Khalifa, M., Moussa, T., Elmarzouky, M. and Shaker, R. 2026. Competing to Waste Less? How Tournament Incentives Influence Corporate Waste Outcomes. 48th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association. Prague, Czech Republic 27 - 29 May 2026 European Accounting Association (EAA).
| Title | Competing to Waste Less? How Tournament Incentives Influence Corporate Waste Outcomes |
|---|---|
| Authors | Khalifa, M., Moussa, T., Elmarzouky, M. and Shaker, R. |
| Type | Conference paper |
| Abstract | Although firms face growing regulatory and stakeholder pressure to reduce waste, scant research has examined how executive promotion incentives influence corporate waste outcomes. Drawing on tournament, stakeholder and agency theories, we examine whether and how tournament incentives among senior executives shape firms’ waste generation. Using 1,489 firm-year observations from S&P 500 firms (2010–2022), we find that larger CEO–vice-presidents pay gaps are associated with lower corporate waste. This result suggests that competition for promotion may increase managerial attention to waste reduction and environmentally responsible practices. The relationship is stronger in environmentally sensitive industries and among firms with higher agency costs and greater common institutional ownership. The findings are robust to alternative specifications, endogeneity and selection checks. Overall, our study contributes to research on executive compensation and environmental governance by suggesting that tournament incentive structures can serve as an internal governance mechanism linked to an operational, measurable environmental outcome. |
| Keywords | Tournament incentives, executive compensation, waste generation, environmental performance, corporate governance |
| Year | 2026 |
| Conference | 48th Annual Congress of the European Accounting Association |
| Publisher | European Accounting Association (EAA) |