|Title||Whose experience is the measure of justice?|
A recent collection of essays edited by George Pavlakos explores Alexy's theory from a number of philosophical standpoints. Although this collection is primarily concerned with aspects of Alexy's work, it nonetheless draws attention to the degree to which mainstream jurisprudence continues to be preoccupied with conceptualising and containing the dual manifestations of law within a rational discourse. Against the backdrop of Pavlakos's collection, this essay argues that theories of law, including Alexy's theory, which employ dichotomies such as facts and values, law and morality, to construct their argument, fail to address issues of justice in a satisfactory manner. To construct an empirically viable concept of law which is sensitive to the demands of justice, legal theory needs to transcend beyond the descriptions of law based on dichotomies. This can be achieved by bringing into focus the dialectical dependency of facts and norms, law and morality, and the internal and external standpoints.
|Keywords||Robert Alexy, legal theory, antinomy, separation thesis, legal argumentation, ethics|
|Journal citation||10 (2), pp. 209-222|
|Web address (URL)||http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/hart/legeth/2007/00000010/00000002/art00009|