 Iraq has weapons of mass destruction
   03 Iraqi people will welcome regime change
   04 Iraq has missiles exceeding UN imposed range limit
   05 Iraq is a threat to its neighbours and/or wider international community
   06 War against Iraq is legal
   07 War against Iraq is justified (not in a legal sense)
   08 Iraq is cooperating with the UN weapons inspectors
09 Evidence against Iraq is solid and sufficient
10 Situation with Iraq should be solved through the UN

**V14 Which of the possible rationales for war are mentioned?** (multiple answers possible)

01 Disarmament of Iraq: preventing Iraq from developing and using WMDs
02 Hurt terrorist: deny al-Qaeda a friendly harbour, WMDs, or other type of support
03 Exporting democracy: portrayed as an attempt to introduce democracy in the Middle East
04 Enforcement of UNSC resolutions/warning of non-compliance
05 Oil-related objectives
06 Expansion of US sphere of influence
07 Supporting Israel
08 Regime change: removal of Saddam Hussein from power
09 Free Iraqis from Saddam's rule
10 Other, what?

**V15 Which of the possible rationales for war are mentioned NOT to be objectives?**
(Multiple answer possible)

01 Disarmament of Iraq: preventing Iraq from developing and using WMDs
02 Hurt terrorist: deny al-Qaeda a friendly harbour, WMDs, or other type of support
03 Exporting democracy: portrayed as an attempt to introduce democracy in the Middle East
04 Enforcement of UN Security Council resolutions/warning of non-compliance
05 Oil-related objectives
06 Expansion of US sphere of influence
07 Supporting Israel
08 Regime change: removal of Saddam Hussein from power
09 Free Iraqis from Saddam's rule
10 Other, what?___________________________________________________________

V16 Which of the possible measures are mentioned? (Multiple answers possible)
01 Military force
02 Continuation/enforcement of weapons inspections
03 Nothing: the international community should not take any new action with regard to Iraq
04 Something/Unspecified: should be done to Iraq
05 Employment of UN peacekeepers and/or expansion of no-fly zones
06 Other, what?__________________________________________________________

V17 Which of the possible measures are questioned? (Multiple answers possible)
01 Military force
02 Continuation/enforcement of weapons inspections
03 Nothing: the international community should not take any new action with regard to Iraq
04 Something/Unspecified: should be done to Iraq
05 Employment of UN peacekeepers and/or expansion of no-fly zones
06 Other, what?__________________________________________________________

V18 Which of the following themes are mentioned? (Multiple answers possible)
01 Looting/anarchy
02 Humanitarian crisis: e.g. displacement, starvation, epidemics, lack of clean water
03 US/UK military advancement in Iraqi territory
04 US/UK military casualties
05 Iraqi military casualties
06 Civilian casualties
07 Journalist casualties
08 Reconstruction/Rebuilding of Iraq
09 Humanitarian aid
10 Use of depleted uranium in US/UK ammunition
11 Casualties unspecified: use this code only when its impossible to determine between 4-7

**V19 Which of the possible implications of the war are mentioned?** (Multiple answers possible)

01 Safer international system
02 Safer Middle East
03 Introduction of democracy in the Arab World
04 Weakening of the UN authority
05 Harm to Western relations with the Muslim world and/or minorities in the West
06 Increasing threat of terrorism
07 Sets a dangerous precedent of pre-emption and/or regime change
08 Long occupation of Iraq
09 Civil war
10 Unspecified negative implications
11 Unspecified positive implications
12 Other, what?________________________________________________________

**V20 Which of the possible implications of the war are questioned?** (Multiple answers possible)

01 Safer international system
02 Safer Middle East: e.g. “destabilisation of the region”
03 Introduction of democracy in the Arab World
04 Weakening of the UN authority
05 Harm to Western relations with the Muslim world and/or minorities in the West
06 Increasing threat of terrorism
07 Sets a dangerous precedent of pre-emption and/or regime change

08 Long occupation of Iraq

09 Civil war

10 Other, what?________________________________________________

V21 Which sources are quoted

Governmental sources:

01 US government

02 US military

04 French government

05 German government

06 French government

07 Chinese government

08 Belgian government

09 Iraqi government

10 Iraqi military

11 Iraq: exile

12 Iraq: Iraqi National Congress (US-supported opposition group led by Ahmed Chalabi)

13 Iraqi civilian

14 Finland: President Tarja Halonen

15 Finland: Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen (resigned on 17 April)

16 Finland: Foreign Minister Erkki Tuomioja (resigned 17 April)

17 Finland: Centre Party leader Anneli Jäätteenmäki (Prime Minister from 17 April)

18 Finland: National Coalition Party

19 Finland: Social Democratic Party

20 Finland: Centre Party
21 Finland: other political party, which? ____________________

22 UK: Prime Minister Tony Blair

23 UK: Foreign Minister Jack Straw

24 UK: Defence Minister Geoff Hoon

25 UK: PM's spokesman

26 UK military

27 UK: Robin Cook

28 UK: Clare Short

29 UK: George Galloway

30 UK: Labour Party source (excluding the three above: Cook, Short, Galloway)

31 UK: Conservative Party

32 UK: Liberal Democratic Party

32 UK: other governmental (diplomats, ministry sources, 10 Downing street aides etc)

34 Ireland: Taoiseach Bertie Ahern

35 Ireland: Foreign Minister Brian Cowen

36 Ireland: Progressive Democrat Party

37 Ireland: Fianna Fail party

38 Ireland: Fianna Gail party

39 Ireland: Labour Party

40 Ireland: Green Party

41 Ireland: Socialist Party

42 Ireland: Sinn Fein Party

43 Other states which have not been listed above, which? ________________

International organisations:

44 UN

45 EU
46 NATO

47 Humanitarian aid organisations (e.g. International Red Cross)

48 Other international organisation, which?__________________________________

Media

49 US Media

50 UK Media

51 Finnish Media

52 Irish Media

53 Iraqi Media

54 Arab Media

55 Other, what?______________________________________________

Other sources

56 US: anti-war protester/activist

57 UK: anti-war protester/activist

58 Finland: anti-war protester/activist

59 Ireland: anti-war protester/activist

60 Other, what/who _________________________?