|Title||Equitable representation in councils: theory and an application to the United Nations Security Council|
|Authors||Gould, M. and Rablen, M.D.|
We analyze democratic equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a voting body containing all members delegates decision-making to a (time-varying) subset of its members, as describes, e.g., the relationship between the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We develop a theoretical framework for analyzing democratic equitability in CVGs at both the country and region levels, and for different assumptions regarding preference correlation. We apply the framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to reform it. We find that the individual permanent members are overrepresented by between 21.3 times (United Kingdom) and 3.8 times (China) from a country-level perspective, while from a region perspective Eastern Europe is the most heavily overrepresented region with more than twice its equitable representation, and Africa the most heavily underrepresented. Our equity measures do not preclude some UNSC members from exercising veto rights, however.
|Journal citation||169 (1), pp. 19-51|
|Digital Object Identifier (DOI)||https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-016-0368-x|
|Published||13 Sep 2016|
|Published online||13 Sep 2016|
|License||CC BY 4.0|