Principal–agent analysis with one agent and two principals: European Union trade negotiations with South Africa

Frennhoff Larsen, M. 2007. Principal–agent analysis with one agent and two principals: European Union trade negotiations with South Africa. Politics & Policy. 35 (3), pp. 440-463.

TitlePrincipal–agent analysis with one agent and two principals: European Union trade negotiations with South Africa
AuthorsFrennhoff Larsen, M.
Abstract

This article explores the utility of using principal–agent analysis—both at the level of the Commission and the European Union (EU) as a whole—to explain EU decision making in the negotiations between the European Union and South Africa that led to the Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement of 1999. The article argues that the internal Commission negotiations, which are often overlooked in analyses of EU trade negotiations, need to be analyzed. It demonstrates that both the initial EU agenda and the final agreement with South Africa were heavily influenced by those Directorates-General (DGs) most affected by these policy decisions. Moreover, the EU negotiators, who had developmental interests because of their location within DG Development, were particularly influential.

JournalPolitics & Policy
Journal citation35 (3), pp. 440-463
ISSN1555-5623
YearSep 2007
PublisherWiley
Digital Object Identifier (DOI)doi:10.1111/j.1747-1346.2007.00068.x
Publication dates
PublishedSep 2007

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