Title | Reform of the United Nations Security Council: equity and efficiency |
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Type | Journal article |
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Authors | Gould, M. and Rablen, M.D. |
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Abstract | The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is critical to global peace and security, yet more than 20 years of negotiations over its reform have proved fruitless. We use recent advances in the theory of a priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the implications for democratic equity and efficiency of the “structural reforms” contained within 11 current reform proposals, as well as the separate effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only one reform proposal–a weakening of the veto power for Permanent Members by requiring two negative votes for a veto to be effective—robustly dominates the status quo against our measures of equity and efficiency. Several proposed structural reforms may actually worsen the issues they ostensibly claim to resolve. |
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Keywords | United Nations, United Nations Security Council, United Nations Security Council reform, Equity, Efficiency, Voting power, Square-root rule |
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Journal | Public Choice |
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Journal citation | 173 (1-2), pp. 145-168 |
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ISSN | 0048-5829 |
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Year | 2017 |
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Publisher | Springer |
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Accepted author manuscript | License CC BY 4.0 File Access Level Open (open metadata and files) |
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Publisher's version | License CC BY 4.0 File Access Level Open (open metadata and files) |
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Digital Object Identifier (DOI) | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0468-2 |
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Web address (URL) | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11127-017-0468-2 |
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Publication dates |
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Published online | 14 Jul 2017 |
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Published | 14 Jul 2017 |
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Supplemental file | License CC BY 4.0 File Access Level Open (open metadata and files) |
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License | CC BY 4.0 |
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