| Abstract | Naval policymaking in the 1920s was a significant political battleground both then and in subsequent memoirs. This policy environment was shaped externally by Inter-Allied debts, the Washington agreement of 1922, and pro-disarmament public opinion. Internally, the arenas of policy conflict were in Parliament between the three major parties, and within Whitehall around the Cabinet/Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) complex and in the relationship between the Treasury and the Admiralty. These factors all impacted on the major naval controversies of the decade: the building of the Singapore base; conflicts over naval expenditure and cruiser-building programmes; and the handling and aftermath of the 1927 Geneva naval conference. Examination of these episodes leads to three main conclusions. First, these naval controversies need to be understood in their own terms, not refracted through the prism of the Second World War. Second, the Treasury did not significantly constrain naval policymaking, yet nor did it or the CID effectively co-ordinate it either. And naval policy shaped public opinion more than the other way round. Finally, the Washington agreement had path-dependent effects on naval policy, not least by producing a focus on ship requirements and parities, rather than arms control and overall security. |
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