Abstract | This paper advances neo-institutional theory and upper echelons perspectives by proposing a multi-dimensional model for exploring executive remuneration decision-making. Drawing on qualitative research in the UK, the model integrates institutional isomorphism with the lenses of accountability, diversity, independence, and professionalization. The dynamic interaction of normative, coercive, and mimetic isomorphic forces shapes executive remuneration practices, creating a status-quo-preserving “No-Come-In” effect. The model incorporates public/societal accountability, examines the role of diversity in remuneration committees, explores the gap between independent advice and context-specific decision-making, and scrutinizes the idea of professionalizing executive remuneration decision-making. Overarching the model is upper echelons theory, explaining why remuneration committee members welcome certain aspects of diversity while avoiding value dilution. This comprehensive framework provides a foundation for future research, policy development, and practical application in the field of executive remuneration and its regulation, offering insights into the complex factors shaping executive pay practices. |
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