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**Politics of Iran-West relations within the context of Iranian  
occidentalism; image of the west in the Iranian press during  
reformism (1997-2001) and conservatism (2005-2009)**

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**POLITICS OF IRAN-WEST RELATIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT  
OF IRANIAN OCCIDENTALISM; IMAGE OF THE WEST IN THE  
IRANIAN PRESS DURING REFORMISM (1997-2001) AND  
CONSERVATISM (2005-2009)**

**EHSAN BAKHSHANDEH**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of  
the University of Westminster for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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## **Abstract**

The present research is about relations between Iran and the West from the communication point of view and the role of the media in creating anti-American and anti-Western sentiments amongst the Iranians. It studies how Occidentalism has evolved in Iran and how, as an ideological representation, it has influenced the press portrayal of the West in the country. It also identifies dominant frames in newspaper reporting of the West and indicates how the perception of reality and meaning construction work in mainstream Iranian newspapers.

The present thesis seeks to investigate, through content analysis of news items and critical discourse analysis of news editorials, the impact of political affiliation of newspapers (as the first independent variable) and the political period in which they are published (as the second independent variable) on the representation of the West (as the dependent variable) in Iran.

The results and findings of the present study are yet another contribution to the study of the West, particularly in the Iranian context. In fact, the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers in the way discussed throughout this thesis signifies the creation of a new type of Occidentalism in the Orient, which I here brand as “Iranoccidentalism”.

Iranoccidentalism is an ideological concept, which is under the influence of the prevailing discourse; It projects the West, through media, as “arrogant/imperial and interventionist”; It is coupled with anti-Americanism and opposition to the West, and is linked to the history of colonialism and imperialism in Iran as well as the Iranian encounter with modernity; Moreover, it is a reaction to Orientalism and seeks to spread the Islamic ideology of governance and awakening within the framework of the Shiite ideology;

Furthermore, Iranoccidentalism pursues a “nativistic” and “nationalistic” approach which manifests itself in the Iranians’ national resolve to develop indigenous technologies such as the nuclear, aerospace and missile technologies as well as biotechnology and nanotechnology.

I argue in the course of this thesis that Occidentalism is evolving and turning into a structured discourse in Asia and especially in the Muslim countries of the Middle East, including in Iran where it is under the great influence of the history of relations with the West and in particular the Iranian response to Western-driven modernity.

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## **Acknowledgement**

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*I declare that all the material contained  
in this thesis is my own work.*

## **Chapter 1: Introduction: Brief overview**

**iv. Statement of the problem**

**v. Statement of the aims**

**vi. Significance and contribution to knowledge**

## **i. Statement of the problem**

A quick summary of a recent Gallup report suggests:

Iranians' already low approval of US leadership did not get worse after the US toughened sanctions in late 2011. Eight percent of Iranians approved of US leadership in late 2011 and early 2012 -- one of the lowest ratings the US receives worldwide. While nearly half of Iranians (46 per cent) support cutting ties with countries that impose economic sanctions on Iran, nearly one in three (31 per cent) do not, showing a sizable minority of Iranians still value relations (Ray, 2012).

A previous Gallup poll in 2009 on the US image in the Middle East and North Africa revealed that the image of the United States in the predominantly Muslim regions, including in the Islamic Republic of Iran, is "very poor" (Ray, 2009). In particular, the unfavourability trend of the United States in Iran has been on the rise since 2001 (Mogahed, 2005). Some 52 per cent of Iranians had an unfavourable view of the United States in 2001 while the figure, according to the Gallup Centre for Muslim Studies, rose to 63 per cent in 2005 and 84 per cent by February 2009<sup>1</sup>. A recent poll in December 2011 indicated that the majority of Iranians disapprove of the leadership of the US (65 per cent), the UK (62 per cent), Germany (57 per cent) and the European Union (49 per cent) (Morales and Ray, 2011). A similar trend could be spotted with regards to European countries (the United Kingdom, Germany and France) which form the wider "Occident" region when combined with the United States.

A number of reasons have been previously explored with regards to the rise of anti-Westernism in Iran (albeit before the 1979 revolution). Researchers have mainly attributed it to the impacts of imperialism and colonialism (Keddie, 1983, 1994; Makdisi, 2002; Moaddel, 1992; Vahdat, 2003; Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, 1994), which could be regarded as two main factors leading to the Iranian "Occidentalisation" of the West<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> The issue of the favourability of the US among the Iranians is of a paradoxical nature. Some might argue that the reality of the perception of the US in Iran is different from what is suggested by opinion polls. This could be true. However, despite being passionate towards the US culture, freedom and democratic values, the majority of Iranian people are critical of the United States because of its "foreign policy" in the Middle East and especially towards Iran (This "hatred" could have been a result of the Iranian press portrayal of the West, which is the subject of the present research).

<sup>2</sup> One limitation with this explanation is, however, that it fails to study the role of the media inter alia in creating anti-Western sentiments among the Iranians.

Nobody could deny the role the media have played in this area. Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) believe this role was played by “small media” which marked a “big revolution” through the traditional channels of communications such as tapes, graffiti and night letters. Moreover, Ayatollah Khomeini, the late founder of the Islamic revolution, emphasised on many occasions on the importance of media including the radio and television in Iran’s anti-West drive. He urged the Iranian television to act as a “general university to raise people who can fight” against the Western hegemony and propaganda and “save the cultural apparatus of the country from Westoxication and imperialistic training” (Khomeini, Vol. 9:185). Such an awareness-raising role was primarily played by the clergy and the intelligentsia prior to the revolution. In fact, events during the 1950s and 1970s led to the formation of an anti-Western “discourse” which was later changed into an anti-Western (and particularly anti-American) “revolutionary ideology” after the Islamic revolution, continuing to this date.

The present research seeks to investigate the ways and mechanisms through which the West is portrayed and characterised in the Iranian press after the 1979 revolution. To study how these mechanisms are used by the state and the press to portray the West (UK, Germany, France plus the United States), the researcher analyses the content of the press during the two different presidential (political) terms, when the most striking developments happened between Iran and the West<sup>1</sup>.

## **ii. Statement of the aims**

In recent decades and specifically after the September 11 attacks and the subsequent “war on terror”, anti-Westernism (and particularly anti-Americanism) has become mostly associated with the Middle East (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008; Criss, 2003; Faath, 2006; Makdisi, 2002; O’Connor and Griffiths, 2006), and particularly with Iran which is portrayed as an “evil” state accused of imposing “serious threats” to the stability of the region and the West. The political relations between the West and Iran should be examined as part of a project if one wishes to understand how the Occident is generated in the Oriental thought of the Iranians.

This study aims to identify the roots of anti-Westernism in Iran and discuss various aspects of the representation of the West in the Iranian press during two politically-significant historic periods after the 1979 Iranian revolution. The researcher views the

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<sup>1</sup> They include, but are not limited to, disputes between Iran and the West in areas such as the nuclear issue, the war in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

rising “negative” perception of the West in the Islamic Republic of Iran as possibly a by-product of the portrayal of the West in the country’s press (although other factors are definitely engaged). This research aims to investigate the way the negative descriptions of the West are generated in Iran, the (evolution) process of Occidentalism or the Occidentalisation of the West in Iran and the social, political, and intellectual factors that lead to Occidentalist constructions of alien societies in that country. The present project also seeks to provide a comprehensive outline of the concept of the West as the “Occident” in Iran and the portrayal of the West in the Iranian press.

### **iii. Significance and contribution to knowledge**

The current research would make several new scholarly contributions. First and foremost, it analyses the media “strategies” through which the West is portrayed in Iran and with a very specific focus on “Occidentalism”. Regardless of the fact that the anti-Western nature of the Iranian regime is already known to everyone, the “portrayal of the West in the Iranian press” or “Occidentalising the West in Iran” has been much understudied and poorly understood.

Second, whereas extensive research has been conducted with the objective of understanding the image of the West among the Iranian intelligentsia (Mirsepassi, 2000; Tavakoli-Targhi, 2001; Vahdat, 2002; Nabavi, 2003; Boroujerdi, 2006), the current literature has partly failed to study the image of the West as characterised by the Iranian “press” for the people and the intelligentsia and from the communication point of view. In other words the role of the media in portraying such a negative view of the West remains largely untouched in academic research.

Third, by examining the press’ narratives on Occidentalism, this research sheds light on how the media representation strategies are carried out in reality and how journalists use them to lead (or mislead) the public opinion.

Fourth, not only is this research new and fresh in the decision to take on the Occidental view from the Iranian press “after” the 1979 revolution (and in recent years), it will also break with previous research regarding Occidentalism in Iran, which has often limited its focus to Iran-West relations “before” the revolution. Moreover the present research presents a political analysis from the academic point of view of major developments in recent years affecting the interaction between Iran and the West in two

significant presidential terms<sup>1</sup>.

No organised and comprehensive research has been published to study the role of the media in creating anti-American and anti-Western sentiments among the Iranian public opinion. The present research could be the first academic material in the field and could be used as a model to study the rising trend of the Occidentalisation of the West in the Middle East.

Findings of this study could be used by politicians and decision makers to set new agendas for improving relations between Iran and the West. Given the proximity in geography and culture between Iran and other nations in the Middle East and the Islamic world, the results of the present research could be generalised to the whole Muslim countries or be treated, at least, as an Iranian model of political communication.

As stated above, this research could be the first wide-ranging original study of mainstream Iranian newspapers and their portrayal of the West. The present research is undoubtedly the first study of Occidentalism in the Iranian context from the viewpoint of the Iranian press.

I believe the current research will contribute considerably to knowledge in the sense that it is:

- *detailed and in-depth* as it covers four mainstream Iranian newspapers; with different political affiliation; during a time span of eight years; from the various communication/journalistic point of view
- *original* as it is the first study of its kind to the way the West is portrayed in Iranian newspapers within the context of Occidentalism<sup>2</sup>
- *innovative* as it studies newspapers from two different political wings within the context of Occidentalism and ends up with a new characterisation of the West by the East
- *pioneering* as it could turn into a model and example of similar and progressive research into the image of the West in the East
- *academic* as it uses scientific methods to describe the image of the West in the Iranian press

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<sup>1</sup>They include, but are not limited to, disputes between Iran and the West in areas such as the nuclear issue, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

<sup>2</sup> There is only one scholarly study to investigate how the outside world is depicted in the Iranian press. And that research is rather old and restricted to only one Iranian newspaper. In 1991, Shoar-Ghaffari examined the coverage of the West in “Ettelaat” newspaper during 1979 and 1988.

- *historical* as it provides a history of relations between Iran and specific Western countries about which one can rarely find an analysis, and also it discusses two important historical stages of the Iranian politics
- *objective and systematic* as it uses Content Analysis as a scientific method of analysing media messages (in addition to Critical Discourse Analysis)
- *interdisciplinary* as it studies media and politics

In general, the present research would help fill the gap in knowledge about relations between Iran and the West from the communication point of view and the role of the media in creating anti-American and anti-Western sentiments amongst the Iranians.

## **Chapter 2: Review of the related literature**

### **Part 1: Occidentalism: the West as the “Occident”**

- ii. Occidentalism: different approaches
  - a. Occidentalism: Orientalism in reverse or opposition?
  - b. Coroni's modes of Occidental representation
  - c. Occidentalism: Hatred of the West (anti-Westernism)?
- ii. Occidentalism, modernity and the Iranian response
- iii. Anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism in the Iranian context

### **Part 2: The concept of the West in Iran**

#### **iii. Iran-West relations; a historical perspective**

- a. Relations with the United States
  - 1. Before the 1979 revolution
  - 2. After the 1979 revolution
- b. Relations with the United Kingdom
  - 1. Before the 1979 revolution
  - 2. After the 1979 revolution
- c. Relations with Germany
  - 1. Before the 1979 revolution
  - 2. After the 1979 revolution
- d. Relations with France
  - 1. Before the 1979 revolution
  - 2. After the 1979 revolution

#### **iv. The West among Iranian opinion leaders**

- a. Al-e Ahmad's “Westoxication”
- b. Ayatollah Khomeini and the “Satanic” US
- c. Ayatollah Khamenei and the “Evil” Britain

### **Part 3: Iran's two main political wings and the West**

- iii. Conservatism and the West
- iv. Reformism and the West

### **Part 4: Media landscape in Iran**

- xi. Media and politics in Iran
- xii. Iranian media before the revolution
- xiii. The revolution effect
- xiv. Post-revolution media
- xv. Iraq-Iran war coverage
- xvi. Post-war reconstruction coverage
- xvii. Reformist period and newspapers
- xviii. Post-reform landscape
- xix. Press freedom and supervision
- xx. Coverage of the West

## **Part 1: Occidentalism: the West as the “Occident”**

- i. Occidentalism: different approaches
  - d. Occidentalism: Orientalism in reverse or opposition?
  - e. Coroni's modes of Occidentalist representation
  - f. Occidentalism: Hatred of the West (anti-Westernism)?

## **Occidentalism: The West as the “Occident”**

The West, as defined by the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, is the region in the Western Hemisphere encompassing Europe, North America and Canada, contrasted with the East which includes Asia and the Middle East. Geographically, the West today normally includes Europe and the overseas territories belonging to the Anglosphere, the Hispanidad, Lusosphere and the Francophonie<sup>1</sup>.

From the political point of view the concept of the West (versus the East), or the Occident (as opposed to the Orient), which emerged in the late nineteenth century, is a political construct and a dialogue between the Old World or “Europe” and the New World or “the United States” (Coker, 1998)<sup>2</sup>. According to Raymond Williams (as cited in Coronil 1996), the West-East distinction dates back to the Roman Empire era and to the separation between the Christian and Muslim worlds during the third and fifth centuries, even though Hobson (2006) attributes the rise of the West to the period between 500 to 1800.

In his “Twilight of the West”, Coker (1998) describes the West as “an elusive” term which sometimes includes even Japan (as the “emblem of the East” (Coronil, 1996:53), “Western-type society” (Williams, 1983:333 as cited in Coronil 1996), “honorary European” (Chomsky, 1991:13 as cited in Coronil 1996)), Russia and other countries such as Australia and New Zealand that are outside the institutions that have constituted the “Western community” or “Western coalition or alliance”.

Studying the debate over the West between Hegel and Goethe, two of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century, Coker (1998) recognises that America, as the most modern society in history, would be “the master builder” of the Western world. Therefore, it might be inferred, as explained below by Coronil (1996), that the United States is the “representative” of the Occident before the Orient. In other words, the West is “exemplified” by the United States (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:4)<sup>3</sup>; therefore, the two words “West” and the “United States” could be used interchangeably:

With the consolidation of US hegemony as a world power after 1945, the

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<sup>1</sup>The word “Occident” (meaning the West) was used primarily, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, originally with reference to Western Christendom or the Western Roman Empire, or to Europe as opposed to Asia and the Orient; It is now usually used with reference to Europe and America as opposed to Asia and the “Orient”, or occasionally to America or the Western hemisphere as opposed to the Old World.

<sup>2</sup> Coronil (1996:52) believes that using binary words such as the “West”, the “Occident”, the “center”, the “first world”, the “East”, the “Orient”, the “periphery” and the “third world” sets forge links in a paradigmatic chain of conceptions of geography, history, and personhood that reinforces each link and produces an almost tangible and inescapable image of the world.

<sup>3</sup> While the West is generally recognised, in political terms, with the United States, Furumizo (2005: 128-137) believes the term “the West” as a set of ideas has a root in Britain and France as well.

“West” shifted its centre of gravity from Europe to “America”, and the United States became the dominant referent for the “West”. Because of this recentering of Western powers, “America”, ironically, is at times a metaphor for “Europe” (Coronil, 1996: 54).

Zinkin (1953) defines the West as a “cultural” and not a geographical concept, which means “the countries of city corporations, free association, and Biblical religion” (Zinkin, 1953: 9). In his analysis of the “Western City” and its comparison with the “Eastern Village”, Zinkin highlights the role of the West in pioneering personal freedom, urbanisation, modernity and technology.

In the Western town all men started equal...There was no aristocracy of birth resting upon military prowess and monopolistic offices as there was in the countryside. Any man, if he was successful in his business and respected by his fellow citizens, could aspire to anything. But in Asia...real opportunity did not exist. There is no Asian equivalent for the Fuggers, Counts of the Empire, the Medici, Grand Dukes of Tuscany. In Asia government was carried on by the appointees of the monarch or the lord (Zinkin, 1953:16-17).

Originally, the Western philosophy, as contrasted with the Eastern philosophy, started in the 1800s and 1900s by ideas such as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and Colonialism which emanated mainly from Europe.

The ideas of the West then spread so widely in the early twenty-first century and since the end of the Cold War (1945-1991) that many modern and developed countries are to some extent influenced by different aspects of the Western or Occidental philosophy. Presenting a critical analysis of Jack Goody’s “The theft of history” (2006), Santos (2009:104) argues that the West, from the sixteenth century onwards, started to “impose its conceptions of past and future, of time and space, on the rest of the world”:

It has thus made its values and institutions prevail, turning them into expressions of western exceptionalism, thereby concealing similarities and continuities with values and institutions existing in other regions of the world (Santos, 2009:104).

Hobson (2006: 408-410) observes that such a discourse of “racist-Eurocentrism or Orientalism”, which reached its peak in the nineteenth century, led to the formation of Orientalist and “civilisational-apartheid” themes such as the superiority of the West to the

East with the former being “exceptional, progressive and superior” and the latter “regressive and inferior”<sup>1</sup>.

The struggle between the West (Occident) and the East (Orient), defined by Said (1994: xi) as “mostly ideological oppositions”, is more linked to the history of imperialism and colonialism than modernism and its confrontation with traditionalism. Indeed, Buruma and Margalit (2005:33) try to demonstrate that the West simply is equal to “Roman imperialism, Anglo-American capitalism, Americanism, Crusader-Zionism and American imperialism” and can be discussed through a thorough investigation of Occidentalism.

### **i. Occidentalism: different approaches**

Edward Said (1978:12) has divided the world into two “unequal halves” of Orient and Occident. The relationship, or in Said’s words, the “ontological and epistemological distinction”, between them is a “man-made” relationship of power, domination and hegemony (Said, 1978:5). In his seminal work on the Orient and Orientalism, Said (1978) explains how representations of the Orient in the literary works of Westerners have been a source for the knowledge of the West about the East, and the power the Occident exercised over the Orient. Said (1978:3) believes the West gained strength and built up its power through the East and the “weakness” of the East.

In Said’s view, Orientalism is a strategy of Western world domination which began with the domination of Britain and France (until the Second World War) and the United States (after the end of the Second World War) on the Orient. Throughout his book, Said (1978) tries to tell the reader that the West is wielding power over the East through his concept of Orientalism. He highlights the role culture played in the formation of “political and ideological” Orientalism and how the latter “borrowed” from the former (Said, 1978:22).

...Orientalism offers a marvelous stance of the interrelations between society, history, and textuality; moreover, the cultural role played by the Orient in the West connects Orientalism with ideology, politics, and the logic of power... (Said, 1979:24).

Said’s work on Orientalism has been criticised widely, from issues related to the originality of his work (Sardar, 1999), to questions of the basis of his theory of Orientalism (Porter, 1994), and feminists complaints about the absence of any discussion of gender in

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<sup>1</sup> Having studied East and West in “global history”, Hobson (2006:410) attributes the rise of the West during 500 and 1800 to the “diffusion of Eastern resource portfolios” and the “imperial appropriation of Eastern resources”.

the text (Kennedy, 2000).

Despite criticisms, Orientalism has turned into a political discourse, dominating relations between the West and East. Orientalism is, however, one end of the spectrum. The other end is Occidentalism. Like its counterpart, Occidentalism is an overarching discourse which is employed with respect to historical context, although it is not yet as structured as Orientalism<sup>1</sup>.

The Oxford English Dictionary traces the use of the word “Occidentalism” in writings back to 1839 when “Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine” carried a story about an Iranian king, Soltan Mahmoud Ghaznavi (971-1030)--the ruler of the Persian Ghaznavid dynasty<sup>2</sup>:

“...The Sultan Mahmoud and his Turkish subjects..have no taste for...the Occidentalism, the journalism, the budgetism, the parliamentaryism of the nineteenth Century (Vol. 46, 1839:105).”

Occidentalism can be discussed from two “general” and “political” points of view. By definition, Occidentalism, as in the example of Soltan Mahmoud, accounts for any Occidental quality, style, character, or spirit or any Western customs, institutions, characteristics, etc. More precisely, Occidentalism is the knowledge of the West (in terms of language, history, culture and ...) in/by the East.

Similarly, an “Occidentalist” is either a student of Western languages, history, culture, etc. or a person who favours or advocates Western customs and ideas (Iranian intellectual Jalal Al-e Ahmad describes so Westernised people as “Westoxicated” i.e. Eastern people who excessively devote themselves to adopting Western ideas)<sup>3</sup>.

As stated above, the term Occidentalism and its derivatives were being used during the eighteenth century mostly in academic contexts to refer to “Western customs”. However the term has taken a more political and ideological meaning, almost similar to its counterpart—Orientalism—which will be explained below. The very term “Occidentalism” politically has generated some controversy in recent years as very few organised and fully-scholarly piece has been written about it and the field remains much understudied. The

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1 By discourse, I mean the Foucaultian approach ie “a specific form of knowledge with its own object of study, premises, rules, conversations and claims to truth”.

2 Other derivatives of the word “Occidentalism” have a longer track of historical use. For example, “Occidentalise”, as a verb, was used for the first time in 1829.

3 Occidentalise” is another derivatives of the word Occident. To “Occidentalise” means to Westernise or to imbue with Western ideas or characteristics. The verb “Occidentalise” was first used in 1829 in a piece of writing about the Chinese language in which the author complains that the native Chinese language was “strangely Occidentalised” (Imaginary conversations of Greeks and Romans, 1853: 123). The word “Occidentalist” has been also used very rarely to refer to an advocate or user of the artificial language called “Occidental”.


major literature in the field could be attributed, but not limited, to the works of Carrier (1992), Chen (1992), Cole (1992), Howard (1995), Ning (1997) Coronil (1996), Venn (2001), Buruma and Margalit (2004, 2005), Furumizo (2005), Bilgrami (2006), Roth-Seneff (2007), Friedman (2009) and Santos (2009).

### **a. Occidentalism: Orientalism in reverse or opposition?**

According to Boroujerdi (1996), the concept of Occidentalism in the Orient has been formulated by the Syrian critic Jalal Sadik al-Azm. Writing an essay in 1981, al-Azm proposes the concept of “Orientalism in reverse”. In it, he accepts the basic dichotomy of East and West and reiterates that only Islam is authentic and solution to the problems.

Reviewing the literature related to Occidentalism, one can identify a group of “similar” vocabularies used to define Occidentalism. They include words such as “mirror”, “mirror image”, “reverse”, “obverse” and “inversion” which denote that the signified is “the same as” the signifier.

For example, Coronil (1996:56) defines Occidentalism as “not Orientalism in reverse” but its dark side as in a mirror; which means Occidentalism is in opposition to Orientalism. Such a definition has been reiterated by Ning (1997: 62) who defines Occidentalism as “opposed to Orientalism”. In other definitions, Howard (1995:111) believes Occidentalism is the “obverse of Orientalism” and Cole (1992: 15) defines it as “not the mirror-image” of Orientalism, while Friedman (2009: 92) describes Occidentalism as “an inversion of the former Orientalism”.



One definition of Occidentalism using similar words

Santos (2009: 105) has identified “two very distinct” conceptions with regards to the definition of Occidentalism:

First, Occidentalism as a counter-image of Orientalism: the image that the ‘others’, the victims of Western Orientalism, construct concerning the West. Second, Occidentalism as a double image of Orientalism: the image the West has of itself when it subjects the ‘others’ to Orientalism (Santos: 105).

He further explains that the first conception is a “reciprocity trap” as victims of the Western stereotypes have “the same power” to construct stereotypes of the West while the second conception is related to the “critique of the hegemonic West”. In fact, Santos (2009:103-104) argues that Westerners in the Occident have used Occidentalism as a double-image to Orientalism to castigate hegemonic Eurocentrism and Western values, exceptionalism, uniqueness and superiority in the same way as Easterners in the Orient have applied it as a counter-image of Orientalism to criticise the West<sup>1</sup>. He believes Occidentalism, as a double image of Orientalism, has been ignored or sidelined in the West because it did not “fit the political objectives of capitalism and colonialism at the roots of Western modernity” (Santos, 2009:103)<sup>2</sup>.

The use of Occidentalism as a counter to Western colonialism and hegemonism has been also stressed by Ning (1997). She describes Occidentalism as a “decolonising” and “anti-colonialist” strategy and a challenge to “those Western hegemonists who have always had a bias against the Orient” (Ning, 1997:62).

Ning (1997:62-65) argues that Occidentalism manifests itself among the people in Muslim countries in the Middle East as “an antagonistic form” that strongly opposes Western hegemonism represented and identified by the United States.

In these cases, “Occident” is also constructed as an “other”, and the Occidentalism in the eyes of the Oriental is obviously characterised by the Third World’s anticolonialist and antihegemonic tendency (Ning, 1997:62).

Although Ning (1997: 62-64) defines Occidentalism as “opposed” to Orientalism, she believes looking upon it as a “counterpart” to Orientalism is “undesirable”.

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<sup>1</sup> Based on this definition, Westerners such as Noam Chomsky and Edward Said, who are critical of the foreign policy of the United States, fall in the category of Occidentalists and end up being Occidentalists in their struggle against Eurocentrism.

<sup>2</sup> Studying Jack Goody’s “The Theft of History”, Santos (2005: 121) enhances the possibility of a “non-Occidental West” by linking it to the possibility of a “non-capitalist” future.

Notwithstanding, Ning attributes the rising of China as a global power to the Chinese Occidentalism in the form of its “struggle against imperialism and hegemonism”.

Occidentalism manifested itself in different forms during different periods, but its fundamental tone was hostile to the West, especially the US imperialists, and sometimes even the Soviet social imperialists (Ning, 1997:64).

From the viewpoint of Ning, Occidentalism is a social and cultural “discourse” opposed to Western cultural hegemonism and an “ideological force” challenging the West (Ning, 1997: 66). Such a perspective has been echoed by Furumizo (2005: 128-137) who has described Occidentalism as an “ideological” concept and a “confusion of views opposed to Western culture”. This opposition in fact shares with Orientalism many “ideological techniques and strategies” which, according to Chen (1992:688), draw the discursive practice of Occidentalism into a “paradoxical relationship” to Orientalism.

In his study of the Chinese Occidentalism, Chen (1992) argues that the Chinese Occidentalism, as a “counter-discourse” of Orientalism, has served mainly as an “ideological function” quite different from that of Orientalism.

Orientalism, in Said’s account, is a strategy of Western world domination, whereas...Chinese Occidentalism is primarily a discourse that has been evoked by various and competing groups within Chinese society for a variety of different ends, largely, though not exclusively, within domestic Chinese politics. As such, it has been both a discourse of oppression and a discourse of liberation (Chen, 1992:688).

According to him, Occidentalism in China has been employed for two contrasted purposes of “justifying” and at the same time “countering” domestic oppression. Chen (1992:680-691) explains that the Chinese government uses “Maoist Occidentalism” as a means for the domestic oppression of political opponents, while the intelligentsia uses “anti-official Occidentalism” as a strategic move to stand against government crackdown.

Throughout Chinese history, literary and political texts have often been composed by the intelligentsia as deliberate endeavors of anti-official discourse...Accused of being “Western” both by virtue of their cultural status and their political sympathies, they had little choice but to assert that the Western Other was in fact superior to the Chinese Self (Chen, 1992: 691).

From this viewpoint, Chen (1992:710) equates Occidentalism with Orientalism by justifying that “if it is imperialistic for the Occident to “misrepresent” the Orient, then the Orient can also anti-imperialistically use the “Occident” to achieve its own political aims at home”. However, Chen’s equation of Occidentalism to Orientalism should not be regarded as a “double-image” relationship but a “counter-image” relationship. In other words, Chen acknowledges that Occidentalism is an anti-imperialistic concept in opposition to Orientalism whose main aim is imperialistic.

One of the other scholars who have attributed Occidentalism to opposition to Western hegemonism and dominance is Coronil. He believes Occidentalism is “inseparable” from Western hegemony.

Coronil (1996: 56-57) defines Occidentalism not as the reverse of Orientalism but as “its condition of possibility, its dark side (as in a mirror)”, which refers to the conceptions of the West “animating” the West’s representations of the Orient. He defines Occidentalism as the study of “how ‘Others’ represent the ‘Occident’” to help them counter the West’s dominance of publicly circulating images of difference and as the “ensemble of representational practices” that participate in the production of conceptions of the world.

Coronil (1996: 56) is also of the opinion that Occidentalism should not be “opposed” to Orientalism because this opposition “runs the risk of creating the illusion that the terms can be equalised and reversed, as if the complicity of power and knowledge entailed in Orientalism could be countered by an inversion”.

“Occidentalism is thus the expression of a constitutive relationship between Western representations of cultural difference and worldwide Western dominance Coronil (1996: 56).”

Coronil has defined three modes of Occidental representation: the dissolution of the Other by the Self; the incorporation of the Other into the Self; and the destabilisation of the Self by the Other. Here the “Other” represents the East and the “Self” represents the West.

## **b. Coronil’s modes of Occidental representation**

### **1. The dissolution of the Other [East] by the Self [West] (Coronil, 1996:58-61)**

In this modality of representation, Western and non-Western cultures are opposed to each other as radically different entities, and their opposition is resolved by absorbing non-Western peoples into an expanding and victorious West.

The question of the Other [East] is presented as a problem for the Self [West], not of the Self or for the Other. In this modality of Occidentalism, the Self is assumed. Analysis centers on the problems the Self confronts but does not include the constitution of the Self as a problem. The other question is not asked: the question of the Self.

In this representational modality, America becomes but the territorial stage for the expansion of the West, and its diverse cultures the object to be absorbed. Since the Self is identified with history's victors, it is understandable that the increasingly powerful United States was identified with America and became a metaphor for Europe<sup>1</sup>.

## **2. The incorporation of the Other [East] into the Self [West] (Coronil, 1996:61)**

In this second modality of Occidentalism, a critical focus on Western development unwittingly obscures the role of non-Western peoples in the making of the modern world, subtly reiterating the distinction between Other and Self that underwrites Europe's imperial expansion.

Coronil develops this argument through a discussion of Eric Wolf's "Europe and the People Without History" (1982), which presents Western capitalism as a transformative process that originates in the centre and engulfs non-Western peoples, and Sidney Mintz's "Sweetness and Power" (1985), which analyses sugar's place in the modern world in terms of the interplay between commodity production in the colonies and consumption in the imperial center.

## **3. The destabilisation of the Self [West] by the Other [East] (Coronil, 1996:68)**

While in the previous two modalities of Occidentalism, non-Western peoples are either dissolved or incorporated by the West, in this third form they are presented as a privileged source of knowledge for the West. This knowledge becomes available, as in the first modality, by opposing Western and non-Western peoples as contrasting entities, but in this case the depiction of radical Otherness is used to unsettle Western culture.

By examining Michael Taussig's "The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America" (1980) and Timothy Mitchell's "Colonizing Egypt" (1988), Coronil shows how the use of polarised contrasts between cultures that are historically interrelated has the effect of exalting their difference, erasing their historical links, and homogenising their

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<sup>1</sup> In the context of Iranian Occidentalism, the researcher will later discuss that Iranian intellectuals (such as Jalal Al-e Ahmad) and presidents Mohammad Khatami and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad have shown their opposition to this modality because they do not want their nation to be "dissolved" by or "absorbed" to the West.

internal features, unwittingly re-inscribing an imperial Self-Other duality even as it seeks to unsettle colonial representations<sup>1</sup>.

### **c. Occidentalism: Hatred of the West (anti-Westernism)?**

One of the most organised existing works on Occidentalism is perhaps the investigation by Buruma and Margalit in 2005 of anti-Western stereotypes in the East<sup>2</sup>. In their book, “Occidentalism, a short history of anti-Westernism”, Buruma and Margalit present a history of anti-Westernism which, they describe, as being in close link to Occidentalism.

Buruma and Margalit (2005: 5-6) define Occidentalism as the “dehumanising picture of the West painted by its enemies” as a “hateful caricature” of Western modernity. Studying the case of Occidentalism in both the West (Germany and Russia) and the East (Japan, China, Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan), they see Occidentalism as the expression of hatred toward “an offensive display of superiority by the West” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:95). They in fact equate Occidentalism to anti-Westernism.

They argue that Occidentalism in the Third World (the East) was inspired during 1960s-1970s by Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China followed by the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. However, Occidentalism in Europe is older than Occidentalism in East and originated from Nazi Germany’s hatred for “Jewfied” American, French and British people during 1930s-1940s (although they describe that the Germany army started attacks on the British in Flanders in 1914 as the first European war against the West)<sup>3</sup>. They also associate the nineteenth-century Occidentalism with Russia though it was imported from Germany.

It is indeed one of our contentions that Occidentalism, like capitalism, Marxism and many other modern isms, was born in Europe, before it was transferred to other parts of the world (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:6).

In Russia, Occidentalism turned into an ideology in the 1800s under the influence of Russian Orthodoxy in opposition to Roman Catholicism. The West in the minds of the

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<sup>1</sup> In the context of Iranian Occidentalism, the research will later discuss that none of the Iranian leaders seem to be following this model out of the fear that it might lead to military confrontation with the West.

<sup>2</sup> In 2004, Buruma and Margalit published their first book on Occidentalism under the title of “Occidentalism: West in the Eyes of its Enemies”. In 2005, they published this book under a new title “Occidentalism, a short history of anti-Westernism”.

<sup>3</sup> German nationalists view of the West was of an “old World, effete, money-grubbing, selfish and shallow” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005: 58).

Russian way of thinking was “decay” (as labeled by Konstantin Leontiev)--an entity constructed on “rotten foundations” (as described by Ivan Kireyevsky) which makes decisions only by resorting to rationalism and scienticism and ignoring other faculties such as emotion or religion. In the Russian mindset, rationalism was equal to imperialism (of mind) which was a source of Occidentalism not only in Russia but also in China. Under the influence of Chinese nativism, Mao believed that Western imperialism and moral decadence was a destroyer of Chinese traditions and thoughts (Buruma and Margalit, 2005). In 1950s, he ordered intellectuals to be cleansed of bourgeois ideology (individualism and pro-Americanism) in a similar way two decades later revolutionaries in Iran set up the Supreme Council of Cultural Revolution to clear universities of the sympathizers of the Western ideology and mindset—a move which was repeated in the aftermath of the controversial 2009 elections.

In Egypt, from the nineteenth century onward, the West was associated, in Buruma and Margalit words, with “emptiness” (as described by Sayyid Qutb), “materialism” and the “worship of money” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:70)—a tendency vehemently rejected by Muslim scholars and radicals who called for a holy war with Westernisation and rulers who had been “corrupted” by the Western ways. Sayyid Qutb revived the concept of “Jahiliyya” (used to describe an era of ignorance of people in pre-Islamic history) to describe the West in such terms as a “gigantic brothel, steeped in animal lust, greed and selfishness” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:117). In his view, the Western Jahiliyya culture is only valued for sex, food, drink and things fit for animals. Such an Occidentalist mindset encouraged him to join the Muslim Brotherhood and work to develop an Islamic ideology (religious Occidentalism) to confront the West.

The concept of Jahiliyya was also developed in the twentieth century in Pakistan. Abulala Maududi proposed the “new Jahiliyya” and called for the exercise of the Sharia rule in Muslim countries in order to avert the influence of the West and Western agents. Maududi later set up the Jamaat Islami party (in 1941 in India and in 1947 in Pakistan) to “struggle against the enemies of Islam”. Allameh Mohammad Iqbal (1877-1938), known by many as the spiritual father of Pakistan, was another Pakistani philosopher who turned against the West. However, the opposition of Iqbal to the West was rather different from that of Maududi and his sympathisers in other Islamic states. Iqbal was more a critic than an Occidentalist. He was only against the Western economic exploitation and he never dehumanised the West.

In the 1900s in Japan, the West was regarded as shallow, materialistic, rootless and “un-Japanese”. When new Western-manufactured machineries were introduced to Japan’s industries, the West was described as a “machine civilisation, mechanical and without soul.” In Kyoto in 1942, intellectuals convened a conference to denounce Westernisation as a disease which had infected the Japanese spirit. They wanted to become modernised and at the same time preserve their past. And they were ready to sacrifice themselves in order to reach this goal. The so-called Kamikaze pilots hurtled themselves to death onto enemy vessels.

Kamikaze pilots were not just fighting the Americas; they saw themselves as intellectual rebels against what they considered Western corruption of Japan, the selfish greed of capitalism, the moral emptiness of liberalism, the shallowness of American culture (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:66).

A similar “extremist and violent” mindset later prevailed Afghanistan where the Taliban regime confronted all signs of Westernisation such as Western hairstyle, fashion, ornaments, clothing and even music, television and games such as kite flying, chess and soccer. In order to erase elements of Westernisation, the Taliban resorted to force and violence as well as the strict application of the Shariah law. But this was not sufficient and led Al-Qaeda terrorists to attack twin towers in 2001 and mark the beginning of violent anti-Americanism followed by several other abortive attempts to blow up US planes and shopping centres.

The Kamikaze-style resistance was also reinvented by the Hezbollah in Lebanon after the Israeli invasion of 1982 when hundreds of US soldiers were killed by a suicide bomber who drove a truck full of explosives to the US military base. Such a tactic was later adopted by the Palestinians as well.

Buruma and Margalit’s concept of Occidentalism is an accumulation of destructive images constructed by either East (mainly Maoist China and Kyoto intellectuals) or the West (Germany) about the West—what they call “intellectual destruction” which they believe are consequence of “metropolitan hubris” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:19): The West is soulless, shallow, rootless, godless, mechanical, superficial, trivial, corrupt, greedy, money-grubbing, insensitive, parasitic, mediocre, fashion-addicted poisonous materialist civilisation and destructive of creative power<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Another scholar Howard (1995:120) explains that the West in Occidental eyes is both monolithic (all Westerners represent and are represented by the US) and without history.

Although Buruma and Margalit (2005:9-15) believe that Occidentalism is not the same as anti-Americanism, they attribute Occidentalism (hatred of the West) mainly to anti-Americanism and dissatisfaction with the US foreign policy. In general, they blame Occidentalism simply on an “arrogant Western mindset” (Westernism) and what they call “Western influences” on modernism, urbanism, “Jewified” Americanism, imperialism, colonialism and capitalism.

Historical origins of the hatred of the West or anti-Westernism have been traced back to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century when the idea of the “universal West” emerged in Europe and Asia (Aydin, 2007: 15). In fact, from the 1870s onward in Asia, pan-Islamist Ottoman and pan-Asian Japanese intellectuals proposed critiques of the West and opposed the “Westernisation” project and the “imperialist West” while in Europe, Americaphobia was widespread among the ruling classes and the intelligentsia from 1766 on (Ross and Ross, 2004)<sup>1</sup>.

In his analysis of “The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia”, Aydin (2007) compares Ottoman pan-Islamic and Japanese pan-Asian visions of the West from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of World War II and concludes that their anti-Westernism is not about Western values but the Western imperialism.

In order to have a better understanding of anti-Westernism, one should study this concept in a close relationship with anti-Americanism because, as discussed earlier, the West is usually represented and identified by the United States as a superpower which has a “special relationship” with Britain and enjoys the backing of France and Germany<sup>2</sup>. This is more relevant in the case of Iran as the country regards the United States as the representative of the West. In fact, when Iranian leaders talk about the West, they are indeed referring to the United States. This is particularly true when it comes to Iran’s nuclear dispute with the West<sup>3</sup>.

Anti-Americanism is largely associated with either a series of “criticisms” regarding the United States (Tai et al, 1973; O’Connor, 2006) or any “hostile” or “hateful”

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<sup>1</sup> We will later discuss that anti-Westernism in fact was also prevalent in Europe in the early nineteenth century when some European countries turned against the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism (as well as their derivatives) are, therefore, used interchangeably throughout this thesis. Since this study is about the perceptions of the West in a non-Western (Muslim) country, anti-Westernism could be identified with anti-Americanism (and vice versa) as the West equals America (and vice versa) in the mind of a non-Westerner Muslim living in the Middle East.

<sup>3</sup> The dispute is always referred to by Iranian leaders as an issue between Iran and the United States. For example, two days after the Security Council passed its sixth resolution against Iran on 9 June 2010, President Ahmadinejad told reporters in Shanghai that “this resolution is said to aim to open the way for diplomacy. However, the reality is that we face America. The American government is misusing the Security Council to impose its own will on nations.”

action against or “systematic opposition” to the US foreign policy, society, culture and use of military might (Rubinstein and Smith, 1988; Toinet, 1990; Ross and Ross, 2004; Nolan, 2005; Chiddick, 2006)<sup>1</sup>. Although there is no widely-agreed-upon definition for anti-Americanism, the common denominator of available definitions is that anti-Americanism is any “hostility” towards the United States (and the West). This hostility could be expressed in the form of protest, criticism and negatively sanction of the US (Tai et al, 1973: 470).

O’Connor (2006) has defined four chronological phases for the “hermetical” development of anti-Americanism, each with a specific theme: culture, politics and ideology, globalisation and terrorism. According to him, anti-Americanism started in Europe (and mainly in France) in the nineteenth century by criticising the American culture and lack of manners and developed to new forms of anti-Americanism in later decades.

During the first phase, which started with the inception of America as a European settlement to the end of World War II in 1945, anti-Americanism was largely associated with the “cultural” criticism of America by Europe.

In short, Americans were seen as overconfident and self-important and...it was this American ‘egocentricity’ that most aggravated Europeans...with the United States being depicted as the antithesis of Europe (O’Connor, 2006:13).

The second phase of anti-Americanism happened during the Cold War (1945-1989) and it was characterised with the “political and ideological” criticism of America, either in the West or the East. Much of this criticism in the East tended to be leftist and by communists while the European criticisms were about the American policies during the Vietnam War (1955-1975) and towards Israel’s occupation of Palestine in 1967 as well as the presence of American bases and nuclear weapons in Britain and West Germany in the 1980s. Ross and Ross (2004) observe that Washington’s “unswerving” pro-Israel policy is the most “salient reason” for hostility towards America.

With the end of the Cold War in 1989, criticism of America in the third phase was focused on the “ill effects” of American capitalism and Americanisation in the name of globalisation (O’Connor, 2006:12). Ross and Ross (2004:7-8) blame this type of anti-Americanism on the “new imperialism” or “liberal imperialism” or “limps” exercised by the United States.

The anti-Americanism of this period is frequently associated with the

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<sup>1</sup> Ross and Ross (2004) attribute this hostility to the “overstated” profile of Americanism and the Only-in-America stereotype.

anti-globalisation movement and its fears of a world dominated by American capital interests and American culture (O'Connor, 2006:18).

The fourth and the most recent phase of anti-Americanism began in 2001 with the arrival of “terrorist or violent anti-Americanism” which carried with itself the concerns of previous phases. O'Connor (2006:18) traces this type of anti-Americanism to some previous actions against the United States. They included the killing of Americans in Beirut and the Iranian hostage crisis in the 1970s as well as several car bomb attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and the 2000 suicide bombing of the USS Cole destroyer in Yemen. O'Connor (2006:19) believes terrorist anti-Americanism is motivated by what he calls “religious and territorial” concerns created by the American silence towards Israeli occupation of holy Muslim places in Jerusalem, the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq and the Jewish influence over America “as a puppet of Israel”.

O'Connor's classification of anti-Americanism into “cultural, political and ideological” arenas was earlier underlined by Naim's identification of five types of anti-Americanism: politico-economic, historical, religious, cultural and psychological (Naim, 2002).

There is a consensus among scholars and researchers that rising anti-Americanism in the Middle East should be blamed on the US foreign policy in particular its support for Israel in the Palestinian conflict and its engagement in the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan which lie at the heart of Middle Eastern construction of the US image (Nolan, 1995; Gerges, 2003; Islam, 2006; Chiddick, 2006; Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008; Graber, 2009)<sup>1</sup>.

The Intifada renewing violence between Palestinians and Israelis in 2000 made things worse, especially because harm done to Palestinians was televised. The wars on Iraq and even the war on terrorism have further exacerbated the situation [of rising anti-Americanism] (Graber, 2009:736).

This has been also documented in numerous public opinion surveys in the Middle East by major American polling firms including the Gallup Organization, Zogby International and the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press since 2001<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup>Since its inception in 1948 and its intensification in 1967, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been one of the greatest factors in regional and international equations including the formulation of the US foreign policy in the Middle East. As reiterated by Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008: 47), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been also a “major contributing force” to anti-Americanism in the Arab world given the “special relationship” between Israel and the United States.

<sup>2</sup> According to a Zogby survey in 2002 (as cited in Nisbet et al, 2004:15), a majority of respondents in Egypt,

There is historical tendency in the Middle East to portray America as an “interventionist and occupier” power. This tendency which started by the CIA-engineered coup in 1953 in Iran came into light after the Cold War in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In a valuable analysis of the conflicts in the Middle East, Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008) review the historical aspects of the major conflicts in the Middle East during the past century and their impact on rising anti-Americanism.

Analysing the Muslim reaction to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Iranian revolution as well as the wars in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Iraq, Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008) blame US reactions to these conflicts as the main factor contributing to anti-Americanism.

They argue that “double standards” in the US foreign policy in the Middle East particularly in relation to its “special treatment” of Israel and failing to act as an “honest broker” in the peace process between Israel and Palestine culminated in anger and abhorrence among the Arabs of America (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:56-62).

From the Arab perspective, Israel was receiving special treatment and the United States was turning a blind eye to a flagrant breach of international law (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:56).

According to Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008:136-155), there is a “symbiotic” relationship between anti-Americanism in the Middle East and the US-Israel alliance at the expense of Palestinians as Arab perceptions of the United States changed from a “natural ally of Arab anti-colonial movements” in the early years of the twentieth century to an “untrustworthy”, “hypocritical” and “double standard” broker in the late years of the 1900s.

The consistent use of its veto power in the UN Security Council to protect Israel from resolutions that insist that Tel Aviv change its policy towards the Occupied Territories, the continued and increased funding of Israel’s already formidable military capacity, and the unstinting political support for Israel’s regional policy have all greatly affected Arab view of the United States... [and] damaged its standing in the broader Middle East (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:156).

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Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates named US policies, rather than the American values of freedom and democracy, as the reason for their negative opinions of America. In another poll in 2004, majority of respondents in six Middle Eastern countries opined that America should “change its Middle East policy, stop supporting Israel and get out of Iraq” if it wants to improve its standing among Muslims (as cited in Chiddik, 2004: 99).

One of the other developments which greatly impacted upon the image of the US in the Middle East was the Iraq war in 2003 which Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008:161-169) believe was perceived by the people of the region as “a neo-colonialist adventure to secure America’s interest” and also a “pattern of US interference” in regional politics particularly after it was revealed that there were no WMDs in Iraq.

The US invasion of Iraq could not but...give Arabs further reason to view Washington as a global bully...Public anger over the role and actions of the US military stirred popular discontent (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:170).

Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008:105) also argue that the US support for the formation of the Taliban in 1980s in Afghanistan as a force against the Soviet was also a source of anti-Americanism among the Muslims as the emergence of Taliban was “a product of the betrayal of the US” which continued in the 1990s with the support it offered to Saddam Hussein in its war against Iran and the intervention by US soldiers in “liberating” Kuwait.

...[I]t was oil, rather than a political commitment to respecting the fate of the region, that was seen as integral to Washington’s decision to carry out a military liberation. This...strengthened Arab distaste for US regional policy (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:132).

## **ii. Occidentalism, modernity and the Iranian response**

Apart from dissatisfaction with the US foreign policy, the other reason behind the Iranian Occidentalisation of the West could be traced to the Iranian encounter with the “Occidental modernity” which was later intertwined with the “Occidental imperialism”. Here, I study the encounter of the East (including Iran) with the Western concept of modernity and its role in the formation of Occidental thoughts about the West. Before going to this main point, I would like to emphasise the relationship between modernity and Occidentalism.

In the West, Orientalism has been formed mainly through literature, stories, movies and sometimes through the first-hand accounts of diplomats and travelers<sup>1</sup>. However, in the East, Occidentalism has been formed mainly by the Westerners themselves through their policies towards the East. Additionally, thanks to their colonial and imperial (military) presence in the East, the Westerners gained information about the East and became

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<sup>1</sup> Primarily, the Western knowledge of the East was taken through literature and films; therefore, there were assumptions about the East which were later, with the passage of time, turned into stereotypes about the Orient, leading to the formation of Orientalism.

familiarised with the Oriental way of life. However, the Easterners have been deprived from this advantage; instead, they have been exposed to the colonial and imperial policies of the West. In the best possible manner, the Easterners became familiarised with the Western “modernity” and were forced to attract some of its positive (in science and technology) and negative (in sexual relationships) aspects.

In English, they say “always trust your first impression”. The first impression people in the East and Iranians got with the West was with modernity. The concept of modernity started from the West with the introduction of new ideas, norms and institutions as well as new sciences and technologies. It then spread to the East (Asia), including Iran, where it was later accompanied by Western “colonisation, territorial expansion and economic exploitation” (Vahdat, 2002:XI). Venn (2000:19) explains that Occidentalism is closely related to the “becoming-modern of the world and the becoming-West of Europe such that Western modernity gradually became established as the privileged, if not hegemonic”.

Exploring the encounter of Muslim scholars in the East with the Occidental concept of modernity, one can identify two rather different views. One group of scholars believes that Muslim states should accommodate the Western concept of modernity in its entirety while others should reject the “Western” model of modernity unless it is modified to welcome Islamic principles and in some cases the indigenous (native) features of the society concerned. Throughout the past centuries, the former has welcomed different aspects of modernity while the latter has rejected aspects which were perceived to be against Islamic tenets and/or the native structure. Although supporters of the second view outnumbered their rivals, these two views survived together in various periods of history, marking revolutions in Muslim countries of the Middle East. In fact, the common denominator of the Occidentalisation of the West in the East was their resistance against the West-driven modernisation programmes. They assumed that modernisation is equal to secularisation which is against religion (Buruma and Margalit, 2005)<sup>1</sup>.

In Egypt, for example, Muhammad Abduh, the Egyptian scholar and a student of Jamaluddin Asadabadi, believed that Muslims should integrate change into their society based on the principles of Islam if they want to bridge the gap between Islam and modernity. He believed that Islam should be the moral basis of a modern society but it should not approve everything done in the name of modernisation.

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<sup>1</sup> British Orientalist Bernard Lewis argues that Islam’s “war against modernity” would eventually escalate into “a clash of civilisations” between the United States as the “archenemy, the incarnation of evil” and “theocratic zealots from Lebanon to Iran” (Little, 2002:36).

A rather similar attitude prevailed among the other Egyptian scholars. Sayyid Qutb, a prominent Arab thinker from Egypt, was of the opinion that Islam and the West are incompatible and that modernisation was a defeat for Muslims. Even though he welcomed Western scientific advances, he believed that Western materialism and capitalism will be destroyed and modernity dismantled. Similarly, Hasan al-Banna, founder of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, perceived the West as a threat which has invaded the Muslim life and a challenge "which is armed and equipped with all the destructive and degenerative influences of money, wealth, prestige, ostentation, material enjoyment, power and means of propaganda" (as cited in Hopwood, 2002: 6).

Hassan al-Turabi, a Sudanese leader, believed that modernity should be "Islamised" rather than Islam be modernised. Similarly in India, scholars Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Altaf Husain Hali tried to Islamise European modernism in the late nineteenth century. They tried to "appropriate rather than simply imitate" Western modernity in their works of literature (Majeed, 2000:12).

On the other side of the spectrum, Muhammad Talbi, from Tunisia, was more moderate towards integrating Islam with modernity. He believed that Islam should coexist with modernity. He advocated a "positive Islamic vision of people with freedom of choice, able to interpret the contemporary world and to fix their position in it for themselves" (Hopwood, 2002: 9).

Mohamed Abed Jabri, another prominent Arab philosopher, was a supporter of Western concepts such as democracy and human rights. He was of the belief that not all modern concepts were the direct outcome of the traditional Western principles and therefore cannot be considered as "Occidental". He believed that such concepts which are perceived to be Western fall in fact within the Islamic framework (Filali-Ansari, 2000).

Muhammad al-Ghazali, an ex-member of the Muslim Brotherhood, had a similar idea. He welcomed the scientific aspect of the Western modernity but rejected its philosophy such as atheism and communism (Hopwood, 2002).

In Turkey, both the nationalists and those inclined to the West regarded Islam as contradictory to Westernisation and modernisation. Occidentalism in Turkey was a "way of restoring the authenticity of the past lost due to modernisation in the form of the nation, while at the same time catching up with the time of modern history" (Ahiska, 2010:41).

Iran's encounter with modernity took place within a similar context. In fact, the issue of modernity, since the nineteenth century, was a pre-occupation for not only scholars

in other Muslim countries across the Middle East and the wider Asia, but also for the intellectuals and religious leaders in Iran, formulating the foundation of their encounter with the West<sup>1</sup>.

In Iran, modernity, which began with the Period of Awakening during the reign of Naseroddin Shah Qajar, enticed many political, social and cultural responses from intellectuals, religious leaders and state actors in the form of acceptance or rejection (of some aspects) of this “Western” concept. Miresepassi (2000:13) has defined three phases of Iranian modernity: 1) an uncritical embrace of modernity as a Western model designed to totally replace the Iranian culture, 2) a shift to a leftist paradigm of modernity critiquing imperialism and capitalism, and 3) the turn towards Islamist discourses of authenticity. Those who warmly welcomed the Western concept of modernity (first phase) were labeled by intellectuals and religious leaders as “Westoxicated”, and those who rejected the Western modernity (phases 2 and 3) were described by the other group as “anti-Westerner backwarded”<sup>2</sup>. Proponents of the first view (phase 1) were mainly the officials of the Shah government and the King himself at the lead. Supporters of the second view (phases 2 and 3) were led by intellectuals Al-e Ahmad and Shariati<sup>3</sup>.

Although both views have prevailed in Iran throughout history, the view that rejected the Western concept of modernity gained more support and strength than the view which accommodated the West without any resistance<sup>4</sup>. The prevalent view was promoted by opinion leaders such as Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Khomeini, as the founders of the 1979 revolution, who developed the revolutionary ideology of the Islamic Republic as “a direct and indirect response to the discourse of modernity” in the way implemented by the Pahlavi regime (Vahdat, 2002:131).

Broadly, Iranian responses to modernity throughout the past century and a half can be analysed from political and socio-cultural aspects which have their roots in the tradition of Islam and nativism, respectively.

From the political point of view, those who were against welcoming modernity in

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1 For more reflections of modernity and the Iranian experiment with Western modernity, see Vahdat, Farzin (2002), *God and Juggernaut; Iran's Intellectual Encounter with Modernity*, US: Syracuse University Press.

2 Vahdat (2002:212) summarises the Iranian responses to modernity to “denial, emulation, infatuation, confrontation, resentment, or a combination of these”. He believes that Iran’s encounter with modernity is unique in the sense that the country’s intellectuals and opinion leaders were preoccupied with “the metaphysical foundations of modernity” routed in monotheism and sense of cultural identity.

3 The former believed that modernisation should take place but under the “cultural and ideological base of an authentic Islamic culture and government” (Mirsepassi, 2000:13). The latter wanted to reconcile Shiism with modernisation. Both adopted a nativistic approach towards modernisation.

4 The early political encounter of Iranians with modernity can be traced back to the 1800s when the Qajar kings were interested in exploiting Western technology, science and military “to resist the military threat posed by Britain and Russia” (Vahdat, 2002:28).

its entirety gradually gained power. Concepts related to political Islam were developed in confrontation with the Western model of modernity and its products (colonialism and imperialism). This led to the spread of an anti-Western ideology at different levels.

From the socio-cultural viewpoint, Iranian intellectuals called for a return to self and native (indigenous) Iranian and/or Islamic culture (nativism) in confrontation with the West. They played a crucial role in making two major revolutions (namely the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and the Islamic Revolution of 1979). At the same time, they welcomed “positive” aspects of modernity (such as science and technology) to the Iranian society. For example, Amir Kabir’s famous reforms were based on importing Western modern sciences and technologies<sup>1</sup> to Iran (such as university and hospital) and gaining access to the Western military sciences against the British, Russians and the French<sup>2</sup>. Iran’s insistence on using nuclear power is another example.

Such a “duality” in the Iranian encounter with modernity from the beginning has been described as “a strong interest in the military and technological aspects of modernity side by side with a weaker appreciation of its sociopolitical aspects—in particular, democratic institutions” (Vahdat, 2002:28).

This has been reflected in the thoughts and speeches of top Iranian leaders, particularly after the 1979 revolution. For example, Ayatollah Khamenei has on many occasions during his meetings with university scholars and students as well as the members of the State Expediency Council responsible for devising the country’s long-term vision, called for the development of “indigenous inward-looking development plans”. In fact, the concern of such leaders in the Muslim world is how to modernise without becoming a “mere clone of the West” (Buruma and Margalit, 2005:40). Mirsepassi (2000:94) attributed the rise of political Islam in Iran to the presentation of an “alternative discourse to overcome Western-centric projects of modernisation, enabling Iran to try and accommodate modernity within the context of her own historical and cultural experiences and specificities”. In a meeting with the students of Ferdosi University in Mashhad on 15 May 2007, the Iranian leader criticised the Western model of development and modernity:

There are two misguided approaches towards development...One is the damages and betrayals in the name of development ... by people who were dependent on the West and colonial policies such as the Qajar

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1 Such sciences and technologies included engineering, infantry, cavalry, artillery, medicine and surgery, mineralogy, physics, chemistry, mathematics and pharmacology.

2 The first regular Iranian newspaper was also published by Amir Kabir to “enlighten and educate” the people of Persia (Farman Farmayan, 1996: 128 as cited in Vahdat, 2002:29).

kings and Reza Khan [founder of the Pahlavi dynasty]... and the other approach is those who are completely against development (Khamenei, 2007).

Elsewhere in his remarks, Ayatollah Khamenei reiterated that the “Western model of development is misguided and dangerous”. He said that in the minds of many people “development equals West and becoming Westernised”. At the end, Ayatollah Khamenei proposed that Iranian elites and scholars should find the Islamic-Iranian pattern of development:

Why do we say Islamic and why do we say Iranian [model of development should be devised]? Islamic because it should be based on the mental and philosophical principles of Islam...Iranian because it should be based on the Iranian mindset and initiative...Therefore, it should be an Islamic-Iranian model (exerpts from Khamenei speech, 2007).

Ayatollah Khamenei’s opposition to Western modernity and Western-style development, like his predecessor’s, stems from the experience of the former regime of Shah and other US-installed regimes in the wider Middle East, such as Iraq and Libya where ambitious programmes of Westernisation and economic growth were designed by the United States to avert the Soviet influence in these countries—a failed policy which ultimately resulted in the spread of anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism. Little (2003:194) describes such a failure as not a “surprise” given the policies of the West:

Having insisted for twenty years that economic development and political reform would contain Nasserism and bring stability to Iraq, Libya, and Iran, US policymakers were stunned when modernisation brought xenophobic nationalism and revolutionary Islam instead (Little, 2003: 194).

In the case of Iran, the miscalculation of the West in exporting Western-style modernity speedily into the Iranian society was reflected in CIA reports and White House expert comments on Iran. CIA analysts reported in 1970 that ambitious programmes of modernisation by the Shah had given him over-self-confidence “that his the master in his own house” (Little, 2003: 222). In another example, White House Middle East expert, Gary Sick, warned the government that Shah reforms under the Western modernisation programme is “backfiring”: Sick referred to the “reactionary Muslim right wing...which

finds his [Shah's] modernisation programme too liberal and moving too fast away from the traditional values of the Iranian society" as a threat to the Shah regime (Little, 2003:224). George Ball, an advisor to Jimmy Carter, envisaged a similar conclusion and blamed "imported modernisation" programmes behind the failure of the Shah regime and the "unintended revolutionary consequences" for the United States which later led to the Iranian Occidentalisation of the West (Little, 2003:226).

### **iii. Anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism in the Iranian context**

To establish its hegemony in the Middle East, America has relied on two major tactics: strengthening allies and weakening foes. To fulfill the former, America has supported its Arab allies as a means of undermining local political forces who challenge its regional hegemony. To materialise the latter, America has relied on either direct military intervention or the intensification of regional conflicts<sup>1</sup>.

Mitchell (2004:88) believes these tactics were employed apparently to establish the position of America and fight its enemies (i.e. anti-Americans) but surprisingly led to the rise of hatred against America (anti-Americanism). He blames this anti-Americanism principally on (1) Washington's support for "unpopular client regimes" in the Middle East such as Iran (before 1979) and (2) the failure of US military interventions in the long term at the cost of millions of people and billions of dollars.

The US support for the repressive regime of Iran during the 1970s was one of the roots of anti-Americanism. Scholars blame this on the full support by the United States to unpopular "absolutist dictatorship" of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi who established the notorious torturing SAVAK intelligence service under the direct support of America with Israeli advisers to torture Iranian revolutionaries (Makdisi, 2002; Keddie, 1981; Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008; Graber, 2009). Such a support resulted in public resentment towards America among the Iranians. An American citizen who was at that time teaching at the University of Pahlavi (which later changed its name to the University of Shiraz) describes this anti-Americanism months before the revolution:

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<sup>1</sup> Mitchell (2004:100) observes that America tried to "prolong and intensify" the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as the war between Iran and Iraq, which lasted for nearly a decade, as a means of weakening the newly-formed Islamic Iran because it refused to "accept the US hegemony". US military invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 as well as the CIA-coup against Iran in 1953 and the Persian Gulf War of 1990 are examples of direct American military intervention in the region which were launched against the countries US presidents labeled "rogue states" or "axis of evil". According to the US National Security Strategy, "rogue states" are countries that "hate the United States and everything for which it stands".

There was a very clear anti-Americanism right from the start, but it was restrained and polite. They wanted the US to leave Iran alone for awhile, to be able to develop the country at a pace and in a manner of their choosing. Our first experience came immediately after a statement of support for the Shah by Carter, around October 10. “Yankee go home” was whispered by a passer-by. This whispering was the usual although later it became louder, more passionate, and more dramatic...A low level advisory from the US consulate in Shiraz told us to lay low. The French began to leave at this time, apparently for contract reasons: they were having trouble getting paid...“Out with the US” was certainly a demand. A group of us went to talk with the consul at this time. We told him we saw a direct cause and effect relationship with Carter's statements supporting the Shah and the heckling we were experiencing in the streets. We had a few unpleasant experiences beginning in early November. My wife was trailed in the bazaar by seven young men who unofficially escorted her out of the bazaar, and she was hit with a rock...We felt that the demands were legitimate and would sympathize with what was happening. Americans were encountering increasing hostility, such as garbage thrown over their walls, heckling, spitting (cited in MERIP Reports, 1979:15-16).

Another American living in Shiraz described the situation during the revolution in the following manner:

The American community numbered about 1,500, including about 300 dependents mostly American wives of Persian husbands. There was a fairly large British community. There were French and German communities large enough to have a German-speaking institute there...A number of restaurants and cinemas were bombed or burned during the summer. These were primarily Western-oriented establishments. There were only four such restaurants in town and they were all closed down when we returned. Some burned out, some just closed. None of the local kebab shops were touched (cited in MERIP Reports, 1979:14).

Iranians' perceptions of the US presence in their country during the 1970s were also expressed months before the victory of revolution in the form of leaflets, flyers and

night letters. In them, Iranian activists criticised the US government for “helping the Shah survive” and hindering Iran’s struggle for independence (from America). Following is an excerpt of a night letter given to an American national living in Iran at the time of revolution:

Dear Foreign Residents of Iran: Please Read

As you are well aware, except for a few privileged groups around the Shah, all Iranians have joined hands in their efforts against him, even in the army, where contact with the rest of the people is severely restricted and possessing a night-letter (such as this) would mean facing the firing squad. We hear about desertions everyday. But the Shah, supported by foreign powers, especially the US, the UK, and Germany, is still hanging on to the throne and killing and jailing more innocent people every single day. . .and you, being a foreigner, have some direct or indirect bearing on the situation whether you like it or not. A lot of foreigners have left Iran in recent weeks; some out of fear and others in order to show support for our nation (by leaving their positions vacant). Those still around could be of three categories:

1. Those who could not care less what was going on around them, or what kind of money they’d be making as long as they could make more.
2. Those who are members of foreign military and intelligence agencies and are therefore directly helping the Shah survive.
3. Those who have enjoyed living in Iran, met nice Iranians, would like to see our nation succeed in its efforts to gain independence and freedom, would like to help, and would feel cheap about bailing out now that things are getting rough.

...except for reporters, we suggest and strongly recommend that the rest of you leave Iran as soon as possible (cited in MERIP Reports, 1979: 14-15).

Lake (1983: 144) suggests that the rise of anti-American sentiments during the 1970s in Iran enabled religious leaders of the revolution to “lead and redirect” the revolution and conceal the struggle of power after the revolution:

Resentment at American intrusion into Iranian military, industrial and technological matters grew to fever pitch in 1978 when the Shah visited

the White House and the mullas used this emotionalism to show America as a spiritual graveyard and an Islamic Iran, on the other hand, as ‘freeing men from submission and from the rule of one person or group of people’. Moreover, by focusing attention on ‘the great Satan’ during the early months of the Republic the mullas could conceal the power-struggle in the Central Government (Lake: 144-145).

Such an attitude has been also underlined by Tai et al (1973) who attribute the rise of anti-Americanism to “ideological” confrontations with the United States in the form of “resistance” and “scapegoating”.

Tai et al (1973:456) argue that anti-American hostility is an independent positive function of the US “presence” and “internal politico-economic stress”. They explain that anti-Americanism is a “justifiable response” to (or “resistance” against) the US economic and cultural penetration to and its political and military intervention in other societies.

The argument underlying our “resistance” hypothesis is that the greater the US economic, cultural, or military presence in another country, the greater the indigenous opposition...xenophobia is often a result, among both the elite and the populace at large. Political intervention is even more likely to generate hostility. Few indigenous elites welcome the sharing of influence or control with foreigners, and alien troops stationed even in a friendly country seem almost universally despised (Tai et al, 1973:457-458).

Tai et al (1973:456) also believe that some states tend to blame “internal hostilities” on a “convenient external target” i.e. the US.

Why the United States should become the target of scapegoating is easily explained. It is one of the most visible and powerful actors in the international arena. The total magnitude of its economic linkages with other nations is greater than those of any other international actor. Its corporations own more overseas property, and it has more citizens abroad, than any other contemporary nation. It manifests in most developed form a social and economic system which is widely believed in non-Western countries to be the epitome of social injustice and the precursor of a golden age of egalitarianism (Tai et al, 1973:459).

This view has been echoed by Snyder (1999) who argues that radicals in

revolutionary states such as Iran began hostilities with the US to “externalise” their domestic conflicts with the liberals<sup>1</sup>.

Citing the theory of externalisation, Snyder (1999:270) argues that leaders of Iran, Cuba and Nicaragua had “strong incentives” to promote anti-Western and anti-American foreign policies and antagonise domestic liberals with close ties with the West.

Since the [liberals] bourgeoisie had strong transnational ties with the US, the radicals believed they had to defeat these moderates in order establish completely new orders (Snyder, 1999:266).

Studying the process from friendship to hostility between Cuba, Nicaragua and Iran on one hand and the United States on the other, Snyder (1999:266) blames the hostility between these revolutionary states and the US and breakdown of their relations on (1) America’s economic and ideological goals, (2) mutual suspicion and misrepresentations of the two states and (3) domestic politics in the revolutionary states.

Snyder (1999:273) argues that this process took place through four stages: Domestic conflict, externalisation, US hesitation and US hostility.

In Stage One, domestic conflicts developed between the radicals and moderates in the revolutionary states. In Stage Two, the radicals became hostile to the US. In Stage Three, Washington resisted responding to the revolutionary states’ hostility. In Stage Four, the US reciprocated the revolutionary states’ antagonism for fear of Soviet gains, and the radicals then moved to defeat the bourgeoisie. Stage Four differs in the Iran case, for the US reacted to the taking of the US Embassy as opposed to the fear that Tehran was becoming too close to the Soviet Union (Snyder, 1999:273).

Snyder (1999:277) analyses these four stages in the context of Iran. In the first stage, he argues that, the post-revolution struggle of power between moderates and radicals in Iran led to the rise of a “domestic conflict” over the ruling system of the country which was won by the radicals over the moderates.

In the second stage, Snyder (1999: 277) explains that the hostage-taking of Americans by Iranian students in November 1979 was not a blow to the US but aimed at preventing the moderates from increasing relations with the US in order to “eliminate the moderates and US influence”.

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<sup>1</sup> Snyder (1999:269) refers to this as the “theory of externalisation” which argues that revolutionary states were proactive and became antagonistic to the West for ideological and domestic reasons.

The third stage began with US hesitation. Snyder (1999:277) observes that the lack of action by America was because Americans did not want to “hurt the moderates and help the radicals”. However, Jimmy Carter changed this policy in 1980 and broke diplomatic relations with Iran. In the fourth stage, the US hostility began with an ill-fated rescue operation (in Tabas). According to Snyder (1999: 277), this was a victory for the radicals who managed to set up an Islamic Constitution.

In sum, the radicals used Iran’s conflict with the US to attack the moderates on the grounds that they were too pro-Western and not sufficiently Islamic. In building its institutions and political coalition, the Iranian Revolution largely defined its Islamic identity in opposition to the West (Snyder, 1999:279).

In his analysis of why the United States could not tolerate the Iranian revolution as well as the revolutions in Cuba and Nicaragua, Snyder (1999:268-272) refers to the opposition of these states to “capitalism”. He argues that because Iran, Cuba and Nicaragua challenged capitalism, the United States pushed them to an unwanted anti-American camp through antagonistic measures such as economic sanctions, military threats, covert aid and political pressure to overturn the revolution.

Explaining the rise of political Islam and in particular Shiism which led to Iran’s revolution and its subsequent anti-Americanism, Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008:70) argue that the emergence of an anti-US regime in Iran reflected the “wave of popular discontent with US interference and influence throughout the region”. They further discuss that America’s siding with Iraq and in particular arming Saddam with chemical weapons during the 1980-88 war with Iran was another source anti-Americanism among Iranians<sup>1</sup>.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the United States played a central role in the arming, advising and finally fighting that consumed the Persian Gulf. The United States...pursued and increasingly interventionist regional agenda that was aimed at securing both influence and resources. As a result, Middle Eastern perceptions of the superpower and its intentions in the region were adversely affected (Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008:109).

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<sup>1</sup> Iranian anti-Americanism will be discussed in more detail in the section on Iran’s relations with the United States.

## **Part 2: The concept of the West in Iran**

### **i. Iran-West relations; a historical perspective**

- a. Relations with the United States
- b. Relations with the United Kingdom
- c. Relations with Germany
- d. Relations with France

### **ii. The West among Iranian opinion leaders**

- a. Al-e Ahmad's "Westoxication"
- b. Ayatollah Khomeini and the "Satanic" US
- c. Ayatollah Khamenei and the "Evil" Britain

## **The concept of the West in Iran**

A Gallup poll on the “US image in the Middle East and North Africa” revealed that the image of the leadership of the United States in the predominantly Muslim Middle East and North Africa is relatively “very poor” with the regional median approval standing at 15 per cent (Ray, 2009). This image even deteriorated with the advent of the Arab Spring in 2011. Such a finding might not be a surprise to policymakers and researchers of political sciences, as the United States is already in many troubles in that region, ranging from the war in Afghanistan to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iran’s nuclear dispute.

However, what could be of interest to policymakers and researchers of political sciences is the approval rating of the leadership of the United States in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Surprisingly, a Gallup poll in 2009 found that 16 per cent of Iranians, compared to 12 per cent of people in Saudi Arabia (as a strong US ally), six per cent of people in Egypt (as a strong US ally) and four per cent of Syrians had approved the US leadership. Such an approval rating (16 per cent) is low; yet, it is higher than ratings among the populations of key US allies in the Middle East. This is interesting because Iran and the United States had no formal diplomatic relation for three decades<sup>1</sup>. In fact, a Gallup poll in 2011 demonstrated that fewer Iranians approve of US and EU leadership. Morales and Ray (2011) indicated that most Iranians disapprove of the West (65 per cent against the US, 62 per cent against the UK and 57 per cent against Germany).

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<sup>1</sup> The poll also suggested that unlike other populations in the region, relatively few Iranians (21 per cent) rate US withdrawal from Iraq as very significant to improving their opinion. Also, Iranians (45 per cent) were most likely to say greater technology transfer and the exchange of business expertise with their country would improve their opinions of the United States very significantly, while 40 per cent of Iranians say actions related to economic development and aid would improve their opinions of the United States very significantly.

The unfavourable image of the United States in Iran, judging from Gallup surveys since 2001, is on the rise (Mogahed, 2005). While 52 per cent of Iranians had an unfavourable view of the United States in the early 2000s, the figure increase to 65 per cent by the end of the decade<sup>1</sup>. But what are the reasons behind such rising resentment of Iranians with the West? In order to answer this question, history of relations between Iran and the West should be investigated.

### **i. Iran-West relations; a historical perspective**

In the Persian language and in the contemporary literature, the word “West” has been equivalent to “Farang” (or Farangestan) and more recently to “Maghreb” or “Gharb”. In the fifth century Iranian literature, Farang was a title given to France which was gradually used to refer to the West.

Few researches have been done into the representations of Europeans in Iranian works before the eighteenth century. Cole (1992) has undertaken an analysis of eighteenth-century depictions of the West in three Persian texts by Shiite high-class Indo-Iranian authors Abdollatif Khan (1805), Mirza Aboutaleb Khan (1812) and Aqa Ahmad Behbahani (1810)<sup>2</sup>. Cole (1992) recognises two paradoxical conceptions of the West (in Cole’s analysis Britain) among Iranian intellectuals:

...[Intellectuals] became divided between those who opposed the expansion of European [Western] power in the Muslim world and those willing to ally themselves or collaborate with the foreigners. Sometimes the career of a leader...demonstrated both leanings, with early opposition to the foreigners followed by a collaborationist phase in the

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<sup>1</sup> This is while another Gallup poll in January 2009 indicated that 67 per cent of people in the Middle East and North Africa disapprove of the leadership of the United Kingdom. The polls conducted from 2005 to 2008 in more than 140 countries and areas find that only in Africa is median approval of British leadership above 50 per cent. This is while the median global approval of British leadership is statistically similar to that of other major world players such as the United States and France, but significantly lower than that of German leadership (Brown and Nyiri, 2009). The Gallup poll, based on responses on the leadership of the United Kingdom from 143 countries including in the Middle East, suggested that while the disapproval rating for the United States stands at 35 per cent, it is 21 per cent for Britain and France and 16 per cent for Germany (Ibid). Another poll in September 2008 within the European Union showed that the approval of the leadership of Germany has received the most favour (51 per cent) than that of other powerful Western nations. Based on this poll, France, (41 per cent) Britain (39 per cent) and the United States (20 per cent) respectively obtained the highest approval rating in Europe (Nyiri and English, 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Cole (1992:6) observes that intellectuals often received “patronage” from European consuls or agents to write Persian chronicles about the local political events of the day from a point of view that “flattered” the British.

wake of a decisive defeat in the British hands (Cole, 1992: 5)1.

In his analysis, Cole (1992:6-13) discovers three positive themes about Britain in the works of the authors: egalitarianism (particularly with regards to gender relations and female dress code), the system of government (parliamentarianism) and scientific and technological advancement (as in printing press, shipbuilding, arms manufacturing, and industrial mechanisation).

He also discovers negative points in the Persian writings about Britain: high levels of individualism and mercenary attitudes, coward, lack of manliness, lack of religious belief, inclination to secular philosophy and dishonesty among the lower class. In particular, Abutaleb devotes a whole chapter to criticise the Europeans for being “selfish, irritable, inconsiderate, consumed with acquiring material things...and...for living extravagantly”. One most significant criticism in the Persian writings about Britain (and the West) was raised, according to Cole (1992: 14), by Abutaleb about “colonialism”—a concept which entertained Iranian intellectuals and politicians for more than one and a half centuries later when the Islamic revolution became victorious in Iran and the “political West” was perceived negatively among the Iranians.

Many people might think that any image of the West in Iran is only attributed to the hostage-taking crisis in 1979 or even the CIA-engineered coup in 1953 which has been described as “an orchestrated program of destabilisation” by CIA participants who spent at least 60,000 dollars to topple the Iranian government (Gasiorowski, 1987: 272-77). However, the history of relations between Iran and the West in the contemporary history of the country dates back to the Safavids (1501-1736) and the Qajar era (1796-1925)2.

The revival of the Silk Road in the sixteenth century, as the trade route between the East and West, had a great impact on the relations between Iran and the West as Shah Abbas Safavai (1587–1629) was heavily engaged in establishing diplomatic relations with the West, particularly with Europe. However, these relations reached its peak during the reign of Nasseroddin Shah Qajar (1831-1896) who was the first Iranian king after Islam to visit Europe.

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1 The “ambivalent” approach by Iranians towards the West has been also underlined by distinguished Iranian historian and author Homa Katouzian (2010).

2 The history of relations between Iran and the West dates back to the Sassanid era (224-651 AD) when Persians first encountered the European civilisation. During this period, Persia was the only transaction route between Greece, Rome, Asia and Egypt on one side and China, India and Middle Asia on the other. In that era, Persia exported many commodities such as silk and textile items to Europe. Such a geographical (and geostrategic) privilege of Persia later turned it into a hot spot of the West in the Middle East, mainly for commercial and political purposes.

Nasseroddin Shah paid three visits to Europe in 1869, 1874 and 1885 during which he became largely familiarised with the Western culture. He was the first Iranian to be photographed and became a patron of photography in Iran. Under the influence of his Westernised prime minister Mirza Hossein Khan Qazvini, Nasseroddin Shah introduced a number of Western technologies to Iran, including modern postal, transport and banking systems and newspaper publishing. He even founded the first hospital in Iran in 1869. The Shah visited Russia, Germany, Belgium, Britain, France, Switzerland, Italy, Austria and Turkey.

Mirza Hossein Khan Qazvini, entitled “Sepahsalar”--the highest government rank after Shah, translated literally as “Brigadier General”--was fluent in English and French as he had spent 20 years studying and working abroad as an Iranian envoy. He was a strict follower of Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Nazem or Amir Kabir, the first prime minister of Nasseroddin Shah, who is known as the first Iranian reformist. Amir Kabir tried to introduce political, economic and cultural reforms to the then society of Iran.

Amir Kabir succeeded in encouraging Nasseroddin Shah to make reforms to develop the country in almost every sector of science and technology. However, due to the conspiracies of some allies to the Shah and foreign intervention of Russia and Britain which considered a developed Iran against their interests, Amir Kabir was assassinated and failed to complete his reforms. When Mirza Hossein Khan Qazvini also known as Moshiroddoleh came into power, he tried to persuade Nasseroddin Shah to keep on the development path of Amir Kabir and continue his reforms. Moshiroddoleh managed to persuade the Shah by encouraging him to tour Europe so that he could be acquainted with developments of science and technology in the West. During one of his visits, Nasseroddin Shah said he aims to procure more equipment and ammunition for his armed forces.

However, apart from the benefits of establishing ties with Europe, Nasseroddin Shah gave several remarkable concessions to the West which raised bitter criticisms against him later. In his last trip, the British received several important contracts such as the permit to exploit Iran’s resources (mine and jungle), roads and shipping. British diplomats could also secure a contract to exploit Iran’s lucrative tobacco industry which later led to an all-out religious ban on consuming tobacco (or the so-called Tobacco Movement of 1891) until the contract was annulled. Other concessions Nasseroddin Shah gave to Westerners included the Harat (Paris) Treaty under which Iran left Afghanistan and recognised its independence, and the concession of establishing a bank by the Russians.

Notwithstanding, Nasseroddin Shah's visits to Europe had also positive implications for the Iranian society. For example, he learnt from Europe to form a cabinet of ministers and structure a Government Consultancy Council which later led to the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905-1911). Moreover, he established a Justice Fund to deal with the legal enquires and complaints of the people.

However, he gradually turned against the West by preventing students from going abroad or establishing universities in Iran. He was quoted as saying that "going abroad will have very bad effects and it is very bad to allow Iranians to go to Europe." In response to a demand by eager students to establish a university, Nasseroddin Shah rejected and insulted them. Such reactions disappointed Iranian intellectuals and religious sources who believed his costly trips to Europe had a negative impact on Shah. Keddie (1983:584) observes that those Iranians who were sent to study abroad were mesmerised by "economic development, comparative justice and lack of arbitrary rule" in the West and began to criticise the Shah.

Nasseroddin Shah's successor, Mozaffaroddin Shah, continued the path of his "Westernised" father. Mozaffaroddin Shah even spent far more money on trips to Europe. He also borrowed two Russian loans in return of giving further economic concessions to the Russians. The British also managed to guarantee several important economic concessions such as the William Knox D'Arcy oil concession in 1908 (Keddie, 1983). Keddie (1983:592) argues that the last shahs during the Qajar period "tended to squander the state's funds on luxurious living and foreign travel for court favorites and members of the royal family without foreseeing the disastrous financial consequences."

Such sentiments towards the West were later reinforced by the religious society of Iran in 1935 when Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979), issued a directive to provinces "forcing women to abandon their hijab" (Islamic dress code). Such a hasty decision was taken after Reza Shah made his only foreign trip in 1934 to secular Turkey whose leader, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was largely under the influence of the Western culture. Shah was impressed by Turkish women who did not wear hijab despite being Muslims and shortly upon arrival ordered a "compulsory" ban on hijab. Women who resisted this compulsory unveiling had their veils forcibly removed.

Reza Shah's decision on hijab was largely rejected by Iranian women and religious scholars who were unhappy about him on many previous occasions including his Western-inspired modernisation projects.

In 1928, for example, Reza Shah instituted a law, requiring everyone (except

clerics) to wear Western dress code and a special Pahlavi hat. This decision angered religious authorities whose followers were unable to reach their foreheads to the ground during the prayers because of the long brim of the hat. In other events, female teachers were ordered to discard hijab while going to schools; women were allowed to study law and medicine; cinemas, restaurants and hotels were given orders to receive both men and women; The Shah restricted religious mourning days during Muharram<sup>1</sup> and ordered mosques to use chairs instead of the traditional sitting by mourners. In another incident in 1928, Reza Shah beat a cleric in the holy city of Qom who had admonished the Shah's wife to observe the full hijab when visiting the holy Shrine.

He dealt harshly with opposition; troops were sent to massacre protesters at mosques and nomads who refused to settle; newspapers were closed and liberals imprisoned. He also used his power to vastly increase his fortune, becoming the biggest landowner in Iran, proprietor of nearly three thousand villages, as well as many factories and enterprises.

Such measures were widely rejected by Iranian clerics and some intellectuals who accused the Shah of being too Westernised (or Westoxicated) under the influence of foreigners, although he cancelled several concessions awarded to West by previous governments<sup>2</sup>.

During the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941), he established close ties with Germany—Iran's biggest trade partner which dispatched hundreds of technicians and advisors to the country. This led to chilly ties with Britain and Russia. In 1931, he nullified the concession given to Britain to fly in Iran's air space, rendering it to the German-owned Lufthansa Airlines. In 1932, Reza Shah unilaterally withdrew from an oil concession given to Britain's D'Arcy. He employed American consultants to develop Western-style financial and administrative systems in Iran<sup>3</sup>.

However, before Americans could open their way to Iran, Iranians were largely discouraged by the role the British were playing in their country. Under the Anglo-Russian

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1 In Muharram, the first lunar calendar month, Muslims mourn the martyrdom of the third Shiite Imam Hossein (AS). Traditionally, Iranians mourn the first 10 days of Muharram, every night by going to mosques. Reza Shah restricted this period to one day.

2 In 1928, he dropped the controversial Capitulation Act under which Europeans were no more given political and judicial impunity in Iran. The right to print money was also taken from the British Imperial Bank and was transferred to Bank Melli Iran, as was the administration of the telegraph system from the Indo-European Telegraph Company to the Iranian government, in addition to the collection of customs by Belgian officials.

3 In an interesting note from exile, Reza Shah was quoted as urging Iranians against the Americans.

“Write to Iranians that they (should) fear from Americans more than Russians or the British. This is the last word of Reza Shah and this advice will be proved by history (Khandaniha, 1944).”

Convention between Britain and Russia in 1907, they divided Iran into two “spheres of influence” without informing the Iranian government of their decision. The northern part was occupied by the Russian Army while the southern part was given to the British. This was seen by Iranians as a “betrayal” and further added insult to the injury of Iranians by the Westerners.

In 1919, British Foreign Secretary Earl Curzon tried to finalise the Anglo-Persian Agreement with Iran under the terms of which Iran could have turned into a British colony in practice. The terms of the agreement were so “imperialistic, colonialist and hegemonic” in nature that it raised the ire of even the United States, France and Russia in addition to domestic opposition. If it had been concluded, as observed by Sir Denis Wright<sup>1</sup>, Britain would have had total influence in Iran.

For Britain, a Persia...“friendly to Great Britain and independence of foreign control”...became a fixation in its (British) foreign policy. In order to protect Iran...from France...and...Soviet Union, Britain often rode rough-shod over Iranian sensibilities and interests. In doing so, the “English”...left on many Iranian minds feelings of *awe*, *resentment* and distrust rather than affection--awe for British power...cleverness--resentment that the British...(did) not to treat Persians on equal terms; distrust because Britain was seen to have reneged on treaty obligations negotiated with Fath Ali Shah (which) had forced Iran to abandon its historic claims to Herat and had ignored Iran’s declared neutrality in World War I (Wright, 2001: ix-x).

Elsewhere in his book, Wright (2001) confesses that “in Iranian eyes Curzon’s cherished Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was an unwanted take-over of their country” (Ibid). He believes that even after the revolution of 1979, old feelings about “the English” (as all Britons are known in Iran) still linger.

The oil nationalisation movement in 1951, as Keddie (1983) argues, indicated the “deep anti-imperialistic” sentiments of the Iranians when the first democratically-elected prime minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddeq, complained to the International Court of Justice of what he called the “cruel and imperialistic” nature of Britain stealing from a “needy and naked people”. Such a nationalistic fevour of Mosaddeq and his opposition to the British imperialism led to his overthrow by the United States and Great Britain in 1953 (Keddie, 1983). There are many other developments and bones of contention between Iran

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<sup>1</sup> He was British ambassador in Iran for eight years (1963-71).

and the West which will be discussed hereafter.

In order to understand the context of Occidentalism in Iran, one should also study the history of relations between Iran and the West. This is necessary to perceive developments and points of contention and cooperation between the two sides.

## **a. Relations with the United States**

### **1. Before the 1979 revolution**

Iran and the United States did not have much interaction before the Second World War. However, Iran became a “pivotal state” during 1945 and 1991--the Cold War Era (Lytle, 1987; Snyder, 1999). The two countries did have “nominal diplomatic representations”; however, American diplomats in Iran “did little more than monitor the policy of the major powers involved in the region” since the United States had little interests in the Iranian affairs (Lytle, 1987: 13). This is how Lytle (1987) describes interaction between Iran and the US in the 1940s:

In 1941 most Americans probably could not have located Iran on a world map, much less explained its importance to the United States. Only a handful of American missionaries, travelers, oilmen and diplomats had visited Iran. Trade between the two nations amounted to about \$15 million annually. In fact there was little in the historical traditions of either Iran or the United States to draw the two together (Lytle, 1987: 1).

In spite of this all, the two countries set up diplomatic relations after signing the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce at Constantinople on 13 December 1856 (Yeselson, 1956). The treaty provided for diplomatic and consular representations in addition to commercial clause and extra-territorialities.

The US Congress in 1882 legalised the establishment of diplomatic relations with Iran. On 14 February 1883 US Secretary of State Frelinghuysen appointed Samuel G. W. Benjamin as charge d’Affairs and Consul General of the US at Tehran with a salary of 5,000 dollars plus 3,000 dollars for expenses (Yeselson, 1956). In the same year, Benjamin set up the American legation in Iran. His activities focused on promoting Christianity. F. H. Winston was the second US ambassador to Iran. He arrived in Tehran on April 2, 1886. He, however, resigned two months later saying “the expenditure for a mission to Persia was unwarranted” as he saw no commercial interests for the US in Iran (Yeselson, 1956: 32). E.

Spencer Pratt was the next US envoy who served in Tehran for five years. He believed in the “great natural wealth of this land and of the profits that must result from its development (Yeselson, 1956: 33)<sup>1</sup>. Pratt further managed to persuade the Shah to send an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the US. Haji Hossein Qoli Khan arrived in Washington on 5 October 1888. He pleased to US President Cleveland to “save Persia from Britain and Russia” by going into a “treaty of alliance” and exploitation of Iran’s resources by Americans (Yeselson, 1956: 39).

In 1935, Reza Shah removed Iran’s ambassador from Washington after he was arrested by the Maryland police for speeding and a Hearst newspaper reported that the Shah was once a “stableboy” at the British legation (Lytle, 1987). Iran later re-opened its legation in Washington in 1939. During the 1940s, the US State Department started to send advisors to Iran in five key missions of army, finance, gendarmerie, urban police and food and supply to transform Iran from what they believed to be an “impoverished, semifeudal, traditional rural society into a progressive nation” (Lytle, 1987: 103).

The first serious political encounter between Iran and the US could be traced back to 1953 when the Eisenhower administration decided to support a coup against the government of Iran in favour of the pro-America Shah (Snyder, 1999:277). In fact, the first case of the US involvement in the Iranian politics, Gasiorowski (1987: 266) suggests, happened when Mosaddeq broke diplomatic relations with Britain on 16 October 1952 and the British were forced to bring the US officially into Iran as they had no base for operation inside the country.

Thanks to its geopolitical position and geostrategic privileges, Iran has been always at the heart of attention in the Middle East throughout the history. However, during the 1950s, which coincided with the height of the Cold War, Iran, which enjoyed long border with the Soviet Union, took the centre stage in the regional affairs for the United States. Moreover, the emergence of the Toudeh Party with communist Soviet-lined inclinations and growing confrontations between Iran and Britain over the nationalisation of oil led US policymakers to become increasingly concerned about Iran.

Gasiorowski (1987: 267) observes that under such circumstances Iran was turned into a suitable place for America’s “espionage and other covert activities” against the Soviets. The US administration increased its CIA and embassy staffs in Tehran and appointed Henry Grady, who had played a key role in the Greek Civil War, as the new

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<sup>1</sup> The next US envoy to Iran was Watson R. Sperry who went to Tehran in around 1906 to be succeeded by Alexander McDonald.

ambassador to Iran.

Out of the fear of losing its huge interests in Iran, the US government also inked a military aid agreement with the Shah and pledged a yearly 23-million-dollar military aid package. Another agreement was reached between the two countries under which the United States vowed to give a 25-million-dollar loan to Iran and support the allocation of another 10-million-dollar loan by the World Bank.

America's political support for and military aid to Iran was so great that some described the Shah as the "Local Gendarme" and "regional kingpin" of the US in the Middle East<sup>1</sup>. As reported by Ayoob (1973: 1415), Washington was going to sell two to three billion dollars in value of the most sophisticated weapons to Iran while up to 14,000 American "advisors" were already present at the country<sup>2</sup>.

In 1951, the Truman administration outlined two major goals regarding the US interest in Iran. In the first hand, Americans wanted to keep Iran in the "Western camp at all costs" and secondly they wanted to maintain stability in the global "oil markets" following the mayhem created by the oil nationalisation movement in Iran (Gasiowski, 1987: 267). However, these goals were interpreted by some as aiming to challenge Iran's sovereignty while others said they were designed to weaken the Soviet rather than Mosaddeq's position in Iran<sup>3</sup>. As suggested by Gasiowski (1987: 268), the United States began "covert" intelligence efforts to control and "manipulate" the political process in Iran in the late 1940s when the CIA designed five types of activity in Iran:

First, stay-behind networks had been organised among the tribes in southern Iran to conduct guerrilla warfare in the event of a Soviet invasion. Second, escape and evasion routes had been set up for use in a major war. Third, cross-border espionage and subversion operations were being launched into the Soviet Union using Azerbaijanis, Armenians, and other ethnic groups living on both sides of the border. Fourth, Soviet activities in Iran were being monitored with espionage and counter-espionage operations. Finally, an operation [propaganda campaign] codenamed BEDAMN had been started in 1948 to counter

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1 America regarded Iran as the regional kingpin in the CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation) alliance which incidentally had been reactivated.

2 On the huge "political investment" of the United States in Iran, Ayoob (1973) argues that America's interests in Iran were increased manifold following reports of a major energy crisis overtaking the US in the 1980s. This was reinforced by America's not too happy relations with oil-producing Arab states for its support for Israel.

3 US officials were, however, aware of British covert activities against Mosaddeq in this period and occasionally discussed these activities with their British counterparts.

Soviet and Tudeh influence in Iran (Gasiorowski, 1987: 268) (*brackets added*).

Although Gasiorowski believes these operations were conducted against the Soviet Union, critics believe one can understand the real intention of Americans of undertaking covert operations particularly when they were used to overthrow the Mosaddeq government in the 1953 coup.

## **2. After the 1979 revolution**

Twenty-six years after the 1953 coup was conducted by the US in Iran, the American ambassador left Tehran and the US suspended arms shipments in February 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in France and established the Islamic regime (Snyder, 1999:277). In fact the Islamic revolution of 1979 was a “direct challenge” to the US hegemony and America’s “strategic position” in the Middle East (Makdisi, 2002:551) as the Shah and his large and advanced military had been America’s “chief surrogate” securing US interests in the region (Criss 2002:588).

The revolution not only ended Iran’s close relationship with the United States, but Iran was transformed from a status quo power into a state intent on bringing radical political change to the region (Criss 2002:588).

This radical change had the “most formative effect” on the foreign policy of America and inflicted the “real damage” on US interests as it lost “a staunch...ally whom President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, once counted on to police the Persian Gulf” (Gerges, 2003:76-77)<sup>1</sup>.

Relations between Iran and the United States after the 1979 Islamic revolution have been based on one “principal benchmark” which is now at the forefront of Iran’s foreign policy principles particularly during the reins of the Conservatives under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2012). That principal principle is “Mobarezeh ba Estekbar-e Jahani” or the “fight against global imperialism/arrogance”, which is an indirect reference to the fight against the United States<sup>2</sup>. But why has the United States turned into a target of

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1 This was also stressed in the US National Security Strategy in March 2006 that “we face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran...The Iranian regime sponsors terrorism; threatens Israel; seeks to thwart Middle East peace; disrupts democracy in Iraq; and denies the aspirations of its people for freedom” (as cited in Mishra, 2008:156).

2 The term “Mobarezeh ba Estekbar-e Jahani” is literally translated as the “fight against global arrogance”. “Estekbar” or “arrogance” is the behaviour of a person when they feel that they are more important than other people, so that they are rude to them or do not consider them. Arrogance, when used by Iranian officials, is a

Iran's aggression?

To answer this question, one needs to review major developments after 1979 which have since overshadowed relations between Iran and the US and resulted in the post-revolution hostility between the two (although one should not underestimate developments before 1979 in particular in the 1950s). These developments include hostage crisis (1979-1981), Iraqi-imposed war (1980-88), IranAir Flight 655 shooting down (1988), war on terror and the US regime-change ambitions (2001), Iran's nuclear dispute (2003) and US unilateral sanctions against Iran, Obama's New Year message and Iran's response (2009 and 2010)<sup>1</sup>.

Arrangements to resume full relations between the new revolutionary regime in Iran and the US in the aftermath of the 1979 (as cited in Snyder, 1999: 277) were blocked by the 444-day-long hostage-taking crisis. Less than nine months after the victory of revolution and the day after American diplomats were taken by Iranian students, Ayatollah Khomeini the then supreme leader branded the US as the "Great Satan" and its embassy as the "Den of Espionage".

November 5, 1979 was the start of hostilities between Iran and the US which began with Carter-administered sanctions in April 1980.

President Carter responded immediately by issuing Proclamation 4702, imposing a ban on the importation into the US of Iranian oil. Ten days later, he issued Executive Order 12170, which blocked all property within US jurisdiction owned by the Central Bank and Government of Iran. In April 1980, President Carter issued Executive Order 12205, instituting an embargo on US exports to Iran (including restrictions on financial transactions) and Executive Order 12211, imposing a ban on all imports from Iran and prohibiting US citizens from traveling to Iran or conducting financial transactions there (Franssen and Morton, 2002).

Although most of these sanctions were removed after the hostages were released

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direct reference usually to the West and the United States in particular (when collocated with adjective "global"). According to Farhang-e Moin (Moin Persian Dictionary), "estekbar" means "having megalomaniac behaviour" or "having excessive pride". In political terms within the Iranian context of relations with the West, "Estekbar" equals "imperialism". Exclusively, when "estekbar" is collocated with the adjective "jahani" or "global", it means "global imperialism" which is an indirect reference to the United States as a symbol of imperialism and global power which seeks to broaden its influence in other regions including the Middle East.

<sup>1</sup> Of these six major developments, five either were created by hostility (from either sides) or resulted in contention between the United States and Iran. Except Obama's New Year message, the other five developments are described here as "points of contention".

(and many more were later reinforced by other US governments), the US government continued to block the property of the Iranian government in the US soil—a main point of contention to the present day.

The second major development which negatively affected Iran-US ties after 1979 was the political and logistic supports given to Saddam in the longest conventional war of the twentieth century. The costs of Iran-Iraq war included not only human casualties (estimated at around a million dead and injured), but also continued devastating impacts on the economy of Iran. Saddam used chemical weapons (believed to have been supplied by the West) against Iranian soldiers (and the Kurds inside Iraq) and inflicted physical damages on Iranian cities which continue to the present time. Iranians blame their underdevelopment on this eight-year war which they perceive as a product of US anger at the Islamic revolution<sup>1</sup>.

The finishing months of Iran-Iraq war coincided with the third major development which affected relations between Iran and the US. A civilian flight belonging to Iran, known as IranAir Flight 655, was shot down by the USS Vincennes en route to Dubai. The US shooting, which occurred in the Iranian waters and airspace, killed 290 passengers<sup>2</sup>. Iran accused the US of “knowingly” targeting the passenger plane. Although the American government agreed to pay 6.8 million dollars in compensation to the families of victims, not only did it never take responsibility for it, but also it awarded the USS Vincennes commander with the Navy Commendation Medal “for acts of heroism or meritorious service” in the Persian Gulf. This commendation and the failure of the US to apologise to Iran remain as another important point of contention between Iran and the US, clearly being stated in a report by the official news agency of Iran on the anniversary of the IranAir Flight 655 incident:

The airplane...was targeted on purpose by the aggressive and criminal forces of the Great Satan...Shooting down of Iran’s passenger plane by American criminals was in fact another stage of the confrontation of the global arrogance with the Islamic Republic of Iran aimed at reinforcing Iraqi aggressors in frontlines and bringing the officials of the Islamic system to knee...This was a

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<sup>1</sup> Iran-Iraq war damages were so great and progressive that Iranians commemorate it each year. Some of such damages to buildings continue to the present time (despite eight years of re-construction) while war handicapped suffering from Saddam’s chemical weapons wounds are dying every year.

<sup>2</sup> It was the highest death toll of any aviation incident in the Indian Ocean and the highest death toll of any incident involving an Airbus A300 anywhere in the world.

totally hostile act [by America]...which was recorded alongside other countless murders by the American government in the black file of the global arrogance...(part of a report entitled Shooting Down of Iranian Passenger Flight by America by IRNA).

The fourth major point of contention between Iran and the United States is related to the war on terror and regime-change ambitions of the US administration which started in 2001 with the Afghan war.

Condemning and describing the 9/11 attacks as “horrific and terrorist” perpetrated by “cult of fanatics who...could only communicate with perceived opponents through carnage and devastation”, President Mohammad Khatami was unhappy about the lack and unwillingness of the Bush administration to heed his offer of cooperation in hunting down the al-Qaeda in Afghanistan<sup>1</sup>.

We have not been given any clear or written evidence in this regard [Osama Bin Laden’s involvement in 9/11 attacks]. Some activities attached to these people or these groups have carried out acts no doubt that can be interpreted as acts of terrorism, but in this particular respect we have no evidence except this speculation that has been made and statements made about having the evidence (Khatami in an interview with The New York Times, 2001).

The moderate government of Iran, which had based its foreign policy on detente with the West, took another opportunity two years later in 2003 to propose its offer of cooperation<sup>2</sup>. This offer widely known as the “grand bargain” was a fax from the Swiss

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<sup>1</sup> Iran’s willingness to cooperate with America in the war on terror as a starting point for normalising relations with the West was underlined by the then US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage who said in an interview with the PBS’ *Frontline* series that the “Iranians were not unhelpful mostly by staying out of the way [of US forces to invade Afghanistan]”. Armitage further said both Iran and the US “share a general view that stability in Afghanistan would very much benefit everybody”. One example of Iran’s cooperation with the US was that Tehran encouraged its ally in Afghanistan, namely the Northern Alliance, to fight alongside US Special Forces against the Taleban and al-Qaeda. This paved the way for Hamid Karzai to go to Afghanistan as the Taliban regime collapsed within weeks of Iran’s cooperation.

<sup>2</sup> There are mixed opinions regarding this proposal. Senior figures from both Iran and the US including Richard Armitage and Hossein Shariatmadari (editor in chief of Kayhan newspaper), believe this document was redrawn by the Swiss ambassador to Tehran who faxed it to the US Department of State. Shariatmadari (as cited in PBS <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/interviews/shariatmadari.html>) said “I’m quite certain that this did not happen. We are even a bit suspicious that the Swiss ambassador wrote that fax himself; we don’t know it for sure. It was not an important issue and I’m sure the Supreme Leader and the National Security Council had nothing to do with it”. Armitage remembers “talking with people from our Near East division about a fax that came in from the Swiss ambassador, and I think our general feeling was that he had perhaps added a little bit to it because it wasn’t in consonance with the state of our relations. And we had had some discussions, ... particularly through intelligence channels with high-ranking Iranian intelligence people, and nothing that we were seeing in this fax was in consonance with what we were hearing face to face. So we didn’t give it much weight”.

Embassy in Tehran (as the protecting power for US interests in Iran) outlining areas of bilateral cooperation and terms and conditions of a peace treaty<sup>1</sup>. However, it was turned down by the Bush administration, killing any glimmer of hope for the resumption of formal relations<sup>2</sup>. Iranians then were alarmed that Bush might invade Iran after Iraq to change the Islamic regime and set up a democracy as part of his Greater Middle East Initiative<sup>3</sup>.

At a time when American forces were harshly struggling with terrorist groups in Iraq, Iran's President Ahmadinejad broke with the 27-year Iranian tradition and wrote the first formal letter to his American counterpart George Bush on 8 May 2006. The "surprise letter", 18 pages in Persian (around 10 in English), was handed over to the Swiss Embassy, which safeguards the US interests in Tehran. When the news was released, some analysts predicted an "opening" in relations between Iran and the United States. However, the Bush administration ignored the letter, suggesting that it does not contain any "proposal" for resolving Iran's nuclear issue<sup>4</sup>.

On 17 March 2006 and less than two months before the Iranian president wrote his letter, US Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, said that "back-channel discussions" were underway with Iran on resuming direct talks about Iraq that broke off shortly after the 2003 US-led invasion. The first such talks were conducted in May 2007 between US Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, and his Iranian counterpart Hassan Kazemi Qomi. The talks, first high-level face-to-face contact between the two countries in 28 years, were about

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<sup>1</sup>According to New York Times (as cited in PBS <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/themes/grandbargain.html>), the grand bargain on Iran's behalf included: full transparency with regards to Iran's nuclear programme, decisive action against terrorism, support for a stable Iraq, acceptance of the two-state solution regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and abandoning support for Hamas and Hezbollah. The US commitments included the abolishment of all sanctions and hostile behaviour including the axis-of-evil branding towards Iran as well as US support for anti-Iran terrorist organisations, recognition of Iran's security interests and national interests in Iraq and full access to peaceful nuclear technology.

<sup>2</sup>Flynt Leverett, the then Middle East director at the US National Security Council (as cited in PBS) described the content of the document as an "extraordinary proposal" for a "diplomatic process" to resolve all outstanding differences between the United States and Iran. (as cited in PBS <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/showdown/themes/grandbargain.html>).

<sup>3</sup>Hossein Shariatmadari, the chief editor of influential Conservative newspaper *Kayhan* spoke in an interview with PBS about the fear of the Supreme Leader of any regime change in Iran by the US which had stationed thousands of troops in nearby Iraq. Shariatmadari exclaimed "we consider al-Qaeda is an American creation. So 9/11 was created to justify the next move of Mr. Bush...to invade Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran as well".

<sup>4</sup>There are two approaches regarding Ahmadinejad's letter. One approach says the letter offered no grounds for the resumption of ties with the US. Supporters of this approach believe that there was nothing important in the letter and that it was not related to Iran's nuclear issue. They argue that Ahmadinejad's letter was in line with an unsolicited epistle in January 1989 by Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, predicting the collapse of communism. The second approach, however, says the opposite. Proponents of this approach describe the letter as a "turning point" in relations between the two countries. They believe that although the "bold" letter made no specific request for direct diplomatic exchanges between Iran and the United States, it presented "global problems" and "new solutions", which if understood deeply, could provide new diplomatic opportunities in the region and subsequently between the two countries.

Iraq's security only. The second round of these talks was held in July 2007 but did never continue in view of US allegations that Iran had increased support for militia groups in Iraq acting against American forces.

The fifth major and maybe the most significant point of contention between Iran and the US (West) is about Iran's nuclear programme and subsequent sanctions imposed by the US. Since its inception in 2003, the nuclear issue turned into a dispute between Iran and the US.

The nuclear dispute started when an anti-Iran opposition group provided some documents for a US news channel of undeclared nuclear activities of Iran. The dispute, usually referred to as an "issue" in the Iranian media, was initially dealt with on the Iranian side by President Khatami's government during the reformist period (1997-2005). Khatami's policy was based on cooperation and engagement. He suspended enrichment activities temporarily and entered into negotiations with the West (UK, Germany and France known as EU3). This policy was later slammed by President Ahmadinejad who based his own policy on confrontation and engagement.

It was for the first time during Khatami's administration that three European foreign ministers went to Tehran together to discuss the nuclear issue. However, Iran was confronted with the Security Council Resolution 1696 just three days before Ahmadinejad took office.

The Ahmadinejad's government decided not only to revoke the suspension of uranium enrichment activities but also to reinforce the number of centrifuges and nuclear sites. This led to the passage of five more resolutions and four rounds of sanctions in the Security Council and many more restrictions unilaterally imposed by the United States and Britain against Iranian companies and financial institutes.

The hardship felt under these sanctions strengthened Iran's resoluteness to continue with its nuclear activities in particular enriching uranium in "breach" of UN resolutions. These sanctions and restrictions were interpreted as an action against the Iranian "nation" to deprive them from exercising their "right" of exploiting nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The more pressure was imposed by the US and allies on the Iranian government to give up enriching uranium, the more support it could gain from the Iranian people for the nuclear programme, now turned it to a "national pride". This gave the go-ahead for Ahmadinejad in his confrontation with the West over the nuclear dispute. In a radio interview on 7 December 2009, Ahmadinejad said that the "global arrogance", an indirect

reference to the US, is the “biggest impediment to the administration of justice in the world” (Ilna news agency, 07 December 2009).

The number of centrifuges operating in Iran reached from 1274 in 2004 to at least 6,000 in 2010<sup>1</sup>. Also, new generations of centrifuges capable of enriching uranium in a shorter period and larger capacity five times greater than previous generations were unveiled by Ahmadinejad on various national ceremonies and occasions. On the number of centrifuges, President Ahmadinejad told a France 24 interview in 2007 that:

Do you know how many centrifuges are being operated by the US and Britain? They are operating hundreds of thousands. Why should the US and Britain, which are [like Iran] members of the [International Atomic Energy] Agency, have the permit to operate hundreds of thousands of centrifuges but we are not allowed to install centrifuges? Where among the Agency’s regulations and articles has this been mentioned? (Ahmadinejad, 2007)

Increased number of centrifuges enabled Iran to produce large quantities of uranium enriched up to 20 per cent. However, Iranian scientists were unable to convert enriched uranium to nuclear fuel required for Tehran Research Reactor used for purely medical purposes. It was running out of fuel and Iran, at that time, did not have the technology to produce fuel<sup>2</sup>. Therefore, this encouraged Ahmadinejad to hold a new round of negotiations with the EU3+3 (UK, France and Germany, plus US, Russia and China) to reach agreement on swapping enriched uranium with nuclear fuel.

It was the first time Iran’s negotiating team held “direct” talks with their American counterpart. Iranian diplomat Saeed Jalili and US negotiator William Burns held the highest level one-to-one talks between the two countries in 30 years in Geneva on 1 October 2009. A few days before the talks, it was revealed that Iran was constructing another enrichment site in Qom<sup>3</sup>. The Geneva talks resulted in Iran agreeing in principle to export much of its stock of enriched uranium for processing into fuel and to open the newly revealed

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<sup>1</sup> President Ahmadinejad announced in the fourth annual commemoration of the National Day of Nuclear Technology in March 2010 that the number of centrifuges in Natanz, where the largest enrichment site of Iran exists, will exceed 60,000 as soon as the third generation of centrifuges are tested positively by the end of 2011. Earlier in November 2009, Ahmadinejad told a cabinet meeting that Iran needed 500,000 generation I and II centrifuges to generate 20,000 megawatts of electricity as instructed by the Fourth Development Plan (2005-2010).

<sup>2</sup> Two years later, Iranians claimed they have managed to produce nuclear fuel for their research reactor.

<sup>3</sup> In a letter to the IAEA on 21 September 2009, Iran informed the Agency that “based on [its] sovereign right of safeguarding ... sensitive nuclear facilities through various means such as utilisation of passive defence systems ... [Iran] has decided to construct a new pilot fuel enrichment plant (up to five per cent enrichment)”. This letter was not publicised until 25 September 2009 when the United States accused that Iran had been building the site “secretly”.

enrichment plant to UN inspections.

On 25 October 2009, UN inspectors visited the Qom facilities<sup>1</sup>. However, Iran and the US failed to reach a final agreement on swapping uranium with fuel<sup>2</sup>. This resulted in the sixth resolution (and fourth round of sanctions) by the Security Council against Iran's nuclear programme. President Ahmadinejad responded to the sanctions by calling the resolution as "not worth a dime for the Iranian nation". He further said "the resolutions you [the West] issue are like a used hanky which should be thrown in the bin".

The fourth round of US-sponsored sanctions were imposed 14 months after Barack Obama offered his "olive branch" to Iran 59 days after taking oath as the new US president. On 19 March 2009, Obama sent a televised message to Iran on the occasion of the New Iranian Year (Norouz), calling for a "new beginning" in relations with Iran<sup>3</sup>.

...I would like to speak directly to the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran... For nearly three decades relations between our nations have been strained. But at this holiday we are reminded of the common humanity that binds us together...We have serious

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<sup>1</sup>The IAEA later confirmed in a report

(<http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-74.pdf>) that the plant corresponded with the design information provided by Iran and that the IAEA "still had questions about the purpose for which the facility had been intended and how it fit into Iran's nuclear programme".

<sup>2</sup>Iran held a meeting with the representatives of the US, France, Russia and the IAEA to agree on the details of a swap deal. Under the deal, Iran was asked to ship most of its uranium abroad to be enriched to higher levels in Russia, then turned into fuel rods in France and finally returned to Tehran. Iran said the exchange should take place in "phases" rather than all "at once". It was rejected by the US even though it was later discovered that Obama had primarily asked Turkey and Brazil to conclude this agreement with Iran but revoked from it at the last minute. Six months later, Iran reached an agreement (known as the Tehran Declaration) with Turkey and Brazil to transfer its enriched uranium abroad to be turned into fuel. However, it was too late to stop the US pushing for new sanctions against Iran. Hours before passing Resolution 1929, the US, France and Russia responded to the Tehran Declaration. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had earlier said Tehran Declaration had "a number of deficiencies" and was a "transparent ploy" by Iran to avoid further sanctions.

<sup>3</sup>Obama's message preceded a letter by Ahmadinejad to him. On 6 November 2008 and two years after Ahmadinejad's letter to Bush, the Iranian president wrote a congratulatory message to his newly-elected counterpart, Barack Hussein Obama. Like the letter to Bush, Ahmadinejad's message to Obama was a rare event. It was the first time after the revolution that an Iranian president was congratulating his American counterpart on victory in presidential elections. The congratulatory message was delivered at a time when Obama had earlier declared, in his election campaigns, that he will support a diplomatic (and not military) engagement with Iran without any pre-condition. Obama's overture to Iran is not limited to the nuclear issue as he is seeking to resolve the problems in the Middle East with the contribution and help of Iran. It is remarkable to mention that there were unconfirmed reports that Obama had written a confidential letter in response to Ahmadinejad's before sending his New Year message. On 29 January 2009, a Guardian newspaper report revealed Obama had drafted the letter to unfreeze relations and open the way for face-to-face talks. Although the US State Department denied that such a letter has been drafted, Iran's supreme leader acknowledged in his Friday prayers on 19 June the receipt of the letter and said Obama has expressed his "respect for the Islamic Republic and for re-establishment of ties". Obama's letter to Iran, like Ahmadinejad's letters to US, was described by observers as both historic and historical. The content of this letter was never released.

differences that have grown over time. My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community. This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect (Obama, 2009).

Obama's message was responded a day later by the Supreme Leader of Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei replied that:

We do not have any record of the new US president. We are observing, watching and judging. If you change, we will also change our behaviour. If you do not change, we will be the same nation as 30 years ago (excerpts from Khamenei speech, 2009).

Iran's leader also recited a list of grievances against the US over the last three decades, including the 1988 downing of the Iranian civilian plane, the freezing of Iranian assets and strong support for Israel and armed Iranian opposition groups.

Obama was not satisfied with Khamenei's response and sent another New Year message in 2010. This time, Obama highlighted the continuation of differences and hinted at the anti-American sentiments of the Iranian leaders:

For three decades, the United States and Iran have been alienated from one another. Iran's leaders have sought their own legitimacy through hostility to America. And we continue to have serious differences on many issues...We are familiar with your grievances from the past--we have our own grievances as well, but we are prepared to move forward. We know what you're against; now tell us what you're for...You have refused good faith proposals from the international community...Faced with an extended hand, Iran's leaders have shown only a clenched fist (Obama, 2010).

Ayatollah Khamenei responded that his country needs to see "in practice" Obama's extended hand:

"The US president's message speaks of normalising relations but in practice plotted against the Islamic Republic. The words contradict the actions" (excerpts from Khamenei speech, 2010).

He also borrowed a very famous phrase from the late founder of the revolution

Ayatollah Khomeini who described Iran's relations with America as a relationship between a "wolf and sheep"<sup>1</sup>. In response to Obama's overture, Ayatollah Khamenei this time added another aspect to this relationship. He said the "US sometimes speaks like a fox but acts as a wolf" (excerpts from Khamenei speech Khamenei, 2010).

"We said that if they are extending a metal hand inside a velvet glove, we won't accept. Unfortunately, what we had guessed turned out to take place" (excerpts from Khamenei speech Khamenei, 2010).

Ayatollah Khamenei also added another item to his list of grievances with the US: inciting Iranians to take the streets in the aftermath of June 2009 elections to protest the results.

The US president called those street fighters "civil rights activists". You talk of human rights and democracy...then you take the side of a bunch of rioters and call this a civil rights movement. Aren't you ashamed of yourself? (excerpts from Khamenei speech Khamenei, 2010)

Relations between Iran and the United States were further overshadowed by several other developments. In December 2011, Iran announced that it had captured a hi-tech US stealth drone in the Iranian soil. The capture of the sophisticated RQ-170 Sentinel's was regarded as a real achievement for the Iranian armed forces. President Obama urged Iran to return the reconnaissance drone. Iran filed a complaint with the United Nations accusing the US of spying and intruding to the Iranian soil. Days after downing the US drone, Iran said it had arrested Amir Mirza Hekmati an Iranian-American "CIA spy" with the mission of jeopardising the Iranian national security. Months earlier in May 2011, 30 Iranians had been arrested on charges of spying for the US and Israel.

These happened shortly after the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the opening of the US "Virtual Embassy" in Iran—a move which was rejected vehemently by Iran's Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehias being a "espionage trap". The US State Department said the virtual embassy was set up to provide "another perspective and another source of information...[for Iranians as]... the Iranian government, like other authoritarian regimes, tries to limit what its citizens see, hear, think, and feel by placing an 'electronic

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<sup>1</sup> Developments between Iran and the United States after the 1979 revolution are largely affected by the thoughts and attitudes of Ayatollah Khomeini. More on this will follow in the section on Ayatollah Khomeini and the West.

curtain' around its people"<sup>1</sup>. However, the Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast said the virtual embassy is an indication of "admission of error by the US for cutting ties with Iran".

## **b. Relations with the United Kingdom**

### **1. Before the 1979 revolution**

Britain is perhaps the only Western country with the most fluctuated and troubled relations with Iran. It was Iran which first officially sent an envoy to England in 1611. During 1611 and 1926, 19 Iranian representatives at different levels (special envoy to ambassador) were sent to UK. Likewise, Britain, up to 1926, sent 34 envoys and special missions to Iran, beginning in 1627 (Wright, 1985:216-220).

A glance at the chronology of relations between Iran and Britain shows that the two countries have severed diplomatic relations at least eight times throughout the history of bilateral relations. In the first instance, in 1838, the British diplomatic and military missions were expelled from Iran after British forces from India occupied the Kharq Island following the Iranian attack on Herat. Diplomatic ties resumed in 1841 but again broke off in 1855 following a personal dispute between British Minister Charles Murray and the Iranian government. In 1952, Prime Minister Mosaddeq closed the British Embassy in Tehran. In 1980, the UK Foreign Office shut down its embassy and moved its diplomatic staff to the Swiss Embassy concurrent with the start of the Saddam-imposed war. Later in 1989, bilateral diplomatic relations were cut off following the Rushdie verdict. In 2009, the British Council shut its office in Iran because of what it described as "intimidation and harassment" of its staff by the Iranian government. In June the same year, two British diplomats were expelled from Iran when Britain was accused of fomenting riots in the aftermath of the controversial presidential elections. Two Iranian diplomats were also expelled from London in tit for tat retaliation. In December, 2011, the Iranian parliament passed a resolution asking the government to downgrade UK relations to the lowest possible level i.e. charge d'affaires. One day after the motion was ratified, Iranian students stormed the British Embassy in Tehran. The Foreign Office, accordingly, recalled all embassy staff and ordered the closure of the embassy. Likewise, the UK government expelled Iranian diplomats from London, creating another serious tension in bilateral relations.

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<sup>1</sup> In addition, the US State Department appointed Alan Eyre—an American fluent in Persian—as its Farsi Spokesman.

Denis Wright is a former UK ambassador to Iran who has written two valuable volumes on Iran-UK relations. According to him, the first Iranian visited England in 1238 during the reign of Henry III to ask the English for help against the Mongol raid in favour of Persian ruler Ala ud-Din Mohammad. Nearly 400 years later, in February 1626, Naqd Ali Beg landed at Portsmouth as the first “Persian” ambassador to England of Shah Abbas (Wright, 1985). He left London in 1627 and died on the way to Iran. Since then until 1809, no other Iranian envoy appeared in England, a “clear indication that neither country had much interest in the other” (Wright, 1985: 9).

In 1598, the famous Sherley brothers arrived in Qazvin. They persuaded Shah Abbas to send a diplomatic mission headed by Anthony Sherley and Hossein Ali Beg to England to seek their help in return for “trading facilities in Persia” (Wright, 1985: 3).

The sixteenth century was a turning point in relations between Iran and Britain as the latter located interests. At first, British interests in Iran were purely commercial but were later turned overriding political in defense of India (Ahmad, 1974; Wright, 1985). As the British imperial interest was expanding in India, it became important to keep Iran and the Persian Gulf under the control “so that India could be made safe from any possible aggression by other powers” (Ahmad, 1974:1). The English sent Mehdi Ali Khan, originally an Iranian national living in Bombay to represent them at the Shah’s Court in 1798. In 1800, the English “alive to the possibility of an invasion of India by France and Russia” signed an alliance with Fath Ali Shah of Qajar (Martin, 1989:13). After Mehdi, the British Governor-General of Calcutta decided to send Captain John Malcolm as the second UK envoy to Iran. He arrived in Bushehr on May 4, 1800, aiming at promoting the political interests of the UK in Iran (Wright, 1985).

1238	Persian ruler Ala ud-Din sends an envoy to Henry III
1290	Edward I send Geoffrey de Langley to Persia
1562	Queen Elizabeth I sends a letter through Anthony Jenkinson to Shah Tahmasp’s Court in Qazvin <sup>1</sup>
1611-1613	Sir Robert Sherley sent to Britain as Iran’s envoy
1624-1627	Sir Robert Sherley sent to Britain as Iran’s envoy (disputed)
1626-1627	Naqd Ali Beg sent to Britain as official Iran’s envoy
1627	Britain sends Sir Dodmore Cotton as its envoy to Iran
1800-1801	John Malcolm comes to Iran as UK’s envoy
1801	Iran and UK sign Anglo-Persian Political and Commercial Treaties

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<sup>1</sup> Jenkinson was later expelled by the Shah who, under the influence of Turkish merchants, said “we do not need the friendship of the Koffars (non-Muslims).

	in Tehran negotiated by Malcolm
1804	UK sends Samuel Manesty to Iran as envoy
1808	John Malcolm re-appointed as UK envoy
1809-1810	Iran sends Mirza Abdolhassan Shirazi as envoy to UK
1809-1811	Sir Harford Jones appointed UK envoy to Iran
1811-1814	Sir Gore Ouseley appointed UK envoy to Iran
1814-1815	James J. Morier appointed UK envoy to Iran
1815-1826	Henry Willock appointed UK envoy to Iran
1819-1820	Iran sends Mirza Abdolhassan Shirazi as envoy to UK
1851-1853	Shafi Khan becomes Iran's envoy to UK
1859-1860	Hassan Ali Khan serves as Iran's envoy o UK
1860-1861	Mirza Jafar Khan becomes Iran's envoy to UK

Table 1 An Anglo-Persian Chronology up to 1925. Source: (Wright, 1985: 216-220)

Replacing the Portuguese and the Dutch, the British emerged as the predominant European power in the Persian Gulf in the course of the eighteenth century (Cole, 1992). However, two major developments led to the deterioration of relations between Iran and the United Kingdom before the 1979 revolution. And both developments were related to the issue of oil.

The main point of contention between the two countries happened in the 1950s when the Iranian government declared the country's oil industry "nationalised", even though Iran-Britain relations were going to sever after the conclusion of the Anglo-Iranian (-Persian) Agreement of 1919. The agreement was provided by the British government to Iran in August 1919 in order for the former to exploit the huge oil resources of the latter. According to Katouzian (1998:5) the agreement, which was finally revoked by the Iranian parliament in 1921, was designed to "turn Iran into a British protectorate" but received great opposition by Iranians from different political backgrounds as well as Iranian expatriates and even foreigners<sup>1</sup>. The terms of the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919 were so "exploitative" and "imperialistic" that even the British Treasury, War Office and India Office as well as the government of India regarded that as "costly and/or offensive to the surging nationalist sentiments" in Iran (Ibid,6)<sup>2</sup>.

It lit the touch-paper of the surging Iranian nationalism and aroused the

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<sup>1</sup>Katouzian (1998:8) observes that not only the modern nationalists (pro-Qajar, pro-Pahlavi, conservative, liberal, democrat, Marxist-Leninist, and Islamist), but the ulama and religious community, Democrats and popular constitutionalists, the Gendarmerie and some of the Cossack officers were united in the belief that Iran had become a British protectorate if the agreement would have been concluded.

<sup>2</sup> Even the then Shah of Iran who got stuck in France as the result of the turmoil inside Iran revolving the agreement, described it as a "British plot to get rid of him" (Katouzian, 1998: 31-2).

anger and suspicion of the other great powers into the belief that Iran had lost her independence, and henceforth would be ruled by the combined dictatorship of Britain's Iranian agents and her technical advisers (Katouzian, 1998:7).

Foreign opposition to the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919 was also a factor which ultimately led to the failure of the British to persuade Iran to implement the agreement. France, the United States and Russia viewed the agreement as "hegemonic" and against their interests in Iran (Katouzian, 1998: 12-19).

In his deep analysis of the reasons behind the failure of the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919, Katouzian (1998: 45-6) raises four main reasons which, he concludes, "paved the way" for the coup d'état of 1921. The reasons include:

...its unqualified rejection by Iran's body politic; the confirmation of their worst fears by France, America and Russia; the refusal of the [British] War Office, the Treasury, the India Office and the government of India to supply the necessary instruments for its defence; and [British Foreign Secretary Earl] Curzon's incredible rigidity in dealing with a rapidly deteriorating situation... (Katouzian, 1998: 45-6).

The second point of contention between Iran and Britain before the revolution was again related to the issue of oil. The democratically-elected government of Mohammad Mosaddeq managed to revoke the concession given to the British government to exploit the Iranian oil. This resulted in tit-for-tat political conflict over the concession to exploit oil between Iran and Britain. Iran finally won the case in The Hague. Mosaddeq ordered the UK Embassy closed. This led the British government to stage a coup and topple Mosaddeq in 1953, marking the main source of Iranian pessimism and hatred towards not only Britain but also the United States as two major powers "interfering in the domestic affairs" of their country.

In his deep analysis of the 1953 coup, Gasiorowski (1987: 279) points out that the American complicity in the British plot was the foundation of the "anti-American character" of the 1979 revolution and in the many "anti-American incidents" after the revolution.

Gasiorowski (1987: 261-3), who claims his analysis is "more complete" than previous accounts of the 1953 coup, maintains that the British government, in consultation with Americans, had adopted a "three-track strategy" to regain its control over Iran after

Mosaddeq's nationalisation efforts:

The first component of this strategy consisted of a series of legal maneuvers [through the International Court, the United Nations, and mediation by the United States]... The second component of the British strategy was to undermine Mosaddeq's base of support by imposing economic sanctions on Iran and carrying out military maneuvers in the region... The third component of the British strategy was to try to remove Mosaddeq from office...mainly through covert political action, undertaken with the help of a network of pro-British politicians, businessmen, military officers, and religious figures Gasiorowski (1987: 263).

The first tactic was futile as international negotiations failed; the second tactic also bore no result when Mosaddeq announced that the first shot fired would "signal the start of World War III" and US President Truman advised the British government that the United States would not back an invasion of Iran. Therefore, the British and Americans reached consensus over the third tactic: to oust Mosaddeq from power. Gasiorowski (1987: 261) argues that this tactic which led to the 1953 coup marked the "first peacetime use of covert action" by the United States to overthrow a foreign government, even though low-level CIA experts were against the coup and viewed it as "putting US support behind Anglo-French colonialism".

According to Gasiorowski (1987: 272), the 1953 coup had four main components:

First, the propaganda and political action capabilities of BEDAMN<sup>1</sup> were to be turned immediately against Mosaddeq. Second, opposition figures were to be encouraged to create a disturbance that would dramatise the situation by taking *bast* [sanctuary] in the Majlis. Third, since the Shah had not been consulted about the coup, his agreement to dismiss Mosaddeq and appoint Zahedi was to be obtained. Finally, the support of key active-duty military officers was to be sought Gasiorowski (1987: 272).

## **2. After the 1979 revolution**

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<sup>1</sup> BEDAMN was the codename of an American propaganda operation which started in 1948 to counter Soviet and Tudeh influence in Iran through the press.

Iran-UK relations after the revolution have been full of highs and lows. The first instance of “lows” happened in 1980 when the Foreign Office shut down its embassy and moved its diplomatic staff to the Swiss Embassy concurrent with the start of the Saddam-imposed war.

In the same year on 30 April, the Iranian Embassy in London was taken over by six terrorists who introduced themselves as members of the “Democratic Revolutionary Movement for the Liberation of Arabestan”, demanding autonomy for the southern oil-rich province of Khuzestan and release of some prisoners from the Iranian jails. They took the embassy occupants (26 people) hostage and killed one embassy staff. The six-day siege was ended when British Special Forces stormed the building and killed five of the terrorists. There is still a controversy about this incident as some argue that the terrorists were Arabs with Iraqi passports who entered London to storm the Iranian Embassy in cooperation with Iraq’s defence attaché. There is also mystery about the way the British government handled the situation. Some say British forces “deliberately” killed the hostage-takers as they had hinted that they are ready to surrender if interviewed by an Arab newspaper or escorted to Heathrow by an Arab ambassador. These conditions were all rejected by the British government. Moreover, the court hearing of the sixth terrorist who was captured alive was held behind closed doors. He was later released from prison and given British citizenship.

In 1981, the British charge d’affaires in Tehran met Majlis speaker and called for the improvement of relations. However, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the then Majlis speaker, declined and responded that it is the basic policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran not to have “friendly relations with countries which have imperialistic and domineering tendencies”. In 1986 and two years before the end of the war imposed by Saddam, who many Iranians now believe was supported by the West including Britain, Margaret Thatcher called for the amelioration of bilateral ties. However, Thatcher’s call was overshadowed by the arrest of a British national Roger Cooper in Iran on charges of spying in 1985 (until 1991) and the arrest of an Iranian diplomat in Manchester in 1987.

In 1988 after eight years of turmoil in relations, the British Embassy was reopened in Tehran and foreign ministry officials of both countries visited their capitals. However, improved relations did not take more than several months until February 1989 when Britain cut diplomatic relations after Ayatollah Khomeini issued a death religious edict (fatwa) against Salman Rushdie, a British citizen, for authoring his “Satanic Verses”. Iran’s parliament also passed a resolution, obligating the government to suspend all political ties

with Britain. Diplomatic ties were broken off only to be resumed at a chargé d'affaires level in 27 September 1990.

In 1998 full diplomatic relations were restored at ambassadorial level when reformist Mohammad Khatami was elected Iran's president and adopted a detente foreign policy. Jack Straw, the then British Foreign Secretary, became the first high ranking British official to visit Tehran in 2001 since the revolution. He later made five visits to Iran and received his Iranian counterpart Kamal Kharrazi three times in London the first in January 2000.

Improved relations suffered a setback in 2002 when David Reddaway was rejected by Tehran as London's ambassador on charges of being a spy, and further deteriorated when Iran detained eight British sailors in June 2004 after their vessel strayed into Iranian waters near the border with Iraq<sup>1</sup>.

The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the establishment of British soldiers near Iranian borders raised serious concerns for Iran as the country's nuclear programme was also turning into a bitter dispute with the West including Britain who played a key role in resolving the dispute and imposing unilateral and multilateral sanctions on Iran<sup>2</sup>. Such measures were interpreted by Iranians as "interference" by Britain in their affairs, instigating occasional anti-British demonstrations outside the British Embassy in Tehran<sup>3</sup>.

Iran-UK relations remained at the ambassadorial level with the inauguration of President Ahmadinejad's government. He was highly likely to drop his predecessor's detente foreign policy. And he did it.

In November 2006, the Metropolitan Police arrested a retired Iranian diplomat Nosratollah Tajik on charges of trying to illegally buy night vision goggles for Iran from US mediators<sup>4</sup>. The British government announced it was going to extradite Tajik to the

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1 British sailors were released three days later. Two similar incidents happened during the presidency of Ahmadinejad. The first was on 23 March 2007 when 15 British sailors were captured in Iranian waters but were released 12 days later. The third incident occurred in November 2009 when five British sailors strayed unintentionally into Iranian waters in the Persian Gulf. Like the two previous incidents, they were released five days later. There has been always controversy over Iranian sea borders in the Persian Gulf. One such incident also happened in 2008 when Iranian military boats approached three US Navy ships near the Strait of Hormoz. No fighting was reported.

2 On 21 August 2003 an Iranian diplomat Hadi Soleimanpour was arrested in London on charges related to the 1994 AMIA bombing in Argentina.

3 On 15 October 2005, nine Iranians were killed and 45 injured in explosions in the southern city of Ahvaz. Iran's Intelligence Ministry attributed the bombings to "English spies" and said the bombers were "connected to British intelligence services". The British Embassy in London denied allegations.

4 According to some reports, undercover FBI agents posing as international military equipment dealers offered to sell Tajik night vision goggles valued over £50,000 while secretly filming him. Tajik and his lawyers argue that the US agents planned to incriminate and frame him, as they were not following a legitimate lead.

US. This increased tensions between Iran and the UK at a time when Gordon Brown became the British premier in 2007. Iran's Embassy in London described Brown's era in an analysis as below:

Britain's hostile policy towards Iran was continued when Gordon Brown assumed power and guided harsh economic sanction plans through 5+1 Group against Iran. The British Prime Minister [Brown] was the first Western leader calling for imposing all-out sanctions on Iran's oil and gas industries (Iran's Embassy analysis, 2010)<sup>1</sup>.

On 5 February 2009, the British Council shut its office in Iran because of what it described as "intimidation and harassment" of its staff by the Iranian government. The British Council's chief executive, Martin Davidson, told the Guardian that the 16 local staffers of his office in Tehran had been ordered by Iranian security forces to resign<sup>2</sup>.

Relations between Iran and Britain reached its lowest dimension in the aftermath of the disputed presidential elections in June 2009. Iran officially accused Britain of "overt and covert interferences in the domestic affairs" of the country after people took the streets to protest the results of the elections which handed President Ahmadinejad a decisive victory for another four years.

Two British diplomats were expelled from Iran and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei described Britain on 19 June 2009 as the "most evil" of enemies<sup>3</sup>.

This is a reality. These conspiracies which were undertaken in the past 30 years by various enemies-of course America in the lead and Britain the most evil of them- against the Islamic Republic system...They fear and they plot...Today, pioneers of imperialist policies-America and Zionists and other arrogant powers, have mobilised all their efforts to marginalise the Islamic Republic system (excerpts from khamenei speech, 2009).

Although British officials denied allegations of interference in the Iranian affairs and avoided making comments on the post-election incidents in Iran, relations between the two countries were overshadowed by such allegations. The Iranian parliament announced it

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1 On 12 October 2009, HM Treasury issued a direction under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, requiring the financial sector in Britain to cease business relationships and transactions with Bank Mellat and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and do not enter into new business relationships and transactions with the two Iranian companies and their branches. Such a restriction was a unilateral measure taken by the British government to stop the development of Iran's nuclear and missile ballistic programmes.

2 The British Council was invited to open an office in Tehran in 2001 under Khatami's administration.

3 The British Foreign Office also expelled two Iranian diplomats from London in retaliation.

is seeking to pass a proposal, calling for the severance of relations with Britain in various sectors of commerce and education.

Less than 10 days after the leader's speech, Iranian intelligence officials arrested nine local staffs of the British Embassy in Tehran. They were charged with inciting street protests and stoking riots which London denied. Eight of them were released. Hossein Rassam, the embassy's chief political analyst, remained in prison for less than one month and was released on bail, but charged with espionage and harming national security. Rassam later admitted during a trial described by many as a "show trial" that "based on the order of British embassy, the local staff were asked to be present in the riots". The Guardian newspaper described the post-election events in Iran and their impacts on relations with Britain in this way:

Distrust of Britain in Iranian official circles goes back to colonial days. State-sponsored media often accuse British intelligence of being behind acts of sabotage and attacks by rebels in its provinces, and Britain is blamed for rallying UN Security Council support for sanctions resolutions aimed at Iran's nuclear programme (Borger, 2009).

In fact, President Ahmadinejad referred to this distrust in an interview with France 24 in which he elaborated on his attitudes towards Britain and other Western countries:

Our country does not have any expectation from Britain because our history has many bitter memories of interference by British statesmen...And about other European countries like France and Germany, we want them to help Europe...And about the United States, America has devised conspiracies against our country for 27 years and the Europe followed. However, we progressed during this period...America is the most hated in the Middle East...America is using the Europeans as puppets to reach its own interests (Ahmadinejad, 2007).

Elsewhere during a provincial visit, Ahmadinejad said he believed that Britain has been pursuing "imperialistic goals" under the cover of "humanitarian motifs" in the past three centuries in the Middle East:

Having formed an emperor in that time [300 years], Britain dominated the Middle East. The issues of human rights, democracy and the war on

terror are big lies and Western statesmen have never had the courage to express their goals [in the Middle East] (Ahmadinejad's speech during a provincial visit, 14 Jan. 2010, *brackets added*).

Later on 27 September 2010, President Ahmadinejad proposed the “National Day of Combat Against the British Imperialism”. His proposal was accepted by the Cabinet. It assigned 12 Shahrivar in the Iranian calendar as the national day of combat against the British imperialism. This day coincides with the martyrdom anniversary of Reis Ali Delvari—a prominent Iranian rebel who fought the British during the First World War and was killed in 1915, becoming the symbol of struggle against Britain.

Iran-UK relations entered a new low stage in 2011 after the Iranian parliament, in response to the unilateral act by the UK government to restrict transactions with the Central Bank of Iran, passed a resolution urging the government to downgrade relations with Britain to the lowest possible level<sup>1</sup>. This could have resulted in expelling the newly-arrived British Ambassador to Iran Dominick Chilcott.

On November 29, 2011, a day after the resolution was ratified, Iranian students stormed the British Embassy during a rally to demonstrate against unilateral restrictions imposed by Britain. Demonstrators protested against new sanctions imposed by the British government on Iran. They also showed their resentment to a report published on 2 November by the Guardian newspaper that revealed the British armed forces are considering contingency plans to back up a possible US attack on Iran.

According to the Reuters News Agency report, “several dozen protesters broke away from a crowd of a few hundred outside the main British embassy compound in downtown Tehran, scaled the gates, broke the locks and went inside” (Pomeroy, 2011)<sup>2</sup>.

British diplomats left Iran several hours later upon the order by British Foreign Secretary William Hague who announced the British Embassy in Tehran closed, despite the assurances given by the Iranian government to safeguard British diplomats and compounds and investigate the incident<sup>3</sup>. The British Government also decided to close the Iranian

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1 London unilaterally banned all British financial institutions from doing business with their Iranian counterparts, including the Central Bank of Iran, after an IAEA report accused Iran of developing nuclear weapons—a claim rejected by Iran.

2 Another report said six British embassy staff had been briefly held by the protesters. British Foreign Secretary William Hague said the situation had been “confusing” and that he would not have called them “hostages”.

3 Several protestors were arrested by the Iranian police. The deputy commander of the Islamic Republic of Iran Police also attended to the scene in person when the attack was reported. There are some mysteries surrounding the British Embassy assault. Some argue that the attack had been orchestrated by elements of the British government. They argue that the gate and doors of the embassy are heavily guarded and well secured. They ask how ordinary protestors could have passed through such secured doors and even reached the office

Embassy and Consulate in London. Iranian diplomats were given 48 hours to leave the country.

Major European countries such as France and Germany recalled ambassadors from Tehran for further consultation. Thousands of Iranians and British people both in Iran and Britain were left with no consular service. Relations were severed once again.

### **c. Relations with Germany**

#### **1. Before the 1979 revolution**

Germany and France are the only Western countries with less imperialistic and colonialist history in Iran. The first semi-official contact between Iran and Germany has been recorded during the Safavid Era (1502–1736) and dates back to 1523. King Esmael I of Iran wrote a letter to Germany's Emperor Charles V to seek his union to attack the Ottomans from East and West. Charles V agreed with King Esmael's proposal and sent Johann Balbi as his envoy to Iran in 1529 (Mahdavi, 2009). In 1600 and during Shah Abbas reign, an Iranian delegation met the Germany's Emperor and signed an agreement with him against the Ottomans (Mousavian, 2006). Then, in 1602, both emperors, Rudolf II and Shah Abbas, established diplomatic relations.

Official political relations between the two countries, however, were not established until three centuries later when Iran's ruler Nasseroddin Shah expressed his deep interest in opening relations with Germany to counter the influence of the Russians and Britons in Iran. He visited Germany in 1873 and met German Emperor Wilhelm I and German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. They signed a friendship pact under which both sides agreed to open diplomatic missions and expand relations.

On June 20, 1874, Nasseroddin Shah requested the presence of a German minister and diplomatic mission in Tehran. However, the Germans said they would only establish a legation in Tehran if Iran would do the same in Berlin (Martin, 1959). Ultimately, a German mission led by Ernest von Braunschweig was sent to Tehran by Bismarck to prepare the grounds for the establishment of a diplomatic representation in Iran (Martin, 1959).

In 1885, Nasseroddin Shah dispatched Mirza Reza Khan Moayyedossaltaneh Geranmayeh as Iran's first plenipotentiary envoy to Berlin in exchange for Graf von

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of the ambassador and how come the embassy staff had been present in the embassy despite receiving prior notice by the police to be vigilant. They base their argument on the fact that Britain could have been dealt a humiliating blow in the international scene should British ambassador had been expelled from Iran in view of the Iranian Parliament ratification to downgrade ties with Britain. This argument has not been supported by the two governments.

Braunschweig who established the first German Embassy in Tehran. This was followed by several military and commercial contracts and cultural agreements which raised the outcry of the Russians and Britain, leading to the cancellation of commercial contracts between Iran and Germany. In 1897, Germany set up a consulate in the southern Iranian city of Bushehr to promote ship building and establish its influence in the Persian Gulf<sup>1</sup>. While the Qajar Empire had become the plaything of British-Russian rivalries, Iran and Persia signed a Trade and Partnership Act in 1857. So, the German prestige in Persia was more of economic nature and was less marked by political and colonial interests.

At the turn of the twentieth century, when Anglo-Russian antagonism over Persia was at its height, the political situation there was complicated by the irruption of a third contender: Imperial Germany (Martin, 1959:7).

The most important aspect of Iran-Germany relations before the 1979 revolution is related to their role in the two world wars. Although Iran tried to keep its neutrality in the First World War, it was forced to take side with the Allies (UK, Russia and France) against the Alliance (led by Germany) despite the general will of the Iranian nation in favour of Germany.

During the years between the two world wars, the Germans played a key role in industrialising Iran. German companies took the responsibility of Iran's air mail and national bank services respectively in 1927 and 1930 while being engaged in building some parts of the country's railway network<sup>2</sup>. The two countries sealed three more agreements in 1929 to promote friendship and commerce.

The peak of relations between Iran and Germany occurred during 1930s when Adolf Hitler became the Germany's ruler. He promoted the idea that the Iranian and German nations have many things in common particularly with regards to their Aryan race and their struggle against communism and imperialism. Bilateral trade relations expanded rapidly in 1935. Germany's exports to Iran increased by five times in five years and Germany became the largest importer of Iran's raw material in 1939<sup>3</sup>. In 1938, a direct shipping line was set up between Hamburg and Khorramshahr and the Lufthansa started flights between Tehran

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<sup>1</sup> In 1910, Germany opened a second consulate in Tabriz, northwest of Iran.

<sup>2</sup> German engineers established the first sugar company in Iran in 1904 (Mousavian, 2006).

<sup>3</sup> Former Iranian ambassador to Germany, Hossein Mousavian, notes that the German industries are dependent on Iran for supplying energy and selling their products. Likewise, Iran relies on the transfer of technology and industrial equipment from Germany to feed domestic manufacturers. For facts and figures of trade between Iran and Germany, see *Mousavian, Hossein (2006). Chaleshhaye ravabete Iran va Gharb: Barresiye ravabete kharejiye Iran va Alman (Challenges of Iran-West Relations: Analysis of Iran-Germany Relations). Tehran: State Expediency Council, Strategic Research Centre Publications*

and Berlin<sup>1</sup>. However, in 1943 and under the extent pressure by the Allies, Iran was forced to declare war with Germany in the Second World War. All bilateral agreements were suspended.

After the end of the Second World War, Iran resumed diplomatic relations with Germany. Iran's head consulate was opened in Stuttgart in 1951 and later in Hamburg, Munich and Berlin in 1952. Bilateral accords were revived and strengthened. Four years later diplomatic relations reached the highest possible (ambassadorial) level. In excess of 300 official visits were exchanged during 1990 and 1996. Many agreements in different economic and cultural sectors were exchanged between Iran and Germany during 1950s and 1970s<sup>2</sup>. Supported by the development funds of Shah Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980), thousands of students attended German universities in the 1960s and 1970s in order to transfer German technological knowledge to Iran.

## 2. After the 1979 revolution

No official political delegation was exchanged between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Germany during the 1979 and 1984 although some Iranian officials paid unofficial visits to Germany<sup>3</sup>.

The Islamic Revolution in 1979 censured the mutual ties for a short while, but never interrupted the export of German technology, machines, and other industrial goods to Iran. The basis of the current Iranian nuclear programme that started in 1985 was laid with the help of German and French technology during the Shah period.

In 1984, Germany's foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher visited Tehran at the lead of a business delegation—the first visit by a high-ranking German official after the revolution. In his meeting with Ayatollah Khamenei, the then-president of Iran, Hans-Dietrich Genscher was reminded that the German government “has been better among the Westerners' stances against us in dealing with us. Stances of your government concerning the use of chemical weapons by the Iraqi regime have been fair” (Khamenei as cited in Mousavi, 2006:42)<sup>4</sup>. According to former Iranian ambassador to Germany, Hossein Mosavian, Germany recognised Iraq as the aggressor during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988)

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1 Germany set up its first shipping line between Hamburg and Persian Gulf in 1904 (Mousavian, 2006).

2 For the details of these agreements, see Mousavian, Hossein (2006). *Chaleshhaye ravabete Iran va Gharb: Barresiye ravabete kharejiye Iran va Alman (Challenges of Iran-West Relations: Analysis of Iran-Germany Relations)*. Tehran: State Expediency Council, Strategic Research Centre Publications

3 They visited Germany in 1980, 1981, 1983 and 1984.

4 Mousavi (2006:141) notes that Germany played a “significant role” during the years after the Iranian revolution in confronting with American policies to marginalise Iran.

but failed to denounce Saddam.

It was revealed after the war that German companies had played an important role in exporting the technology of chemical weapons to Iraq. Some of these companies were tried in German courts but the German government did not pay any compensation to Iran...neither did Germany apologise to the Iranian government (Mousavian, 2006:47-48).

An analysis of Iran-Germany relations by Mousavian (2006:141) suggests that bilateral relations between the two after 1979 was “unique” in various aspects such as trade compared to Iran’s relations with other Western countries. He also states that such good relations were being influenced negatively by foreign players particularly by the United States, Britain and Israel. Such interference and pressure on Tehran-Bonn relations were in the form of obstructing Iran-Germany ties and influencing the Mykonos court proceedings<sup>1</sup>.

According to Mousavi (2006: 224), the Berlin court verdict in 1997 with regards to Mykonos was politically-motivated and “the most serious damage” to the relations between Iran and Germany (and Europe). Four Iranian diplomats and some intelligence agents of Iran were expelled from Germany. Iran also expelled four German diplomats; the German government suspended the so-called “Europe’s Critical Dialogue” with Iran (mediated by Germany); ministerial meetings were also suspended. Mosavian (2006:233) describes this as “the biggest political crisis” in the history of relations between Iran and Germany (and Europe) after the Second World War<sup>2</sup>.

In sum, according to Mousavian (2006), relations between Iran and Germany during 1979 and 1997 were affected by 1) foreign players (US, UK and Israel) 2) differences of opinion about human rights, WMDs and the Middle East peace process 3) Iranian opposition groups movements in Germany and 4) the Mykonos case.

Relations between Iran and Germany improved during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami. He paid the first visit by an Iranian head of state to Germany after the 1979 revolution. This landmark three-day visit in July 2000 was described by Gerhard

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<sup>1</sup> In 17 September 1992, some members of Iranian opposition groups were murdered in a restaurant named Mykonos. A court in Germany accused top Iranian officials of ordering the assassination—a claim dismissed categorically by Iran.

<sup>2</sup> Tensions between Iran and Germany over the Mykonos case eased after their leaders exchanged letters in 1996 and stressed that bilateral relations should not be further affected by the verdict. However, Iran-Germany relations were strained in 2004 with the unveiling of a plaque in Berlin commemorating the Mykonos incident. In response, Iranian war veterans unveiled a plaque outside the German Embassy in Tehran accusing Germany of supplying chemical weapons to Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88.

Schroeder, the then German chancellor, as a “substantial new start” in relations with Iran. Khatami said his visit signified that Iran wanted to cooperate with the West. Export guarantees for German investments in Iran was planned to increase five-fold to 490 million dollars while a bilateral economic commission (which had not met since 1991) was discussed to be revived. As a result of Khatami’s official visit, Schroeder promised to expand economic and cultural cooperation and to increase the volume of Hermes-Export Funds for Iran<sup>1</sup>.

In 2001, Iran’s Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi paid a surprise visit to Germany and met many German officials<sup>2</sup>. The German Foreign Ministry reported that Kharrazi’s discussions with the Germans went well. The official Iranian News Agency reported an “expansion of bilateral relations, particularly in the areas of economics and trade”. It said that Germany had agreed to fund higher export credits.

Tehran’s relations with Germany particularly in the trade area during Reformism (1997-2005) were among the closest with any Western nation since Iran’s 1979 revolution. However these ties were overshadowed during Conservatism (2005-2013) when the nuclear programme of Iran came into spotlight<sup>3</sup>. Chancellor Angela Merkel showed a tougher stance toward Iran. In a newspaper article in 2007, she wrote “it is dangerous and still grounds for great concern that Iran, in the face of the UN Security Council’s resolutions, continues to refuse to suspend uranium enrichment.” Merkel also stressed that she wanted “to reduce our own trade relations with Iran”, noting that the German government was restricting export guarantees and that German banks had moved to halt business with Iran<sup>4</sup>.

In 2005, Germany had the largest share of Iran’s export market with 5.67 billion dollars--14.4 per cent of the country’s total exports. In 2008, German exports to Iran increased 8.9 per cent and comprised 84.7 percent of the total German-Iranian trade volume. The overall bilateral trade volume until the end of September 2008 stood at 4.19

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1 At the end of Schroeder’s chancellorship (1998-2005), economic relations between Germany and Iran had reached a volume of 6.3 billion dollars.

2 During the two-day trip he met with Foreign Affairs Minister Joschka Fischer (Green party), Federal Economics Minister Werner Müller (non-party), the chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, Hans Ulrich Klose, as well as Bundestag (parliament) President Wolfgang Thierse and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (Social Democratic Party).

3 Germany is one of three European powers alongside France and Britain negotiating with Iran over its nuclear programme. The engagement of Germany as a non-permanent member of the Security Council along with other permanent members (US, Russia, China, Britain and France) in nuclear talks with Iran is evident of the significance of its ties with Iran. Germany has strongly opposed any probable Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons but has adopted a softer tone than Britain and France.

4 Despite this, according to the German Chambers of Industry and Commerce (DIHK), economic sanctions against Iran may cost more than 10,000 German jobs and have a negative impact on the economic growth of Germany in particular the medium-sized companies which depend heavily on trade with Iran.

billion dollars, compared to 3.78 billion dollars the previous year. Such a high amount of trade between Iran and a Western country resulted in Germany becoming the biggest trade partner of Iran in the European Union<sup>1</sup>.

Other developments affecting relations between Iran and Germany during Conservatism included Ahmadinejad's controversial Holocaust statements, his aggressive stances concerning Israel (as a close ally to Germany) and the contested presidential elections in 2009 which forced Merkel to accuse Iran of "blatantly crossing the red line".

In February 2006, Merkel compared Ahmadinejad to Hitler and said "a president who questions Israel's right to exist, a president who denies the Holocaust cannot expect to receive any tolerance from Germany".

In June 2009, Germany summoned its ambassador from in Tehran in a clear opposition to the "government crackdown on demonstrations". At the same time, Merkel said in a joint press conference with Barack Obama that "the Iranian people need to be given the right to peaceful demonstrations; that the Iranian people have the right to have votes be counted and the election results substantiated; that the rights of human beings, of individuals, of citizens are indivisible the world over, and also apply, therefore, to the Iranian people"<sup>2</sup>.

#### **d. Relations with France**

##### **1. Before the 1979 revolution**

As stated earlier, France, alongside Germany, is the only Western country with less imperialistic and colonial history in Iran. After Britain, Russia, Germany, Portugal and Spain, France was the other Western (European) country which tried to establish relations with Iran. While Britain and Russia had imperialistic ties with Iran, Germany's relations were mostly economic and France's were cultural.

Throughout the sixteenth century, there was no official relation between Iran and France as the latter, under the Valois Dynasty (1328-1589), allied with the Ottomans who were enemies to the former. Upon the extinction of the Valois Dynasty in France, Henry IV who had founded the Bourbon Dynasty (1589-1792) dispatched Pere Juste (a French priest)

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<sup>1</sup> Until 2008, some 1,700 German companies including giants such as Siemens and chemical group BASF were operating in Iran.

<sup>2</sup> Germany's Iran policy, according to Wall Street Journal columnist Matthias Künzle (2008), is very ambivalent and at the crossroads under the Social-Christian Grand Coalition of Angela Merkel. The Federal Foreign Ministry sets the Iranian nuclear issue on the top of its global agenda, but the public information flow and influence is very little. While policy consultants of Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (SPD) preach accommodation and even a strategic partnership with Iran, Chancellor Merkel calls for tougher sanctions if necessary to stop an Iranian bomb.

to Shah Abbas Safavi in 1610 to persuade him to set up relations with France.

Iran-France relations during the sixteenth and nineteenth century were not of a political nature. In 1636, Louis XIII sent a letter to Shah Safi (1629-1642) of Iran asking him to promote Christianity—a demand met by Shah Safi<sup>1</sup>.

During the reign of Louis XIV (1643-1715), France got stronger and established the French East India Company in 1664. In November the same year, Jean-Baptiste Colbert the minister of France sent a delegation led by Messrs Lalain and Laboulay to Shah Abbas II who exempted French merchants from custom duties and agreed with the establishment of the French East India Company branch in Isfahan.

Officially, it was in 1705 that Jean-Baptiste Fabre, a merchant from Marseille, was sent as the first Ambassador Extraordinary of France to Iran (Amini, 1998: 17). Shah Abbas II then sent Mohammad Reza Beg to France in 1715 to meet Louis XIV. Beg signed a treaty of alliance with Louis. Bilateral relations were downgraded with the fall of the Safavid Dynasty in 1722 and the French Revolution during 1789 and 1799.

Franco-Persian relations continued to the nineteenth century. France was trying to unite Iran with the Ottomans against Russia. For example, Jean Francois Rousseau, the French consul in Iraq, encouraged the French King to reinforce Iran's military force against French enemies and expand trade and political relations. Such efforts strengthened between 1807 and 1809 as part of a Napoleonic plan to counter the British influence in the strategic Iran<sup>2</sup>. At a time when French victories across Europe was increasing and Napoleon decided to conquer India through Iran and the Black Sea as a major blow to the UK, the British sent John Malcolm to Iran. In 1801, he managed to seal a politico-economic pact with Fath Ali Shah who promised to be an ally of Britain and prevent any attack from Afghanistan to India<sup>3</sup>. In return, Britain vowed to provide Iran with weapons in the event of a Franco-Afghan attack on the country. Britain also promised to fight with French forces if they attacked Iran from the Persian Gulf.

Franco-Iranian relations during the 1800s were limited to military cooperation such as the Finkenstein Treaty in 1807. Napoleon sent General Claude Mathieu de Gardanne at the lead of a 20-strong-military-expert team to train the Iranian army after providing Iran

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1 This happened again 30 years later when Shah Abbas II guaranteed that Christians were free to preach in Iran. Also, French envoys Sercey and Sartiges pressed Iran respectively in 1840 and 1844 to improve the life for Christians and give them more freedom to preach their religion.

2 This led to the formation of the so-called Franco-Persian Alliance to conquer India.

3 Under this agreement, British merchants were free to travel inside Iran and were exempt from duties and tax. Malcolm was awarded with the Order of Knighthood. Sir Malcolm returned to India and the French plan to conquer India was cancelled.

with weaponry<sup>1</sup>. The two countries signed another military contract in 1808 under which France sold 20,000 weapons and artillery to Iran. These weapons were never sent to Iran as the country was engaged in a war with Russia—a French ally. The war with Russia made France unwilling to expand cooperation with Iran. General Gardanne left Iran in 1809 and Britain entered into a friendship pact with Iran in the absence of France.

Thirty years after Gardanne's departure, a new French diplomatic corps entered Iran in 1840. Comte de Sercey stayed in Iran for two years but left the country in view of pressure by Russia and Britain on Mohammad Shah Qajar to sever ties with France. Such influences and interferences continued for nearly a decade, ultimately resulting in the break-off of relations between Iran and France in 1849 when Comte de Sartiges, the French ambassador, left Tehran.

Under Napoleon III (1825-1870), the French government was again keen on restoring ties with Iran. He sent an ambassador to Iran. Prosper Bourte's arrival in Tehran was concurrent with the declaration of war by Britain to Iran over Afghanistan's Herat and the Iranian government was seeking a mediator. Napoleon III welcomed Nasseroddin Shah's envoy Farrokh Khan Aminolmolk in Paris and mediated peace talks between Iran and Britain in Paris in 1857. The Paris Treaty was concluded and Britain withdrew its troops from Iran which then pulled out its troops from Herat.

Iran-France relations entered a new era during Napoleon III in the second half of the nineteenth century. The two countries had cordial relations. In 1873, Nasseroddin Shah made his first foreign trip to France<sup>3</sup>. After this visit, Iran and France stepped up cooperation mainly in the cultural areas as the latter had lost its politico-military might and could never again play a key role in the Iranian politics. Iran sent many students to France which in return opened religious missions throughout Iran to promote Christianity and the French language which became the first foreign language being taught in Iran and had a great influence on the Persian language. Many French teachers were also admitted to Darol Fonoon—the first Iranian university<sup>4</sup>. In 1895, a French archeological team was given the permit to excavate the historically-significant Shoush area in southern Iran. France continued its Iran ties mainly in the cultural sector.

Relations continued during the first half of the twentieth century when Reza Shah established the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925-1979). Reza Shah was brought into power by the

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<sup>1</sup> They trained 4,000 ground forces.

<sup>2</sup> During his stay in France, Farrokh Khan re-opened the Iranian Embassy in Paris.

<sup>3</sup> Nasseroddin Shah later made two more trips to France in view of good relations.

<sup>4</sup> In 1900, two French schools were opened in Tehran: The Saint Louis for boys and Joan de Arc for girls.

British. The French press had therefore adopted a very critical approach towards him. In January 1937, a Paris-based newspaper, *Excelsior*, published an article on Reza Shah, criticising him harshly. This raised the agony of Reza Shah. He summoned the Iranian ambassador and ordered the severance of relations with France. Relations remained severed for two and a half years until the French government sent General Maxim Weygand to attend the wedding ceremony of the Iranian prince. Reza Shah welcomed the move and sent a new ambassador to Paris, normalising bilateral relations in 1939—the year Tehran-Paris relations were overshadowed by the Second World War at the end of which Americans entered into the Iranian political domain and France and Germany were sidelined. Under such circumstances, Franco-Iran relations continued at a lower level although Iran bought weaponry from France and sent students to France<sup>1</sup>.

## **2. After the 1979 revolution**

France occupied a special place among the Iranian nation (and not government) during the 1970s when the French president snubbed the Iranian King's invitation to monarchical ceremonies to mark 2,500 years of Persian Empire in 1971. Later in 1978 and months before the Iranian revolution, France hosted Ayatollah Khomeini (the leader of the revolution) for four months<sup>2</sup>. In 1979, the first ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Shamsoddin Amir-Alaei was sent to Paris. Observers had hoped relations between Iran and France would improve in an unprecedented manner in the near future, given the assistance Paris offered to Ayatollah Khomeini to mark the revolution and the fact that France had no colonial/imperialistic aspirations in the Iranian history.

However, with the establishment of the Islamic republic in Iran and the adoption of Nor-East-Nor-West-only-the-Islamic-Republic strategy by Iran, relations with France (as a major Western country) did not improve. They even deteriorated when France gave refuge to several Iranian opposition figures such as the former Iranian prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar, former president Abolhassan Banisadr and Maryam Rajavi the co-founder of Mojahedin Khalq Organisation—a terrorist group which assassinated many Iranian officials.

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<sup>1</sup> In 1945, Iran upgraded the level of its diplomatic mission to ambassador and sent Zeinolabedin Rahnam as its ambassador to France. Various high-level official visits were also exchanged between the two countries.

<sup>2</sup> The French public opinion and press were in favour of the Iranian revolution and compared it with their own revolution in 1789. Ayatollah Khomeini published its longest interview ever in *Le Monde*. He was also given the opportunity to communicate with revolutionaries in Iran and provide them with his support in the form of speeches and written announcements.

In 1980, Iran-France relations downgraded to the charge d'affaires level following the hostage-taking crisis of 1979. France saw Iran as a destabilising force. Agreements between the two countries in different military, heavy-industries and agricultural sectors were also suspended. France refused to deliver three military speed boats ordered by the King of Iran in earlier years. It also refused to refund Iran's 10-per cent share in France's Sofidif, a joint French-Iranian company with a major stake in Eurodif-- the world's largest uranium enrichment plant<sup>1</sup>. In 1982 the issue of Iran's shares in Eurodif was raised. French president Francois Mitterrand again refused to give Iran's stake of enriched uranium. Nor did he agree to pay Iran's debt. In 1991, however, France agreed to refund more than 1.5 billion dollars. Iran remained shareholder of Eurodif via Sofidif but did not receive any enriched uranium. The issue of Iran's stakes in the world's largest uranium enrichment plant was later raised in 2009 by Iran's nuclear negotiation team in their talks with Russia, France and the IAEA about the nuclear fuel swap. Iran said France had not abided by its commitments concerning the Eurodif and therefore cannot be trusted to be given the whole of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile in exchange for nuclear fuel.

Like other Westerners, French officials were of the opinion that Iran was seeking to spread its influence and revolutionary ideology in the Islamic world through supporting radical Shiite groups in Lebanon and Palestine. They accused Iran of bankrolling violent actions against Western interests. France believed that these efforts could threaten the secure and free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf, as well as the stability and security of the Middle East and the West. Such views crashed the prospects of better Franco-Iranian alliance.

Saddam-imposed war during 1980 and 1988 dealt another blow to Iran-France relations as Iraq enjoyed a high level of military support from France. Iraq's military purchase from France exceeded 5.5 billion dollars in 1985 as dozens of Mirage F1s, Dassault Super Etendards and Aerospatiale Gazelles were sold to Saddam to fight against Iran. On several occasions including one in Egypt in 1982, France expressed its support for Saddam. This led to further deterioration of relations between Iran and France until the end of the war in 1988 and Iran's need for foreign reconstruction aid. France was an important potential source of foreign loans, credits, and investments since US sanctions were still in

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<sup>1</sup> Eurodif was formed in 1973 by France, Belgium, Spain and Sweden. In 1975, Iran lent one billion dollars (and another 180 million dollars in 1977) for the construction of the Eurodif factory and bought Sweden's 10 per cent share under an agreement with France. France and Iran then established Sofidif enterprise with respectively 60 and 40 per cent stakes. In turn, Sofidif acquired a 25 per cent share in Eurodif, which gave Iran its 10 per cent share of it.

force. For the Europeans, including France, Iran was an attractive large market and a source of energy supplies. During the reconstruction period in Iran (1989-1997), when both Iran and France explored expansion of cooperation, two major events shaped the Iranian-French relations: the freeing of French hostages in Lebanon thanks to Iran's mediation; and the contract between the French oil company Total and the Iranian government despite US pressures.

In 1989, following Ayatollah Khomeini's verdict against Salman Rushdie, Britain severed diplomatic relations with Iran and other European countries including France recalled their ambassadors in protest, creating another downturn in relations with Iran.

A glimmer of hope was created in the relations between France and Iran when reformist Mohammad Khatami became president in 1997. In this period European countries, including France, tried to resolve their differences with Iran, which were mostly related to their conflicting worldviews. They set up a "critical dialogue" strategy with Iran. In their opinion, interaction with Iran could be more effective than sanctions in moderating Iran's behaviour<sup>1</sup>.

President Khatami paid a visit to Paris in 1999—a turning stone in bilateral relations as he was the first Iranian head of state to be welcomed in France<sup>2</sup>. This was a complimentary to Jacques Chirac's lenient approach towards Iran. He had earlier ruled out marginalising Iran through US D'Amato sanctions, saying bilateral relations with Iran should enhance. In view of such an approach, business expanded between Iran and France and oil giant Total invested in Iran's oil sector. The first direct Paris-Tehran flight by Air France was set up in 2004. France became Iran's sixth largest supplier in 2005 with 6.25 per cent of the exports market share of Iran which in turn was France's third largest customer in the Middle East. The majority of French exports to Iran were in the auto sector. Iran Khodro, Middle East's largest car manufacturer, entered into several new lucrative agreements with France's Peugeot. About 64 per cent of Iran Khodro's passenger cars and pickups produced in 2007 were manufactured Peugeot models. Similar agreements were concluded between Saipa (Iran's second largest car manufacturer) and Renault.

Many positive developments happened in relations between Iran and France during Reformism: French foreign minister met his Iranian counterpart in 1998, calling for the expansion of relations; former French president Valery Giscard visited Tehran; French

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<sup>1</sup>This period witnessed an overall improvement in political and economic relations between Iran and France although the Mykonos incident in Germany produced another setback and European ambassadors were once again recalled from Iran and critical dialogue was suspended.

<sup>2</sup> Khatami made a second trip to Paris at the end of his presidency.

reiterated its opposition to D'Amato sanctions; many high-ranking Iranian and French diplomats met at the sidelines of international conferences and summits; French continued oil cooperation with Iran, granting a 900-million-dollar loan; A delegation of French lawmakers visited Tehran to discuss peace in the Middle East; A 192-million-Euro in value deal in the energy and transport sector was announced shortly after Khatami's first visit to France<sup>1</sup>. Thanks to these developments, France became the main European proponent of "constructive dialogue" with Iran<sup>2</sup>.

Constructive relations between Iran and France went on the right track until 2003 when the issue of Iran's nuclear activities was raised in the international scene. Since then, suspicion prevailed from both sides. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, France became engaged in direct talks with Iran. Alongside foreign ministers of Britain and Germany, France's foreign minister visited Tehran and concluded an agreement on 21 October 2003 with Iran to suspend its enrichment programme. It was the first time three foreign ministers of European countries gathered in Tehran altogether.

In 2005, Conservative Ahmadinejad became president and Franco-Iran relations, already affected by the nuclear issue and allegations of terrorism and human rights issues, were overshadowed by President Ahmadinejad's controversial comments on Israel and Holocaust<sup>3</sup>. As a strong ally of Israel, French foreign minister Philippe Douste-Blazy condemned Iran, saying the country was "ruining its chances to play a positive and stabilising role in the Middle East". He also summoned Iran's ambassador in protest. Resumption of uranium enrichment by Iran further dealt another blow to relations with France. Iran's nuclear issue was referred to the Security Council in 2006 and the first anti-Iran resolution was passed with France in favour.

Relations between Iran and France further deteriorated in 2007 when Nicholas Sarkozy was elected French president and adopted a foreign policy more convergent with the US. He was unanimous with other European countries and the United States in imposing more sanctions and human rights resolutions on Iran. France made no single protest to four rounds of sanctions by the Security Council against Iran. On various

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<sup>1</sup> These developments happened between 1997 and 2000.

<sup>2</sup> A BBC report on 27 October 1999 described the foreign policy of the Reformist government of Iran as "widely appreciated", saying relations between Iran and European Union countries had improved.

<sup>3</sup> On many occasions, the French government expressed its concerns with regards to the human rights situation in Iran. In 2005, France awarded a human rights prize to an Iranian activist being in prison in Iran. The French government also summoned the Iranian chargé d'affaires to Paris in August 2005 to express its concerns regarding the fate of journalist Akbar Gandji. Such measures also led to the exacerbation of bilateral relations.

occasions when President Ahmadinejad was delivering a speech in international gatherings (such as his speeches to the UN General Assembly), the French delegation walked out in protest.

In December 2008, Sarkozy slammed Ahmadinejad for his belligerent comments on Israel and his insistence on pursuing nuclear ambitions. He said “I know perfectly well that we must resolve what is perhaps the most serious international crisis we are having to resolve: that of Iran moving towards a nuclear bomb...I find it impossible to shake hands with somebody who has dared to say that Israel must be wiped off the map.” Sarkozy’s comments raised the Iranian outcry. Tehran summoned French envoy Bernard Poletti, and told him that “France’s approach towards Iran would leave unsuitable consequences on bilateral ties”.

Any glimmer of hope in improvement of Iran-France relations was dashed when Ahmadinejad won the contested elections of 2009. Alongside the other EU states, France summoned Iranian ambassador in coordinated protest at the post-election crackdown on Iranian demonstrators. Relations between Iran and France exacerbated when Iranian security forces arrested Clotilde Reiss, a French teacher residing in Iran, who was convicted on espionage charges as part of a Western plot<sup>1</sup>--an accusation which was also brought against local staffers of the British Embassy in Tehran.

In July 2009 when Ahmadinejad was declared the winner of elections and Western countries did not have any choice but to recognise him as the president of Iran, France’s foreign minister Bernard Kouchner said his country will recognise Ahmadinejad’s re-election. But Kouchner noted that Paris will strengthen builds with the opposition movement created in the aftermath of elections in Iran and continue to oppose Iran’s nuclear programme—two redline issues for Iran. Since then, France continued to support Iranian opposition movement (the Green Movement) by giving refuge to activists and journalists who introduced themselves as supporters of the Green Movement. France was also a strict supporter of further US and EU sanctions on Iran.

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<sup>1</sup>Reiss was finally released in 2010. Her discharge came five days after France refused an American request to extradite Majid Kakavand, an Iranian businessman who is wanted in the US for evading export controls and buying technology that could be used in Iranian missiles. He was released along with Ali Vakili-Rad, another Iranian who was convicted of murdering Shapour Bakhtiar, the last prime minister of Shah and was imprisoned in France. Their release and subsequent return to Tehran prompted speculation of a deal over Reiss.

## **ii. The West among Iranian opinion leaders**

As discussed earlier, many might attribute anti-Westernism (or anti-Americanism) to the hostage crisis of 1979, in which 53 Americans, mostly diplomats, were held hostage by Iranian students for 444 days and the 1953 coup engineered by America and Britain to topple the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq. However, according to renowned Iranian thinker Al-e Ahmad (1964), the first signs of Occidentosis or anti-Westernism in Iran could be attributed to the time when Cyrus the Great (600-530 BC) ruled Persia. Al-e Ahmad (1964) believes the Western conspiracy led the Mongols to invade Iran in 1219 and that the West and Westerners were involved in the Shiitisation of Iran during the Safavids (1501-1736), the conflicts between the Safavids and the Ottomans, the promotion of Baha'ism during the Qajar era (1794-1925), the defeat of the Ottomans in the First World War and the turmoil during the Constitutional Revolution of Iran (1905-1911).

Iranian anti-Westernism in the contemporary era could be dated to the early 1870s and 1880s where Iranian people became disappointed with what the West could contribute to their society. In fact, the failure of Nasseroddin Shah in realising completely the ambitions of reformists, who were trying to promote the “goods” of the West by taking him to European tours, led to the early emergence of anti-Westernism in Iran.

However, not all Iranians were against the West. Conversely, there were so many people who had such great ambitions towards the West that they lost their cultural identity

and originality (nativity) through the adoption and imitation of Western models in different sectors of society, education, art and culture as well as the transformation of Iran into a passive market for Western commodities, according to Al-e Ahmad. Such people with a high passion for the West were described by him and other Iranian opinion leaders as “Gharb Zadeh” meaning “Westoxicated”.

### **a. Al-e Ahmad’s “Westoxication”<sup>1</sup>**

The term “Gharb Zadehgi”, translated as “Occidentosis” or “Westoxication” was coined by Iranian philosopher Seyyed Ahmad Fardid (1921-1994) in 1956 (Vahdat, 2003: 604).<sup>2</sup> But it was popularised in 1962 when eminent Iranian writer and critic Seyyed Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923-1969) published a book on the negative aspects or what he called the “plagues” or “diseases” of the West<sup>3</sup>.

Al-e Ahmad’s “Occidentosis: The Plague of the West” was in fact the beginning of the foundation of a discourse-turned-ideology which has since plagued Iran-West relations. The name of Al-e Ahmad has become synonymous with the concept of Occidentosis in Iran as it greatly influenced the country (Vahdat, 2003).

Al-e Ahmad’s Occidentosis played an important role in the formation of the Iranian revolution in 1979 as he blamed Westoxication as “the most prominent socioeconomic, cultural force at work in Pahlavi Iran” (Hanson, 1983:1) being dependent on the West. The discourse of Westoxication was perceived as a “traditionalist critique of modernity” and a

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1 The researcher had primarily studied related thoughts and works of Fardid and Shariati in addition to Al-e Ahmad, Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei. However, due to space constraints (as per the University’s regulations), the researcher had to set aside some of the related literature.

2 Seyyed Ahmadi Fardid coined “Gharb Zadehgi” in a meeting with his colleagues in 1956 (Fardid Website, 2008). In fact, Gharb Zadehgi was “discovered” by Fardid but “theorised” by Al-e Ahmad to designate Iranians’ loss of “subjectivity” by “surrendering” their identity to the West (Vahdat, 2003: 604). Some researchers have used vocabularies such as, “Weststruckness”, “Westomania”, “Westernitis” “Westamination”, “Blighted by the West”, “Plagued by the West” and “West-strickenness” as equivalents for Gharb Zadehgi. For the purpose of this research, the researcher prefers to use Occidentosis and Westoxication, interchangeably. Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994:97) have referred to Gharb Zadehgi as “Westoxification” and “Occidentitis”.

3 Al-e Ahmad authored his book on Occidentosis primarily in 1961 in the form of reports for Iran’s Culture Target Council. The council however refused to publish the book (according to Hanson (1983), Al-e Ahmad published part of the book “secretly” in 1961). So, Al-e Ahmad decided to publish it a year later in 1962. The book was revised in 1965.

call for “return to Islamic traditions and mode of life” (Mirsepassi, 2000:78).

The Occidentosis discourse, mingled with a sense of nativism, influenced Iranian intellectuals, political activists and Islamists who were opposed to the Pahlavi “regime” and viewed the Shah as the “agent” of the West, and America in particular. Such a discourse later upgraded to an ideology of anti-Westernism (and anti-Americanism) after the revolution.

The book “Gharb Zadegi”, which Keddie (1994:486) describes as a “central” text that led Al-e Ahmad to “seek in Islam the solution to Iran’s problems” and Hanson (1983:8) describes as a “systematic historical and cultural analysis of Westernisation in Iran”, focuses on the disadvantages of the West for Iran (in the East) in different political, social and economic sectors. Al-e Ahmad argues that Iran should not turn into a sole “consumer” of Western products and technologies and become West-stricken.

Gharb Zadehgi, I say, is like cholera-strickenness. Or if not appropriate, let’s say (it is like) frostbite or burn. But no. At least it is something like wheat stem sawflies. Have you seen how they infest the wheat? From within. The healthy skin remains untouched but it is only a skin, just like the same shell of a cicada on a tree. Anyway, it (Gharb Zadehgi) is a talk of disease (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:3).

Al-e Ahmad does not see Occidentosis as limited to politics and economy. He says the same could be traced in culture and even literature as well as news. On one occasion, Al-e Ahmad elaborated on the “Westoxicated” features of some Arabic magazines from Egypt and Lebanon and criticised their use of stories on “tanks”, “wine-drinking” and “naked women” (Hanson, 1983:9).

All the news (from the West) is about Nobel (prizes), replacement of Pope, Cannes awards, latest Hollywood films and... (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:48).

Hanson (1983:1) believes that Al-e Ahmad uses “Westoxication” to convey both “intoxication” (the infatuation with the West) and “infection” (the poisoning) of Westernisation of an indigenous native culture. Also, Gharb Zadegi was the “anti-Western nostalgia” of Iranian intelligentsia in the 1960s and 1970s (Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, 1994: 61).

Bayat (1990:41) explains that Al-e Ahmad’s Westoxication referred to the “overall technological, economic, and especially cultural dependency of the Third World nations on the West”. Keddie (1983:595) confirms such socioeconomic and cultural dependence on

the West was the reason of the opposition of Iranian revolutionaries to the “evils” of the society.

Moreover, Tavakoli-Targhi (2000:566) defines Gharb Zadigi as the “nodal point of a populist discourse critical of Iran’s dominant developmental strategy and its subordination to the West”.

Al-e Ahmad maintains that Westoxication has two sides: one is the West and the other is “us”, as a part of the East, who is West-stricken. He sees the concept of the West as something beyond geopolitics. He gets concepts such as “developed states”, “progressive countries”, “industrial nations” and “those countries that are able to process the raw materials by machines and distribute them to the market as a commodity” as equivalents to the West.

And these raw materials are not just iron ore or oil or...they include mythology, they include ideology, they include music,...For me, East and West are not two geographical concepts. For an American or European, the West means Europe and America and the East means the Soviet Russia and China and Eastern European states (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:8-9).

From the perspective of Al-e Ahmad, the West and East are not viewed as political and geographical concepts. However, they are “two economic concepts”:

West means countries which are full and East is countries which are hungry. For me the South African government is part of the West...but most Latin American countries are in the East (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:10).

In his further investigation of the West, Al-e Ahmad defines the specifications of the West versus the East. From his viewpoint, in Western countries “salaries are high, death and birth rates are low, social services are regulated and democracy is prevalent with a heritage of the French revolution” while in Eastern countries “salaries are low, death rate is high, birth rate is even higher (than the death rate), there is no social services, and democracy is zero with a heritage of colonialism.”

Al-e Ahmad distinguishes between East and the West in terms of “rich and poor”, “power and inability”, “knowledge and ignorance”, “development and underdevelopment” and “civilisation and barbarity.” He in fact polarises the concepts of the East and the West with one polar being in the hands of “power holders, the rich and exporters” and the other in the hands of “the powerless, the poor and importers and consumers”.

In his book “Khasi dar Miqat” (A Chaff at Appointment), his account of his

pilgrimage to Mecca in 1964, Al-e Ahmad lashes out at the appetite of pilgrims (or Hajjis) for purchasing Western and Japanese products as souvenirs. He sarcastically explains that Hajjis see development in buying Western products.

If you look with a Western viewpoint, then “civilisation” means “consumption” (and greater needs); thus, these hajjis are “backward” and in the process of development. When will they reach “development”? Certainly, when they “consume” as much as possible of the products made in the West (Al-e Ahmad as cited in Hanson, 1983:9).

As a prominent social critic, Al-e Ahmad questions the basis of the formation of international organisations such as the United Nations, UNESCO, FAO and what he terms as “other so-called international institutes” which are global and public in appearance but colonial in reality.”

Contrary to public beliefs about Al-e Ahmad’s rejection of the modernisation, his Occidentosis was not about the repulsion of Western modernism or “mechanisation”. He believed that universality of mechanisation and modernisation is historical “determinism”. Notwithstanding, he was critical of those Westernised people who have been unable to “preserve” their “cultural and historical personality”, or in Boroujerdi’s words “nativism”, against machine and its “deterministic assault” on the East.

The issue is not the repulsion of mechanisation...Never...The issue lies with how we deal with machine and technology. The issue is we as developing states...are not the manufacturers of machine. But we have to be...consumers of the products of the Western industry because of the determinism of economics and politics (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:13).

Al-e Ahmad believes people who have not perceived the nature, basis and philosophy of Western civilisation by heart are just pretending to be Westernised and are like a “donkey in the skin of a lion” (ibid).

Such a feeling of being “invaded by an evil alien force” was prevalent over much of the Persian literature in the 1980s during which Iranian writers felt overwhelmed with a sense of “cultural alienation”, expressing it in a posture of “wide-eyed bewilderment” (Karimi-Hakkak, 1991:523).

Westoxication in the view of Al-e Ahmad is related partly to consumerism. He states that “we are westoxicated until we are consumers and have not built machine”. By bringing the example of Western colonialism in Africa, Al-e Ahmad believes Westerners

exploited Africa and its people for not only colonial purposes, but also for religious and commercial goals as they could preach Christianity in Africa and turn it into a consumer market and what he calls “laboratory”.

He also believes that Muslim Middle Easterners were not receptive of Westerners because of their religious and Islamic nature. Al-e Ahmad in fact attributes “the 12-century conflict between the East and the West” to the “struggle between Islam and Christianity”. As observed by Moaddel (1992: 364), Al-e Ahmad believed that the problem has roots in the “contradiction between Islam and Western culture”, even though Mirsepassi-Ashtiani (1994: 62) suggests that Al-e Ahmad saw the roots of Gharb Zadegi in the “mid-nineteenth-century intellectual movement of secular ideas and Western-oriented political systems”. That’s why Al-e Ahmad insisted that a “defense of Islam” was the only path to national liberation and development of Iran and that the solution was the “emancipation of Iranian culture from Western domination” (Moaddel, 1992: 365) and its return to its “own [nativistic] and Oriental ways” (Keddie, 1983:594).

In defining Westoxication or West-strickenness as a “disease”, Al-e Ahmad highlights the cultural and non-material aspects of anti-Westernism.

Let’s...as an Easterner...define Gharb Zadegi like this: a set of symptoms which have been created in the life and culture and civilisation and attitude of the people of a spot in the universe without any tradition as a support and without any consistence in history. Without any development. But only as the souvenir of machine (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:17).

Al-e Ahmad believes as soon as the Easterners reach self-sufficiency and master new sciences and technology and know-how of manufacturing machine, they are not branded “Westoxicated”.

Although he argued that Iranians have been forced to be “servile consumers” of Western industry and to “reshape” themselves, their government, culture, and everyday lives to resemble a machine (Moaddel, 1992: 364), Al-e Ahmad was not opposed to the concept of machine and mechanisation. He is in fact a supporter of machine but he rejects the notion of absolute reliance on it or what is called “Mashin Zadegi” or machinisme which he practically equated with Gharb Zadegi (Hanson, 1983:12).

He states that “machine should be built and owned but not relied on because machine is only a means and not an end (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:65). The end, he says, is

eradicating poverty and providing spiritual and material welfare for all. He describes machine as a “spell” by the West for the Westoxicated which could lead to “unemployment” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:54).

Hanson (1983:12) explains that Al-e Ahmad was a strong supporter of technological and scientific self-sufficiency of Iranians as a way to “gain economic and cultural independence” from the West. This view was also prevalent in post-Mao China where the Chinese rulers wanted Western science and technology only for “economic reform” while wholly rejecting the Western political and legal systems (Chen, 1992:706)<sup>1</sup>.

Judging from Al-e Ahmad, the first route of Westernism in Iran should be traced in urban civilisation and urbanisation of villages which he terms as a “cancer gland”. He believes the discovery of oil in southern Iran turned the country into a hot sport for Britain and the United States and a struggle between East and the West. He refers to oil as the major factor of “underdevelopment” in the East and “development” in the West for three centuries.

He also attributes anti-Westernism to the struggle between Islam and Christianity. In fact, Al-e Ahmad believes that the West started to exploit the East out of the fear of the spread of Islam in the West (Al-e Ahmad, 1964). He also states that the West tried to create a division among Shiites and Sunnis to reach its own goals.

We started from where the West finished, when the West stood up, we sat down. The West woke up in the aftermath of its industrial revival, we went into a deep sleep...it was like a see-saw...the West started intellectualism in early eighteenth century while we started it in early twentieth (with the Constitutional Movement) when Europe was moving towards socialism and guided styles in economics, politics and culture (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:40).

The ramifications of Occidentosis, as reiterated by Al-e Ahmad, are not solely limited to the negative impacts of mechanisation. He argues that Occidentosis will result in migration from rural areas to the cities, which will subsequently lead to the escalation of

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<sup>1</sup> Such an anti-imperialist approach and attitude towards “machinisme” exists today among the Iranian leaders who are seeking scientific technological dominance over the West, in many areas including the nuclear energy, nanotechnology and biotechnology. They have in fact achieved commendable accomplishments. For example, in nuclear energy, Iran is among the world’s top 10 countries which have mastered the nuclear fuel production cycle—a very sophisticated phenomenon. In nanotechnology Iran is again among the top 10 globally and is the top in the Middle East. In biotechnology, the Islamic Republic is also a pioneer worldwide by producing stem cell and cloning sheep and goats. It is important to note here that based on one of Iran’s most strategic development plan called “Vision 2025”, the country is planning to become the top powerhouse of the Middle East in science and technology. This shows the importance of mastering new science and technologies as the main vehicle for confronting the West and Westoxication, as reiterated by Al-e Ahmad<sup>1</sup>.

“insecurity” and rising “unemployment” while threatening the extinction of “traditions and handicrafts” in villages (Al-e Ahmad, 1964: 52-55).

Al-e Ahmad also believes that Occidentosis have negative impacts upon “schools” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:59), while it “pretends” to give women their rights of freedom.

The ramification of Occidentosis is to give introductory freedom to women in a way that women can go to school and remove their headscarf and that’s all; but they do not enjoy suffrage and the right to become judges and give testimonies at court. We have only provided women with the right to “pretend” in society and this for a woman means social irresponsibility and not social accountability (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:56).

One other ramification of Occidentosis, according to Al-e Ahmad, is that in the religious society of Iran people do not trust the government and are after “their own religious beliefs and superstitions” while evading taxes and conscription (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:59), therefore forcing the government to “resort to the West and its military aid, newspaper and political men” to survive (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:60-61).

Al-e Ahmad believes the most dangerous impact of Occidentosis is the proximity of Iran to the West out of fear of the spread of communism as the result of inclination towards the former Soviet Union. Al-e Ahmad describes this situation as “the most dangerous paradox emanating from Westoxication” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:60-63). He argues that the Iranian government (the Shah) managed to “steer a middle course with religion and the clergy” (who was against communism) yet established close ties with the West which was being opposed by the clergy (Ibid). Such a paradox, he states, is because the fear of the Shah of communism and the former Soviet Union.

Al-e Ahmad also criticises Iranian clergy as the “last arm of resistance against the West” for failing to resist against the assault of mechanisation and “closing doors to the outside world” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:42). He urges clerics to rise against Occidentosis of radio and television by “being armed with radio and television as is Vatican” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:44).

Al-e Ahmad attributes the peak of Occidentosis to the time when Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri, the forerunner Iranian cleric who championed “legitimacy” or “mashrou’e” (religious constitutionalism) to “constitution” or “mashrouteh” (monarchical constitutionalism), was executed:

I regard the corpse of this revered cleric as a flag which was hoisted (in Iran) as the result of the domination of Occidentosis after 200 years of struggle. And now under this flag, we are foreign to ourselves (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:42).

He believes that Islam as equals “legitimacy and religion” has the capacity to be a shield against the infiltration of machine and the West.

Explaining the chronology of events related to the issue of the nationalisation of the oil industry in Iran and the intervention of Britain and the United States during 1901 (when the Qajars gave the oil concession to the British) and 1332 (when Iran’s Constitutional Revolution occurred), Al-e Ahmad argues that “imitation of the West, oil companies and Western governments, is the highest extreme of Occidentosis” in Iran.

And this is how the Western industry loots us and governs us and controls our destiny. It is clear that when you give the control of the country’s economy and politics to foreign companies, they know what to sell to you or at least what not to sell to you...they loot your oil and give you whatever you want (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:48).

Al-e Ahmad implicitly describes oil as one of the main instigators Westoxicating Iranian rules. From his viewpoint, with the oil sector of the economy in the hands of Western companies, it is only a matter of time until the West makes Iran totally dependent (Hanson, 1983:10). The hatred towards the West by Al-e Ahmad can be clearly spotted in the following:

Forty per cent (of our oil) belongs to the United States; 40 per cent to Britain and the rest likewise to France, Holland and the like. In return of the oil they take from us, we have to import machine and after that experts (machine operators) and after that machine...I wish the day could come and we would have no need to the army of (Western) experts and advisors (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:72-78).

From the viewpoint of Al-e Ahmad, the causes and effects of Occidentosis is the same as the old-age dilemma of chicken and egg. He states that the Iranian politics and economics in the past three centuries has been “a function of the West” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:69-71).

Rejecting Western values, Al-e Ahmad believes that a Westoxicated government only “pretends to have Western democratic values...as freedom of expression, freedom of

speech...” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:95) and is under an autonomous ruler who is “unrestrained and fully controls the army” (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:93).

From the social and economic point of view, the (Westoxicated) society is plagued with a non-coherent organisation, a mishmash of shepherded economy...under the influence of foreign economic conglomerates such as cartels or trusts (Al-e Ahmad, 1964:88).

## **b. Ayatollah Khomeini and the “Satanic” US**

Having learnt many lessons from distinguished Iranian religious scholars as well as his own political observations during the 1940s and 1950s, Ayatollah Rouhollah Khomeini revived “Islamic philosophy” studies in the twentieth century in Iran after the demise of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi in 1961 and continued it until the end of 1970s.

One of the concerns of Ayatollah Khomeini, as for Al-e Ahmad, was the issue of Gharb Zadegi among Muslims, particularly among the elite and intellectuals. Ayatollah Khomeini led protests against the increasingly powerful influence of the United States in Iran by resorting to political Islam (Shiism) as a means of opposing Shah (Mirssepasi-Ashtiani, 1994:66). On many occasions and sermons even from exile in Iraq and France, Ayatollah Khomeini warned against the spread of Westoxication and the dangers of Westernism.

From his viewpoint, Gharb Zadegi meant “the failure of people to rely on their own potential and actual abilities and resort to foreigners for development and progress instead of trying to overcome their problems” (Kosar, 2000). He also defined a Westoxicated person as the “one who feels that he and his society have no ability in resolving his material and spiritual problems and that the only way to resolve problems and reach progress and perfection moves through the West and the Western culture (Ibid).

In his “Sahifey-e Nour” (Book of Light), in 22 volumes, Ayatollah Khomeini describes the West as the “source of many calamities of Muslims and the Iranian nation” (Khomeini, Vol. 11: 183).

...Today our county is Westoxicated, which is worse than an earthquake. Today, some people in this country want to prevent the materialisation of Islam...Now we are quake-hit, we are West-hit. We should join hands altogether to continue this way we have passed through until now (Khomeini, Vol. 7:120).

Ayatollah Khomeini divided the dangers of Occidentosis into three categories: “neihilisation<sup>1</sup>” of humans (Khomeini, Vol. 7: 53), separating humans from morality and dignity and making humans go barbaric (Khomeini, Vol. 7: 66).

He believed that Westoxicated and “alien-hit” people are “nihilists” who are strange with “humanity and morality” while they are “savage, cannibal and murderer”.

Many of the things they (the Westerners) have built are against humanity. This is the West which is destroying the basis of human morality...and human personality and we imagine that the West has everything; (Do you suppose that) now that the West has built cars, so the West should have everything? (Khomeini, Vol. 7:66).

Comparing the West with the Muslim world, Ayatollah Khomeini explained that “Islam is (a) human-making (religion) and the West and Western culture are the destroyer of human” (Ibid). He states that the Islamic law, contrary to the Western law, is “progressive” (Ibid).

Ayatollah Khomeini’s perception of the dangers imposed by the West on the East is very similar to Al-e Ahmad’s. Both believe that the West regards economy as an “end” while Islam uses economy as a “means”. Both regard the concept of freedom in the West as a matter of “irresponsibility” and against “morality”.

Ayatollah Khomeini believed that there are two types of West-stricken people as far as politics and governance are concerned. The first group, he explained, are “betrayers who say, on purpose, that Islam should not interfere in governance (politics). They want to form a non-Islamic but a democratic republic.” The second group, according to Ayatollah Khomeini, are ignorant people “who have heard and believed in the ideas of the first group but they do not intend to betray Islam and Muslims and might otherwise publicise the Western attitude and way of life to serve people” (Ibid, 71).

One of the most compelling reasons Ayatollah Khomeini brings for rejecting Gharb Zadegi is his perception of the West as a power who wants to “exploit” Muslims (Khomeini, Vol. 7:85) and prevent the East from “taking steps towards progress” (Khomeini, Vol. 10:55). Ayatollah Khomeini is so opposed to the West that he describes the link between the West and the East as the relation between a wolf and sheep—a metaphor which has crippled relations between Iran and the United States since the victory of the revolution.

Don’t imagine that our relation with the United States and our relation

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<sup>1</sup> The process of making somebody void of life and “nihilist”.

with, say for example, the Soviet Union...will benefit us. This is like the relation between sheep and wolf. The relation between sheep and wolf is not beneficial to the sheep. They (Westerners) want to swindle us. They don't want to give us something [beneficial] (Khomeini, Vol. 10:55).

From the cultural perspectives, Ayatollah Khomeini elucidates the ways the West employs to expand its "hegemony" as well as mechanisms to counter the West. According to him, Westerners try to "weaken Islam" (Khomeini, Vol. 9:25), "separate people from the clergy (Islam)" (Ibid), "misuse sacred principles such as development, civilisation, democracy and freedom" (Khomeini, Vol. 3:156), "mislead the youth" (Khomeini, Vol. 9:109) and "hire intellectuals" (Khomeini, Vol. 7:23).

Nowadays...pens...and papers instead of lances and guns have turned against Islam. Now, our problem is the pen, people of pen and the intellectuals...and those who are seeking freedom but do not know what freedom is (Ibid).

Mechanisms proposed by Ayatollah Khomeini to counter the Western "hegemony" were mainly based on Islamic tenets and the need to stand against the West. They included "reaching independence, self-sufficiency and self-reliance" (Khomeini, Vol. 11:183, Vol. 14:193), "advancing cultural revolution" (Khomeini, Vol. 5:198, Vol. 1:276, Vol. 15:160), "revamping the radio and television" (Khomeini, Vol. 5:198), "exposing Western conspiracies and cultural corruption" (Khomeini, Vol. 1:152, 161), "promoting progressive Islamic principles" (Khomeini, Vol. 12:52, Vol. 13:80, Vol. 1:260, Vol. 9:185) and "avoiding division and enhancing unity" (Khomeini, Vol. 3:88)<sup>1</sup>.

"You raised an uprising...against big powers...the result is that it is possible to stand against the West...You witnessed that we can go ahead with empty hands...(Khomeini, Vol. 14:193)."

Apart from these mechanisms, Ayatollah Khomeini urged Iranian officials to gain independence from the Western influence in political, economic and cultural areas and clear the society from the Westoxicated. He warned officials against "internal division" and called on them to prevent "imperialist governments" from "spreading rumors" in the Islamic Republic.

"The most important and painful problem confronting the subjugated nations of the world, both Muslim and non-Muslim", Ayatollah Khomeini believed, "is the problem of

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<sup>1</sup> These mechanisms later turned into the pillars of the Islamic Republic and formed the basis of the Iranian politics, including the nuclear and defensive doctrine of the country after the 1979 revolution.

America”:

America is the number-one enemy of the deprived and oppressed people of the world. There is no crime America will not commit in order to maintain its political, economic, cultural, and military domination of those parts of the world where it predominates. It exploits the oppressed people of the world by means of the large-scale propaganda campaigns that are coordinated for it by international Zionism. By means of its hidden and treacherous agents, it sucks the blood of the defenseless people as if it alone, together with its satellites, had the right to live in this world. Iran has tried to sever all its relations with this Great Satan and it is for this reason that it now finds wars imposed upon it (as cited in Makdisi, 2002:551).

Ayatollah Khomeini emphasised on many occasions on the importance of media including the radio and television in Iran’s anti-West drive. He urged the Iranian television to act as a “general university to raise people who can fight” against the Western hegemony and propaganda and “save the cultural apparatus of the country from Westoxication and imperialistic training” (Khomeini, Vol. 9:185).

The adoption of such an anti-West “discourse” by Ayatollah Khomeini before the 1979 revolution and its promotion after it was in fact an influential “doctrine” which was not only turned into a “theory” but also an “ideology” which influenced greatly the Iranian domestic and foreign politics. He in fact created a new political discourse and agenda for young Iranian revolutionaries who had passionate interest in following “the Imam path”.

Ayatollah Khomeini managed to turn anti-Westernism and particularly anti-Americanism dominant in line with his notion of “the rule by jurispudent<sup>1</sup>” and Islamic governance theory which later enabled him to employ concepts such as “imperialism”, “oppression”, “imperialists”, “the oppressed<sup>2</sup>” as well as “global arrogance” (an indirect reference to America) and “capitalism” to denounce or demonise the West (Khomeini, Vol. 5:109, Vol. 6:30, Vol. 8:117, Vol. 11:262).

Khomeini’s arguments about the West and Islamic governance were suitably welcomed by the “anti-state and anti-foreign” orientation of the bazaaris and landowners (Moaddel, 1992: 364). He blamed “imperialists” and “their agents” for creating conditions

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<sup>1</sup> Velayat-e Faqih

<sup>2</sup> Ayatollah Khomeini used these concepts to inspire Iranians about the Palestinian cause. He referred to Israelis as “the oppressors and usurpers” and Palestinians as “the oppressed”.

leading to the division of Muslims into “oppressors” and “the oppressed”. Khomeini also provided the solution to these problems by urging Muslims to “overthrow oppressive governments and form Islamic systems” (Ibid).

Ayatollah Khomeini managed to set up an Islamic revolutionary discourse against the West and the United States as the symbol of “global arrogance” as he was the “most uncompromising” opponent of “Taghout” (monarchy) and particularly of “foreign control and cultural domination” (Keddie, 1983:596)<sup>1</sup>. As observed by Makdisi (2002:551):

Khomeini did not hide his antipathy to the West and the United States in particular for propping up the Shah’s repressive regime. “With the support of America”, Khomeini wrote in 1978, “and with all the infernal means at his disposal, the Shah has fallen on our oppressed people, turning Iran into one vast graveyard” (Makdisi, 2002:551).

### **c. Ayatollah Khamenei and the “Evil” Britain**

As the current leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei believes that anti-Westernism is not related to the issue of rejection of science and technology. He explains that the “anti-Western ideology” of Iran after the 1979 revolution is a “political” issue.

“Opposition to the West does not mean opposition to Western technology, science, development and experiences, at all and no wise man will do this (and oppose the Western science and technology) (Khamenei as cited in Kayhan newspaper, 2007).”

Ayatollah Khamenei explains that the repulsion of the West is in fact the repulsion of the “Western dominance and hegemony” in political, economic and cultural areas (Ibid).

He describes that the Western culture is a set of “beauties and ugliness” as well as “goods and evils” and that a wise nation “would absorb the goods, add it to its own culture and reject the evils” (Ibid).

In a remarkable speech in 1999, Ayatollah Khamenei referred to the “Western liberal democracy<sup>2</sup>” as the main challenge of the Islamic Republic after the collapse of the former Soviet Union (Kayhan newspaper, 2007).

Ayatollah Khamenei’s perception of the West was that Western governments or

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<sup>1</sup> The word “arrogance” (which is the translation of Estekbar) equals “imperialism” in the Iranian political context.

<sup>2</sup> Liberal democracy also known as constitutional democracy is the dominant form of democracy in the 21st century.

“liberal democracies” are against the applicability of religion in politics and society. According to his views, anti-Westernism has two main benchmarks: trying to magnify the role of religion and Islamic governance in politics and society and rejecting the Western domination and arrogance in imposing the Western way of democracy and governance.

“There is an important point regarding the Western culture...The culture of the West i.e. the culture of Europeans has a problem...i.e. it is seeking (political) domination (Khamenei as cited in Kayhan newspaper, 2007).”

Referring to the historical aspects of Occidentalism, Ayatollah Khamenei explains that the West dominated science and technology and tried to exploit it for its own politico-economic interests which led to the “Western colonialism” in the nineteenth century.

Ayatollah Khamenei rejects the idea that the West should impose its culture and values on other nations, even if such values and culture are good. He likens such an imposition of the Western culture on the East to the situation when “they put Kebab in your mouth and order you to eat it while you definitely prefer yogurt and bread to eat” (Ibid).

When a thing is imposed from the position of power, stubbornly and arrogantly, every nation will and should reject it. For example, tie is a Western phenomenon. The Westerners want this. They like it as their tradition. However, if you are from another country and have accidentally chosen suit as your (formal) clothes, and you refuse to wear a tie, you will be regarded as impolite. Why? (Khamenei as cited in Kayhan newspaper, 2007).

From the viewpoint of Ayatollah Khamenei, certain state leaders and “corrupt regimes” are trying to “inject” the Western culture to the nations. Referring to the Pahlavi period, Ayatollah Khamenei states that the “regime tried to impose the Western culture and traditions on the people by humiliating the national culture and beliefs”—a clear reference to Reza Khan’s brutality in forcing women to remove their hijab.

Like Al-e Ahmad and Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Khamenei also believes that the Westoxicated rulers of Iran during Pahlavi and the late Qajar eras rejected the notion of “self-sufficiency” and relied on Western products, hindering development in Iran.

On the attitudes of Ayatollah Khamenei who has the final say on Iran’s foreign policy and domestic issues, Zibakalam (as cited in BBC Persian, 2009), University of Tehran’s professor of political science, states that Iran’s leader believes in “a historical confrontation between developing states and the countries to which he (Khamenei) refers to as belonging

to the imperial order”. One such attitude can be obviously seen in Ayatollah Khamenei’s policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He encourages Palestinian groups as well as Islamic and Arab states to “resist” against Israel and the United States as they are “arrogant and imperial” powers.

Ayatollah Khamenei is of the opinion that dividing countries to developed and developing categories is a “shrewd Western tactic” to impose Western values and culture on the East (Khamenei, 2009). He believes that there could be no single pattern of development for all countries as it largely depends on the historical, geographical, political and cultural circumstances of each country.

Considering the history and culture and other special circumstances of Iran, we cannot progress by following the (development) patterns of the United States, Western or Eastern Europe or other models. Yet the art is we seek an indigenous (local) model (Ibid).

As with Ayatollah Khomeini who emphasised the importance of relying on Islamic tenets, Ayatollah Khamenei also highlights the need to incorporate Islamic economic, political and social principles into the macro-planning decision-making processes of the Islamic Republic<sup>1</sup>. On such a basis, he devised the long-term strategic planning document of Iran known as the “20-Year Vision Plan” which envisages that by the end of 2015, Iran should turn into the Middle East’s number one state in terms of science and technology and economy.

Rejecting Western capitalism<sup>2</sup>, Ayatollah Khamenei believes “toeing the line of the United States and others is not a sign of development and has no value”.

“Countries should retain their political and economic independence as well as their decision-making power should globalisation is to be realised properly (Ibid)”.

Like Al-e Ahmad, Ayatollah Khamenei urges senior Iranian officials not to “marginalise” themselves and retreat from “the front of confrontations with arrogant power centres”. On the occasion of the second investiture ceremony of President Ahmadinejad, Ayatollah Khamenei said “the decisive and unparalleled vote of people to the respected elected president is in fact a vote for the records of the ninth [Ahmadinejad] government in

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<sup>1</sup> For example, he believes that while Western patterns regard the rise in the GNP as an important benchmark of development, “Islamic principles stipulate that as far as there is injustice and huge class divisions, true development would be impossible even if the GNP increases by ten-fold” (Ibid).

<sup>2</sup> The collapse of the Soviet communism, opposition to Marxism and growing post-modernism provided the space for Islam to be a substitute for the Western capitalism and consumerism.

the past four years...this is a vote for the blessing and dignified discourse of the Islamic revolution; a vote for anti-arrogance and brave resistance against global arrogance”.

Ayatollah Khamenei’s agenda in foreign policy is largely influenced by Ayatollah Khomeini’s anti-Westernism ideology which has turned into one of the pillars of Iran’s foreign policy particularly towards the United States and Israel—two countries to which Iran is ideologically opposed. Although such an ideological influence cannot be denied, Ayatollah Khamenei has prioritised “expedient pragmatism” to “ideological anti-Americanism” in several occasions such as direct talks between Iran and the United States on Iraq in 2007. Such an approach could be also seen after the election of Barack Obama as the US president and his promise of adopting a “direct engagement” policy with Iran.

### **Part 3: Iran’s two main political wings and the problem of the West**

Like many political systems in other countries, Iran’s political system is non-partisan parliamentary based, although the parliament in practice is divided into two main factions with affiliations to political wing parties: the Majority Faction and the Minority Faction<sup>1</sup>. There are three main branches of state i.e. executive, legislative and judicial bodies which are overseen by three more organisations: the Supreme Leader’s Office, the State Expediency Council and the Guardian Council<sup>2</sup>.

Traditionally and historically there have been two main “ideological camps” active in the Iranian politics: the leftists or liberals (also known as Reformists) and the rightists or fundamentalists (also known as Conservatives). The former has a desire for more Western

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<sup>1</sup> These factions are usually occupied in each term of the parliament by dominant political wing parties. For example, in the sixth round of parliament, Reformists formed the Majority Faction while Conservatives took the Majority Faction in the seventh, eighth and ninth rounds.

<sup>2</sup> According to the law, the Parliament (Majlis) is duty-bound to supervise the Government; the Judiciary is under the direct supervision of the Supreme Leader’s Office and there is currently no official mechanism to supervise the Parliament. All the three branches of state as well as other organisations and bodies are unofficially under the supervision of the Supreme Leader’s Office. It has the ultimate power as an arbitrator and is itself overseen by the Assembly of Experts, according to the law.

ideals while the latter strictly seeks return to pure Islamic principles and revolution achievements<sup>1</sup>.

Such a composition was prevalent in the two Iranian revolutions of 1905 and 1979 and continued in the same manner under the rightists' domination until 1997 when Mohammad Khatami won presidential elections in a landslide victory.

The party politics in its modern form in Iran was brought into the limelight in the third decade after the revolution when the Second of Khordad Movement was formed after the 1997 elections. This movement later changed its name to the Reform Movement and that was the beginning of competition and rivalry between Conservatives and Reformists.

Before 1997, political currents in Iran were being identified usually with titles such as the "religious/Islamic current", "nationalist current", "nationalist-religious current", "liberal current" and the "Marxist left current". The strongest amongst them was the religious/Islamic current which was ultimately divided after the demise of Ayatollah Khomeini into the Society of Combatant Clergy and the Association of Combatant Clerics. The former was the representative of the Right Wing (Conservatives) and the latter was the birthplace of the Left Wing (Reformists). After the 1997 elections, the Left Wing became known as Reformism while the Right Wing was introduced as Conservatism after the 2005 elections<sup>2</sup>.

Since 23 May 1997, which is known as the Second of Khordad (the day presidential elections were held and Reformists became victorious), the leftists introduced themselves as "Eslah Talaban<sup>3</sup>" or "Reformists" and set up the Reforms Movement which led to the formation of the Reform Wing or the Reformism mannerism in the Iranian politics.

Likewise, when the rightists won the 2005 presidential elections through their candidate, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, they represented themselves as "Osoul Gerayan<sup>4</sup>" or "Principlists<sup>5</sup>" (hereafter referred to as Conservatives) which resulted in the formation of

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1 In her sociological comparison of the two Iranian constitutional and Islamic revolutions, Keddie (1983: 592-593) argues that the liberals desire for "Westernisation", while fundamentalists wish to "return to pure Islam". The former was prevalent in the constitutional revolution and the latter won out in the Islamic revolution. Paul (1999:183-184) argues that religious forces "systematically" consolidated the political power within the new government of Iran after the 1979 revolution.

2 The Islamic reformism movement, in the broader sense, has been the "main intellectual trend" in the Muslim world since the late nineteenth century (Keddie, 1994: 484). The central idea of the reformism movement is to reach sustainable development by "imitating and naturalising Western thought" on liberal issues such as the formation of a parliament or women's rights (Ibid).

3 Literally means "Reform Seekers"

4 Literally means "Principle Aspirants" ("Gera" is a suffix in the Persian language which means "having a desire for". "Gerayan" is the plural form of "Gera").

5 They call themselves "Principlists" because they believe they should return to the "principles" of Islam and the Islamic revolution.

the Principlist Wing or the Conservatism mannerism<sup>1</sup>.

Reformism and Conservatism are both religiously-oriented and share many principles in common particularly when it comes to major national issues such as the nuclear programme. They adhere to the principles in which the Islamic revolution of 1979 was based and became victorious. Both identify themselves as the “followers of the path of Imam” Ayatollah Khomeini.

Such proximity between the two encouraged the Conservatives in view of the 2009 controversial presidential elections, to propose the idea of “Osoul Gerayan-e Eslah Talab” or “Reformist Conservatives” and the Reformists to raise the prospects of “Eslah Talaban-e Osoul Gara” or the “Conservative Reformists”<sup>2</sup>. Such a nominal paradox was in fact the product of pre-presidential-election negotiations in 2009 among and within various political parties from the Reformist and Conservative camps about who to nominate.

Due to differences of opinion among prominent political figures and unclear boundaries between Reformism and Conservatism (before the elections), some candidates, whose main aim was to cover their affiliated party’s deficiencies and attract more voters, decided to identify themselves as Conservative Reformist or Reformist Conservative instead of Reformist or Conservative alone.

Among such prominent hopefuls from the Conservative wing was Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf who is widely known as the founder of Reformist Conservatism<sup>3</sup>. When asked about his motivation to set up such a political current, he said in an interview on 17 March 2009 that Reformist Conservatism is a new “political discourse inspired by the Supreme Leader” which has been established to stop “extremism, populism, backwardness, violence, freedomphobia” and in order to “escape from the

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1 Followers of this wing adopted the term “Principlists” as their official name because they desired to adhere to the “principles” and achievements of the 1979 Islamic revolution laid out by Ayatollah Khomeini. Since there is no direct equivalent to describe the term “Principlists” in the English language, the researcher prefers to use the term “Conservatives” as it is the closest equivalent in political terms as Conservatives are opposed by Liberals (or in the case of Iran the Reformists). The researcher avoids using the term “Fundamentalists” to describe “Principlists” because the former is used frequently in religion (and Taleban-style fundamentalism) and not politics while Principlists are not religiously-oriented only. In other words, Principlists adhere to both Islamic and the 1979 Revolutionary tenets while Reformists adhere to the 1979 Revolutionary and Islamised Western principles.

2 Some members of the Conservative wing prefer the use of “Osoul Gerayan-e Montaqed” or “Critic(al) Conservatives” instead of “Osoul Gerayan-e Eslah Talab” or “Reformist Conservatives”. They believe that because Reformists are opposed to the Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the jurispudent) or the current Valiy-e Faqih (Supreme Leader), they should avoid using the term Reformist to describe Conservatives. In fact, opposition to Velayat-e Faqih or Valiy-e Faqih (Supreme Leader) has long been a political taboo in Iran.

3 A similar situation happened in the Reformist camp. Mir Hossein Mousavi, long struggling to throw his hat in the ring, identified himself as a “Reformist who does not miss the principles”. It was inferred among the media and political circles that Mousavi is the candidate of a new current—the Conservative Reformism. This current however was never formed as Mousavi lost the elections according to official results and his main affiliated front, the Reformist Wing, was marginalised with two of its important parties dismantled.

present crisis”. He also rejected that Reformist Conservatism is a composition of Reformism and Conservatism. In the Reformist Conservatism, he said, reforms are formulated in the society within the framework of Islamic and revolutionary principles.

We are Muslim and pious people who are committed to Islamic values particularly justice...We have been also dreaming a developed society for more than a century...Experience has it that Conservatism and Reformism have highlighted only one of these two factors while ignoring the other...Reformist Conservatism is based on underscoring both of them (excerpts from Qalibaf speech, 2009)<sup>1</sup>.

The idea of Reformist Conservatism was initiated in a speech by Ayatollah Khamenei during a visit to the Kerman province weeks before the 2005 presidential elections. Addressing a gathering of students and professors, he elaborated on the new concept:

I don't accept the clash between Reformism and Conservatism. I believe this is a misguided categorisation. The opposite point of Conservatism is not Reformism; the opposite point of Reformism is not Conservatism [either]. The opposite point of Conservatism is...a person who does not believe in any principle; a person who changes religion [beliefs frequently]...The opposite point of Conservatism is corruption. I believe in Reformist Conservatism [which believes in] strong principles emanating from Islamic epistemological fundamentals [coupled] with reforming methods day by day and according to new issues [requirements of the time] (Khamenei, 2005) [*brackets added*].

In terms of foreign policy, one might juxtapose the foreign policy line of the two major political wings in Iran (Reformists and Conservatives) with the foreign policy of the two US parties towards Muslim states. In other words, to have a better understanding of Iranian Reformism and Conservatism, it could be helpful to first study dominant approaches to the US foreign policy and then compare the two.

According to Niva (1998:27), there are two “dividing” foreign policy approaches in the United States with regards to dealing with what might be ignorantly or wrongly called “Islamic threat”: the conservative “Cold War vision” of Samuel Huntington and the neo-liberal “end of history” triumphalism of Francis Fukuyama. The former portrays Islam as a

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<sup>1</sup> The Supreme Leader's views on Reformist Conservatism are further discussed in details in the next section.

“new Communism” and a “great threat” to Western civilisation while the latter urges accommodation with Islam.

The first camp seeks to create a new “threat” to justify its strict “national security” strategy and is largely influenced by America’s pro-Israeli lobby--the AIPAC-- and pro-Israeli media such as the “Weekly Standard” (Niva, 1998:27).<sup>1</sup>

Uniting proponents of this view is the belief that “Muslim fundamentalism” constitutes an openly revisionist approach to the regional and international systems...because it is “the only expressly anti-Western ideology of any importance in the world and it means to destroy the Western position, Western institutions and Western culture, wherever it can” (Niva, 1998:27).

Supporters of this approach call on the US government to confront rouge states militarily, punish acts of terrorism, block any access by Muslim states to weapons of mass destruction, prevent any takeover of power by Islamic states in the Middle East and strengthened deterrent military presence in the Persian Gulf. Niva (1998:27-8) calls this approach to foreign policy as “Islam-as-threat” or “lesser-of-two-evils” school which only serves the United States interests in the region:

The “Islamic threat” scenario reproduces the Cold War paradigm of mutually hostile blocs and ideologies, thus perpetuating familiar modes of US intervention in the Third World that rely upon high levels of militarisation. For these policy makers, defending a global network of authoritarian political and social arrangements remains the most expedient way for the US to maintain its hegemony and the operation of international capital. Confronting the “Islamic threat” provides the best pretext for preserving the existing status quo of authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes and alliances that served US Cold War aims of ensuring the flow of cheap oil, providing military bases for US power projection and guaranteeing Israel's military hegemony in the region (Niva, 1998:28).

Proponents of the second approach to the US foreign policy vis-à-vis Islamic states

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<sup>1</sup> Notable purveyors of this line include Daniel Pipes, editor of *The Middle East Quarterly*, Peter Rodman, a fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former member of the Reagan National Security Council, syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer, and Bernard Lewis, professor of Middle East studies at Princeton University.

perceive Islam not as a “threat” but as an “opportunity”<sup>1</sup>. They believe that the US can approach certain Islamic states and Iran in particular by adopting a more constructive and nuanced but less confrontational policy.

...[They] argue that Islamism has been nurtured by the failure of existing secular regimes to deliver economic justice and democracy, coupled with popular desires for independence from Western domination. Moreover, they suggest that US policy is partly responsible for the emergence of such movements due to its support of repressive dictatorships and its unconditional support of Israel (Niva, 1998:28).

They maintain that the US should adopt a new approach regarding Islamic states in the Middle East and replace its strict “containment” of Islamist states with policies of “constructive engagement” and “critical dialogue”. They believe that “carrots such as economic integration are more likely to influence these states than the stick of isolation” (Ibid). They urge the US to help promote “civil society” principles in Islamic states and encourage more IMF- and World-Bank-style “reforms” on them.

Proponents of this policy, fearful of repeating the mistakes made in Iran, urge the US to adopt a more accommodating policy towards Islamists...The intellectual edifice of this emerging paradigm derives from Fukuyama’s “end of history” liberal universalism rather than Huntington’s conservative “clash” (Niva, 1998:28).

In the case of Iran, the Reformists influenced by Khatami’s “dialogue-among-civilisations theory” believe in “cooperation and engagement” with the West much in the same way as Fukuyamaian supporters wish to accommodate Islam in contrast with Huntington’s “clash-of-civilisations” approach.

This is while Iran’s Conservatives are pursuing policies to “confront” with the West but not in the total same manner Huntingtonian followers desire to confront Islam. To put it differently, Iranian Conservatives have adopted an approach to foreign policy similar “only in content” (and not in format) to American neo-Conservatives<sup>2</sup>. Although Iran’s Conservatives seek to confront the West, they might even accommodate it in order to exploit for their interests and ultimately confront it. Such a policy could be clearly tracked

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1 Figures of this group include James Baker, Zbigniew Brzezinski and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Robert Pelletreau, as well as Middle East specialists and scholars in the US such as Georgetown University professor John Esposito and former CIA analyst Graham Fuller.

2 That Iran’s Conservatives regard America (the West) as a “threat” is similar in content to American neo-Conservatives describing Islamic civilisation as a menace to the Western civilisation.

in Iran's foreign policy towards the West during the conservative rule of Ahmadinejad when he wrote to German and American leaders to "invite" them to Islamic peace and justice.

### **i. Conservatism and the West**

In political and party politics terms, Conservatism emphasises on maintaining and preserving the status quo and traditional institutions while resisting great and sudden changes in a society. In fact, Conservatism, which was brought into being in 1970 by Edmund Burke in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, believes that society should change as little as possible. In the Iranian politics after the 1979 Islamic revolution, however, Conservatism is not only related to maintaining traditional institutes such as religious entities (mosques, Hosseiniyehs, seminary schools, mausoleums) and politico-Islamic bodies (the Guardian Council, Assembly of Experts, Islamic Culture and Communications Organisation, Hajj and Endowments Organisation and so on) but also preserving "Osool" or "principles or fundamentals" on which the Islamic revolution was based. These principles were framed by the founder of the Islamic revolution Ayatollah Imam Khomeini and his successor Ayatollah Imam Khamenei<sup>1</sup>.

Conservatism as a mainstream political wing (under the title of "Osool Geraei" or literally translated as "Principlisim") came into spotlight when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005 and ended eight years of Reformist executive rule.

The Conservatives were active during the Reformism period (1997-2005) in the form of several right-wing political parties and circles such as the Islamic Coalition Party, the Islamic Society of Engineers, the Islamic Society of University Scholars and Ansar-e Hezbollah as well as the powerful Society of Combatant Clergy whose foundation was based by Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Motahhari and other prominent clerics including Ayatollah Khamenei in 1979 and the Qom Seminary Teachers Society to which Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, who is widely believed to be Ahmadinejad's spiritual teacher and leader, is affiliated. However, they were not as organised and strong as they grew after the election of Ahmadinejad as president.

The Conservatives' hold of power was further strengthened when the next

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<sup>1</sup> These basic principles were outlined by Ayatollah Khomeini as the foundation stone of Iran's domestic and foreign policies. The most important principle in domestic politics is adherence to the rule by jurisprudent (Velayat-e Faqih) and the fight against monarchism (Taghout). In foreign policy, the most fundamental principle is spreading Islamic values (through, for example, defending the Palestinian cause) and the fight against global arrogance (anti-imperialism).

parliament was formed with the majority of Conservative MPs backed by the Conservative-ruled Judiciary and the Guardian Council. The support given by the Supreme Leader to President Ahmadinejad on different occasions including during government disputes with the parliament over the laws and most prominently in the aftermath of 2009 presidential elections was unique and unrivalled. On one occasion, Ayatollah Khamenei described Ahmadinejad's government as a "very great blessing" elected "with Osouli (principled) slogans" to "make Osouli (principled) slogans" (Khamenei, 2006)<sup>1</sup>.

In an important meeting with the newly-elected government of President Ahmadinejad on 19 June 2006, Ayatollah Khamenei outlined the yardsticks through which Osoul Gerayan (Principlists or Conservatives) were to be recognised. He in fact defined Osoul Geraei (Principlism or Conservatism) as not a "political school of thought" but a "basic Islamic thought" to manage the state of affairs.

Osoul Geraei is not in words. Osoul Geraei is not also against the current political schools of thought. This is wrong that we divide the country or political activists to Osoul Gera [Conservative] and Eslah Talab [Reformist]...Osoul Geraei belongs to all those who are committed to the principles of [1979 Islamic] revolution and adore them. Now whatever you call them [Conservative or Reformist] (excerpts from Khamenei speech, 2006) [*brackets added*].

But what are these principles? In the same meeting, the leader outlined eight of them in the following order:

- 1- To have Islamic and revolutionary faith and identity and commitment to them
- 2- To administer justice in all the state of affairs
- 3- To maintain political independence from West
- 4- To reinforce national self-confidence
- 5- To promote scientific Jihad and initiate a movement of science production
- 6- To stabilise and secure freedom and free thought
- 7- To reform and revise methods based on principles (principled reforms)
- 8- To promote economic prosperity


These principles have been outlined by Ayatollah Khamenei as the basics by which political parties and not necessarily Conservatives should abide. An analysis of the statements of the Conservatives' leaders and manifestos of political parties affiliated with

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<sup>1</sup> In the same address, he called for the formation of an "Osouli" (principled) Parliament and Judiciary.

Conservatism indicates that the principles to which Conservatives adhere include:

- 1- Adherence to the path of Ayatollah Khomeini and his attitudes particularly his legacy of Velayat-e Faqih and the belief that politics is intertwined with religion
- 2- Adherence to the Constitution
- 3- Adherence to Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme Leader<sup>1</sup>



Although principles outlined by Ayatollah Khamenei appear to have been set out for the Conservatives, they were widely respected and followed by Reformists as well during 1997 and 2005. The main difference between Khamenei-defined principles for Ahmadinejad’s government and those observed by Khatami-led Reformist administration might be about the nature and the mechanisms through which these principles were to be materialised. Ayatollah Khamenei instructed the Conservatives, who have strong supporters among clerics, to implement these principles through “principled” Islamic and indigenously-defined mechanisms “independently from the West”, while Khatami’s administration were intent on incorporating “Western concepts and mechanisms” but in Islamic styles into their programmes.

To put it differently, while Conservatives seek inward-looking programming, Reformists rely on outward-looking planning. As Khatami reiterated in an interview on 9 February 2010:

In our Reformism, we have not pinned our hopes on the foreigner [the West]; nor have we believed that foreigners [Westerners] basically want to benefit us (Khatami, 2010) [*brackets added*].

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<sup>1</sup> The intersection of these three fundamental principles of Conservatism is commitment to Velayat-e Faqih as the rule by jurisprudent is the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini which has been stipulated legally in the Iranian Constitution according to which the Supreme Leader is the (spiritual and non-spiritual) ruler of the country.

One of the other main differences between Conservatives and Reformists is related to their interpretation of the basic laws of the country. Whereas Conservatives believe that the Supreme Leader is above the law (because of his capacity as a qualified jurisprudent and the representative of the Hidden Imam), the Reformists argue that Iran's Constitution should be the base of the state while believing in the concept of Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the jurisprudent)<sup>1</sup>.

Our base in this movement [Reformism] is the Constitution. Although it is a human innovation, the Constitution is the base of our Reform movement. Therefore, any manipulation, misinterpretation or deviation in contradiction to the Constitution or anything hindering the implementation of the Constitution should be reformed (Khatami, 2010) [*brackets added*].

The incorporation of the concept of Velayat-e Faqih into the agenda of the Conservatives, according to Vahdat (2003), was an initiative influenced by Reza Davari-Ardakani--a prominent Iranian philosopher and member of the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council. Vahdat (2003:599) believes Davari-Ardakani, alongside Ahmad Fardid (who proposed Westoxication), is "the central figure" and intellectual patron of Conservatism, who unlike his reformist counterpart Abdolkarim Soroush, believes in the maintenance of this concept.

Even though Davari-Ardakani is not considered a political figure in Iran, his thoughts directly or indirectly influenced Conservatives. He believes that the Islamic revolution was a reaction to Westoxication and heralds the end of the Western hegemony and what he describes as the "holocaust of Westoxication":

...in Davari's discourse, there is very little space for reconciliation between Islam and modernity. Such a reconciliation for Davari would entail becoming accomplices with imperialists of the East (i.e., the

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<sup>1</sup>Allegiance to Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the jurisprudent) is the most important benchmark for Conservatives to distinguish between "true" Osoul Gerayan and Reformists. It is remarkable to mention that the concept of Velayat-e Faqih has been stipulated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to Article 5 "During the Occultation of the Hidden Imam (May God Hasten His Reappearance), in the Islamic Republic of Iran the rule of order and the leadership of the nation devolve upon a just and pious, aware of the circumstances of the age, courageous, resourceful and wise faqih [jurisprudent] who is responsible for it in accordance with Article 107". Iran's Constitution was primarily drawn up by 3 December 1979. It was however reviewed in 28 July 1989 during which major changes were made. One such major change was the revision of Article 5 which necessitated that the faqih who is going to lead the nation should "have been known and acknowledged by the majority of people". The old-version Article 5 also stipulated that "if a faqih cannot secure such a majority, the leader or the Leadership Council consisting of faqihs with above-mentioned qualifications will devolve it in accordance with Article 107".

former Soviet Union and its allies) and the West who have expropriated and dominated everything in the world (Vahdat, 2003: 608).

Davari-Ardakani, however, like Al-e Ahmad, was not opposed to “all” aspects of the West. He even called for the embrace of modern sciences and technologies, although he insisted that the West should conform to Islam and not the other way around. He maintains that:

Iran needs the modern positivist sciences and technology to survive, but these must be confined to the achievement of evil, but necessary, this-worldly needs, otherwise technology’s dominance will be established again (as cited in Vahdat, 2003: 609).

Based on the main priority of the Conservatives i.e. following whatever is dictated by the Velayat-e Faqih (rule of the jurispudent), the government of President Ahmadinejad formulated its domestic and foreign policies according to the thoughts and stipulations of Ayatollah Khamenei as the present Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic (and former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini)<sup>1</sup>. In sum, Conservatives are against the accommodation of West while promoting anti-imperialist and anti-arrogance sentiments among allies.

Main Conservative parties are the United Conservative Front also known as Group 7+8, Paydari (Endurance) Front and Istadeqi (Resistance) Front. They were formed in 2011 before the parliamentary elections in order to coordinate policies for the elections.

The United Conservative Front or the Group 7+8, inspired by Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani (the head of the Assembly of Experts who oversee the Leader) consists of a 15-person committee of Conservatives. Prominent figures of Group 7+8 are also members of Conservative groups such as the Society of Combatant Clergy, Followers of the Line of Imam and Leadership Front, Qom Seminary School Teachers Society, Islamic Revolution Isargaran Campaign, Rahpouyan Campaign and Reformist Conservatives. Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and the Mayor of Tehran Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf have introduced representatives to the Group 7+8.

The Paydari (Endurance) Front is inspired by Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi—a prominent pro-Conservative cleric. It consists of key figures of the Conservative wing close to the Ahmadinejad government such as Sadeq Mahsouli, Gholamhossein Elham, Hamid Rasaei and Mehdi Kouchakzadeh. Jebhey-e Vola (Qarargah-e Ammar) is a

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<sup>1</sup>This of course is in line with the Constitution; however, when compared with Reformists, observers level criticisms on Ahmadinejad for being too obedient to the leader. For more on Ayatollah Khomeini’s and Ayatollah Khamenei’s attitude and thoughts towards the West, please refer to previous related sections.

subsidiary of this group.

The Istadegi (Resistance) Front, under the leadership of Mohsen Rezaei, former presidential candidate and IRGC commander, is the third pro-Conservative group which consists of less known figures and subsidiaries. They include Velayat Supporters Front, Islamic Iran Justice and Development Party, Islamic Revolution Youth Campaign, Hazrat Zeinab Followers Society, Green Party, Islamic Assembly of the Cause of the Iranian Nation and International Association for the Anti-Zionist Movement.

The Group 7+8 is critical of the Paydari Front because it believes the Paydari Front does not clearly and publically reject the thoughts and attitudes of the so-called Jariyan-e Enherafi (the Deviant Current<sup>1</sup>). Likewise, the Paydari Front accuses the Group 7+8 of adopting silence towards the so-called Jariyan-e Fetneh (the Fitna Current<sup>2</sup>). The Istadegi Front mainly adopts critical stances towards the government while rejecting the ideas and approaches of both the Jariyan-e Enherafi (the Deviant Current) and Jariyan-e Fetneh (the Fitna Current).

## **ii. Reformism and the West**

Reformism, according to Western liberal discourses, is putting in place reforms to stabilise the standing political system by avoiding a revolution. It is a political current which promotes change in a society through peaceful reforms in various sections rather than bloody revolutions.

The concept of reform in the contemporary history of Iran could be traced back to the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty—Reza Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941). He introduced a series of reforms in numerous aspects of the Iranian life to change the country into a “modern” state.

The Shah’s reforms programme was in fact a series of serious changes to modernise different sectors of the Iranian society and primarily aimed at making Iran “a more respectable society” in the world community (Bill, 1970: 30s). However it failed and resulted in the White Revolution of 1963 by his son Mohammad Reza who adopted a more

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1 The Deviant Current is a term used to refer to the supporters and followers of Esfandiyar Rahim-Mashaei—the Chief of Staff and the closest ally of President Ahmadinejad. Conservatives accuse Rahim-Mashaei of deviating from the path of the revolution and Velayat-e Faqih by making controversial comments on Islam and relations of Iran with other countries such as the US and Israel.

2 The Fitna Current is used to refer to the supporters and followers of defeated presidential candidates Mirhossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karubi. The government blames them for the riots and controversies in the aftermath of the 2009 presidential elections.

Conservative approach to return Iranians to the “traditional” system and patterns of life.

These reforms were not as effective as the reforms proposed by clerics during the 1960s and 1970s which finally led to the Islamic revolution of 1979. Karimi-Hakkak (1991) likens the movement of Iranian reformists during the early 1900s to a famous Iranian poem-story “the myth of Kaveh the Ironsmith” by Abolqasem Ferdosi—the tenth-century Iranian poet—in which people, led by Kaveh an ironsmith, revolt against a tyrannical ruler, Zahhak.

Popular revolt against tyrannical rule, restitution of legitimacy, and progress toward social justice, all the elements present in the myth, had been thematised in the hands of a generation of Iranian reformers, modernisers, and revolutionaries in such a way as to serve the ideals of liberal democracy, individual freedom, and social justice (Karimi-Hakkak, 1991:525-526).

Mirsepasi-Ashtiani (1994:66) observes that the changes proposed by “reformist clerics” in the 1960s aimed at setting up an “Islamic-style constitutional” rather than a “monarchical” government. These reforms were of course not consistent with the motives of secular intellectuals and politicians who sought a Western model of government to reverse what they called the “backwardness” of Iranian society. Mirsepasi-Ashtiani (1994) believes these reformists were more concerned with reforming Shiism than conforming to the values and practices of early Islamic history or to the Prophet’s traditions.

Thus, it is more accurate to describe the movement as a reformist political movement trying to come to terms with modernity rather than as a “traditionalist” effort to restore Islamic values in Iranian society (Mirsepasi-Ashtiani, 1994:72).

After the victory of the 1979 revolution, there was no call for reforms for nearly a

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1 Mohammad Reza Shah’s 12-point “white-revolutionary” programme included reforms in the following areas (Bill, 1970: 31-32):

- 1- Land reform
- 2- Nationalisation of forests and pastures
- 3- Public sale of state-owned factories to finance land reform
- 4- Profit-sharing in industry
- 5- Reform of electoral law to include women
- 6- Literacy campaign (Sepah-e Danesh)
- 7- Health campaign (Sepah-e Behdasht)
- 8- Reconstruction and development campaign
- 9- Rural Courts of Justice
- 10- Nationalisation of the waterways
- 11- National reconstruction
- 12- Educational and administrative revolution

decade until the establishment of the Association of Combatant Clerics in 1987 partly due to the eight-year war. This association was formed by a number of clerics who later set up the new reform movement (Second of Khordad Movement) in 1997 when Mohammad Khatami, an influential member of the association, won the presidential elections.

Two main pro-reform political parties were also formed within the Reformist Wing: The Islamic Iran Participation Front and the Islamic Republic of Iran Mojahedin Organisation. Members of these two parties were later elected to the Parliament and City Councils across the country<sup>1</sup>.

The reform movement in post-revolution Iran was different from the reform movement in decades to the 1979 revolution. In fact, the nature of reforms was different. Whereas the reforms before the revolution revolved around governance and the system of government issues, the reform movement after the revolution called for major reforms including the incorporation of Western liberal concepts of civil society and political participation (development). Top on the agenda of the reform movement of 1997 was “religious democracy”—Islamic-style democracy. This implied that Reformists seek a “more open and democratic” civil society (Vahdat, 2003:599)<sup>2</sup>. Such a trend could be only materialised through “accommodation” with the modern world particularly its democratic principles<sup>3</sup>. In sum, Reformists adopted a detente policy with regards to the West and sought wider relations.

With the virulent anti-Westernism of the early and mid-1980s having subsided considerably, Iranian authors and academics appear more willing to critically examine concepts and phenomena prevalent in the West. In addition to the works and the authors cited so far, books and articles on such singularly Western phenomena as modernity and post-modernity have become highly popular in recent years (Kamrava, 2008:177).

Main beliefs and agenda of the Reformists are to follow up reforms in different sectors of the regime, to develop civil freedom and public participation, to heed citizenship rights and to improve the status of Iran at the global level in view of dialogue and

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1 After the controversial elections of June 2009 and its subsequent street violence, the Interior Ministry annulled the permits of these two parties whose senior members were either in prison or under strict government control. Since then their activities were regarded illegal by the government.

2 Kamrava (2001: 171) observes that under such circumstances, the print media started to break “taboos” and published subjects which were previously forbidden. This resulted in a number of pro-reform newspapers being banned by the Judiciary.

3 This approach, Niva (1998:27) believes, led the US to adopt a “less confrontational” policy towards Iran during Khatami (Reformism) period.

avoidance of direct confrontation with great powers.

Analysing a number of books, articles and statements by Reformist officials during the Khatami period, Kamrava (2001:167) concludes that Iranian reformists perceived the notion of civil society “through a substantial process of indigenisation” in which they underlined the need for the “rule of law” within an Islamic framework.

...even Iran’s secular theorists have not been able to fully evade the gravitational pull of Islam and its overwhelming role in Iranian culture and society. At a minimum, they maintain that civil society is possible only after a “proper” interpretation of Islam gains popular acceptance (Kamrava, 2001: 167).

Examining Khatami’s speeches and writings, Merat (1999:34) identifies central issues top on the agenda of the Reformist government: the need for greater freedom of opinion and association, political parties’ right to publicise their views, a serious effort to meet the multifaceted needs of Iranian youth, a re-evaluation of women’s status, a condemnation of violence and the institutionalisation of tolerance and dialogue.

According to Vahdat (2003:603), the Reformism raised such Western concepts as civil society under the intellectual leadership of Abdolkarim Soroush<sup>1</sup>. Soroush believed in human “inter-subjectivity and its political embodiment as universal citizenship”. In this line, he urged Khatami’s government not to resist against the Western achievements particularly those in the field of thought (“Andisheh”) and human sciences<sup>2</sup>:

[W]e do not wish to deprive ourselves from the achievements of others...[W]e believe that the [fruits of] humanity’s thought are valuable and needed by all of humanity, although through critique some of these [thoughts] may be falsified. Therefore, the rule should not be to close the doors upon ourselves, not using other’s thoughts. On the contrary, the principle is to not deprive ourselves of others’ thoughts (Soroush as cited in Vahdat, 2003:617).

The introduction of such Western concepts to the Iranian society was implied by the Conservatives as a threat to the Islamic system and a betrayal to the 1979 revolution values

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<sup>1</sup> His real name is Hossein Haj Faraj Dabbagh (b. 1963). Abdolkarim Soroush is only a pen name.

<sup>2</sup> The reformists’ call for the accommodation of Western thoughts in human sciences was harshly criticised by Ayatollah Khamenei who emphasises on an Iranian-Islamic (Quranic) pattern rather than Western models. When Conservatives took power, he instructed them to incorporate “Islamic ideologies” into the curriculum of human sciences at universities. He said “many human sciences currently being taught in our universities are based on materialistic and non-Islamic philosophies. Teaching them in our universities will result in the disappearance of Islamic and divine tenets while creating a sense of doubt in religious and ideological beliefs (of our students) (Khamenei, 30 August 2009)”.

and principles<sup>1</sup>. This was explained in a newspaper article in the early months after Khatami took office:

After years of trial and error...finally someone has come to power who promises the realisation of civil society. But there are those who say it is not consistent with our national character and is not good for us (as cited in Kamrava, 2001:170).

The opposition (Conservatives) accused the Reformists of trying to theorise the basics of a non-religious and secular system based on liberalist ideas in Iran through pursuing reforms<sup>2</sup>. Conservatives also labeled reformists as “Westoxicated”—a move Khatami said is a result of “our historical ignorance” and lack of “adequate understanding of Western political thought”. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei also criticised Reformists for bringing what he described “American reforms”:

Preserving principles and reforming methods is the [real] meaning of Reformism. We should reform methods [and not principles]. However, from the American point of view, reform means opposition to the Islamic republic system. Reza Khan [Pahlavi dynasty Shah] came and brought reforms. So did Mohammad Reza [son of Reza Shah]. This is what I call American reforms. These reforms are worthless. The Iranian nation will undertake reforms based on its principles (Ayatollah Khamenei, 2005).

In another speech a year later, the Supreme Leader repeated that any reform should be Conservative and any Conservatism should be based on reformism:

Reforms under American criteria in our country are like the same Reza Khan reforms. You know that Reza Khan based his monarchy on the slogan of reforms. All these crimes and murders during his time were committed in the name and under the flag of reforms...Reforms under the Reza Khan and American criteria and Western culture are not reforms (Eslahat) but corruption (Efsadat) (Ayatollah Khamenei, 2006).

He said reforms should be regulated and based on “Islamic and Iranian values, criteria and boundaries”. Ayatollah Khamenei later reiterated that those who are opposed to the principles and basics of the Islamic system in Iran should not be allowed to govern.

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<sup>1</sup> At the heart of these principles was the concept of Velayat-e Faqih and the relationship between politics and religion.

<sup>2</sup> Reformists categorically reject these accusations.

They accuse us of trying to “unify” the system. No, this is not true...Two wings for the country are like the two wings of a bird; the country can fly [and flourish] with two wings. Two opposing wings can exist in the system...provided that they abide by the Constitution...Nowhere else in the world are those who do not believe in the Constitution and principles allowed to be involved in different sectors of governance...Of course it is clear that we will not allow, either. Those who do not accept the Constitution and the fundamental of the Islamic Republic, should they be allowed at the top? Is this called Reformism? (excerpts from Ayatollah Khamenei speech, 2005).

Elsewhere in his remarks in the second day of the new Iranian year in 2004, Ayatollah Khamenei defined Reformism as any measure to “change negative points to positive”. He said the revolution in Iran was the “first long step” towards reformism. Ayatollah Khamenei in fact believes in a form of reformism which is of “Islamic” and “revolutionary” nature.

Main pro-Reform parties and groups are the Association of Combatant Clerics under the leadership of Mehdi Karrobi and Mohammad Khatami, the Construction Executives Party under the leadership of former Tehran mayor Gholamhossein Karbaschi, the Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organisation under the leadership of Mohammad Reza Khatami and Mohsen Mirdamadi, and the Islamic Iran Participation Front led by Behzad Nabavi. The Islamic Revolution Mojahedin Organisation and the Islamic Iran Participation Front were outlawed in 2010 because of what the government described as “legal offences” during and after the 2009 presidential elections.

At the beginning of 2012 and two months before parliamentary elections, a new pro-Reform wing was born. The Mardomsalari Wing, comprised of 14 groups led by Mostafa Kavakebian and Majid Mohtashami, published its charter on 01 January 2012. The charter said the new wing, whose founders are well-known Reformists, believes in “religious values and Islamic principles, the line of Imam [Ayatollah Khomeini] based on the Revolution’s foundations and the preservation of the heritage of Imam and the martyrs, national interests at the international level and the Constitution in particular the right of free expression and economic and political security and rights of nations”. Prominent groups belonging to the Mardomsalari Wing include the Mardomsalari Party, the Freedom Party,

the Iran National Unity Party, Islamic Mihan, Independent Iran Farzandan.

## **Part 4: Media landscape in Iran**

- i. Media and politics in Iran**
- ii. Iranian media before the revolution**
- iii. The revolution effect**
- iv. Post-revolution media**
- v. Iraq-Iran war coverage**
- vi. Post-war reconstruction coverage**
- vii. Reformist period and newspapers**
- viii. Post-reform landscape**

## **ix. Press freedom and supervision**

## **x. Coverage of the West**

### **Part 4: Media landscape in Iran**

#### **i. Media and politics in Iran**

A historical review of the past centuries indicates that the media played a great role in creating major political and social developments, such as the French Revolution, America's civil war and more recently Iran's constructional and Islamic revolutions. These are only some examples of the role-playing of media in creating big revolutions.

Various forms of media throughout the history have served different purposes in social, political, economic and cultural areas. Harold Lasswell has defined several functions for the media to be later developed by scholars such as Wilbur Schramm. The main functions of the media can be divided into four parts: the surveillance of the environment ("watcher" function), transmission of the social heritage ("teacher" function), the correlation of society's response ("forum" function) and the creation of entertainment

(“recreational” function).

Therefore, every media equipped with these functions could perform a crucial role in advancing major developments. Srebenry-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) argue that these functions coupled with other “dynamics” of the media use could mark a regime and ideology change and be used as either “strong weapons of opposition” or “tools in the hands of authoritarian states”. In their case study of the Iranian revolution, Srebenry-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) discuss that some media (radio and television) were used as state institutions to promote the modernisation programme of the Shah and Western culture while other media (cassettes and leaflets) were used to mobilise public opinion against the suppressor regime.

In a similar valuable study of the Iranian media, Kia (2001:53) has explained the “enduring strength” of the traditional channels of communication in Iran. In particular, Kia (2001) has studied the role of “menbar” (pulpit) or mosque and the clergy as spiritual and political leaders in the revolutionary mobilisation of Iranians during the past century.

The history of the print media in Iran is full of highs and lows as they were directly engaged in two big developments, namely the constitutional and Islamic revolutions, happened respectively in 1906 and 1979. A glance at the 175-year history of the Iranian press indicates that the pendulum of the press has swung back and forth in two opposite directions of “freedom” and “restriction”. Such a status has been described by many Iranian scholars of communication studies as the most important characteristic of the Iranian media system since its establishment (Beheshtipour, 1990; Forqani, 2008; Afkhami, 2009; Norouzi, 2009; Bahrampour, 2007; Hekmat, 2009). In fact, a 30-year assessment of the Iranian media proves that the impacts of the revolution are still prevalent on the media. In other words, like the Iranian politics, the Iranian media are part of a pendulum with “freedom” and “restriction” as its two extremes which are affected by revolutionary principles and values. On some occasions (for example Iraq-imposed war), the media were close to the “restriction” axis of the pendulum while on other occasions (as in during the reform period) they enjoyed a great degree of freedom. The study of the significant periods after the revolution indicates that Iran has episodically enjoyed a lively press, most of them asking for the rule of law, but were confronted with suppression.

For the ease of analysis, the researcher divides the history of media developments in Iran into six significant periods: pre-revolution, post-revolution (1979-1980), Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), post-war reconstruction and economic liberalisation (1989-1996), reform

movement (1997-2005) and the post-reform (2005-2009) periods. Each of these periods are characterised by a dominant feature affecting the Iranian media.

Before getting into the subject, it is worth mentioning that a glance at the development of media in the three decades after the Iranian revolution indicates that the media movement has never been independent from the political atmosphere of the country. As explained earlier, each significant period after the revolution had its own specifications, requiring the media to adapt themselves with the conditions of the time. For example, during the war period and early years after the revolution when a shaky cabinet was in charge, the media had to move in line with preserving the national interests. During the reconstruction era, the media were encouraged to fulfill their developmental functions while during the reform period they were given the mission of forging political and cultural reforms proposed by the government. In the post-reform period the media became restricted again to preserving national security and interests. Therefore, as indicated above, the media have been a function of political movements in Iran after the revolution.

## **ii. Iranian media before the revolution**

The first Iranian magazine was published in Tehran in 1837 but only continued to exist for three years. “Kaghaz-e Akhbar” (“Paper of News”) monthly was shut down in a state of turmoil which led the Shah to think the paper was helping freedom-fighters to topple his monarchy. No other newspaper was published inside Iran under the stringent regulations of the authoritarian system of governance during the first decade of the nineteenth century. Due to the strangulation of cultural practices and unpleasant political situation, the Iranian press did not take the opportunity to develop. There was no space for the freedom of expression and information. There were only a few “newspapers in exile” published from abroad as opposition (Kia, 2001). This era of “press suppression” continued until Iran’s Constitutional Revolution in 1906 which created an atmosphere of freedom for the press (Forqani, 2008; Kia, 2001).

Until the early years of the 1970s, many newspapers found their way on news stands. According to figures published by the Revolution Council in 1979, there were 120 newspapers across the country (Norouzi, 2009). Most of these newspapers were daily “yellow press” which, under state-imposed restrictions, were forced to publish soft news in particular entertainment and keep their distance from deep political and social news and analysis. There were also several “regulatory guidelines” circulated by the State

Intelligence and Security Organisation (SAVAK) among the press, while the radio and television were under the full control of the Shah regime. One of SAVAK censorship regulations instructed the press to avoid using specific words, names and phrases. The same rules applied for radio and television. Many journalists were banned from writing in 1976 by SAVAK (Forqani, 2008).

State-run television and radio, the country's only news agency, cinemas and newspapers were all under the tight control of the government in the years before the revolution. Vreeland et al (1957) observed that each paper presented the views of its backer and that all were "vulnerable to suppression" and control which were given the "colour of legality" by the interpretation of the Constitution and the Press Law.

There is no direct newspaper censorship at present, but all newspaper publishers must obtain licenses from the High Education Council, which is a board composed of educators as well as government officials (Vreeland et al, 1957:116).

Many newspapers later turned to revolutionary media; however, the National Radio and Television Organisation, Pars News Agency and the cinemas were under the direct supervision of the Shah regime until the very days of its overthrow. Revolutionaries had little access to radio, television, news agency and mainstream newspapers. However, they did have access to "traditional methods of communication" which included audio cassettes, leaflets and most importantly religious channels of communication such as mosques and Islamic altars.

Toffler (1980) believes that traditional methods of communication among people from different walks of life in the late 1970s in Iran were inspired by the statements and comments of the late founder of Islamic Revolution Ayatollah or Imam Khomeini. Toffler (1980) describes Imam Khomeini as an influential figure who combined the "first wave" media in the form of verbal and face-to-face sermons by the clergy with the "third wave" technology of cassettes and photocopying machines to mark the Islamic revolution of Iran with reliance to traditional media.

Rogers (1986) reports that the Shah regime, in spite of controlling mainstream electronic and print media, could not resist against the strongly-manned traditional network of communication of the revolutionaries. Srebenry-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) later highlighted the importance of such "small media" in creating a "big revolution":

The mobilisation was coordinated by the religious leaders using

traditional networks of social communication which were enhanced and extended by an innovative use of various contemporary “small media,” including photocopied leaflets and audiocassette tapes (Srebenry-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, 1994: 11).

Such a role has been also underlined by Kia (2001). According to him, Iranian media in different forms such as cassette tapes and leaflets acted as important political tools in the hands of religious leaders during the revolution.

### **iii. The revolution effect**

Under circumstances where the Shah, government and their foreign supporters underestimated the power of traditional channels of communication, revolutionaries continued to develop their network of sermons, leaflets and messages of Ayatollah Khomeini and other religious scholars which gradually opened their way to newspapers. As people approached the revolution, newspapers allocated some space to publishing some of the leaflets. After the bloody day of 4 November 1978, which was later labeled the “Students’ Day”, newspapers ran out of the control of civilian surveillance bodies of the Shah who then ordered “military” figures to exert strict control on the media. Such a decision was seen as a tool to restrict the freedom of the press. Newspapers, now at the service of the revolution, went in protest of the Shah’s decision and prior-to-publication censorships by army generals into a second-time two-month strike which was called off by Ayatollah Khomeini’s decree. In it, the founder of the revolution urged journalists to end their strike and continue reporting news which in the absence of the newspapers was in the monopoly of the National Radio and Television Organisation.

In his review of the role of traditional communication in conducting the Iranian revolution of 1979, Forqani (2008) points out the significance of traditional networks of communication and particularly mosques in motivating and mobilising the public opinion against corruption, repression and dictatorship of the Shah regime:

The Iranian revolution could not have happened in the absence of the covert and overt operations of such a communication network...which spread messages, protests, oppositions and revelations immediately throughout the country to raise public outcry against the Shah regime (Forqani, 2008:121).

The 1979 revolution greatly strengthened the link between the people and the press.

Hossein Elhami, a veteran Iranian journalist who was an editorial staff of “Ettelaat” newspaper at the threshold of the revolution, said the people and the press were interconnected at the time of revolution; people were more incited to throng the streets when newspapers published more revolutionary materials (Abbasi, 2009):

We reached a point where the circulation of Ettelaat exceeded 1.4 million per day. The technical staff warned that printing machines will go out of order should the current trend (of large circulation) continues. People were so excited that, on some special occasions, we had to publish our paper four times a day. People queued up for buying newspapers and were ready to buy them even in higher prices. In some cases, when there were no copies of the newspaper, people would borrow them (Elhami, 2009).

The radio and television were entirely dependent on the Shah regime and reflected the views of the Pahlavi government. People had the least level of confidence in radio and television news and preferred to follow the news of revolution through traditional media such as leaflets, night letters, audiotapes and newspaper news as well as foreign sources such as the BBC.

Compared with the radio and television, the press were under less restriction until the military cabinet of Azhari came into office. Two colonels were sent to “Kayhan” and “Ettelaat”, two major newspapers of the time, to impose prior-to-publication censorship which later led to the second strike of the press corps. Coordination among newspapers in the final weeks of the Shah regime was so great that “Kayhan” and “Ettelaat” were turned into a countdown of revolution, while other journalists focused their attention on reflecting revolution events. Forqani (2008) describes the days of revolution as “the press explosion era” in which hundreds of magazines with different political inclinations were published on the eve of the revolution without taking any license from the government. The mushroom development of the press continued to the early years after the revolution.

#### **iv. Post-revolution media**

The early years after the revolution were the “spring of the press” as they experienced a very high level of freedom. Many journalists who were repressed by security apparatus of the Shah regime now were given the opportunity by the revolution to openly express their ideas and mark the beginning of the “spring of freedom”, without any

restriction by the government.

The first newspaper which was published after the revolution was “Jomhouriy-e Eslami”. Several other weekly and daily newspapers were also published in the aftermath of the revolution where there were no restrictions for newspapers. Nearly a year after the revolution, 200 new newspapers and magazines opened their way to newsstands across the country, with party newspapers having the highest frequency followed by independent newspapers (Afkhami, 2009). Such a progressive trend continued until 1981 when the then-prosecutor ordered a temporary ban on several newspapers, mainly run by parties, on charges of publishing “provocative materials against Islamic tenets and public rights of the new and revolutionary society of Iran”<sup>1</sup> (Rajaei, 2009). Since then a 10-article document was drawn by the prosecutor to control the press which was later ratified by the Revolution Council. According to this document, which formed the basis of the first press law of the Islamic Iran, everybody who abided by its terms and conditions was permitted to open a newspaper legally. Several newspapers were then shut down due to failure to obtain a permit by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. However, a remarkable number of newspapers were being published until the Iraq-imposed war started in the summer of 1980.

#### **v. Iraq-Iran war coverage**

The most evident feature of every war is destruction and destitution. The Iranian media were no exception to that rule. The start of the war was a shock to the newly-formed Islamic republic and its media which experienced only a short period of freedom.

As the war continued, several newspapers affiliated with some leftist political organisations were closed down due to national security reasons. Six newspapers were banned due to affiliation with specific political organisations whose allegation was spreading anti-revolution values. In 1982, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance issued a statement urging media managers to re-submit their application for the permit of publication. Publishing houses were ordered not to publish those newspapers which lacked this permit. A Press Arbitration Council was set up in the same year to resolve differences of opinion between media managers and revolutionary government departments which were busy with the war.

The number of newspapers which had exceeded 200 during the “spring of the press” period in 1979-80 reduced to 62 in the chaotic troubled times after the revolution. In Tehran, according to the Media Studies and Development Office, only four newspapers

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<sup>1</sup> A similar incident also happened 19 years later when 12 newspapers were closed down overnight.

(Kayhan, Ettelaat, Jomhouriy-e Eslami and Sobh-e Azadegan) were published and in low circulations. The circulation of “Kayhan” and “Ettelaat”, which reached more than one million during the heat of the revolution, declined sharply by one fifth. Such a slump in the press section was mainly attributed to competitions during the war among political groups, and their violent confrontations with the ruling establishment including the assassination of political and religious leaders in the summer of 1981.

## **vi. Post-war reconstruction coverage**

After the end of the war in 1988, a new era began in the Islamic Republic. In the “reconstruction” period under the then-president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1996), a better politico-cultural atmosphere was created for the Iranian media to develop. As suggested by Mohammadi (2003), the arena for open political discussion and cultural relaxation gradually opened up under the initiatives of Rafsanjani during the second decade of the post-revolution Iran. During the first term of Rafsanjani in office, a selected group of voices outside the immediate ruling establishment was given permission to voice their views in the Iranian press. According to Momayesi (2002), the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance approved some 80 licenses for “non-conformist” personalities and political groupings.

New instructions and guidelines were circulated among the press by the newly-formed Department of Press and Promotion of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in 1989. The guidelines aimed at reviving the press movement and helping them fulfill their duties in line with communication development policies of the government. State restrictions were eased and the press were even provided with financial assistance and subsidised paper and printing facilities.

The content of the press during this period were focused on the “reconstruction” and “economic liberalisation” efforts of Rafsanjani’s government. According to the Media Studies and Development Office, the number of periodical magazines increased significantly to 550 during 1992-94, from 100 during 1980-88 (war period).

In a joint research project with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 1998, Professor Kazem Motamednejad, the father of Iran’s communication science, studied the development of the press after the war. According to this study titled “The Development of Independent and Pluralistic Press in Iran”, the total press circulation during the post-war period did not exceed 1.5 million per

day, while the global standard index defined by the UNESCO was six million copies per day.

Motamednejad (1998) believes the post-war period (1989-1996) introduced an appropriate political and cultural environment for the development of press in Iran while creating new hopes for their independence, freedom and pluralism. The establishment of the Department of Press and Promotion, according to Motamednejad, was a positive move which led to the relaxation of former restrictions and strict regulations and the formation of the Media Studies and Research Centre<sup>1</sup> which focused its attention on assessing the press and training journalists. The first specialised journal, the “Media”, was also set up in 1990, when Seyyed Mohammad Khatami was in charge of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance.

The suitable political and cultural conditions created in the post-war period (1989-1996) were a good opportunity for the print media to develop. The number of the periodical press was remarkably increased to 550 during 1992-94. Several important daily newspapers such as “Resalat”, “Salam”, “Hamshahri” (Iran's first full-colour newspaper), and state-owned “Iran” were also launched in this period.

## **vii. Reformist period and newspapers**

The “reform period” after the 1979 revolution began in 1997 when Seyyed Mohammad Khatami was elected as the new Iranian president in a landslide victory on the “Second of Khordad” (second day of the third Iranian calendar month). Having passed the “reconstruction” period with economic development as its top priority, preceded by the chaotic years after the revolution and Saddam-imposed war, the Iranian society voted in a historical election for Khatami to become the “architect” of the “reforms movement” in the political and cultural sectors. Khatami was the minister of culture during Rafsanjani. This boosted considerable hope among the press to enjoy more freedom and privileges. Parfitt and Egorova (2003) point out that the presidential elections of May 1997 provided the groundwork for the new administration to support the campaign of the Iranian press for freedom of expression.

As reiterated by Bahrapour (2005), the press experienced an “explosive growth” in quantity and quality during the reform period under Khatami (1997-2004). Forqani (2008) believes that the period between 1997 and 2001 marked a new era for the press in terms of diversity and variety, although many newspapers were closed down and replaced by other

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<sup>1</sup> The centre later changed its name to the Media Studies and Development Office.

publications after 2001. Motamednejad and Badii (2002) describe the situation that more than 10 years after the end of the Iraq-Iran war, there was a “turning point” with respect to the improvement of the press freedom while prospects for a free, independent, and pluralistic press were brighter than ever.

According to the figures published by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in 1998, the number of published newspapers and magazines exceeded 850 (five times greater than the number of the press in the pre-revolution era), while the total circulation of daily newspapers reached a record number of two million for the first time after the “spring of freedom” and the early years after the revolution. Notwithstanding, several changes were made in the Press Law in 2000 by the Iranian parliament. Afkhami (2009) describes this period as a “turning point” in the history of the Iranian press. According to him, the most significant specification of this period was the emphasis of the Khatami administration on the “freedom of speech” as a tool for political development. During this period, many newspapers emerged; the first journalism courses were developed and a mob of enthusiasts and amateur journalists registered for academic learning of journalism. The first college specifically devoted to teaching journalism after the 1979 revolution was set up by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) in 1997. The School of Media Studies trained journalists in English and Persian in six different specialties, while Allameh Tabatabaei University had already launched similar “social communication” courses in 1989. The first Press Jury was also set up during the reform period. The impacts of the reform movement of Khatami were so great that Motamednejad (1998) describes the public space provided for the development of press as “unprecedented”:

The press freedom has developed... We presently have 32 newspapers in Tehran and 12 in other provinces. According to my brief historical studies, I suppose we never had such a number of newspapers in Iran... This is a unique opportunity for us to develop the press in different areas (Motamednejad, 1998: 11).

Mohammadi (2003) looks at the reform period as a “very different” era driven by the technological changes in the modes of message delivery, specifically satellite and cable systems, and by global media deregulation. He however believes that the rapidly changing media environment of the 1990s aimed at changing “non-Western cultures more radically than ever before” (Mohammadi, 2003:24).

### **viii. Post-reform landscape**

The Islamic revolution of Iran had great social and cultural impacts on the population. The literacy rate increased from 5.47 per cent in 1976 to 86 per cent in 2008. The number of Iranians with higher education studies has increased by 35 times 30 years after the revolution, with the figure increasing from around 150,000 in 1976 to more than 5.2 million in 2008. In the telecommunications sector, the number of landline phones skyrocketed from 1.17 in 1978 to 29 million in 2008 while 41 million mobile phone lines were registered in Iran by the end of 2008 (Government Information Dissemination Council, 2008). According to the country's long-term macro policymaking document known as the Vision 2025, Iran should emerge as the top economic and scientific power in Southwest Asia by 2025. This means science and technology in different sectors including the communication and information technology (ICT) have remarkably progressed in the past three decades, laying the ground for the better development of media and increasing public demand for quality press products, accordingly.

The Iranian media in the last three decades have experienced many positive and negative occasions. In different periods after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the media were witness to both qualitative and quantitative growth, pluralism, popularity and different degrees of freedom and restriction. The high number of print media in Iran is well-suggestive of the rapid and extensive development of the media. In 2010, the Press Supervisory Board announced it was processing more than 3,000 applications. According to the latest national census conducted by the Ministry of Culture's Media Studies and Development Office in 2007, there are 2,877 newspapers, magazines and news agencies across Iran, of which 70 are Iranian-based foreign media (Table 1). According to tables 2 and 3, there are 94 daily newspapers and 392 weekly newspapers across the country. Of the total number of the press in Iran, 616 are published at the local, 1,072 national and 225 international levels. While the Iranian radio and television are state-run, the majority of the Iranian press which are published in five different languages<sup>1</sup> are owned by the non-government sector.

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<sup>1</sup> The languages include Persian, English, Arabic, Kurdish and Turkish (arranged in the order of having the highest frequency).

Table 2 Number of Iranian press and news agencies in 2007<sup>1</sup>

Type of media	Print Media (newspapers & magazines)	News agencies			Total	
		Main headquarters	Provincial bureaus	Foreign media bureaus		
<b>Total</b>						
	2,877	2,500	10	297	70	377

Table 3 Number of Iranian press based on their publication period

Type of print media	Daily newspapers	Weekly newspapers	Monthly magazines	Quarterlies	Others	
<b>Total</b>						
	1,913	94	392	521	528	378

Table 4 Number of Iranian press based on their distribution range

Distribution range	National	Local	International	
<b>Total</b>				
	1,913	1,072	616	225

Tables 4, 5 and 6 indicate that of the total 30,960 people employed in the print media and news agencies, about 23,000 are male, while female employees account for more than 26 per cent. Also, less than 50 per cent of the employees in Iran's print media and news agencies have passed higher education courses at universities.

Table 5 Number of employees in the Iranian press and news agencies

Occupation	Press people	News agencies & news bureaus people	Press vendors and distributors	Newsstands	
<b>Total</b>					
	30,960	18,446	2,719	3,166	6,629

Table 6 Number of employees in the Iranian press and news agencies based on gender

Gender	Male	Female	No answer	
<b>Total</b>				
	30,960	22,769	8,191	1

Table 7 Number of employees in the Iranian press and news agencies based on level of education

Educational level	PhD	Master's	Bachelor's	Associate degree	High school graduate	Theological school graduates	Others	
<b>Total</b>								
	30,960	1,416	1,970	7,865	2,195	10,800	341	6,373

According to Table 7, around three fourth (75 per cent) of the Iranian media people are full time employees. Table 8 suggests that more than 90 percent of those engaged and employed in Iran's print media and news agency industries have less than 30 years of experience; this means that more than 90 per cent of the Iranian journalists are young and have gained their experience after the 1979 revolution.

<sup>1</sup> Figures of all the tables were obtained from the comprehensive census of Iranian press and news agencies conducted by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in 2007. This research has not yet been updated (at the time of the publication of this thesis).

Table 8 Number of employees in the Iranian press and news agencies based on type of contract

<b>Total</b>	<b>Type of contract</b>	<b>Full time</b>	<b>Part time</b>
	30,960	22,207	8,753

Table 9 Number of employees in the Iranian press and news agencies based on job experience

<b>Job experience</b>	<b>1-9 years</b>	<b>10-19 years</b>	<b>20-29 years</b>	<b>More than 30 years</b>	<b>No answer</b>	
<b>Total</b>	30,960	18,489	6,833	2,772	530	2,336

The above figures indicate that there is great potential for the development of media in Iran as most media people including journalists are young with high ambitions. The blogosphere has also provided a unique platform for journalists to publish their personal and public views. According to Deutsch Karlekar (2007), the internet at the forefront of new communication technologies has played a great role in providing independent news to Iranians. Thirty years after the revolution, the third generation of Iranian youth is taking the most out of the electronic media via internet and satellite, although these services are occasionally suspended by the government.

The potential created by the Iranian blogosphere is “an index of an emerging public sphere” and the “space where both religious and secular voices are articulated” (Sreberny, 2008:16). There are estimated to be at least 75,000 active blogs in Persian which is one of the most common languages on the internet, after English and Chinese (Deutsch Karlekar, 2007). “Blogfa”, one of the most popular hosts of Persian weblogs, estimates two million blogs have been registered in the blogosphere in Iran since 2001—the time the first Persian blog went online.

Moreover, Iran stands top in the Middle East in terms of having the highest number of internet users. According to the Internet World Stats, an international website featuring up to date world internet usage<sup>1</sup>, there are presently more than 36.5 million internet users in Iran, indicating a 600-per cent growth in a decade (Table 9). In fact, almost half of the population of Iran is using the internet. Such a great number of users with the penetration rate of 46.9 per cent is significant when compared to other Middle Eastern countries.

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.internetworldstats.com>

## Middle East Internet Users, Population and Facebook Statistics

MIDDLE EAST	Population ( 2011 Est. )	Users, in Dec/2000	Internet Usage 31-Dec-2011	% Population (Penetration)	Users % Region	Facebook 31-Mar-2012
<b>Bahrain</b>	1,214,705	40,000	<b>694,009</b>	57.1 %	0.9 %	346,220
<b>Iran</b>	77,891,220	250,000	<b>36,500,000</b>	46.9 %	47.4 %	n/a
<b>Iraq</b>	30,399,572	12,500	<b>1,303,760</b>	4.3 %	1.7 %	1,550,840
<b>Israel<sup>1</sup></b>	7,473,052	1,270,000	<b>5,263,146</b>	70.4 %	6.8 %	3,469,020
<b>Jordan</b>	6,508,271	127,300	<b>1,987,400</b>	30.5 %	2.6 %	2,226,220
<b>Kuwait</b>	2,595,628	150,000	<b>1,100,000</b>	42.4 %	1.4 %	898,560
<b>Lebanon</b>	4,143,101	300,000	<b>1,367,220</b>	33.0 %	1.8 %	1,444,200
<b>Oman</b>	3,027,959	90,000	<b>1,741,804</b>	57.5 %	2.3 %	422,180
<b>Palestine (West Bk.)</b>	2,568,555	35,000	<b>1,512,273</b>	58.9 %	2.0 %	914,660
<b>Qatar</b>	848,016	30,000	<b>563,800</b>	66.5 %	0.8 %	481,400
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	26,131,703	200,000	<b>11,400,000</b>	43.6 %	14.8 %	5,148,240
<b>Syria</b>	22,517,750	30,000	<b>4,469,000</b>	19.8 %	5.8 %	n/a
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	5,148,664	735,000	<b>3,555,100</b>	69.0 %	4.9 %	2,909,860
<b>Yemen</b>	24,133,492	15,000	<b>2,609,698</b>	10.8 %	3.4 %	436,500
<b>Gaza Strip</b>	1,657,155	n/a	<b>n/a</b>	n/a	n/a	n/a
<b>TOTAL Middle East</b>	216,258,843	3,284,800	<b>77,020,995</b>	35.6 %	100.0 %	20,247,900
Copyright © 2012, Miniwatts Marketing Group.			Source: <a href="http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm">http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats5.htm</a>			

<sup>1</sup> Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)

In the radio and television sector which attracts more than 80 per cent of the audience for news (Deutsch Karlekar), the IRIB's World Services have developed remarkably with services broadcast in more than 20 languages. The state-run organisation launched the first 24/7 English-Language news channel "Press TV" in 2007, taking the lead in "exporting" the views and values of the Islamic Republic beyond the Iranian borders. A similar Spanish-speaking news channel, called "Hispan TV", was launched in 2012 for the Spanish-speaking population of the world.

Almost all Iranian media scholars agree that the number of newspapers and magazines has drastically increased since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. However, Motamednejad and Badii (2000) believe that there remain obstacles on the way of independent and free activities of the press in Iran, particularly in the post-reform period. They classify these obstacles into four categories which include the need to obtain permission from the government for the establishment of a newspaper; the absence of a desirable ground for the press to defend the public against the government; self-censorship and unbalanced distribution of government subsidies among the press.

There are some other challenges as well. From the financial point of view, most Iranian newspapers are in short of funding and rely only on the commercials. Apart from some newspapers which attract government-funded advertisements, the majority of the Iranian press are in desperate need of financial assistance. The high price of paper as the result of the global sanctions against Iran is a more recent challenge for the press. Two newspapers voluntarily stopped publication in October 2012 for financial reasons.

Technical difficulties such as poor internet connection and dilapidated printing machines have posed a serious challenge for the press as they do not have individual internet service providing facilities and rely on private ISPs which filter many news websites on the basis that they spread anti-Islamic and anti-revolution ideas aiming to topple the government. This situation is rather different in the IRIB which attracts a great share of government budget while reaping a huge amount of income by selling the air time to private companies to broadcast TV and radio commercials. The IRIB studios are well-equipped with the state-of-the-art broadcast technologies such as SNG vans, live broadcast facilities, broadband internet connection and advanced telecommunication satellite equipment.

The most serious challenge for the Iranian media in the post-reform era is perhaps the shortage of skilful and educated staff and journalists. The crux of the problem lies with the

English-language media whose managers are not familiar with the English language and lack the required knowledge of news writing and reporting in English, which is very different from Persian linguistically. In many other sections of the media, the personnel and even the managers do not hold a journalism-related university degree, posing a serious managerial challenge to the development of media, qualitatively and quantitatively.

### **ix. Press freedom and supervision**

The first Iranian Press Law was ratified 65 years after the first Iranian newspaper was published. In 1905 and one year before the Constitutional Revolution, representatives of the parliament ratified the first and most comprehensive Press Law—a duplicate of the France’s Press Freedom Charter. According to this law, everybody could publish a newspaper without obtaining any special permit or license. However, this law was later revised in 1952 during Mohammad Mosaddeq who instructed the press managers to obtain a license before publishing their newspapers. The next amendment took place in 1955 with no major change.

After the revolution, a new Press Law was passed in 1979 and the last version was drafted in 1985 based on which the Press Supervision Board was erected. The fifth and the last amendment to the Iranian Press Law was introduced in 2000 when parliamentarians imposed more restrictions on the press. Then a new parliament was sworn in and tried to revise the Press Law but was confronted with a “governmental decree”. The struggle for amending the Press Law continued to the last days of the reformist parliament which finally managed to pass a separate law concerning the composition of the Press Jury.

The freedom of press in Iran is a complicated phenomenon. There are four periods in the contemporary history of Iran in which the press enjoyed freedom. Norouzi (2009) divides these periods into the Constitutional Revolution (1906), the second period (1940s), the Islamic Revolution (1979) and the fourth period (since 1990s).

According to Norouzi, Iranian press enjoyed a high degree of freedom during the first three periods mainly due to the collapse of the security and control mechanisms of the government. In other words, the anarchic situation in the aftermath of major developments in the contemporary history of Iran provided the opportunity for the press to exercise a high degree of freedom. However, the fourth period beginning from 1991 is significant in the sense that the level of freedom provided for the press was not created in the absence of security and control systems. During the fourth period, there existed press supervisory

mechanisms; however, significant changes in the political, social and power structures of the government gradually paved the way for the press to enjoy a high level of freedom. Norouzi (2009) believes the Iranian press in the past 175 years have been enjoying six different freedom right indexes: the right of publication, the right of the continuity of publication, the right of gathering news, the right of releasing news, the right of job security and the right of legal hearing. According to Article 168 of the Constitution, an open Public Court session should be held in the presence of the Press Jury if a complaint is filed against a newspaper.

If we consider these six rights as our benchmark, we reach to this conclusion that we are witness to a declining trend in the press freedom which means the development of the press freedom and rights curve is in decline. However in sum the status quo is still a high peak when compared to various periods in the history of the Iranian press (Norouzi, 2009).

The most recent case of closing down of a newspaper in Iran is when the famous Sharq newspaper published a cartoon interpreted by critics as a humiliation of the Sacred Defense and Iranian soldiers. The Press Supervisory Board ordered the Sharq newspaper to shut down in October 2012. Less than a week, the Board closed down “Kayhan Caricature” (an affiliate of the famous Kayhan newspaper) for publishing a cartoon depicting Joseph the Prophet. Such closing of the press is perceived by some as examples of the state clampdown on the press.

## **x. Coverage of the West**

There is rarely a case in which the print media have not played a crucial role since 1837, when the first newspaper was published in Iran. Iranian press have been always involved in major developments throughout their existence: the 1905 Constitutional Revolution, the 1953 coup and the 1979 Islamic Revolution, to name a few.

The first instance of the role of Iranian media in politics might date back to the 1910s when the Iranian press were used for political purposes by the British and Iranian officials to persuade the public opinion that the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919 was in the interests of Iran.

According to Katouzian (1998: 9), a translated version of a letter by Sir Percy Cox (the interim British envoy to Tehran responsible for negotiating the Anglo-Iranian

Agreement of 1919) to Vosouq (the then-head of the Iranian government) was published in the Iranian press to restore public confidence in the agreement. Cox wrote in his letter that:

[The] essential objects of this agreement ... are: the complete internal and external independence of the Persian State, the preparation of means of strengthening the power of the Persian Government to enable them to maintain internal order and guard against frontier dangers; and finally to devise means for the development and progress the country. In no way has it been the aim of the British Government by this agreement to limit the independence and authority of Persia, on the contrary, it is their desire that this ancient kingdom that has so long been in jeopardy and discord should be made capable of preserving its independence, and (having regard to the important geographical position of Persia) that the mutual interests of the two States should be better respected and safeguarded (as cited in Katouzian, 1998: 8-9).

This letter was translated in Persian and published in the country's newspapers to persuade the public that the 1919 Agreement is not aimed at turning Iran into a British protectorate. But according to Katouzian (1998: 9), "it did not work" in favour of the English.

The Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919 attracted opposition expressed in the form of pamphlets in Iran<sup>1</sup>. For example, a long pamphlet entitled *Ebtal al-Batel* (Annulling the Invalid) by Abdollah Mostofi—a high-ranking Ministry of Finance official—addressed Vosouq:

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<sup>1</sup> The agreement could not even escape criticism from Iranian poets whose poems were published mainly in the newspapers. One such poems (by Aref) maintained that (as cited in Katouzian, 1998:10):

God condemn to everlasting shame  
He who betrayed the land of Sassan  
Tell the zealous Artaxerxes The Long-armed  
The enemy annexed your kingdom to England

Another (by Eshqi) read:

It is the story of cat and mouse, our pact with Britain,  
Once it catches the mouse, how would the cat let it go?  
Even if we be lion, she is the fox of our time,  
The fox famously deceives the lion

Or this one (by Farrokhi Yazdi):

Nosrat al-Dawleh is busy in Europe Annihilating the motherland-look and see ...  
Like a dealer for the sale of the motherland  
Constantly finding customers-look and see ...  
To deliver the motherland to Britain  
He is even keener than her-look and see

You may have imagined that Iran has other things too, which you have not given as a gift to the British...Do not worry. The present level of service which you have rendered to the British has made them the owners of everything in Iran, and you can rest assured that-as a satirical magazine in Paris has put it-you have sold this country to the British for fifty centimes (as cited in Katouzian, 1998:9).

Elsewhere in the pamphlet, Mostofi accused Vosouq of taking the “British money” to spend on “propagandists and producers of false public opinion”.

In his analysis of political cartoons in two newspapers in the 1940s, Amin (2001:335) explains how the Iranian press engaged themselves in politics and tried to influence the decision-making of the state<sup>1</sup>.

These traces suggest that, despite the highly-politicised environment of Iran in the 1940s, the most dramatic forces of change in this period were not, strictly speaking, political but economic and social: the meaning and value of the press had changed (Amin, 2001:354).

Amin’s study focused on *Mard-e Emrouz* (Today’s Man) and *Atash* (The Fire)--two weeklies published in the 1940s the decade when the Iranian government was keen on employing foreign (and particularly American and British) consultants<sup>2</sup>.

In his study, Amin (2001) analysed Iranian press reaction to two major events: the failed American Financial Mission under Arthur Chester Millspaugh and the Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946. The Iranian press in fact took the opportunity to criticise the Allied occupation of Iran and the presence of Western consultants in the country as both events were somehow related to the West. According to Amin (2001:347), L. P. Elwell-Sutton, an employee of the British Embassy in the 1940s observed that the Iranian press were “strongly nationalist and hostile to Allies and Axis alike”. Elwell-Sutton’s view was supported in 1945 by American press attaché T. Culyer Young who invited Iranian journalists to the US to “improve America’s tarnished image in the wake of the failed

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<sup>1</sup> Amin (2001:344) concluded in his study that the “sensational and sexually explicit nature of political expression of the 1940s had its roots in Iranian press culture in the 1920s and 1930s”. Amin (2001:345) also argues that since the 1890s, the Iranian newspaper industry has never been a “business”. Neither has it produced profits for their owners as a means of livelihood. Notwithstanding, they have tried to influence the decision-making process of the state.

<sup>2</sup> According to Amin (2001:348), there were approximately 40 Persian-language periodicals from 1890 to 1900 while approximately 330 periodicals were produced between 1906 and 1911 and 582 were produced from 1941 to 1948.

<sup>3</sup> Arthur Chester Millspaugh was an American financial expert who headed up two Financial Missions to Iran: the first from 1922 to 1927 and the second from January 1943 to January 1945. Both times, the American Financial Missions were terminated early--the first time due to the ambitions of Reza Shah Pahlavi and the second time due to the opposition of Parliament and the press (Amin, 2001:336).

Millspaugh mission” (Amin, 2001: 347).

The two weekly newspapers, according to Amin (2001:335), “raised questions about Iran’s sovereignty over its territory, its finances, and its minorities” and finally made it impossible for the pro-America officials of Iran to prevent the antagonisation of the public against America (Financial Mission). The press in other words highlighted Iranian historical pessimism towards Westerners: That Westerners want to exploit rather than benefit us.

In one cartoon which was published in “Today’s Man” in 1944, Millspaugh is depicted as a “towering Reza Shah-like figure, terrorising tiny, top-hatted politicians” (Figure 1). The cartoon is accompanied with two articles one describing Millspaugh as a “foreign dictator” and the other against the presence of “American consultants” in Iran<sup>1</sup>.

Amin (2001) opines:

Though intended as a critique of Millspaugh, the cartoon was also a critique of Reza Shah, not merely for being a dictator but for relying on foreign support despite his nationalist pretensions. It was during this time that the accusations of British support for Reza Shah’s 1921 coup and 1925 accession to the throne were in wide circulation, fueled by the publication of Husayn Makki’s chronicle of Reza Shah’s “Twenty Years” (Amin, 2001:337-338).


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<sup>1</sup> Moreover, Amin (2001:351) observes that articles published in the “Today’s Man” tended to “mock Euro-American fashions”.



Figure 1 Front page of “Today’s Man” Weekly newspaper (7 April 1944), depicting Milispaugh in the form of a Reza Shah as a towering male tyrant (Source: Amin, 2001:337).

In another cartoon in “The Fire” in 1944, Milispaugh is portrayed as a “drunken womaniser wasting the Iranian public’s money” (Figure 2).



**Figure 2 A cartoon from “The Fire” weekly newspaper, 22 April, 1944, criticising the presence of Milispaugh as an American consultant in Iran. The cartoonist believes that Milispaugh is exploiting Iran’s resources by spending his time with women instead of dealing with Iran’s problems.**

These cartoons might have had little impact on Reza Shah’s decision to welcome foreigners into the country warmly. However, the assassination of the editor of “Today’s Man” weekly newspaper, Mohammad Masoud, following the publication of the anti-American cartoon might be suggestive of the influence of the press in the politics. Moreover, the rapid development of cultural and political activities including the 500-percent increase in the number of press in the post-Reza Shah period (1941-1953) is a proof that newspapers were being suppressed during Reza Shah’s reign due to their influence.

Mirsepassi-Ashtiani (1994) observes that the 1940s and early 1950s, the years of people’s suppression, were a “rare historical” opportunity for the Iranian press to flourish.

Soon after the fall of Reza Shah (1940), workers’ unions were formed, new political parties were organized, and

Parliament...became involved in influencing the state of affairs of the country...Print media were revitalised. The number of presses in publication increased to 582 (only ninety-eight had published before). By comparison, during Reza Shah's period, only forty-one newspapers and magazines were published (Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, 1994:52).

The press had a decisive role to play in three significant turning points during the 1950s and 1970s<sup>1</sup>. The first event was in 1948 when the US government launched a propaganda operation codenamed BEDAMN with an annual budget of one million dollars to counter the Soviet Union and Tudeh Party influence<sup>2</sup>. Under the propaganda arm of BEDAMN, anti-communist articles and cartoons were planted in Iranian newspapers; books and leaflets critical of the Soviet and the Tudeh were written and distributed and rumors were spread against the USSR.

The second event in which the Iranian press played a role was during the 1953 coup in which newspapers were influenced by domestic and foreign elements affiliated with the CIA to promulgate fabricated materials aimed at weakening the government. This tool-like use of the press was orchestrated by Americans who revived BEDAMN to publish materials against Mosaddeq. Gasiorowski (1987) describes the role of the press as pivotal.

...the anti-Mosaddeq actions undertaken by the United States through BEDAMN in the year before the coup had played a key role in preparing the groundwork for it by undermining Mosaddeq's base of support (Gasiorowski, 1987: 277).

The third important event in which the press played a role after Reza Shah was deposed was during the Iranian revolution in which newspapers were exploited by the Shah to attack opposition forces and especially Ayatollah Khomeini<sup>3</sup>. An editorial published in prestigious Ettelaat newspaper on 7 January 1978 accused Khomeini of being a foreign agent. The newspaper article raised the outcry of Khomeini supporters who staged demonstrations in response two days after the publication of the article, eventually leading

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1 For example, the role of the media was so significant during the 1953 coup, that a pro-Zahedi army detachment seized Iran's radio station and began to broadcast pro-Zahedi bulletins.

2 Gasiorowski (1987: 272) observes that as with the anti-Mosaddeq BEDAMN activities, it is impossible to gauge how effective these actions really were; but it seems safe to assume that they were significant.

3 It is remarkable to mention that the media during the last years of the 1970s were used by both the government and anti-government forces as a means of propaganda. In their case study of the Iranian revolution, Srebenry-Mohammadi and Mohammadi (1994) discuss that some media (radio and television) were used as state institutions to promote the modernisation program of the Shah and Western culture while other media (cassettes and leaflets) were used to mobilise public opinion against the suppressor regime.

to the overthrow of Shah about a year later (Beeman, 2005).

The role of the media in different significant periods during the contemporary history of Iran is not limited to the domestic press. In fact, the foreign media also played a part in developments leading to the 1953 coup. For example, the BBC Persian radio broadcast the exact wording required by the Shah in a mid-night news bulletin to make sure the coup was being supported by Britain. The other example includes CIA-sponsored reports published by *New York Times* days before the 1953 coup to publicise the Shah's dismissal of Mosaddeq and appointment of Zahedi (Gasiorowski, 1987: 273). Another example is the support by American and European (French, Swiss and Belgian) press and their opposition to the Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919. As observed by Katouzian (1998:16-19), the "European press campaigned against the agreement" and published materials which implied that Iran was being "sold out" to Britain. Such reports were also given coverage in the Iranian press:

The French press, on the other hand, felt no restraint in attacking the Agreement. *Le Figaro* was quoted in Tehran as having gone so far as to say that 'the half-a-centimeter tall Shah had sold his country for one centime'. To give only one important example, in a long article on 17 August, the influential Paris daily, *Temps*, wrote that the Agreement was prejudicial-'porte alliente'-to the independence of Iran (as cited in Katouzian, 1998: 17).

In the early years after the 1979 revolution when Iran was pre-occupied by the war with Iraq, the role of the press was limited to war reporting and exciting. The press were used as a strong machine to mobilise the Iranian people and encourage them to join the frontlines of the war of "Haq" (good) against "Batel" (evil).

In the period after the end of the war in 1988, the arena for open political discussion and cultural relaxation gradually opened up under the initiatives of former president Rafsanjani (1989-1996) who wanted to "reconstruct" the country after a devastative war (Mohammadi, 2003)<sup>1</sup>.

The most flourishing period for the Iranian press after the 1979 revolution might have been materialised in 1997 when Khatami was elected president and architect of the

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<sup>1</sup>The content of the press during this period were focused on the "reconstruction" and "economic liberalisation" efforts of Rafsanjani's government. According to the Media Studies and Development Office, the number of periodical magazines increased significantly to 550 during 1992-94, from 100 during 1980-88 (war period). Motamednejad (1998) believes the post-war period (1989-1996) introduced an appropriate political and cultural environment for the development of press in Iran while creating new hopes for their independence, freedom and pluralism.

Reforms Movement and initiated his civil society campaign.

The role of the press in advancing the reformist agenda in the domestic areas has been described as “crucial” by Ramin and Bahrapour (1999)<sup>1</sup>.

Following the initial wave of attacks on the reformist press...a second crop of independent dailies appeared in late 1998. These papers exposed Intelligence Ministry agents’ involvement in the [chain] political assassinations of reformist intellectual and activists in late 1998 (Ramin and Bahrapour, 1999:38-39)<sup>2</sup>.

Hooglund (1992:20) observes that in this period the Iranian press appeared to be “more free of government control” than their counterparts in the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf—a phenomenon Merat (1995:35) describes as “Khatami’s miracle”. He explains that Tehran’s daily papers, for example, provide a “broad diversity of views on domestic and foreign policies, and certain newspapers consistently and harshly criticise the government”. “Salam”, for example, was a Reformist government with a circulation of 70,000 which was “at the forefront of the anti-imperialist struggle” of the Iranian government (Merat, 1999:35). “Khordad” and “Sobh-e Emrooz”, two other pro-Reform newspapers, also forced the government to admit that Intelligence Ministry agents were involved in the so-called “serial killings” of 1998 (Ibid).

The multiplicity of newspapers and diversity of views and criticisms presented by them reached a new peak in 1999. Menashri (2001:325) observes “at no other time before in Iran (nor elsewhere in the Middle East) had there been so many new papers and journals, enjoying such a degree of freedom and expressing such a diversity of viewpoints with such fervor and sense of mission”. Such “intervals of openness” were only observed in the early 1940s (following the abdication of Reza Shah), the early 1950s (under the opposition movement led by Mosaddeq) and early 1980s when the revolution happened.

As of 2000, the power of Conservatives strengthened. They moved to crush the pro-Reform newspapers with the assistance of the Judiciary. “Salam”, “Khordad” and “Sobh-e Emrouz” were banned and many journalists including the ex-interior minister Abdollah Nouri (Editor of Khordad and Fat’h) were imprisoned (Granmayer: 2003:65). Another

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1 According to the figures published by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in 1998, the number of published newspapers and magazines exceeded 850 (five times greater than the number of the press in the pre-revolution era), while the total circulation of daily newspapers reached a record number of two million for the first time after the “spring of freedom” and the early years after the revolution.

2 Ramin and Bahrapour (1999) argue that the Conservatives reactivated the Press Court through the Judiciary to try to close down reformist newspapers by accusing them of “plotting against Islam and the revolution”. Conservative MPs also managed to impeach the Culture Minister on the grounds he was too lenient with the press.

daily “Jameeh” which was the first pro-reform newspaper appeared in 1998 was also banned. Its publishers immediately launched a new daily “Tous” on the same day “Jameeh” was banned. The new paper was nearly identical to its predecessor. One week later, “Tous” was also banned and its publishers were beaten up by a violent pressure group. Undaunted, the publishers introduced a third daily, “Aftab-e Emrooz”. This led to the creation of a phenomenon named “chain newspapers”.

In the early 2000s, according to Menashri (2001:325), “almost all the taboos” including the relations between Iran and the US were removed and discussed widely in the pro-reform newspapers until April 2000 when over 20 newspapers and journals were banned from publication by Conservative organs of the state.

...with the banning of newspapers they were replaced by others, often with the same line and editorial staff. Newspapers were discontinued and then reappeared, sometimes under the same title, at other times with a new name (Menashri, 2001:326).

With the election of Conservative president Ahmadinejad, pro-reform newspapers began experiencing tough times as almost all of them were confronted with government-imposed bans. From the 17 newspapers with reformist inclinations<sup>1</sup>, which were present during Reformism (1997-2005), only five were publishing in 2010.

No organised and fully-scholarly research has been done with regards to the portrayal of the West in the Iranian press during Reformism and Conservatism as the area remains understudied<sup>2</sup>. There are however regular quantitative content analysis studies of the press undertaken by the Media Studies and Planning Office affiliated with the Ministry of Culture<sup>3</sup>. According to the results of two studies (summerised below), Iranian

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1 They include: Aftab-e Yazd, Sharq, Etemad, Etemad-e Melli, Ham-Mihan, Hayat-e No, Sarmayeh, Jameeh, Tous, Neshat, Asre Azadegan, Salam, Mardomsalari, Hambastegi, Kargozaran, Seday-e Edalat and Tehran-e Emrouz. From amongst these, five survived during Conservatism: Aftab-e Yazd, Ham-Mihan, Sharq, Mardomsalari and Tehran-e Emrouz. From among all of these pro-reform newspapers, only Aftab-e Yaz (if identified as a reformist newspaper) has been immune from “publication ban” while all the others have experienced at least one period of ban. Also, seven of them including Salam, Jameeh, Tous, Neshat, Asre Azadegan, Ham-Mihan and Hayat-e No, were banned during Reformism.

2 Notwithstanding, there is widespread belief that the press have followed the line of the government in covering the West during Reformism and Conservatism. The present research, in fact, hypothesises that the press toed the foreign policy line of Reformist government in detente with the West whereas they followed the Conservative policy of confrontation with the West. When analysing the image of the West in the Iranian press, one cannot ignore the hypothesis that most of Iranian newspapers reflect the official lines of policy vis-à-vis the West which are affected by ideological and politico-cultural factors such as the historical pessimism towards the West, Westoxication and Vision 2025 strategy.

3 This office was primarily established by former president Khatami in 1990 under the tile of the “Media Studies and Research Centre” to conduct researches on the media. It has since undertaken two series of changes in mission and name. During the first period of Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-2009), the centre changed its name to the “Media Studies and Development Office” which was again re-named to the “Media

mainstream newspaper reporting of foreign news has decreased during Conservatism. This implies international relations were more important for the press to cover during Reformism than Conservatism, empowering the hypothesis that the Reformist government based his foreign policy on cooperation with the West while the Conservative government sought confrontation<sup>1</sup>.

Whereas 18.8 per cent of the front page headlines were about foreign policy issues in 2005 (during Reformism), it was decreased to 13.8 per cent in 2007 (during Conservatism). Likewise, editorials about foreign policy issues dropped from 19 per cent in 2005 (during Reformism) to 13.3 per cent in 2007 (during Conservatism).

This is while wars and conflicts covered in the foreign policy pages of Iran’s mainstream newspapers increased from 37 per cent in 2005 (during Reformism) to 52.8 per cent in 2007 (during Conservatism). The coverage of US-related news also increased from six per cent in 2005 (during Reformism) to near eight per cent in 2007 (during Conservatism).

	2005 (Reformism) (January-February-March)	2007 (Conservatism) (January-February-March)
<b>Iran’s nuclear issue</b>	N/A	16.9
<b>Foreign policy issues</b>	18.8	13.8
Domestic politics issues (highest percentage)	22	21.3

Front page headline issues in major Iranian press

	2005 (Reformism) (January-February-March)	2007 (Conservatism) (January-February-March)
<b>Foreign policy issues</b>	19	13.3
<b>Iran’s nuclear issue</b>	N/A	10.7
Domestic politics issues (highest percentage)	43	16.9

Editorial issues in major Iranian press

	2005 (Reformism)	2007 (Conservatism)
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Studies and Planning Office”. These names might be well suggestive of the missions of the centre.

<sup>1</sup> This does not necessarily mean that the Conservative government was in a confrontational track with the West. As indicated in the figures, the coverage of US-related news in the newspapers increased during Conservatism. This suggests that the Conservative government indeed wanted cooperation with the West. More on this issue will be discussed in the conclusion section.

	(January-February-March)	(January-February-March)
<b>Wars and conflicts</b>	37	52.8
<b>Foreign policy issues</b>	36	25.1

Foreign news issues in major Iranian press

	2005 (Reformism) (January-February-March)	2007 (Conservatism) (January-February-March)
<b>Iran</b>	68.5	69.2
<b>United States</b>	6	7.9

Place of the event covered in the news in major Iranian press

While there are several academic works on the representation of the West in other countries (Wasburn, 2002; Yang, 2003; Park, 2003; Kuisel, 2004; Pauels and Fox, 2004; d’Haenens, 2005; King, 2007; Mohamed, 2007; Bow, 2008; Ojebode, 2009), there are very few researches on the portrayal of the West in Iran and vice versa (Peh and Melkote, 1991; Tabaar, 2006; Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2007, Sharifi, 2008). In fact, no organised and comprehensive research has been published, to date, to study the role of the media in creating anti-American and anti-Western sentiments among the Iranian public opinion.

As mentioned earlier, there is little academic research on the image of the West in the Iranian newspapers. Shoar-Ghaffari (1991) studied the “news of the outside world” published during 1979 and 1988 in “Ettelaat” daily—a leading Iranian newspaper<sup>1</sup>. He studied the reliance of Ettelaat on “Western news agencies, the extent and emphasis of international coverage and the treatment of news about the superpowers”.

The findings of Shoar-Ghaffari’s content analysis of Ettelaat indicated that 61 per cent of the “foreign news” published in the newspaper during the 10-year period was supplied by four major Western news agencies (AP, UPI, AFP and Reuters)<sup>2</sup>. He also demonstrated that Ettelaat placed a great emphasis on covering the news of the Islamic world and promoted opposition to superpower influence around the world. Shoar-Ghaffari’s research also concluded that Ettelaat portrayed the West and in particular the United States negatively in Iran while it gave “special attention” to the Palestinian struggle and “liberation movements” in the Middle East<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Results of Shoar-Ghaffari’s research were earlier presented in 1989 to a conference in Toronto, Canada.

<sup>2</sup> More specifically, this content analysis showed the coverage of the West in Ettelaat increased by two per cent during the first and second five-year period. Shoar-Ghaffari (1991:8) suggests this was because during that period “the internal affairs of the country were perceived as more important than the events outside Iran”.

<sup>3</sup> He also argued that although the four major Western news disseminators dominate the international news

Given the fact that news is conventionally defined in negative terms by the Western agencies and also the fact that Iranian media still rely heavily on these news agencies for the news of the outside world, these findings come as no surprise. What is surprising though, is the fact that Iranian gatekeepers who controlled the inflow of the world news, still defined newsworthiness in the same fashion that the Third World leaders and especially the leaders of the Islamic Republic have always objected to (Shoar-Ghaffari, 1991:14).

According to Shoar-Ghaffari's study, the United States received the highest amount of coverage in Ettelaat followed by Lebanon, France and Britain. Germany came in the ninth place. In terms of topics most covered in Ettelaat during 1979-1989, politics ranked first while Iran's foreign relations ranked 17<sup>th</sup> preceded by US international affairs in the 14<sup>th</sup> rank.

Sharifi (2008) researched Iran-US relations by examining the image of the US in Iran. He concluded that both Iran and the US "reproduce each other as enemy". He further argued that "representational practices" are to blame for the construction of such mutual animosity. According to Sharifi (2008:5), for some Iranians, the best way to deal with the US is to contain its "inherent menace by not provoking it". For others, America is imaged as a "belligerent power that aims to exploit, corrupt, dominate and destroy Islam" (Sharifi, 2008:5).

Another study by Tabaar in 2006 focused on the US representation in Iran after the 9/11 attacks and the conspiracy theories surrounding it. He studied newspapers from both the Reformist and Conservative camps.

On Conservative press portrayal of the US, Tabaar (2006) studied the representation of the US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, worldwide hatred towards America and what he calls America as a "Paper Tiger" against Iran. He concluded that Conservative media tried to promote the "inevitability of the fall of the US...and... Western civilisation...followed by the resurgence of Islamic civilisation and its golden era" (Tabaar, 2006:23-24).

According to Tabaar (2006:24), the Conservative media use "fringe Western sources" and "quotations out of context" (among others) to promote the idea that 9-11 attacks were orchestrated by the American government itself. In conclusion, Tabaar

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flow, "they have no direct control over the construction of world images" (Shoar-Ghaffari, 1991:1).

(2006:34-35) argues that the conservative media “ties America’s “moral corruption” to its decreasing global stature (both soft and hard power)”.

On Reformist media representation of the US, Tabaar (2006:38) concluded that reformist media had a “markedly more positive approach toward the US” than the Conservative media. He also noted that the Reformist media “emphasise the US threat against Iran to advance their own domestic agenda” Tabaar (2006:35).

Each side attempts to portray the US in a way that undermines the other side in order to maximise its own influence and popularity among the people... In the context of this fluid boundary between politics and journalism, the US will continue to be an important instrument used by the two sides for political gain (Tabaar, 2006:41-42).

While there is little research on the representation of the West in Iran, there are several researches on how the Islamic Republic is portrayed in America. Most of the research in the field concerns the coverage of the hostage crisis (Said 1981, Dowling 1989; Larson 1986; Malek 1988/1989; Shoar-Ghaffari 1991). For example, Said (1981) indicated that the US press, in their coverage of the Iranian hostage crisis, tended to simplify complex cultural-political issues by resorting to a “pre-conceived superficial” formula of Islam and its values. While the hostage crisis captured considerable attention, much of the coverage was given to the actual event and the various personalities involved; there was limited analysis of the politics, history, or society in Iran which had led to the revolution and the hostage situation.

According to a study by Brewer et al (2003), the American public opinion tends to associate Iran with terrorism under the influence of the media and exposure to news. They explained that the American public opinion has been exposed to “a steady stream of stories” linking Iran (and Libya) to terrorism (Brewer et al, 2003:497). They concluded that the association of terrorism with Iran (and Libya) among the Americans is related to being exposed with news which linked terrorism with the countries<sup>1</sup>. In other words, participants who read stories framing Iran (and Libya) as “sponsors of terrorism” were more likely to draw “negative associations between anti-terrorist efforts and these nations” (Brewer et al, 2003:501).

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<sup>1</sup> Brewer et al (2003), however, rejected any link between the association of terrorism with Iran (and Libya) and being exposed to news about domestic terrorism. According to the findings of their studies, “exposure to the stories about domestic terrorism did not alter the impact of attitudes about terrorism on either attitudes toward Libya or attitudes toward Iran” Brewer et al (2003:501).

Entman (1991) studied the US downing of an Iran Air Flight 655 in the Persian Gulf and suggested that frames used in the news coverage of this event were influenced by US government policies. A similar study was done by Peh and Melkote in 1991 in which they examined if three prestigious US newspapers biased in their reportage of shooting of Iran Air Flight 655. They found that US newspapers almost under-reported the shooting of Iran Air flight compared to that of the Korean Airliner Flight 007. According to this study, US newspapers depicted Iran Air Flight 655 positively (i.e. not objectively) which means they were not critical of the incident (compared to the Korean incident in which they portrayed it negatively (i.e. objectively)). For example, US newspapers did not reflect the Iranian views of the incident by refusing to publish any press releases or press conferences by Iranians.

Peh and Melkote (1991) suggested that the US press would report international crises differently if the nationality of the perpetrators were different “especially if the foreign countries involved were not allies of the US” (Peh and Melkote, 1991: 59).

The hostile US/USSR, and US/Iran relationships were predicted to have been reflected in the coverage of the two incidents. The Soviets would suffer condemnation, and the Iranians, held responsible for their plane being shot (Peh and Melkote, 1991:63).

Roushanzamir (2004:9) explored how American newspapers construct a “specific commodified version and vision” of Iran through representing Iranian women. Analysing news reports from 1995 to 1998, she found that news stories published in US newspapers on Iran “whatever their actual content, are anchored by the graphic illustrations of Iranian women, veiled in the apparently impenetrable black chador.” Roushanzamir (2004:24) concluded that US media construct Iranian women for American audiences as “outside and other, first to “our” society but also to “theirs””. She also suggested that “images of Iranian women are the tool through which US media signify Iran” (Roushanzamir, 2004:9).

Izadi and Saghaye-Biria (2007) presented a discourse analysis of elite American newspaper editorials on Iran’s nuclear case. Employing Said’s concept of Orientalism and van Dijk’s concept of the ideological square, they found that “the Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post more predominantly drew on Orientalist arguments than did The New York Times” when portraying Iran (Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2007: 140). They concluded that “Orientalist depictions of Muslim countries and their political issues concentrate around the idea that Islam is a source of threat” (Izadi and Saghaye-Biria, 2007: 161). They also revealed that American newspapers “selectively framed the issues

surrounding the Iranian nuclear dispute by employing linguistic, stylistic, and argumentative maneuvers” (Ibid).

There are also previous researches on the image of the West in such countries as Indonesia, Canada, France, Russia, Nigeria and Egypt.

Wasburn (2002) studied the image of the US in Indonesian newspapers. Doing a content analysis of the news about the Persian Gulf War (1990-91), he concluded that the press in Indonesia portray the US as a “world military power”. He also suggested that Indonesian press tend to support the policies of the government when reporting the Persian Gulf War in ways that helped legitimise the stances of the Indonesian government.

Bow (2008) presented a history of the evolution of anti-Americanism in Canada. He proposed that anti-Americanism has a “long and colorful history in Canada” and that the United States is imaged as an “overbearing, expansionist power, waiting (more or less patiently) at the border for its chance to take advantage of Canadian disunity and weakness”. Bow (2008) also argued that the Iraq war provided Canadians with ample reason to “disagree with American policy and to dislike and distrust the Bush administration” and gain negative feelings”.

Kuisel (2004) studied the representation of the US before the French public opinion. He argued that the image of the US in France is “deteriorating”. Kuisel (2004) studied surveys on the US image in France and discussed that Bush’s policies and unfair trade by the US imposed on other countries (during 2000-2004) are to be blamed. He concluded that the French think of the US as a “domineering, self-interested nation that uses its inordinate power to establish global hegemony”.

Another study was conducted to examine the image of the US in English-as-a-Foreign- Language textbooks in Russia. Pauels and Fox (2004) suggested while the US is portrayed as a “strong military forces” and is associated with “rudeness”, there is a generally positive portrayal of the US holidays.

Ojebode (2009) content analysed foreign news published in Nigerian newspapers. He found that the majority of the news about the West was negative and taken from Western news agencies.

A similar finding was recorded by Mohamed. Mohamed (2007) analysed Egyptian newspaper portrayal of the United States as a case to generalise it to the whole Arab media. He found that the overwhelming news published in major Egyptian newspapers on the West was negative. On the reason for portraying the West negatively, he argues that the

dominance of “nationalist, Islamist and leftist ideologies among a large number of Egyptians writers and journalists” led them to select negative news about the West. He also found that American foreign policy issues were the “most important sources in forming the US image in the Egyptian press” which portrayed the US as an “invading, hostile state that has lost its credibility”.

## **Chapter 3: Theoretical framework: Theories of media and communication**

- iv. Agenda-setting theory and media portrayal**
- v. Theory of framing**
- vi. Theory of priming**

## **Theoretical framework: Theories of media and communication**

For some people, the media are the only source of gaining information and news about international relations. Therefore, the media can play a significant role in shaping the perceptions either of actors or of other nations among their audience. Many researches have studied the link between media exposure and their influence on public opinion (Albritton and Manheim, 1983, 1985; Perry, 1987). According to other scholars such as Brewer et al (2003), Wanta et al (2004), Choi (2009) and Yang (2003), exposure to news increases knowledge about other countries and can significantly influence the audience towards foreign nations.

More specifically on the relation between media and anti-Americanism, Nisbet et al (2004:32) have demonstrated that TV news coverage of the United States in predominantly Muslim countries leads to the rise of anti-Americanism. They argue that while Arab regional news coverage of the US tends to “amplify” anti-American perceptions, watching the same news in Western TV networks such as the BBC and CNN will “buffer” the negative coverage of the US in Muslim countries (Nisbet et al, 2004:22).

Previous research on the role of news in policy making indicates that although the media are not officially part of the foreign-policy establishment, they have been an influential participant in the foreign-policy making. In the United States, for example, news media have played a “significant role in setting the political agenda” for administrations, particularly in times of crisis (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005:83) and post-conflict (Mishra, 2008). Gerges (2003:82) notifies that the US media coverage of Islam is an indispensable part of the making of the US policy.

In this view, a number of factors contribute to the situation, including the media’s overwhelming dependence on government sources for their news stories; the lack of public contestation of government propaganda campaigns; and the government’s use of ideological weapons like anti-communism, a demonised enemy, or potential national-security threats. (Gerges, 2003: 81-82).

The influence of media on foreign policy is a well-established and well-researched notion (el-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002; Nisbet et al, 2004; Chan, 1994; Gerges, 2003). Such influence is so great that some governments monopolise media (particularly radio and television) to “mobilise their citizens politically” (Nisbet et al, 2004:17) and use media as

“a vehicle for their propaganda” (El-Affendi 1993: 165). However, it is not clear whether it is the media which influences the government or it is the government policy which influences the media. While Gerges (2003) believes the media play a significant role in making policies (in the US), Chan argues that the media are affected by government policies in covering news. Citing previous research by Shaheen (1985), Entman (1991) and Shoemaker (1991), Chan indicates:

...research on the relationship between media coverage of international affairs and government foreign policy often showed that media tend to cover international affairs from government’s point of view, and that if the home government is involved, media would adopt a “pro-government” stance (Chan, 2004: 135)<sup>1</sup>.

This view has been supported by Ryan (2004) who studied 10 US newspaper editorials and concluded that US newspapers followed the line of the government in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks which was to encourage military intervention<sup>2</sup>. Peh and Melkote (1991:76) studied the shooting of civilian airliners of Iran and Korea respectively by the US and former USSR and concluded that US newspapers “served as a medium through which the government transmitted its attitudes to the people”.

In the case of the KAL downing, Reagan re-affirmed his view of the Soviet Union as an evil empire to the public, and in the Iran Air incident, that his Persian Gulf policies were good, and the Khomeini regime, irresponsible (Peh and Melkote, 1991:76).

This supports the findings of previous studies which suggested that American newspaper coverage of international issues is, quite often, a reflection of official policy and not reality.

The issue of news and its influences or effects has been always at the heart of communication studies. Since the late 1920s and early 1930s when the issue of media influence became one of the main preoccupations of governments after the First World War, the questions of “do the media influence society?” and “who influences the media?” came to the spotlight of communication studies. In 1927, Harold Lasswell pointed out such influences by studying propaganda techniques in Nazi films during the world war. Ten

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1 Chan (2004: 142) however concludes in his own research that the “press did not always cover international news from the government’s point of view, even at times when its government is directly involved in an international issue”.

2 Ryan (2004:308) criticised US newspapers for failing to “explore, analyse, evaluate and publicise alternative strategies and ideas” concerning the 9/11 attacks.

years later, Harold Gosnell studied the influence of newspapers on readers' choice of candidates in Chicago elections, which resulted in the development of one-step model of mass media influence; In another study in 1944, Paul Lazarsfeld et al researched the extent to which mass media influenced voting behaviour, introducing the two-step flow of communication. Later in 1947, Kurt Lewin introduced the gatekeeping process which was further developed in 1972 by McCombs and Shaw in their agenda-setting model.

In general, as explained by Hjarvard (2002:91), there are two dominant perspectives through which communication scholars study the effects of news: those of "selection" and "construction". While researches during the 1930s and 1960s focused on what influences the "selection" of news (or the "production of image"), studies since the 1970s have been conducted to see how the news is "constructed" (or the image is "represented" or "reproduced").

Followers of the first perspective in media influence research have centred their studies on "agenda-setting" while proponents of the second perspective formulated their researches with the framework of the theories of "framing and priming"<sup>1</sup>.

The present research, therefore, is employing the agenda-setting, framing and priming as its main framework of analysis. among other media influence theories of the hypodermic needle theory (magic bullet theory), cultivation theory, diffusion of innovations theory and the two-step flow of communication theory, to name a few. As mentioned above, the two dominant media effects perspectives i.e "selection" and "construction" are usually applied through agenda-setting, framing and priming. The three well-known and largely-used theories seem to be appropriate for studying the question of how the West is portrayed in the Iranian press. In other words, the media representation of the West in Iran is closely tied to agenda setting, framing and priming processes employed by Iranian journalists to reflect the news of the West. In addition, as reiterated by Park (2003), "integrating frame analysis and agenda-setting research will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the potential impact of international news coverage". The present research is a study of the "selectors" and "producers" of news stories and not the "consumers" of news. Therefore, media audience theories are not applied in this research. Audience studies are related to the way audiences use the media, the extent to which the audiences engage

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<sup>1</sup> McCombs and Shaw (1972) combine the two inter-connected perspectives in one and discuss that "choosing" (selecting) and "displaying" (presenting) the news are the main functions of the agenda-setting theory. They actually do not differentiate between selecting the news (agenda-setting) and presenting the news (framing and priming). This has been also emphasised by McQuail (2000:456) who regards priming as "a more specific aspect of agenda-setting".

with media and their “cognitive and affective reactions to media content” and “the short- and longer-term effects media can have on audiences” (Gunter, 2000:54). While it is beyond the boundary of this research to study the audience of news, it could be potentially the subject of another PhD research to study how the Iranian people are influenced by the media in terms of views towards the West. In order to study how the Iranian audience shape their views towards the West through exposure to the media, a survey should be conducted through questionnaires. I am not considering audience studies in my thesis because I am not basically studying the audience in my research. In other words, I am studying the newspaper coverage of the West in Iran and not the audience. Similar studies on the newspaper coverage or representation have employed agenda-setting, framing and priming as their theoretical framework to study the coverage of news. For example, D’Haenens and Verelst (2002) studied the portrayal of Indonesia’s reform in the Dutch print media, using frames in news reporting. They proposed that news frames influence public opinion even though some believe that “news framing of political subjects has no visible effect on the perceptions of the public with regard to the government or the media” (D’Haenens and Verelst: 2002: 187). Parker (2003) studied the coverage of Korea and Japan by American television networks. She concluded that the portrayal of Korea and Japan in US television is influenced by the foreign policy of the US. Spencer (2004) studied the impact of television news on the Northern Ireland peace negotiations. He discussed how television news writers impacted on the politics and momentum of the Northern Ireland peace process through the process of agenda-setting. Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) studied the 2003 Iraq war coverage in elite newspapers in Sweden and the US. Employing framing and agenda-setting, they concluded the American newspapers “relied more heavily on official government and military sources” to report the Iraq war (Dimitrova and Strömbäck, 2005:399). In a similar study, Horvit (2006) discussed the portrayal of the Iraq war in the six major news agencies. He also used agenda-setting to study how different news agencies, from the West and non-West, covered the Iraq war based on their own agenda. D’Haenens and Bink (2007) studied the image of Islam in the Dutch press. Employing agenda-setting and framing theories, they discussed the role of media in shaping the public opinion and hypothesised that “the media alone are not able to impose their opinion on the public” (D’Haenens and Bink, 2007: 136). In all such researches and many other similar ones on media effects (Yanovitzky, 2002; Yang, 2003; Trivundza, 2004; Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005; D’Haenens, 2005; Gan et al, 2005; Fahmy and Kim, 2008), the coverage of

news of events has been studied using the agenda-setting and framing theories.

### **i. Agenda-setting theory and media portrayal**

As defined by Rogers and Dearing (1988: 565), the word “agenda” is defined as “a list of issues and events that are viewed at a point in time and ranked in a hierarchy of importance”. McCombs and Shaw (1972) proposed the idea of agenda-setting. Studying the role of media in the 1968 presidential election campaigns in the US, they concluded that news people “play an important role in shaping political reality” through selecting and presenting the news to the public (McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 176)<sup>1</sup>.

Not only did McCombs and Shaw (1972:176) hypothesised that the media set the agenda for the people what issue to read, but also they discussed that the readers learn through the agenda set by the media “how much importance to attach to that issue from the amount of information in a news story and its position”.

Loaning a quotation from Berelson (1961) who said “on any single subject many ‘hear’ but few ‘listen’”, McCombs and Shaw (1972) distinguished between minority politically-educated and majority politically-under-educated consumers of news in that the former “seek” information by visiting various sources of news and the latter “acquire” it under the influence of the media (McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 176-177).

The media are the major primary sources of national political information; for most, mass media provide the best-and only-easily available approximation of ever-changing political realities (McCombs and Shaw, 1972: 185).

Such an agenda-setting function of the media has been emphasised by Lang and Lang (1966), Cohen (1963) and Said (1997) and many other scholars who believed the media tell people what to read and what to think about by giving salience to subjects<sup>2</sup>.

McCombs and Shaw’s theory were later expanded by Dearing and Rogers (1996) who defined three types of agendas in the process of media influence. They include media,


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<sup>1</sup> They asked voters to name the most important issues of the day (prior to elections). The voters’ responses reflected the pattern on the news coverage during the previous month in the mix of newspapers, network television news, and news magazines available to them.

<sup>2</sup> The term “agenda-building” has been used by communication scholars to define a process through which policy agendas of political elites become influenced (Rogers and Dearing, 1978). While the “agenda-setting” tradition has been used to study the influence of media on public, “agenda-building” has been employed to explain how public issues influence policy agendas. Christie (1993) has also studied, through the spiral of silence theory and agenda-building, the model of “agenda-opinion congruence” to see how the media and policy agendas are related to the dominant public policy (opinion) at certain conditions (such as war). He used the model of agenda–opinion congruence to view the high degree of public support for the initial phase of the Iraq war and the resulting interaction between mass media and public policy.

public and polity agendas<sup>1</sup>.

According to Dearing and Rogers's model, the agenda set by the media influences the public agenda which in turn has impacts upon the policy agenda<sup>2</sup>. This model, which is based on the three agendas and interrelationships among them, has been displayed in the following figure:



Three main components of the agenda-setting process: media, public and policy agendas  
Source: Rogers and Dearing (1988)

Based on this model, Dearing and Rogers (1996) defined agenda-setting as a process of “social construction” used in the media to prioritise one issue over the others to be published for the public. They argued that the media have either a direct or indirect influence on setting the agenda in society.

In some cases, the media agenda has a direct effect in the policy agenda-setting process, although more often, the media agenda has an indirect effect through the public agenda...(Dearing and Rogers, 1996:87).

Scheufele (2000) argued that agenda-setting has to be viewed on two levels of

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1 To measure the media and public agendas, communication researchers regularly calculate the correlation between the ranking of issues on the media agenda and the ranking accorded those same issues on the subsequent public agenda. On such a basis, Dearing and Rogers (1996), explain three research traditions in the field of media agenda-setting. Content analysis is used to measure the media agenda while surveys are employed to measure what is on the agenda of public; the policy agenda could be also measures through policy-making actions as the introduction of new laws about and issue (agenda), budget appropriations and by the amount of time given to debate the issue (agenda) in the parliament.

2 Lang and Lang (1983) emphasised the relationship between media and public agenda by investigating the Watergate scandal. They noted that the Watergate became a public agenda item after months of intensive media coverage of it.

analysis which are the agendas of media and audience. He called the formation of a media agenda as “agenda-building while describing the formation of an audience agenda as “agenda-setting.” Elsewhere, McCombs and Shaw (1993) describe agenda-building as the “fourth phase” of agenda-setting research while Lang and Lang (1983) studied it as “a complex process” and suggested that it comprises several steps. Rogers & Dearing (1988) also indicated that agenda-building influences the policy agendas of elite political establishments.

McQuail (2000:461) describes agenda-setting as a way of representing “the reality of society” and constructing a “frame of reference for viewing the world”, thus significantly influencing the pictures in people’s minds about the outside world. In other words, which aspects of an issue are covered or highlighted in the news makes a considerable difference in how people view that issue. More specifically, in the first stage, the public learns what the media consider important and to which they give more coverage. In the next stage, the public forms its images portrayed by the media.

Becker and McCombs (1978) found significant evidence of media influence in the voters’ choice of presidential nominees. In a similar study on Spanish elections, McCombs et al (2000) found that there is a considerable correlation between the voters’ description of the three major party leaders and the representation of them in the media. Studying visual representation of news, Domke et al. (2002) and Perlmutter (1998) found evidence to suggest that visual news images influence the image the public gains about social and political events as well as the formation of public opinion particularly on wars and conflicts.

Rinnawi (2007) studied the role of media in “de-legitimising” the Palestinian uprising. Through a content analysis of Israeli newspapers, he concluded that the Israeli media play a central role, during the times of conflicts, in de-legitimising the Palestinian protest through news production processes. Through a content analysis of White House briefings and newspaper and television coverage of the Iraq war, Christie (2006) studied the interaction between mass media and public policy statements at the start of Iraq war and revealed a significant relationship between the public policy and media agendas during a period of “high” but not “low” public support for the war.

On the relation between the media and public opinion, Noelle-Neumann (1974) maintained that the mass media express the dominant view and that the dominant opinion is often defined by mass media. She went further to propose that the media may form the

dominant opinion and thus influence public opinion.

In a related agenda-setting study of President Carter's State of the Union address found that the press set the agenda for the president's speech, rather than vice versa (Gilberg et al, 1980). Thus, studies have found the mass media to be one of many elements involved in a reciprocal process including public opinion and public policy. D'Haenens and Verelst (2002) studied the portrayal of Indonesia's reform in the Dutch print media. They concluded that the media agenda can determine the public agenda, and influence how the public thinks and acts through the way in which the news is presented.

Downs (1972) emphasised the role of media coverage in what he termed as "issue-attention cycle" in reinforcing the drawing of public attention to environmental and climate change issues. Also, McComas and Shanahan (1999) hypothesised that climate change dangers were given special attention by the public in periods when newspapers gave more coverage to global warming. Doing a content analysis of the New York Times and the Washington Post, they investigated the ways media constructed narratives about global warming and how these narratives influenced the public attention to climate change.

Wal et al (2005:937) expanded on the "influential" role of media in portraying ethnic minorities. They explained that the media use "generalisations" to negatively portray minorities and emphasised on the importance of news selection mechanisms and minority-related media and public agendas. According to their study, negative portrayal in the press was not by itself determined by ethnicity, but by the "frequent association of minorities with particularly negative news contexts" such as religious fundamentalism and illegal immigration (Wal et al, 2005:948). In a similar research, Dixen and Linz (2000) explored the "misrepresentation" of victims belonging to minority groups in US television news and concluded that Whites are overrepresented and Latinos are underrepresented in US news while Blacks and Latinos are more likely than Whites to be portrayed as perpetrators on TV news. Covert and Dixon (2008) made a similar study on the representation of the women of colour in mainstream US magazines. The findings of their study suggested that white women were "overrepresented" and Black and Latina women were "underrepresented" in mainstream women's magazine articles. Covert and Dixon (2008) also examined whether a greater representation of women of colour in mainstream women's magazines, might affect readers' endorsement of stereotypes of them. And their hypothesis was approved.

It was mentioned earlier that foreign news plays an important role in the shape of views about other nations. Such a role has been underlined by studies of foreign news

(Brewer et al, 2003; Choi, 2009; Wanta et al, 2004; Kioussis and Wu, 2008; Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Gan et al, 2005).

Brewer et al (2003:493-6) found evidence of a link between a news story frame and the representation of a foreign nation in another country. They indicated that news frames are “a route by which the media could influence attitudes toward foreign countries” and “may shape how audience members judge that nation”.

The findings...show that the media can influence the standards by which people evaluate foreign nations. At the same time, the data also suggest that there are limits to this influence. When members of our audience read stories that offered a direct link between an issue and a nation that carried a specific evaluative implication, they tended to adopt this frame of reference in their own thinking...[however] when participants read about issues on the domestic front, they did not carry their thoughts over to the international realm (Brewer et al, 2003:504-505).

Brewer et al (2003:496) further stated that news stories could “frame a particular country as a supporter of terrorism, thereby suggesting that if one supports a ‘war on terrorism’ then one should evaluate that nation negatively”.

Choi (2009:526) emphasised the “vital function” of foreign news in shaping the audience’s views of the world. Citing Beaudoin and Thorson’s study in 2001 who revealed that the majority of foreign news headlines in Los Angeles Times were “negative”, Choi (2009:525) noted that “foreign news in the US media has long been accused of inaccuracy and incompleteness, and that its manner of reporting tends to the so-called coups and earthquakes approach.”

Wanta et al (2004) examined how people are influenced by foreign news. They found that negative coverage of a nation results in negative public opinion about it. The finding of their research also indicated that with an increase in the importance of a nation for the US, the media’s coverage about that nation also increases. Particularly, Wanta et al (2004) highlighted the importance of foreign news and concluded that the negative depiction of a nation by the media (in US) is closely related to negative perceptions about that nation.

Kioussis and Wu (2008:67) did a similar study and found evidence that “media content portraying foreign countries in a negative light is positively associated with public salience of those countries.” They stated that “increased salience of negative news content

is also linked to increased negative views of foreign nations on thermometer scales” Kiouisis and Wu (2008:68)<sup>1</sup>.

To borrow Walter Lippmann’s phrase, “the pictures in our heads,” the agenda presented by the news media influence what the pictures in our heads are about. The agenda of attributes presented for each of these agendas, public figures, or other objects literally influences the pictures themselves that we hold in mind.

## **ii. Theory of framing**

When news happens, journalists then decide which news to publish. This has been described by communication scholars as “gate-keeping” (McQuail, 2000:496). When the news is selected, the agenda is automatically set. The agenda-setting function of the media was discussed in the previous section. According to the literature on agenda-setting, the more people see or hear about an issue or subject, the more they will talk about it and this will increase the chance that issue ends up on the public and policy agenda. But how do the media do this and help increase the chance? The answer is through the use of frames and primes in the news.

The media impact upon the audience in two ways. Audiences acquire news and information from the media and also learn how much importance to attach to a subject-matter on the basis of the emphasis placed on it in the news. Newspapers often highlight a story by displaying it on the front page or by using large headlines. Television news attaches more importance on stories by cueing them at the opening of the news bulletin (as headlines) and giving them more time of broadcast. In fact, when media dedicate more attention on an item, this may in time result in the audience also finding this news item important. In this way, the news is framed and primed for the audiences.

The term frame was first defined academically by Entman in 1991 and developed in 1993. “Frames are information-processing schemata” (Entman, 1991:7) that are created to influence the audience by “selecting and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others” (Entman, 1993: 53).

As cited in Park (2003:148-9), DeFleur and Ball-Rokeach (1989) believe that like agenda-setting, the theory of framing explains people’s “perception of reality” and “meaning construction”. According to McCombs et al. (1997), framing and agenda-setting

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<sup>1</sup> Kiouisis and Wu (2008:68) emphasised the role of public relations. They stated that it “plays an essential role in public perceptions of foreign nations by *decreasing* the impact of negative news on the perceived salience of those countries”.

are related in a way that framing is an extension of agenda-setting or the “second-level agenda-setting”. d’Haenens (2005:422-3) notes that framing “goes beyond agenda-setting, assuming that the media not only put certain issues on the agenda, but are also able to ‘frame’ a certain issue: that is, they suggest how the issue or the problem should be conceptualised”. Gamson (1989:157) explains that “facts...take on their meaning by being embedded in a frame or story line that organises them and gives them coherence, selecting certain ones to emphasize while ignoring others”.

According to Entman (1993: 52), “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular definition of a problem, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”<sup>1</sup>. In other words, the process of framing consists of “selection” and “salience” or “selecting” and “highlighting” a particular subject-matter in order to create a targeted sense in the audience<sup>2</sup>. Thus, the process of framing is a mixture of and related to the processes of gate-keeping (presence or absence of an issue), agenda-setting (emphasis on one aspect at the expense of others) and influencing<sup>3</sup>. In other words, while agenda-setting deals with “what” people exposed to media should think about, framing instructs people “how” to think about it. On such a basis, Smith et al (2001) refer to two media coverage biases: selection bias and description bias. It could therefore be argued that the selection bias concerns agenda-setting while the description bias is about framing (and priming) as it is believed that the media “set” the agenda by selecting events while they “frame” the agenda by describing it. Dimitrova and Stromback (2005:404-405) explains such a process on influence as follows:

Framing can construct reality, impact interpretations and influence audience responses and opinions toward a particular event after the event enters the public agenda. In other words, framing affects the perceptions of the event, not just its salience (Dimitrova and Stromback, 2005:405).

Journalists use framing in the news to “optimise audience accessibility” (Valkenburg et al, 1999) and influence interpretations that enable individuals to perceive,


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<sup>1</sup> According to Entman (1993: 52), “an increase in salience enhances the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory.”

<sup>2</sup> Referring to researches done by Ghanem (1997), Lopez-Escobar et al (1998) and Wanta and Hu (1993), Kiouisis and Wu (2008:60) explain that the news media can influence “how” people think about a topic “by selecting and placing emphasis on certain *attributes* and ignoring others”.

<sup>3</sup> Some researchers refer to the process of framing as the “second-level agenda-setting” which suggests that media coverage may move beyond “what” issues audiences think about to influencing “how” audiences think about the issue.

organise and make sense of information (Pan and Kosicki, 1993 as cited in Yang (2003))<sup>1</sup>. According to McQuail (2000:495), framing is used in two levels in media influencing theories. At the first level, journalists use framing to “shape and contextualise” news according to their own (or their organisation’s) frame of reference while at the second level, framing is used by the audience to “adopt” those frames of reference offered by journalists. In other words, McQuail (2000:495) believes that that the end result of the framing process is that the audience “see the world in a similar way” as journalists do. Therefore, there are two types of frames which operate based on the following model: media frames and individual frames<sup>2</sup>. Individual frames are sometimes described as mental schemas, heuristics or scripts (Entman, 2004). They help an individual perceive, interpret and discuss public events. Media frames, on the other hand, are contained in journalistic stories across different media. Entman (1991: 7) explains that media frames are usually embodied in the “keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols and visual images” in news narratives. By repeatedly using them under the theory of priming, the news narratives reference some ideas but not others, which is exactly how frames work to highlight certain ideas.



Framing process as defined by McQuail (2000)

When framing news stories, journalists frequently tend to use five general frames of reference defined by Semetko and Valkenburg (2000:95) as “conflict”, “human interest”, “economic”, “morality” and “responsibility” frames.

The “conflict” frame is used to highlight conflicts between parties and countries<sup>3</sup>; the “human interest” frame occurs when attention or emotion is paid to an individual<sup>4</sup>; the

<sup>1</sup> Pan and Kosicki (1993) refer to framing as a “cognitive device” which is used to “encode, interpret and retrieve” information (as cited in Yang, 2003:232).

<sup>2</sup> According to Ryan (2004:365), “media frames help individuals create personal frames as they provide pertinent bits of information or news, thus making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences”. Entman (1993: 53) notes that an “increase in salience enhances the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it in memory”.

<sup>3</sup> This frame is mostly used mostly during election campaigns (for example between Conservatives and Reformists) or tense political relations between countries (for example, between Iran and the US). The so-called “horse race frame” is an instance. Winning and losing in this frame is of central importance.

<sup>4</sup> For example, during natural disasters or wars, this frame is used frequently to “personalise, dramatise and give emotional content to the news” d’Haenens and Verelst (2002: 186). The human interest frame puts emphasis on the personal, emotional side of an event, issue, or problem to capture the audience’s attention.

“economic” frame is emphasising the economic consequences of an issue for the public<sup>1</sup>; the “morality” frame is when the news is presented from a religious or moral point of view<sup>2</sup>; and the “responsibility” happens when journalists put the blame on parties, politicians or individuals.

It was earlier mentioned that “the media can influence the standards by which people evaluate foreign nations” (Brewer et al, 2003:501). Other researchers have also confirmed that using frames influence the way in which the public thinks about subjects and how these subjects are recalled and reflected upon.

Brewer et al (2003:496) studied the concept of framing from a psychological point of view. Arguing about previous research on the psychological aspects of framing done by Cappella and Jamieson (1997), Iyengar (1991) and Nelson et al. (1997), they offered two “psychological mechanisms” on the effects of framing. They proposed that framing works through an “accessibility-driven process”. They also concluded that framing works by telling people which associations should receive greater weight and which should matter less.

The authors’ experiments showed that issue frames affect importance judgments and that these importance judgments mediate the effects of frames on opinion, whereas accessibility does not. Both accounts, however, conclude that exposure to frames can shape which standards of judgments people use to evaluate the subject of the frame (Brewer et al, 2003:496).

Cappella and Jamieson (1997) argue that the use of the “conflict” frame will lead to increasing public cynicism and mistrust. Patterson (1993) also argues that the “conflict” frame is used to divert public attention from political processes. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) believe news frames are employed to “shape public perceptions” of political realities, while Rhee (1997) indicates news frames set “evaluative criteria” for the audience to judge the importance of political agendas (as cited in Gan et al, 2005:443). D’Haenens and Verelst (2002: 187) conclude that the public mind can be influenced by the media “through the way in which the news is presented”. Such a finding has been emphasised by Dimitrova and Stromback (2005:413) who showed how people in one country may develop

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1 When the economic impact of an event on an individual, group, institution, region, or country is highlighted, the economic frame is used to make the potential economic impact of an event clear to the public. The economic impact has an important news value and it is often suggested that news producers use this frame to “make an issue relevant to their audiences” d’Haenens and Verelst (2002: 186).

2 Journalists use this frame to add a religious or moral charge to an event, problem, or subject. It is often used indirectly in the news and through a third person.

quite different beliefs and attitudes toward an event than people in another country depending on how they have been exposed to media coverage.

Studying the 2003 Iraq war coverage in Swedish and US newspapers, Dimitrova and Stromback (2005:413) further confirmed the link between framing and the construction of reality, particularly in times of “international conflict where national media may engender different interpretations for the national audience”<sup>1</sup>.

We showed that the elite newspapers in each country framed the war in different ways, favouring some aspects of the war and disregarding other aspects... By selecting some aspects of war reality—such as military success—and ignoring other aspects—such as anti-war protest – the media text constrains audience interpretations (Dimitrova and Stromback, 2005:413).

On factors which influence how journalists frame the news, almost all researchers have consensus on the Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchy of influences model to be responsible. According to this model, the media content is influenced by five factors: individual factors, media routines, the organisation, extra-media factors, and ideology (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996)<sup>2</sup>.

The link between ideology and framing has been also studied by other scholars such as Tuchman in 1978, Edelman in 1993, Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad in 1998, Massey in 2000 and Reta in 20003. They studied how power relations and political forces influence media frames<sup>4</sup>. Doing a content analysis of newspaper stories in France and Singapore, Gan et al (2005) identified the dominant frames in newspapers’ reporting of the 2000 US presidential elections. They concluded that “which frames journalists use is determined, in part, by their professional socialisation and the journalistic ideology of the newspaper for

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1 Dimitrova and Stromback (2005:413) suggested that people who are not exposed much to reporting about war protests and war victims may ultimately be supportive of war. In another study of the Iraq war coverage, Choi (2009) explored how US newspapers’ coverage of foreign news was affected by the war. He concluded that after the start of the Iraq war, US newspapers preferred to use “government” sources for their coverage. This may suggest that newspapers rely on official sources at the periods of conflict.

2 Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchy of influences model was developed by Scheufele (1999) who introduced five factors influencing the journalists’ framing of news. They include: social norms and values, organizational pressures and constraints, pressure of interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists.

3 According Yang (2003:232), Edelman (1993: 232) has asserted the news frame is “driven by ideology and prejudice rather than by rigorous analysis or the aspiration to solve social problems”. Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (2000) did find that the dominant ideology of a nation was a major source of frame in their analysis of US press coverage of the Fourth UN Conference and the NGO Forum in Beijing. Reta (2000) reached the same conclusion in his analysis of the 1994 South Africa elections in US media.

4 Gerbner (1964) as cited in Yang (2003:232) pointed out there is “no fundamentally non-ideological, apolitical, non-partisan news gathering and reporting system”. Yang (2003:232) believes “it is from this line of reasoning that the concept of framing is derived”.

which they write (Gan et al, 2005:442).”

Another research by van Dijk (1985) indicated that the way news is framed in the media is a result of social and professional routines of journalists. This was supported by Scheufele in 1999 who listed five main factors which influence the way journalists frame the news: social norms and values, organisational pressures and constraints, pressures of interest groups, journalistic routines, and ideological or political orientations of journalists (Scheufele, 1999: 109).

According to Dimitrova and Stromback (2005:404), framing of news could be either “intentional” or “subconscious”. However, they also highlight the impact of “national political elite” institutes such as the president’s office and the parliament upon journalists’ framing of news. Other researches have attributed news framing (in the US media) to being influenced by government policies (Entman, 1991), American democratic values (Reta, 2000), patriotism (Reese and Bucklaw, 1995), political ideology (Wang, 1992; Pan et al., 1999), diplomatic sensitivity (Wang, 1992), history and organisational resources (Pan et al., 1999) and national interest (Lee and Yang, 1995).

The combination of all the influences makes a significant contribution to the final product of news and eventually defines the landscape of media content. As is well known, it is impossible to make news without going through the framing process (Yang, 2003:232).

In a study of America’s 10 largest newspapers, Ryan (2004:374) concluded that journalists “relied heavily on official government sources” to construct frames for the news of the war on terror. Yang (2003) argues that “national interest” (which he distinguishes from ideology) is another factor which influences the framing process particularly with regards to foreign news<sup>1</sup>. Studying the representation of NATO air strikes on Kosovo in Chinese and American newspaper, Yang (2003:231) highlighted the “considerable influence of national interest on media frames in newspapers”. He concluded that the national interest factor often “outweighs” other factors in framing international news reportage. Ryan (2004:364) refers to “personal prejudices, past experiences, religious feelings, values, educations” as main factors contributing to the framing of social reality.

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<sup>1</sup> Yang (2003:233) points out, on the difference between ideology and national interest, that while “ideology concerns a person’s, an organisation’s or a nation’s value or belief system, national interest is more closely related to a nation’s standing in dealing with international affairs.

### **iii. Theory of priming**

The final product of news media is presented to the public under a rather complex process, depending on the resources of the newsroom: Gate-keepers select the news; journalists are assigned; translators produce the news; editors edit the first draft; chief editors apply editorial policies and the news is finally broken. This process could be more complicated and sophisticated should technology allows. It consists of gate-keeping, agenda-setting, framing and priming, each of which could be done by gate-keepers, journalists, translators, editors and editors in chief.

A typical example of such a news-making process could be located at the time of elections. Suppose that polls have been closed. The winner has been announced but the loser is accusing the winner of vote rigging. The news department at the state television is instructed to report on the elections. The agenda, therefore, has been set i.e. “elections” (stage 1: agenda-setting). Now, the story should be filed and the set agenda should be expanded on. In most cases, the editor in chief advises the journalist that the story should be framed in a way, for example, that the audience is understood that elections were “free and fair”. The frame, therefore, is set i.e. free and fair elections (stage 2: framing). The story is filed. In the next stage, editors who now have the agenda and frame of the news, try to “prime” one aspect of the story. They, for example, give prime (or salience) to the “high participation rate” in the elections as an indication that elections were free and fair. This process continues for several days after the elections (stage 3: priming).

Priming in fact is the “third-level” agenda-setting which is employed by the media or politicians in the long run (at intervals), particularly during election campaigns, to exert influence on public opinion and voters.

Because priming can alter the criteria citizens use to evaluate political issues, leaders, and events, priming effects can have important consequences for the outcomes of elections, the emergence of public support for policy initiatives, and the approval ratings of political leaders (Althuas and Kim, 2006:960).

Priming is based on the fact that the more prominence media attach to an issue, the more the chance of influence on the public opinion about that issue. McQuail (2000:456) refers to priming as “a more specific aspect” of agenda-setting which shows that issues highest on the political agenda will be given more public prominence when they receive

most media attention. Priming is employed in some cases by officials to “divert attention from domestic failure by some foreign policy success, or even military adventure” (McQuail, 2000:456) and “help them achieve their political and ideological objectives” (Ryan, 2004:364).

The idea of priming was promoted in the 1980s by Iyengar and Kinder who, by conducting a series of experiments, studied the priming effect of television news on the public opinion about the performance of the government. They proved that news coverage of an issue can “prime” the audiences to pay more attention to that issue in their decision-making about government officials and candidates.

Most literature on priming is mainly focused on the “cognitive psychological” aspects of it. In other words, priming is mostly researched as a “psychological” concept, as it aims at having long-term influence on the public and voters’ opinion. According to Althaus and Kim (2006:961), priming is the “activation of knowledge stored in long-term memory following exposure to a stimulus”.

Based on this definition, the public use stored knowledge in memory potentially for making a judgement in future. For example, Nisbet et al (2004:31) demonstrated that the media bombard viewers with a “torrent of information” while they are “unlikely to be able to spend a great deal of time weighing, assessing, and deliberating the content of the news, arriving at carefully considered judgments” about policies. Brewer et al (2003:494) further argue that ordinary people do not base their judgements on complex information processing but rather on a “shortcut strategy” which helps them retrieve the knowledge and pieces of information stored in their memory. This function is also known as “accessibility effect”. Using the concept of accessibility effect defined by Higgins (1996), Althaus and Kim (2006:962) argue that not only does priming produce “accessibility effects” (i.e. activating stored knowledge), but it also produces “applicability effects” (i.e. generating associations between the primed construct and other constructs). Applicability effect means news coverage irrelevant to a specific issue does not tend to influence opinions regarding that. According to them, this whole process is dependent on several factors such as the “framing of the task...the degree of attention to stimuli...the motivations...predispositions...prior value commitments and social norms” used by individuals to process information (Althaus and Kim, 2006:962).

Seen in this way, the social psychological literature envisions priming as something like a two-stage process: the priming

stimuli should influence the accessibility of some knowledge constructs more than others, but whether people use those primed constructs as evaluative criteria depends on the degree to which they are perceived as applicable to the judgmental task (Althaus and Kim, 2006:962).

As explained earlier, the priming process helps activate previously-learned cognitive structures in the public mind to influence their judgment on an issue. This process works when a node is “activated” or “primed” in one’s memory and consequently affects his or her evaluation on a subject matter (Brewer et al, 2003:494). The accessibility of a subject matter in the memory depends on the “frequency” and “recency” with which it has been used in the past (ibid). In fact, the basis of the priming is that the public relies on the agenda set and framed by the mass media to make a decision when casting a vote or simply to discuss about issues in the public sphere. For example, Iyengar and Simon (1997) studied the coverage of the American invasion of Saddam during the first Persian Gulf War and concluded that extensive television coverage of the war put it high on the American public agenda as the most important issue of their country. Another priming effect was studied by Brosius and Kepplinger in 1992. They found that party preferences during the 1986 elections in Germany were vastly influenced by the public reaction to the agenda set by the media. For example, if the news media covered poor economic performance of the government over a period during elections, then the public is “primed” to think critically of the government.

The whole process of media influence on the public opinion consists of the three stages of “agenda-setting”, “framing” and “priming” the news. A typical example is this: The media choose to manoeuvre, for instance, on the “rising unemployment” during elections. Suddenly, the number of stories and lead stories on unemployment soars (agenda-setting); Then the media tell the public how to think about unemployment (framing); After some period when this process continues, unemployment is primed for the public opinion and people will judge about the government based on the knowledge the media spread and stored in their mind (priming). Therefore, during this period, the media have dictated to the public what is important for them to think, how to think about it and how to use it to make a judgment. In our example, the media tell people that the issue of unemployment is important for you to think about; then they tell people that unemployment is one of the decisive factors to evaluate a government or party performance; and finally and during a

specific period (usually weeks before elections), the media create an atmosphere under which there is little room for the people to resist against the agenda the media had set and framed for them. And the media in this way force people, through news exposure, to “use the dominant agenda carried in the news as an evaluative criterion” in their political and even non-political decision-making (Althaus and Kim, 2006:963).

## **Chapter 4: Research Methodology**

**vii. Research questions**

**viii. Research hypotheses**

**ix. Research methods**

**x. Data collection and sampling**

**xi. Data analysis technique**

**xii. Test of reliability**

## **i. Research questions**

The main aim of the present research is to study how the West is portrayed (qualitatively and quantitatively) in mainstream Iranian newspapers during the two different political periods. For this purpose, two independent variables were defined: the political affiliation (ideology) of newspaper and the political period (discourse) it was published. The dependent variable, the representation of the West, was also defined in terms of story layout/story page, method of story produced, primary Western country involved, dominant political theme, dominant stereotype, story direction towards Western relations and image of the West. All variables are at nominal level of measurement<sup>1</sup>.

This research seeks to study the impact of political affiliation of newspapers (as the first independent variable) and the political period in which the newspapers were published (as the second independent variable) on the representation of the West (as the dependent variable).

Therefore, the researcher has defined three types of research questions: Descriptive, analytical and main research questions. **Descriptive** research questions study the representation of the West from the quantitative point of view. Figures and statistics related to the representation of the West in terms of features such as the story layout or political theme are described in the form of frequency tables in the Descriptive Research Questions (DRQ) section<sup>2</sup>. **Analytical** research questions investigate the impact of the political affiliation of newspapers on the representation of the West (in terms of relationship). It also investigates the impact of the political periods on the representation of the West (in terms of relationship). Related results are described in the form of statistical tables in the Analytical Research Questions (ARQ) sections. **Main** research questions include the investigation of the impact of political period/affiliation on the representation of the West in Ettelaat, Hamshahri, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami newspapers (in terms of difference). Related results are described in the form of statistical tables in the Main Research Questions (MRQ) sections. A summary has been provided below:

### **Descriptive question (Frequency):**

Frequency tables about representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspaper

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<sup>1</sup> The lowest level of measurement is called nominal. It consists of a set of categories that are distinct from one another. The use of numbers in nominal scale is for labeling only and the order of the categories is not important which means reordering the categories makes no difference in the meaning of the scale. The nominal scale categories can therefore be merged or changed.

<sup>2</sup> Due to space constraints, descriptive tables have been appended (see Appendix 2).

**Analytical question (Relationship):**

Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the representation of the West and newspaper affiliation (ideology)?

Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the representation of the West and the political period (discourse)?

**Main question (Difference):**

Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation or framing of the West in Ettelaat/Hamshahri/Iran/Jomhouriy-e Eslami during Reformism and the representation of the West in Ettelaat/Hamshahri/Iran/Jomhouriy-e Eslami during Conservatism? In other words, did media from two different political systems differ significantly in their coverage of issues related to the West?

**ii. Research hypotheses**

One of the other main goals of the present research is to investigate if newspaper affiliation and political period in which newspapers were published have had any impact upon the portrayal of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers. In other words, the current study seeks to understand if mainstream Iranian newspapers are affected in portraying the West by the dominant discourse and ideology. For this, the following hypotheses were formulated:

**RH1.** Newspaper affiliation (ideology) does impact upon the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers.

**RH2.** Political period (discourse) does impact upon the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers.

**RH3.** Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more positively during Reformism while trying to defuse tension (*détente*) and highlight cooperation between Iran and the West during the same period.

**RH4.** Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more negatively during

Conservatism while trying to highlight conflict (tension) between Iran and the West during the same period.

### **iii. Research methods**

There are various methodologies when it comes to media and communication research. Some of the most prominent research methods include content analysis (Krippendorff, 2004), semiotic analysis (Chandler, 2007), cultural analysis (McQuail, 1987), frame analysis (Miller, 1997) and discourse analysis (Potter, 1996). Since the current research aims to study different aspects of Iranian Occidentalism and how the Occident (West) is portrayed in mainstream Iranian newspapers, the researcher decided to examine the content of the Iranian press through (comparative, qualitative and quantitative) content analysis and critical discourse analysis during two different political periods.

#### **a. Content Analysis**

Content analysis is a research method used widely in communication and media studies. It has been used in many researches for more than six decades. It uses a set of procedures “to make valid inferences from text” about the sender of the message, the message itself or even the audience of the message (Weber, 1990:9) to study social and economic trends such as the press coverage of social and political issues and the survey of public opinion on a variety of topics (Gunter, 2000:56). Since 1940s, according to Gunter (2000), researchers have been using content analysis as an academic tool to study communication and media.

Content analysis has been defined as “a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of manifest content of communications” (Berelson, 1952:18). This is a definition over which almost all communication scholars have consensus<sup>1</sup>. Notwithstanding, Berelson’s definition has been criticised for being descriptive (Krippendorff, 1980), limited to quantitative analysis (Huber, 1989, Kracauer, 1952, Lasswell, 1949), and manifest content of communication only (Gunter, 2000). Because of such limitations, researchers usually employ more qualitative methods alongside content

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<sup>1</sup> Many other scholars have provided definitions of content analysis. For example, Stone et al (1966:5) defines content analysis as “any research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within text”. Krippendorff’s definition of content analysis is “a research technique for making replicative and valid inferences from data to their context” (Krippendorff, 1980:21). Neuendorf (2002:1) defines content analysis as the “systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics”.

analysis. The present research also followed a similar manner. In fact, researchers believe content analysis could be employed as a secondary instrument for recoding social reality “when used in tandem with interviewing or observational analysis” (Gunter, 2000:58)<sup>1</sup>.

In spite of such limitations, a rather great number of studies have been conducted with content analysis as their methodology to explore specific categories of content in the media particularly the portrayal or depiction social groups and minorities. Ter Wal et al (2005) used quantitative content analysis to study the representation of ethnicity in EU and Dutch domestic news. They used content analysis to study how news outlets select news topics and sources to portray ethnic minorities in the media. Covert and Dixon (2008) employed content analysis to investigate the portrayal of women of colour in mainstream women’s magazines in the US. Dixon and Linz (2000) content analysed random sample of television news in the US to assess representations of Whites, Blacks and Latinos as crime victims. Baym (2004) studies structures of form in US network news coverage of Watergate and the Clinton impeachment through content analysis. Many more similar researches can be found which have employed content analysis in their study of media texts (Benson and Hallin, 2007; Blakely and Bumphus, 2005; Gan et al, 2005; Dimitrova and Stromback, 2005; King, 2007; Stromback et al, 2008).

Neuendorf (2002:52) believes content analysis is a “tool for testing relationships within a basic communication model”. According to him, Berelson (1952) proposed four functions for content analysis based on the Shannon-Weaver’s basic model of communication in 1998 of “source, message, channel and receiver”. The four purposes of content analysis are (Neuendorf, 2002:52):

- i. to describe substance characteristics of message content
- ii. to describe form characteristics of message content
- iii. to make inferences to producers of content
- iv. to determine the effects of content on audience.

Although Berelson (1952) believes it is possible to make conclusions about source or receiver on the basis of an analysis of the message content alone, some scholars are of the opinion that content analysis cannot be used for inference. For example, Carney (1971) and Neuendorf (2002) believe content analysis only “facilitates” inference, while it is used for descriptive and hypothesis-testing functions as well as identifying relationships among message characteristics. Based on this, Neuendorf (2002) has defined four types of content

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<sup>1</sup> Interviewing was not used for present research for two reasons: first, authorities were not interested in having an interview, and second, the staff of some newspapers especially pro-Reform press were not available for interview.

analysis, which are: descriptive, inferential, psychometric and predictive. Such categorisation relies on the fact that the goals of every science including content analysis are typically presented as description, prediction, control and explanation. However, in practice two types of content analysis are used widely by researchers: conceptual and relational. The former is descriptive while the latter is inferential.

In conceptual analysis, the number of occurrences of a “concept” within a text is recorded and described in the form of frequency tables. Once a sample is chosen, the text should be coded into desired categories based on research questions. By breaking down the contents of materials into meaningful and pertinent units of information, certain characteristics of the message may be analysed and interpreted. Conceptual analysis is in fact a “quantitative” content analysis. In this approach, a text is coded for the existence of certain words which could be negative, positive or neutral. The researcher is interested only in quantifying these words, not in examining how they are related, which is a function of relational analysis. In conceptual analysis, the researcher simply wants to examine presence with respect to research questions.

In relational analysis, relationships between concepts in a text are studied. As in conceptual analysis, a coding scheme is necessary in relational analysis. The main difference between relational analysis and conceptual analysis is that the former could be “qualitative” whereas the latter is “quantitative”. Both the conceptual and relational content analysis have been used in the present research to answer research questions.

As a technique and scientific tool, content analysis involves specialised procedures. In other words, in order to do a content analysis, the desired text should be first coded or broken down into the so-called “manageable categories”. Categories are then identified and defined. The coding takes place next and results are analysed. A similar procedure was followed for the purpose of the present research, which will be explained hereafter.

## **b. Critical Discourse Analysis**

As explained above, content analysis is used to study the manifest content of media texts objectively, systematically and quantitatively. Content analysis is widely used in media and communication research. Notwithstanding, as mentioned above, this research method has been criticised by some scholars<sup>1</sup>. More importantly, content analysis studies a

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<sup>1</sup> In order to do a more in-depth research and gain more and new information about the variables of the research, the researcher decided to use CDA as the second method of research for the present study. Moreover, findings of the CDA are more reliable and valid than the CA. In other words, while the CA is usually used to make “generalisation”, the CDA is exploited for “particularisation”.

“fixed meaning of media texts that can be repeatedly identified by different readers using the same analytical frameworks” while discourse analysis procedures study the “capacity of texts to convey multiple meanings, depending upon the receiver” (Gunter, 2000:82).

Due to shortages in the content analysis method (such as it being *quantitative* rather than *qualitative*; it studying the *manifest* rather than *covert* content of communication; it examining the *what* and not the *how* question of research; it studying the *content* rather than the *context* of communication), the researcher decided to apply the critical discourse analysis (CDA) method in order to investigate how ideological differences between mainstream Iranian newspapers manifest themselves in the discourse of the selected texts. In fact, discourse analysis is related to the study of the linguistic components of the language use especially in the news as news is perceived to be a representation of events in the language. Fairclough (2003) describes such ways of representing the world as “discourse”. A discourse may represent a particular aspect of the world in a text; likewise, texts can “articulate different discourses together” which can be identified through semantic and syntactic relations between the words, such as collocations and presuppositions as well as grammatical features (Fairclough, 2003:133). Discourses may differ in the representation of social events and how these events are represented concretely or abstractly.

According to Fowler (1991), ideological distinctions manifest themselves in differences of expression of an idea or news as there are always many and definitely different ways of transferring a meaning or concept. And such differences in expression may not be accidental. Therefore, discourse analysis can investigate the “ideological practice of representation” in the news through language (Fowler, 1991:5). Discourse analysis, in fact, as reiterated by van Dijk (1993), studies the underlying ideological positions and relations of power in a text. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analysis which is restricted to “critical social research”, as defined by Fairclough (2003:202). The aim of CDA, according to him, is to better understand “how societies work and produce both beneficial and detrimental effects, and of how the detrimental effects can be mitigated if not eliminated” (Fairclough, 2003:203). The CDA studies the dialectical relationships between discourse and other elements of social practices such as language.

As explained by van Dijk (1993) and Wodak (2001), the CDA discusses the role of discourse in the reproduction of social inequality through uncovering ideologies implicit in language. The CDA critically analyses the relationship between language and social meanings. It is in fact used in social research to study how realities construct discourse

through ideology, language and power and how the representation of reality is used in texts to maintain socio-cultural practices and relationships (Richardson, 2007).

Generally, there are three approaches to CDA: Discourse as a social practice, developed by Norman Fairclough; Discourse as a socio-cognitive model, developed by Teun van Dijk; and discourse as sociological and historical, developed by Ruth Wodak. The present research uses a Faircloughian method of doing CDA developed by Richardson (2007). According to this approach, “there is a dialectical relationship between the consumption of journalistic texts and social practices: readers decode the meanings of texts using knowledge and beliefs of the world, and these texts go on to shape (through their transformation or reproduction) these same readers’ knowledge and beliefs” (Richardson, 2007:45).

Richardson (2007) uses micro and macro textual analysis scales to do CDA. They include: naming and referencing<sup>1</sup>, predication<sup>2</sup>, transitivity<sup>3</sup>, modality<sup>4</sup>, presupposition<sup>5</sup>, rhetorical tropes<sup>6</sup> (hyperbole, metaphor, metonym, neologism, puns) and narrative<sup>7</sup>. To apply this CDA approach in the present research, I use these concepts and tools, where appropriate, to try to investigate how ideological differences between mainstream Iranian newspapers from different political camps (pro-Reform and pro-Conservative) manifest themselves in the discourse of a text.

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1 The way elements in the news are referred to and named can greatly influence the way the audience read and perceive the news. These “referential strategies” can have psychological, social and political purposes. As stated by Richardson (2007:50), not only do referential strategies “project meaning and social values onto the referent, they also establish coherence relations with the way that other social actors are referred to and represented. Van Dijk’s “ideological square”, which is characterised by a *Positive Self-Presentation* and a simultaneous *Negative Other-Presentation*, is another tool to explain referential strategies used in the news (Richardson, 2007).

2 Apart from the referential strategies used in the news, Reisigl and Wodak (as cited in Richardson, 2007:65) introduce “predicational strategies” which are defined as “the very basic process and result of linguistically assigning qualities to persons, animals, objects, events, actions and social phenomena.”

3 Transitivity is one of the main features of discourse analysis of news texts as journalists’ freedom in choosing words and phrases bear social or ideological significance. According to Richardson (2007: 54), transitivity “describes the relationships participants and the roles they play in the processes described in reporting.” It forms the very basis of representation and is about the “participants”, “processes” and “circumstances” associated with them. Any syntactic transformation in sentence clauses (verb, noun, adverb) are regarded as important in analysing the news.

4 Modality is the “counterpart” of transitivity, pointing out the journalist’s judgments, comment and attitude (Richardson, 2007:59). It is usually useful in analysing editorials in which authors freely express their views. Modality is expressed usually via the use of modal verbs.

5 As the name suggests, presupposition is a “taken-for-granted, implicit claim embedded within the explicit meaning of a text or utterance” (Richardson, 2007:63). It is in fact the hidden or presupposed meanings in the news text.

6 Corbett (as cited in Richardson, 2007:65) defines a trope as “deviation from the ordinary and principal signification of a word”. Examples include: hyperbole (exaggeration), metaphor (perceiving one thing in terms of another), metonym (substitution), neologism (creating new words) and puns (forms of word play such as homography, ideography and homophony).

7 Narrative is the sequence of events as they occurred in the actual story of news and the sequence in which events are presented to the audience (Richardson, 2007:71).

To this end, I selected six editorials<sup>1</sup> (under two subjects of Iran-US talks and Iran's nuclear issue): Three from pro-Reform newspapers (Salam, Hambastegi and Mardomsalari) and three from pro-Conservative newspapers (Kayhan, Resalat and Qods). These newspapers are regarded as purely supporting and promoting the ambitions and principles of their respective political affiliation. The unit of analysis was individual paragraph.

The editorials are about resolutions imposed by the UN Security Council on Iran as the result of the nuclear activities in 2006 and issues related to Iran-US relations including former president Khatami's historic interview with the CNN in 1998 and President Obama's monumental New Year (Norouz) message to Iranians in 2009. The reason for selecting similar editorials is because they reflect the views of their respective political wing regarding two significant issues on relations between Iran and the West, namely Iran-US confrontation and the nuclear case of Iran<sup>2</sup>. They also reflect on the views of Iranian leaders on establishing relations with the West. Moreover, these two topics are somehow interconnected ie with the settlement of one, the other will be also settled automatically.

#### **iv. Data collection and sampling**

As explained above, in doing content analysis, texts should be coded. However, before coding the text, a "unit of analysis" should be selected for identifying the population and drawing a sample from it. According to Neuendorf (2002:71), units can be "words, characters, themes, time periods, interactions" or any other bits of written or spoken communication such as paragraph, sentence or the whole story. For the purpose of this research, each "paragraph" of the news was selected as the unit of analysis.

The data required for the present study were taken from four mainstream Iranian newspapers. They include Ettelaat, Hamshahri, Jomhouriy-e Eslami and Iran. At the beginning, the researcher wanted to content analyse newspapers identified as fully

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<sup>1</sup> Editorial by definition is an opinion article which reflects the official position of a newspaper with regards to a specific topic. Editorials are written by a member of the Editorial Board or publisher of a newspaper. According to van Dijk (1992), editorials usually provide a "summary" of the news event, an evaluation of "actions and actors" and a conclusion in the form of "expectations, recommendations, advice, and warnings" (as cited in Izadi, 2007:148). Editorials are usually analysed by researchers of media studies to decode their "underlying ideological visions" (Gunter, 2000:88). Please note that there is not a unified framework for the publication of editorials in the Iranian press. In some newspapers, editorials are usually by-lined. In the other press, opinions are published in the form of an editorial which reflect the official policy of the respective newspaper.

<sup>2</sup> It is remarkable to mention here that the nuclear issue came to the spotlight of the Iranian media in 2006 when the United Nations Security Council imposed its first resolution (Resolution 1696) on Iran, demanding that it suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities or face sanctions. The reason the researcher selected only two editorials on the nuclear issue is because the nuclear issue was brought into the limelight of Iranian newspapers during Conservatism when President Ahmadinejad was in power.

supportive of Iran's two main political wings: Reformists and Conservatives. However, due to the absence or shortage of the archives of pro-Reform newspapers, the researcher ultimately decided to select Ettelaat, Hamshahri, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami. These newspapers are considered "mainstream" and have large circulations. "Iran" is owned and funded by the government. The other three are owned and funded by organs not affiliated with the government. Like some other countries in the Middle East, newspapers in Iran are under the strict regulation and control of the government and are monitored constantly by the Ministry of Culture for any probable breach of related laws and regulations including the Press Law. As per the law, newspapers in Iran should apply for a publication permit with the government. Like the Defence Advisory (DA) Notice system in Britain, Iranian newspapers are also required to follow the notices of the government on different occasions to publish or not publish a news story especially when it comes to foreign policy issues.

Ettelaat is more than 70 years old. In fact, it is the oldest Iranian newspaper being published to date. It was first published in 11 July 1926 in Tehran. It is a daily newspaper which was first published in two pages and 500 issues. It is currently affiliated with the Leader's Office and the Foundation for the Needy People (Bonyad-e Mostazafan). As a mainstream Iranian newspaper, Ettelaat currently publishes 20 pages. It has an international edition called "Ettelaat International" which is published in London. Ettelaat is in fact a multi-purpose publishing house which also publishes books and journals. It digitally archives its newspaper issues, which is a strong point when compared with other Iranian newspapers. Ettelaat is among the very few Iranian newspapers with a stable managerial structure and human resources. Ettelaat has never been closed down by the government. In a research done in 1991 by Shoar-Ghaffari, the content analysis of Ettelaat indicated that 61 per cent of the "foreign news" published in the newspaper during a 10-year period was supplied by four major Western news agencies (AP, UPI, AFP and Reuters)<sup>2</sup>. It was also

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<sup>1</sup> A great deal of effort was made to access the archived copies of pro-Reform newspapers. However, due to logistic or political reasons, no archived copies of many pro-Reform newspapers were available. Many such papers had been closed down completely. Some others were temporarily shut down for months or even years, resulting in disruption in publication. Officials or owners of the pro-Reform press were either not available for interview or declined to comment. The researcher contacted the offices of pro-Reform newspapers. They were either closed or had not kept an archive of past issues. The researcher was referred to the National Library of Iran which kept most issues of past newspapers including those of pro-Reform press. However, access was extremely restricted to the archive of pro-Reform newspapers. Not all the copies of pro-Reform newspapers were available. According to the library rules, only six pages of each newspaper per day were accessible to the members. No photography or photocopy was allowed. It could take months to collect the required data from the library. Therefore, considering into account such limitations, the researcher decided in consultation with supervisors to drop pro-Reform newspapers.

<sup>2</sup> More specifically, this content analysis showed the coverage of the West in Ettelaat increased by two per cent during the first and second five-year period. Shoar-Ghaffari (1991:8) suggests this was because during that period "the internal affairs of the country were perceived as more important than the events outside Iran".

demonstrated that Ettelaat placed a great emphasis on covering the news of the Islamic world and promoted opposition to superpower influence around the world. The research concluded that Ettelaat, during 1979-1988, depicted a negative image of the US. Ettelaat usually publishes a variety of news in its international page. Although Ettelaat is affiliated with the Leader's Office and is usually described as a non-aligned paper, it was pro-Conservative during 1997-2002 and pro-Reform during 2005-2008.

Hamshahri is the largest circulated newspaper in Iran and is the first newspaper published in colour. It was first published on 15 December 1992. It is affiliated with the Municipality of Tehran. Its circulation in 2009 was about 500,000 issues. As a mainstream newspaper, Hamshahri publishes 18 "supplements" and magazines. Its "Zamimeh" (supplement) is the most popular advertisement supplement which is published, usually in more than 120 pages, every day in Tehran. Hamshahri publishes books and periodicals. Hamshahri was among the pioneers of publishing online versions. It has a digital archive which is sold out every three months. No research has been conducted to study how Hamshahri portrays the West. It has an international news page which usually publishes news in brief and analysis on the issues of the day. The main focus of Hamshahri newspaper is on the news of urban development and municipal issues. Hamshahri tries to portray itself as siding with no group and party; However, on some occasions, especially during Conservatism when there was differences between the government and Tehran Municipality over the former's budget (subsidies), it has published articles against the government. Hamshahri was pro-Reform during 1997-2002 and pro-Conservative during 2005-2008.

"Iran" is the first colour Iranian newspaper with Arabic and English versions.. It is the only Iranian newspaper which is officially owned by the government and is published by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). As a mainstream Iranian newspaper, "Iran" publishes several other publications including an Arabic and an English language newspaper as well as a sports-specific daily paper. "Iran", like its licence holder "IRNA", has been pregnant with developments (particularly sudden changes of managers) which have affected its work, employees and policy as the result of the power struggle inside the government. For example, this newspaper was closed down for more than six months under the pretext of publishing a cartoon believed to have insulted Azaris. Like IRNA, "Iran" was a "tool for retaliation" in the hands of the government ministers. In the latest example of this struggle for power, the managing director of IRNA and "Iran" (who was also the Press

Advisor to the President) was imprisoned in 2012 while at home watching Ahmadinejad's speech at the UN General Assembly. "Iran" has archived some of its issues digitally on DVD. "Iran" adopted a pro-Reform policy during 1997-2002, and a pro-Conservative approach during 2005-2008.

Jomhuriy-e Eslami is the first Iranian newspaper published after the 1979 revolution. Jomhuriy-e Eslami was first published in 30 May 1979. It is the first newspaper which was published immediately after the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. "Preserving the causes of the Muslim and revolutionary people of Iran" has been declared as the main aim of this mainstream Iranian newspaper. Iran's Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is the licence holder of Jomhuriy-e Eslami. It was primarily the mouthpiece of the Islamic Republic Party, which was later dissolved. It is a daily newspaper in 16 pages, with a circulation of about 100,000 issues. No research has been conducted to study how it depicts the West. It digitally archives its past issues. Jomhuriy-e Eslami is the only Iranian newspaper which has all its issues right from the beginning of its publication available on CD. It has been having a one-time cleric managing director since 1981. Jomhuriy-e Eslami says its political direction is to "raise public awareness in areas of society and politics and promote the culture of the Iranian nation". Jomhuriy-e Eslami adopted a non-aligned policy during 2005-2008. However, it was pro-Conservative during 1997-2002.

These four newspapers have published almost continually since their first publication. They are also among the oldest Iranian newspapers which have good publication and editorial facilities including a large number of staffers and several subsidiary publications. All the four newspapers had their past copies digitally archived. The archive of the copies published during the period of study was bought in the form of CD or DVD from the newspapers' headquarters in Tehran. There were gaps in the sample which were filled from other sources including the National Library of Iran and the Library of the Iranian parliament.

The data for this research included the sampling of news stories about the West published in the four mainstream newspapers during the two different four-year political periods: Reformism (1997, 1999, 2000 and 2001) and Conservatism (2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008)<sup>1</sup>. The Reformist Period corresponds to the period when pro-Reform Mohammad Khatami was president. The Conservative Period is when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a pro-Conservative hardliner, was president.

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<sup>1</sup> The year 1998 was excluded from the Reformist period because no major development happened between Iran and the West in that period.

The sampling statistical population included the entire newspapers published in 1997, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. However, since content analysing such a great number of newspapers and news items (big population) requires a great deal of time and effort and is almost impossible to implement, the researcher had to draw a smaller representative sample from the population which could also be generalised to the whole population. For content analysis to be generalisable to the population, the sample should be randomly selected. This means “every element (unit) in the population must have an equal chance of being selected” (Neuendorf, 2002:83).

For this purpose, “systematic random sampling” was chosen as the sampling method for this research. It consists of selecting every Nth unit. For systematic sampling to be random, it should start with a random start, for example, between 1 and N. Therefore, a random day in a week was chosen. A random start number was also chosen: 6. Since Iranian newspapers do not publish on Fridays and public holidays including bank holidays, such days were excluded from the sample. If the counting had fallen on Friday or a public holiday, the immediate next day would have been sampled and the counting would have continued as normal (with a 6-unit distance). Regarding the dates to be sampled in this way, the researcher identified the dates in which the most important developments happened between Iran and the West. When the date was identified, the whole corresponding month was chosen and then samples were drawn from it. A total of 26 months were chosen. Some of the most important developments between Iran and the West during the period of study included: the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; developments related to Iran’s nuclear issue such as resolutions and sanctions; rallies and demos on specific occasions such as the anniversary of the victory of the 1979 Islamic Revolution or the National Day of the Fight Against Arrogance (anniversary of the hostage-taking crisis); developments related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; major speeches and statements by the leaders of Iran and the US such as the axis-of-evil speech by George Bush or the letter of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Bush or Barack Obama.

## **v. Data analysis technique**

I explained earlier that as a technique and scientific tool, content analysis involves specialised procedures. In other words, in order to do a content analysis, the desired text should be first coded or broken down into the so-called “manageable categories”.

Categories are then identified and defined. The coding takes place next and results are analysed.

A similar procedure was adopted for the purpose of the present research. Having drawn the statistical sample, the researcher devised the coding scheme which consists of a codebook and a coding sheet (form). Codebook consists of the “theoretical” (conceptual) and “operational” definitions. After defining the categories in the codebook, the researcher developed the coding sheet. It consists of categories of variables to be examined. After several revisions and consultation with supervisors, a total of 29 categories were defined based on variables and research questions. The final version of categories was then defined and entered in SPSS. Five main Wes-related news themes were also selected for analysis: “Iran nuclear case”, “terrorism”, “hypocrisy”, “animosity” and “arrogance and colonialism”.

A total of 2,138 news items in 365 newspaper issues were coded in SPSS. Related frequency tables and test of significance (Chi-Square) were taken from and applied in SPSS1. The Chi-square test was conducted to address the research questions and test the hypotheses. The Chi-square test is used to compare the observed frequencies of cases found in one variable in two or more unrelated samples or categories of another variable. It is also used to compare the observed frequencies of cases with those expected in a variable which has more than two categories2.

In SPSS, in order to take the Chi-Square test and find relationships between pairs of variables, crosstabulation is used. Crosstabulation is one of the most frequently used ways of demonstrating the presence or absence of a relationship. It is also used to show the level of statistical significance in a relationship. If the  $p$  value or the significance level or probability (Asymptotic Significance) is bigger than 0.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected (and the research hypothesis proved) and therefore there is no statistically significant relationship between variables, meaning that there is more than a 5 per cent chance that there is no relationship in the population3. It also indicates that we are more

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1 Chi-Square test is used to test the significance. The Chi-Square test is based on differences between the Observed Frequency (counts for each cell in the table) and the Expected Frequency (which is calculated by the null of “no association” between the two variables).

2 There is a restriction on using the Chi-Square test when expected frequencies are small. The Chi-Square test should not be used when any expected frequency is smaller than 1 or when more than 20 per cent of the expected frequencies are smaller than 5. In other words, if the expected frequencies are less than five, the researcher has to either combine or merge related categories or use binominal test should be used instead.

3 The significance level relates to the probability that the researcher might be making a false inference. For example, if we say that the computed Chi-Square values is significant that the 0.05 level, we are saying that we would expect that a maximum of 5 in every 100 possible randomly selected samples that could be drawn from a population might appear to yield a relationship between two variables when in fact there is no

than 95 per cent confident in generalising the finding to all the population. If it is smaller or equal to the conventional cut-off level of 0.05, then it fails to reject the null hypothesis (and the research hypothesis is rejected) and therefore the relationship between the variables is not statistically significant. The larger the Chi-Square value, the more significant the relationship<sup>1</sup>.

## **vi. Test of reliability**

The reliability test is conducted to see to what degree our measure is consistent over time. In other words, reliability is calculated to understand the extent a “measuring procedure yields the same results on repeated trials” (Neuendorf, 2002:112) In content analysis, reliability test is performed to measure the amount of agreement or correspondence among two or more coders when doing the coding on variables (which is called “intercoder reliability”).

Test of reliability is usually carried out for variables which are hard to measure during the coding procedure. For example, variables which require the coder’s judgement in coding should be tested for reliability. There is little consensus among scholars as to what constitutes an acceptable level of intercoder reliability for each variable. A general rule, according to Ellis (1994, as cited in Neuendorf, 2002:143), is that a reliability degree of more than 75 per cent (0.75) is acceptable and shows that the measure has been reliable.

There are several ways to test reliability. The most popular coefficients are Scott’s pi, Cohen’s kappa, Krippendorff’s alpha, Spearman rho and Pearson r. The researcher for this thesis adopted the Scott’s pi formula:

$$\text{Scott's pi} = \frac{\text{PAO} - \text{PAE}}{1 - \text{PAO}}$$

where, PAO is proportion agreement observed,

PAE is proportion agreement expected

To do the reliability test, the researcher selected three variables which require some sort of judgement by coders while measuring them: Dominant stereotype of the West; Story direction towards Iran-West relations; Image of the West in the story.

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relationship between them in that population.

<sup>1</sup> The most frequently used conventional levels of significance include:

- Less than 0.001: Probability that a tested relationship occurred by chance is less than 0.001, or 1 in 1000, or 0.1 per cent
- Less than .01: Probability that a tested relationship occurred by chance is less than 0.01, or 1 in 100, or 1 per cent
- Less than 0.05: Probability that a tested relationship occurred by chance is less than 0.05, or 1 in 20, or 5 per cent

SPSS uses the 5 per cent significance level as its default.

Fifteen per cent of the total number of items was sampled randomly for the reliability test (Total number of items content analysed: 2138 news items; Total number of items sampled randomly for reliability test: 320 news items). They were given to an independent analyser for re-analysis. She was given the coding sheet and instructions on how to do the coding.

The primary frequency tables of the three variables (RQs 16, 18 and 23) were taken in the SPSS. The Expected agreement percentage (PAE) was calculated for each variable:

RQ16:

$$Pe: (0.082)^2 + (0.071)^2 + (0.046)^2 + (0.80)^2 = 0.006724 + 0.005041 + 0.002116 + 0.64 = 0.653881$$

RQ18:

$$Pe: (0.091)^2 + (0.12)^2 + (0.055)^2 + (0.73)^2 = 0.008281 + 0.0144 + 0.003025 + 0.5329 = 0.5585$$

RQ23:

$$Pe: (0.036)^2 + (0.43)^2 + (0.34)^2 + (0.005)^2 + (0.17)^2 + (0.005)^2 = 0.001296 + 0.1849 + 0.1156 + 0.000025 + 0.0289 + 0.000025 = 0.330746$$

Then the observer agreement percentage (PAO) was also calculated based on the number of agreements between the two coders:

RQ16:

315 AGREEMENTS

$$PAO = 315 * 100 / 320 = 0.98$$

RQ18:

313 AGREEMENTS

$$PAO = 313 * 100 / 320 = 0.97$$

RQ23:

306 AGREEMENTS

$$\text{PAO} = 306 * 100 / 320 = 0.95$$

The intercoder reliability test was conducted based on the Scott's Pi formula:

RQ16:

$$\text{Scott's Pi: } 0.98 - 0.65 / 1 - 0.65 = 0.94$$

RQ18:

$$\text{Scott's Pi: } 0.97 - 0.55 / 1 - 0.55 = 0.93$$

RQ23:

$$\text{Scott's Pi: } 0.95 - 0.33 / 1 - 0.33 = 0.92$$

Results of the reliability test indicate a reliability coefficient of more than 75 per cent, which could be concluded as being highly reliable.

## **Chapter 5: Results and findings**

### **iii. Content analysis**

- a. Main Research Questions tables

### **iv. Critical discourse analysis**

- a. Iran-US talks: Contextualisation

1. Text 1: Iran-US relations ; Confrontation of negotiation
2. Text 2: Iran-US relation
3. Text 3: Clear and frank!
4. Text 4: An introduction to dialogue among civilisations

- b. Iran's nuclear issue: Contextualisation

1. Text 5: Active diplomacy; the better option
2. Text 6: What is the end of Iran's nuclear case?

## **Chapter 5: Results and findings**

As explained in Chapter 4, three types of research questions were defined: Descriptive, analytical and main research questions. In this chapter, related SPSS tables, results and findings are presented based on the five main themes: “Iran nuclear case”, “terrorism”, “hypocrisy”, “animosity” and “arrogance and colonialism”<sup>1</sup>.

### **Main Research Questions tables**

Main research questions include the investigation of the impact of political period on the representation of the West in Ettelaat, Hamshahri, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami newspapers (in terms of difference). Related results are described in the form of statistical tables in the Main Research Questions (MRQ) sections<sup>2</sup>.

#### **Main question (Difference):**

Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation or framing of the West in Ettelaat/Hamshahri/Iran/Jomhouriy-e Eslami during Reformism and the representation of the West in Ettelaat/Hamshahri/Iran/Jomhouriy-e Eslami during Conservatism? In other words, did media from two different political systems differ significantly in their coverage of issues related to the West?

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<sup>1</sup> Questions asked for each theme include the following:

- What is the position of the four newspapers regarding the Western confrontation with this theme?
- Does this position differ in the two periods?
- Does this position differ in newspapers with different affiliations?
- What phrases/concepts are used to describe the Western confrontation with this theme?
- What are the reasons behind such a representation? What factors are involved? What is the analysis? How does this theme affect the representation of the West?

## Overall Result

**Representation of the West**=In terms of story layout/story page/method of story produced/primary Western country involved/dominant political theme/dominant stereotype/story direction towards Western relations/image of the West

**Is there a significant statistical difference between the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?**

	Representation	significant statistical difference							
		Yes				No			
	Name of newspaper*	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
1	story layout		√		√	√		√	
2	story page	√	√		√			√	
3	method of story production	√	√		√			√	
4	primary Western country involved	√			√		√	√	
5	dominant political theme	√	√		√			√	
6	dominant stereotype				√	√	√	√	
7	story direction towards Western relations		√	√		√			√
8	image of the West	√	√	√	√				
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>

\*Name of newspaper: 1= Ettelaat, 2=Iran, 3=Hamshahri, 4=Jomhouriy-e Eslami

According to the above table, the representation of the West was significantly different during Reformism and Conservatism in Jomhouriy-e Eslami, Iran and Ettelaat. However the representation of the West did not have any statistically-significant difference during Reformism and Conservatism in Hamshahri.

## i. Content Analysis

### a. Main research questions tables:

**MRQA1: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story layout in Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?**

**RQ4 Story Layout \* RQ2 Publication Period \* RQ1 Name of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

RQ1 Name of Newspaper				RQ2 Publication Period		Total
				Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
Ettelaat	RQ4 Story Layout	Main headline of page (Lead Story)	Count	12	33	45
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	10.7%	11.7%	11.4%
	Top half page	Count	70	180	250	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	62.5%	63.6%	63.3%	
	Bottom half page	Count	30	70	100	
% within RQ2 Publication Period		26.8%	24.7%	25.3%		
Total	Count	112	283	395		
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Iran	RQ4 Story Layout	Main headline of page (Lead Story)	Count	27	37	64
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	18.6%	11.5%	13.7%
	Top half page	Count	93	197	290	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	64.1%	61.4%	62.2%	
	Bottom half page	Count	25	87	112	
% within RQ2 Publication Period		17.2%	27.1%	24.0%		
Total	Count	145	321	466		
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Hamshahri	RQ4 Story Layout	Main headline of page (Lead Story)	Count	20	42	62
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	15.9%	14.3%	14.8%
	Top half page	Count	61	152	213	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	48.4%	51.9%	50.8%	
	Bottom half page	Count	45	99	144	
% within RQ2 Publication Period		35.7%	33.8%	34.4%		
Total	Count	126	293	419		
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	RQ4 Story Layout	Main headline of page (Lead Story)	Count	30	58	88
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	8.1%	11.9%	10.3%
	Top half page	Count	212	303	515	

	% within RQ2 Publication Period	57.3%	62.1%	60.0%
Bottom half page	Count	128	127	255
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	34.6%	26.0%	29.7%
Total	Count	370	488	858
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

#### Chi-Square Tests

RQ1 Name of Newspaper		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Ettelaat	Pearson Chi-Square	.212(a)	2	.899
	Likelihood Ratio	.211	2	.900
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.207	1	.649
	N of Valid Cases	395		
Iran	Pearson Chi-Square	7.824(b)	2	.020
	Likelihood Ratio	7.892	2	.019
	Linear-by-Linear Association	7.806	1	.005
	N of Valid Cases	466		
Hamshahri	Pearson Chi-Square	.444(c)	2	.801
	Likelihood Ratio	.443	2	.801
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.003	1	.957
	N of Valid Cases	419		
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	Pearson Chi-Square	8.933(d)	2	.011
	Likelihood Ratio	8.954	2	.011
	Linear-by-Linear Association	8.855	1	.003
	N of Valid Cases	858		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.76.

b 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 19.91.

c 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.64.

d 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 37.95.

According to the above tables, while there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story layout in Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami newspapers, there is no such a statistically-significant difference in Ettelaat and Hamshahri newspapers. In Iran newspaper, story layouts “main headline” and “top half page” have been used less in Conservatism rather than Reformism, while story layout “bottom half page” has been used more in Conservatism. This means that the West has been given less prominent coverage in Iran newspaper during Conservatism in comparison to Reformism. In Jomhouriy-e Eslami, the opposite prevails. News of the West has been given more prominence (as the main headline or the top half page story) during Conservatism in comparison to Reformism. Ettelaat and Hamshahri did not show any statistically-significant difference during the two political periods.

**MRQA2: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story page in Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?**

**RQ5 Story Page \* RQ2 Publication Period \* RQ1 Name of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

RQ1 Name of Newspaper				RQ2 Publication Period		Total
				Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
Ettelaat	RQ5 Story Page	Domestic news/politics page	Count	27	52	79
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	24.1%	18.4%	20.0%
		Foreign news/diplomacy page	Count	55	179	234
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	49.1%	63.3%	59.2%
		Front page	Count	30	52	82
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	26.8%	18.4%	20.8%
	Total	Count	112	283	395	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Iran	RQ5 Story Page	Domestic news/politics page	Count	23	111	134
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	15.9%	34.6%	28.8%
		Foreign news/diplomacy page	Count	96	161	257
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	66.2%	50.2%	55.2%
		Front page	Count	26	49	75
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	17.9%	15.3%	16.1%
	Total	Count	145	321	466	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Hamshahri	RQ5 Story Page	Domestic news/politics page	Count	27	75	102
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	21.4%	25.6%	24.3%
		Foreign news/diplomacy page	Count	77	187	264
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	61.1%	63.8%	63.0%
		Front page	Count	22	31	53
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	17.5%	10.6%	12.6%
	Total	Count	126	293	419	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	RQ5 Story Page	Domestic news/politics page	Count	102	106	208
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	27.6%	21.7%	24.2%
		Foreign news/diplomacy page	Count	185	231	416
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	50.0%	47.3%	48.5%
		Front page	Count	83	151	234
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	22.4%	30.9%	27.3%
	Total	Count	370	488	858	

% within RQ2  
Publication Period

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

**Chi-Square Tests**

RQ1 Name of Newspaper			Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Ettelaat	Pearson Chi-Square		6.763(a)	2	.034
	Likelihood Ratio		6.685	2	.035
	Linear-by-Linear Association		.141	1	.707
	N of Valid Cases		395		
Iran	Pearson Chi-Square		17.276(b)	2	.000
	Likelihood Ratio		18.529	2	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association		10.538	1	.001
	N of Valid Cases		466		
Hamshahri	Pearson Chi-Square		4.029(c)	2	.133
	Likelihood Ratio		3.857	2	.145
	Linear-by-Linear Association		3.012	1	.083
	N of Valid Cases		419		
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	Pearson Chi-Square		8.863(d)	2	.012
	Likelihood Ratio		8.943	2	.011
	Linear-by-Linear Association		8.425	1	.004
	N of Valid Cases		858		

- a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 22.40.
- b 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 23.34.
- c 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.94.
- d 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 89.70.

According to the above tables, there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story page in Ettelaat, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami. This is while no statistically-significant difference was found between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story page in Hamshahri. This means that news of the West appeared less in the front page of Hamshahri in Conservatism when compared with Reformism. The same situation applies with regards to Ettelaat and Iran, while front page stories about the West increased in Jomhouriy-e Eslami during Conservatism. Regarding Iran, the news of the West appeared in the domestic page doubled in Conservatism compared to Reformism.

**MRQA3: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of method of story production in Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?**

**RQ6 Story Production Method \* RQ2 Publication Period \* RQ1 Name of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

RQ1 Name of Newspaper				RQ2 Publication Period		Total
				Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
Ettelaat	RQ6 Story Production Method	Pure Translation	Count	3	2	5
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	2.7%	.7%	1.3%
		Transcreation (translation and creation)	Count	54	107	161
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	48.2%	37.8%	40.8%	
	Staff Writers	Count	55	174	229	

			% within RQ2 Publication Period	49.1%	61.5%	58.0%
	Total		Count	112	283	395
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Iran	RQ6 Story Production Method	Pure Translation	Count	53	5	58
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	36.6%	1.6%	12.4%
		Transcreation (translation and creation)	Count	43	136	179
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	29.7%	42.4%	38.4%
		Staff Writers	Count	49	180	229
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	33.8%	56.1%	49.1%
		Total	Count	145	321	466
				% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%
Hamshahri	RQ6 Story Production Method	Pure Translation	Count	12	27	39
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	9.5%	9.2%	9.3%
		Transcreation (translation and creation)	Count	54	149	203
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	42.9%	50.9%	48.4%
		Staff Writers	Count	60	117	177
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	47.6%	39.9%	42.2%
		Total	Count	126	293	419
				% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	RQ6 Story Production Method	Pure Translation	Count	24	13	37
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	6.5%	2.7%	4.3%
		Transcreation (translation and creation)	Count	173	291	464
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	46.8%	59.6%	54.1%
		Staff Writers	Count	173	184	357
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	46.8%	37.7%	41.6%
		Total	Count	370	488	858
				% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%

#### Chi-Square Tests

RQ1 Name of Newspaper		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Ettelaat	Pearson Chi-Square	6.717(a)	2	.035
	Likelihood Ratio	6.420	2	.040
	Linear-by-Linear Association	6.085	1	.014
	N of Valid Cases	395		
Iran	Pearson Chi-Square	112.566(b)	2	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	108.636	2	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	67.943	1	.000

Hamshahri	N of Valid Cases	466		
	Pearson Chi-Square	2.404(c)	2	.301
	Likelihood Ratio	2.404	2	.301
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	Linear-by-Linear Association	1.176	1	.278
	N of Valid Cases	419		
	Pearson Chi-Square	17.725(d)	2	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	17.720	2	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	1.796	1	.180
	N of Valid Cases	858		

a 1 cells (15.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.42.

b 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.05.

c 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.73.

d 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.96.

According to the above tables, while there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of method of story production in Ettelaat, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami, there is no such difference in Hamshahri. This means transcreation has increased in Hamshahri during Conservatism while staff writing decreased in the same period. In Ettelaat and Iran, staff writing increased during Conservatism. In Jomhouriy-e Eslami, while staff writing decreased during Conservatism while transcreation increased in the same period. In Iran, pure translation has remarkably decreased from 36.6 per cent in Reformism to 1.6 percent during Conservatism.

**MRQA4: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of primary Western country/countries involved in Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?**

**RQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved \* RQ2 Publication Period \* RQ1 Name of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

RQ1 Name of Newspaper				RQ2 Publication Period		Total	
				Reformist Period	Conservative Period		
Ettelaat	RQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved	US	Count	80	182	262	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	71.4%	64.3%	66.3%	
		UK	Count	9	19	28	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	8.0%	6.7%	7.1%	
		France	Count	10	13	23	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	8.9%	4.6%	5.8%	
		Germany	Count	4	13	17	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.6%	4.6%	4.3%	
		Group 5+1	Count	5	28	33	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	4.5%	9.9%	8.4%	
		Not mentioned	Count	4	28	32	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.6%	9.9%	8.1%	
		Total		Count	112	283	395
				% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Iran	RQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved	US	Count	72	216	288
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	49.7%	67.3%	61.8%
		UK	Count	18	41	59
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	12.4%	12.8%	12.7%
		France	Count	5	21	26
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.4%	6.5%	5.6%
		Germany	Count	5	8	13
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.4%	2.5%	2.8%
		Group 5+1	Count	4	17	21
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	2.8%	5.3%	4.5%
Not mentioned	Count	41	18	59		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	28.3%	5.6%	12.7%		
Total	Count	145	321	466		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
Hamshahri	RQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved	US	Count	99	199	298
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	78.6%	67.9%	71.1%
		UK	Count	5	32	37
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	4.0%	10.9%	8.8%
		France	Count	5	24	29
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	4.0%	8.2%	6.9%
		Germany	Count	4	13	17
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.2%	4.4%	4.1%
		Group 5+1	Count	4	11	15
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.2%	3.8%	3.6%
Not mentioned	Count	9	14	23		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	7.1%	4.8%	5.5%		
Total	Count	126	293	419		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	RQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved	US	Count	265	322	587
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	71.6%	66.0%	68.4%
		UK	Count	24	51	75
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	6.5%	10.5%	8.7%
		France	Count	24	27	51
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	6.5%	5.5%	5.9%
		Germany	Count	17	12	29
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	4.6%	2.5%	3.4%

	Group 5+1	Count	5	18	23
		% within RQ2			
		Publication Period	1.4%	3.7%	2.7%
	Not mentioned	Count	35	58	93
		% within RQ2			
		Publication Period	9.5%	11.9%	10.8%
Total		Count	370	488	858
		% within RQ2			
		Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

### Chi-Square Tests

RQ1 Name of Newspaper		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Ettelaat	Pearson Chi-Square	10.386(a)	5	.065
	Likelihood Ratio	11.231	5	.047
	Linear-by-Linear Association	5.866	1	.015
	N of Valid Cases	395		
Iran	Pearson Chi-Square	49.042(b)	5	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	45.561	5	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	30.859	1	.000
	N of Valid Cases	466		
Hamshahri	Pearson Chi-Square	9.826(c)	5	.080
	Likelihood Ratio	10.808	5	.055
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.394	1	.530
	N of Valid Cases	419		
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	Pearson Chi-Square	13.354(d)	5	.020
	Likelihood Ratio	13.796	5	.017
	Linear-by-Linear Association	2.162	1	.141
	N of Valid Cases	858		

a 1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.82.

b 1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.05.

c 1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.51.

d 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.92.

According to the above tables, while there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of primary Western country/countries involved in Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami, there is not such a difference in Ettelaat and Hamshahri. This means in Ettelaat the news about the West almost doubled during Conservatism compared to Reformism. In Hamshahri, while the news about EU3 almost doubled in Conservatism, the news about the West (not mentioned) decreased by half during the same period. In Iran, the news about the US, increased by about 20 per cent during Conservatism while the news about the West (not mentioned) decreased dramatically from 28.3 per cent during Reformism to 5.6 per cent during Conservatism. In Jomhouriy-e Eslami, the news about the West (not mentioned) and the UK increased in Conservatism.

**MRQA5: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of dominant political theme of stories related to West in Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?**

**RQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story \* RQ2 Publication Period \* RQ1 Name of Newspaper  
Crosstabulation**

RQ1 Name of Newspaper				RQ2 Publication Period		Total
				Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
Ettelaat	RQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story	Cooperation with West	Count	11	41	52
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	9.8%	14.5%	13.2%
		Opposition to West	Count	7	20	27
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	6.3%	7.1%	6.8%
		Violation of law/rules and Western threats	Count	9	28	37
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	8.0%	9.9%	9.4%
		Terrorism, war and violence	Count	31	53	84
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	27.7%	18.7%	21.3%
		Interference of West in domestic affairs	Count	4	8	12
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.6%	2.8%	3.0%
		Western support for Israel	Count	11	5	16
% within RQ2 Publication Period			9.8%	1.8%	4.1%	
	Else (bilateral relations between West and non-Iran)	Count	33	122	155	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	29.5%	43.1%	39.2%	
	Non-relevant	Count	6	6	12	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	5.4%	2.1%	3.0%	
	Total		Count	112	283	395
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Iran	RQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story	Cooperation with West	Count	17	31	48
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	11.7%	9.7%	10.3%
		Opposition to West	Count	7	28	35
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	4.8%	8.7%	7.5%
		Violation of law/rules and Western threats	Count	3	54	57
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	2.1%	16.8%	12.2%
		Terrorism, war and violence	Count	23	55	78
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	15.9%	17.1%	16.7%
	Interference of West in domestic affairs	Count	1	7	8	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	.7%	2.2%	1.7%	
	Western support for Israel	Count	7	5	12	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	4.8%	1.6%	2.6%	

Hamshahri	RQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story	Else (bilateral relations between West and mom-iran)	Count	75	137	212
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	51.7%	42.7%	45.5%
		Non-relevant	Count	12	4	16
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	8.3%	1.2%	3.4%
		Total	Count	145	321	466
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Cooperation with West	Count	4	13	17
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.2%	4.4%	4.1%
		Opposition to West	Count	7	18	25
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	5.6%	6.1%	6.0%
		Violation of law/rules and Western threats	Count	9	35	44
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	7.1%	11.9%	10.5%
		Terrorism, war and violence	Count	36	76	112
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	28.6%	25.9%	26.7%
		Interference of West in domestic affairs	Count	3	6	9
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	2.4%	2.0%	2.1%		
Western support for Israel	Count	8	16	24		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	6.3%	5.5%	5.7%		
Else (bilateral relations between West and mom-iran)	Count	55	127	182		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	43.7%	43.3%	43.4%		
Non-relevant	Count	4	2	6		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.2%	.7%	1.4%		
Total	Count	126	293	419		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%		
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	RQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story	Cooperation with West	Count	21	15	36
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	5.7%	3.1%	4.2%
		Opposition to West	Count	87	58	145
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	23.5%	11.9%	16.9%
		Violation of law/rules and Western threats	Count	24	57	81
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	6.5%	11.7%	9.4%
		Terrorism, war and violence	Count	83	144	227
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	22.4%	29.5%	26.5%
		Interference of West in domestic affairs	Count	25	16	41
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	6.8%	3.3%	4.8%
Western support for Israel	Count	33	29	62		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	8.9%	5.9%	7.2%		

	Else (bilateral relations between West and mom-Iran)	Count	38	96	134
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	10.3%	19.7%	15.6%
	Non-relevant	Count	59	73	132
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	15.9%	15.0%	15.4%
Total		Count	370	488	858
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

#### Chi-Square Tests<sup>1</sup>

RQ1 Name of Newspaper		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Ettelaat	Pearson Chi-Square	24.298(a)	7	.001
	Likelihood Ratio	22.516	7	.002
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.002	1	.966
	N of Valid Cases	395		
Iran	Pearson Chi-Square	41.915(b)	7	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	46.505	7	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	9.886	1	.002
	N of Valid Cases	466		
Hamshahri	Pearson Chi-Square	6.551(c)	7	.477
	Likelihood Ratio	6.294	7	.506
	Linear-by-Linear Association	1.000	1	.317
	N of Valid Cases	419		
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	Pearson Chi-Square	50.180(d)	7	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	50.694	7	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	10.159	1	.001
	N of Valid Cases	858		

a 3 cells (18.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.40.

b 3 cells (18.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.49.

c 3 cells (18.8%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.80.

d 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 15.52.

According to the above tables, there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of dominant political theme of stories related to West in Ettelaat, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami. There is no such a difference in Hamshahri during Reformism and Conservatism. This means Western support for Israel was less used as the political theme of stories in Conservatism than Reformism. This is while the political theme “opposition to West” was used more during Conservatism than Reformism in all the newspapers except for Jomhouriy-e Eslami. So is the situation with the political theme “cooperation with the West”. In Ettelaat, the political theme of “terrorism, war and

<sup>1</sup> It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the most similar categories. Since 4 cells (22.2%) regarding Ettelaat, 5 cells (27.8%) regarding Iran and 4 cells (22.2%) regarding Hamshahri had expected count less than 5, two categories of “Denial of the Western pattern of development and promotion of the Iranian-Islamic pattern of development (Vision 2025)” and “Opposition to West” as well as “Violation of law/rules” and “Western threats” were respectively merged into two categories of “Opposition to West” and “Violation of law/rules and Western threats” to avoid this statistical problem.

violence” was used less during Conservatism. In Iran, the political theme “Violation of law/rules and Western threats” was eight times more in Conservatism than Reformism. In Jomhouriy-e Eslami, all political themes were used less in Conservatism except for the political theme of “terrorism, war and violence” which was used more in Conservatism than Reformism.

**MRQA6: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of dominant stereotypes of the West in Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?**

**RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West \* RQ2 Publication Period \* RQ1 Name of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

RQ1 Name of Newspaper				RQ2 Publication Period		Total
				Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
Ettelaat	RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West	Arrogance and colonialism	Count	10	15	25
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	8.9%	5.3%	6.3%
	Interventionism	Count	3	5	8	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	2.7%	1.8%	2.0%	
	Suspicion toward West	Count	2	10	12	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	1.8%	3.5%	3.0%	
	No stereotype	Count	97	253	350	
% within RQ2 Publication Period		86.6%	89.4%	88.6%		
Total			Count	112	283	395
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Iran	RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West	Arrogance and colonialism	Count	4	6	10
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	2.8%	1.9%	2.1%
	Interventionism	Count	6	16	22	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	4.1%	5.0%	4.7%	
	Suspicion toward West	Count	6	9	15	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	4.1%	2.8%	3.2%	
	No stereotype	Count	129	290	419	
% within RQ2 Publication Period		89.0%	90.3%	89.9%		
Total			Count	145	321	466
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Hamshahri	RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West	Arrogance and colonialism	Count	9	13	22
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	7.1%	4.4%	5.3%
	Interventionism	Count	7	10	17	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	5.6%	3.4%	4.1%	
	Suspicion toward West	Count	7	7	14	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	5.6%	2.4%	3.3%	
	No stereotype	Count	103	263	366	
% within RQ2 Publication Period		87.3%	80.0%	87.3%		

			% within RQ2 Publication Period	81.7%	89.8%	87.4%
	Total		Count	126	293	4
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West	Arrogance and colonialism	Count	67	51	1
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	18.1%	10.5%	13.8%
		Interventionism	Count	41	64	10
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	11.1%	13.1%	12.2%
		Suspicion toward West	Count	34	23	5
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	9.2%	4.7%	6.6%
		No stereotype	Count	228	350	57
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	61.6%	71.7%	67.4%
	Total		Count	370	488	83
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

#### Chi-Square Tests

RQ1 Name of Newspaper		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Ettelaat	Pearson Chi-Square	2.876(a)	3	.411
	Likelihood Ratio	2.840	3	.417
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.913	1	.339
	N of Valid Cases	395		
Iran	Pearson Chi-Square	1.093(b)	3	.779
	Likelihood Ratio	1.057	3	.787
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.193	1	.660
	N of Valid Cases	466		
Hamshahri	Pearson Chi-Square	5.518(c)	3	.138
	Likelihood Ratio	5.181	3	.159
	Linear-by-Linear Association	4.747	1	.029
	N of Valid Cases	419		
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	Pearson Chi-Square	19.216(d)	3	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	19.057	3	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	9.855	1	.002
	N of Valid Cases	858		

a 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.27.

b 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.11.

c 1 cells (12.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.21.

d 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 24.58.

According to the above tables, there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of dominant stereotypes of the West in Jomhouriy-e Eslami. There is no such a difference in Ettelaat, Iran and Hamshahri. This means in Ettelaat, while stereotypes “Arrogance and colonialism” and “Interventionism” were used less in Conservatism, stereotype “Suspicion toward West” was used more in Conservatism than Reformism. In Iran, while stereotypes “Arrogance and colonialism” and “Suspicion toward West” were used less in Conservatism, stereotype

“Interventionism” was used more in Conservatism than Reformism. The same situation applies with regards to Jomhouriy-e Eslami. In Hamshahri, all the stereotypes were used less in Conservatism than Reformism.

**MRQA7: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story direction towards Iran-West relations in Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?**

**RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations \* RQ2 Publication Period \* RQ1 Name of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

RQ1 Name of Newspaper				RQ2 Publication Period		Total	
				Reformist Period	Conservative Period		
Ettelaat	RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	17	42	14.8%	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	15.2%	14.8%		
		Against (tension-conflict)	Count	13	32		11.3%
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	11.6%	11.3%		
	Neutral	Count	7	22	7.8%		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	6.3%	7.8%				
	Non-relevant	Count	75	187	66.1%		
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	67.0%	66.1%			
	Total	Count	112	283	100.0%		
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%			
Iran	RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	19	30	10.3%	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	13.1%	9.3%		
		Against (tension-conflict)	Count	8	55		13.1%
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	5.5%	17.1%		
	Neutral	Count	8	23	6.5%		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	5.5%	7.2%				
	Non-relevant	Count	110	213	69.0%		
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	75.9%	66.4%			
	Total	Count	145	321	100.0%		
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%			
Hamshahri	RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	11	13	5.3%	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	8.7%	4.4%		
		Against (tension-conflict)	Count	9	38		11.3%
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	7.1%	13.0%		
	Neutral	Count	4	27	7.1%		
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.2%	9.2%				
	Non-relevant	Count	102	215	75.0%		
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	81.0%	73.4%			

Jomhouriy-e Eslami	Total		Count	126	293	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations	In favour of (détente- cooperation)	Count	24	39	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	6.5%	8.0%	7.0%
		Against (tension-conflict)	Count	52	53	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	14.1%	10.9%	12.0%
	Neutral		Count	8	18	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	2.2%	3.7%	3.0%
	Non-relevant		Count	286	378	
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	77.3%	77.5%	77.0%
Total		Count	370	488		
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

#### Chi-Square Tests

RQ1 Name of Newspaper		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Ettelaat	Pearson Chi-Square	.276(a)	3	.965
	Likelihood Ratio	.284	3	.963
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.000	1	.994
	N of Valid Cases	395		
Iran	Pearson Chi-Square	13.021(b)	3	.005
	Likelihood Ratio	14.717	3	.002
	Linear-by-Linear Association	1.636	1	.201
	N of Valid Cases	466		
Hamshahri	Pearson Chi-Square	10.515(c)	3	.015
	Likelihood Ratio	11.284	3	.010
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.249	1	.618
	N of Valid Cases	419		
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	Pearson Chi-Square	4.022(d)	3	.259
	Likelihood Ratio	4.071	3	.254
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.003	1	.959
	N of Valid Cases	858		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.22.

b 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.65.

c 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.22.

d 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.21.

According to the above tables, while there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of story direction towards Iran-West relations in Iran and Hamshahri, there is no such a difference in Ettelaat and Jomhouriy-e Eslami. This means that while the majority of the news published in Iran during Reformism and Conservatism were not about Iran-West relations, Iran tended to highlight tension between Iran and the West during Conservatism almost three times more than Reformism. The same situation applies with regards to Hamshahri.

**MRQA8: Is there a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of image portrayal of the West in Ettelaat/Iran/Hamshahri/Jomhouriy-e Eslami?**

**RQ23 Image of the West in the story \* RQ2 Publication Period \* RQ1 Name of Newspaper  
Crosstabulation**

RQ1 Name of Newspaper				RQ2 Publication Period		Total
				Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
Ettelaat	RQ23 Image of the West in the story	Positive	Count	12	8	20
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	10.7%	2.8%	5.1%
		Negative	Count	45	126	171
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	40.2%	44.5%	43.3%
		Neutral	Count	39	118	157
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	34.8%	41.7%	39.7%
		Negative stereotypical	Count	15	30	45
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	13.4%	10.6%	11.4%	
	Non-relevant	Count	1	1	2	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	.9%	.4%	.5%	
	Total	Count	112	283	395	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Iran	RQ23 Image of the West in the story	Positive	Count	8	5	13
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	5.5%	1.6%	2.8%
		Negative	Count	53	185	238
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	36.6%	57.6%	51.1%
		Neutral	Count	72	102	174
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	49.7%	31.8%	37.3%
		Negative stereotypical	Count	4	29	33
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	2.8%	9.0%	7.1%	
	Non-relevant	Count	8	0	8	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	5.5%	.0%	1.7%	
	Total	Count	145	321	466	
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
Hamshahri	RQ23 Image of the West in the story	Positive	Count	13	6	19
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	10.3%	2.0%	4.5%
		Negative	Count	27	152	179
			% within RQ2 Publication Period	21.4%	51.9%	42.7%
		Neutral	Count	69	107	176
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	54.8%	36.5%	42.0%	
	Negative stereotypical	Count	16	28	44	

Jomhouriy-e Eslami	RQ23 Image of the West in the story	Non-relevant	% within RQ2 Publication Period	12.7%	9.6%	10.5%	
			Count	1	0	1	
		Total		% within RQ2 Publication Period	.8%	.0%	.2%
				Count	126	293	419
		Positive	% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
			Count	12	13	25	
		Negative	% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.2%	2.7%	2.9%	
			Count	123	228	351	
		Neutral	% within RQ2 Publication Period	33.2%	46.7%	40.9%	
			Count	104	121	225	
		Stereotypical	% within RQ2 Publication Period	28.1%	24.8%	26.2%	
			Count	1	9	10	
		Negative stereotypical	% within RQ2 Publication Period	.3%	1.8%	1.2%	
			Count	130	117	247	
		Total	% within RQ2 Publication Period	35.1%	24.0%	28.8%	
			Count	370	488	858	
				% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

#### Chi-Square Tests

RQ1 Name of Newspaper		Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Ettelaat	Pearson Chi-Square	12.174(a)	4	.016
	Likelihood Ratio	10.946	4	.027
	Linear-by-Linear Association	.004	1	.951
	N of Valid Cases	395		
Iran	Pearson Chi-Square	46.121(b)	4	.000

	Likelihood Ratio	47.729	4	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	1.846	1	.174
	N of Valid Cases	466		
Hamshahri	Pearson Chi-Square	42.544(c)	4	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	43.463	4	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	3.974	1	.046
	N of Valid Cases	419		
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	Pearson Chi-Square	24.045(d)	4	.000
	Likelihood Ratio	24.988	4	.000
	Linear-by-Linear Association	13.880	1	.000
	N of Valid Cases	858		

a 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .57.

b 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.49.

c 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .30.

d 1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.31.

According to the above tables, there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism in terms of image portrayal of the West in all the four mainstream Iranian newspapers. This means mainstream Iranian newspapers portrayed a less positive image of the West during Conservatism than Reformism, while the negative image of the West exacerbated during Conservatism.

## ii. Critical discourse analysis

Critical discourse analysis is usually used as a research method to study hidden aspects of the text. It is a methodology for examining texts and the communicative process that gives rise to them. Its primary purpose is to enable researchers to ‘gain a deeper understanding and appreciation of texts’ (Chimombo and Roseberry, 1998:9-10).

Due to the shortfalls of the content analysis as a qualitative method of analysing media texts, and in order to enable the researcher to investigate how ideological differences between mainstream Iranian newspapers from different political camps (pro-Reform and pro-Conservative) manifest themselves in the discourse of a journalistic text, six editorials were selected from six newspapers with opposite political affiliations. The editorials are about different aspects of relations between Iran and the West.

The discourse analysis of the six newspaper editorials suggests that they define the West in terms of Occidental themes such as “arrogant” and “colonial” more than non-Occidental themes such as “plunderer”, “murderer” or “heinous”. In fact, the Occidental nature of the West is described through such phrases. This portrayal of the West is most offered in pro-Conservative newspapers such as Kayhan which describes the West as “imperialist”. Kayhan uses Van Dijk’s concept of ideological square to define the relationship between Iran and the West as two opposite poles. Kayhan writes in an editorial (12 April 2009):

*Our confrontation with the US is the conflict between two opposite identities. Until the US views the Islamic Republic of Iran with a superior, one-sided and unilateral eye, and does not abandon its imperialist nature and does not change its policy and attitudes regarding Iran in action, this gap will not be filled.*

Unlike pro-Conservative newspapers, pro-Reform press tend to represent the West more leniently with a softer tone. Mardomsalari, for example, uses phrases such as “the White House”, “the superpower US” and “system of the US” (instead of the “regime of the US” to describe the US. In an editorial, Mardomsalari encourages Iran and the US to reconcile (07 April 2009):

*The two systems in general seem to be still in opposite [directions] and alternative to one another. However, the two governments are aware that allegations and inciting rhetoric have not helped and do not help in resolving issues and in this stage only by admitting*

*differences, steps can be taken in line with mutual understanding and creating security and ... in order to stabilise the situation and reduce costs.*

In general, the West as “global arrogant” was the most repeated theme in pro-Conservative press while their pro-Reform counterparts refused to portray the West stereotypically or even negatively.

The discourse analysis also suggests that the Iranian press, from both political camps, are not oblivious to the pains inflicted by the West (US) on them. Grievances such as the “Saddam-imposed war, economic sanctions, soft war, cultural assault, espionage and overthrow efforts” are described as “hostile” by the Iranian press. The only difference is that pro-Reform press refer to such grievances indirectly. In an editorial, the Kayhan newspaper wrote (12 April 2009):

*US antagonistic policies in previous administrations in that country—particularly during the Bushs— colonising global security has imposed huge costs on the international community and the America itself.*

In its editorial on Khatami’s historical interview with the CNN, the pro-Conservative Resalat newspaper wrote (08 January 1998):

*Our president used a rare opportunity for talks with the people of America and exposed the crimes and murders of American statesmen in the past 50 years.*

The pro-Reform Mardomsalari, however, tends not to highlight Iran’s grievances with the West in this piece (07 April 2009):

*The two systems in general seem to be still in opposite [directions] and alternative to one another. However, the two governments are aware that allegations and inciting rhetoric have not helped and do not help in resolving issues and in this stage only by admitting differences, steps can be taken in line with mutual understanding and creating security and ... in order to stabilise the situation and reduce costs.*

In the discourse of the newspaper editorials, the concept of “cooperation” or “confrontation” is strongly under the influence of the policies of the respective

governments (as hypothesised in this research)<sup>1</sup>. Mardomsalari, a pro-Reform newspaper, reflects the détente policy of the pro-Reform government (07 April 2009):

*The two sides as global and regional superpowers are aware that the peaceful co-existence of two different systems is the less costly, more efficient and more rational solution to go through very hard security and economic crises. We should wait with patience and effort and work for more vigilance in the White House regarding the necessity of understanding the central role of Iran...The Iranian society is seeking in its various rhetoric to reject arrogance [domination] and by averting sensational moves, and by turning mottos to reason and ideology to idea and thought and culture, to negotiate within the framework of its national interest and thousands-years civil traditions, with an America which has been liberalised from the ambitions of its neo-conservative faction but is pursuing its national interest.*

Like the pro-Reform press, pro-Conservative newspapers also tend to reflect the policies of Conservatives when it comes to foreign relations. Kayhan writes (12 April 2009):

*...it should not be supposed that these days when Americans have extended their hand to Iran, it means they regret their previous doings and have changed their policy and attitude towards Iran. Given the oppression imposed on our nation for several decades by America, the new Obama administration has adopted a policy to come close to Iran while continuing past US expansionist policies, unilateralism and colonial interests.*

In connection with the establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and the US, the pro-Reform newspaper's editorials highly welcomed Obama's Norouz message with optimism although they heeded differences between the two. Mardomsalari highlighted that a "new language, respect and will" has arisen from the US side which should result in "mutual understanding". It also stressed the "necessity of [creating] change and adaptation with new global and national conditions" for Iran, and the "necessity of understanding the central role of Iran" for the White House.

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<sup>1</sup> That "presupposition" is the most frequently used technique to describe the West is another proof that the Iranian press are influenced by their ideology.

The use of the terms and phrases such as “the two sides as global and regional superpowers”, “peaceful coexistence”, “vigilance” and “rational” as well as the call of the editorial to “replace confrontation with negotiation” is suggestive of the détente nature of the policies supported by pro-Reformists in Iran in confrontation with the West. In fact, pro-Reform newspapers use the power of Iran as a positive tool to call for reconciliation with the US. Mardomsalari writes:

*The two sides as global and regional superpowers are aware that the peaceful co-existence of two different systems is the less costly, more efficient and more rational solution to go through very hard security and economic crises.*

Similarly, the pro-Reform Salam newspaper, writes in an editorial titled “An introduction of dialogue among civilisations” (11 January 1998):

*Dialogue among civilisations is a strategy with win for all. We have proposed to replace “clash” with “dialogue”. In fact we have challenged the Western world in terms of negotiations with America (although rumors about establishing relations with the US are now being exploited by some to castigate senior officials of the country)... Talks with the West on behalf of the powerful owner of Islamic values will create no concern for us.*

Conversely, the discourse prevalent in pro-Conservative press indicates that even though they highlight the role of Iran as a “great regional power” or even “superpower”, they use this analogy as a lever of power to confront the West. Kayhan, a pro-Conservative newspaper, writes in its editorial (12 April 2009):

*The US, while admitting this reality that today’s Iran is a great regional power and plays a determining role in Middle East developments and in the international arena, and while admitting the failure of Iran isolation policy, is seeking to change its language – and not behaviour— regarding the Islamic Republic...The noticeable point is that we do not need to establish ties with the US but it is America which needs to establish relations with us in order to prevent Iran’s enmity with that country and its weakening in the Middle East, as well as saving it from the self-made quagmire in Iraq and Afghanistan.*

A similar approach was followed by Resalat, another pro-Conservative press. It wrote in an editorial about relations between Iran and the US (08 January 1998):

*Mr. Khatami, in response to the gullible view that “establishing relations with the US will resolve our problems”, and also in response to greedy American statesmen said: Now, we do not have any feeling of need to establish relations with America... “In Iran, there is no interest in the West and especially communication and negotiation with the US”.*

The newspaper editorials analysed here define Iran’s nuclear issue in terms of cooperation with the West. In fact, newspapers from both political wings argue that Iran should continue cooperation and negotiations, out of the fear of being referred to the Security Council or attacked by the US or Israel, with the West, although Qods, a pro-Conservative newspaper, believes talks should be without pre-conditions. In an editorial, the pro-Reform Hambastegi newspaper writes (28 August 2006):

*On the other hand, choosing a diplomatic solution for resolving Iran’s nuclear crisis and the start of a new round of negotiations is a less costly option for both parties.*

Newspapers from both parties try to highlight the achievements of Iran in the nuclear area. Qods writes in an editorial (14 September 2006):

*Iran’s access to the heavy water project in Arak is another example of the success of our scientists who are struggling to bring dignity and progress for the Islamic Republic.*

Apart from highlighting Iranian nuclear achievements, newspapers also spotlight the “inalienable right” of the Iranian nation to have access to the nuclear technology:

*Attaining this important success indicates the true will of the Islamic system to guarantee the inalienable and national rights of the citizens of the Islamic Iran, which heralds independence and will introduce the independent and strong Iran in different sectors on a par with other regional and international players to the global public opinion (Qods newspaper, 14 September 2006).*

### **a. Text 1: Iran-US relations: Contextualisation**

Iran has been always in the spotlight of the international relations in the Middle East. So has been the United States. Therefore, there should be common interests for the two countries in the region. Relations between Iran and America date back to the late 1800s when Nasseroddin Shah Qajar, ruler of the Persian Empire, appointed the first ambassador to the US in 1856 on the advice of his wise minister Amir Kabir (Lesch, 2003). In 1911, the new constitutional government of Iran invited American merchant Morgan Shuster to lead a team of economists and financial experts to revise the country's ailing financial system but he was forced to resign under the pressure of Britain and Russia (Ansari, 2006). The two countries shared common views in many sectors until the post-World War II era in 1953 when the democratically-elected Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq was toppled in a coup engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency which brought Mohammad Reza Pahlavi into power to establish the Pahlavi Dynasty. "Operation Ajax" was the beginning of the US intervention in the Iranian affairs--a move the impacts of which are continuing to be felt in relations between the two countries to the present time. Having been brought to the throne by Americans, Mohammad Reza Shah and his successors toed the line of the US to the level that Iran was turned into the strongest ally of the US and Israel in the Middle East, particularly in energy and military sectors.

However, the cordial relations between Iran and the US turned sour after the 1979 Islamic Revolution when US President Jimmy Carter unilaterally ceased all diplomatic relations with Iran on 7 April 1980--six months after students occupied the American Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979 (Dey, 2006). Carter also ordered 12 billion dollars worth of Iranian assets frozen. Since then, relations between Iran and America were coordinated by a third party, the Swiss Embassy in Tehran and Pakistan Embassy in Washington. Later in compliance with the "Algiers Declaration" of 20 January 1981, brokered by the Algerian government between Iran and the US to resolve the hostage crisis, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal was set up to deal with claims of American nationals against Iran and Iranian nationals against America.

Many other developments happened between the two countries. However, the overview of Iran-US relations since the post-revolution period (1979) does indicate that Iran's revolutionary ideology and its resistance against pressures and sanctions have moved the country towards a major confrontation with America.

The United States imposed its first sanctions against Islamic Iran in 1979 by

freezing the assets of Iran including bank deposits, gold and other properties. In 1984, when Iran was in the middle of a bloody war with Iraq, the American government approved another set of sanctions. In 1995, President Bill Clinton prohibited all commercial and financial dealings with Iran. Clinton's anti-Iran sanctions have been continuously extended by his successors, including George Bush and Barack Obama<sup>1</sup>.

In spite of such sanctions, President Khatami decided to engage with the US. On several occasions including his historic interview with the CNN, Khatami said Iran was ready for a new beginning with the US<sup>2</sup>. He talked about breaking the "wall of mistrust" between the two nations. In response to Khatami's "olive branch", the US State Department welcomed the call for "direct" and "official" talks with Iran. However, while it said it expected Iran to "raise issues of concern to it", the US State Department accused Iran of supporting terrorism, pursuing weapons of mass destruction and favouring violent opposition to the Middle East peace process.

Views of the both sides were welcomed in general; however, obstacles remained on the way of improving relations. The American president was a captive of the US Congress which had already instructed him to adopt a tougher stance against Iran; And the Iranian president was hostage to the Conservative Iranian leader who had the final say on such sensitive issues. Westerners knew that Khatami was not speaking with full authority on behalf of Ayatollah Khamenei. And Khatami was too optimistic of the American will for engagement.

Khatami even offered a "grand bargain" to help the US in the war against terrorism and cooperate in the nuclear issue. However, his proposals of cooperation were rejected by the Bush administration only to face the harliner President Ahmadinejad.

Several months after the beginning of his presidency, Ahmadinejad wrote a letter to President Bush inviting him to monotheism, justice, reconciliation and respect. He wrote similar letters to other Western leaders such as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. However, he was ignored by them. In November 2006, Ahmadinejad wrote an open letter to the American people, calling for dialogue.

Hopes for ameliorating relations with the US boosted when Iran and the US agreed

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<sup>1</sup> In a move described by political analysts as "unanticipated", Obama extended sanctions against Iran on 13 March 2009.

<sup>2</sup> Due to the significance of Khatami's interview, the researcher decided to select this occasion for discourse analysis. Therefore, two editorials were selected from two newspapers with different political affiliation. The editorials were published immediately after Khatami's interview. The Resalat newspaper is believed to be representing the stances of Conservatism. The Salam newspaper was a real representative of Reformism. It published for a short period and was forced to shut down by pro-Conservative Judiciary.

to hold formal talks on Iraq. These talks which were held in Baghdad were the first official direct bilateral negotiations (with the presence of Iraqi representatives) after the 1979 revolution. However, these talks were halted and hopes were dashed again until the victory of Barack Obama in 2009 US presidential elections.

Two days after Obama's election, President Ahmadinejad congratulated him and welcomed any "basic and fair change" in the US foreign policy.

On 20 March 2009, the US president for the first time in history sent a televised happy-new-year (Norouz) message to Iran<sup>1</sup>. In it, Obama clearly called for a new chapter in Iran-US relations. He highlighted "a moment of renewal", "promise of a new day", "season of new beginnings", "renewed exchanges", "new season" and "new beginning".

For the first time, a US president referred to Iran as "the Islamic Republic of Iran". He also emphasised the "great and celebrated culture", "contributions of Iranian Americans", "great civilization", "common humanity" and "greatness of the Iranian people and civilization". But he also urged against "threats" and the use of "terror or arms" while also referring to "strained" relations between Iran and the US as well as "serious differences that have grown over time".

President Obama called for "greater security and greater peace" and promised that he seeks "engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect"—a demand requested by President Ahmadinejad.

Obama's Norouz message was viewed both in Iran and the US as a goodwill gesture. It was described as an "olive branch" offered by the US to Iran. People from both sides were delighted and hoped ties would be resumed. All awaited Iran's response.

One day after Obama's message, leader of Iran Ayatollah Khamenei responded during a public address on the occasion of the new Iranian year. He welcomed the message but outlined the list of Iranian grievances from the US.

Ayatollah Khamenei called for a "real change" in "hostile" US policies. He urged against the use of "the language of threat and intimidation" as well as "pressure". He also referred to the extended hand of Obama to Iran and said: "If the hand that has been extended to us is iron hands covered with a velvet glove, it does not have any positive meaning. They congratulated the Iranian nation on Norouz, but in the same message they accused the Iranian nation of supporting terrorism, seeking nuclear weapons, and things like that."

In the end, Ayatollah Khamenei said he will "observe and then judge" the new US

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<sup>1</sup> Full text of Obama's message can be found in the appendix section.

president: “If you change, our behavior will change too. If you do not change, our nation will not change”.

Many Iranian newspapers published editorials about Obama’s message and the leader’s response. Kayhan and Mardomsalari newspapers were selected as the real representative of the Conservative and Reformist wings, respectively<sup>1</sup>.

## 1. Text 1: Iran-US; Confrontation of negotiation

<b>TEXT 1</b>
<b>Iran-US; Confrontation of negotiation<sup>2</sup></b>
<b>By: Amir Madani</b>
<b>Mardomsalari newspaper, 07 April 2009</b>
<i>The “unprecedented” Norouz message by the US president, which had been prepared in view of the encouragement by peace lovers of the human society, was conveyed to the “people and leaders” of Iran as the “first step” amid opposition from the extremists and some Arab governments. This message, although repeats some allegations, is based on a new language, respect and will.</i>
Mardomsalari is a pro-Reform newspaper. The title of this editorial suggests that Iran and the US are in fact negotiating, but in opposite directions. In other words the author presupposes that negotiation is already underway between the two sides ( <b>presupposition</b> ). In the above paragraph, the author tries to highlight some points ( <b>hyperbole</b> ). Using parentheses, the author underlines that it is the first time that a US president is sending a message of congratulation to Iran. The author seems to have a positive view towards Obama’s initiative as he uses phrases as “encouragement”, “peace lovers” and “first step” which all connote optimism. Such positivity is stressed in the last sentence which implies new US policy through concepts as “new language”. It is also implied from the above paragraph that the author, while mentioning the opposition from extremists and Arab states, has welcomed and appreciated Obama’s initiative as the first step of ameliorating Iran-US relations. Furthermore, the author implies that even though allegations are repeated against Iran, the opportunity should be used to start a new era with the West as Obama is determined and shows respect and uses a different good language as opposed to that of the Bush ( <b>presupposition</b> ). The use of “extremists” here connotes Conservatives who have traditionally been opposing US ties.
<i>The detailed response by senior officials of the system to the brief message by the US president, indicates that despite the probable existence of the will to normalise relations and create a change in the 30-year situation based on mistrust, often interests and attitudes remain different and sometimes in contradiction. If in Iraq and Afghanistan, policies of the two countries are close with different targets, stances are in contradiction in the atomic issue and terrorism.</i>
Referring to Ayatollah Khamenei as a “senior official” ( <b>referencing</b> ), the author suggests his opposition to the hostile attitude of Conservatives towards establishing ties with the US. It is one of the rare cases in which Ayatollah Khamenei, leader of the Islamic revolution, is referred to as a “senior official”. He is always described as “the supreme leader” in newspaper texts. In the second paragraph, the author again brings into limelight his optimism regarding the establishment of relations with America. He again reminds the reader of the will of both sides to resume ties. The use of opposite phrases as “brief” and “detailed” denotes the significance of the Obama’s initiative as it has entailed a long response by Iran. It also suggests that it is important for Iran to enter into a dialogue with the United States. The author also refers to the atmosphere of mistrust governing Iran-US relations which has created differences of opinion between the two. He lists the main points of contention but also presupposes that the two countries can reach agreement over Iraq and Afghanistan as they are pursuing close policies ( <b>presupposition</b> ).
<i>The two systems in general seem to be still in opposite [directions] and alternative to one another. However, the two governments are aware that allegations and inciting rhetoric have not helped and do not help in resolving issues and in this stage only by admitting differences, steps can be taken in line with mutual understanding and creating security and ... in order to stabilise the situation and reduce costs.</i>

<sup>1</sup> Kayhan is known as the mouthpiece of Conservatives and Mardomsalari is regarded as a genuine pro-Reform newspaper.

<sup>2</sup> In translation of the texts from Persian to English, it has been tried to render the “exact” translation of the Persian words and phrases so that analysis would be more precise. Wherever needed, additional words are described in brackets.

<p>The author in this paragraph underlines impediments which he believes have created a deadlock in the resumption of relations. On the American side, the author refers to allegations (developing nuclear weapons and exporting terrorism), while in the Iranian side, he blames the language Iranian officials use against the US. The author also presupposes that “differences” (and not animosity) exist between Iran and the US (<b>presupposition</b>). The use of the word “difference” instead of animosity indicates that the author believes contention between the two countries can be easily removed.</p>
<p><i>The two sides as global and regional superpowers are aware that the peaceful co-existence of two different systems is the less costly, more efficient and more rational solution to go through very hard security and economic crises. We should wait with patience and effort and work for more vigilance in the White House regarding the necessity of understanding the central role of Iran.</i></p>
<p>The author presupposes that the US does not understand the central role of Iran in regional and global affairs (<b>presupposition</b>). He also blames the US president (<b>referencing</b>) for the lack of vigilance which has resulted in the status quo in bilateral relations (<b>presupposition</b>). Furthermore, the author envisages a security crisis for Iran and an economic crisis for the US.</p>
<p><i>In this connection, in the governmental society of Iran, activities are being formed that are suggestive of understanding the necessity of [creating] change and adaptation with new global and national conditions—a change for which layers of Iran’s civil society and “structural reformists” have been seeking since many years speedily through seeking rights and demanding normalisation of relations with all.</i></p>
<p>In this paragraph, the author suggests that the Iranian system of governance is based on decrees issued by the top leader. The author also portrays the Reformists’ manifesto of establishing relations will all and demanding more freedom. This paragraph also implies, by Referring to Reformists as “structural” and not “revolutionary”, that Reformists are still seeking to change the system of governance in Iran (<b>referencing</b>).</p>
<p><i>Some believe that the announcement by the supreme leader about having one vote, and his overt referring to not favouring a special candidate in the [upcoming] presidential elections, mean that a different approach could be taken out of the ballot box, and it should be respected. Giving the more powerful majority to the moderate and pragmatist head (who has belief in negotiation) of the Assembly of Experts by its members who are the most considerate section of the state is a clear indication of understanding the new global situation and determines a new [policy] line. Correctional efforts of conservatives who support (nominating only one candidate and that candidate is the) incumbent president and correctional efforts of conservatives who do not support the incumbent president (and support nominating several candidates) are steps taken in this regard.</i></p>
<p>The author here refers to the presidential elections in Iran and implies that the leader will not support Ahmadinejad in the elections (<b>presupposition</b>). The author in fact presupposes that Ahmadinejad’s main rival, Mir Hossein Mousavi (a Reformist), could be elected president (<b>modality</b>) as the leader will not favour Ahmadinejad. The reason for such optimism by the author is the response by Ayatollah Khamenei to Obama and the election of Ayatollah Rafsanjani as the head of the Assembly of Experts—a body which selects and supervises the leader. The other reason is the author presupposes that Rafsanjani is in favour of negotiating with the US as a pragmatist (<b>referencing</b>). In general, the whole idea the author is trying to imply in this paragraph is that the leadership and the Conservatives are willing to establish relations with the US.</p>
<p><i>The refusal of the former president and founder of reforms from candidature with a view towards more reforms in the future, which should be institutionalised at the senior levels (under the directorship and support of the head of the Assembly of Experts) to lead the [Iranian] traditional society to a modern law-giving society, is another indication of a change which was potential and now is being operationalised. The insistence of the former Reformist speaker of the parliament in defending the rights of the victims, and making efforts to agree on nominating a one candidate should be assessed in this line.</i></p>
<p>Such optimism is being reiterated in this paragraph which also outlines the aspirations of the Reformists. The author also suggests Reformists’ principles should prevail at the senior levels through Ayatollah Rafsanjani (modality).</p>
<p><i>This more rational-making puzzle, which is eyeing [to attract] 20 million undecided voters (almost half of Iranian voters) and trying to replace confrontation with negotiation, is being solved with the entry of the last Iranian prime minister to the presidential contest.</i></p>
<p>The author in this paragraph presumes that the current policy of “not establishing relations with the US” is not rational (<b>presupposition</b>). He also indicates his optimism that a pro-Reform candidate (<b>referencing</b>) will be elected president and that he would favour negotiation with the US with reliance on the vote of 20 million people.</p>

<i>In the belief of analysts, the last prime minister [of Iran who is] close to Reformists [and] who is supported by defense and ideological circles will enter the stage as a civil and non-military candidate of some parts of the system and Reformists, with the vote of the voters and in a national move following a power engineering in the horizontal domain. He is entering the stage so that to manage the heavy economic crisis, overcome inabilities and fight against poverty and corruption and develop stability at the summit of power to create social security and détente in foreign relations and negotiate with the world and America in a stabilised atmosphere.</i>
The author presumes that this pro-Reform candidate is being supported by the influential defence and ideological circles ( <b>presupposition</b> ) and if elected, he would revive the détente policy of Reformists in international relations. The author again expresses his optimism that relations would be set up with the US.
<i>The Iranian society is seeking in its various rhetoric to reject arrogance [domination] and by averting sensational moves, and by turning mottos to reason and ideology to idea and thought and culture, to negotiate within the framework of its national interest and thousands-years civil traditions, with an America which has been liberalised from the ambitions of its neo-conservative faction but is pursuing its national interest.</i>
In the last paragraph, the author indicates his optimism about establishing relations with the US. He recounts that the US is not being ruled by the neo-Cons who were against relations with Iran. Furthermore, the author suggests that Iran should abandon its “anti-Western” ideology while maintaining its fight against arrogance.

**Overall, the analysis of this editorial proves the following research hypotheses of the thesis:**

**RH2.** Political period (discourse) does impact upon the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers.

**RH4.** Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more negatively during Conservatism while trying to highlight conflict (tension) between Iran and the West during the same period.

## 2. Text 2: Iran-US relation

<b>TEXT 2</b>
<b>Iran-US relation1</b>
<b>By Hamid Omid</b>
<b>Kayhan newspaper, 12 April 2009</b>
<i>The US president’s Norouz congratulation, the decisive, careful and powerful response by the revolution leader to Obama, and Iran’s participation in the Afghanistan Conference, which all happened at the beginning of the new [Iranian] year, are events which have once again brought the issue of “US-Iran relation” to the limelight.</i>
Kayhan is purely pro-Conservative. The author here relates the issue of Iran-US relations to Obama’s message and the Afghan war. Using <b>transitivity</b> , the author states that Iran has given a decisive response to Obama, confirming the Conservative approach towards Iran-US relations.
<i>These days—8 April—coincide with the anniversary of the severance of relation between the US and Iran. Close to thirty years ago, following the seizure of the US espionage den in Tehran and the hostage taking event, that country cut unilaterally its political relations with Iran and the late Imam [Khomeini] (PBUH) said in a message to the Iranian nation after the news of the severance of US ties: “Relation between a nation, who has awakened to be free from the claw of international plunderers, with a world plunderer is always to the disadvantage of the oppressed nation and to the benefit of the plunderer. We welcome this severance of relations because it is a reason that America has lost hope in Iran...I have reiterated</i>

1 In translation of the texts from Persian to English, it has been tried to render the “exact” translation of the Persian words and phrases so that analysis would be more precise. Wherever needed, additional words are described in brackets.

<i>repeatedly that our relation with countries like America, is a relation between the oppressed nation and world plunderers.”</i>
The author’s <b>reference</b> to the former US embassy in Iran as the “espionage den” signifies the <b>presupposition</b> that Americans are spies. The US is depicted negatively in this paragraph as a “plunderer” ( <b>naming</b> ), using a quote from the founder of Islamic Iran.
<i>At a time when political groupings of great powers had divided countries to two parts namely the Eastern block led by the former Soviet and the Western block under the leadership of the US, and political systems had to accept the domination of one of these blocks for survival, the victory of the Islamic Revolution changed the power calculations and the passage of the years after the revolution, a third block emerged in global political relations as the block of Muslim countries in the Middle East centered in the Islamic Iran.</i>
This paragraph tries to depict Iran as a power and emerging superpower capable of disrupting international equations ( <b>presupposition</b> ).
<i>It did not take a long time that Imam Khomeini’s prediction about the collapse of communism and the former USSR materialised and the Eastern block broke. The US which regarded itself as the master in the unipolar world, did not tolerate the block of Muslim states with Islamic Iran as its centre. The US did whatever it could to overthrow the Islamic governance and the Islamic Republic regime. The imposed war, encouraging opposition, supporting separatist and terrorist movements, economic sanctions and blocking billions of dollars of the Iranian nation assets, cultural assault, soft war and ... all are hostile measures taken by the US to bring Islamic Iran to its knees but finally failed.</i>
This paragraph again stresses the increasing power of Iran, blaming the US for regime change attempts after the 1979 ( <b>presupposition</b> ). The author also recounts historical Iranian grievances towards the US and accuses it of trying to overthrow the Islamic regime.
<i>US antagonistic policies in previous administrations in that country—particularly during the Bushs— colonising global security has imposed huge costs on the international community and the America itself. In addition to the Islamic countries block, non-Muslim and free nations across the world such as in Africa and Latin America moved towards multilateralism in international relations. However, leaders of the White House are preoccupied with imposing unilateralism and colonising other nations through threats and intimidation.</i>
The US is portrayed as an enemy and coloniser ( <b>referencing</b> ) whose animosity with Iran has imposed costs. The author here again stresses the formation of a Muslim block against the US, suggesting that it is pursuing unilateralism through intimidation ( <b>presupposition</b> ).
<i>The end of the Bush era should be considered as the failure of the US unilateralism—a plan which turned the Bush administration in the world’s most hated government and caused Obama to become victorious in the presidential contest with the slogan of change. But has this slogan of change gone further than an election campaign? Have we seen something more than a change in rhetoric and literature?</i>
As against Text I, which depicted Obama’s message as a new start and promising, this paragraph tries to portray former US government policies as a failure ( <b>modality</b> ). The author also presupposes that Obama’s change of policy has also failed ( <b>presupposition</b> ).
<i>Supreme leader of the revolution referred to this in his Norouz address: If indeed anything other than your literature towards us has changed, let us know. Has your enmity towards the Iranian nation changed? Have you released the assets of the Iranian nation? Have you lifted the sanctions? Have you stopped slandering and negative propaganda? Have you given up your unconditional support for the Zionist regime?...Change should not be in words only and with unhealthy intention and if you want to change your policies and tactics while keeping your previous goals, this is deception not change and if you are thinking of real change, it should be seen in action.”</i>
Quoting Ayatollah Khamenei, the author recounts Iranian grievances with the US in response to Obama’s message. Notwithstanding, he also instructs the US on what measures should be taken in order for Iran to believe that US policy is changing.
<i>The US, while admitting this reality that today’s Iran is a great regional power and plays a determining role in Middle East developments and in the international arena, and while admitting the failure of Iran isolation policy, is seeking to change its language –and not behaviour—regarding the Islamic Republic.</i>
The author portrays Iran as a great regional power and stresses the role of Iran, while suggesting that US policy has failed ( <b>naming and presupposition</b> ).
<i>The noticeable point is that we do not need to establish ties with the US but it is America which needs to establish relations with us in order to prevent Iran’s enmity with that country and its weakening in the Middle East, as well as saving it from the self-made quagmire in Iraq and Afghanistan.</i>
The author here tries to suggest that Iran is stronger than the US in the Middle East, confirming the Conservative policy of rejecting US hegemony ( <b>transitivity</b> ). He brings the war in Iraq and Afghanistan as examples of weakening US policy.

<i>Obama is trying to throw the ball in the court of Iran through a gentle language and removing for example the pre-conditions for negotiation—which are regarded in his view as a concession—and conveying Norouz message—which contained unfounded and ridiculous allegations—and he wants to pretend under a reconciliatory gesture that he has proposed to negotiate and establish relations and it is now Iran which should decide about it.</i>
Allegations in the Obama message are referred to here as ridiculous ( <b>transitivity</b> ), while it is sought in the paragraph to imply that this message is only a deception.
<i>However, Hazrat Ayatollah Khamenei, in a vigilant and powerful speech said change should be seen in deeds. As reported by Fox News, Hazrat Ayatollah Khamenei rejected Obama’s olive branch and throw the ball to the US court.</i>
Referring to Ayatollah Khamenei as “Hazrat” suggests that the author is a pro-Con loyalist ( <b>referencing</b> ). This paragraph also portrays Iran as stronger than the US.
<i>Political decision makers of the country would naturally monitor developments in the US and US reactions. However, it should not be supposed that these days when Americans have extended their hand to Iran, it means they regret their previous doings and have changed their policy and attitude towards Iran. Given the oppression imposed on our nation for several decades by America, the new Obama administration has adopted a policy to come close to Iran while continuing past US expansionist policies, unilateralism and colonial interests.</i>
The author presupposes that the US administration will not change its policy towards Iran. Nor will it apologise for its previous policies—a request Iran has been long demanding from the US should it want to resume relations ( <b>presupposition</b> ). It is also implied that the US is oppressing Iran ( <b>presupposition</b> ). The US is represented stereotypically as expansionist and colonialist ( <b>naming</b> ).
<i>A few days before the Obama’s Norouz message! he extended one of the presidential sanctions orders issued in 1995 for another year. This order, which according to Washington aims at eradicating the connection of Tehran with terrorism! and the policy to access weapons of mass destruction!, has been in effect since Clinton presidency. In his message to the Congress, Obama considered actions and policies of the Iranian government in contravention to the interests of the US in the region as well as an extraordinary and non-conventional threat! for the security and economy of America.</i>
In this paragraph, the author reviews what he describes as “hostile” policies of the US against Iran. However, he uses exclamation marks wherever he disagrees with the statement made ( <b>rhetorical trope</b> ). Based on this, the author connotes that Obama’s Norouz message was in fact not a congratulatory message as he extends anti-Iran sanctions. The author also shows his opposition with Washington over its claim that Tehran is exporting terrorism and has access to WMDs and is a threat to the US.
<i>So how could one speak of America’s good intention while that country extends sanctions against Iran and encourages others to pursue this policy of encouragement and promotion?</i>
Here, the author believes there is a contradiction in the US policy regarding Iran. Imposing sanctions and at the same time trying to reach out to Iran is the same carrot and stick policy pursued by the West vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear issue—a policy vehemently rejected by Iran.
<i>In his visit to Turkey a few days ago, Obama did not stop accusing Iran. In his address to the Turkish parliament, Obama did not consider the statements by Iranian officials that nuclear weapons do not have a place in our policy. He did not also consider IAEA reports and pointed the finger of allegation to Iran and said: Now, Iranian officials should decide between producing nuclear weapons! or creating a better future for their people!. Are such statements and the like not the same iron hands in a velvet glove?! We should remember that US national security charter for the 21<sup>st</sup> century regards Iran as a main threat to the security and survival of the US.</i>
The author in this paragraph again outlines US allegations against Iran. The author uses exclamation marks wherever a US allegation is made. He also refers to the expression “iron hand in velvet gloves” used by Ayatollah Khamenei in response to Obama’s olive branch. Once again, the author repeats the US allegation that Iran is a threat to the US.
<i>Our confrontation with the US is the conflict between two opposite identities. Until the US views the Islamic Republic of Iran with a superior, one-sided and unilateral eye, and does not abandon its imperialist nature and does not change its policy and attitudes regarding Iran in action, this gap will not be filled.</i>

The author presupposes that there is a confrontation between Iran and the US (*presupposition*) and that the two sides are poles apart. In this last paragraph, the author falls short of naming the US as “arrogant” (although he stereotypes US as imperial). Instead he describes it as superior and one-sided which are the two main features of arrogance (*rhetorical trope*). As explained earlier, Iranians, thriving on their age-old civilisation and political culture, detest to be viewed as inferiors. Further, the author suggests that Iran and the US could resume relations should Americans stop their “arrogance” and “imperialism”. On many occasions, Iranian officials have urged American counterparts to apologise to the Iranian nation and release Iranian assets and deposits in the US. Only in this way can America demonstrate it is changing its policy “in action”.

**Overall, the analysis of this editorial proves the following research hypotheses of the thesis:**

**RH1.** Newspaper affiliation (ideology) does impact upon the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers.

**RH3.** Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more positively during Reformism while trying to defuse tension (*détente*) and highlight cooperation between Iran and the West during the same period.

### 3. Text 3: Clear and frank!

<b>Clear and frank!</b>
<b>By Mohammad Kazem Anbarlouei</b>
<b>Resalat newspaper, 08 January 1998</b>
<i>The clear and frank talk by the President with the American reporter of the CNN ended 24 days of waiting. The Western media hastily talked of a u-turn in the foreign policy of the Iranian government and its inclination towards West and especially negotiation and relation between Iran and the United States! The Western media published such an analysis three weeks ago, after Mr. Khatami told reporters: Soon I have a message for the American nation.</i>
As mentioned earlier, Resalat newspaper is a follower of the line of Conservatives. Mohammad Kazem Anbarlouei, the author of this editorial, is the editor-in-chief of Resalat who is the leading author of its editorials. In the lead paragraph, he uses exclamation marks in order to indicate that the long-awaited wishes of the “Western media” for a change in the Iranian foreign policy towards the West were not fulfilled after the Khatami’s interview. In this paragraph, he hints that there will be not u-turn in Iran’s foreign policy towards the US. In fact, he signals the will of the Conservatives that no relationship should be established with the US. And that signal is “clear and frank” for all even for the Reformists.
<i>Based on such a lie [by the Western media], they promoted the thesis of differences of opinion between our officials regarding sever or minor confrontation with the West. If we want to present a summary of the one-hour talk of the president, we should say that Americans not only did not take any benefit, but also they to a large extent had to give concession.</i>
Likewise, he tries to hide the conflict between Khatami and the leader over establishing ties with the US, and to <i>confiscate</i> the interview in favour of the Conservatives ( <i>modality</i> ). He explains this more in the following paragraph.
<i>Our president used a rare opportunity for talks with the people of America and exposed the crimes and murders of American statesmen in the past 50 years. He also removed the doubts in the minds of the people of America regarding the “death to America” slogan and neutralised the interpretation published by Zionist horns [media] about it. He said: the “death to America” is in response to the heinous act of the former American defense secretary who said the roots of the Iranian nation should be dried. Or it is a response to the downing of the Iranian civilian plane with about 300 women and men passengers who were destroyed by the commander of the US navy commander (1).</i>

<p>Here, the author uses referential strategies (<b>naming and referencing</b>) to <b>hyperbole</b> the experience of Iran with the US. He also <b>presupposes</b> that such experience is full of crimes and murders. He <b>refers</b> to the Western media as Zionist horns. He highlights two of the Iranian grievances with the US ie the insulting statement by the ex-secretary of defense and the downing of the Iranian civilian plane by the US in the Persian Gulf.</p>
<p><i>Mr. Khatami, in response to the gullible view that “establishing relations with the US will resolve our problems”, and also in response to greedy American statesmen said: Now, we do not have any feeling of need to establish relations with America. We are doing our own work and there is a tall wall of distrust between us and American administrations as the result of the inappropriate behaviour of the US administration (2).</i></p>
<p>In this paragraph, the author promotes the pro-Conservative approach that establishing relations with the US will not resolve our problems (<b>presupposition</b>). And he uses <b>naming</b> to describe such an attitude (that establishing relations with the US will resolve our problems), which at that time was being pursued by reformists, as gullible. The author also blames the absence of relations between Iran and the US on the American administrations and their bad behaviour (<b>presupposition</b>).</p>
<p><i>Having listened to our president last night, the White House spokesman said with disappointment that: statements by Mr. Khatami are insufficient for the improvement of relations between the two countries. James Rouin again set ridiculous pre-conditions for talks between Iran and the US! This means a hue and cry for nothing!</i></p>
<p>Here, the author again shows his political inclinations (ie opposition to the West) by describing the Khatami interview as a “hue and cry for nothing”. The author promotes this idea through rhetorical tropes by the use of words such as “disappointment” or “pre-conditions” or “ridiculous”.</p>
<p><i>The president in this frank talk reminded the American nation about defending values such as freedom and independence in the US administration when it was first formed 200 years ago. He invited the American nation to fairness and justice in their judgment about the struggles of the Iranian nation. He in fact raised this historical question for the American nation: If freedom and independence are good things, why only for you! And not for the Iranian nation?</i></p>
<p>The author in this paragraph explains how Iranians perceive the judgment of the US about them: unfair and unjust. Fairness and justice are two concepts occasionally called for by Iranians when it comes to establishing relations with the US. This can be clearly seen in the statements of the Iranian leaders.</p>
<p><i>The president of our country clearly defended the struggles of Palestinians and declared Islamic Iran’s opposition to the so-called peace process and said clearly that: Supporting people who are fighting for the liberalisation of their lands is not terrorism but a support for those who are fighting against state terrorism” (3).</i></p>
<p>The author here considers President Khatami’s statement on terrorism as a sign of his support for Palestinians and his opposition to the peace process. This is while the real reference by Khatami to the fight for liberalisation in this statement is the issue of terrorism and US accusation that Iran is sponsoring terrorism. Therefore, the author wants to <b>presuppose</b> that Khatami is opposed to the peace process. The reason Khatami mentioned this issue was that the US is accusing Iran of supporting terrorists. Khatami himself did not refer directly to the Israeli-Palestinian issue in his statement.</p>
<p><i>It is interesting that the CNN censored two parts of the president’s statements: In one part, Mr. Khatami defended the rights of the Palestinian nation. In the other part, he denounces the violent acts of the Zionist regime! And this indicates that to what extent they are satisfied with the interview! The CNN also deleted another part of the statements by Mr. Khatami who said the US administration had allocated 20 million dollars to overthrow the Iranian government.</i></p>
<p>In this paragraph, the author once again indicates his opposition to Khatami’s interview. He blames this on the satisfaction of the CNN with Khatami’s statements. True or false, the author claims that the CNN has “censored” some parts of Khatami’s interview regarding Israel. The <b>reference</b> to Israel as “Zionist regime” (accompanied with an exclamation mark) and the claim that Khatami’s defense of Palestinians has been deleted imply that the author regards this interview as a ploy by the “Zionist regime”. The claim proposed in this editorial (censorship of Khatami’s statements on Israel and the 20 million dollars allocated to overthrow the Islamic regime in Iran) was not confirmed neither by President Khatami’s Office nor by the CNN. Therefore, the author tries to tell the readers that Khatami should have raised these issues in his interview. It is in fact a sarcasm to Khatami that “you should have talked about these two issues”.</p>

<i>The other point in the president’s interview was the neutralisation of this big lie that he faces obstacles inside Iran to fulfill his responsibilities! Foreign media and some of their agents in Iran were constantly promoting that the president is being resisted against fulfilling his duties and materialising his promises. They were instructed to intensify differences and add fuel to the fire of disagreement. In response to a question in this regard, Mr. Khatami said: the supreme leader sets the general policies but the government executes them and I think there is no impediment on the way of the government’s imposition of sovereignty (4).</i>
In this paragraph, the author highlights another issue of conflict between the pro-Reform government and the leader of Islamic Revolution. He proposes that Khatami has removed any doubts that he faces obstacles in fulfilling his responsibilities. The <b>reference</b> to “obstacle” is related to the opposition of the Iranian leadership to Khatami’s proposed reforms such as his détente foreign policy.
<i>The last point in the president’s interview was that he neutralised the third axis of the enemy’s propaganda against our nation—that they want our nation separated and divided into moderates, traditional and conservatives or in the words of some who have been deceived inside of the country “leftists, rightists and modern and traditional rightists and modern and traditional leftists! Mr. Khatami said: moderates, traditional and the like are concepts which are more meaningful in the West. Let’s allow such categorisations happen at the right time and right place.</i>
The author regards Khatami’s interview as an enemy propaganda. Once again such a <b>reference</b> indicates that the author, his pro-Conservative newspaper and political affiliates, are opposed to the interview of a pro-Reform president with an American media which is described here as a “Zionist horn”.
<i>If we wanted to have a fair conclusion about the president’s interview, we should say that he properly neutralised three axes of the enemy’s propaganda which were described by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution in last week’s Friday Prayers. The president was able to make the government and nation of America understood that “in Iran, there is no interest in the West and especially communication and negotiation with the US”, and that “there is no division among the Iranian officials” and “the vigilant people of Iran have abided by their promises to defend divine values”.</i>
In conclusion, the author once again brings his political inclinations in his analysis. He belongs to the Conservative camp and promotes its slogans in this editorial: that there is no interest in the West and particularly the US in Iran. He also tries to tell the reader that that there is difference of opinion in Iran, which is of course not true at the time. The author’s <b>reference</b> to “divine values” implies the ideology of the Islamic revolution is Occidentalisation of the West and anti-Americanism.

**Overall, the analysis of this editorial proves the following research hypotheses of the thesis:**

**RH1.** Newspaper affiliation (ideology) does impact upon the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers.

**RH2.** Political period (discourse) does impact upon the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers.

**RH4.** Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more negatively during Conservatism while trying to highlight conflict (tension) between Iran and the West during the same period.

#### **4. Text 4: An introduction to dialogue among civilisations**

<b>An introduction to dialogue among civilisations</b>
<b>By Soroush Jenabi</b>
<b>Salam newspaper, 11 January 1998</b>
<i>With a strong logic and wise thought, as promised earlier, the president of our country gave an interview to the CNN in America. As against the prediction of some circles including the press before the interview, it did not violate the values of the system. Instead it brought the positive reaction of people across the world and in fact it was an introduction to a new chapter of the encounter of thoughts—a chapter which has been named by H.E. Mr. Khatami as the “dialogue among civilisations”.</i>

<p>This editorial was published in a purely pro-Reform newspaper which was only tolerated by Conservatives for a few months. Right from the beginning, the author of this editorial indicates his support to the pro-Reform president. Through <i>rhetorical tropes</i>, the author praises Khatami's historical interview as logical and wise. He continues to highlight this interview by telling the reader that it didn't harm the interests of the Islamic regime and indeed helped to promote it across the world. The editorial also reflects the stances of the pro-Reform camp to promote Khatami's thesis of dialogue among civilisations in view of the opposition by the pro-Conservative circles and press.</p>
<p><i>The president is following up the concept of dialogue among civilisations under circumstances where the influence of thoughts such as the "clash of civilisations" by Samuel Huntington on the world is evident. According to this theory, the next century is the period of confrontation between the Western civilisations and the Islamic and Confessiosi civilisations. Such an approach should be studied more. However, it can deceive the Western mind. Notwithstanding, it has provided the opportunity to replace the "green danger" with the "red danger". So, on such a basis, whatever allegations such as terrorism, access to nuclear weapons and ... are leveled against countries as Iran, even if unfounded, will be accompanied by aggressive or the so-called containment policies. Dialogue among civilisations will foil the public justification for such policies in the world given the fact that influential media are in the hegemony of the world powers.</i></p>
<p>In this paragraph, the author <i>presupposes</i> that Khatami's taboo-breaking interview is more than an attempt to reconcile Iran with the US but a project to reconcile Islam with the Western world—something opposed to the Huntington's theory. The author explains that Khatami's interview neutralised accusations leveled by the US against Iran. Moreover, the author <i>presupposes</i> that the US will attack Iran in future and that Khatami's interview would contain such a threat.</p>
<p><i>Dialogue among civilisations is a strategy with win for all. We have proposed to replace "clash" with "dialogue". In fact we have challenged the Western world in terms of negotiations with America (although rumors about establishing relations with the US are now being exploited by some to castigate senior officials of the country). The importance of this issue is summarised in this question: Are "we" as the representative of the Islamic civilisation going to talk to the West or the "others"? The next question is: When and under what circumstances?</i></p>
<p>The author further highlights Khatami's theory as a win-win strategy (<i>hyperbole</i>). He exaggerates about such a theory but also takes into consideration the opposition of Conservatives to this theory. He indicates that Conservatives are lashing out at Khatami because he wants to establish relations with the US.</p>
<p><i>Now the conditions of our country are different from the past. The Islamic Republic of Iran has sovereignty over every inch of its soil. There are no threats from inside or outside for the foundation of the regime. Elements of the civil society have strongly rooted in our territory. Iran's policies have been operationalised in view of the efforts of the officials. Heads of state from tens of Islamic countries gather in Tehran and discuss the future policies of the Islamic world. And Mr. Seyyed Mohammad Khatami assumes the chair of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) for the next three years. Who is more competent than the chair of the OIC to talk to the Western civilisation as the representative of the Islamic civilisation? Talks with the West on behalf of the powerful owner of Islamic values will create no concern for us. Should not we believe in our accomplishments in the past two decades instead of creating illusion and difference among the people?</i></p>
<p>In the last paragraph, the author once again promotes the policy of the pro-Reform government of Khatami: to remove tensions with the West and establish relations with the US. The author believes conditions in Iran are ripe for such a relationship. This is in fact the core of the détente policy of the pro-Reform government: that conditions have changed against the past; that the "death to America" slogan was something for the past; that the anti-American ideology belonged to the past.</p> <p>As in the previous paragraph, the author in fact suggests that such a policy by Khatami is overarching and will benefit the whole Muslim world. The author regards such a policy (establishing relations with the US) as an opportunity for Iran to lead the Muslim Ummah and represent them in the West.</p> <p>And finally, the author criticises the Conservatives for their opposition to such a policy by creating illusion and difference among the people about Khatami as a traitor to the values of Islam and principles of the revolution.</p>

**Overall, the analysis of this editorial proves the following research hypotheses of the thesis:**

**RH1.** Newspaper affiliation (ideology) does impact upon the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers.

**RH2.** Political period (discourse) does impact upon the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers.

**RH3.** Mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to portray the West more positively during Reformism while trying to defuse tension (*détente*) and highlight cooperation between Iran and the West during the same period.

### **b. Iran's nuclear issue: Contextualisation**

Iran's nuclear activities turned into an international issue in 2002 when an anti-Iran opposition group exposed Iran's nuclear activities in two important sites of Natanz (where the uranium enrichment is taking place) and Arak (where the heavy water reactor is being developed). Consequently, the West and particularly the United States accused Iran of developing nuclear weapons—an allegations vehemently denied by Iran. The International Atomic Energy Organisation was then assigned the task of verifying the militarisation of Iran's nuclear programme. This coincided with the presidency of pro-Reform president, Mohammad Khatami.

Khatami had adopted a *détente* policy in international relations and particularly with the West. The nuclear issue was a major obstacle. Therefore, he formulated a policy of cooperation with the West in the nuclear issue. He even proposed the so-called “grand bargain” to the US, expressing readiness to cooperate in various areas including the nuclear issue and terrorism with the West. Although the US administration did not respond to Khatami's proposals, two rounds of talks were held between Iran and the so-called EU3 over the nuclear issue. For the first time in the history of relations between the Islamic Republic and the West, three European foreign ministers travelled to Tehran in 2003. They issued the Tehran Declaration. And for the first time, Iran's foreign minister visited London. Under the Tehran Declaration, the two sides finally agreed that Iran suspends uranium enrichment activities and accept the Additional Protocol to the NPT so that the issue be resolved through negotiations. In the second round of negotiations in Paris in 2004, Iran agreed under the Paris Agreement to suspend uranium enrichment voluntarily and implement the Additional Protocol. The two sides exchanged packages of proposal. Such a policy was only pursued for a short time (less than a year) as Khatami's tenure ended and pro-Conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005.

Unlike Khatami, he believed that Iran should continue its nuclear activities including uranium enrichment. He broke the IAEA seals and ordered the resumption of

uranium enrichment--a critical dual-use component which can be used for both generating electricity and building a nuclear bomb. He even reinforced the number of centrifuges in the Iranian nuclear sites and started developing a second facility for uranium enrichment this time under the ground. Iran stepped up uranium enrichment. In April 2006, President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran has officially joined the club of countries with nuclear technology. At the same time, he agreed to continue negotiations with the West.

Such measures were perceived by the West as belligerent. Iran's nuclear case was referred to the United Nations Security Council in February 2006 by the IAEA and the US, Russia and China (and later Germany) entered into Iran's nuclear issue. The Security Council adopted the first resolution against Iran in July 2006. This marked the start of a long-term confrontation between Iran and the West over the nuclear issue (and that's why two editorials were selected here in this period after the passage of Resolution 1696 from two newspapers with different political affiliation for the discourse analysis).

Iran's insistence that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes was "upgraded" to a more nationalistic and broader sense when President Ahmadinejad took the reins of the country's top foreign policymaking body, the Supreme National Security Council, in 2005. He turned Iran's quest for nuclear power to a "national will" and "national self-reliance" of the Iranians and always exaggerated about the "inalienable right" of Iran to access nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The perception of "having the right to nuclear power" per se is higher and stronger than the perception of using the nuclear energy for "peaceful purposes" as the former also includes the latter.

Ahmadinejad's zeal for developing Iran's nuclear programme was heightened with the country's gradual command of the nuclear and missile technologies and the support given by Iran's leader as well as the Iranian nation on various occasions, such as the revolution victory rallies and provincial visits by President Ahmadinejad<sup>1</sup>.

Iran believes that using nuclear energy for producing electricity and research purposes is the right of every nation. Ahmadinejad is also of the opinion that the West, including the United States, is opposed to Iran's nuclear programme because it is portrayed

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<sup>1</sup> Some believe that the ultimate power in Iran's politics (including the foreign policy) rest with Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad does not have the final say. This is partly true as this responsibility has been bestowed on the Leader by Iran's Constitution which regards the Leader's power above the President's. However, in the case of Ahmadinejad, there is such a great similarity of attitudes between Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad that one can say Ahmadinejad is in the same line as the leader and his policies are automatically endorsed. In one of his key speeches, Ayatollah Khamenei said Ahmadinejad's views are closer to his than previous presidents including Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami.

by Israel as an “existential threat”. The conflict between Iran and the West over the nuclear issue is continuing to this date.

## 1. Text 5: Active diplomacy; the better option

<b>Active diplomacy; the better option</b>
<b>Qods newspaper, 14 September 2006</b>
<i>Two rounds of negotiations have already been conducted between Iran and Europe. Under circumstances in which these negotiations are due to continue next week, news analyses by the Western media indicate that Tehran and Brussels (headquarters of the European Union) are likely to reach common agreement in line with the diplomatic settlement of the nuclear case. At the present juncture, it seems that the continuation of negotiations without pre-conditions has been guaranteed and the necessity of suspending enrichment activities by Iran has partly reduced tensions; otherwise, with the insistence of Tehran, reaching agreement will become difficult and will endanger the continuation of talks.</i>
Qods has been a pro-Conservative newspaper. In the nuclear issue, however, it did not act conservatively and followed the official line of state. As the title of this editorial suggests, Qods believes in diplomacy rather than military action in dealing with the nuclear case of Iran. In the first paragraph, the author emphasises on the necessity of continuing negotiations and the suspension of enrichment activities. The author also indicates that he is opposing any measure or decision by the government to stand against the West in the nuclear issue. He indicates this by saying that if Tehran insists on continuing enrichment activities, talks will stall and difficulties will arise.
<i>In this line, it seems that the continuation of negotiations with the Europeans should be conducted in a manner that Iran’s nuclear issue be returned to the Agency—the only decision maker on nuclear issue—and be discussed away from political discussions. Iran’s nuclear policies which are rooted in dignity, wisdom and expedience of the state, have more influence on the European Union than the isolationist America.</i>
The author here <b>presupposes</b> that the Western confrontation with Iran over the nuclear issue is politically-motivated. He proposes that the nuclear case of Iran be returned to the IAEA from the Security Council. Moreover, the author warns about entering the US in the nuclear talks because he believes the situation will get more complex, difficult and dangerous for Iran should the US influences the talks, given the difficulties Americans had created for Iran in the three decades after the revolution. The author believes that the policy of continuing talks is in accordance with the three pillars of Iran’s foreign policy: dignity, wisdom and expedience.
<i>Iran’s access to the heavy water project in Arak is another example of the success of our scientists who are struggling to bring dignity and progress for the Islamic Republic. Attaining this important success indicates the true will of the Islamic system to guarantee the inalienable and national rights of the citizens of the Islamic Iran, which heralds independence and will introduce the independent and strong Iran in different sectors on a par with other regional and international players to the global public opinion.</i>
On such a basis, the author in this paragraph suggests that if negotiations succeed, Iran will be represented as a powerful nation on a par with other regional and international players.
<i>At the present time and in pursuit of the negotiation diplomacy, the gap among the permanent members of the Security Council has gone deeper, as the cautious stances of China and Russia and the soft tone of France and its positive attitude towards China and Russia have turned Iran’s nuclear case into a major challenge in the relations between the US and Europe—a challenge which has kept the nuclear case in tangle between Vienna and New York. Koffi Annan told Financial Times that: the government of Iran is very confident either true or false. This country will not bow and has been prepared for the worst. On the other hand, no diversion has been reported in Iran’s nuclear activities by the Agency inspectors and ElBaradie. Amr Musa, the secretary general of the Arab League, has said that Iran’s nuclear case is not a threat for the Middle East, therefore, it is evident that Iran’s efforts and defending its nuclear performance is within the legal framework of the Agency.</i>
In this paragraph, the author talks about the prospects of the settlement of the nuclear case of Iran in view of several reasons: 1- the drift in the EU3 and the US, 2- Iran’s confidence not to bow to the pressures, 3- and the approval by the IAEA and the Arab League that nuclear activities of Iran are not a threat. In fact, the author tries to tell the reader that Iran’s nuclear activities are legal and therefore Iran can defend its rights.
<i>The unavoidable welcome by the US of the recent negotiations between Iran and the EU and the cautious statement by the latter indicate that preliminary progress in Tehran-Brussels talks has increased hopes that Iran’s nuclear issue would be resolved fairly and upon the agreement of both sides.</i>

The author highlights the importance of continuing negotiations so that Iran's nuclear case be resolved fairly.
<i>Presently, it is the US which is insisting on the necessity of suspending enrichment activities and is still speaking of its "trigger" strategy in the nuclear issue in order to reach its political goals. In contrast, Europeans who have been pushed back as the result of the isolationist policies of Washington, are calling for the continuation of diplomacy and talks with Iran. Agreement between Iran and EU to continue talks within the next weeks or days has increased hopes that a consensus will be reached and the current deadlock will be broken.</i>
Here the author again raises concerns with regards to the stronger US engagement in the nuclear issue of Iran. He warns about this and once again spotlights the significance of the continuation of diplomacy.
<i>In their proposal, Europeans have clearly guaranteed the right of Iran to continue nuclear activities and support Iran against the political pressures of the US for further sanctions in the Security Council.</i>
In this paragraph, the author again warns about stronger US involvement in the nuclear case of Iran and cautions about the US pressures and sanctions while calling for the continuation of negotiations.
<i>The continuation of talks between Iran and the EU will portray a peaceful and tolerant image of Iran as a country which is seeking interaction with the global community within international frameworks in order to address national demands. What is encouraging our diplomacy apparatus to continue talks with the EU is the transparent and unambiguous performance of our country in the nuclear energy sector which leads our officials to the negotiating table without any concern.</i>
In the last paragraph, the author once again highlights the importance of continuing nuclear negotiations. He believes that Iran's rights can be secured only through diplomacy. He also <i>presupposes</i> that Iran's nuclear activities have been transparent and unambiguous.

**Overall, the analysis of this editorial suggests that when it comes to issues of national interest and security including the nuclear issue of Iran, pro-Conservative press are more lenient in portraying the West.**

## **2. Text 6: What is the end of Iran's nuclear case?**

<b>What is the end of Iran's nuclear case?</b>
<b>By Foad Sadeqi</b>
<b>Hambastegi newspaper, 28 August 2006</b>
<i>The end of August made the nuclear case of the Islamic Republic of Iran one step closer to its end. The Security Council resolution and Iran's response to the EU proposal has put this case in a dilemma which will either go to the Security Council or a new round of negotiations—each of which has a different perspective.</i>
Hambastegi is a pro-Reform newspaper. Like its pro-Conservative counterparts, Hambastegi in this editorial stresses the significance of continuing negotiations. The author warns against any more involvement by the Security Council in Iran's nuclear issue.
<i>On one hand, the referral of Iran's nuclear case to the Security Council and the imposition of sanctions calling for the suspension of enrichment activities would enter the Islamic Republic into a serious challenge with the West—a challenge whose minor consequence will be the suspension of cooperation between Iran and the IAEA and the start of industrial enrichment. On the other hand, choosing a diplomatic solution for resolving Iran's nuclear crisis and the start of a new round of negotiations is a less costly option for both parties. Notwithstanding the outbreak of the Lebanon war and the relative victory of the Shiite Hezbollah against the Israeli army have partly overshadowed equations regarding the nuclear case. This event has seriously reduced the possibility of the success of a military action against Iran and has simultaneously strengthened the position of anti-war currents in the public opinion and the world governments.</i>
The author sees the enrichment of uranium at the industrial scale as a serious challenge for Iran with the West. This is in fact a reflection of the policy of the pro-Reform government who suspended enrichment as against the policy of the incumbent pro-Conservative government which insists on the continuation of enrichment. Again, the author calls for the continuation of negotiations under circumstances in which the success of a military option against Iran seems partially limited.
<i>Moreover, it has encouraged the West to accept that the key to resolving the Middle East crisis should be found in Tehran. In response, Iran has actively encountered with the EU package and its proposals have been perceived positively and based on national interests in Iran. Even the issue of suspension within the framework of negotiations which can make confidence-building possible for the parties has been taken into consideration. And even its possibility has not been completely rejected by the officials of the system.</i>

<p>Here the author once again calls on the pro-Conservative government to suspend enrichment activities. He is in fact hopeful that high-ranking officials would do so in line with national interests.</p>
<p><i>In sum, it can be stated that the present atmosphere governing the Security Council and the stances of influential countries in this council indicate that there are three options with regards to the performance of the council about Iran. The first option, with the publication of the report by the IAEA secretary general in a few weeks time about the non-suspension of Iran's nuclear activities and the start of new activities in the heavy water reactor in Arak, the Security Council in accordance with Resolution 1696 will ratify the implementation of sanctions against Iran. These sanctions will be growing and will gradually spread from the political domain to industrial and economic sectors. The second option, given the response of Iran's proposals and the announcement of preparedness for comprehensive negotiations, the Security Council would suspend making decisions against Iran for a short while until after another round of negotiations or pre-negotiations are held and the goodwill and preparedness of the Islamic Republic in resolving the nuclear crisis are proved. Third option, the Security Council concurrent with the process of confrontation with Iran, start a new round of talks and prepare the grounds for more talks with the imposition of new punishment against the Islamic Republic which will be enforced after a period of one or two months. Under such circumstances, grounds will be paved for new talks with Iran and agreement on the conditions of suspension of nuclear activities.</i></p>
<p>In this paragraph, the author studies options Iran has to continue its nuclear programme. The first option, according to him, is to adopt a policy which will put Iran on the path of conflict with the West. The author warns about the consequences of such an option: growing sanctions.</p>
<p><i>The second and third options will depend on Iran's preparedness in continuing or stopping negotiations with the West. The author believes punishments will be imposed within the framework of the so-called "dual track" strategy on Iran if it fails to continue negotiations with the West. It seems one of the biggest impediments for confrontation with Iran, which has so far disappointed Israel and the US, is the reluctance of other world countries and in particular energy-hungry countries such as France, Germany, Japan, Italy and China to adopt a military option against Iran. Therefore, any measure considered to be ignoring opportunities for negotiations, will be naturally resisted. Therefore, it seems choosing a middle way option which will not discredit the Security Council which has clearly called in a statement and resolution in the current year for the suspension of Iran's nuclear activities and will provide another opportunity for negotiations is more likely.</i></p>
<p>Here again, the author reiterates the importance of continuing negotiations and urges the pro-Conservative government to keep on talks with the West after suspending enrichment activities—a measure considered by Conservatives as treason.</p>

**Overall, the analysis of this editorial suggests that Iranian newspapers believe in diplomacy (cooperation) rather than confrontation with the West when it comes to the nuclear issue.**

## **Chapter 6: Analysis, discussion and conclusion**

- v. Analysis of main findings**
- vi. Analysis of main themes**
- vii. Discussion of the thesis**
- viii. Conclusion**

### **a. Analysis of main findings**

This study was conducted to outline how mainstream Iranian newspapers conceptualise the West in the minds of the Iranians. Two independent variables (period under publication and political affiliation of the press) were analysed. Findings of this research were presented in detail in Chapter 5. Here, possible reasons behind the findings are discussed and an analysis of the main findings is provided based on the five main themes of “Iran nuclear case”, “terrorism”, “hypocrisy”, “animosity” and “arrogance and colonialism”.

These themes were selected after a careful analysis and review of the bulk of the news published in mainstream Iranian newspapers about the West. Relations between Iran and the West throughout the history have been full of highs and lows, forming an important element of the study of such relations. Iran and the West had a close cooperation before 1979. Such cooperation turned into conflict in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution in Iran. In recent years, the two sides have had cooperated in various areas such as Iran’s nuclear issue and the fight against terrorism. Paradoxically, the two sides have been at loggerheads over the same issues of Iran’s nuclear programme and terrorism. Iran’s nuclear issue is currently at the top of the list of disagreements between Iran and the West. The West accuses Iran of developing a nuclear weapon and imposes tough sanctions on the Islamic regime. Iran denies the allegation, saying it is using the nuclear power for peaceful purposes including for generating power. Iran’s nuclear case has been one of the main subjects of news in the Iranian and Western media since 2003. Terrorism (war and violence) is another important factor in relations between Iran and the West as the latter accuses the former of exporting terrorism and posing a great threat to the world’s stability. Such accusations and conflicts between the two sides have resulted in the formation of stereotypes such as “hypocrite”, “enemy” and “arrogant and colonial” to describe the West.

Therefore, the researcher selected the five broad categories mentioned above in order to provide a better analysis of the results. The selection of the five themes is also in accordance with the main research question which investigates the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian press.

Below are the main findings of the research before I analyse the main themes.

One of the main findings of this study is that “the representation of the West in

mainstream Iranian newspapers is influenced by the affiliation (ideology) of the newspapers and the political period (discourse) in which they are published”<sup>1</sup>. The findings also suggest that political period has more influence on the representation of West than political affiliation<sup>2</sup>.

From the communication point of view, such a finding suggests that the anti-Western ideology of the regime in Iran influences the process of news production including the agenda-setting, framing and priming of the news about the West in the Iranian press. That one cannot find mainstream Iranian newspapers ignoring any piece of news about the West in their morning issue (agenda-setting function), that mainstream Iranian newspapers frame the news based on (valid or invalid) stereotypes about the West (framing function), that mainstream Iranian newspapers highlight stories about the West in their front pages (priming function) indicate that the processes of agenda-setting, framing and priming are influenced by the Occidental ideology of the Iranian system.

Furthermore, this finding is not only in compliance with the media influence hierarchical model presented by Shoemaker and Reese in 1991<sup>3</sup>, but also contributes to it in the following manner.

According to Shoemaker and Reese model, the media content is under the influence of five factors: individual level, media routines level, organisation level, extramedia level and ideological level. Shoemaker and Reese (1991) explain the theoretical perspectives on influences on media content previously presented by Gans (1979) and Giltin (1980). They discuss that the content of media is influenced by the personal attitudes and professional roles of journalists. They also argue that constraints on newsgathering and news writing affect the presentation of news. They also investigate the influence of media organizations (such as political endorsements and corporate policies) on content. Moreover, they study what they call “extramedia factors” such as economy, circulation, competition and profitability which influence the media content. And finally, Shoemaker and Reese (1991) believe ideology also influences the way media content is produced.

Findings of the present research suggest that two more factors could be added to this

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<sup>1</sup> Such a hypothesis was supported by a set of data and statistics presented in Chapter 5. They demonstrated that there is a statistically-significant difference between the representation of the West in the three (Ettelaat, Iran and Jomhouriy-e Eslami) of the four mainstream newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism. Jomhouriy-e Eslami was pro-Conservative which turned non-aligned and Ettelaat was pro-Conservative and turned pro-Reformist. Both newspapers were under the influence of the political period and their affiliation.

<sup>2</sup> “Iran” and Hamshahri were both Reformist-turned-Conservative. The representation of the West in “Iran” was statistically significant while Hamshahri’s portrayal of the West was not. Therefore, political period had more impact upon the representation of the West than political affiliation.

<sup>3</sup> Other authors have proposed media influence models which are worth studying. They include Donsbach, 1987; Kepplinger, 1989; Schudson, 1991; Weischenberg, 1992; Donsbach and Gattwinkel, 1998.

model of media content influence<sup>1</sup>: the affiliation of newspapers and the political period in which they are published. These two factors may not fit the sort of media structure in the West, which is independent in most cases from government and is usually driven by the economy factor. However, they fit the media structure in developing countries such as Iran where the media are usually owned by the government and are under stringent regulation and supervision directed by politics<sup>2</sup>.

As explained earlier, one of the most conspicuous features of the 1979 Iranian revolution was its anti-Western inclinations (in the form of anti-imperialism, anti-arrogance, anti-bullying) which later turned into an “ideology” for the Islamic state, influencing its foreign policy. This ideology itself was influenced, on some occasions, by the “dominant discourse” of the time. Findings of this research suggest that the anti-Westernism ideology of the Islamic regime was influenced by the Reformist and Conservative discourses (unique to each political wing) during 1997-2001 and 2005-2009, respectively.

The influence was related to the Reformist (to “accommodate” the West) and Conservative (to “face up to” the West<sup>3</sup>) discourses regarding the West. However, there seems to be a paradox when it comes to the Conservative tendency in favour of or against relations with the West. In other words, while the data (from ARQ6) indicates that pro-Conservative press are against relations with the West, the same data (from ARQ20) suggests that “cooperation with the West” is the main political theme of the news. Such a contradiction is explicable. In fact, similar to the so-called “dual-track” approach of the West (regarding the nuclear issue), the policy of President Ahmadinejad’s government (particularly regarding the nuclear issue) is to “accommodate” the West while at the same time “reject” it. Such a policy is reflected in the actions of the Ahmadinejad’s government. While he continued uranium enrichment activities against the wishes of the West, at the same time he called for negotiations to continue. It is actually a dual-track policy of cooperation and conflict with the West which is reflected in the news carried by

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1 Some may argue that the two factors presented here have already been described by Gans and Giltin and developed by Shoemaker and Reese in their media influence model. However, the model presented by Gans (1979) and Giltin (1980) is specific to Western media structure which is different from that of Iran. There are structural and political differences between the media systems of the West and Iran. For example, most of the media in Iran are somehow related to government and are under control. Moreover, whereas “economy” is the most determining factor for media in the West, in Iran “politics” determines who owns and runs the media.

2 The element of control over the media has been the subject of much discussion and attention. McQuail (1984) for example has defined five functions of the media for those who control them: “First, the media can attract and direct attention to problems, solutions or people in a way which can favour those in power and correlatively divert attention from rival individuals or groups. Second, the mass media can confer status and confirm legitimacy. Third, in some circumstances, the media can be a channel for persuasion and mobilisation. Fourth, the mass media can help to bring certain kinds of publics into being and maintain them. Fifth, the media are a vehicle for offering psychic rewards and gratification (McQuail, 1984:50).”

3 Each of these discourses influences Iranian Occidentalism according to features unique to them.

pro-Conservative press. For example, when President Ahmadinejad announces a breakthrough in the nuclear technology, it is perceived by the Iranian press as a move against the Western wishes. However, when Ahmadinejad calls for negotiations with the West, the press reflect on that as a gesture of cooperation with the West.

It is noteworthy to mention here that even though it may be suggested that both the pro-Reform and pro-Conservative governments of Iran in the two periods under study tried to “engage” with the West, the spirit and nature of “cooperation” is different in each government. In other words, the cooperation sought by the Reformist government is unequal to the cooperation sought by the Conservative government. The former was seeking to engage with the West in a “two-way” channel of communication so that both sides could benefit mutually. It was a win-win game for the two sides. The latter however tried to reach out to the West in a “one-way” communication which could only benefit the Islamic Republic of Iran in a win-lose game<sup>1</sup>. To put it differently, the pro-Reform government proposed the theory of “dialogue among civilisations” in order to cooperate with the West in true terms; whereas, the latter proposed the concept of “global management” in order to influence the West and impose Islamic-style conditions on it. Such a policy is clearly manifested in examples of the interaction of the pro-Con government with the West and in particular with the US. President Ahmadinejad wrote letters to the heads of some Western states including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, President George Bush and President Obama, urging them to join the Islamic Iranian-proposed “global management” initiative to “prevail justice and equality” in the world affairs. The continued demand by Iran to “reform the standing unjust order” dominating the United Nations/Security Council is another manifestation of the win-lose approach of the pro-Con government in Iran.

Overall the data of this research seem to suggest that the West is more of an “issue” and “pre-occupation” for Conservatives than the Reformists<sup>2</sup>. A pro-Conservative newspaper provided the largest volume of news coverage of the West. Moreover, the widest coverage of the West was recorded during Conservatism. Also, the coverage of the West increased during Conservatism<sup>3</sup>. This could have happened because of two reasons. First, during Conservatism, there were more developments in relations between Iran and the West than during Reformism; second, a change of policy could have happened during

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<sup>1</sup> President Ahmadinejad believes that this is a “win-win game for all” as in view of his global management initiative, justice will prevail for all humans.

<sup>2</sup> On the basis of the data taken from DRQs 1,2,3 and 4.

<sup>3</sup> This rise may be attributed to the increase in coverage devoted to the nuclear issue and related subjects.

Conservatism so that both sides reach out to one another. Continued letter writing between Iran and the West and unconfirmed behind-the-scene talks between the two during Conservatism are also an indication<sup>1</sup>.

Generally speaking, on the basis of data from DRQs 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 23, mainstream Iranian newspapers tend to highlight “negative” but not “stereotypical” news and image of the West in the “headline”<sup>2</sup>. Interestingly, the news of the West also appeared in the “domestic” news page in addition to the “foreign” news page and news about natural disasters in the West was exceptionally covered<sup>3</sup>. While the press projected a neutral image of the West (UK and France in particular) during Reformism, they represented the West negatively during Conservatism and during the whole period of study, according to data from DRQs 23 to 29 and the CDA findings<sup>4</sup>. The projection of a neutral image of the West during Reformism is an indication of the “accommodation” policy of Reformists vis-à-vis the West.

This finding that the West is not imaged by Iranian newspapers “stereotypically” in the majority of news is very significant and interesting. In fact, it is a proof of this thesis that Iranian Occidentalism is not Orientalism-in-reverse even though the former projects a negative image. Orientalism has been criticised for untruly representing the East through stereotypes such as “terrorist,” “backward,” “inferior,” “irrational” and so on. However, Iranian Occidentalism does not portray the West stereotypically in the same way Orientalism does. Iranian Occidentalism is a product of colonialism and the ensuing response to modernity mixed with a sense of nativism and sometimes nationalism. As it will be explained in the next section, Iranian newspapers are a component of the Iranian Occidentalism under the influence of the state and its ideology. Therefore, it is not Orientalism-in-reverse<sup>5</sup>.

The bulk of the coverage of the West (particularly during Conservatism) focuses on the “foreign policy”, with the dominant political theme of stories being “relations between the West and other countries rather than Iran”, followed by stories of “terrorism, war and

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1 President Ahmadinejad wrote several letters to the heads of Western governments including Obama. Similarly, President Obama corresponded with Ayatollah Khamenei. There are also unconfirmed reports that representatives of President Ahmadinejad (led by his chief of staff Esfandiyar Rahim-Mashaei) have met Americans to discuss possible ways of settling down differences.

2 Moreover, pro-Conservative newspapers during Conservatism underscored negative political points about the West. For example, they tend to draw the attention of readers to natural disasters in the West and the way Western governments handle them. That Iranian newspapers project a negative image of the West is suggestive of the influence of the Iranian government on newspapers.

3 Notwithstanding, news of scientific/technological developments in the West was also covered.

4 However, the visual representation of the West in the Iranian press does not reflect such a finding, as in both periods they depicted a neutral direction in photos accompanying stories about the West.

5 More discussion on Iranian Occidentalism and Orientalism in reverse will follow.

violence”<sup>1</sup>. Such a finding could be interpreted in the absence of diplomatic relations between Iran and the US<sup>2</sup>. Since the two countries do not have embassies and direct diplomatic ties, news stories of relations between the West and other countries (not Iran) are being highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers. One other possible reason behind the coverage of relations between other countries and the West is the propaganda function of the Iranian newspapers which want to highlight negative news of the West, even in its relations with other countries, especially the Arab states.

Moreover, the news of developments between the West and countries other than Iran received a great deal of coverage in comparison to the news of Iran-West developments. In fact, Iranian newspapers used other countries as a scapegoat for lambasting the West in the absence of official diplomatic relations between Iran and the West.

The data also suggest that the West is being represented mainly by the US in the Iranian press. In fact, relations between Iran and the US account for the highest volume of coverage given to Iran-West relations<sup>3</sup>. The reason may be that most interaction (either in the form of cooperation or conflict) between Iran and the West occurs through the US. In other words, the West is being represented by the US in Iran. When Iranian leaders make statements about the West, their reference is mainly to the US. It can therefore be inferred that in the Iranian political parlance, the West equals the US.

Moreover, the United States remained the primary Western country involved in the news in the both periods. Notwithstanding, the focus of newspapers shifted from stories of the United States during Reformism to stories of Britain during Conservatism. This could have happened because of a tougher line of policy adopted by Britain against Iran (which also led to the assault by Iranian students on the UK embassy in Tehran in 2011). Iranians blame Britain for the economic hardship of their country. For example, Iranians believe it was first Britain which restricted financial transactions with Iranian banks including the Central Bank of Iran. They accuse Britain of “being more catholic than the pope” in pressurising Iran.

On the nature of relations between Iran and the West, the Iranian press tried to release stories of “conflict” nature during both periods. This trend was also observed in the

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<sup>1</sup>Regarding Iran’s nuclear issue, the majority of the news highlighted the “right of Iran to access nuclear energy for peaceful purposes”.

<sup>2</sup> Although Iran has formal and diplomatic relations with other Western countries, such relations are at the lowest level. Iran broke relations with the UK late in 2011 when Britain closed its embassy in Tehran and expelled Iranian diplomats.

<sup>3</sup> On the basis of data taken from DRQs 10 and 17.

relations between Iran and the US (and the UK) as well as relations between the West and countries other than Iran. However, the press promoted “cooperation” when reporting relations between Iran and the EU31. This explains the fact that Iran and the West are on a collision course. As explained earlier, confrontation is more serious between Iran and the US in comparison to the confrontation between Iran and the EU3, considering the history of anti-Americanism in Iran. It is also an indication of the conflicting nature of the Iranian foreign policy against the West.

In terms of techniques used to portray the West, Iranian press tend to give more prominence to stories about the West by highlighting them in the “top half-page” section of the “domestic” and “foreign news” pages as well as the “front page” of the newspaper2. This indicates that the West is of utmost significance, under the influence of the anti-Western ideology of the regime, for the Iranian press to report on3. This also suggests that the agenda-setting and priming functions of the press in Iran is greatly under the influence of the state.

Moreover, the data on DRQs 6, 7, 8 and 9 suggest that the Iranian press do not mainly rely on “foreign sources” of news to report on the West. Even though Iranian press do not have correspondents based in other countries, they rely heavily on their own staff writers to “compile” (other than “translate”) the news, and gather it not from major international sources of news but from less-known international newspapers and local agencies. Indirectly, however, Iranian newspapers rely on the official Iranian News Agency (IRNA) to portray the West, as IRNA has bureaus in major Western capitals.

It is discussable why the Iranian press do not rely on “major” foreign sources. The fact that the press rely on “minor” sources of news could be related to the publication of negative news of the West by such minor or “alternative” agencies and particularly the Arab media. In other words, less-known sources of news tend to cover stories which are not published by the Big Four; such news mostly highlight negative points about the West and are therefore covered heavily by the Iranian press.

One other key finding of the study suggests that newspapers which are controlled directly by the government follow the official line and policies of the same government. In fact, they tend to construct the news of the West in accordance with the foreign policy interests of their respective government4. For example, the “Iran” newspaper (a

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1 On the basis of data taken from DRQs 18 to 22.

2 Nearly half of the West-related stories appear on the “domestic” and “foreign” pages of newspapers.

3 On the basis of data taken from DRQs 4 and 5.

4 Such a trend was not observed in newspapers with no affiliation to the government.

government-owned and –controlled newspaper) promoted cooperation between Iran and the West during Reformism in line with the détente policy of the government in international relations. However, the same “Iran” newspaper promoted conflict between Iran and the West during Conservatism when the government policy was to face up to the West.

The critical discourse analysis also demonstrated that pro-Conservative newspapers portray the US “negatively and stereotypically” while pro-Reform media refuse to do so. The foreign policy approach of Conservatives (rejection of the West) and Reformists (accommodation of the West) are well promoted in the affiliate press. Newspapers from both the political camps have consensus over representing Iran as a “regional power” and stressing its role in international relations, while ruling out US allegations against Iran. The use of the “presupposition” technique in newspaper editorials of both political wings implies that tensions between Iran and the West are only “presuppositions” or “assumptions” which the press deem true while in practice they may be untrue. This reflects the sort of “suspicion” existing in relations between Iran and the West. Overall, the analysis of this editorial on the nuclear issue suggests that Iranian newspapers, regardless of their affiliation, believe in diplomacy (cooperation) rather than confrontation with the West when it comes to the nuclear issue.

### **b. Analysis of main themes**

As explained earlier, five main themes were selected in order to provide a better analysis of the results. Here, I analyse these main themes.

#### **- Iran’s nuclear issue and the Western confrontation**

Iran’s nuclear issue is the case of nuclear activities of Iran which came to the spotlight of the International Atomic Energy Agency and respective UN bodies in 2002. It continues to be on the limelight. The West accuses Iran of developing a nuclear weapon. Iran denies the allegation, saying it is using the nuclear power for peaceful purposes including for power generation and medical purposes. Iran’s nuclear issue has been one of the main subjects of news in the Iranian and Western media since 2003. The researcher decided to select this theme for analysis as it constitutes a main bone of contention between Iran and the West.

Although the nuclear issue is considered to be one of the main points of difference between Iran and the West, findings of this research demonstrate that mainstream Iranian newspapers have a different opinion. They highlighted stories (such as the relations

between the West and other countries) other than the nuclear issue of Iran. And this happened during Conservatism when the official policy of the government was to ignore the West when it comes to the nuclear issue. On several occasions, President Ahmadinejad declared that the nuclear case is closed and “we will not negotiate over the nuclear issue”. On negotiations with the Group 5+1, the Iranian side is insisting that it will only negotiate with the West on a broad range of issues including nuclear disarmament and the right of Iran to enrich uranium. Moreover, the majority of the news about the nuclear issue highlighted cooperation (than conflict) with the West over Iran’s nuclear activities. Again, such coverage is consistent with the official policy of the Ahmadinejad government to accommodate the West while at the same time rejecting it. Qods newspaper, a pro-Con, wrote in an editorial: *At the present juncture, it seems that the continuation of negotiations without pre-conditions has been guaranteed and the necessity of suspending enrichment activities by Iran has partly reduced tensions; otherwise, with the insistence of Tehran, reaching agreement will become difficult and will endanger the continuation of talks (Qods newspaper, 14 September 2006).*

Another feature of newspaper reporting of the nuclear case of Iran during the period under this study was that the majority of the news published in mainstream Iranian newspapers highlighted the right of Iran to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Jomhouriy-e Eslami, a pro-Conservative newspaper, writes in an editorial on the occasion of the National Day of Nuclear Technology: *Now, Iran has access to the peaceful nuclear technology with the aim of supplying energy. The world has reached this belief that in spite of all the obstacles created for Iran, its access to the nuclear energy is a work bigger than the industrialisation of oil. Officials and people of Iran are trying their best not to withdraw an inch from their right to access nuclear energy as according to the leader of Islamic Revolution, it is a need and necessity as part of the scientific advancement of Iran (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 09 April 2011).*

Iranian newspapers also highlighted the achievements of the country in the nuclear area. Jam-e Jam, a pro-Conservative newspaper, wrote in an article about Iran’s nuclear achievements: *The long steps of Iran in the nuclear technology have embarrassed the West, Zionist regime and its long-term allies. President Ahmadinejad has unveiled Iran-made 20-per cent fuel rods. This indicates the inefficiency of the Western sanctions. In spite of unjust economic pressures by the West and assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists by Mosad, Iran continues its nuclear achievements without interruption (Jam-e Jam, 19 February*

2012) In a similar piece, Jam-e Jam wrote: *New nuclear achievements indicated that Iran's nuclear capabilities have passed the "threshold" and is now in the "deep and stable" stage (Jam-e Jam, 18 February 2012)*

In general, findings indicate that Iran's nuclear issue is not a major player in the negative portrayal of the West in the Iranian press. Notwithstanding, Iranian newspapers use the nuclear issue to stress the fact that "we need to engage with the West". At the same time, the nuclear issue is also exploited by the press to highlight the nuclear achievements of the country and boost national spirit.

#### - **Terrorism and the West**

Terrorism in its various forms is another problem between Iran and the West. Both sides accuse each other of sponsoring terrorism. The United States accuses Iran of sponsoring terrorist groups. The US regards Hamas and Hezbollah, the two main anti-Israel movements mainly bankrolled by Iran, as terrorist organisations. This is while Iran describes them as "freedom fighters". The pro-Conservative Resalat newspaper wrote in a newspaper editorial : *The president of our country clearly defended the struggles of Palestinians and declared Islamic Iran's opposition to the so-called peace process and said clearly that: Supporting people who are fighting for the liberalisation of their lands is not terrorism but a support for those who are fighting against state terrorism" (Resalat, 08 January 1998).*

On the other side, Iran accuses the US of creating terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Jondollah which have created insecurity inside Iran by terrorising, bombing and assassinating. Iran also accuses the US of backing the MKO which it describes as "hypocrite terrorist". Furthermore, Iranians believe the "military intervention and occupation" by Western soldiers of the neighboring countries of Iran is akin to terrorism. Iran attributes any sort of violence in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Syria to "foreign occupants".

The present research indicates that issues related to terrorism (such as war, violence and intervention) are the dominant theme of stories published in the Iranian press about the West regardless of their affiliation and the period in which they publish<sup>1</sup>. Newspapers from

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<sup>1</sup> Table 27 suggests that while 31.9 per cent of stories were about relations between West and other countries than Iran (except for Iraq and Afghanistan), their dominant political theme was bilateral relations between the West and those countries. Out of stories related to relations between Iran and West (including stories about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), 23.4 per cent were about terrorism, war and violence. Opposition to West was the theme of 10.7 per cent of the stories.

both political parties describe US support for MKO and Israel as examples of “state-sponsored terrorism”. For example, Mardomsalari- a pro-Reform newspaper, blamed the US for the “*terrorist acts by the Monafeqin*”: *The US administration finally after years of hiding its support for the MKO terrorist grouplet, proscribed this hated group from the list of terrorist organisations of that country. By this act, the US added to its long list of anti-Iran measures (Mardomsalari, 30 September 2012)*

The newspaper reporting of issues related to terrorism and the West demonstrates that Iranian newspapers, like the Iranian government, do believe that the West is behind any act of terrorism in the region and especially inside Iran. Explosions in holy Iraqi cities of Karbala, Najaf and Samara—main destinations for Iranian pilgrims—are extensively covered by Iranian newspapers who blame them on the “US military occupation”. Exposures by the Ministry of Intelligence of assassination attempts and bombings in different Iranian cities blamed on the “America, Britain and the Zionist regime and their hypocrite collaborators” are constantly covered by the Iranian press. For example the news of the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists appeared on the front page of almost all Iranian newspapers. The Ebtekar newspaper described the assassination of one Iranian nuclear scientist in the following manner: *Assassinating Iranian [nuclear] scientists is fruitless...and will not cause any delay in the progress of Iran’s nuclear activities...(Ebtekar, 08 March 2012).*

Conservatives also used “interventionist” as a stereotype to refer to the West, possibly under the influence of the war factor. They were in fact fearful of an Iraq-style invasion by the US and its allies. Similarly the Conservatives had an interest in introducing the West as an “interventionist” and “warmonger” in Iraq and Afghanistan and later in Libya, Yemen, Egypt and most recently in Syria. Ebtekar, a pro-Reform newspaper, wrote in an editorial: *The people of Iraq are right in having no good memorial from the Americans despite the fact that the US saved them from the vice of Saddam. The people of Iraq are right in counting the days impatiently for the exit of the last soldier of the occupier American army from their soil (Ebtekar, 09 October 2011)*. Similarly, Jomhouriy-e Eslami, a pro-Conservative newspaper, used this headline to report on an anti-war protest rally in the US: *Protest in the US against the White House warmongering (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 11 April 2011).*

Kayhan, a pro-Conservative newspaper, attributes terrorism in Syria to the US: *The Tehran Meeting was held in an atmosphere in which the Syrian Army operations are*

*continuing in Aleppo against terrorist groups which are supported by the US and its regional allies. Also, this meeting was held under circumstances in which the West is using force as a tool to dominate Syria and change its regime. Such efforts by the West have reached a deadlock (Kayhan, 12 August 2012).*

- **The West as “enemy”**

The West is stereotyped as an “enemy” by the mainstream Iranian newspapers<sup>1</sup>. According to the data of this research, “animosity” is in fact the third mostly-used stereotype in mainstream Iranian newspapers to describe the West. The data also indicates that the Iranian press used this stereotype more during Reformism than Conservatism. One possible reason behind such a difference in the two periods under study is related to the foreign policy of the pro-Reform government vis-à-vis the official policy of the Islamic regime. The Khatami administration’s policy, in contradiction to the official policy of the regime (stipulated by Ayatollah Khamenei), was to accommodate the West. Such an accommodation policy was confronted by Conservative hardliner supporters of Ayatollah Khamenei and even himself. On difference occasions, they openly talked about their opposition to the normalisation of relations with the United States on the basis that “America is our biggest foe and number one enemy”. They demonised the West among the public opinion in order to put pressure on the pro-Reform government to abandon its policy to accommodate the West. Such public statements were indispensably carried by the

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<sup>1</sup> The term stereotype was first coined by Walter Lippmann in 1922 when he used the term in his book “Public Opinion” to describe the uniform pictures and preconceptions that group members hold in their minds to simplify their views of the world and for reaching common agreement regarding events in their environment. He argued that people interact directly not with objective reality but with the representations they have created about that reality. The term stereotype was further developed in 1933 by Daniel Katz and Kenneth Braly who presented an operational definition of stereotype. In their study, believed to be the first organised and influential study on stereotype, Katz and Braly defined stereotypes as “pictures” of national and ethnic groups which reflect attitudes toward them. Decades later, researchers argued that members of a group act toward other groups on the basis of shared stereotypes (attitudes, feelings and ideas). This theory was developed in the 1980s by Henry Tajfel who suggested that when members form a group and social identity, they tend to derogate and even discriminate other groups in order to raise their own self-esteem and status. Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005:3) went further and defined stereotype as “repertoire (i.e. beliefs) that people have about the characteristics of other groups”. According to them, at first stereotype was believed to be the “product of faulty, rigid, and irrational thinking” which was used interchangeably with “prejudice” (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005:3). However, later most researchers began to consider stereotype as an “expression of normal and universal cognitive functioning”. Technically, stereotype is a “text cast in rigid form for the purpose of repetitive use” in printing (Pickering, 2001:9). The Collins Cobuild English Dictionary defines stereotype as a “fixed general image or set of characteristics that a lot of people believe represent a particular type of person or thing”. Putnam (1975:34) defines stereotype as “a typical feature of a kind”. Stereotype has been defined by Allport (1954: 191) as “an exaggerated belief associated with a category. Its function is to justify our conduct in relation to that category”. Franklin et al (2005:254) have identified three features of stereotypes: First, stereotypes are “exaggerated beliefs” which involve either an “inflation of characteristic” or “over-generalisation from part...to whole”...Second, stereotypes contain “a kernel of truth” and “resonate with what we (and others) think to be true. And third, stereotypes function to “rationalise our conduct and justify our actions”. Fowler (1991:16) adds a fourth feature to stereotypes: meaningfulness. He defines meaningfulness as “an ideology of ethnocentrism...or homocentrism: a pre-occupation with countries...”.

newspapers. The pro-Conservative Khorasan newspaper published an interview with a Friday prayers leader about the controversial 2009 presidential elections: *Mashhad Friday prayers leader...said “I have said that they [fitna leaders] are the grounds of fitna. They are not real fitna. The real fitna is America and the English. Referring to the statements by the leader of Islamic Revolution who said “you have to know the enemy”, Ayatollah Alamolhoda said “the main enemy are they [US and Britain] because the issue of Mousavi and Karrobi is finished; however the issue of America and the English is not finished...American and the English are the planner of fitna (Khorasan, 31 December 2012).*

In their reasoning against the West (the US) and stereotyping it as “enemy”, Conservatives cited “violent incidents orchestrated by the West against the noble people of Iran”. Among the most cited events was the 1953 coup against the Iranian government, the botched attempt to rescue American hostages in 1980, downing of a civilian plane with 290 passengers onboard by American navy in the Persian Gulf in 1988, and the logistic and political support given to Saddam in his eight-year war against Iran (1980-88). Kayhan, a pro-Conservative newspaper, describes the relationship between Iran and the US as a “reality of the animosity of the US administration with Iran” and writes in a report: *Some people and particularly modernist thinkers believe that the existence of enemy and threats by foreign enemies are only a fantasy and hyperbole by the state officials. They believe that in action there is no threat by the US and Western countries against the Iranian nation and this [demonisation of the US and the West] is only a fantasy. This claim is made under circumstances in which such people for a long time were hiding the fact that foreigners wanted to stage a colour revolution and fitna [in the 2009 presidential elections]. However, the confessions by those related to foreign currents and in particular the agents of the English and America disproved this claim. Moreover, recent statements by the Western rulers and in particular the recent confession by Hillary Clinton in the TV demonstrated that they [the West] supported the fitna movement of 2009... (Kayhan, 04 March 2012).*

Each of the above-mentioned incidents, described by some hardliners as “terrorist acts”, has now turned into a “national event” in the Iranian calendar celebrated by marches and anti-American demonstrations. Such gatherings are usually accompanied with speeches by high-ranking officials which are also covered extensively by the mainstream media. In his historical interview with the CNN, president Khatami replied to a question about the “death to America” slogan in Iran. He stated: the “death to America” is in response to the

heinous act of the former American defense secretary who said the roots of the Iranian nation should be dried. Or it is a response to the downing of the Iranian civilian plane with about 300 women and men passengers who were destroyed by the commander of the US navy commander.

- **The West as “hypocrite”**

Another stereotype used widely by the Iranian press to portray the West is the “West as hypocrite”. After “animosity”, “hypocrisy” is the mostly-used stereotype to describe the Western attitude towards Iran. A careful analysis of the news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers suggests that “hypocrisy” is usually collocated with “double standards”.

The use of such phrases to describe the West is mainly attributed, by mainstream Iranian newspapers, to the policy of the West and in particular the United States vis-à-vis developments related to Iran. The good example is perhaps the approach of the West towards Iran’s nuclear programme on one side and Israel’s atomic activities on the other. It has widely been reported that Israel holds at least 200 nuclear warheads. The IAEA has not been able to verify that Iran has a single nuclear weapon. However, Iran is under constant pressure and severe sanctions by the West to drop its nuclear programme, while Israel is continuing its nuclear activities without any pressure. Moreover, as one newspaper editorial said, *“Iran’s nuclear facilities are under the 24-hour monitor by the IAEA, while this international organisation is ignoring the atomic bombs of the Zionist regime”*. Such an approach by the West is described by the mainstream Iranian press as *“double standards and hypocrisy”*. Mardomsalari, a pro-Reform newspaper, wrote in a report that: *the Iranian nation cannot accept the West double standards towards the nuclear technology (Mardomsalari 14 November 2012)*.

Another frequently-cited instance of “the Western double standards and hypocrisy” promoted by the Iranian press is regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In particular, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and Palestine as well as the blockade of Gaza are matters of the “Western double standards”, Iranian newspapers accuse the West of “adopting silence towards the atrocities of the Zionist regime”. They also accuse the West of supporting terrorism. Such stories are repeatedly covered by mainstream Iranian newspapers, mostly in their front pages. Mardomsalari, a pro-Reform newspaper, wrote: *The US administration...demonstrated that it still regards terrorism as a tool. The US administration is using double standards towards the phenomenon of terrorism. Terrorism*

*from the viewpoint of the US government is divided into good terrorism and bad terrorism (Mardomsalari, 30 September 2012).*

Human rights issues are another area which is claimed by Iran to be an example of the Western hypocrisy. This is also reflected in the news about the West in the Iranian press, particularly when it comes to the Western reaction to the uprising in Bahrain, the massacre of Muslims in Myanmar or the killing of children in Gaza and most recently the alleged support given by the US to armed groups in Syria which has resulted in the killing of thousands of people. For example, Hamshahri described the US reaction to the situation in Bahrain as a “*double standard by the global arrogance*” (Hamshahri, 02 January 2013).

**- The West as “global arrogant and colonial power”**

While more than 80 per cent of stories related to the West did not reflect any stereotype to portray the West, the majority of the stereotypes in the stories described the West as “arrogant and colonial”.

“Arrogance” is the literal translation of the Persian (and originally Arabic) word “Estekbar”, which means the behaviour of a person when they feel that they are more important than other people, so that they are rude to them or do not consider them important. Arrogance is “having megalomaniac behaviour” or “having excessive pride”. Buruma and Margalit (2005:127) explain that arrogance manifests itself in Western imperialism and is seen as an “infringement of the rule of God”. In speeches by Iranian leader, “arrogance” is usually collocated with (adjective) “global”. Likewise, the “fight against the global arrogance”<sup>1</sup> is a popular phrase used by top Iranian officials to refer to the main principle of the revolutionary ideology of Iran’s foreign policy<sup>2</sup>. “Arrogance” is usually an indirect reference to the United States. In the parlance of the Iranian leaders, the United States is the “symbol of arrogance” and global power which seeks to broaden its influence in other regions including the Middle East and dominate it.

Ayatollah Khomeini, founder of the Islamic Iran, employed concepts such as “imperialism”, “bullying behaviour”, “domineering manner” and “global arrogance” to denounce or “demonise” the West. Such concepts were later turned into stereotypes by Iranians to describe the West. Ayatollah Khamenei, the incumbent leader of Iran, uses “global arrogance” to reject the Western liberal democracy and the Western “domination and arrogance” in imposing its own way of democracy and governance.

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1 “Mobarezeh ba Estekbar-e Jahani”

2 In addition, Ayatollah Beheshti, an influential Iranian cleric killed after the revolution, has been quoted as saying that “the line of the revolution is anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, and anti-feudalism” (Moaddel, 1992:307).

The phrase “global arrogance” was used during Conservatism by government officials to gain more support from the leader and the right wing. For example, President Ahmadinejad said in a radio speech on 7 December 2009 that the “global arrogance is the major impediment to the administration of justice in the world”. In response to his American counterpart who called for negotiations with Iran, Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi said in an interview on 29 October 2011 that “Iran is not a country to which one can speak from the stance of arrogance”.

A similar attitude prevails in mainstream Iranian press. Hamshahri uses the phrase “global arrogance” in a piece of news: *The president referred to the history of the savageness of the arrogant [powers] and said: the heads of arrogant [a reference to the US and UK] have agreed that they should spread war and bloodshed, which was prevalent in the past and in particular during the Second World War and the killing of about 60 million people in Europe, to the whole world so that they could plunder other countries and divide the booty among themselves (Hamshahri, 02 January 2013).*

The use of this stereotype to portray the West could be attributed to the history of relations between Iran and the West and in particular the way Americans treat Iranians. In fact, it may be attributed to consequence of the use of Orientalist theme which describes the Easterners as “inferior” to the Westerners. The continued call for direct talks between Iran and the US is hampered by what the Iranian side describes as the “lack of respect” and the “absence of a just and fair environment” for negotiation. And this is echoed in the Iranian press portrayal of the West. In an editorial on the relations between Iran and the US, the pro-Conservative Kayhan newspaper describes the US as an “enemy” and “arrogant power” and concludes that *“America has reached concensus over confrontation with Iran. America for the past 33 years has targeted the independence, territorial integrity and identity of Iran and Islam...If our resistance is increased, definitely we will have an Islamic region minus the West within the next two decades” (Kayhan, 07 August 2012).*

### **c. Discussion of the thesis**

As discussed at the beginning of this thesis, Iranian people have an unfavourable view towards the West and in particular the United States and more recently Britain. This “hatred” could have been a result of the Iranian press portrayal of the West, which is the subject of the present research. The researcher views the rising “negative” perception of the West in the Islamic Republic of Iran as possibly a by-product of the portrayal of the West

in the country's press, although other factors are definitely involved<sup>1</sup>.

A number of reasons have been previously formulated with regards to the rise of anti-Westernism in Iran (albeit before the 1979 revolution). Researchers have attributed it mainly to the impacts of imperialism and colonialism (Keddie, 1983, 1994; Makdisi, 2002; Moaddel, 1992; Vahdat, 2003; Mirsepassi-Ashtiani, 1994), which could be regarded as two main factors leading to the Iranian "Occidentalisation" of the West<sup>2</sup>. Furthermore, the bitter experiences of Iran with the West throughout the history and particularly the reaction by the Iranian kings and people to the Western concept of modernity, the Islamic nature of the Iranian regime, and misguided policies of the United States in the Middle East could be blamed for the rise of anti-Westernism in Iran.

Findings of this research demonstrate that while imperialism and colonialism should be blamed for the hatred towards the West in Iran "before" the revolution, the hostile approach of the West towards Iranian people (and particularly with regards to the nuclear issue and subsequent "crippling sanctions") are to blame for this "after" the revolution. In fact Occidentalising the West before the Iranian public opinion has created obstacles on the way of strategic interactions between the West and Iran, jeopardising the global interests of both sides and particularly the West in the region.

One key finding of the study suggests that newspapers which are controlled directly by the government follow the official line and policies of the same government. In fact, they tend to construct the news of the West in accordance with the foreign policy interests

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<sup>1</sup> For example, unfavourable image of the West in Iran and the wider Middle East could be attributed to the exercise of power and influence on oil-rich Muslim and Arab countries which hold a heavy geostrategic weight in global politics and economy. Since the end of the World War II, the United States has made extensive efforts to become the dominant political and military power in the Middle East. However, these efforts have culminated in the rise of anti-Americanism as the result of the "relative weakness" of America (Mitchell, 2004:100). American involvement with the Middle East began in 1784 when a series of confrontations between Arabs and Americans led to Barbary wars. The element of "war" and "military intervention" in the Middle East has remained strong since the 1800s, ultimately resulting in the current negative image of the West in the Muslim world which was amplified in the nineteenth century with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and later the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Makdisi, 2002:539-540). Moreover, there is historical tendency in the Middle East to portray America as an "interventionist and occupier" power. This tendency which started by the CIA-engineered coup in 1953 in Iran came into light after the Cold War in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even the Western promise to pull out troops from Afghanistan by 2014 has not improved the image of the West. It has even exacerbated as the result of burning copies of Quran in a US base followed shortly by a shooting spree by an American soldier who killed dozens of women and children in March 2012, fueling the flames of anti-American sentiments and mass protests and demonstrations not only in Afghanistan but also in other Muslim nations including Iran. Anti-Americanism is not pervasive in the Middle East only. According to Nolan (2005:88), anti-Americanism has been a "pervasive feature" of the post-9/11 global landscape which is widespread within Europe not only in France but also in Britain and even in Germany long regarded as the most Americanised and pro-American Western European nation.

<sup>2</sup> One limitation with this explanation is, however, that it fails to study the role of the media inter alia in creating anti-Western sentiments among the Iranians.

of their respective government<sup>1</sup>. This may explain the propaganda function of the Iranian newspapers in highlighting negative news of the West, even in its relations with other countries, especially the Arab states.

The use of the “presupposition” technique in newspaper editorials of both political wings implies that tensions between Iran and the West are only “presuppositions” or “assumptions” which the press deem true, while in practice they may be untrue. This reflects the sort of “suspicion” existing in relations between Iran and the West and explains the fact that Iran and the West are on a collision course. As explained earlier, confrontation is more serious between Iran and the US in comparison to the confrontation between Iran and the EU<sup>3</sup>, considering the history of anti-Americanism in Iran. It is also an indication of the conflicting nature of the Iranian foreign policy against the West.

To look at Iranian Occidentalism in more details, one should study events during the 1950s and 1970s which led to the formation of an anti-Western “discourse” which was later changed into an anti-Western (and particularly anti-American) “revolutionary ideology” after the Islamic revolution continuing to this date. Results of the present study suggest that such a discourse and ideology have influenced the press representation of the West in Iran.

By examining the press narratives on Occidentalism, this research indicated how the media representation strategies are carried out in reality and how journalists use them to lead/mislead the public opinion in favour or against the Occident.

The results and findings of the present study are yet another contribution to the study of the West, particularly in the Iranian context. In fact, the representation of the West in the Iranian newspapers in the way discussed above signifies the creation of a new type of Occidentalism in the Orient, which I describe here as “Iranoccidentalism”. Iranoccidentalism has several defining characteristics: It is an ideological concept, which is under the influence of the prevailing discourse; It projects the West, through media, as “arrogant/imperial and interventionist”<sup>2</sup>; It is coupled with anti-Americanism and opposition to the West, and is linked to the history of colonialism and imperialism in Iran; It is a reaction to Orientalism; It seeks to spread the Islamic ideology of governance and awakening within the framework of the Shiite ideology; In fact, Iranian Occidentalism is a tool to materialise the Shiite ideology of “standing against the evil and the oppressor”. Moreover, Iranoccidentalism pursues a “nativistic” and “nationalistic” approach which

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<sup>1</sup> Such a trend was not observed in newspapers with no affiliation to the government.

<sup>2</sup> Such stereotyped images of the West are dehumanising, hateful and antagonistic.

manifests itself in the Iranians' national resolve to develop indigenous technologies such as the nuclear, aerospace and missile technologies as well as biotechnology and nanotechnology. As discussed by Boroujerdi (1996), the discourse of nativism, which was prevalent in the Iranian society from the 1950s onward, led Iranian intellectuals to call for "the resurgence, reinstatement or continuance of native or indigenous" Iranian values, customs and beliefs, in reaction to the Western modernity. This nativism, which according to Arbus (2009:9) was accompanied with Iranian nationalism "to assert the power of the nation state in the face of the encroaching West", led to the formation of a type of Occidentalism and an authentic Iranian identity aimed at reclaiming "a native, pure and untainted Iranian heritage in opposition to that of the modernising, capitalist, and tyrannical West"<sup>1</sup>.

Such an Occidental function has been also reiterated by Michel Foucault who praised the role anti-Westernism and Occidentalism played in boosting the Iranian resolve to alternative forms of non-Western modernity and counter-discourse to the hegemonic West (as cited in Afary and Anderson, 2005).

As indicated earlier in the research, Occidentalism by definition, is the science of knowing the Occident. Academically and in the general sense, it constitutes a system of Occidental quality, style, character, or spirit as well as Western policies, customs, institutions and characteristics.

In special terms, Occidentalism goes far beyond geography and academics. It may become ideological. Occidentalism denotes the image of the Occident (West) in the Orient (East). Or it could be the image of the West "constructed" (by the state) and/or "portrayed" (by the media) in the East. In fact, one of the functions of Occidentalism is to study the Occident, either in the East or in the West, by either Easterners or Westerners<sup>2</sup>.

Said believes the "relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of a complex hegemony" (Said, 1979:5). The same applies in Occidentalism and the relationship between the Orient and Occident. While Said's Orientalism is a strategy of Western world domination, Occidentalism in the Iranian context is a model of relationship between East and West. Findings of the present research

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<sup>1</sup> Borrowing from the concept of Occidentalism developed by critic Sadiq Jalal al- Azm (1981), Boroujerdi (1996: 11-12) defines Occidentalism as a counter-narrative of Orientalism and "a discourse used by 'oriental' intellectuals and political elites to lay claim to, recapture, and finally appropriate their 'true' and 'authentic' identity". Boroujerdi (1996: 14) attributes Occidentalism in Iran to the "seductive lure of nativism," which is defined as "the doctrine that calls for the resurgence, reinstatement, or continuance of native or indigenous cultural customs, beliefs, and values".

<sup>2</sup> Such a study might consist of the investigation of the "image", "understanding" and "manifestation" of the West in the East as well as the knowledge of the East about the West.

suggest Iranocidentalism could be a mode of “ideological representation” which might paradoxically have both positive and negative orientations. It is mainly about the political, philosophical, ideological and religious differences between the (Islamic) East and (Western) West<sup>1</sup>.

In a sense, Occidentalism in the Iranian context is not Said’s “Orientalism in reverse” as the latter was created as the result of the exploitation and victimisation of the East by the West for imperialistic purposes, while the former could not basically be created for imperialistic purposes because the East (and Iran) is obviously economically and politically incapable of exploiting the West<sup>2</sup>. And Said himself has confirmed such a view. Two times in his book on Orientalism, Said (1978:50) reiterates that “...no one is likely to imagine a field symmetrical to it [Orientalism] called Occidentalism”. Elsewhere at the end of his book, he emphasises that “...I hope to have shown my reader that the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism” (Said, 1979: 328). These two statements indicate that Said himself was not imagining that Occidentalism is Orientalism-in-reverse and that a concept similar to Orientalism can be invented.

As explained by Santos (2009) and Buruma and Margalit (2005), Occidentalism is a “reciprocity trap”, as victims of the Western stereotypes have the same power to construct stereotypes of the West in order to criticise Western superiority (arrogance) as opposed to Eastern inferiority. In other words, Occidentalism is a product of Orientalism. In Said’s view, hegemony (power) is one of the two main elements of Said’s Orientalism<sup>3</sup>. He believes that the West Orientalised (or more precisely “hegemonised”) the East in order to reach to power; however, the East cannot Occidentalise (or more precisely “hegemonised”) the West in the same manner that the West Orientalised the East. In fact, hegemony cannot be applied from the East to the West; it flows from the West to the East.

In fact Occidentalism is an ideological concept which could be of a paradoxical nature. While Orientalism could be directly or indirectly related to colonialism, imperialism, anti-Islamism (Islamophobia) and Westernisation in the context of Western-

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1 The adjective “Western” was used here to avoid confusion as the Eastern West could include Eastern countries such as Japan or Russia or more recently China. Such a distinction also exists with regards to two main Islamic branches. While claiming to be the “true” followers of the “pure Mohammadic” Islam (Islam-e Nab-e Mohammadi), Shiites accuse Sunnis of being Westernised or more accurately Westoxicated. Therefore, we have Western Islam and Eastern Islam. Followers of Shiite Islam are generally scattered in the Middle East while Sunnis are mainly living in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf.

2 This could be demonstrated simply by making an analogy between the Occidentalism-Orientalism relationship and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Palestinians are clearly incapable of launching a proportionate attack against Israel because (1) they do not possess any army or sophisticated weaponry and (2) Israel has one of the advanced armies and weaponries in the region and is equipped with nuclear and biological weapons.

3 The other element of Said’s Orientalism is “knowledge”.

style modernity, Occidentalism (particularly in the Iranian context) is mainly characterised with anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-Westernisation (anti-Americanism) in the context of Islamic-Iranian-style modernity<sup>1</sup>. In other words, Occidentalism, while being interrelated to Orientalism, is a natural “reaction” to Orientalism<sup>2</sup>.

Occidentalism in the Iranian context in general could not be a “response” to Orientalism because it is not a “considered” or “reciprocal” action. Iranian Occidentalism could not be an “attack” but a “defence” as attack denotes a “considered” action while defence is usually an “automatic reaction”<sup>3</sup>. In this sense, Occidentalism could not be a “counter-argument” as counter-arguments are “thought” in advance<sup>4</sup>.

Indeed, from the twentieth century onward, this type of Occidentalism has been a “response” to and an “attack” on Orientalism especially during the World War II when Japanese kamikaze pilots crashed into the ships of Western Allies in suicide actions, or during the 1910s when Germany’s army launched a series of attacks on the British in Flanders. Occidentalism in the modern time could be a response to and an attack on Orientalism when al-Qaeda terrorists attacked the World Trade Centre and Twin Towers and committed suicide bombing in Iraq and Afghanistan against Western armies<sup>5</sup>.

Occidentalism could also not be a “mirror”, “image”, “reverse”, “obverse”, “opposite” or “inversion” of Orientalism, because this group of words (which have been used by scholars to define Occidentalism) implies that Occidentalism is exactly the “same” as Orientalism, in a reverse order. However, Occidentalism (particularly in the Iranian context) could be a “counter-image” and an “opposition” to Orientalism when it comes to criticising the West. To put it more accurately, Occidentalism is in “opposition” to Orientalism but Orientalism is not in opposition to Occidentalism as Orientalism has come first.

Occidentalism in Iran represents the image of the West among the Iranians portrayed by

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1 In addition to these characteristics, Buruma and Margalit (2005: 3-12) identify Occidentalism also with Western capitalism, materialism, dehumanism, modernism, globalisation (as a shorthand for US imperialism), anti-Americanism as well as Jewish financial power in the West, Western support for Israel and Western warmongering (in Iraq and Afghanistan).

2 This is the only one common denominator among the definitions of Occidentalism presented in this thesis. Almost all define Occidentalism as a “reaction” (and not a response) to Orientalism. Since Occidentalism is a reaction to Orientalism, it is therefore an “ideological representation”.

3 Occidentalism could be a counter-attack but only in the form of resistance similar to the type of resistance the Palestinians are exercising against Israel. They can only resist but not attack proportionately.

4 Notwithstanding, Occidentalism could also be a “response” when it is promoted by specific extremist entities. Buruma and Margalit (2005) refer to this as “murderous Occidentalism” and trace it back to eighteenth-century Japan and even in the heart of Europe where Nazi Germany invaded the “Jewified West”.

5 Al-Qaeda-style Islamism (radical/extremist version of Islam) has been described by Buruma and Margalit (2005: 102) as the “main religious source” of Occidentalism in the modern era.

the media. This image, as indicated above, could be positive or negative and signifies the West as an “arrogant/imperial and interventionist” entity. Such negative representation of the West by the Iranian press may not be fabricated, as negative news about the West is indeed negative in nature<sup>1</sup>. In fact, negativity sets value for news.

The stereotypical representation of the West also has its roots in the history of relations between Iran and the West. As explained earlier, this history is full of highs and lows and mistrust.

On one hand, Iranians believe that the West is hypocritical towards them; they accuse the West of adopting double standards; they blame the US for “illegally” imposing sanctions on them trying to overthrow the Islamic regime; and more importantly, Iranian leadership firmly believes that the US is behaving in a proud, unpleasant way with Iran, showing no respect and thought for them<sup>2</sup>. Such stereotyping in fact seems to have been heeded by the Obama administration. As discussed in the Critical Discourse Analysis section, in his Norouz messages Obama showed respect to the “government and nation” of Iran and urged Iranian officials to forget the past.

On the other side, the West accuses Iran of violating human rights, sponsoring terrorism and developing nuclear weapons to destabilise the Middle East—charges which have been categorically denied by Iran.

Moreover, Iranian newspapers use foreign sources of news to report on the West. Although the press act selectively in publishing news of the West somehow in the same manner that their counterparts are doing in the West, they at least have a foreign and in some cases credible source of news for their readers. And this is another proof that Iranian Occidentalism is not Orientalism in reverse. Said (1978) argues that the media and cultural apparatus of the United States and the West have presented the concept of Islam based on ignorance, cultural hostility and racial hatred. This is while mainstream Iranian newspapers are not acting based on ignorance, cultural hostility or racial hatred.

Iranoccidentalism has two rather different aspects:

**i. State Occidentalism:**

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<sup>1</sup> For example, when a hurricane hits parts of the US and the government is not quick to help the victims, the unfolding news is definitely negative, even for Americans themselves.

<sup>2</sup> Such “arrogant” behaviour is emphatically rejected in the Iranian political culture. Like many other Middle Eastern nations, Iranians, are proud of their history and culture in which “arrogance” and “you-think-you-are-more-powerful-than-me” have no place. One good example is the reaction by the then-spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran to President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech. Hamid Reza Asefi (as quoted in PBS’ FRONTLINE documentary series “Showdown with Iran”, 23 Oct. 2007) said: America is at the centre of evils of the world...because where there is a problem...America has got a finger in it...They think they are responsible for every event in every part of the world. Nobody has given this responsibility to America.

It is the image of the West “constructed by the state” for Iranians. This image could be constructed through government policies and official statements and speeches, also carried by the media (through publishing domestic news). The constructed image is perceived to be “negative” and “stereotypical”.

State Occidentalism in Iran could be a reaction to Orientalism and is associated with anti-Westernism (in particular anti-Americanism), anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. It emanates mainly from the historical track/record of the West in Iran, especially the Western-imposed modernity during the past century.

This type of Occidentalism is mainly related to the political and economic relations between Iran and the West. The state Occidentalism could be a product of the non-state Occidentalism or it could result in the emergence of non-state Occidentalism. Since there are newspapers in Iran which are under the control of the government, it can be implied that their production functions (agenda-setting, framing and priming of the news about the West) are under the influence of the “state Occidentalism”.

**ii. Non-state (public or media) Occidentalism:**

It is the image of the West “portrayed” among the Iranians by (1) the (public or state-owned) media through their coverage of news or the publication of opinions/editorials or (2) by the intelligentsia who according to Boroujerdi (1996:21), have served as “crucial intermediaries and interpreters between their own culture and that of the West”<sup>1</sup>. This image could be “negative” and/or “positive” and sometimes “stereotypical”.

Non-state Occidentalism could be attributed to West’s policies in the Middle East (especially with regards to Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war on terror), Western-imposed modernity, West’s Islamophobia, West’s confrontation with Iran’s nuclear programme on one hand and/or West’s democratic/technological/cultural values on the other. The first set of reasons has led to the formation of anti-Westernism (particularly after the revolution) while the second set has created Westernism (Westernised inclinations) among the Iranians (particularly before the revolution).

This type of Occidentalism is mainly related to the cultural, scientific and technological relations between Iran and the West although political considerations are also engaged.

The media, as stated above, are one of the essential tools of promoting Iranian Occidentalism. The role of the media is so instrumental that the Iranian government has launched several international television news channels in different languages in order to

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<sup>1</sup> Arbus (2009:4) describes Iranian intellectuals as Occidentalists who act as “mediators between Iranian society and the West”.

influence the target public opinion in the West. Press TV in English, Hispan TV in Spanish, Al-Alam in Arabic and Sahar TV in French and five more languages are a few to name.

What is striking here is the relationship between communication theories (employed in this thesis) and the promotion of Iranian Occidentalism, which will be explained below.

The link between the media exposure and the formation of public perception is undeniable. For example, Nisbet et al (2004:32) have demonstrated that TV news coverage of the United States in predominantly Muslim countries leads to the rise of anti-Americanism. On the other hand, the influence of media on foreign policy is a well-established and well-researched notion (Ajami 2001; el-Nawawy and Iskandar 2002; Perlez and Rutenberg 2003; Nisbet et al, 2004; Chan, 1994; Gerges, 2003). Such influence is so great that some governments monopolise media (particularly radio and television) to “mobilise their citizens politically” (Nisbet et al, 2004:17) and use media as “a vehicle for their propaganda” (El-Affendi 1993: 165). Moreover, it has already been suggested that the media help to “establish an order of priorities” in society about its problems and objectives<sup>1</sup>. To do this, media effect theories (agenda-setting, priming and framing) are often used by the media to influence the formation of public opinion and the cultivation of image.

Likewise, as the findings of the present research confirmed, Iranian newspapers played a role in shaping public perceptions about the West (Occidentalism) by “selecting and prioritising” related news and set the agenda for the public (or even the government)<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, Iranian newspapers tried to highlight or “prime” stories of the West by displaying them on the front page or the top-half page. In this way, they dedicated more attention to an item so that the audience also finds this news item important. In fact, Iranian newspapers “framed and primed” West-related stories for the audiences in the way they desired. In other words, Iranian newspapers used framing and priming as a process of “selection” and “salience” or “selecting” and “highlighting” a particular subject-matter in order to create a targeted sense (Occidentalism) in the audience.

The whole process is based on the fact that the more prominence media attach to an issue, the more the chance of influence on the public opinion about that issue. Therefore, Iranian newspapers used the three techniques of media influence (agenda-setting, framing

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<sup>1</sup> They do this not by “initiating or determining, but by publicising according to an agreed scale of values which is determined elsewhere, usually in the political system” (McQuail, 1984:45).

<sup>2</sup> According to the literature on agenda-setting, the more people see or hear about an issue or subject, the more they will talk about it and this will increase the chance that issue ends up on the public and policy agenda.

and priming of news) to portray the West and promote Occidentalism in the society.

The classification presented earlier above (state Occidentalism and non-state Occidentalism) is well combined with the general perception of Occidentalism in Iran. According to Homa Katouzian (2010), two opposite views have been held side by side, often by the same persons, since the nineteenth century with regards to Iranian images of the West:

...the one describing the West as a thoroughly immoral [and in Buruma's and Margalit's word "dehumanising" and "main corrupter of sexual morality"] society (especially regarding sexual relations) as well as an imperialist power; the other, as a wonder of the world, a perfect society and the law-giver of science, art, culture, etc. Both views have persisted down to the present day (*Personal interview*) Brackets added.

Saeed Reza Ameli (2012), professor of communications at the University of Tehran, presents a similar grouping on views of the West. He proposes "the West of Science and Technology" and "the West of Arrogance"—both were observed in the news of the Iranian press on the West studied here.

Moreover, Arbus (2009) who has done a survey of the views of prominent Iranian intellectuals makes a similar conclusion about the seemingly paradoxical nature of the Iranian confrontation with the West.

While Shariati and Al-e Ahmad reject some things from the West (notably, it's [sic] cultural and economic exploitation), they are clearly willing to adopt other Western ideas into their thought. While Soroush does not necessarily advocate the complete separation of church and state, he stands as an advocate for equality and democracy in Islamic societies (Arbus, 2009: 47-48).

Iranian Occidentalism is much like the Chinese Occidentalism through which, according to Ning (1997: 63-64) and Chen (1992: 688-690), China could establish its position in the World and stand against the Western hegemony<sup>1</sup>. One important similarity between the Iranian and Chinese Occidentalism (revolutionary ideology) is that both are opposed to "imperialist Western superpowers" and the "exploitation of the East by the West".

According to Chen (1992: 688-689), Chinese Occidentalism was influenced by Mao

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<sup>1</sup> In fact, Ning (1997:62-63) believes that confrontation between Iran and the United States after the 1979 Islamic revolution is a form of Middle Eastern Occidentalism which manifests itself as a form of antagonism and strong opposition to Western "hegemonism".

Tse-tung's Theory of Three Worlds "in which he asserted that the First World superpowers-the Soviet Union and the United States-invariably exploit and oppress the Third World countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America"<sup>1</sup>.

In fact, China could be the role model for Iranian Occidentalism and the Iranian state has chosen to adopt a policy similar to China as Iranian leaders believe that China is well standing successfully against the West (United States) by outperforming economically and politically. President Khatami's "dialogue among civilisations" and President Ahmadinejad's "global management initiative" are within the framework of the Iranian Occidentalism following the Chinese Occidentalism. Iran's efforts to access nuclear technology and its continued call for "reforming the UN Security Council structure" could be also interpreted as being in line with the Islamic Republic policy to follow China's track of Occidentalism. China is an economic powerhouse and also a nuclear power which has given it the privilege of being a veto-wielding member of the Security Council, providing it with the opportunity of challenging the US in many sectors of international relations. Therefore, China's great power status could be the result of its Occidental policies.

Based on the Chinese Occidentalism, there are two types of Western images, much like the images portrayed by the Iranian Occidentalism. The first image is portrayed by those who consider the Occidental culture "superior" to that of the Orient.

"... [T]o them the Western world is a heaven. They seek an opportunity to pay respects to it or enjoy themselves there (Ning, 1997:64)."

The second type of image is constructed by those Chinese who regard the West, and the US in particular, as an "oppressor enemy".

To these people, the West is in decline, its outward prosperity merely a false mask through which we can see its implied crisis; to them the twenty-first century will surely be the century of China or the Orient, and Oriental culture is superior to Western culture and is bound to dominate the world (Ning, 1997:64).

Therefore, the concept of Occidentalism in Iran is much similar to the evolution of

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<sup>1</sup> This element of "Third Worldism" has been also explained by Keddie (1983:596) who believes that Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of Islamic Revolution in Iran, and many Iranian intellectuals, saw the world, under the influence of this ideology, "as largely divided into the just Muslim oppressed" colonised by an imperialist West and the "Western or Western-tied oppressors". Mirespassi-Ashtiani (1994), Bayat (1990) and Hanson (1983) have also stressed that the Third Worldist ideology of the 1960s and 1970s, which was based on rejecting dependence on the West, has influenced the Iranian revolutionary ideology. Moreover, according to Puchala (1997:131), Third-World writers followers are of the opinion that "relations between the non-West and the West are essentially stories about undoing dominance/subordination, gaining self-determination and regaining self-respect, reasserting that which has been suppressed, resurrecting that which has been submerged and reclaiming that which has been stolen".

Occidentalism in China. There is also a similarity here with the Russian Occidentalism: Occidentalism, both in Iran and Russia, has turned into an ideology. However, unlike the Russian Occidentalism, which is a mixture of domestic and imported foreign philosophy (mainly German), the Iranian Occidentalism is purely a product of the Iranian history which was influenced greatly by the West and theology in addition to nativism and nationalism.

As Said has restricted Orientalism mainly to the US, Britain and France and the Anglo-French-American experience of the Arabs and Islam<sup>1</sup>, Occidentalism may be also restricted to China, Russia and Iran and the Iranian experience of the West, although traces of Occidentalism can be also found in other Asian countries as Pakistan and Indonesia, mostly in the form of anti-Americanism.

### **Conclusion**

This research was conducted to investigate how the West is portrayed in the Iranian press and how this representation changes over the time. Findings of the study indicated that the West is portrayed as an “arrogant” power which resorts to “terrorism, war and violence” to reach its “imperialistic” goals and “dominate the world”. The research also observed that such portrayal varies to some extent over the time but only in format (and not the content) with the change of the political discourse under the prevailing ideology.

The present study demonstrated that the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers from different political camps is different between two political periods and this difference is statistically significant. Such a difference might be a function of political inclinations, ideological tendencies and organisational pressures (as explained by Shoemaker and Reese, 1991). The nature of developments in the West and its foreign policy may be also engaged.

While in general, Iranian newspapers were against Iran-West relations, pro-Reform newspapers were in favour and pro-Conservatives were against such relations. Pro-Reform press stereotyped the West as “interventionist” while pro-Conservatives described it stereotypically as “arrogant and imperialist”. While the majority of news about the West presented a “negative” image of the West during Conservatism, a “neutral” image of the West was presented in the majority of news about the West during Reformism.

The four hypotheses of the research are proved and can be sustained by the evidence of statistics and findings of the present study:

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<sup>1</sup> Said (1979:17) describes the US, Britain and France as “pioneer nations” and “colonial vanguards” of Orientalism.

**RH1.** Newspaper affiliation (ideology) does impact upon the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers.

**RH2.** Political period (discourse) does impact upon the representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers.

**RH3.** Mainstream Iranian newspapers tend to portray the West more positively during Reformism while trying to defuse tension (*détente*) and highlight cooperation between Iran and the West during the same period.

**RH4.** Mainstream Iranian newspapers tend to portray the West more negatively during Conservatism while trying to highlight conflict (tension) between Iran and the West during the same period.

Although this research was not conducted to study the “why” question of the Iranian Occidentalism, the researcher, having analysed mainstream Iranian newspapers, has reached this conclusion that “Iranian Occidentalism, which is a feature of the Iranian revolutionary ideology, is a by-product of the Western policies (and in particular the Western modernity) throughout history which, in most cases, have been hostile towards Iran, coupled with a sense of nativism”. This study indicated through the content and discourse analyses of mainstream Iranian newspapers that Occidentalism is characterised in Iran with stereotypes such as “arrogant”, “imperialist”, “colonial”, “warmonger” and “terrorist” projected in the Iranian newspapers under the influence of the state.

A number of reasons could be blamed for the resentment of Iranians against the West throughout history<sup>1</sup>:

- i. **Religious differences between Iran and the West:** The historical study of the role of the West in Iran suggests that religious differences could be blamed for the hatred among Iranians of the West. For example, in 1935, the US-supported Iranian king, inspired by the Western-style clothing, forced women to abandon their hijab against their will and religious obligation. In another incident, Reza Shah beat a cleric in the holy city of Qom who had admonished the Shah’s wife to observe the full hijab when visiting the holy Shrine. The king also restricted religious mourning days during Muharram<sup>2</sup> and ordered mosques to use chairs instead of the traditional sitting by

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1 As stated earlier, Iranians have also positive attitudes towards the West. For example, they praise the Western technology and scientific progress.

2 In Muharram, the first lunar calendar month, Muslims mourn the martyrdom of the third Shiite Imam Hossein (AS). Traditionally, Iranians mourn the first 10 days of Muharram, every night by going to mosques. Reza Shah restricted this period to one day.

mourners—an apparent imitation of the Western-style mourning. Many other such incidents can be recalled.

- ii. **Sociocultural influences:** Social and cultural factors also have a role in arousing anti-Western sentiments among Iranians throughout the history. For example, ordinary Iranians were not happy that the Shahs “squandered” huge costs from the Public Treasury on their foreign trips while many Iranian nomads and peasants were living under very harsh conditions. They accused the Shahs and the royal family of extravagance and accumulating wealth for themselves. People were critical that the royal family was the biggest land owner of the country. Also, majority of Iranians could not tolerate wearing Western clothes and hats as forced by the Shahs. In one example, government forces beat nomads who refused to settle. The critique of the Western concept of modernity is also an important factor. In fact, the anti-modernisation movements in Iran, which occurred in the 1960s and the 1970s, aimed at welcoming modernity but in the context of the native Iranian and later Islamic contexts. Another goal of such movements was to neutralise the destructive effects of colonialism and imperialism on the Iranian society, such as changes in the Iranian traditional lifestyle and cultural patterns, the crisis of urbanisation and shifts in the Iranian intellectual paradigm. In fact, as truly reiterated by Mirsepassi (2000:73), modernisation occurred in Iran in some “spheres of life...without resulting in modernity”. As indicated in the chapter on related literature, the hastily-undertaken Western-style modernisation programmes, which were ignorant of the religious nature of the Iranian society, could be blamed for the gradual formation (evolution) of the discourse of Occidentalism in Iran.
- iii. **Political reasons:** Much of the resentment of the West by Iranians has been created by political differences between Iran and the West, especially after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Iranian clerics were always complaining about the exploitation of Iran’s natural resources by the West as well as giving economic, political and military concessions by the Shahs to the Westerners. For example, the so-called Tobacco Movement of 1891 was inspired by a cleric who protested at the concession of Tobacco exploitation offered to the British. The protest at D’Arcy oil concession, the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 based on which Britain and Russia decided to divide Iran into two “spheres of influence” without informing the Iranian government, the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement under the terms of which Iran could have turned

into a British colony are a few to name. These all undoubtedly created mistrust among the people. Moreover, hostile acts by the West against the interests of Iran before and after the revolution are also a source of Iranian resentment of the West. The CIA-orchestrated 1953 coup, the British exploitation of the Iranian oil, the failed Tabas military operation, unilateral crippling sanctions against Iran, military threats by the US, financial restrictions by the West and its support for armed Iranian opposition are examples of the political disputes between Iran and the West which have resulted in the alienation of the West to Iranians. The two sides have also differences on several international issues. The most striking of all is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is the main source of hostility between Iran and the West<sup>1</sup>. Also, Iranian officials blame Western containment policies for the continued sufferings of the Iranian people and the Muslim world at large. They believe Western policies have caused the country's economic privations.

With no doubt, successive US governments have become a convenient target, according to the polls, for discontent among much of the world's population, especially in the Middle East. In Iran, people's perception of the US as a "land of milk and honey" has long co-existed with another image of "hostility" and "arrogance".

There is also a widespread perception across the whole Middle East of the US government as an "interventionist". This perception has exacerbated in view of the invasion of Libya and continued call for military action against Syria and Iran. A common perception that Western policy is biased toward Israel and regimes with unpopular rulers has been a cause of resentment.

It is also concluded in this research that Iranian Occidentalism is not premeditated as Orientalism might be. In Orientalism, there is an element of "exploitation" or "misrepresentation" of the East by the West, whereas in Occidentalism, the majority of the East is incapable of exploiting the West and is not misrepresenting but representing it. Therefore, Iranian Occidentalism is an ideological representation of a natural reaction and opposition to the Western Orientalisation of Iran as the "exporters and sponsor of terrorism" which is "developing nuclear weapons" and "violating human rights" <sup>2</sup>.

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1 On the reason behind Iranian animosity with Israel, Hooglund (1995) blames British imperialism of the 1940s in Iran. According to Hooglund (1995:89), Iranian views of Israel are influenced by the coincidence of the "news about events in British Mandatory Palestine with a period of anti-British sentiment in Iran, causing Iranians to identify with Palestinians as fellow victims of British imperialism...The 1948 creation of Israel confirmed the pervasive notion of Zionists as British agents sent to Palestine to steal the land from its indigenous inhabitants".

2 This representation could be either positive or negative and sometimes stereotypical.

Most Iranians hate the West not because they are against the Western values and want to replace it, but because they have suffered from hostile Western policies and conduct towards them. In a Gallup Special Report on the Muslim world published in 2006, Mogahed confirmed that in most Gallup surveys Muslims have expressed their desire for the West “to respect Islam” and “stop interfering in the internal affairs of predominantly Muslim states” (Mogahed, 2006:3). The analysis of about 3,000 news stories provides tangible proof for this. As President Ahmadinejad told a rally of supporters in a public speech, “the West should stop acting as arrogant and bullying and instead accept the role of other countries and show greater thought and respect for other people”.

This research also found that Occidentalism in Iran (and the wider Middle East) is closely tied to anti-Americanism. Some researchers have attributed anti-Americanism in the Middle East to mainly cultural (values) and religious differences between the East and the West (Huntington 1996; Lewis 2001; Tessler and Nachtwey 1998 as cited in Nisbet et al, 2004). Others, however, have blamed hatred towards the US on its foreign policy in the Middle East (Telhami 2002; Hertsgaard 2003; Monshipouri 2002; Khan 2002 as cited in Nisbet et al, 2004). Some others have also identified internal situations of Middle Eastern countries (such as their internal politics, lower levels of economic and social development and the failure to establish civil society and democracy) as the main factor behind discontent with the US among the Muslims (Emmerson 2002; Rubin 2002 as cited in Nisbet et al, 2004)<sup>1</sup>.

Nisbet et al (2004:12) have added a fourth dimension to the roots of anti-Americanism in the Middle East: coverage of the US in the target media and what they describe as “ineffective information campaign” by the US government<sup>2</sup>. They believe that “macro-level” factors such as differences in economic and social development

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1 Other scholars have listed other reasons behind anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Kupchan (1989:587) believes that the failure of the “American globalism” has led to the intensification of anti-American movements. Nolan (2005:88) supports this in his paper on “contemporary anti-Americanism” in Germany in which he discusses that anti-Americanism has its roots in the “uneven Americanisation of twentieth-century Germany”. He also believes that anti-Americanism is a “response to what America has done and is doing” US withdrawal from or refuse to sign a variety of international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol, the anti-ballistic missile treaty, the test ban treaty, land mine treaty, the convention to end all discrimination against women, the International Criminal Court (Nolan, 2005:89-113). Brezezinski (as cited in Vijayalakshmi, 2008) argues that US unilateralism in exercising power could result in increasing vulnerability to globally spreading “anti-American virus”. A 2006 Pew poll (as cited in Graber, 2009: 736) blamed anti-Americanism among the Muslims on the view that Westerners are “greedy, selfish, arrogant, immoral, and violent and fall short on generosity, honesty, devoutness, tolerance and respect for women”.

2 Nisbet et al (2004:12) conclude in their study of the role of media in raising anti-American sentiments in the Middle East that “attention to TV news coverage (by the Middle Eastern media of the US) contributes significantly to the rise of anti-American perceptions” even though Western news disseminators do “buffer” or “moderate” or “attenuate” the negative main effects of TV news viewing.

(longevity/health, aggregate education, and standard of living), the degree of Islamisation (the percentage of the population that is Muslim), the degree of political freedom within the country's society (ratings of political rights and civil liberties) as well as "micro-level" or "individual" factors such as gender, income, education and age influence anti-American perceptions in addition to any TV news effects (Nisbet et al, 2004:22)<sup>1</sup>. The present research indicated that anti-Americanism in Iran is influenced by the political discourse and ideology of the regime.

Graber (2009) has conducted another similar study with regards to the role of media in creating anti-American sentiments. In his analysis of three American television programs (*The West Wing*, *That 70's Show*, and *Friends*) broadcast across the Middle East including Iran, Graber (2009) argues that television entertainment programs such as American comedies broadcast throughout the Middle East can be another reason for the "continued low regard for Americans and for the United States"<sup>2</sup>.

The "vital role" of the media in creating anti-American sentiments in the Middle East has been also underlined by Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008:172) who, by giving the example of Abu Ghraib Prison scandal being carried by local media, emphasise that the anti-American perception was heightened in the 2003 invasion of Iraq being covered by non-Western media.

The role of the Arab television...was vital to the public interpretation of Washington's actions. Images of the US military domination of a once-proud Arab state were beamed throughout the region...This perception of Arab humiliation at the hands of a Western military force was further intensified by occasional public relations lapse

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<sup>1</sup>According to the results of their study, people living within the pan-Arab broadcast area have significantly higher levels of anti-American sentiment while those in countries with comparatively higher levels of socioeconomic development score lower in anti-American attitudes. Also, people in countries with a higher percentage of Muslims within their population are less prone to negative perceptions of the United States. In contrast, people in countries with a higher degree of political freedom are more likely to have strong anti-American views. Moreover, women were less negative in their perceptions of the United States than men and people with higher levels of education were more negative in perceiving America Nisbet et al (2004:26-28). They also found that in terms of general television exposure, time spent watching television promoted negative perceptions of the United States. Nisbet et al (2004:28) also reached the conclusion that viewers turning to pan-Arab regional networks such as Al-Jazeera and MBC were more negative in their perceptions of America, while people who watched Western networks such as CNN or the BBC, were significantly less negative in their perceptions of the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Graber (2009: 737-740) further observes that the US State Department has "substantially" stepped up its public diplomacy campaign in some Middle Eastern countries since 2001 to stop "growing anti-Americanism...and improve America's image" through education and media. One such measure, which Franklin (as cited in Graber, 2009:740) believes can "hardly be expected to overcome the impact of the Arab media" and the graphic footages of Palestinians in them, has been monitoring television and news reports in Arab media "to detect misinformation and hostile propaganda".

(Baxter and Akbarzadeh, 2008; 171-172).

Baxter and Akbarzadeh (2008) also highlight the importance of the emergence of indigenous media in the Middle East which provided people with the opportunity to access information free from the control of governments.

The evidence from the present research indicates that the media wield tremendous influence on anti-American attitudes among Iranians, above and beyond any macro-level or socio-demographic factors presented by Nisbet et al. Such a function by the Iranian press is influenced by the strategy of the Islamic Republic to materialise the idea of the Islamic Ummah or the new Islamic civilisation. This could be implied from the policies of different governments ruling Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and particularly after the 1980s.

Governments of President Rafsanjani, President Khatami and President Ahmadinejad have all been following the same strategy: the development of Iran to materialise the greater concept of the Islamic Ummah. This strategy, devised by the leader of the Islamic Revolution, was either influenced by the Western policies (especially before 1979) or itself influenced the Western policies (especially after 1979) towards Iran. Such policies in fact helped the evolution of the Iranian Occidentalism with the help of the media in the manner explained throughout this thesis.

This strategy was implemented under different tactics pursued by different governments. President Rafsanjani wanted to reconstruct Iran to turn it into a power in the Muslim world. He tried to do this by turning Iran into a modern Islamic state. Rafsanjani in fact pursued a policy of modernity through reconstructing the country physically.

President Khatami intended to globalise Iran by developing it into a civil society in tandem with global standards of sustainable development. He proposed the idea of dialogue among civilisations. Khatami followed a policy of modernisation which originally began from the Constitutional Era (1905-1907) but was impeded. He in fact wanted to reconstruct the country mentally. This led to the formation of the discourse of Reformism during 1997 and 2005.

President Ahmadinejad, however, pursued this strategy by trying to contribute to the global governance and proposing the global management initiative to promote the role of Iran in international affairs. He wanted to make a balance in power at the global level. He helped the strengthening of the discourse of Conservatism during 2005 and 2013.

The important note to conclude is that whatever policy or government to rule in Iran, it should follow the strategy described by the Leader of Islamic Revolution. This

strategy, which has influenced the Iranian Occidentalism, is based at the present time on anti-Americanism and resistance against reconciliation with the West (even if it is to be done by a close ally to the leader). The state-owned and –controlled media are the tools of promoting this strategy.

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## **Appendices**

**Appendix 1: Coding scheme**

**Appendix 2: Descriptive research questions tables**

**Appendix 3: Analytical Research Questions tables**

**Appendix 4: President Obama's Norouz message to Iran**

**Appendix 5: Ayatollah Khamenei's response to Obama's Norouz message**

## Appendix 1: Coding Scheme

The coding scheme consists of a codebook and a coding sheet (form). The codebook consists of the “theoretical” (conceptual) and “operational” definitions and the coding sheet consists of categories of variables to be examined as follow.

### a. Codebook

#### DRQ1- Name of newspaper/nominal

##### Theoretical definition:

A newspaper is a body of text which contains news of current events, articles, features and advertisements printed on paper regularly. A daily newspaper is a newspaper which published on a daily basis. In Iran, the first newspaper was published during the Qajar Era (1785-1925). It was named “Kaqaaz-e Akhbar” (Paper of News) and was published in 01 May 1837 by Mirza Saleh Shirazi. The second and third Iranian newspapers, namely “Zaharirady Bahara” (an Assyrian name) and “Vaqaay-e Etefaqiyyeh” (Events Happened) were published respectively in 1849 and 1861.

#### 1. Ettelaat

##### Operational definition:

Ettelaat is the eldest Iranian newspaper which is still publishing. It was first published in 11 July 1926 in Tehran. It is a daily newspaper which was first published in two pages and 500 issues. It is currently affiliated with the Leader’s Office and the Foundation for the Needy People (Bonyad-e Mostazafan). As a mainstream Iranian newspaper, Ettelaat currently publishes 20 pages. It has an international edition called “Ettelaat International” which is published in London. Although Ettelaat is usually described as a non-aligned paper, it was pro-Conservative during 1997-2002 and pro-Reform during 2005-2008.

#### 2. Iran

##### Operational definition:

Iran was first published in 1995. It is the only Iranian newspaper which is officially owned by the government and is published by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA). As a mainstream Iranian newspaper, Iran publishes several other publications including an Arabic and an English language newspaper as well as a sports-specific daily paper. Iran adopted a pro-Reform policy during 1997-2002, and a pro-Conservative approach during 2005-2008.

#### 3. Hamshahri

##### Operational definition:

Hamshahri is the first Iranian colour newspaper. It was first published in 15 December 1992. It is affiliated with the Municipality of Tehran. Its circulation in 2009 was about 500,000 issues. As a mainstream newspaper, Hamshahri publishes 18 “supplements” and magazines. Hamshahri was pro-Reform during 1997-2002 and pro-Conservative during 2005-2008.

#### 4. Jomhouriy-e Eslami

##### Operational definition:

Jomhouriy-e Eslami was first published in 30 May 1979. It is the first newspaper which was published immediately after the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979. “Preserving the causes of the Muslim and revolutionary people of Iran” has been declared as the main aim of this mainstream Iranian newspaper. Iran’s Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is the licence holder of Jomhouriy-e Eslami. It is a daily newspaper in 16 pages, with a circulation of about 100,000 issues. It has been having a one-time cleric managing director since 1981. Jomhouriy-e Eslami says its political direction is to “raise public awareness in areas of society and politics and promote the culture of the Iranian nation”. Jomhouriy-e Eslami adopted a non-aligned policy during 2005-2008. However, it was pro-Conservative during 1997-2002.

#### DRQ2- Publication period under study/nominal

##### Theoretical definition:

Publication period is the political period when the news was published. In other words, it is the time of the publication of news stories in newspapers.

### 1. During the Reformist Period

#### **Operational definition:**

The Reformist Era is when Reformists were in power during the first presidential term of Mohammad Khatami. The Reformist Period, for the purpose of this research, spans from 23 May 1997 (when Mohammad Khatami, a reformist, was elected president of Iran) to 15 February 2002 (when the first term of Khatami's presidency ends<sup>1</sup>).

### 2. During the Conservative Period

#### **Operational definition:**

The Conservative Period is when Conservatives sealed power. For this research, the first presidential term, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took power, was selected. It spans from 22 May 2005 to 18 November 2008.

#### **DRQ3- Political affiliation of newspaper/nominal**

##### **Theoretical definition:**

Political affiliation is the political orientation of the newspaper under study.

### 1. Pro-Reform

#### **Operational definition:**

Pro-Reform newspapers are those which support the causes of the Reformists. Pro-Reform newspapers tend to highlight stories which are high on the agenda of the pro-Reform government. For this research, pro-Reform newspapers include Ettelaat (during Ahmadinejad's first tenure (2005-2008)), Iran (during Khatami's first tenure (1997-2002)) and Hamshahri (during Khatami's first tenure (1997-2002)).

### 2. Pro-Conservative

#### **Operational definition:**

Pro-Conservative newspapers are those which support the causes of the Conservatives. Pro-Conservative newspapers tend to highlight stories which are high on the agenda of the Conservative government. For this research, Pro-Conservative newspapers include Ettelaat (during Khatami's first tenure (1997-2002)), Iran (during Ahmadinejad's first tenure (2005-2008)), Hamshahri (during Ahmadinejad's first tenure (2005-2008)) and Jomhoury-e Eslami (during both periods (1997-2008)).

### 3. Non-aligned

#### **Operational definition:**

Non-aligned newspapers are those which cannot be attributed to any political wing. None of the newspapers in this research is non-aligned, although some believe that Hamshahri, which is owned by the Tehran Mayor, could be categorised as non-aligned. However, during Khatami's first tenure (1997-2002), Hamshahri was in the control of a pro-Reform mayor of Tehran, Gholamhossein Karbaschi. During Ahmadinejad's first tenure (2005-2008), Hamshahri was presided over by Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf—a tough contender of Ahmadinejad during 2005 presidential election campaigns.

#### **DRQ4- Story layout/nominal**

##### **Theoretical definition 1:**

A news story is a news article or item published in the newspaper as a factual account. A news story is a piece of news which appears in the newspaper, has a headline, lead and body as well as a source. For the purpose of this research, all stories which are related somehow to the West are analysed. The story could be related to the domestic affairs of Iran or the foreign policy of the West.

##### **Theoretical definition 2:**

Story layout is the arrangement of news stories in a newspaper page. A newspaper story is placed or laid out in a newspaper page according to editorial and graphical guidelines and policies of the press. It signifies the ordering of news stories. A very important story is laid out at the top of the page while less important news stories come in the bottom. The font size of the news story also signifies its importance. The larger the font size, the more significant is the story. Main headline of the page is usually the most important news of the

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<sup>1</sup> In Iran, the presidential term spans for four years and is renewable once. The first term of presidency for pro-Reform Mohammad Khatami spans from 1997 to 2001. However, due to the lack of any significant development between Iran and the West in 1998 (during the first presidential term), the researcher included the year 2002 (which falls in the second presidential term) in the first presidential term of Mohammad Khatami.

day.

1. Main headline of page (lead story)

**Operational definition:**

Main headline or the lead story of the page is the headline which is the largest in size in a page. The main headline of the page usually comes on top of the page, but not always.

2. Top half page

**Operational definition:**

The top half page in a newspaper is the uppermost page. If a newspaper page is vertically divided into two equal parts, the top part is called “top half page”.

3. Bottom half page

**Operational definition:**

The bottom half page in a newspaper is the lowest page. If a newspaper page is vertically divided into two equal parts, the bottom part is called “bottom half page”.

**DRQ5- Story page in the newspaper/nominal**

**Theoretical definition:**

The newspaper page in which a news story appears is called a story page. It is in fact the place of the news in the newspaper.

1. Domestic news/politics page

**Operational definition:**

If a West-related story appears on the “politics”, “domestic”, “domestic politics”, “news” or “domestic news” page of the newspaper, it is coded in this category.

2. Foreign news/diplomacy page

**Operational definition:**

If a West-related story appears on the “foreign policy”, “foreign”, “foreign news”, “international politics” or “international news” page of the newspaper, it is coded in this category.

3. Front page

**Operational definition:**

If a West-related story appears front page of the newspaper, it is coded in this category.

**DRQ6- Method of story produced/nominal**

**Theoretical definition:**

Newspaper stories which appear in the Iranian press are either produced by their staffers or translators. Sometimes, staff writers, reporters or journalists in newspapers receive the news from government sources, statements and press releases. Other times, staff writers, reporters or journalists compile the news. In this case, they put together or compose from materials gathered from several sources. In other words, they “transcreate” the news. The term “transcreate” means media people use both translation and writing techniques in order to produce the news.

1. Pure translation

**Operational definition:**

Pure translation happens when stories are published as the exact translation of the source. In pure translation, the source of the news is written at the very beginning of the story. No additional sentence is added or reduced from the source news. It is usually a translation from English or Arabic. Pure translation stories are usually very short.

2. Transcreation (translation and creation)

**Operational definition:**

Stories which are compiled through translation and writing are transcreation. Transcreation stories are not only a translation of a piece of news taken from a foreign source, but also the staff writer, reporter or journalist adds his or her own comments to it. In other words, there is at least one foreign source of news in transcreation.

3. Staff writers

**Operational definition:**

News stories which have no source of news are written by the staff. Reporters or journalists usually produce this type of stories. They are usually published in a column or as “opinion”, “perspective” or “editorial”.

#### **DRQ7- Primary source of news**

##### **Theoretical definition:**

Sources of news are people, places or organisations that supply newspapers (journalists) with ideas and general information for potential news stories. For example, organisations such as the police act as primary definers in that they supply the media with many of the crime news stories. International news agencies are one of the main sources of news for national (domestic) media organisations. In particular, the international news desk of newspapers tends to resort to international news agencies as their main source of news. International news agencies gather and distribute news to a range of media clients on a local, regional, national or international scale.

##### 1. International news agencies/press

##### **Operational definition:**

International news agencies or international press are the world’s most well-known media. For this research, international news agencies include Reuters, AP (Associated Press) and AFP (Agence France-Presse). International press include major British, American and Arabic newspapers or magazines including the Guardian, Times, Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Sunday Times, Daily Mail, Independent, International Herald Tribune, New York Times, Washington Times, Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, New Statesman, Wall Street Journal, Asharq Alawsat, Al-Qods Al-Arabi, Al-Nahar, Al-Hayat and Al-Safir.

##### 2. National/official news agencies/press

##### **Operational definition:**

National/official news agencies/press are those Iranian media which are published at the national level and have been given official permit for publication. National and official news agencies under study include IRNA, ISNA, Fars News Agency, Mehr News Agency, Student News Agency (Basij) and ILNA. National and official press include Hamshahri, Iran, Ettelaat, Kayhan, Resalat, Jomhouriy-e Eslami, Donyay-e Eqtesad, Abrar, Jaam-e Jam, Tehran-e Emrouz, Sharq, Etemad-e Melli, Etemad, Hayat-e No and Sarmayeh.

##### 3. Unidentifiable/unknown sources

##### **Operational definition:**

Unidentifiable sources are impossible to identify. Unknown sources are unfamiliar or not widely known sources of news.

##### 4. Correspondents (no source)

##### **Operational definition:**

When the news story has no source or it has been written by the newspaper correspondents.

##### 5. Else

##### **Operational definition:**

Any other source of news which does not fall in the above categories.

#### **DRQ8- Main international source of news/nominal**

##### **Theoretical definition:**

Main international source of news are well known at the international level and have historically been one of the most formative influences in the development of news particularly in developing states. Main international source of news include main international mainstream news agencies, television stations and newspapers.

##### 1. Reuters

##### **Operational definition:**

Reuters news agency headquartered in UK, having bureaus in most countries; Reuters

##### 2. AP

##### **Operational definition:**

Associated Press is based in the US with offices across the world; AP

##### 3. AFP

##### **Operational definition:**

Agence France-Presse is in France while having bureaus in other countries; AFP

4. British media

**Operational definition:**

British media include mainstream newspapers/websites (Guardian, Times, Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Sunday Times, Daily Mail, Independent, New Stateman) and television channels/websites (BBC, Channel 4, ITV News, Sky News).

5. American media

**Operational definition:**

American media include top newspapers (International Herald Tribune, New York Times, Washington Times, Washington Post, Time, Newsweek, Wall Street Journal) and television stations (CNN, NBC, Fox News, ABC).

6. Arab media

**Operational definition:**

Arab media include mainstream press (Asharq Alawsat, Al-Qods Al-Arabi, Al-Nahar, Al-Hayat and Al-Safir) and TV networks (Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya).

7. Other international (local/non-Iranian)

**Operational definition:**

Other international sources of news include major news organisations which do not fall in the above categories. Other international sources mainly include non-Iranian local newspapers or television networks of countries, not mentioned above. For example, Der Spiegel, Azzaman, al-Sabaah.

8. No international source

**Operational definition:**

When the news has no international source.

**DRQ9- National source(s) of news/nominal**

**Theoretical definition:**

National sources of news are sources which are released in Iran. They may include national newspapers, news agencies and Iran's radio and television as well as weblogs, experts and pundits and government organisations and ministries.

1. IRNA

**Operational definition:**

Islamic Republic News Agency. It publishes news in several languages and has bureaus in many other countries; IRNA

2. IRIB

**Operational definition:**

Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting also owns the so-called Central News Unit (CNU) and many radio and television news networks. It publishes news in several languages and has bureaus in many other countries; CNU; IRIB; Radio and television correspondent.

3. Other pro-Conservative

**Operational definition:**

Pro-Conservative sources of news include Fars news agency (Fars), Mehr news agency (Mehr), Basij news agency (Student News Agency), ISNA news agency (during 2005 and 2008).

4. Other pro-Reform

**Operational definition:**

Pro-Reform news sources are ILNA news agency and ISNA news agency (during 1997 and 2001).

5. Non-official news websites

**Operational definition:**

Non-official news websites are those which are being published online unofficially. In other words, they are not affiliated with government organisations.

6. Weblogs

**Operational definition:**

Weblogs are a popular type of website presented in the style of an online diary or journal by the author. It

usually contains personalized commentary and analysis on day subjects and news.

7. Iran's government sources

**Operational definition:**

Iran's government sources of news are the Public Relations Departments of government-owned organisations and ministries which publish press releases and statements. For example, the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which updates media on developments on a daily basis through sending fax messages.

8. Experts/political observers/pundits

**Operational definition:**

Experts, political observers and pundits are those who are contacted by the media in order to produce news. They are one of the main sources of news and analysis for Iranian media. Their name usually is by-lined in the news.

9. Unidentifiable/unknown

**Operational definition:**

Unidentifiable sources are impossible to identify. Unknown sources are unfamiliar or not widely known sources of news.

10. No national source

**Operational definition:**

When the news has no national source.

**DRQ10- Primary Western country/countries involved/nominal**

**Theoretical definition:**

Primary Western country involved is the "first" Western country which has been mentioned in the news story. Sometimes, two Western countries are mentioned respectively (immediately after each other), which are also regarded as primary countries involved in the news. The West is defined as one or more than one of these countries: US, UK, France, Germany or phrases of West, EU3, 5+1 Group, EU 3+3, Europeans.

1. US

**Operational definition:**

The United States of America; the USA; Washington; White House; America; Americans; Great Satan; Global Arrogance

2. UK

**Operational definition:**

The United Kingdom; Britain; England; London; the English; the British; Old Colonialist

3. France

**Operational definition:**

France; the French

4. Germany

**Operational definition:**

Germany; the Germans

5. Group 5+1

**Operational definition:**

EU3 (UK, France, Germany); 5+1 Group (US, Russia, China, UK, France plus Germany); EU 3+3 (US, Russia, China plus UK, France, Germany); Europeans

6. Not mentioned

**Operational definition:**

When there is no mention of the above categories or when there is no single Western country but there is more than one Western country involved; West; more than one Western country; Western countries; Westerners; Arrogance; Foreign Powers; Superpowers; Great Powers<sup>1</sup>. For example, "US, UK fighters

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<sup>1</sup> These words are in fact a reference to the West and in particular to the US. Therefore, they are coded as West.

bombard Iraq”; because we have more than one Western country, we code this as “not mentioned”.

### **DRQ11- Headline direction (line) towards West/ nominal**

#### **Theoretical definition:**

A news headline is a text which comes on the very top of a news story to signify the most important subject of the news. As a headline should highlight an important issue (gist), its font size is much bigger than the text’s font size so that it could be recognisable and distinguishable to the readers. A headline can be directed, by media people under different types of influences, to be positive, negative or neutral towards the West<sup>1</sup>. It could also be stereotypical, positively or negatively.

The term stereotype was first coined by Walter Lippmann in 1922 when he used the term in his book “Public Opinion” to describe the uniform pictures and preconceptions that group members hold in their minds to simplify their views of the world and for reaching common agreement regarding events in their environment. He argued that people interact directly not with objective reality but with the representations they have created about that reality<sup>2</sup>.

The term stereotype was further developed in 1933 by Daniel Katz and Kenneth Braly who presented an operational definition of stereotype. In their study, believed to be the first organised and influential study on stereotype, Katz and Braly defined stereotypes as “pictures” of national and ethnic groups which reflect attitudes toward them. Decades later, researchers argued that members of a group act toward other groups on the basis of shared stereotypes (attitudes, feelings and ideas). This theory was developed in the 1980s by Henry Tajfel who suggested that when members form a group and social identity, they tend to derogate and even discriminate other groups in order to raise their own self-esteem and status.

Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005:3) went further and defined stereotype as “repertoire (i.e. beliefs) that people have about the characteristics of other groups”. According to them, at first stereotype was believed to be the “product of faulty, rigid, and irrational thinking” which was used interchangeably with “prejudice” (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005:3). However, later most researchers began to consider stereotype as an “expression of normal and universal cognitive functioning”.

Technically, stereotype is a “text cast in rigid form for the purpose of repetitive use” in printing (Pickering, 2001:9). The Collins Cobuild English Dictionary defines stereotype as a “fixed general image or set of characteristics that a lot of people believe represent a particular type of person or thing”. Putnam (1975:34) defines stereotype as “a typical feature of a kind”.

Stereotype has been defined by Allport (1954: 191) as “an exaggerated belief associated with a category. Its function is to justify our conduct in relation to that category”. Franklin et al (2005:254) have identified three features of stereotypes: First, stereotypes are “exaggerated beliefs” which involve either an “inflation of characteristic” or “over-generalisation from part...to whole”...Second, stereotypes contain “a kernel of truth” and “resonate with what we (and others) *think to be true*. And third, stereotypes function to “rationalise our conduct and justify our actions”. Fowler (1991:16) adds a fourth feature to stereotypes: meaningfulness. He defines meaningfulness as “an ideology of ethnocentrism...or homocentrism: a preoccupation with countries...”.

Depending on the kind of (favorable or unfavorable) image it projected or the sense of (order or chaos) it conveyed or generally the feeling of (achievement or failure) it aroused, news items were coded as positive, negative or neutral.

#### 1. Positive

#### **Operational definition:**

A positive headline towards West is a headline which highlights a positive point about/related to the West. A

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<sup>1</sup> Positive, neutral, and negative ratings are determined by the content of the text and words used in the story in order to prevent the coder from infusing personal opinions or judgment into the analysis. Although it could be very hard to rate a story on Positive, neutral, and negative grounds, they can be rated based on the combination of context and explicit ratings. Context could be embedded in the text (by analysing the headline, body and photo of the news). Explicit ratings can be identified through the use of words of clearly positive or negative judgment.

<sup>2</sup> Social psychologists such as Katz and Bradley (1993) and Wilson and Gutierrez (1985) agree that the mass media is a powerful mechanism through which stereotypes are disseminated across national and global scales.

headline was coded as positive if it conveyed a favorable impression on West. Positive sentences would have supported or justified the Western act, or contained quotes by individuals who approved of the action. A positive headline about the West is usually one which signifies a medical or scientific breakthrough which has been accomplished in the West. An example of a positive headline is: "American scientist produces new power generator" (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 17-01-1998).

## 2. Negative

### **Operational definition:**

A headline direction was coded as negative if it had a negative meaning toward, or would have, in all probability, caused the reader to form a negative opinion about the West. Negative headline direction would have contained unfavorable descriptions of the Western actors, or the acts, condemned the Western action or actors involved. A negative headline direction highlights a negative point (such as a problem or challenge) about/related to the West or anything which is against the interests of the West. Therefore, a domestic issue of Iran (or even a foreign news item) could be against the interests of the West from the viewpoint of Iran<sup>1</sup>. For example, following up the nuclear issue is against the interests of the West from the viewpoint of Iranians. A negative headline is not fabricated or manipulated by journalists. It only highlights a negative point. For example, "British nurse accused of killing 18 infants" (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 22-May-1997) or "Washington sanctions useless against China" (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 22-May-1997) or "Economic recession forecast for US" (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 22-May-1997).

## 3. Neutral

### **Operational definition:**

A neutral headline direction highlights neither a negative nor a positive point about/related to the West. A headline direction which neither portrayed the West favorably nor unfavorably, neither justified nor condemned the Western act or actor, was coded as neutral. A neutral headline direction is impartial and does not take sides. Examples of neutral headlines: "Goals of Clinton's visit to Turkey" or "Next US elections in 2000" (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 22-May-1997).

## 4. Stereotypical

### **Operational definition:**

A stereotypically-written headline is one which is based on one of the stereotypes attributed to West in Iran. They include: colonialism/exploitation; arrogance, misuse of power/domination/unilateralism/criminal America/Great Satan; Interventionism/military occupation/occupier/aggression/aggressor/warmongering/warmonger/expansionism/ exporter of terrorism (state terrorism)/regime change; Double standards and hypocrisy (Tazvir, Nefaq, Dorooee); Mistrust and lack of confidence; Enemy/animosity. Therefore, if a headline contains one these phrases and vocabularies, it is stereotypical.

## 5. Positive stereotypical

### **Operational definition:**

A positive stereotypical headline is one which highlights a positive stereotype about the West. For example, the West as the hotbed of democracy, freedom and human rights. America as the heart of science and technology.

## 6. Negative Stereotypical

### **Operational definition:**

A negative stereotypical headline is one which highlights a negative stereotype about the West. Negative stereotypes about the West are: colonialism/exploitation; arrogance, misuse of power/domination/unilateralism/criminal America/Great Satan; Interventionism/military occupation/occupier/aggression/aggressor/warmongering (Lashkarkeshi) /warmonger/expansionism/ exporter of terrorism (state terrorism)/regime change; Double standards and hypocrisy (Tazvir, Nefaq, Dorooee);

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<sup>1</sup> An example of a news story (related to the West) which is negative from the viewpoint of Iran but may be positive from the viewpoint of the West:

*Two Holocaust deniers on trial in Germany*

*Berlin, IRNA—German news sources announced on Monday that two researchers will go on trial on the accusation of denying Holocaust. (Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 20-April-2006).*

Mistrust and lack of confidence; Enemy/animosity. Therefore, if a headline contains one these phrases and vocabularies, it is negative stereotypical.

7. Non-relevant

**Operational definition:**

Non-relevant means not mentioned in the story; Category not related to this story.

**DRQ12- Primary subject of story related to West**

**Theoretical definition:**

Primary subject of the news is the dominant subject of the story which is related to the West.

1. Politics

**Operational definition:**

If the subject of the story is about politics (domestic or foreign) of the West, it is coded in this category.

2. Economy and energy

**Operational definition:**

If the subject of the story is about economy and energy of the West and is published on domestic political pages or the front page, it is coded in this category. Since this research does not study news in the “Economy” pages of newspapers, only economic news which appear in other pages are analysed. Examples include: economic sanctions; economic aspects of the nuclear activities

3. Socio-cultural

**Operational definition:**

If the subject of the story is about society or culture of the West, it is coded in this category.

4. Natural disasters and accidents

**Operational definition:**

If the subject of the story is about natural disasters or accidents related to the West, it is coded in this category.

5. Else

**Operational definition:**

If the subject of the story is about none of the above areas, it is coded in this category.

**DRQ13- Policy aspects/issues of the West in the story/nominal**

**Theoretical definition:**

Policy issues highlighted in the story are those which concern either the domestic politics (affairs) of the West or its foreign policy (affairs).

1. Domestic politics of the West

**Operational definition:**

If the subject of the story concerns domestic affairs or policies of the West, it is coded in this category. For example, increasing taxes

2. Foreign policy of the West (such as bilateral relations)

**Operational definition:**

If the subject of the story concerns foreign affairs or policies of the West, it is coded in this category. In other words, if a foreign country is involved in the story about West or if there are two or more than two countries in the story one of which is the West, it is coded in this category. For example, the Iraq war

3. Non-relevant

**Operational definition:**

If the subject of the story neither concerns foreign affairs nor policies of the West, it is coded in this category.

**DRQ29- Iran nuclear issue subject of story**

**Theoretical definition:**

Iran’s nuclear issue is the case of nuclear activities of Iran which came to the spotlight of the International Atomic Energy Agency and respective UN bodies in 2002. The West accuses Iran of developing a nuclear weapon. Iran denies the allegation, saying it is using the nuclear power for peaceful purposes including for generating power. Iran’s nuclear case has been one of the main subjects of news in the Iranian and Western media since 2003.

1. Cooperation (détente)

**Operational definition:**

When the subject of the story is Iran's nuclear issue, whether it promotes cooperation (détente) and positive development between Iran and the West, it is coded in this category.

2. Conflict (tension)

**Operational definition:**

When the subject of the story is Iran's nuclear issue, whether it promotes conflict (tension) and deadlock between Iran and the West, it is coded in this category.

3. Non-relevant

**Operational definition:**

When the story is not about Iran's nuclear issue, it is coded in this category.

4. Else

**Operational definition:**

When the story about Iran's nuclear issue promotes neither conflict nor cooperation but highlights other related issues such as nuclear technology achievements of Iran or its right to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under the NPT.

**DRQ14- Dominant political theme of story related to West**

**Theoretical definition:**

Stories related to the West and its politics have a theme or angle. In other words, they follow a political perspective in order to report the story. The political theme sets the tone of the story and tries to promote a political aspect (positive or negative) related to the West. There might be several political themes. The dominant political theme is the one which has been highlighted in the headline and the body of the story and comes first in the news.

1. Cooperation with West (such as negotiations on Iraq and the nuclear case)

**Operational definition:**

When the political theme of the story signifies cooperation with the West, it is coded in this category. Examples are: Iran's cooperation with the West in the Afghan war; Iran-US talks on Iraq; Iran-Group 5+1 negotiations over the nuclear issue.

2. Denial of the Western pattern of development and promotion of the Iranian-Islamic pattern of development (Vision 2025)

**Operational definition:**

When the political theme of the story is about the denial of the Western pattern of development and promotion of the Iranian-Islamic pattern of development (Vision 2025), it is coded in this category.

3. Opposition to West

**Operational definition:**

When the story tries to promote the idea of opposition to the West in the form of anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism, it is coded in this category. For example, anti-US rallies in Iran and other countries

4. Violation of law/rules

**Operational definition:**

When the story highlights violation of international law/rules by the West, it is coded in this category. For example, imposing unilateral sanctions on Iran by the US; refusing to supply Iranian civil airliners in Europe with fuel

5. Terrorism, war and violence

**Operational definition:**

When the story highlights issues related to terrorism, war and violence, it is coded in this category. It also includes torture issues and any subject related to violence and any type of incident which is related to war, terrorism and the war on terror. Examples include: the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (if it is related to the West); US drone attacks in Pakistan.

6. Interference of West in domestic affairs

**Operational definition:**

When the story highlights the idea that the West is interfering in domestic affairs, it is coded in this category.

For example, during elections; statements by Western officials regarding human rights situation in Iran

7. Western support for Israel

**Operational definition:**

When the story brings into spotlight Western support for Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the peace process, it is coded in this category. Examples are: US veto of anti-Israeli resolutions in the UN Security Council; Western arms sells to Israel

8. Western threats

**Operational definition:**

When the story is about an issue which contains Western threats, intimidation, obstructionism, allegations, pressures, spying and plots, it is coded in this category. For example, nuclear-related allegations; spying charges against West; sabotage claims against West; sanctions imposed by the West

9. Else (affairs of other countries than Iran, economic sanctions against other countries, domestic issues of West)

**Operational definition:**

When the story is either about the domestic affairs of the West, or relations between the West and other countries rather than Iran (except for Iraq, Afghanistan and Israel), or any other political theme not mentioned above, it is coded in this category.

10. Non-relevant

**Operational definition:**

When there is no political theme in the story, it is coded in this category.

**DRQ15- Dominant stereotypes of the West/nominal**

**Theoretical definition:**

As explained above, a stereotype, in its general meaning, is defined as a “fixed general image or set of characteristics that a lot of people believe represent a particular type of person or thing” (Collins Cobuild English Dictionary). If someone is stereotyped as something, people form a fixed general idea or image of them, so that it is assumed that they will behave in a particular way. This general image could be either positive or negative. However, in the political context, a stereotype is “an exaggerated belief associated with a category...[whose]...function is to justify our conduct in relation to that category” (Allport, 1954: 191, brackets added). In this research, a stereotype is defined as an ideologically-driven fixed general image or set of characteristics Iranian newspapers have toward West.

1. Colonialism

**Operational definition:**

If the story contains words or phrases such as “colonialism”, “neo-colonialism” and “exploitation”, it is coded in this category.

2. Arrogance

**Operational definition:**

If the story contains words or phrases such as “arrogance”, “neo-arrogance”, “global arrogance”, “misuse of power”, “domination”, “domineering”, “unilateralism”, “criminal West” and “Great Satan”, it is coded in this category.

3. Colonialism and arrogance

**Operational definition:**

If the story contains words or phrases such as “arrogance”, “neo-arrogance”, “global arrogance”, “misuse of power”, “domination”, “domineering”, “unilateralism”, “criminal West” and “Great Satan” together with “colonialism”, “neo-colonialism” and “exploitation”<sup>1</sup>, it is coded in this category.

4. Interventionism

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<sup>1</sup> Some might argue that words and phrases in this category might not be similar. There are two reasons why this group of words have been categorised under “Arrogance”. First, the pilot project suggested that in order for tackling statistical problems, such categories should be combined. Second, the common denominator among all these words and phrases is “arrogance”.

**Operational definition:**

If the story contains words or phrases such as “interventionism”, “military occupation”, “occupier”, “aggression”, “aggressor”, “warmongering”, “warmonger”, “expansionism”, “exporter of terrorism”, “state terrorism” and “regime change”, it is coded in this category.

## 5. Double standards and hypocrisy

**Operational definition:**

If the story contains words or phrases such as “double standard” and “hypocrisy”, it is coded in this category.

## 6. Mistrust and lack of confidence

**Operational definition:**

If the story contains words or phrases such as “mistrust” and “lack of confidence”, it is coded in this category.

## 7. Enemy/animosity

**Operational definition:**

If the story contains words or phrases such as “enemy” and “animosity”, it is coded in this category.

## 8. Else

**Operational definition:**

If the story contains stereotypical words or phrases not mentioned above, it is coded in this category.

## 9. No stereotype

**Operational definition:**

If there is no stereotype in the news, it is coded in this category.

**DRQ16- Foreign relations subject of story/nominal****Theoretical definition:**

Every story about the West published in the Iranian newspapers is about relations of the West and relations of Iran. In other word, stories about the West signify contacts or elements of contact of either the West or Iran.

## 1. Iran-West relations

**Operational definition:**

If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and the West, it is coded in this category.

## 2. Iran-US relations

**Operational definition:**

If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and the US, it is coded in this category.

## 3. Iran-UK relations

**Operational definition:**

If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and the UK, it is coded in this category.

## 4. Iran-France relations

**Operational definition:**

If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and France, it is coded in this category.

## 5. Iran-Germany relations

**Operational definition:**

If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and Germany, it is coded in this category.

## 6. Relations between the West and other countries other than Iran

**Operational definition:**

If the story is about/pertains to relations between West and other countries other than Iran, it is coded in this category.

## 7. Iran-Int'l Organisations relations

**Operational definition:**

If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and international organisations such as the IAEA or Security Council, it is coded in this category.

## 8. West-Int'l Organisations relations

**Operational definition:**

If the story is about/pertains to relations between West and international organizations, it is coded in this category.

9. None-relevant

**Operational definition:**

If the story is about/pertains to domestic affairs of Iran or the West. And if the subject of the story does not contain the element of foreign relations, it is coded in this category.

**DRQ17-20 Story direction towards Iran-West relations/nominal**

**Theoretical definition:**

If the story is about/pertains to relations between Iran and the West, it follows a direction towards this. The story could promote either cooperation or conflict between Iran and the West. It could also be impartial.

1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)

**Operational definition:**

If the story promotes a state of friendly relations and cooperation between Iran and West and favours détente, it is coded in this category.

2. Against (tension-conflict)

**Operational definition:**

If the story promotes a state of anxious relations, disagreement, antagonism, tension and conflict between Iran and West, it is coded in this category.

3. Neutral

**Operational definition:**

If the story promotes neither détente nor tension in relations between Iran and West, it is coded in this category.

4. Non-relevant

**Operational definition:**

If the story is not about relations between Iran and the West, it is coded in this category.

**DRQ21- Story direction towards relations between the West and countries other than Iran/nominal**

**Theoretical definition:**

If the story is about/pertains to relations between the West and countries other than Iran, it follows a direction towards this. The story could promote either cooperation or conflict between the West and countries other than Iran. It could also be impartial.

1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)

**Operational definition:**

If the story promotes a state of friendly relations and cooperation between the West and countries other than Iran and favours détente, it is coded in this category.

2. Against (tension-conflict)

**Operational definition:**

If the story promotes a state of anxious relations, disagreement, antagonism, tension and conflict between the West and countries other than Iran, it is coded in this category.

3. Neutral

**Operational definition:**

If the story promotes neither détente nor tension in relations between the West and countries other than Iran, it is coded in this category.

4. Non-relevant

**Operational definition:**

If the story is not about relations between the West and countries other than Iran, it is coded in this category.

**DRQ22-27 Image of the West presented in story/ nominal**

**Theoretical definition:**

Picture or general idea about the West highlighted in the story. When the West is portrayed in the Iranian newspapers, it creates an image of the West for the readers. The image could be positive, negative, neutral or stereotypical. Depending on the kind of (favorable or unfavorable) image it projected or the sense of (order or

chaos) it conveyed or generally the feeling of (achievement or failure) it aroused, news items were coded as positive, negative or neutral.

1. Positive

**Operational definition:**

A story (image) was coded as positive if it conveyed a favorable impression on West. Positive sentences would have supported or justified the Western act, or contained quotes by individuals who approved of the action. If the image of the West portrayed in the story is positive, it is coded in this category. If the story highlights a positive point related to the West, it is coded in this category.

2. Negative

**Operational definition:**

A story was coded as negative if it had a negative meaning toward, or would have, in all probability, caused the reader to form a negative opinion about the West. Negative image of the West would have contained unfavorable descriptions of the Western actors, or the acts, condemned the Western action or actors involved. If the image of the West portrayed in the story is negative, it is coded in this category. If the story highlights a negative point related to the West, it is coded in this category.

3. Neutral

**Operational definition:**

An image which neither portrayed the West favorably nor unfavorably, neither justified nor condemned the Western act or actor, was coded as neutral. In other words, if the image of the West portrayed in the story is neutral (impartial), it is coded in this category. If the story highlights neither a positive or negative point related to the West, it is coded in this category.

4. Stereotypical

**Operational definition:**

If the image of the West portrayed in the story is stereotypical, it is coded in this category.

5. Positive Stereotypical

**Operational definition:**

If the image of the West portrayed in the story is positive stereotypical, it is coded in this category.

6. Negative Stereotypical

**Operational definition:**

If the image of the West portrayed in the story is negative stereotypical, it is coded in this category.

7. Non-relevant

**Operational definition:**

If no image of the West is portrayed in the story, it is coded in this category.

**DRQ28- Journalistic photo direction towards the West**

**Theoretical definition:**

Journalistic photo is a particular form of photo which is taken to tell a news story. It is taken by photo journalists on different news occasions such as press conferences or bilateral meetings between officials. A journalistic photo is different from other types of photos in that it is combined with other news elements to make the news more tangible and factual for the audience.

1. Positive

**Operational definition:**

If the photo portrays the signified/person as positive<sup>1</sup>, it is coded in this category. In other words, when you look at that picture, you will have a positive feeling towards it; therefore, it is coded in this category.



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<sup>1</sup> From the viewpoint of Iran.

2. Negative

**Operational definition:**

If the photo portrays the signified as negative, it is coded in this category. In other words, when you look at that picture, you will have a negative feeling towards it; therefore, it is coded in this category. Example:



3. Neutral

**Operational definition:**

If the photo portrays the signified as neutral, it is coded in this category. In other words, when you look at that picture, you will have no feeling towards it; it is coded in this category.

4. No photo

**Operational definition:**

If the story has no photo, it is coded in this category.

## b. Coding Sheet (form)

**DATE: The date of publication**  
for example: 17-05-1997

**DRQ1- Name of newspaper/nominal**

1. Ettelaat
2. Iran
3. Hamshahri
4. Jomhouriy-e Eslami

**DRQ2- Publication period under study/nominal**

1. During the Reformist Era
2. During the Conservative Era

**DRQ3- Political affiliation of newspaper /nominal**

1. Pro-Reformist
2. Pro-Conservative
3. Non-aligned

**DRQ4- Story layout/nominal**

1. Main headline of page (lead story)
2. Top half page
3. Bottom half page

**DRQ5- Story page in the newspaper/nominal**

1. Domestic news/politics page
2. Foreign news/diplomacy page
3. Front page

**DRQ6- Method of story produced/nominal**

1. Pure translation
2. Transcreation (translation and creation)
3. Staff writers

**DRQ7- Primary source of news**

1. International news agencies/press
2. National/official news agencies/press
3. Unidentifiable/unknown sources
4. Correspondents (no source)
5. Else

**DRQ8- Main international source of news/nominal**

1. Reuters
2. AP
3. AFP
4. British media
5. American media
6. Arab media
7. Other international (local/non-Iranian)
8. No international source

**DRQ9- National source(s) of news/nominal**

1. IRNA
2. IRIB
3. Other pro-Conservative (Fars, Mehr2, Basij isna2...)
4. Other pro-Reform (ILNA, isna1)
5. Non-official news websites
6. Weblogs
7. Iran's government sources
8. Experts/political observers/pundits
9. Unidentifiable/unknown
10. No national source

**DRQ10- Primary Western country/countries involved/nominal**

1. US
2. UK
3. France
4. Germany
5. EU3
6. Not mentioned

**DRQ11- Headline direction (line) towards West/ nominal**

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral
4. Stereotypical
5. Positive Stereotypical
6. Negative Stereotypical
7. Non-relevant

**DRQ12- Primary subject of story related to West<sup>1</sup>**

1. Politics
2. Economy and energy
3. Socio-cultural
4. Natural disasters and accidents
5. Else

**DRQ13- Policy aspects/issues of the West in the story/nominal**

1. Domestic politics of the West
2. Foreign policy of the West (such as bilateral relations)
3. Non-relevant

**DRQ14- Iran nuclear issue subject of story**

1. Cooperation (détente)

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<sup>1</sup>MERGED

2. Conflict (tension)
3. Non-relevant
4. Else

**DRQ15- Dominant political theme of story related to West<sup>1</sup>**

1. Cooperation with West
2. Denial of the Western pattern of development and promotion of the Iranian-Islamic pattern of development (Vision 2025)
3. Opposition to West
4. Violation of law/rules
5. Terrorism, war and violence
6. Interference of West in domestic affairs
7. Western support for Israel
8. Western threats
9. Else
10. Non-relevant

**DRQ16- Dominant stereotypes of the West/nominal<sup>2</sup>**

1. Colonialism
2. Arrogance
3. Colonialism and arrogance
4. Interventionism
5. Double standards and hypocrisy
6. Mistrust and lack of confidence
7. Enemy/animosity
8. Else
9. No stereotype

**DRQ17- Foreign relations subject of story/nominal**

1. Iran-West relations
2. Iran-US relations
3. Iran-UK relations
4. Iran-France relations
5. Iran-Germany relations
6. Relations between the West and other countries other than Iran
7. Iran-Int'l Organisations relations
8. West-Int'l Organisations relations
9. Non-relevant

**DRQ18- Story direction towards Iran-West relations/nominal**

1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)
2. Against (tension-conflict)
3. Neutral
4. Non-relevant

**DRQ19- Story direction towards Iran-US relations/nominal**

1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)
2. Against (tension-conflict)
3. Neutral
4. Non-relevant

**DRQ20- Story direction towards Iran-EU3 relations/nominal**

1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)
2. Against (tension-conflict)
3. Neutral
4. Non-relevant

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<sup>1</sup> MERGED

<sup>2</sup> MERGED

**DRQ21- Story direction towards Iran-UK relations/nominal**

1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)
2. Against (tension-conflict)
3. Neutral
4. Non-relevant

**DRQ22- Story direction towards relations between the West and countries other than Iran/nominal**

1. In favour of (détente-cooperation)
2. Against (tension-conflict)
3. Neutral
4. Non-relevant

**DRQ23- Image of the West presented in story/ nominal<sup>1</sup>**

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral
4. Stereotypical
5. Positive Stereotypical
6. Negative Stereotypical
7. Non-relevant

**DRQ24- Image of the US government presented in story / nominal<sup>2</sup>**

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral
4. Stereotypical
5. Positive Stereotypical
6. Negative Stereotypical
7. Non-relevant

**DRQ25- Image of the EU3 presented in story / nominal**

- Positive
- Negative
- Neutral
- Stereotypical
- Positive Stereotypical
- Negative Stereotypical
- Non-relevant

**DRQ26- Image of the UK government presented in story / nominal<sup>3</sup>**

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral
4. Stereotypical
5. Positive Stereotypical
6. Negative Stereotypical
7. Non-relevant

**DRQ27- Image of French government presented in story / nominal<sup>4</sup>**

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral
4. Stereotypical
5. Positive Stereotypical
6. Negative Stereotypical
7. Non-relevant

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<sup>1</sup> MERGED

<sup>2</sup> MERGED

<sup>3</sup> MERGED

<sup>4</sup> MERGED

**DRQ28- Image of German government presented in story / nominal<sup>1</sup>**

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral
4. Stereotypical
5. Positive Stereotypical
6. Negative Stereotypical
7. Non-relevant

**DRQ29- Journalistic photo direction towards the West/nominal**

1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Neutral
4. No photo

**TITLE: headline of the news**

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<sup>1</sup> MERGED

## **Appendix 2: Descriptive research questions tables**

### **i. Descriptive Research Questions tables**

Descriptive research questions study the representation of the West from the quantitative point of view. Figures and statistics related to the representation of the West in terms of features such as the story layout or political theme are described in the form of frequency tables in the Descriptive Research Questions (DRQ) section.

#### **Descriptive question (Frequency):**

Frequency tables about representation of the West in mainstream Iranian newspaper

#### **Descriptive tables:**

As follows:

**DRQ1: Which newspaper had the most coverage of the West during the whole period of study?**

		DRQ1 Name of Newspaper			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Ettelaat	395	18.5	18.5	18.5
	Iran	466	21.8	21.8	40.3
	Hamshahri	419	19.6	19.6	59.9
	Jomhouriy-e Eslami	858	40.1	40.1	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 10** Frequency table for the name of newspaper

**DRQ1 Name of Newspaper**




Table 1 indicates that Jomhouriy-e Eslami, a pro-Conservative newspaper, had the highest volume of coverage of the West (40.1 per cent) during the whole period of the study, followed by “Iran” (21.8 per cent) and Hamshahri (19.6 per cent). Ettelaat had the least (18.5 per cent).

**DRQ2: In which period (Conservative or Reformist), did mainstream Iranian newspapers have the most coverage of the West? (Which newspaper had the most coverage of the West during Reformism and Conservatism?)**

DRQ1 Name of Newspaper * DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation					
		DRQ2 Publication Period		Total	
		Reformist Period	Conservative Period		
DRQ1 Name of	Ettelaat	Count	112	283	395

	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	14.9%	20.4%	18.5%
	% of Total	5.2%	13.2%	18.5%
Iran	Count	145	321	466
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	19.3%	23.2%	21.8%
	% of Total	6.8%	15.0%	21.8%
Hamshahri	Count	126	293	419
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	16.7%	21.2%	19.6%
	% of Total	5.9%	13.7%	19.6%
Jomhouriy-e Eslami	Count	370	488	858
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	49.1%	35.2%	40.1%
	% of Total	17.3%	22.8%	40.1%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 11 Newspaper coverage of the West in two political periods**

According to Table 2, the highest number of stories about the West was recorded in the Reformist period (by Jomhouriy-e Eslami, 49.1 per cent). Notwithstanding, mainstream Iranian newspapers had the most coverage of the West during the Conservative period.


**DRQ3: Which political affiliation had the most representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**

- a. Which political affiliation had the most representation of the West?

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Pro-Reform	214	10.0	10.0	10.0
Pro-Conservative	1435	67.1	67.1	77.1
Non-aligned	489	22.9	22.9	100.0
Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 12 Representation of the West and political affiliation of newspapers**

### RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper



**RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper**

Table 3 suggests that pro-Conservatism had the most representation of the West (67.1 per cent) during the period of the study, while pro-Reformism had the least (10 per cent).

- b. Which political affiliation had the most representation of the West during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	Pro-Reform	Count	213	1	214
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	28.3%	.1%	10.0%
		% of Total	10.0%	.0%	10.0%
	Pro-Conservative	Count	539	896	1435
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	71.6%	64.7%	67.1%
		% of Total	25.2%	41.9%	67.1%
	Non-aligned	Count	1	488	489
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.1%	35.2%	22.9%
		% of Total	.0%	22.8%	22.9%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%	

**Table 13 Political affiliation of newspapers and the representation of the West in two political periods**

According to Table 4, pro-Conservatism had the most representation of the West during both the Reformist period and the Conservative period, respectively with 71.6 per cent and 64.7 per cent of coverage of stories related to the West.

**DRQ4: Which story layout was used most frequently in mainstream Iranian newspapers to portray the West during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**

- a. Which story layout was used most frequently in mainstream Iranian newspapers to portray the West?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Main headline of page (Lead Story)	259	12.1	12.1	12.1
	Top half page	1268	59.3	59.3	71.4
	Bottom half page	611	28.6	28.6	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 14 Story layout to represent the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers**




Table 5 indicates that the “top-half page” layout was used most frequently (59.3 per cent) in mainstream Iranian newspapers to portray the West. Only 12.1 per cent of the stories were the main headline of the page.

- b. Which story layout was used most frequently in mainstream Iranian newspapers to portray the West during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ4 Story Layout \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ4 Story Layout	Main headline of page (Lead Story)	Count	89	170	259
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	11.8%	12.3%	12.1%
		% of Total	4.2%	8.0%	12.1%
	Top half page	Count	436	832	1268
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	57.9%	60.1%	59.3%
		% of Total	20.4%	38.9%	59.3%
	Bottom half page	Count	228	383	611
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	30.3%	27.7%	28.6%
		% of Total	10.7%	17.9%	28.6%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%	

**Table 15 Story layout to represent the West in two political periods**

According to Table 6, most stories about the West were used in the “top half page” layout during both the Conservative period (60.1 per cent) and the Reformist period (57.9 per cent).

**DRQ5: Which page did most stories about the West appear in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**

- a. Which page did most stories about the West appear in mainstream Iranian newspapers?

DRQ5 Story Page					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Domestic news/politics page	523	24.5	24.5	24.5
	Foreign news/diplomacy page	1171	54.8	54.8	79.2
	Front page	444	20.8	20.8	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 16 Story page and the representation of the West**

### RQ5 Story Page




Table 7 suggests that most stories about the West (54.8 per cent) appeared in the foreign news page of mainstream Iranian newspapers.

- b. Which page did most stories about the West appear in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?

#### DRQ5 Story Page \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation

			RQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
RQ5 Story Page	Domestic news/politics page	Count	179	344	523
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	23.8%	24.8%	24.5%
		% of Total	8.4%	16.1%	24.5%
	Foreign news/diplomacy page	Count	413	758	1171
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	54.8%	54.7%	54.8%
		% of Total	19.3%	35.5%	54.8%
	Front page	Count	161	283	444
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	21.4%	20.4%	20.8%
		% of Total	7.5%	13.2%	20.8%
Total		Count	753	1385	2138

% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 17 Story page and representation of the West in two political periods**

According to Table 8, stories about the West were most reflected in the foreign news/diplomacy page of mainstream newspapers during both the Reformist and Conservative periods, respectively with 54.8 per cent and 54.7 per cent.

**DRQ6: Which type of news production method was most frequently used in stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. Which type of news production method was most frequently used in stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers?

**DRQ6 Story Production Method**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Pure Translation	139	6.5	6.5	6.5
	Transcreation (translation and creation)	1007	47.1	47.1	53.6
	Staff Writers	992	46.4	46.4	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 18 Story production method to portray the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers**

**DRQ6 Story Production Method**



**DRQ6 Story Production Method**

Table 9 suggests that transcreation was most frequently used in stories about the West (47.1 per cent) in mainstream Iranian newspapers, while pure translation was used to produce only 6.5 per cent of the stories related to the West.

- b. Which type of news production method was most frequently used in stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ6 Story Production Method \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ6 Story Production Method	Pure Translation	Count	92	47	139
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	12.2%	3.4%	6.5%
		% of Total	4.3%	2.2%	6.5%
	Transcreation (translation and creation)	Count	324	683	1007
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	43.0%	49.3%	47.1%
		% of Total	15.2%	31.9%	47.1%
	Staff Writers	Count	337	655	992
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	44.8%	47.3%	46.4%
		% of Total	15.8%	30.6%	46.4%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%	

**Table 19 Story production method to represent the West during two political periods**

According to Table 10, transcreation was most frequently used (49.3 per cent) to produce stories related to the West during the Conservative period, while the highest number of West-related stories (44.8 per cent) during the Reformist Period was produced by staff writers.

**DRQ7: Which source of news did mainstream Iranian newspapers primarily quote most frequently to portray West during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. Which source of news did mainstream Iranian newspapers primarily quote most frequently to portray the West?

**DRQ7 Primary Source of News**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	International news agencies/press	399	18.7	18.7	18.7
	National/official news agencies/press	1003	46.9	46.9	65.6
	Unidentifiable/unknown sources	26	1.2	1.2	66.8
	Correspondents (no source)	709	33.2	33.2	100.0
	Else	1	.0	.0	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 20 Primary source of news of the West in Iranian newspapers**

### DRQ7 Primary Source of News



**DRQ7 Primary Source of News**

Table 11 suggests that the majority of the news about the West (46.9 per cent) was taken primarily from national official Iranian news agencies/press.

- b. Which source of news did mainstream Iranian newspapers quote most frequently to portray West during Reformism and Conservatism?

#### DRQ7 Primary Source of News \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ7 Primary Source of News	International news agencies/press	Count	173	226	399
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	23.0%	16.3%	18.7%
		% of Total	8.1%	10.6%	18.7%
	National/official news agencies/press	Count	317	686	1003
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	42.1%	49.5%	46.9%
		% of Total	14.8%	32.1%	46.9%
	Unidentifiable/unknown sources	Count	20	6	26
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	2.7%	.4%	1.2%
		% of Total	.9%	.3%	1.2%
Correspondents (no source)	Count	242	467	709	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	32.1%	33.7%	33.2%	
	% of Total	11.3%	21.8%	33.2%	

Total	Else	Count	1	0	1
		% within DRQ2	.1%	.0%	.0%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	.0%	.0%	.0%
		Count	753	1385	2138
		% within DRQ2	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 21 Primary source of news to represent the West in two political periods**

According to Table 12, mainstream Iranian newspapers quoted national official news agencies/press most frequently to portray the West during both the Conservative and Reformist periods, respectively with 49.5 per cent and 42.1 per cent.

**DRQ8: Which is the main international source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. Which is the main international source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers?

**RQ8 Main International Source of News**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Reuters	102	4.8	4.8	4.8
AP	94	4.4	4.4	9.2
AFP	192	9.0	9.0	18.1
British media	134	6.3	6.3	24.4
American media	181	8.5	8.5	32.9
Arab media	101	4.7	4.7	37.6
Other international	221	10.3	10.3	47.9
No international source	1113	52.1	52.1	100.0
Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 22 Main international source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers**

**RQ8 Main International Source of News**



**RQ8 Main International Source of News**

Table 13 suggests that “other international” sources of news rather than Reuters, AP and AFP were used most frequently in mainstream Iranian newspapers as their main international source of news about the West.

- b. Which is the main international source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ8 Main International Source of News \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ8 Main International Source of News	Reuters	Count	55	47	102
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	7.3%	3.4%	4.8%
		% of Total	2.6%	2.2%	4.8%
	AP	Count	28	66	94
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	3.7%	4.8%	4.4%
		% of Total	1.3%	3.1%	4.4%
	AFP	Count	66	126	192
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	8.8%	9.1%	9.0%
		% of Total	3.1%	5.9%	9.0%
	British media	Count	34	100	134
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.5%	7.2%	6.3%
		% of Total	1.6%	4.7%	6.3%
	American media	Count	61	120	181
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	8.1%	8.7%	8.5%
		% of Total	2.9%	5.6%	8.5%

Total	Arab media	Count	32	69	101
		% within DRQ2	4.2%	5.0%	4.7%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	1.5%	3.2%	4.7%
	Other international	Count	92	129	221
		% within DRQ2	12.2%	9.3%	10.3%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	4.3%	6.0%	10.3%
	No international source	Count	385	728	1113
	% within DRQ2	51.1%	52.6%	52.1%	
	Publication Period				
	% of Total	18.0%	34.1%	52.1%	
	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within DRQ2	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	Publication Period				
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%	

**Table 23 Main international source of news about the West in the two political newspapers**

According to Table 14, “other international” sources of news were used as the main international source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during both Reformism and Conservatism, respectively with 12.2 per cent and 9.3 per cent. From amongst the Big Four global news agencies, AFP was used as the main international source of news during both Reformism (8.8 per cent) and Conservatism (9.1 per cent).

**DRQ9: Which is the main national source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**

- a. Which is the main national source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers?

**DRQ9 National Source of News**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	IRNA	578	27.0	27.0	27.0
	IRIB	217	10.1	10.1	37.2
	Other pro-Conservative	195	9.1	9.1	46.3
	Other pro-Reform	13	.6	.6	46.9
	Non-official news websites	2	.1	.1	47.0
	Weblogs	1	.0	.0	47.1
	Iran's government sources	20	.9	.9	48.0
	Experts/political observers/pundits	3	.1	.1	48.1
	Unidentifiable/unknown	2	.1	.1	48.2
	No national source	1107	51.8	51.8	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 24 National source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers**

### RQ9 National Source of News




Table 15 suggests that IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency) was the main national source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers, with 27 per cent of the majority of news quoting IRNA as their primary source. Some 51.8 per cent of the stories did not have any national sources of news.

- b. Which is the main national source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?

#### DRQ9 National Source of News \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ9 National Source of News	IRNA	Count	259	319	578
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	34.4%	23.0%	27.0%
		% of Total	12.1%	14.9%	27.0%
	IRIB	Count	69	148	217
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	9.2%	10.7%	10.1%
		% of Total	3.2%	6.9%	10.1%
	Other pro-Conservative	Count	3	192	195
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.4%	13.9%	9.1%
		% of Total	.1%	9.0%	9.1%
	Other pro-Reform	Count	3	10	13
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.4%	.7%	.6%
		% of Total	.1%	0.5%	0.6%

	% of Total	.1%	.5%	.6%
Non-official news websites	Count	0	2	2
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.0%	.1%	.1%
	% of Total	.0%	.1%	.1%
Weblogs	Count	0	1	1
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.0%	.1%	.0%
	% of Total	.0%	.0%	.0%
Iran's government sources	Count	9	11	20
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.2%	.8%	.9%
	% of Total	.4%	.5%	.9%
Experts/political observers/pundits	Count	1	2	3
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.1%	.1%	.1%
	% of Total	.0%	.1%	.1%
Unidentifiable/unknown	Count	2	0	2
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.3%	.0%	.1%
	% of Total	.1%	.0%	.1%
No national source	Count	407	700	1107
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	54.1%	50.5%	51.8%
	% of Total	19.0%	32.7%	51.8%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 25 National sources of news about the West in two political periods**

According to Table 16, IRNA (Islamic Republic News Agency) was the main national source of news about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during both the Reformist and Conservative periods, respectively with 34.4 per cent and 23 per cent frequency.

**DRQ10: Which country was the most primary country involved in stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**

- a. Which country was the most primary country involved in stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers?

**DRQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	US	1435	67.1	67.1	67.1
	UK	199	9.3	9.3	76.4
	France	129	6.0	6.0	82.5
	Germany	76	3.6	3.6	86.0
	Group 5+1	92	4.3	4.3	90.3
	Not mentioned	207	9.7	9.7	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 26 Primary Western country/countries involved in stories about the West**

**RQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved**




Table 17 suggests that the United States was the most primary country involved in the majority of stories (67.1 per cent) about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers, followed by Britain (9.3 per cent).

- b. Which country was the most primary country involved in stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved	US	Count	516	919	1435
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	68.5%	66.4%	67.1%
		% of Total	24.1%	43.0%	67.1%
	UK	Count	56	143	199
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	7.4%	10.3%	9.3%
		% of Total	2.6%	6.7%	9.3%
	France	Count	44	85	129
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	5.8%	6.1%	6.0%
		% of Total	2.1%	4.0%	6.0%
	Germany	Count	30	46	76
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.0%	3.3%	3.6%
		% of Total	1.4%	2.2%	3.6%
	Group 5+1	Count	18	74	92

	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	2.4%	5.3%	4.3%
	% of Total	.8%	3.5%	4.3%
Not mentioned	Count	89	118	207
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	11.8%	8.5%	9.7%
	% of Total	4.2%	5.5%	9.7%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 27 Primary Western country/countries in stories about the West in two political periods**

According to Table 18, the United States was the most primary country involved in the majority of stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during both Reformism and Conservatism; The United States was the main Western player in 68.5 per cent of the stories about the West during Reformism and 66.4 per cent of the news during Conservatism.

**DRQ11: Which headline direction did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. Which headline direction did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West?

**DRQ11 Headline Direction (line) towards West**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Positive	124	5.8	5.8	5.8
	Negative	1097	51.3	51.3	57.1
	Neutral	794	37.1	37.1	94.2
	Stereotypical	1	.0	.0	94.3
	Negative stereotypical	115	5.4	5.4	99.7
	Non-relevant	7	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 28 Headline direction towards the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers**

**DRQ11 Headline Direction (line) towards West**



**DRQ11 Headline Direction (line) towards West**

Table 19 suggests that mainstream Iranian newspapers mostly used negative direction in headlines of stories related to the West. In other words, the direction of the headline of the majority of news stories about the West (51.3 per cent) was negative. Some 37.1 per cent of headlines of stories related to the West were neutral.

- b. Which headline direction did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ11 Headline Direction (line) towards West \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ11 Headline Direction (line) towards West	Positive	Count	65	59	124
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	8.6%	4.3%	5.8%
		% of Total	3.0%	2.8%	5.8%
	Negative	Count	340	757	1097
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	45.2%	54.7%	51.3%
		% of Total	15.9%	35.4%	51.3%
	Neutral	Count	276	518	794
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	36.7%	37.4%	37.1%
		% of Total	12.9%	24.2%	37.1%
	Stereotypical	Count	0	1	1
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.0%	.1%	.0%
		% of Total	.0%	.0%	.0%
Negative stereotypical	Count	67	48	115	

		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	8.9%	3.5%	5.4%
	Non-relevant	% of Total	3.1%	2.2%	5.4%
		Count	5	2	7
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.7%	.1%	.3%
		% of Total	.2%	.1%	.3%
Total		Count	753	1385	2138
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 29** Headline direction towards the West in two political periods

According to Table 20, the headline direction of stories related to the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers was negative during both Reformism and Conservatism. In other words, the majority of news headlines during Reformism (45.2 per cent) and Conservatism (54.7 per cent) had a negative direction.

**DRQ12: Which primary story subject about the West was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. Which primary story subject about the West was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers?

**DRQ12 Primary Subject of Story**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Politics	1937	90.6	90.6	90.6
	Economy and energy	45	2.1	2.1	92.7
	Socio-cultural	110	5.1	5.1	97.8
	Natural disasters and accidents	32	1.5	1.5	99.3
	Else	14	.7	.7	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 30** Primary subject of story about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers

### DRQ12 Primary Subject of Story



**DRQ12 Primary Subject of Story**

Table 21 suggests that the subject of the majority of news stories about the West (90.6 per cent) highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers was about politics.

- b. Which primary story subject about the West was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ12 Primary Subject of Story \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ12 Primary Subject of Story	Politics	Count	633	1304	1937
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	84.1%	94.2%	90.6%
		% of Total	29.6%	61.0%	90.6%
	Economy and energy	Count	37	8	45
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.9%	.6%	2.1%
		% of Total	1.7%	.4%	2.1%
	Socio-cultural	Count	63	47	110
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	8.4%	3.4%	5.1%
		% of Total	2.9%	2.2%	5.1%
Natural disasters and accidents	Count	7	25	32	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.9%	1.8%	1.5%	
	% of Total	.3%	1.2%	1.5%	
Else	Count	13	1	14	

Total	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	.1%	.7%
	% of Total	.6%	.0%	.7%
	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 31 Primary subject of story about the West in two political periods**

According to Table 22, the subject of the majority of news stories related the West was about politics during Reformism (84.1 per cent) and Conservatism (94.2 per cent).

**DRQ13: Which policy aspects/issues of the West were most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. Which policy aspects/issues of the West were most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers?

**DRQ13 Policy Aspects/Issues of the West**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Domestic politics of the West	286	13.4	13.4	13.4
Foreign policy of the West	1755	82.1	82.1	95.5
Non-relevant	97	4.5	4.5	100.0
Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 32 Policy aspects of the West highlighted in stories in Iranian newspapers**

**RQ13 Policy Aspects/Issues of the West**



**RQ13 Policy Aspects/Issues of the West**

Table 23 suggests that foreign policy issues of the West were most highlighted in the news in mainstream Iranian newspapers. In other words, 82.1 per cent of stories related to West were about the foreign policy of

the West while only 13.4 per cent pertained to the domestic politics of the West.

- b. Which policy aspects/issues of the West were most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ13 Policy Aspects/Issues of the West \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ13 Policy Aspects/Issues of the West	Domestic politics of the West	Count	103	183	286
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	13.7%	13.2%	13.4%
		% of Total	4.8%	8.6%	13.4%
	Foreign policy of the West	Count	598	1157	1755
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	79.4%	83.5%	82.1%
		% of Total	28.0%	54.1%	82.1%
	Non-relevant	Count	52	45	97
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	6.9%	3.2%	4.5%
		% of Total	2.4%	2.1%	4.5%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%	

**Table 33 Policy aspects of the West highlighted in Iranian newspapers in two political periods**

According to Table 24, the policy subject of the majority of stories during Conservatism (83.5 per cent) and Reformism (79.4 per cent) was about the foreign policy of the West.

**DRQ14: Which aspect of Iran's nuclear issue was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**

- a. Which aspect of Iran's nuclear issue was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers?

**DRQ1429 Iran nuclear issue**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Cooperation (detente)	90	4.2	4.2	4.2
	Conflict (tension)	58	2.7	2.7	6.9
	Non-relevant	1864	87.2	87.2	94.1
	Else	126	5.9	5.9	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 34 Iran nuclear issue in stories related to West in mainstream Iranian newspapers**

**RQ1429 Iran nuclear issue**




Table 25 suggests that while 87.2 per cent of stories related to the West were not about Iran’s nuclear issue, the majority (5.9 per cent) of stories about Iran’s nuclear issue and the West highlighted the right of Iran to access peaceful nuclear technology. Some 4.2 per cent of such stories favoured cooperation while only 2.7 per cent sought conflict with the West.

- b. Which aspect of Iran’s nuclear issue was most highlighted in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ14 Iran nuclear issue \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ1429 Iran nuclear issue	Cooperation (detente)	Count	1	89	90
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.1%	6.4%	4.2%
		% of Total	.0%	4.2%	4.2%
	Conflict (tension)	Count	1	57	58
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.1%	4.1%	2.7%
		% of Total	.0%	2.7%	2.7%
	Non-relevant	Count	749	1115	1864
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	99.5%	80.5%	87.2%
		% of Total	35.0%	52.2%	87.2%
Else	Count	2	124	126	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.3%	9.0%	5.9%	

Total	% of Total	.1%	5.8%	5.9%
	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Publication Period	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 35 Iran nuclear issue highlighted in stories about the West in two political periods**

According to Table 26, while 80.5 per cent of the stories published during the Conservative period were not about Iran's nuclear issues, the majority (9 per cent) of related stories highlighted Iran's right to access nuclear technology for peaceful purposes during Conservatism. Regarding the Reformist period, since Iran's nuclear issue was not on the spotlight during the Reformism, no analysis can be inferred from the table.

**DRQ15: What is the dominant political theme of stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. What is the dominant political theme of stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers?

**DRQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Cooperation with West	153	7.2	7.2	7.2
	Denial of the Western pattern of development and promotion of Vision 2025	4	.2	.2	7.3
	Opposition to West	228	10.7	10.7	18.0
	Violation of law/rules	44	2.1	2.1	20.1
	Terrorism, war and violence	501	23.4	23.4	43.5
	Interference of West in domestic affairs	70	3.3	3.3	46.8
	Western support for Israel	114	5.3	5.3	52.1
	Western threats	175	8.2	8.2	60.3
	Else (affairs of other countries than Iran)	683	31.9	31.9	92.2
	Non-relevant	166	7.8	7.8	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 36 Dominant political theme of story about the West highlighted in Iranian newspapers**

**DRQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story**



**DRQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story**

Table 27 suggests that while 31.9 per cent of stories were about relations between West and other countries than Iran (except for Iraq and Afghanistan), their dominant political theme was bilateral relations between the West and those countries. Out of stories related to relations between Iran and West (including stories about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), 23.4 per cent were about terrorism, war and violence. Opposition to West was the theme of 10.7 per cent of the stories.

- b. What is the dominant political theme of stories about the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story	Cooperation with West	Count	53	100	153
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	7.0%	7.2%	7.2%
		% of Total	2.5%	4.7%	7.2%
	Denial of the Western pattern of development and promotion of Vision 2025	Count	4	0	4
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.5%	.0%	.2%
		% of Total	.2%	.0%	.2%
	Opposition to West	Count	104	124	228
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	13.8%	9.0%	10.7%
		% of Total	4.9%	5.8%	10.7%
	Violation of law/rules	Count	13	31	44
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	2.2%	2.1%
		% of Total	.6%	1.4%	2.1%
Terrorism, war and violence	Count	173	328	501	

	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	23.0%	23.7%	23.4%
Interference of West in domestic affairs	% of Total	8.1%	15.3%	23.4%
	Count	33	37	70
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.4%	2.7%	3.3%
Western support for Israel	% of Total	1.5%	1.7%	3.3%
	Count	59	55	114
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	7.8%	4.0%	5.3%
Western threats	% of Total	2.8%	2.6%	5.3%
	Count	32	143	175
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.2%	10.3%	8.2%
Else (affairs of other countries than Iran)	% of Total	1.5%	6.7%	8.2%
	Count	201	482	683
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	26.7%	34.8%	31.9%
Non-relevant	% of Total	9.4%	22.5%	31.9%
	Count	81	85	166
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	10.8%	6.1%	7.8%
Total	% of Total	3.8%	4.0%	7.8%
	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 37 Dominant political theme of stories related to West in two political periods**

According to Table 28, terrorism, war and violence accounted for the dominant political theme of stories related to the West during both Conservatism and Reformism, respectively with the frequency of 23.7 and 23.0 per cent. Opposition to West comes next with 13.8 per cent for Reformism and 9 per cent for Conservatism.

**DRQ16: Which stereotypes did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**

- a. Which stereotypes did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West?

**DRQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Colonialism	17	.8	.8	.8
Arrogance	154	7.2	7.2	8.0
Colonialism and arrogance	4	.2	.2	8.2
Interventionism	153	7.2	7.2	15.3
Double standards and hypocrisy	31	1.4	1.4	16.8
Mistrust and lack of confidence	7	.3	.3	17.1
Enemy/animosity	50	2.3	2.3	19.5
Else	9	.4	.4	19.9
No stereotype	1713	80.1	80.1	100.0
Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 38 Dominant stereotype of the West in Iranian newspapers**

**DRQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West**




Table 29 suggests that while 80.1 per cent of stories related to West did not reflect any stereotype about the West, the majority of the stereotypes used (7.2 per cent) described the West as “arrogant” and “interventionist”.

b. Which stereotypes did mainstream Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West	Colonialism	Count	8	9	17
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.1%	.6%	.8%
		% of Total	.4%	.4%	.8%
	Arrogance	Count	79	75	154
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	10.5%	5.4%	7.2%
		% of Total	3.7%	3.5%	7.2%
	Colonialism and arrogance	Count	3	1	4
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.4%	.1%	.2%
		% of Total	.1%	.0%	.2%
	Interventionism	Count	57	96	153
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	7.6%	6.9%	7.2%
		% of Total	2.7%	4.5%	7.2%
Double standards and hypocrisy	Count	13	18	31	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	1.3%	3.0%	

	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	1.3%	1.4%
	% of Total	.6%	.8%	1.4%
Mistrust and lack of confidence	Count	5	2	7
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.7%	.1%	.3%
	% of Total	.2%	.1%	.3%
Enemy/animosity	Count	25	25	50
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	3.3%	1.8%	2.3%
	% of Total	1.2%	1.2%	2.3%
Else	Count	6	3	9
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.8%	.2%	.4%
	% of Total	.3%	.1%	.4%
No stereotype	Count	557	1156	1713
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	74.0%	83.5%	80.1%
	% of Total	26.1%	54.1%	80.1%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 39 Dominant stereotypes of the West in mainstream newspapers in two political periods**

According to Table 30, the stereotype “arrogant” was used more than other stereotypes during Reformism to portray the West. In other words, while 74 per cent of the stories published in this period had no stereotype, the majority of stories (10.5 per cent) used the stereotype “arrogant” to represent the West. In the Conservative period, however, the majority of stories (6.9 per cent) used stereotype “interventionism” to portray the West, while 83.5 per cent of the news about the West did not have any stereotype.

**DRQ17: Which foreign relations subject was used most frequently by mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study to portray the West?**


**a. Which foreign relations subject was used most frequently by mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

**DRQ17 Foreign Relations Subject of Story**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Iran-West relations	218	10.2	10.2	10.2
Iran-US relations	257	12.0	12.0	22.2
Iran-UK relations	37	1.7	1.7	23.9
Iran-France relations	30	1.4	1.4	25.4
Iran-Germany relations	29	1.4	1.4	26.7
Relations between the West and other countries other than	1003	46.9	46.9	73.6
Iran-Int'l Organisations relations	8	.4	.4	74.0
West-Int'l Organisations relations	6	.3	.3	74.3
None-relevant	550	25.7	25.7	100.0
Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 40 Foreign relations subject of stories related to West in mainstream Iranian newspapers**

**DRQ17 Foreign Relations Subject of Story**



**DRQ17 Foreign Relations Subject of Story**

Table 31 suggests that stories about relations between the West and other countries than Iran were used most frequently by mainstream Iranian newspapers than other foreign relations subject. In fact, the foreign relations subject of the majority of stories (46.9 percent) was about relations between the West and other countries than Iran, followed by Iran-US relations (with 12 per cent).

- b. Which foreign relations subject was used most frequently by mainstream Iranian newspapers during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ17 Foreign Relations Subject of Story \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ17 Foreign Relations Subject of Story	Iran-West relations	Count	40	178	218
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	5.3%	12.9%	10.2%
		% of Total	1.9%	8.3%	10.2%
	Iran-US relations	Count	98	159	257
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	13.0%	11.5%	12.0%
		% of Total	4.6%	7.4%	12.0%
	Iran-UK relations	Count	14	23	37
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.9%	1.7%	1.7%
		% of Total	.7%	1.1%	1.7%
	Iran-France relations	Count	17	13	30
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	2.3%	.9%	1.4%
		% of Total	.8%	.6%	1.4%
	Iran-Germany relations	Count	13	16	29
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	1.2%	1.4%
		% of Total	.6%	.7%	1.4%
	Relations between the West and other countries other than Iran	Count	376	627	1003

	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	49.9%	45.3%	46.9%
	% of Total	17.6%	29.3%	46.9%
Iran-Int'l Organisations relations	Count	0	8	8
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.0%	.6%	.4%
	% of Total	.0%	.4%	.4%
West-Int'l Organisations relations	Count	5	1	6
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.7%	.1%	.3%
	% of Total	.2%	.0%	.3%
None-relevant	Count	190	360	550
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	25.2%	26.0%	25.7%
	% of Total	8.9%	16.8%	25.7%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 41 Foreign relations subject of story in two political periods**

According to Table 32, stories about relations between the West and other countries than Iran were most frequently used to portray the West during both Reformism and Conservatism, respectively with 49.9 and 45.3 per cent frequency.

**DRQ18: Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-West relations during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**

- a. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-West relations?

**DRQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	195	9.1	9.1	9.1
	Against (tension-conflict)	260	12.2	12.2	21.3
	Neutral	117	5.5	5.5	26.8
	Non-relevant	1566	73.2	73.2	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 42 Story direction towards Iran-West relations**

### DRQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations




Table 33 suggests that Iranian newspapers adopted a story direction which promoted conflict in Iran-West relations. Some 12.2 per cent of the stories promoted conflict, while 73.2 per cent of the stories were not related to Iran-West relations.

- b. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-West relations during Reformism and Conservatism?

#### DRQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	71	124	195
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	9.4%	9.0%	9.1%
		% of Total	3.3%	5.8%	9.1%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	82	178	260
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	10.9%	12.9%	12.2%
		% of Total	3.8%	8.3%	12.2%
Neutral	Count	27	90	117	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	3.6%	6.5%	5.5%	
	% of Total	1.3%	4.2%	5.5%	

Total	Non-relevant	Count	573	993	1566
		% within DRQ2	76.1%	71.7%	73.2%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	26.8%	46.4%	73.2%
		Count	753	1385	2138
		% within DRQ2	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 43 Story direction towards Iran-West relations in two political periods**

According to Table 34, while the majority of the news (76.1 per cent during Reformism and 71.7 per cent during Conservatism) was not about Iran-West relations, Iranian newspapers promoted conflict in the relations between Iran and West during both Conservatism and Reformism, with the frequency of 12.9 and 10.9 per cent, respectively. In other words, mainstream Iranian newspapers were against relations between Iran and West.

**DRQ19: Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-US relations during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**

- a. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-US relations?

**DRQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	91	4.3	4.3	4.3
	Against (tension-conflict)	192	9.0	9.0	13.2
	Nuetral	74	3.5	3.5	16.7
	Non-relevant	1781	83.3	83.3	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 44 Story direction towards Iran-US ties**

### RQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations




Table 35 suggests that Iranian newspapers promoted conflict when reporting Iran-US relations. While 83.3 per cent of stories did not reflect relations between Iran and the US, 9 per cent of the stories were against Iran-US relations.

- b. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-US relations during Reformism and Conservatism?

#### DRQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	33	58	91
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.4%	4.2%	4.3%
		% of Total	1.5%	2.7%	4.3%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	74	118	192
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	9.8%	8.5%	9.0%
		% of Total	3.5%	5.5%	9.0%
Neutral	Count	20	54	74	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	2.7%	3.9%	3.5%	
	% of Total	.9%	2.5%	3.5%	
Non-relevant	Count	626	1155	1781	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	83.1%	83.4%	83.3%	

Total	% of Total	29.3%	54.0%	83.3%
	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	Publication Period	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 45 Story direction towards Iran-US ties in two political periods**

According to Table 36, while the majority of news about the West (83.4 per cent during Conservatism and 83.1 during Reformism) was not about relations between Iran and the US, Iranian newspapers promoted conflict in reporting Iran-US relations during both Reformism (9.8 per cent) and Conservatism (8.5 per cent).

**DRQ20: Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-EU relations during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


a. **Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-EU relations?**

**DRQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	84	3.9	3.9	3.9
	Against (tension-conflict)	64	3.0	3.0	6.9
	Neutral	49	2.3	2.3	9.2
	Non-relevant	1941	90.8	90.8	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 46 Story direction towards Iran-EU3 ties**

**RQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations**



**RQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations**

Table 37 suggests that while 90.8 per cent of the news was not about Iran-EU3 relations, mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to promote cooperation in relations between Iran and EU3. 3.9 per cent of the stories were in favour of relations between Iran and EU3.

**b. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-EU relations during Reformism and Conservatism?**

**DRQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	43	41	84
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	5.7%	3.0%	3.9%
		% of Total	2.0%	1.9%	3.9%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	10	54	64
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.3%	3.9%	3.0%
		% of Total	.5%	2.5%	3.0%
	Neutral	Count	12	37	49
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.6%	2.7%	2.3%
		% of Total	.6%	1.7%	2.3%
	Non-relevant	Count	688	1253	1941
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	91.4%	90.5%	90.8%
		% of Total	32.2%	58.6%	90.8%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%	

**Table 47 Story direction towards Iran-EU ties in two political periods**

According to Table 38, while the majority of news about the West (91.4 per cent during Reformism and 90.5 per cent during Conservatism) did not concern Iran-EU3 relations, mainstream Iranian newspapers tended to promote cooperation in 5.7 per cent of the news during Reformism, but promoted conflict in 3.9 per cent of stories during Conservatism.

**DRQ21: Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-UK relations during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


a. Did the Iranian newspapers promoted conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-UK relations?

**DRQ21 Story Direction towards Iran-UK Relations**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	22	1.0	1.0	1.0
	Against (tension-conflict)	29	1.4	1.4	2.4
	Neutral	21	1.0	1.0	3.4
	Non-relevant	2066	96.6	96.6	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 48 Story direction towards Iran-UK ties**

### RQ21 Story Direction towards Iran-UK Relations



**RQ21 Story Direction towards Iran-UK Relations**

Table 39 suggests that while 96.6 per cent of the stories were not about relations between Iran and the UK, the majority (1.4 per cent) of the stories related to Iran-UK ties promoted conflict between the two countries and was against bilateral relations.

- b. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting Iran-UK relations during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ21 Story Direction towards Iran-UK Relations \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ21 Story Direction towards Iran-UK Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	15	7	22
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	2.0%	.5%	1.0%
		% of Total	.7%	.3%	1.0%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	7	22	29
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.9%	1.6%	1.4%
		% of Total	.3%	1.0%	1.4%
	Neutral	Count	9	12	21
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.2%	.9%	1.0%
		% of Total	.4%	.6%	1.0%
Non-relevant	Count	722	1344	2066	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	95.9%	97.0%	96.6%	
	% of Total	33.8%	62.9%	96.6%	

Total	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2			
	Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 49 Story direction towards Iran-UK ties in two political periods**

According to Table 40, while the majority of news about the West (97 per cent during Conservatism and 95.9 per cent during Reformism) did not reflect issues of mutual concern between Iran and the UK, 2 per cent of the stories were in favour of cooperation between the two countries during Reformism. During Conservatism, 1.6 per cent of the news was against bilateral relations between Iran and UK.

**DRQ22: Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting relations between West and other countries than Iran during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. Did the Iranian newspapers promoted conflict or cooperation when reporting relations between West and other countries than Iran?

**DRQ22 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and non-Iran**

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid In favour of (détente-cooperation)	97	4.5	4.5	4.5
Against (tension-conflict)	691	32.3	32.3	36.9
Neutral	222	10.4	10.4	47.2
Non-relevant	1128	52.8	52.8	100.0
Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 50 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and other countries than Iran**

**RQ22 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and non-Iran**



**RQ22 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and non-Iran**

Table 41 suggests that while 52.8 per cent of the stories were not about relations between the West and other countries rather than Iran, the majority (32.3 per cent) of the respective news highlighted tension between the West and non-Iran countries.

- b. Did the Iranian newspapers promote conflict or cooperation when reporting relations between West and other countries than Iran during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ22 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and non-Iran \* DRQ2 Publication Period**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ22 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and non-Iran	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	50	47	97
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	6.6%	3.4%	4.5%
		% of Total	2.3%	2.2%	4.5%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	252	439	691
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	33.5%	31.7%	32.3%
		% of Total	11.8%	20.5%	32.3%
	Neutral	Count	81	141	222
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	10.8%	10.2%	10.4%
		% of Total	3.8%	6.6%	10.4%
	Non-relevant	Count	370	758	1128
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	49.1%	54.7%	52.8%
		% of Total	17.3%	35.5%	52.8%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%	

**Table 51 Story direction towards relations between the West and countries other than Iran**

According to Table 41, while the majority of news about the West (54.7 per cent during Conservatism and 49.1 per cent during Reformism) was not about relations between West and non-Iran countries, the majority (33.5 per cent) of respective stories during Reformism and the majority (31.7 per cent) during Conservatism promoted tension and conflict between West-non-Iran relations.

**DRQ23: What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**

- a. What image did the Iranian newspapers promoted in portraying the West?


**DRQ23 Image of the West in the story**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Positive	77	3.6	3.6	3.6
	Negative	939	43.9	43.9	47.5
	Neutral	732	34.2	34.2	81.8
	Stereotypical	10	.5	.5	82.2
	Negative stereotypical	369	17.3	17.3	99.5
	Non-relevant	11	.5	.5	100.0

Total	2138	100.0	100.0
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**Table 52 Image of the West in the news**

**DRQ23 Image of the West in the story**



**DRQ23 Image of the West in the story**

Table 43 suggests that the majority of news about the West (43.9 per cent) presented a negative image of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers. Some 34.2 per cent promoted a neutral image of the West.

- b. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the West during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ23 Image of the West in the story \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ23 Image of the West in the story	Positive	Count	45	32	77
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	6.0%	2.3%	3.6%
		% of Total	2.1%	1.5%	3.6%
	Negative	Count	248	691	939
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	32.9%	49.9%	43.9%
		% of Total	11.6%	32.3%	43.9%
	Neutral	Count	284	448	732
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	37.7%	32.3%	34.2%
		% of Total	13.3%	21.0%	34.2%
Stereotypical	Count	1	9	10	

		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.1%	.6%	.5%
		% of Total	.0%	.4%	.5%
	Negative stereotypical	Count	165	204	369
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	21.9%	14.7%	17.3%
		% of Total	7.7%	9.5%	17.3%
	Non-relevant	Count	10	1	11
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.3%	.1%	.5%
		% of Total	.5%	.0%	.5%
Total		Count	753	1385	2138
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 53 Image of the West in two political periods**

According to Table 44, while the majority of news about the West (49.9 per cent) presented a negative image of the West during Conservatism, the majority of news about the West (37.7 per cent) during Reformism promoted a neutral image of the West.

**DRQ24: What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the US during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the US?

**DRQ24 Image of the US government in the story**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Positive	31	1.4	1.4	1.4
	Negative	771	36.1	36.1	37.5
	Neutral	530	24.8	24.8	62.3
	Stereotypical	2	.1	.1	62.4
	Negative stereotypical	323	15.1	15.1	77.5
	Non-relevant	481	22.5	22.5	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 54 Image of the US government in the news**

**DRQ24 Image of the US government in the story**



**DRQ24 Image of the US government in the story**

Table 45 suggests that the majority of news about the West (36.1 per cent) presented a negative image of the US government in mainstream Iranian newspapers. Some 24.8 per cent promoted a neutral image of the US government.

- b. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the US during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ24 Image of the US government in the story \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ24 Image of the US government in the story	Positive	Count	13	18	31
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	1.3%	1.4%
		% of Total	.6%	.8%	1.4%
Negative	Count	215	556	771	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	28.6%	40.1%	36.1%	
	% of Total	10.1%	26.0%	36.1%	
Neutral	Count	222	308	530	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	29.5%	22.2%	24.8%	
	% of Total	10.4%	14.4%	24.8%	
Stereotypical	Count	1	1	2	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.1%	.1%	.1%	
	% of Total	.0%	.0%	.1%	
Negative stereotypical	Count	152	171	323	

		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	20.2%	12.3%	15.1%
	Non-relevant	% of Total	7.1%	8.0%	15.1%
		Count	150	331	481
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	19.9%	23.9%	22.5%
	Total	% of Total	7.0%	15.5%	22.5%
		Count	753	1385	2138
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 55 Image of the US government in two political periods**

According to Table 46, while the majority of news about the US (40.1 per cent) presented a negative image of the US during Conservatism, the majority of news about the US (29.5 per cent) promoted a neutral image of the US during Reformism.

**DRQ25: What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying EU3 during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying EU3?

**DRQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Positive	52	2.4	2.4	2.4
	Negative	250	11.7	11.7	14.1
	Neutral	270	12.6	12.6	26.8
	Negative stereotypical	64	3.0	3.0	29.7
	Non-relevant	1502	70.3	70.3	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 56 Image of the EU3 in the news**

### RQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story



### RQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story

Table 47 suggests that while the majority of news about the West (70.3 per cent) did not present any image of the EU3, the majority (12.6 per cent) of respective news presented a neutral image of the EU3 governments.

- b. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying EU3 during Reformism and Conservatism?

### DRQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story	Positive	Count	37	15	52
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.9%	1.1%	2.4%
		% of Total	1.7%	.7%	2.4%
	Negative	Count	57	193	250
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	7.6%	13.9%	11.7%
		% of Total	2.7%	9.0%	11.7%
	Neutral	Count	94	176	270
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	12.5%	12.7%	12.6%
		% of Total	4.4%	8.2%	12.6%
Negative stereotypical	Count	27	37	64	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	3.6%	2.7%	3.0%	
	% of Total	1.3%	1.7%	3.0%	
Non-relevant	Count	538	964	1502	

Total	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	71.4%	69.6%	70.3%
	% of Total	25.2%	45.1%	70.3%
	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 57 Image of the EU3 in two political periods**

According to Table 48, while the majority of news about the West (71.4 per cent during Reformism and 69.6 per cent during Conservatism) did not promote any image of the EU3, the majority (13.9 per cent) of respective news during Conservatism presented a negative image of the EU3 governments and the majority (12.5 per cent) of respective news during Reformism presented a neutral image of the EU3 governments.

**DRQ26: What type of image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the UK during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. What type of image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the UK?

**DRQ26 Image of the UK government in the story**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Positive	16	.7	.7	.7
	Negative	130	6.1	6.1	6.8
	Neutral	124	5.8	5.8	12.6
	Stereotypical	2	.1	.1	12.7
	Negative stereotypical	47	2.2	2.2	14.9
	Non-relevant	1819	85.1	85.1	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 58 Image of the UK in the news**

**DRQ26 Image of theUK government in the story**



**DRQ26 Image of theUK government in the story**

Table 49 suggests that while the majority of news about the West (85.1 per cent) did not present any image of the UK, the majority (6.1 per cent) of respective news presented a negative image of the UK government.

- b. What type of image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying the UK during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ26 Image of the UK government in the story \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ26 Image of the UK government in the story	Positive	Count	13	3	16
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	.2%	.7%
		% of Total	.6%	.1%	.7%
	Negative	Count	27	103	130
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	3.6%	7.4%	6.1%
		% of Total	1.3%	4.8%	6.1%
	Neutral	Count	54	70	124
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	7.2%	5.1%	5.8%
		% of Total	2.5%	3.3%	5.8%
	Stereotypical	Count	1	1	2
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.1%	.1%	.1%
		% of Total	.0%	.0%	.1%
	Negative stereotypical	Count	22	25	47
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	2.9%	1.8%	2.2%
		% of Total	1.0%	1.2%	2.2%
Non-relevant	Count	636	1183	1819	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	84.5%	85.4%	85.1%	
	% of Total	29.7%	55.3%	85.1%	
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%	

**Table 59 Image of the UK government in two political periods**

According to Table 50, while the majority of news about the West (85.4 per cent during Conservatism and 83.5 per cent during Reformism) did not promote any image of the UK government, the majority (7.4 per cent) of respective news during Conservatism presented a negative image of the UK governments and the majority (7.2 per cent) of respective news during Reformism presented a neutral image of the UK governments.

**DRQ27: What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying France during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**

- a. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying France?


**DRQ27 Image of the French government in the story**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Positive	12	.6	.6	.6

Negative	84	3.9	3.9	4.5
Neutral	81	3.8	3.8	8.3
Negative stereotypical	9	.4	.4	8.7
Non-relevant	1952	91.3	91.3	100.0
Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 60**Image of the French government in the news

**DRQ27 Image of the French government in the story**



**DRQ27 Image of the French government in the story**

Table 51 suggests that while the majority of news about the West (91.3 per cent) did not present any image of the French government, the majority (3.9 per cent) of the respective news presented a negative image of the French government.

- b. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying France during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ27 Image of the French government in the story \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ27 Image of the French government in the story	Positive	Count	10	2	12
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.3%	.1%	.6%
		% of Total	.5%	.1%	.6%
	Negative	Count	18	66	84
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	2.4%	4.8%	3.9%
		% of Total	.8%	3.1%	3.9%
	Neutral	Count	32	49	81
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.2%	3.5%	3.8%

		% of Total	1.5%	2.3%	3.8%
	Negative stereotypical	Count	2	7	9
		% within DRQ2			
		Publication Period	.3%	.5%	.4%
		% of Total	.1%	.3%	.4%
	Non-relevant	Count	691	1261	1952
		% within DRQ2			
		Publication Period	91.8%	91.0%	91.3%
		% of Total	32.3%	59.0%	91.3%
Total		Count	753	1385	2138
		% within DRQ2			
		Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 61 Image of the French government in two political periods**

According to Table 52, while the majority of news about the West (91.8 per cent during Reformism and 91 per cent during Conservatism) did not promote any image of the French government, the majority (4.8 per cent) of respective news during Conservatism presented a negative image of the French governments and the majority (4.2 per cent) of respective news during Reformism presented a neutral image of the French governments.

**DRQ28: What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying Germany during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying Germany?

**DRQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Positive	22	1.0	1.0	1.0
	Negative	34	1.6	1.6	2.6
	Neutral	69	3.2	3.2	5.8
	Negative stereotypical	2	.1	.1	5.9
	Non-relevant	2011	94.1	94.1	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 62 Image of the Germany government in the news**

### RQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story



**RQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story**

Table 53 suggests that while the majority of news about the West (94.1 per cent) did not present any image of the Germany government, the majority (3.2 per cent) of the respective news presented a neutral image of the German government.

- b. What image did the Iranian newspapers promote in portraying Germany during Reformism and Conservatism?

#### DRQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story	Positive	Count	13	9	22
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	.6%	1.0%
		% of Total	.6%	.4%	1.0%
	Negative	Count	11	23	34
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.5%	1.7%	1.6%
		% of Total	.5%	1.1%	1.6%
	Neutral	Count	24	45	69
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	3.2%	3.2%	3.2%
		% of Total	1.1%	2.1%	3.2%
	Negative stereotypical	Count	2	0	2
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.3%	.0%	.1%
		% of Total	.1%	.0%	.1%

Total	Non-relevant	Count	703	1308	2011
		% within DRQ2	93.4%	94.4%	94.1%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	32.9%	61.2%	94.1%
		Count	753	1385	2138
		% within DRQ2	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 63 Image of the Germany government in two political periods**

According to Table 54, while the majority of news about the West (94.4 per cent during Conservatism and 93.4 per cent during Reformism) did not promote any image of the German government, the majority (3.2 per cent) of the respective news presented a neutral image of the German government during both the Conservatism and Reformism.

**DRQ29: Which direction did the Iranian newspapers promote in journalistic photos portraying the West during Reformism and Conservatism and the whole period of study?**


- a. Which direction did the Iranian newspapers promote in journalistic photos portraying the West?

**DRQ29 Journalistic photo direction towards the West**

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Positive	61	2.9	2.9	2.9
	Negative	187	8.7	8.7	11.6
	Neutral	344	16.1	16.1	27.7
	No photo	1546	72.3	72.3	100.0
	Total	2138	100.0	100.0	

**Table 64 Journalistic photo direction towards the West in the news**

**DRQ29 Journalistic photo direction towards the West**



**DRQ29 Journalistic photo direction towards the West**

Table 55 suggests that while 72.3 per cent of the stories about the West did not come with a photo, the majority (16.1 per cent) of the respective stories presented a neutral photo in the news about the West. Some

16.1 per cent presented a neutral photo.

- b. Which direction did the Iranian newspapers promote in journalistic photos portraying the West during Reformism and Conservatism?

**DRQ29 Journalistic photo direction towards the West \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ29 Journalistic photo direction towards the West	Positive	Count	30	31	61
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.0%	2.2%	2.9%
		% of Total	1.4%	1.4%	2.9%
	Negative	Count	47	140	187
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	6.2%	10.1%	8.7%
		% of Total	2.2%	6.5%	8.7%
	Neutral	Count	104	240	344
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	13.8%	17.3%	16.1%
		% of Total	4.9%	11.2%	16.1%
	No photo	Count	572	974	1546
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	76.0%	70.3%	72.3%
		% of Total	26.8%	45.6%	72.3%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%	

**Table 65 Journalistic photo direction towards the West in two political periods**

According to Table 56, while the majority of news about the West (76 per cent during Reformism and 70.3 per cent during Conservatism) did not have a photo, the majority (17.3 per cent) of the respective stories during Conservatism and 13.8 per cent during Reformism presented a neutral photo in stories about the West.

### Appendix 3: Analytical Research Questions tables

Analytical research questions investigate the impact of the political affiliation of newspapers on the representation of the West (in terms of relationship). It also investigates the impact of the political periods on the representation of the West (in terms of relationship). Related results are described in the form of statistical tables in the Analytical Research Questions (ARQ) sections.

#### Analytical question (Relationship):

Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the representation of the West and newspaper affiliation (ideology)?

Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the representation of the West and the political period (discourse)?

### Analytical Research Questions Analysis<sup>1</sup>

**ARQ1: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and subject of the story when portraying the West?**

**ARQ12 Primary Subject of Story \* ARQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

			RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
RQ12 Primary Subject of Story	Politics	Count	192	1316	429	1937
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	89.7%	91.7%	87.7%	90.6%
		% of Total	9.0%	61.6%	20.1%	90.6%
	Non-politics	Count	22	119	60	201
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	10.3%	8.3%	12.3%	9.4%
		% of Total	1.0%	5.6%	2.8%	9.4%
Total	Count	214	1435	489	2138	
	% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%	

**Table 66 Relationship between newspaper affiliation and subject of story<sup>2</sup>**

<sup>1</sup> The null hypothesis is that the two variables are not related.

<sup>2</sup> It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the most similar categories. Since four cells (26.7 per cent) had expected count less than 5, four categories of “economy and energy”, “social-cultural”, “natural disasters and accidents” and “Else” were merged into one “non-politics” category to avoid this statistical problem.

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	6.989(a)	2	.030
Likelihood Ratio	6.687	2	.035
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.593	1	.107
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 20.12.

According to the above tables, the Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 6.989 with 2 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.03 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association between newspaper affiliation and subject of the story in the sample.

**ARQ2: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and layout of the story when portraying the West?**

**ARQ4 Story Layout \* RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

			RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
RQ4 Story Layout	Main headline of page (Lead Story)	Count	39	162	58	259
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	18.2%	11.3%	11.9%	12.1%
	Top half page	% of Total	1.8%	7.6%	2.7%	12.1%
		Count	117	848	303	1268
	Bottom half page	% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	54.7%	59.1%	62.0%	59.3%
		% of Total	5.5%	39.7%	14.2%	59.3%
Total	Count	58	425	128	611	
	% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	27.1%	29.6%	26.2%	28.6%	
	% of Total	2.7%	19.9%	6.0%	28.6%	
	Count	214	1435	489	2138	
	% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%	

**Table 67 Relationship between newspaper affiliation and layout of story**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.487(a)	4	.033
Likelihood Ratio	9.651	4	.047
Linear-by-Linear Association	.129	1	.719
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 25.92.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was

obtained as 10.487 with 4 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.033 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association between newspaper affiliation and layout of the story in the sample.

**ARQ3: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and direction of the story when portraying the West?**

**RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations \* RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper**

			RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	22	134	39	195
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	10.3%	9.3%	8.0%	9.1%
		% of Total	1.0%	6.3%	1.8%	9.1%
		Count	15	192	53	260
	Against (tension-conflict)	% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	7.0%	13.4%	10.8%	12.2%
		% of Total	.7%	9.0%	2.5%	12.2%
		Count	5	94	18	117
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	2.3%	6.6%	3.7%	5.5%
	Neutral	% of Total	.2%	4.4%	.8%	5.5%
		Count	172	1015	379	1566
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	80.4%	70.7%	77.5%	73.2%
		% of Total	8.0%	47.5%	17.7%	73.2%
Non-relevant	Count	214	1435	489	2138	
	% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%	
	Total					

**Table 68 Relationship between story direction and political affiliation**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	21.915(a)	6	.001
Likelihood Ratio	23.959	6	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	.427	1	.514
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.71.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 21.915 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.001 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association between newspaper affiliation and story direction in the sample.

**ARQ4: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and primary Western country involved when portraying the West?**

**RQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved \* RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper**

			RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
RQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved	US	Count	127	985	323	1435
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	59.3%	68.6%	66.1%	67.1%
		% of Total	5.9%	46.1%	15.1%	67.1%
	UK	Count	18	130	51	199
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	8.4%	9.1%	10.4%	9.3%
		% of Total	.8%	6.1%	2.4%	9.3%
	France	Count	9	93	27	129
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	4.2%	6.5%	5.5%	6.0%
		% of Total	.4%	4.3%	1.3%	6.0%
	Germany	Count	8	56	12	76
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	3.7%	3.9%	2.5%	3.6%
		% of Total	.4%	2.6%	.6%	3.6%
	Group 5+1	Count	5	69	18	92
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	2.3%	4.8%	3.7%	4.3%
		% of Total	.2%	3.2%	.8%	4.3%
Not mentioned	Count	47	102	58	207	
	% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	22.0%	7.1%	11.9%	9.7%	
	% of Total	2.2%	4.8%	2.7%	9.7%	
Total	Count	214	1435	489	2138	
	% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%	

**Table 69 Relationship between primary Western country involved in the story and political affiliation**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	56.261(a)	10	.000
Likelihood Ratio	48.967	10	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.459	1	.063
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.61.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 56.261 with 10 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is

statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and primary Western country involved in the story in the sample.

**ARQ5: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and stereotypes of the West in mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

**RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West \* RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

			RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West	Arrogance and colonialism	Count	11	113	51	175
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	5.1%	7.9%	10.4%	8.2%
		% of Total	.5%	5.3%	2.4%	8.2%
	Interventionism	Count	12	75	65	152
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	5.6%	5.2%	13.3%	7.1%
		% of Total	.6%	3.5%	3.0%	7.1%
	Suspicion toward West	Count	10	65	23	98
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	4.7%	4.5%	4.7%	4.6%
		% of Total	.5%	3.0%	1.1%	4.6%
	No stereotype	Count	181	1182	350	1713
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	84.6%	82.4%	71.6%	80.1%
		% of Total	8.5%	55.3%	16.4%	80.1%
Total	Count	214	1435	489	2138	
	% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%	

**Table 70 Relationship between stereotypes of the West and political affiliation<sup>1</sup>**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	45.655(a)	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	41.308	6	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	25.454	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.81.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 45.655 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the

<sup>1</sup> It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the most similar categories. Since 11 cells (40.7%) had expected count less than 5, several categories were merged to avoid this statistical problem. Categories merged include: “Colonialism”, “Arrogance” and “Colonialism and Arrogance” were merged into “Arrogance and colonialism”; “Double standards and hypocrisy”, “Mistrust and lack of confidence”, “Enemy/animosity” and “Else” were combined into “Suspicion toward West”;

population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and stereotypes of the West in the sample.

**ARQ6: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and story direction towards Iran-West relations in mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

**RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations \* RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper**

			RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	22	134	39	195
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	10.3%	9.3%	8.0%	9.1%
		% of Total	1.0%	6.3%	1.8%	9.1%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	15	192	53	260
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	7.0%	13.4%	10.8%	12.2%
		% of Total	.7%	9.0%	2.5%	12.2%
	Neutral	Count	5	94	18	117
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	2.3%	6.6%	3.7%	5.5%
		% of Total	.2%	4.4%	.8%	5.5%
	Non-relevant	Count	172	1015	379	1566
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	80.4%	70.7%	77.5%	73.2%
		% of Total	8.0%	47.5%	17.7%	73.2%
Total	Count	214	1435	489	2138	
	% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%	

**Table 71 Relationship between story direction towards Iran-West relations and political affiliation  
Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	21.915(a)	6	.001
Likelihood Ratio	23.959	6	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	.427	1	.514
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.71.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 21.915 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.001 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and story direction towards Iran-West relations in the sample.

**ARQ7: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and story direction towards Iran-US relations mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

**RQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations \* RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper**

			RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
RQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	8	68	15	91
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	3.7%	4.7%	3.1%	4.3%
		% of Total	.4%	3.2%	.7%	4.3%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	14	142	36	192
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	6.5%	9.9%	7.4%	9.0%
		% of Total	.7%	6.6%	1.7%	9.0%
	Neutral	Count	4	56	14	74
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	1.9%	3.9%	2.9%	3.5%
		% of Total	.2%	2.6%	.7%	3.5%
	Non-relevant	Count	188	1169	424	1781
		% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	87.9%	81.5%	86.7%	83.3%
		% of Total	8.8%	54.7%	19.8%	83.3%
Total	Count	214	1435	489	2138	
	% within RQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%	

**Table 72 Relationship between story direction towards Iran-US relations and political affiliation**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11.399(a)	6	.077
Likelihood Ratio	12.057	6	.061
Linear-by-Linear Association	.821	1	.365
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.41.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 11.399 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.077 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is no relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is an association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and story direction towards Iran-US relations. Some 9.9 per cent of the stories published during Conservatism highlighted tension in relations between Iran and the US, while 1.9 per cent of the stories published during Reformism adopted a neutral direction towards Iran-US relations in the sample.

**ARQ8: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and story direction towards Iran-EU3 relations in mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

**DRQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations \* DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper**

			DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
DRQ20 Story	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	14	56	14	84

		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	6.5%	3.9%	2.9%	3.9%
		% of Total	.7%	2.6%	.7%	3.9%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	1	37	26	64
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	.5%	2.6%	5.3%	3.0%
		% of Total	.0%	1.7%	1.2%	3.0%
	Neutral	Count	1	41	7	49
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	.5%	2.9%	1.4%	2.3%
		% of Total	.0%	1.9%	.3%	2.3%
	Non-relevant	Count	198	1301	442	1941
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	92.5%	90.7%	90.4%	90.8%
		% of Total	9.3%	60.9%	20.7%	90.8%
Total		Count	214	1435	489	2138
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%

**Table 73 Relationship between story direction towards Iran-EU3 ties and political affiliation**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	26.114(a)	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	28.161	6	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.002	1	.963
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 1 cells (8.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.90.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 26.114 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and story direction towards Iran-EU3 ties in the sample.

**ARQ9: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and story direction towards relations between the West and other countries than Iran in mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

**DRQ22 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and non-Iran \* DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

			DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
DRQ22 Story Direction towards Relations between the West and non-Iran	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	31	49	17	97
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	14.5%	3.4%	3.5%	4.5%
		% of Total	1.4%	2.3%	.8%	4.5%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	54	468	169	691
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	25.5%	32.8%	34.3%	30.0%
		% of Total	2.5%	32.8%	34.3%	30.0%

Total	Neutral	% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	25.2%	32.6%	34.6%	32.3
		% of Total	2.5%	21.9%	7.9%	32.3
		Count	23	161	38	22
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	10.7%	11.2%	7.8%	10.4
		% of Total	1.1%	7.5%	1.8%	10.4
		Count	106	757	265	112
	Non-relevant	% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	49.5%	52.8%	54.2%	52.8
		% of Total	5.0%	35.4%	12.4%	52.8
		Count	214	1435	489	213
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0
		% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0
		Count				

**Table 74 Relationship between story direction towards ties between the West and non-Iran and political affiliation**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	60.827(a)	6	.000
Likelihood Ratio	44.566	6	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.438	1	.118
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.71.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 60.827 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and story direction towards ties between the West and non-Iran countries in the sample.

**ARQ10: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and image of the West presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

**DRQ23 Image of the West in the story \* DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

			DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
DRQ23 Image of the West in the story	Positive	Count	22	42	13	77
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	10.3%	2.9%	2.7%	3.6%
		% of Total	1.0%	2.0%	.6%	3.6%
	Negative	Count	55	656	228	939
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	25.7%	45.7%	46.6%	43.9%
		% of Total	2.6%	30.7%	10.7%	43.9%
Neutral	Count	112	499	121	732	
	% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	52.3%	34.8%	24.7%	34.2%	

Negative stereotypical	% of Total	5.2%	23.3%	5.7%	34.2%
	Count	16	237	126	379
Non-relevant	% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	7.5%	16.5%	25.8%	17.7%
	Count	9	1	1	11
Total	% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	4.2%	.1%	.2%	.5%
	Count	214	1435	489	2138
	% of Total	.4%	.0%	.0%	.5%
	% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%

**Table 75 Relationship between image of the West and political affiliation<sup>1</sup>**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	175.837(a)	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	138.734	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	11.490	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 2 cells (13.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.10.

According to the above tables, the Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 175.837 with 8 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and image of the West in the sample.

**ARQ11: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and image of the US presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

**DRQ24 Image of the US government in the story \* DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper**

			DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
DRQ24 Image of the US government in the story	Positive	Count	8	12	11	31
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	3.7%	.8%	2.2%	1.4%
Negative		% of Total	.4%	.6%	.5%	1.4%
		Count	51	536	184	771
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	23.8%	37.4%	37.6%	36.1%
		% of Total	2.4%	25.1%	8.6%	36.1%

<sup>1</sup> It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the most similar categories. Since 4 cells (22.2%) had expected count less than 5, category “stereotypical” was merged with “negative stereotypical”.

Total	Neutral	Count	91	350	89	530
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	42.5%	24.4%	18.2%	24.8%
		% of Total	4.3%	16.4%	4.2%	24.8%
	Negative stereotypical	Count	11	212	102	325
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	5.1%	14.8%	20.9%	15.2%
		% of Total	.5%	9.9%	4.8%	15.2%
	Non-relevant	Count	53	325	103	481
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	24.8%	22.6%	21.1%	22.5%
		% of Total	2.5%	15.2%	4.8%	22.5%
	Total	Count	214	1435	489	2138
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%

**Table 76 Relationship between image of the US gov't and political affiliation<sup>1</sup>**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	84.960(a)	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	84.073	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.567	1	.211
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 1 cells (6.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.10.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 84.960 with 8 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and image of the US government in the sample.

**ARQ12: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and image of the EU3 presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

**DRQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story \* DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper Crosstabulation**

			DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
DRQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story	Positive	Count	15	33	4	52
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	7.0%	2.3%	.8%	2.4%
		% of Total	.7%	1.5%	.2%	2.4%
	Negative	Count	12	160	78	250

<sup>1</sup> It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the most similar categories. Since 4 cells (22.2%) had expected count less than 5, category “stereotypical” was merged with “negative stereotypical”.

		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	5.6%	11.1%	16.0%	11.7%
	Neutral	% of Total	.6%	7.5%	3.6%	11.7%
		Count	28	200	42	270
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	13.1%	13.9%	8.6%	12.6%
	Negative stereotypical	% of Total	1.3%	9.4%	2.0%	12.6%
		Count	2	33	29	64
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	.9%	2.3%	5.9%	3.0%
	Non-relevant	% of Total	.1%	1.5%	1.4%	3.0%
		Count	157	1009	336	1502
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	73.4%	70.3%	68.7%	70.3%
	Total	% of Total	7.3%	47.2%	15.7%	70.3%
		Count	214	1435	489	2138
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%

**Table 77 Relationship between image of the EU3 in the story and newspaper affiliation**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	66.688(a)	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	62.011	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.000	1	.984
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.20.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 66.688 with 8 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and image of the EU3 in the story in the sample.

**ARQ13: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and image of the UK presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

**DRQ26 Image of the UK government in the story \* DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper**

			DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
DRQ26 Image of the UK government in the story	Positive	Count	6	9	1	16
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	2.8%	.6%	.2%	.7%
		% of Total	.3%	.4%	.0%	.7%
	Negative	Count	3	81	46	130
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	1.4%	5.6%	9.4%	6.1%

	Neutral	% of Total	.1%	3.8%	2.2%	6.1%
		Count	19	92	13	124
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	8.9%	6.4%	2.7%	5.8%
	Negative stereotypical	% of Total	.9%	4.3%	.6%	5.8%
		Count	3	26	20	49
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	1.4%	1.8%	4.1%	2.3%
	Non-relevant	% of Total	.1%	1.2%	.9%	2.3%
		Count	183	1227	409	1819
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	85.5%	85.5%	83.6%	85.1%
Total		% of Total	8.6%	57.4%	19.1%	85.1%
		Count	214	1435	489	2138
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%

**Table 78 Relationship between image of UK gov't and newspaper affiliation<sup>1</sup>**

#### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	53.323(a)	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	51.858	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.090	1	.764
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.60.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 53.323 with 8 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and image of UK government in the sample.

#### **ARQ14: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and image of France presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

##### **DRQ27 Image of the French government in the story \* DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper**

			DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total
			Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned	
DRQ27 Image of the French government in the story	Positive	Count	2	9	1	12
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	.9%	.6%	.2%	.6%
		% of Total	.1%	.4%	.0%	.6%

<sup>1</sup> It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the most similar categories. Since 6 cells (33.3%) had expected count less than 5, category "stereotypical" was merged with "negative stereotypical".

Total	Negative	Count	5	61	27	93
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	2.3%	4.3%	5.5%	4.3%
		% of Total	.2%	2.9%	1.3%	4.3%
	Neutral	Count	6	62	13	81
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	2.8%	4.3%	2.7%	3.8%
		% of Total	.3%	2.9%	.6%	3.8%
	Non-relevant	Count	201	1303	448	1952
		% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	93.9%	90.8%	91.6%	91.3%
		% of Total	9.4%	60.9%	21.0%	91.3%
Total	Count	214	1435	489	2138	
	% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%	

Table 79 Relationship between image of French gov't and political affiliation<sup>1</sup>

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.795(a)	6	.185
Likelihood Ratio	9.549	6	.145
Linear-by-Linear Association	.390	1	.532
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.20.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 8.795 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.185 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is no relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is no association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and image of French government. While the majority of the stories about the West published in mainstream Iranian newspapers with different political affiliations (93.9 per cent in pro-Reform press, 90.8 per cent in pro-Conservative press and 91.6 per cent in non-aligned press) are not related to France, 2.8 per cent of stories in pro-Reform newspapers presented a neutral image of the France, 4.3 per cent of the pro-Conservative newspapers presented a negative image and 5.5 per cent of non-aligned press presented a negative image of France in the sample.

**ARQ15: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the newspaper affiliation and image of Germany presented in mainstream Iranian newspapers?**

**DRQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story \* DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper**

		DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper			Total	
		Pro-Reform	Pro-Conservative	Non-aligned		
DRQ28 Image of	Positive	Count	5	15	2	22

<sup>1</sup> It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the most similar categories. Since 4 cells (26.7%) had expected count less than 5, category “negative stereotypical” was merged with “negative”.

the Germany government in the story	Negative	% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	2.3%	1.0%	.4%	1.0%
		% of Total	.2%	.7%	.1%	1.0%
		Count	2	27	7	36
	Neutral	% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	.9%	1.9%	1.4%	1.7%
		% of Total	.1%	1.3%	.3%	1.7%
		Count	5	52	12	69
	Non-relevant	% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	2.3%	3.6%	2.5%	3.2%
		% of Total	.2%	2.4%	.6%	3.2%
		Count	202	1341	468	2011
	Total	% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper	94.4%	93.4%	95.7%	94.1%
		% of Total	9.4%	62.7%	21.9%	94.1%
		Count	214	1435	489	2138
% within DRQ3 Political Affiliation of Newspaper		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	10.0%	67.1%	22.9%	100.0%	

**Table 80 Relationship between image of the German gov't and political affiliation<sup>1</sup>**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	8.948(a)	6	.177
Likelihood Ratio	8.791	6	.186
Linear-by-Linear Association	2.006	1	.157
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.20.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 8.948 with 6 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.177 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is no relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is no association in the sample between newspaper affiliation and image of German government. While the majority of stories about the West published in the Iranian press from different political affiliations (94.4 per cent in pro-Reform press, 93.4 per cent in pro-Conservative press and 95.7 per cent in non-aligned press) were not related to Germany, all the three political affiliations presented a neutral image of Germany (2.3 per cent in pro-Reform press, 3.6 per cent in pro-Conservative press and 2.5 per cent in non-aligned press) in the sample.

**ARQ16: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and subject of the story?**

**DRQ12 Primary Subject of Story \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ12	Politics	Count	633	1304	1937

<sup>1</sup> It is a requirement for the application of the Chi-Square test that the value for the Expected Frequency should not fall below 5 in more than 20 per cent of the cells. In this case, we have to combine or merge the most similar categories. Since 5 cells (33.3%) had expected count less than 5, category "negative stereotypical" was merged with "negative".

Primary Subject of Story	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	84.1%	94.2%	90.6%
	% of Total	29.6%	61.0%	90.6%
Economy and energy	Count	37	8	45
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.9%	.6%	2.1%
Socio-cultural	% of Total	1.7%	.4%	2.1%
	Count	63	47	110
Natural disasters and accidents	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	8.4%	3.4%	5.1%
	% of Total	2.9%	2.2%	5.1%
Else	Count	7	25	32
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	.9%	1.8%	1.5%
Total	% of Total	.3%	1.2%	1.5%
	Count	13	1	14
Total	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	.1%	.7%
	% of Total	.6%	.0%	.7%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 81 Relationship between Primary Subject of Story and Publication Period**

#### Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	95.383(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	93.230	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	38.011	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 1 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.93.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 95.383 with 4 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and primary subject of story in the sample.

**ARQ17: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and layout of the story?**

#### DRQ4 Story Layout \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ4 Story Layout	Main headline of page (Lead Story)	Count	89	170	259
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	11.8%	12.3%	12.1%

Top half page	% of Total	4.2%	8.0%	12.1%
	Count	436	832	1268
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	57.9%	60.1%	59.3%
Bottom half page	% of Total	20.4%	38.9%	59.3%
	Count	228	383	611
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	30.3%	27.7%	28.6%
Total	% of Total	10.7%	17.9%	28.6%
	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 82 Relationship between Story Layout and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	1.647(a)	2	.439
Likelihood Ratio	1.639	2	.441
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.218	1	.270
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 91.22.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 1.647 with 2 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.439 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is no relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is no association in the sample between the publication period and story layout. The majority of the news about the West published in the two political periods (57.9 per cent during the Reformism and 60.1 per cent during Conservatism) was laid out at the top half page of newspapers in the sample.

**ARQ18: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and direction of the story towards Iran-West relations?**

**DRQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations	In favour of (détente- cooperation)	Count	71	124	195
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	9.4%	9.0%	9.1%
		% of Total	3.3%	5.8%	9.1%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	82	178	260
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	10.9%	12.9%	12.2%
		% of Total	3.8%	8.3%	12.2%
Neutral		Count	27	90	117
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	3.6%	6.5%	5.5%
		% of Total	1.3%	4.2%	5.5%
Non-relevant		Count	573	993	1566

Total	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	76.1%	71.7%	73.2%
	% of Total	26.8%	46.4%	73.2%
	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 83 Relationship between Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.516(a)	3	.015
Likelihood Ratio	11.068	3	.011
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.378	1	.240
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 41.21.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 10.516 with 3 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.015 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and story direction towards Iran-West relations in the sample.

**ARQ19: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and primary Western country(ies) involved?**

**DRQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ10 Primary Western Country/countries involved	US	Count	516	919	1435
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	68.5%	66.4%	67.1%
		% of Total	24.1%	43.0%	67.1%
	UK	Count	56	143	199
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	7.4%	10.3%	9.3%
		% of Total	2.6%	6.7%	9.3%
	France	Count	44	85	129
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	5.8%	6.1%	6.0%
		% of Total	2.1%	4.0%	6.0%
	Germany	Count	30	46	76
		% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.0%	3.3%	3.6%
		% of Total	1.4%	2.2%	3.6%
Group 5+1	Count	18	74	92	
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	2.4%	5.3%	4.3%	
	% of Total	.8%	3.5%	4.3%	

Total	Not mentioned	Count	89	118	207
		% within DRQ2	11.8%	8.5%	9.7%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	4.2%	5.5%	9.7%
		Count	753	1385	2138
		% within DRQ2	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 84 Relationship between Primary Western Country/countries involved and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	20.754(a)	5	.001
Likelihood Ratio	21.737	5	.001
Linear-by-Linear Association	.178	1	.673
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.77.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 20.754 with 5 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.01 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and primary Western country/countries involved in the story in the sample.

**ARQ20: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and dominant political theme of stories related to West?**

**DRQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story \* DRQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			DRQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
DRQ15 Dominant Political Theme of Story	Cooperation with West	Count	53	100	153
		% within DRQ2	7.0%	7.2%	7.2%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	2.5%	4.7%	7.2%
	Denial of the Western pattern of development and promotion of Vision 2025	Count	4	0	4
		% within DRQ2	.5%	.0%	.2%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	.2%	.0%	.2%
	Opposition to West	Count	104	124	228
		% within DRQ2	13.8%	9.0%	10.7%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	4.9%	5.8%	10.7%
Violation of law/rules	Count	13	31	44	
	% within DRQ2	1.7%	2.2%	2.1%	
	Publication Period				
	% of Total	.6%	1.4%	2.1%	
Terrorism, war and	Count	173	328	501	

	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	23.0%	23.7%	23.4%
	% of Total	8.1%	15.3%	23.4%
Interference of West in domestic affairs	Count	33	37	70
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.4%	2.7%	3.3%
	% of Total	1.5%	1.7%	3.3%
Western support for Israel	Count	59	55	114
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	7.8%	4.0%	5.3%
	% of Total	2.8%	2.6%	5.3%
Western threats	Count	32	143	175
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	4.2%	10.3%	8.2%
	% of Total	1.5%	6.7%	8.2%
Else	Count	201	482	683
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	26.7%	34.8%	31.9%
	% of Total	9.4%	22.5%	31.9%
Non-relevant	Count	81	85	166
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	10.8%	6.1%	7.8%
	% of Total	3.8%	4.0%	7.8%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within DRQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 85 Relationship between Dominant Political Theme of Story and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	82.366(a)	9	.000
Likelihood Ratio	84.354	9	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	5.296	1	.021
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a 2 cells (10.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.41.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 82.366 with 9 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and the dominant political theme of story in the sample.

**ARQ21: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and stereotypes of the West?**

**RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West \* RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

	RQ2 Publication Period		Total
	Reformist Period	Conservative Period	

RQ16 Dominant Stereotypes of the West	Arrogance and colonialism	Count	90	85	175
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	12.0%	6.1%	8.2%
		% of Total	4.2%	4.0%	8.2%
	Interventionism	Count	57	95	152
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	7.6%	6.9%	7.1%
		% of Total	2.7%	4.4%	7.1%
	Suspicion toward West	Count	49	49	98
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	6.5%	3.5%	4.6%
		% of Total	2.3%	2.3%	4.6%
	No stereotype	Count	557	1156	1713
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	74.0%	83.5%	80.1%
		% of Total	26.1%	54.1%	80.1%
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%	

**Table 86 Relationship between Dominant Stereotypes of the West and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	35.370(a)	3	.000
Likelihood Ratio	34.052	3	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	28.102	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 34.52.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 35.370 with 3 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and dominant stereotypes of the West in the sample.

**ARQ22: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and story direction towards Iran-West relations?**

**RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations \* RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			RQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
RQ18 Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	71	124	195
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	9.4%	9.0%	9.1%
		% of Total	3.3%	5.8%	9.1%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	82	178	260

		% within RQ2 Publication Period	10.9%	12.9%	12.2%
	Neutral	% of Total	3.8%	8.3%	12.2%
		Count	27	90	117
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.6%	6.5%	5.5%
	Non-relevant	% of Total	1.3%	4.2%	5.5%
		Count	573	993	1566
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	76.1%	71.7%	73.2%
Total		% of Total	26.8%	46.4%	73.2%
		Count	753	1385	2138
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 87 Relationship between Story Direction towards Iran-West Relations and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.516(a)	3	.015
Likelihood Ratio	11.068	3	.011
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.378	1	.240
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 41.21.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 10.516 with 3 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.015 which is smaller than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and story direction towards Iran-West relations in the sample.

**ARQ23: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and story direction towards Iran-US relations?**

**RQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations \* RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			RQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
RQ19 Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations	In favour of (détente- cooperation)	Count	33	58	91
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	4.4%	4.2%	4.3%
		% of Total	1.5%	2.7%	4.3%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	74	118	192
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	9.8%	8.5%	9.0%
		% of Total	3.5%	5.5%	9.0%
Neutral	Count	20	54	74	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	2.7%	3.9%	3.5%	
	% of Total	.9%	2.5%	3.5%	

Total	Non-relevant	Count	626	1155	1781
		% within RQ2	83.1%	83.4%	83.3%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	29.3%	54.0%	83.3%
		Count	753	1385	2138
		% within RQ2	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Publication Period			
		% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 88 Relationship between Story Direction towards Iran-US Relations and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	3.153(a)	3	.369
Likelihood Ratio	3.234	3	.357
Linear-by-Linear Association	.283	1	.595
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 26.06.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 3.153 with 3 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.369 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is no relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is no association in the sample between the publication period and story direction towards Iran-US relations. While the majority of news about the West (83.1 per cent during Reformism and 83.4 during Conservatism) did not have any direction towards Iran-US relations, 9.8 per cent of the news in Reformism and 8.5 per cent in Conservatism highlighted tensions between the two countries in the sample.

**ARQ24: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and story direction towards Iran-EU3 relations?**

**RQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations \* RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			RQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
RQ20 Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations	In favour of (détente-cooperation)	Count	43	41	84
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	5.7%	3.0%	3.9%
		% of Total	2.0%	1.9%	3.9%
	Against (tension-conflict)	Count	10	54	64
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	1.3%	3.9%	3.0%
		% of Total	.5%	2.5%	3.0%
	Neutral	Count	12	37	49
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	1.6%	2.7%	2.3%
		% of Total	.6%	1.7%	2.3%
Non-relevant	Count	688	1253	1941	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	91.4%	90.5%	90.8%	
	% of Total	32.2%	58.6%	90.8%	
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	

% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 89 Relationship between Story Direction towards Iran-EU3 Relations and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	22.677(a)	3	.000
Likelihood Ratio	23.898	3	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.441	1	.507
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 17.26.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 22.677 with 3 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and story direction towards Iran-EU3 in the sample.

**ARQ25: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of the West presented in Iranian newspapers?**

**RQ23 Image of the West in the story \* RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			RQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
RQ23 Image of the West in the story	Positive	Count	45	32	77
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	6.0%	2.3%	3.6%
		% of Total	2.1%	1.5%	3.6%
Negative	Count	248	691	939	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	32.9%	49.9%	43.9%	
	% of Total	11.6%	32.3%	43.9%	
Neutral	Count	284	448	732	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	37.7%	32.3%	34.2%	
	% of Total	13.3%	21.0%	34.2%	
Stereotypical	Count	1	9	10	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	.1%	.6%	.5%	
	% of Total	.0%	.4%	.5%	
Negative stereotypical	Count	165	204	369	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	21.9%	14.7%	17.3%	
	% of Total	7.7%	9.5%	17.3%	
Non-relevant	Count	10	1	11	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	1.3%	.1%	.5%	
	% of Total	.5%	.0%	.5%	

Total	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 90 Relationship between Image of the West in the story and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	86.564(a)	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	87.195	5	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	27.929	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.52.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 86.564 with 5 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and image of the West in the story in the sample.

**ARQ26: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of the US presented in Iranian newspapers?**

**RQ24 Image of the US government in the story \* RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			RQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
RQ24 Image of the US government in the story	Positive	Count	13	18	31
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	1.3%	1.4%
		% of Total	.6%	.8%	1.4%
Negative	Count	215	556	771	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	28.6%	40.1%	36.1%	
	% of Total	10.1%	26.0%	36.1%	
Neutral	Count	222	308	530	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	29.5%	22.2%	24.8%	
	% of Total	10.4%	14.4%	24.8%	
Stereotypical	Count	1	1	2	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	.1%	.1%	.1%	
	% of Total	.0%	.0%	.1%	
Negative stereotypical	Count	152	171	323	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	20.2%	12.3%	15.1%	
	% of Total	7.1%	8.0%	15.1%	
Non-relevant	Count	150	331	481	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	19.9%	23.9%	22.5%	

Total	% of Total	7.0%	15.5%	22.5%
	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 91 Relationship between Image of the US government in the story and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	52.581(a)	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	52.285	5	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.712	1	.054
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .70.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 52.581 with 5 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and image of the US government in the story in the sample.

**ARQ27: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of the EU3 presented in Iranian newspapers?**

**RQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story \* RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			RQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
RQ25 Image of the EU3 in the story	Positive	Count	37	15	52
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	4.9%	1.1%	2.4%
		% of Total	1.7%	.7%	2.4%
	Negative	Count	57	193	250
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	7.6%	13.9%	11.7%
		% of Total	2.7%	9.0%	11.7%
	Neutral	Count	94	176	270
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	12.5%	12.7%	12.6%
		% of Total	4.4%	8.2%	12.6%
	Negative stereotypical	Count	27	37	64
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.6%	2.7%	3.0%
		% of Total	1.3%	1.7%	3.0%
	Non-relevant	Count	538	964	1502
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	71.4%	69.6%	70.3%
		% of Total	25.2%	45.1%	70.3%
Total		Count	753	1385	2138

% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 92 Relationship between Image of the EU3 in the story and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	47.949(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	47.482	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.894	1	.344
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 18.31.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 47.949 with 4 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and image of the EU3 in the story in the sample.

**ARQ28: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of the UK presented in Iranian newspapers?**

**RQ26 Image of theUK government in the story \* RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			RQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
RQ26 Image of theUK government in the story	Positive	Count	13	3	16
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	.2%	.7%
		% of Total	.6%	.1%	.7%
	Negative	Count	27	103	130
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.6%	7.4%	6.1%
		% of Total	1.3%	4.8%	6.1%
	Neutral	Count	54	70	124
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	7.2%	5.1%	5.8%
		% of Total	2.5%	3.3%	5.8%
Stereotypical	Count	1	1	2	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	.1%	.1%	.1%	
	% of Total	.0%	.0%	.1%	
Negative stereotypical	Count	22	25	47	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	2.9%	1.8%	2.2%	
	% of Total	1.0%	1.2%	2.2%	
Non-relevant	Count	636	1183	1819	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	84.5%	85.4%	85.1%	
	% of Total	29.7%	55.3%	85.1%	

Total	Count	753	1385	2138
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%

**Table 93 Relationship between Image of the UK government in the story and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	33.537(a)	5	.000
Likelihood Ratio	33.811	5	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.004	1	.951
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a 2 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .70.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 33.537 with 5 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and image of the UK government in the story in the sample.

**ARQ29: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of France presented in Iranian newspapers?**

**RQ27 Image of the French government in the story \* RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			RQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
RQ27 Image of the French government in the story	Positive	Count	10	2	12
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	1.3%	.1%	.6%
		% of Total	.5%	.1%	.6%
	Negative	Count	18	66	84
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	2.4%	4.8%	3.9%
		% of Total	.8%	3.1%	3.9%
	Neutral	Count	32	49	81
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	4.2%	3.5%	3.8%
		% of Total	1.5%	2.3%	3.8%
	Negative stereotypical	Count	2	7	9
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	.3%	.5%	.4%
		% of Total	.1%	.3%	.4%
Non-relevant	Count	691	1261	1952	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	91.8%	91.0%	91.3%	
	% of Total	32.3%	59.0%	91.3%	
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%
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**Table 94 Relationship between Image of the French government in the story and Publication Period**

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	20.524(a)	4	.000
Likelihood Ratio	20.771	4	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	.139	1	.709
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.17.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 20.524 with 4 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.000 which is smaller than 0.001. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 0.1 per cent significance level, there is a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, the association found in the sample data is statistically significant and would be regarded as evidence that there is an association in the sample between the publication period and image of the French government in the story in the sample.

**ARQ30: Is there a statistically-significant relationship between the publication period and image of Germany presented in Iranian newspapers?**

**RQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story \* RQ2 Publication Period Crosstabulation**

			RQ2 Publication Period		Total
			Reformist Period	Conservative Period	
RQ28 Image of the Germany government in the story	Positive	Count	13	9	22
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	1.7%	.6%	1.0%
		% of Total	.6%	.4%	1.0%
	Negative	Count	11	23	34
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	1.5%	1.7%	1.6%
		% of Total	.5%	1.1%	1.6%
	Neutral	Count	24	45	69
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	3.2%	3.2%	3.2%
		% of Total	1.1%	2.1%	3.2%
	Negative stereotypical	Count	2	0	2
		% within RQ2 Publication Period	.3%	.0%	.1%
		% of Total	.1%	.0%	.1%
Non-relevant	Count	703	1308	2011	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	93.4%	94.4%	94.1%	
	% of Total	32.9%	61.2%	94.1%	
Total	Count	753	1385	2138	
	% within RQ2 Publication Period	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	
	% of Total	35.2%	64.8%	100.0%	

**Table 95 Relationship between Image of the Germany government and Publication Period**

**Chi-Square Tests**

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	9.362(a)	4	.053
Likelihood Ratio	9.545	4	.049
Linear-by-Linear Association	1.208	1	.272
N of Valid Cases	2138		

a. 2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .70.

According to the above tables, The Chi-Square value for the relationship between the above variables was obtained as 9.362 with 4 degrees of freedom and a significance probability (P Value) or Asymptotic Significance of 0.053 which is bigger than 0.05. On the evidence of this data, there would appear to be no doubt that, at the 5 per cent significance level, there is not a relationship between the two variables in the population from which this sample was taken. Therefore, there is no association in the sample between the publication period and image of the Germany government. While the majority of the news about the West during the two political periods (94.4 per cent during Conservatism and 93.4 per cent during Reformism) did not presented any image of the German government, 3.2 per cent of the news presented a neutral image of Germany in both the periods in the sample.

## Appendix 4: President Obama's Norouz message to Iran

*US President Obama delivered the following Norouz message to the Iranian people from the White House on March 20, 2009, which coincides with the Iranian New Year<sup>1</sup>.*

Today I want to extend my very best wishes to all who are celebrating Nowruz around the world.

This holiday is both an ancient ritual and a moment of renewal, and I hope that you enjoy this special time of year with friends and family.

In particular, I would like to speak directly to the people and leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nowruz is just one part of your great and celebrated culture. Over many centuries your art, your music, literature and innovation have made the world a better and more beautiful place.

Here in the United States our own communities have been enhanced by the contributions of Iranian Americans. We know that you are a great civilization, and your accomplishments have earned the respect of the United States and the world.

For nearly three decades relations between our nations have been strained. But at this holiday we are reminded of the common humanity that binds us together. Indeed, you will be celebrating your New Year in much the same way that we Americans mark our holidays -- by gathering with friends and family, exchanging gifts and stories, and looking to the future with a renewed sense of hope.

Within these celebrations lies the promise of a new day, the promise of opportunity for our children, security for our families, progress for our communities, and peace between nations. Those are shared hopes, those are common dreams.

So in this season of new beginnings I would like to speak clearly to Iran's leaders. We have serious differences that have grown over time. My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community. This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect.

You, too, have a choice. The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right -- but it comes with real responsibilities, and that place cannot be reached through terror or arms, but rather through peaceful actions that demonstrate the true greatness of the Iranian people and civilization. And the measure of that greatness is not the capacity to destroy, it is your demonstrated ability to build and create.

So on the occasion of your New Year, I want you, the people and leaders of Iran, to understand the future that we seek. It's a future with renewed exchanges among our people, and greater opportunities for partnership and commerce. It's a future where the old divisions are overcome, where you and all of your neighbors and the wider world can live in greater security and greater peace.

I know that this won't be reached easily. There are those who insist that we be defined by our differences. But let us remember the words that were written by the poet Saadi, so many years ago: "The children of Adam are limbs to each other, having been created of one essence."

With the coming of a new season, we're reminded of this precious humanity that we all share. And we can once again call upon this spirit as we seek the promise of a new beginning.

Thank you, and Eid-eh Shoma Mobarak.

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<sup>1</sup> The full text has been taken from the official website of the White House.

## Appendix 5: Ayatollah Khamenei's response to Obama's Norouz message

*The following is the full text of the speech delivered on March 21, 2009 by Ayatollah Khamenei the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution to a group of people in the holy city of Mashhad<sup>1</sup>.*

### **In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful**

All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of all sentient beings, and peace and greetings be upon our Master and Prophet, Ab-al-Qassem Al-Mustafa Muhammad, and upon his immaculate and infallible household, especially the one remaining with Allah on earth.

I thank God Almighty who has bestowed upon me the blessing and the opportunity to make a pilgrimage to this holy shrine, and to visit the dear people of Mashhad. I pray to God Almighty to make this Eid and the New Year auspicious for our nation.

This year marks the first year of the fourth decade of the Islamic Revolution - which has been termed the decade of justice and progress. Therefore, I will mention a few points on this occasion, both regarding some important domestic and international issues. We intend the fourth decade of the Islamic Revolution to be the decade of progress and justice in the Islamic Republic. The Iranian nation, with its great movement and by establishing the Islamic Republic, has moved towards making progress and administering justice ever since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution.

As for international issues that our country has to face, I will only discuss one issue: The problems between our country and the US. These problems have represented one of the most important tests facing the Revolution since the very beginning. Since the victory of the Revolution, the confrontation and interaction with the US government has unfurled as a great test for the Iranian nation. This great test has always been there throughout the past thirty years. Since the very beginning, the US government has treated our Revolution angrily and their tone has always been aggressive. Of course considering their calculations, they are justified in their attitude. They had full control over Iran before the Revolution. They had absolute control over our vital resources. America had carte blanche at our decision-making centers. At all our important centers, Americans could employ and fire whoever they wanted. Iran was a ranch on which Americans and American soldiers as well as others could graze freely. They lost all these advantages. Is it really possible for them to repress their aggressive opposition? Since the victory of the Revolution, the US government - both Republican and Democratic Presidents - treated the Islamic Republic unfairly. Everybody knows this. Inciting the few opponents of the Islamic Republic and supporting the separatist groups and terrorist acts were the first measures taken by Americans at the beginning of the Revolution. In every part of the country, in which there was a trace of a separatist movement, we discovered American involvement. Sometimes we could detect their financial support and some other times we could even spot their agents. That caused a lot of harm to our people. Unfortunately, they are still doing the same things.

Some of the outlaws on the Iran-Pakistan border are linked to American agents. That is to say, these outlaws talk to US agents on wireless devices and receive orders from them. We have tapped their lines of communications. There are terrorist murderers in our neighboring countries that are in contact with American officers. Unfortunately, such actions are still being done. That is how their enmity started and they went on to seize Iran's properties and freeze its assets. The Pahlavi regime had given Americans incalculable amounts of money in order to get airplanes, helicopters, and weapons from them. Some of these things had been manufactured in the US. They refused to give us what they had sold to the Pahlavi regime. They also refused to give back several billion dollars that belonged to us. Surprisingly, they even stored these things in a place and charged us for the storage costs. They usurped a nation's properties, refused to return them, and charged it for the storage costs. That is how they have treated us since the beginning. The properties of the Iranian nation are still there in the US and some European countries. We asked them for many consecutive years to give back our properties on several occasions. We told them that they had already received the money for these things. They told us that these things have been manufactured under the US license and, therefore, they were not allowed to deliver them to us. They are still holding the properties of the Iranian nation.

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<sup>1</sup> Although Ayatollah Khamenei did not officially give a response to Obama, this speech is regarded as the unofficial response by the Iranian leader to Obama's Norouz message. The first section of Ayatollah Khamenei's speech is deleted here since they are about domestic issues of Iran which are irrelevant to this topic. The full text has been taken from the official website of the Office of the Supreme Leader.

They gave Saddam the green light to attack our country. That was another measure taken by the US to harm our nation. If Saddam had not received the green light from the US, most probably he would not have attacked our borders. An eight-year war was imposed on our country, during which about 300,000 Iranian civilians and youth were martyred. Throughout the war, especially in the last few years, Americans supported and helped Saddam. They provided him with financial support, weapons, technical information, political assistance, satellite intelligence, and media support. They used to use their satellites to record the activities of our forces at the front. Then they used to send the information to Saddam to use them against our youth and forces.

They turned a blind eye to Saddam's crimes. A tragic event took place in Halabcheh. Different cities throughout the country were targeted by missiles. Our houses were destroyed. Chemical weapons were used in the front line against us. They turned a blind eye to these crimes. They did not raise any objections. Instead, they helped Saddam. That was another measure taken by the US government against our nation. Then towards the end of the war, our passenger plane was targeted by missiles fired from an American warship and was downed in the Persian Gulf. There were about 300 people on that plane. They were all killed. Then instead of reprimanding the officer who shot down the plane, the then US President awarded a medal to the officer. Do they really expect our nation to forget this? Could our nation ever forget this?

They supported the terrorists who killed our men, women, and children. They supported the terrorists who killed our great religious scholars and young children. They allowed these terrorists to continue their activities from inside their country. They constantly broadcast spiteful propaganda against our country. Throughout the years, especially during the two terms of the previous US President [George Bush], all US Presidents insulted our nation whenever they started to talk nonsense about our people, our country, our government officials, and the Islamic Republic. That has been the same for many years.

They undermined the security of the region, the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan, and Iraq. They flooded the region with different weapons to oppose the Islamic Republic and of course to let their arms manufacturing companies line their own pockets in the process. They provided unconditional support for the Zionist regime. You saw one manifestation of this regime's oppression in Gaza two or three months ago. They caused a great tragedy, killing numerous men, women, and children. Their bombing raids, missiles, and bullets massacred about 5000 people in 22 days. That was while the US government supported the Zionist regime until the end of the war. Whenever the UN Security Council decided to pass a resolution against the Zionist regime, America intervened and supported the Zionists.

They used every opportunity to threaten our country. They constantly threatened us with a military attack. They said they had a military option on the table. They made many other threats. They threatened our nation every time they said something against our country. Of course these threats had no effect on our nation, but their threats demonstrated their enmity. They constantly insulted the Iranian nation, government, and President. A few years ago, an American said that the Iranian nation had to be wiped out. Recently an American official said a good Iranian is a dead Iranian. That is how they insulted our great and honorable nation, a nation that has only tried to defend its identity and independence.

They imposed sanctions on our country for thirty years. Of course these sanctions turned out to be a blessing in disguise. We should thank Americans for the sanctions they imposed on us. If it had not been for their sanctions, we would not have achieved this level of scientific progress. These sanctions have awakened us to the realities, forcing us to grow independently. But they did not intend to do us a favor. They wanted to show their enmity. For thirty years they treated the Iranian nation in this way. Now the new US administration says that it is prepared to negotiate with Iran, urging us to let bygones be bygones. They say they have extended a hand towards Iran. What kind of hand is that? If the hand that has been extended to us is an iron hands covered with a velvet glove, it does not have any positive meaning. They congratulated the Iranian nation on Norouz, but in the same message they accused the Iranian nation of supporting terrorism, seeking nuclear weapons, and things like that.

I do not know who is making the decisions in America. Is it the President? Is it the Congress? Or is it the unknown people who pull the strings? I want to say that there is a logic behind our actions. The Iranian nation has acted logically since the very first day. When we want to make decisions about important issues, we do not act on the basis of our emotions. We do not make emotional decisions. We make our decisions on the basis of rational calculations.

They invite us to negotiate and form relations with them. They shout slogans of change. Where is the change you are talking about? What is it that has changed? Clarify this for us. What is it exactly that has changed? Has your enmity towards the Iranian nation changed? Where are the signs of this change? Have you released the assets of the Iranian nation? Have you lifted the unfair sanctions? Have you stopped slandering, negative propaganda, and allegations against our great nation and its populist government officials? Have you given up your unconditional support for the Zionist regime? What is it that has changed? They only change their slogans while their actions remain the same. We have not seen any changes. Even their rhetoric is the same. The new US President insulted the Iranian nation and the Islamic Republic right after he was inaugurated as President and delivered his inaugural address. Why? If you really believe there has been a

change, show us. We cannot see any change. I would like to tell everybody - including US government officials as well as others - that the Iranian nation will neither be deceived nor intimidated.

First of all, verbal change is not enough. Of course I have not noticed much verbal change either. There must be genuine change. I would like to tell American government officials that the kind of change to which they only pay lip service is a necessity for them. You have no other choice: You must change. If you do not change, the divine laws of nature will force you to change. Nature will force you to change. You must change, but this change must not be in words only and there must be no ulterior motives. You cannot talk about change if you only change your policies and pursue the same goals. This kind of change does not constitute genuine change: That is deception. If there is any genuine change, it must manifest itself in action. I advise the US government officials or whoever makes the decisions there - be it the President, the Congress, or other people - that the situation in which the US government is involved is harmful to the American nation as well as the US government. You ought to know that you are one of the most hated countries in the world. Other nations burn your flag. Muslim nations shout "Down with the US" throughout the world. What is the reason behind so much hatred? Have you ever tried to investigate this issue? Have you ever scrutinized it? Have you learnt any lessons?

The reason is that you treat the world in a domineering manner. You speak in an arrogant manner. You try to impose your ideas on the entire world. You interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. You apply double standards. Sometimes when a deeply frustrated Palestinian youth snaps under pressure and carries out a martyrdom-seeking operation, you attack him with negative propaganda. But when the Zionist regime caused that tragedy in Gaza in only 22 days, you turned a blind eye to all the crimes it committed. You label the Palestinian youth as a terrorist and at the same time you say that you are committed to the security of the Zionist regime, which should be considered a terrorist regime by all standards. These are the reasons why you are hated in the world. This advice is in your best interest. You must give up your arrogant tone for your own wellbeing and for the future of your country. You must stop domineering behavior. Do not interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. Do not encroach on the rights of other people. Do not define interests for yourselves in every part of the world. If you do these things, you will see that the global attitudes towards the US will gradually change. Pay attention to these recommendations. That is my advice to the US government officials - the US President and the others. Think about these recommendations carefully. Have them translated. Of course you must not ask the Zionists to translate them for you. You must consult moral people.

As long as the US government continues the ways, actions, positions, and policies it has adopted in the past thirty years, we will act the way we have in the past. Our nation hates to be the object of your simultaneous attempts at negotiation and pressurizing. Our nation hates to negotiate while being pressurized. The simultaneous use of threats and negotiation will not work with our nation. We do not have a record of the new US President and administration. We will observe and then judge them. If you change, our behavior will change too. If you do not change, our nation will not change, as it has only become more and more experienced, patient, and powerful in the past thirty years.

Dear God, please do not withhold your mercy and blessings from our nation. Unfortunately, I was informed that the esteemed and loyal wife of our magnanimous Imam (r.a.) passed away today. This honorable lady was a precious blessing to our nation. She patiently stood by Imam Khomeini (r.a.) - who was the pivot of the heart of our nation - in all hardships and in all circumstances. She was a prominent lady. I extend my condolences to the Iranian nation and her family members and relatives on the loss of this lady. May Allah bestow His mercy and blessings on her. O God, associate the soul of this honorable lady with Your saints. O God, associate the souls of our magnanimous Imam (r.a.), his esteemed children, and his wife with Your saints. Make us appreciate our dear Imam (r.a.) forever. Bestow Your blessings and guidance on all our people, especially the dear youth. O God, send down Your rain onto our parched lands and for our people.

Greetings be upon you and Allah's mercy and blessings